Two defects left behind by #948 made sanctioned multi-client operation
impossible. They are inseparable: fixing either alone still leaves the
multi-client canary unable to run.
1. Client-identity environment keys were not recognized.
gitea_mcp_server reads GITEA_MCP_CLIENT, GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_INSTANCE and
GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_SESSION as the authoritative client-identity inputs for
worker registration, but none of the three appeared in
RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS or matched a recognized prefix. The runtime
diagnostic scans every peer mcp_server.py process environment and classifies
any unlisted GITEA_* key as an unsupported override, which is raised as a
runtime blocker, so gitea_resolve_task_capability returned
blocker_kind=runtime_reconnect_required with stop_required=true. Because that
resolver is the mandatory preflight for every author, reviewer and merger
mutation, setting the very variable #948 requires closed the mutation gate
for the whole fleet, and reconnecting could not clear it: the variable is
re-exported from the client's server definition on every launch.
The three keys are now named individually in the recognized-key set. No
prefix is added, so an unrecognized GITEA_* override is still refused
exactly as before.
A related inconsistency in the same path is also fixed. The diagnostic
reasons are raised as one RuntimeError, but the preflight re-raise
recognized only "stale-runtime:", so an "unsupported-env:" reason was
silently swallowed there while still failing the resolver. Both reason
families now live in RUNTIME_DIAGNOSTIC_HARD_PREFIXES beside the function
that produces them, and both propagate identically. This only widens what is
refused, never what is permitted.
2. WorkerRegistry.heartbeat() had no production caller.
#948 delivered heartbeat() but only tests called it. The single production
writer registers once per process behind an attempted-once flag, and
register() stamps the same timestamp into both started_at and
last_heartbeat_at. Nothing advanced it afterwards: no lifespan hook, no
background task, no atexit handler in a process that blocks in mcp.run().
Since liveness is age against heartbeat_ttl_seconds, that TTL was not a
liveness window at all but a hard cap on how long any client could stay
attached; at 900 seconds a healthy, connected, client-managed process became
session_ownership=unowned with blocker_kind=session_attachment_missing.
WorkerHeartbeatSupervisor in mcp_worker_identity is the missing caller,
started from _active_worker_identity() at the moment register() succeeds,
because that is the only point where identity and fencing_epoch are both
known. It is a daemon thread rather than an asyncio task or a request-driven
refresh because renewal must survive an idle session, and because the
registry performs blocking BEGIN IMMEDIATE sqlite writes that must not run on
the server's event loop. daemon=True is deliberate: a hard kill takes the
thread with it, so a dead worker still goes stale on the normal TTL.
heartbeat_interval_for() returns one third of the TTL, hard-capped at one
half, so two consecutive beats can be lost without the row expiring and no
override can produce an interval that outlives the registration it renews.
heartbeat() gains optional keyword-only expectations (session, generation,
client name, pid); each supplied one must match the recorded row or the
renewal is refused with the existing BLOCKER_FENCED literal rather than a new
blocker_kind, since consumers switch on that value. Omitting them preserves
the pre-existing behavior exactly. Client names are compared normalized, so
several namespaces of one application stay one client while separate
applications stay distinct.
A terminal refusal stops the supervisor permanently and records why, so a
fenced session can never beat its way back into ownership. A transient
failure is counted and beating continues. An atexit hook stops it on orderly
shutdown. status() is surfaced read-only as worker_heartbeat on
gitea_get_runtime_context so a stopped heartbeat is diagnosable before the
TTL turns it into session_attachment_missing; it grants nothing.
claim_generation() still has no production caller. It bumps fencing_epoch,
which would fence the supervisor's cached epoch, and the strict refusal is
left in place deliberately: auto-re-adopting a bumped epoch would defeat
fencing.
No lock or lease TTL is changed, including the author issue-lock TTL, and no
mutation refused today becomes permitted.
Tests: tests/test_issue_975_client_identity_heartbeat.py adds 40 focused tests
covering all 13 acceptance criteria. Every TTL assertion uses an injected
clock; no test waits for a real TTL. The thread-loop tests use a
millisecond-scale interval with bounded polling.
Focused: 40 passed, 15 subtests passed.
Full suite from inside the branches worktree: 28 failed, 6105 passed, 6 skipped,
1105 subtests — an identical failure set to the 324a0c8a baseline measured in a
sibling branches worktree (28 failed, 6065 passed, 1090 subtests). Zero new
failures; the delta is exactly the added tests.
Closes #975
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Gitea Tools
A collection of Python scripts and an MCP server to automate interactions with Gitea instances.
Supported Instances
| Remote | Host | Org / Repo |
|---|---|---|
dadeschools |
gitea.dadeschools.net |
Contractor / Timesheet |
prgs |
gitea.prgs.cc |
Scaled-Tech-Consulting / Timesheet |
Authentication
Authentication is configured via environment variables or a local .env file in the repository root (uses python-dotenv).
Create a .env file in the project root:
# Option A: Gitea Personal Access Tokens (Recommended)
GITEA_TOKEN_DADESCHOOLS="your_token_here"
GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS="your_token_here"
# Option B: Gitea Username & Password (fallback)
GITEA_USER_DADESCHOOLS="username"
GITEA_PASS_DADESCHOOLS="password"
GITEA_USER_PRGS="username"
GITEA_PASS_PRGS="password"
# Optional: Fallback to macOS Keychain (via git credential fill)
# GITEA_USE_KEYCHAIN=1
MCP Server (Recommended)
The Gitea-Tools MCP server exposes all functionality as structured tool calls. Any MCP-compatible agent (Antigravity, Claude Code, etc.) can call these tools natively.
Available Tools
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
gitea_create_issue |
Create an issue with title, body, remote |
gitea_create_pr |
Open a pull request with title, head, base |
gitea_edit_pr |
Edit details of an existing pull request |
gitea_list_prs |
List pull requests with state/remote |
gitea_view_pr |
Get full details of a single pull request |
gitea_merge_pr |
Gated merge: merge/squash/rebase only after identity+profile+eligibility gates pass, explicit confirmation="MERGE PR <n>", optional head-SHA and changed-files pinning (no self-merge, no force) |
gitea_review_pr |
Legacy wrapper for gitea_submit_pr_review (merging disabled) |
gitea_delete_branch |
Delete a remote branch |
gitea_close_issue |
Close an issue by number |
gitea_list_issues |
List issues with state/label filters |
gitea_view_issue |
Get full details of a single issue |
gitea_whoami |
Read-only: identify the authenticated Gitea account (safe metadata only) |
gitea_get_profile |
Read-only: describe the active runtime execution profile (safe metadata only) |
gitea_check_pr_eligibility |
Read-only: check if the current identity/profile may review/approve/request_changes/merge a PR |
gitea_assess_conflict_fix_classification |
Read-only: classify conflict-fix need from a live PR head re-fetch before creating a conflict-fix worktree |
gitea_submit_pr_review |
Gated review mutation: comment/approve/request_changes, only after identity+profile+eligibility gates pass (no merge, no self-approval) |
gitea_mark_issue |
Claim/release an issue (start/done) |
gitea_list_labels |
List all available labels in a repository |
gitea_create_label |
Create a new label with custom color |
gitea_set_issue_labels |
Replace all labels on an issue |
gitea_get_file |
Retrieve file content and SHA metadata |
gitea_commit_files |
Commit changes to multiple files atomically |
gitea_mirror_refs |
Mirror branches + tags between instances |
Setup
1. Install dependencies
cd /Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools
python3 -m venv venv # skip if venv already exists
source venv/bin/activate
pip install "mcp[cli]"
2. Configure your AI client
The MCP server uses stdio transport — each client starts it as a subprocess. Add the config below to your client, then restart it.
Antigravity (Google)
Add to ~/.gemini/antigravity-ide/mcp_config.json inside "mcpServers":
"gitea-tools": {
"command": "/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/venv/bin/python3",
"args": ["/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/mcp_server.py"],
"env": {}
}
Restart Antigravity to load the server. Tools appear as lazy-loaded MCP tools
(call via call_mcp_tool with ServerName: "gitea-tools").
Claude Code (Anthropic)
Add to ~/.claude.json (global) or .mcp.json in the project root:
{
"mcpServers": {
"gitea-tools": {
"command": "/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/venv/bin/python3",
"args": ["/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/mcp_server.py"]
}
}
}
Restart Claude Code. Tools appear as mcp__gitea-tools__gitea_create_issue, etc.
Any MCP-compatible client
The server is a standard MCP stdio server. Point your client at:
- Command:
/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/venv/bin/python3 - Args:
["/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/mcp_server.py"] - Transport:
stdio
No environment variables needed — auth is handled via macOS keychain.
Runtime profiles (multiple env-configured entries)
The same server can run as separate MCP entries, each authenticating as its own Gitea token and carrying its own profile name. This keeps roles task-scoped: the profile is the role, not the LLM. Point each entry at a different gitignored env file.
{
"mcpServers": {
"gitea-tools-reviewer": {
"command": "/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/venv/bin/python3",
"args": ["/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/mcp_server.py"],
"env": {
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"
}
},
"gitea-tools-merger": {
"command": "/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/venv/bin/python3",
"args": ["/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/mcp_server.py"],
"env": {
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"
}
}
}
}
Recognized environment fields (see .env.example for placeholders):
| Variable | Purpose |
|---|---|
GITEA_TOKEN |
API token for this runtime. Read only by the auth layer; never returned, logged, or committed. |
GITEA_PROFILE_NAME |
Non-secret label for the running profile (e.g. gitea-reviewer). Surfaced by gitea_whoami. |
GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS |
Optional, comma-separated operation categories (descriptive metadata only for now). |
GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS |
Optional, comma-separated categories this profile must not perform (descriptive). |
GITEA_AUDIT_LABEL |
Optional short label for this runtime, for audit purposes. |
GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE |
Optional name of the token source (e.g. an env var name). A name only — never the token value. |
GITEA_BASE_URL |
Optional informational base URL. |
GITEA_AUDIT_LOG |
Optional path to an audit log file. When set, mutating actions append one redacted JSON record each (profile + authenticated user + outcome). Unset ⇒ auditing off (no records, no extra API calls). |
GITEA_MCP_CONFIG |
Optional path to a JSON file defining multiple named runtime profiles. Unset ⇒ pure env behaviour. |
GITEA_MCP_PROFILE |
Name of the profile (from GITEA_MCP_CONFIG) to activate for this runtime. |
External MCP Control Plane servers
Jenkins and GlitchTip are separate MCP trust boundaries, not tools inside this
Gitea MCP runtime. Register them as jenkins-mcp and glitchtip-mcp in the
client that will use them, then reconnect or reload the client and verify the
expected tools are visible before claiming readiness. See
docs/mcp-client-registration.md.
Notes:
- This provides one token + one profile per process. It does not implement multi-token switching inside a single runtime, nor any approve/merge/eligibility gating — those are later roadmap items (#14–#18).
- Profile name and allowed operations are metadata only; the token value is
never part of any tool output.
gitea_whoamireturns the profile name, andgitea_get_profilereturns the full non-secret profile metadata so a workflow can inspect which runtime it is talking to before deciding to act. - See
docs/gitea-execution-profiles.mdfor the full profile model, anddocs/llm-workflow-runbooks.mdfor the task-scoped, profile-based runbooks (create/review/merge/close, thin launchers, migration, fail-closed rules). - For the portable version of this workflow (issue-first, isolated
worktrees, no self-review/merge, profile safety, cleanup, fail-closed) that
can be copied into any project, see the reusable skill
skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md. - Audit logging (#18): mutating actions emit a durable, redacted JSON audit
record — timestamp, action, result (
allowed/blocked/failed/succeeded), profile name + audit label, authenticated username, target repo/issue/PR, branch and head SHA where applicable — whenGITEA_AUDIT_LOGis set. Auditing is off by default and never adds API calls or breaks the action when off. Seegitea_audit.py.
Canonical runtime profiles (#19). Define every Gitea profile once, in a
canonical JSON file, and keep each LLM launcher (Claude / Gemini / Codex) a
thin pointer at it — no duplicated GITEA_USER_* / GITEA_PASS_* blocks and
no raw tokens in client configs. See gitea-mcp.example.json,
loaded by gitea_config.py.
Canonical profile file (e.g. ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json):
{
"version": 1,
"profiles": {
"prgs": {
"base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
"username": "jcwalker3",
"auth": { "type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-gitea-token" },
"default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
"execution_profile": "personal-prgs"
},
"mdcps": {
"base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
"username": "913443",
"auth": { "type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_MDCPS" },
"execution_profile": "mdcps"
},
"mdcps-reviewer": {
"base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
"username": "913443",
"auth": { "type": "keychain", "id": "mdcps.gitea.reviewer.token" },
"execution_profile": "mdcps-reviewer"
}
}
}
Thin LLM launcher (Claude / Gemini / Codex) — only two env vars, no secrets:
"gitea-tools": {
"command": "/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/venv/bin/python3",
"args": ["/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/mcp_server.py"],
"env": {
"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": "/Users/jasonwalker/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json",
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs"
}
}
- Secrets by reference only: a profile's
authnames where the token lives —{ "type": "keychain", "id": "..." }(macOS keychain) or{ "type": "env", "name": "..." }(env var). Inlinetoken/passwordkeys are rejected. The value is resolved on demand and never stored in, returned by, or logged as profile metadata. - Precedence: explicit process env vars (
GITEA_PROFILE_NAME,GITEA_BASE_URL,GITEA_TOKEN, …) override the JSON profile; the JSON profile only fills what the environment leaves unset. - Backwards compatible / fail-safe: with
GITEA_MCP_CONFIGunset, behaviour is exactly the legacy env-only mode. A missing file, invalid JSON, unsupportedversion, unknown/unset selected profile, or unresolvable secret reference raises a clear startup error that never prints file contents, tokens, or passwords. Parsing makes no network calls.
Migrating from duplicated GITEA_PASS_* blocks. Move each instance's
credentials into one canonical profile entry (referencing a keychain id or env
var for the secret), then delete the GITEA_USER_* / GITEA_PASS_* /
GITEA_SITE_* blocks from every LLM mcp_config.json, leaving only
GITEA_MCP_CONFIG + GITEA_MCP_PROFILE. Existing env-only setups keep working
unchanged until migrated.
Interactive setup — no hand-editing JSON. Run the menu to create/edit/ validate profiles, store a token in the macOS keychain (never echoed or written to any config), test a profile's authentication, print the authenticated user, check reviewer eligibility for a PR, and generate ready-to-paste launcher snippets for Claude / Gemini / Codex:
./scripts/gitea-config-menu
The generated launcher snippets contain only command, args,
GITEA_MCP_CONFIG, and GITEA_MCP_PROFILE — never a token or password.
Portable LLM workflow skill
Reusable LLM operating rules are packaged as a portable skill at
skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md.
It documents issue-first work, isolated branch worktrees, no self-review or
self-merge, profile safety, fail-closed behavior, merge cleanup, and recovery
patterns. Copy the skills/llm-project-workflow/ directory into other projects
that should use the same workflow.
Codex / non-MCP tools
OpenAI Codex and other tools that don't support MCP can use the CLI scripts directly. See the CLI Scripts section below.
# Example: Codex can shell out to the scripts
python3 /Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/create_issue.py \
--remote prgs --title "Bug report" --body "Details here"
CLI Scripts
The MCP tools can also be used as standalone CLI scripts:
| Script | Description |
|---|---|
create_issue.py |
Create an issue (--remote, --title, --body, --body-file) |
create_pr.py |
Open a Pull Request (--remote, --title, --head, --base) |
edit_pr.py |
Edit a Pull Request (--title, --body, --body-file, etc.) |
review_pr.py |
Review/sign-off on a pull request (--merge is disabled — fails closed; merge only via gated gitea_merge_pr) |
close_issue.py |
Close a specific issue |
mark_issue.py |
Claim/release an issue via status:in-progress label |
manage_labels.py |
Create label set and apply label mappings (--dry to preview) |
mirror_refs.sh |
Mirror branches + tags between dadeschools ⇄ prgs |
Quick Examples
# Create an issue
./create_issue.py --title "Fix PDF output" --body "Blank on Safari"
# Create an issue on the prgs instance
./create_issue.py --remote prgs --title "Add tests" --body-file description.md
# Create a PR
./create_pr.py --title "feat: add validation" --head feat/validation --body "Closes #12"
# Edit a PR's description or title
./edit_pr.py 155 --body "Updated description wording"
# Review and approve a PR (review only — CLI merge is disabled; use the
# gated gitea_merge_pr MCP workflow to merge)
./review_pr.py --pr-number 12 --event APPROVE --body "Approved"
# Close issue #5
./close_issue.py 5
# Claim an issue before working on it
./mark_issue.py 10 start
# Release when done
./mark_issue.py 10 done
# Mirror refs (dry-run by default)
./mirror_refs.sh
# Actually push the refs
./mirror_refs.sh --apply
Use --help on any Python script or shell script for full usage details.
Architecture
gitea_auth.py ← shared auth & API helpers (get_credentials, api_request)
mcp_server.py ← MCP server (FastMCP, stdio transport)
create_issue.py ← CLI: create issues
create_pr.py ← CLI: create PRs
edit_pr.py ← CLI: edit PRs
review_pr.py ← CLI: review PRs
manage_labels.py ← CLI: label management
close_issue.py ← CLI: close issues
mark_issue.py ← CLI: claim/release issues
mirror_refs.sh ← CLI: ref mirroring
Tests
# Run with the venv (includes MCP SDK)
source venv/bin/activate
python3 -m pytest tests/ -v
| Test file | Covers |
|---|---|
test_mcp_server.py |
All 7 MCP tools: create, list, view, close, mark, PR, mirror |
test_create_issue.py |
CLI arg parsing, remote resolution, payload, auth, errors |
test_create_pr.py |
CLI arg parsing, remote resolution, payload, auth, errors |
test_credentials.py |
get_credentials(), get_auth_header(), repo_api_url() |
test_manage_labels.py |
Label create/skip, dry run, mapping, constant validation |
test_python_cli.py |
close_issue.py + mark_issue.py CLI validation |
test_mirror_refs.py |
Flags, safety defaults, local integration tests |
(Core suites — the table is non-exhaustive; see tests/ for the full set.)
All tests mock network and keychain access — no real API calls are made.
For how to write tests — mocking the API/auth safely, testing profile and
self-review/self-merge gates, no-secret regression expectations, and unit vs.
integration guidance — see
docs/developer-testing-guidelines.md.
Troubleshooting
macOS: com.apple.provenance blocks Python execution (#3)
On macOS Sequoia and later, files written by an agent/IDE terminal receive the
com.apple.provenance extended attribute, and macOS blocks Python.app from
executing such files. Symptoms: newly created/restored .py files fail to
run (e.g. create_issue.py "vanishing" or refusing to execute), while shell
scripts and files created before the session are unaffected. This is a macOS
security feature, not a bug in this project's code.
Workarounds (run from a terminal with Full Disk Access, e.g. Terminal.app
— not the IDE terminal, or the removal itself may be blocked):
# Preferred: strip only com.apple.provenance under the repo (dry-run first)
./scripts/clear-provenance --dry-run
./scripts/clear-provenance
# Or a single file
./scripts/clear-provenance /path/to/file.py
# Manual equivalents
xattr -r -d com.apple.provenance /Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/
xattr -cr /Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/ # clears ALL xattrs
Alternatively, grant Full Disk Access to the terminal app in
System Settings → Privacy & Security. scripts/clear-provenance removes only
com.apple.provenance (leaving other extended attributes intact) and supports
--dry-run.