gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree referenced four globals that commit
a942afe (#850) introduced without ever defining:
_active_username 1 reference, 0 definitions
_active_profile_name 1 reference, 0 definitions
_current_session_id 1 reference, 0 definitions
_author_mutation_block 1 reference, 0 definitions
Evaluating the call arguments therefore raised
NameError: name '_active_username' is not defined
before author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree was entered, so
the capability was unusable for every caller including dry_run=true. The fourth
name, _author_mutation_block, sits on the reviewer-stop refusal path and was
found by the generalised regression test rather than by the original report.
The defect was unreachable until PR #942 (#941) wired the bootstrap scope into
workflow_scope_guard: before that, verify_preflight_purity refused first with
missing_issue_worktree, masking it.
Changes:
* _active_username reads the immutable #714 session context that gitea_whoami
seeds — the identity pin every other mutation gate already consults. An
unbound context returns None so callers fail closed rather than acting as an
unverified actor; a profile's expected_username is never substituted.
* _active_profile_name prefers the live get_profile() and falls back to the
bound session context only when the profile cannot be read.
* _current_session_id mints the same "<profile>-<pid>-<hex>" shape as the three
pre-existing lease call sites, bound once per process so repeated calls
describe one session instead of a fresh owner per call, which would make
lease-ownership comparisons unsatisfiable. None is never memoised.
* _author_mutation_block returns the uniform refusal shape the other author
mutations already return for the same check_author_mutation_after_reviewer_stop
block.
No guard, signature, or permission changes. Wrong-role, wrong-profile,
wrong-identity, stale-runtime, expected-base and workflow-scope enforcement all
still gate the call; the helpers only supply values the service then validates
fail-closed (missing_active_identity / missing_active_profile /
missing_owner_session / stale_concurrency_pin).
Regression: tests/test_issue_943_runtime_context_helpers.py (27 tests). The
generalised test resolves every global the wrapper's body references against
module globals and builtins, so the next missing reference fails too rather
than only the three named here — that test is what found
_author_mutation_block. Coverage also coversdry-run reaching and completing the
service with helper-produced bindings, dry-run leaving no branch, worktree,
assignment or lease, apply reaching its intended transition, each fail-closed
mismatch, expected-base mismatch, and the #941/PR #942 scope wiring.
Pre-fix 20 failed / 13 passed against unmodified aab54d48; post-fix 27 passed.
Targeted bootstrap and guard suites: 245 passed, 59 subtests.
Full suite: 28 failed, 5552 passed, 6 skipped, 1006 subtests — the 28 are the
standing baseline, every one of which also fails on the unmodified base.
Closes#943
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013ygVZQLbbhJTChuVuLaJWb
PR #926 (#892) taught create_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout
to accept task_scope=author_issue_bootstrap and wired that canonical decision
into the #274 branches-only enforcer and the #604 anti-stomp preflight. A third
enforcement path was left unwired.
workflow_scope_guard kept its own copy of the clean-root author decision, gated
on create_issue_bootstrap.is_create_issue_task -- a task-name allowlist that
never contained bootstrap_author_issue_worktree. The real call path
gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree
-> verify_preflight_purity
-> _enforce_issue_scope_guard
-> workflow_scope_guard.assess_production_mutation_guards
therefore raised ProductionGuardError(missing_issue_worktree) before
assess_author_issue_bootstrap was ever consulted, leaving the #892 deadlock
partially present and blocking issue #931.
Changes:
* workflow_scope_guard.assess_root_source_mutation accepts the server-derived
bootstrap_assessment and, for the clean-root author case, consults the
canonical bootstrap_permits_control_checkout decision instead of a local
task-name allowlist. The create_issue arm is unchanged.
* workflow_scope_guard.assess_production_mutation_guards forwards the evidence.
* _enforce_issue_scope_guard accepts and threads the same assessment the #274
and #604 guards already consume, so all three judge identical evidence, and
waives the pre-ownership issue-lock requirement for the bootstrap task via
that same canonical decision rather than a second task-name allowlist.
* verify_preflight_purity passes the once-computed assessment at both sites.
The waiver cannot widen: the predicate fails closed on missing, malformed,
cross-scope, dirty, drifted, or wrongly bound evidence, so ordinary author
source and test mutation from the control checkout stays forbidden and the
#274/#604/#618/#683 protections are unchanged.
Regression: tests/test_issue_941_scope_guard_bootstrap_wiring.py drives the
real enforcer rather than the authorization helper in isolation, which is why
#892's own predicate tests passed while the live bootstrap stayed blocked.
Closes#941
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Add docs/remote-mcp/coupling-inventory.md, the blocking first child of epic
#929. It enumerates every place gitea_mcp_server.py and its supporting modules
depend on being a local, client-spawned, stdio-attached process on the
operator's machine.
62 entries across the seven required categories: transport bind, launch
provenance, role binding, credentials, runtime freshness, local filesystem,
and durable state. Each entry carries a file and line anchor resolving at
7bf4f12584, states what the code assumes today
and what it would observe on a remote host, is classified as portable as
written / needs a seam / needs a replacement / cannot be remote, and is
assigned to exactly one epic child. Every child from #931 through #939 is
named by at least one entry. Summary tables count entries per category, per
classification, per category-by-classification, and per child.
Documentation only. No server behavior changes.
Closes#930
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvJz7bUz5CkZgUxq8twHMz
Align assess_author_issue_bootstrap with bootstrap_permits_control_checkout
so gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree can create the first branches/
worktree without the lock↔worktree deadlock.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
B1: classify_attention_event uses structured flags/category only — never
substring-match human-authored title/summary for escalation.
B2: make notification ids unique across probe_errors and collisions
(include loop index / kind).
B3: do not assign probe_errors to fetch_error (avoids false Fetch Warning
and double-reporting).
Regression tests cover all three blockers.
Refs #648
Keep notifications (#648) routes and nav alongside master requests (#643)
and other base updates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Keep #644 recovery console actions and #643 initiate_workflow side by side
in console_authz and authz audit docs after merging latest master.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Reviewer REQUEST_CHANGES on PR #903 at head 1c88b87 raised five blockers, all
reproduced by executing that head. The shared shape: a write path that declared
itself gated, audited, and verified, but never armed the gate, mutated a copy of
the state it claimed to fix, and then verified against that same copy.
B1 - the apply path never asked the execution gate.
execute_recovery_playbook called console_authz.authorize with the default
for_execution=False, and the phase branch only fires when it is True. ACTIVE_PHASE
is 1 and every new action is phase 2, so an operator executed a phase-2 write
through POST /api/v1/system/recovery/apply while build_recovery_preview reported
execution_enabled false. The call now passes for_execution=True and surfaces the
phase_not_active refusal. Preview reports the same decision under
execution_authorization / execution_blocked_reason instead of a hardcoded False it
could not explain.
B2 - both env playbooks mutated a discarded copy and verified against it.
source_env = dict(os.environ) meant clear_stale_binding and rebind_session_worktree
never touched the running process, and verify_post_recovery(env=source_env)
re-diagnosed the same copy, confirming a change that had not happened. Mutations
now target the live mapping (apply_recovery's sanctioned env=None -> os.environ
path, #702 AC2) and verification re-reads state rather than the mutated input.
binding_before / binding_after / binding_changed are returned, and a playbook that
changed nothing reports performed: false. verify_post_recovery no longer reads an
unverified_inherited binding as clean, because unproven is not clean.
B3 - the reconcile playbook called a function that does not exist.
merged_cleanup_reconcile.reconcile_merged_cleanups is absent from that module and a
bare except turned the AttributeError into a generic failure, so the playbook could
never succeed. It now calls gitea_mcp_server.gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups, the
real orchestrator, imported lazily; failures carry error_type. task_capability_map
declared gitea.pr.close for reconcile_cleanups while the entry point gates on
gitea.read; the two authority statements are reconciled to the one that is enforced.
B4 - the #630 contamination integration could not block.
assess_contamination_gate was fed marker=None, which short-circuits to block: False
on its first statement; the task passed was a console action id outside
CONTAMINATION_GATED_TASKS; and the result was read through a "contaminated" key the
gate never returns, making STATUS_BLOCKED_CONTAMINATION unreachable. The live marker
now comes from the #641 session inventory reader, the gated task key
console_recovery_apply is added to CONTAMINATION_GATED_TASKS, every read uses the
"block" key the gate actually returns, and the marker is forwarded to
sanctioned_restart.execute_restart so a restart cannot launder a contaminated
runtime. The reconciler cleanup playbook stays exempt as the designated remedy.
B5 - the parity baseline was captured from the head it was compared against.
capture_startup_parity(root, head=checkout_head) stores the head verbatim, so
in_parity was structurally incapable of being false, and live_remote_head was never
passed. The baseline is now the daemon start head that assess_stale_runtime already
returns, and the #610 live-remote dimension is restored.
Also: _recovery_card was the one renderer in system_health_views.py interpolating
without _esc(), and it is where a marker's operator-supplied command_summary lands
once B4 is wired; it now escapes, including the except branch. Docs no longer claim
apply enforces master parity or that verify asserts clean: true, and the absolute
file:///Users/... links are relative.
Tests: the two that asserted the defects as intended are inverted -
test_api_recovery_apply_with_dev_auth asserted the phase-gate bypass, and the rebind
test asserted the input echoed back. Added coverage per blocker, including a no-op
detection test that fails when a playbook reports success without changing anything,
the previously untested reconcile playbook, contamination block and remedy-exemption
tests, and parity baseline/live-remote tests. Both new guards were mutation-verified:
disarming for_execution fails 2 tests, restoring the env copy fails 2 tests.
Validation: WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE=1 ../../venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q from
branches/feat-issue-644 gives 27 failed / 5291 passed / 6 skipped / 953 subtests;
the same command from branches/baseline-master-76f293e at 76f293eb28 gives
28 failed / 5262 passed / 6 skipped / 926 subtests. Suites run one at a time.
comm of the sorted FAILED lines shows no new signature at the head. The single
absent signature, test_workspace_guard_alignment.py::
TestRuntimeContextGuardAlignment::test_declared_branches_worktree_passes_when_mcp_root_differs,
is suite-order dependent: that file passes 9/9 in isolation at both revisions.
Closes#644
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Add recovery_playbook.py with the narrow-to-broad recovery ladder, symptom
routing, attempt-log helpers, and escalation metrics. Wire the attempt-log
gate into restart_coordinator so rolling/full/host restarts require prior
insufficient narrower attempts (or break-glass). Document the ladder and
update gitea_request_mcp_restart for prior_recovery_attempts_json.
Co-Authored-By: Grok 4.5 <[email protected]>
Records the two GET routes, what each panel consumes, and the three
properties the surface is held to: an unreadable source reports
unavailable rather than green, authorization is probed with
for_execution=True so a Phase 1 refusal is never shown as an allow, and
the control-plane database is opened mode=ro so reading status never
creates it.
Refs #655#642#658#661#662#663#633#652#653#664
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Add a Phase 3 read-only console that resolves issue↔PR linkage with
evidence (closes keyword, branch marker, body mention), surfaces the
latest canonical handoff for a focused thread, and deep-links to Gitea
only under the admin reveal opt-in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Addresses both blockers from the PR #902 review (review 589) for issue #643.
B1 — an allocator-created assignment could be orphaned and reported as no
mutation.
apply_request re-previews, then re-runs the allocator with apply=True. The CAS
fingerprint hashes only {kind, number} plus exclusions, so a competing lease
taken on the requested unit inside the window leaves the fingerprint identical:
the pin passes, the selection loop skips the now-claimed unit and commits an
assignment on the *next* one, and _selection_matches then fails on egress. The
old code returned mutation_performed False with that lease still committed and
owned by a synthetic session nothing heartbeats. The window contains a second
full load_queue_snapshot(), so it is seconds wide, and foreign sessions acting
on this repo concurrently are an observed condition.
The egress mismatch now releases the assignment the allocator created before
refusing. When the release succeeds the refusal reports mutation_performed
False and a compensation record; when it fails the response carries
mutation_performed True, an explicit orphaned_assignment, and a
gitea_release_workflow_lease reclaim action, because claiming nothing changed
while a lease is live is the defect rather than a report of it.
The same state was reachable through _run_allocator's bare except Exception:
allocate_next_work only catches InvalidWorkKindError, LeaseRequiredError and
ControlPlaneError, so anything raised after assign_and_lease committed arrived
as "no result" with a durable lease. A None result on the apply path now sweeps
and releases whatever this flow's session owns. That sweep is only possible
because of the B2 fix below — the session id is now stable across the flow, so
the lease is findable.
B2 — the "read-only" preview wrote to the control-plane DB.
allocate_next_work called db.upsert_session and db.expire_stale_leases
unconditionally, before the apply branch was consulted, and default_allocator
minted a fresh webui-request-<hex> per call. Every preview therefore appended a
never-reused session row and mutated global lease state while the payload said
dry_run True / mutation_performed False, driven by an operator refreshing a
form. One apply wrote two rows and bound the lease to the second, which is why
B1's orphan had no reclaimable owner.
allocate_next_work gains a keyword-only side_effect_free flag, default False so
every existing caller is byte-for-byte unchanged. Under the flag both writes are
suppressed and expired leases are instead filtered out of the claim map in
memory, which reaches the same selection the sweep would have produced without
persisting anything; a claim whose expiry cannot be parsed is kept, since an
unreadable expiry is not evidence that work is free. side_effect_free with
apply=True fails closed rather than silently reserving. request_service mints
one session id per request flow and threads it through both the dry-run and the
apply, and the dry-run now routes through the side-effect-free path.
Coverage.
test_allocator_drift_on_apply_is_not_read_as_an_assignment asserted the defect —
it built the orphan state and then required mutation_performed to be False, which
a leak satisfies. It now requires the compensating release. Added: release-failure
surfacing a reclaim action, an assignment with no lease id, the post-commit
exception route, and session-id identity across the flow. The two areas the review
named as having zero coverage now have it: default_allocator past its two
fail-closed early returns (side_effect_free routing, session-id pass-through and
minting, scope and fingerprint propagation) and default_claims_source (scoped
read, and an unreadable substrate denying rather than reading as "nothing
claimed"). allocator_service gains side-effect-free tests against a real
temp-file DB plus the expiry-filter unit tests.
Every new guard was mutation-tested by reverting it one at a time: B1
compensation removed → 3 failures; post-commit sweep removed → 1; session id
re-minted per call → 2; side_effect_free ignored → 3; in-memory expiry filter
removed → 1.
Verification: WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE=1 python -m pytest tests/ -q from this
branches/ worktree gives 23 failed, 5263 passed, 6 skipped, 899 subtests. The
sorted FAILED set is identical to the reviewer's clean-master baseline at
2f4dec83 (23 failed, 5190 passed) — no new, changed, or disappeared failure —
and 21 tests were added over the reviewed head's 5242. Zero conflict markers;
py_compile passes; git diff --check clean.
Refs #643, PR #902
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V6xFqovhbArPv61j9KCGkL
Addresses the two blockers raised in the PR #886 review (comment 16559) for
issue #663.
B1 — apply_authorized ignored restart-class authorization.
The #663 restart-class matrix and the #661 drain-proof hard gate are
independent authorizations that first coexisted when PR #882 landed on
master and this branch merged it. The union preserved both, but the apply
decision consulted only the drain gate:
payload["apply_authorized"] = gate.allow
so a clean drain proof — or an authorized break-glass, which needs no proof
at all — reported apply_authorized: True for a class the least-privilege
matrix had just denied, in the same payload carrying allow_restart: False
and "role 'author' may not request full_mcp_restart". One environment
variable therefore collapsed the whole nine-class matrix for the apply
decision, including host_restart.
The apply decision is now the conjunction of both authorizations, and
apply_gate carries drain_gate_allow and restart_class_authorized so a denial
is attributable to the authorization that produced it. Break-glass keeps its
purpose — bypassing the drain proof — and never bypasses the class matrix.
No existing fail-closed behaviour is weakened: allow_restart, drain-proof
verification, fingerprint binding, and requester authorization are untouched.
B2 — docs/mcp-restart-coordinator.md described pre-#661 behaviour.
The document still called the drain proof "a separate child" and omitted
drain_proof_json and request_break_glass from the published signature, so a
safety document asserted there was no gate where a gate now exists. It now
documents both parameters, states that the gate executes inside this tool,
and records dry-run versus apply behaviour, authorization ordering, the
break-glass scope, and fail-closed conditions as implemented.
Regression coverage.
tests/test_issue_886_apply_authorization_conjunction.py exercises the MCP
tool itself, which previously had no test at all — that absence is why the
defect shipped. It pins both conjunction directions, proves a clean proof
cannot override a role, approval, unknown-class, or missing-target denial,
proves break-glass does not collapse the matrix for any worker role or
restricted class, and proves the existing scoped and unscoped paths and the
#661 denials still hold. Against the pre-fix tree 24 of these fail; against
this commit all 19 pass with 45 subtests.
tests/test_mcp_restart_governance_docs.py now binds the published signature
to inspect.signature() of the real tool and forbids the stale pre-#661
phrasing, so the drift that produced B2 cannot return unnoticed.
Verification: targeted restart/drain/governance/webui suites 194 passed,
113 subtests. Full suite 23 failed, 5230 passed, 6 skipped, 912 subtests —
the failure set is identical to the reviewed baseline at 9bc021e
(23 failed, 5201 passed), with +29 passing from the added tests and no new
or changed failure. Zero conflict markers; py_compile passes; the #882
union remains intact in both directions.
Refs #663, PR #886
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V6xFqovhbArPv61j9KCGkL
Operators had to paste a role prompt into a terminal to start work, and
nothing enforced that the allocator had been consulted first, so two sessions
could reach for the same issue and each believe it was theirs. This adds a
request surface: a desired role, an issue or PR, and a stated intent, answered
by an authorization decision and - on confirmation - an exclusive assignment
from the allocator.
Preview (POST /api/v1/requests/preview, and the /requests form) runs five
checks and reports authorize/deny with a reason for each: console
authorization, capability resolution for the desired role, lease availability,
whether the allocator would independently select this work unit, and head
pinning for PR work. It is read-only - it calls the allocator with apply=false
and writes only an audit line. An unauthorized principal never reaches the
allocator or the control-plane DB, so a denial cannot enumerate the queue.
Initiation (POST /api/v1/requests/apply) never assigns the requested item
directly. It runs a dry-run first and proceeds only when the allocator would
independently pick that exact work unit, carrying the dry-run's
candidate_set_fingerprint as a CAS pin; otherwise it returns wait or blocked
and mutates nothing. An active claim on the work unit rejects a duplicate
assign before one is attempted. A returned assignment carries a handoff block
naming the required profile, namespace, and the actions that stay forbidden.
Authorization reuses the #633 model rather than adding a second one. The new
initiate_workflow action is operator-class because its outcome is a claim, not
a Gitea verdict: requesting reviewer or merger work reserves that work but
grants no right to approve or merge. Execution is gated by a new per-action
execution_env_flag (WEBUI_REQUESTS_EXECUTION), deliberately in place of raising
ACTIVE_PHASE - a phase bump would enable execution for every phase-2 action at
once, including ones whose execution path is not implemented. Actions that
declare no flag are unchanged and still report execution_enabled false.
Every preview and apply emits a console audit record correlated to the
resulting assignment by correlation.request_id.
Fail-closed throughout: an unreadable control-plane DB, an incomplete queue
inventory (#758), an allocator that raises, an unpinned PR head, a moved PR
head, and an unconfirmed apply all deny without mutating.
Files:
- webui/request_service.py (new) - request model, preview, initiation
- webui/request_views.py (new) - form and preview rendering, escaped
- tests/test_webui_request_initiation.py (new) - 52 tests
- webui/console_authz.py - initiate_workflow action, execution_wired()
- webui/app.py - /requests, /api/v1/requests/preview, /api/v1/requests/apply
- webui/nav.py - Requests nav entry
- webui/traffic_loader.py - public candidates_from_queue_snapshot alias
- docs/webui-requests.md (new), docs/webui-authz-audit.md
Validation: full suite on this branch 5242 passed, 6 skipped, 899 subtests, 23
failed. Clean master baseline at 2f4dec83 in an equivalent branches/ worktree:
5190 passed, 6 skipped, 867 subtests, the same 23 tests failed. The branch adds
52 passing tests and introduces no new full-suite failure signature.
Closes#643
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Stale-runtime and runtime-mode mutation refusals previously shared the
permission-denial channel, so permission_report claimed a missing op the
active profile already held and recommended gitea_activate_profile.
Typed blocker_kind payloads report reconnect-only recovery for staleness,
omit permission_report for non-permission gates, and fail closed when a
permission_report would invent a missing permission the profile holds.
Addresses the two blockers from the PR #898 review at a81db754.
B1 - degraded ownership inventory was rendered as affirmative absence.
_build_session_rows read the sessions/leases/locks sections without
consulting their status, so a session row emitted lease_ids=() and
worktree_paths=() whether the session genuinely held nothing or the
lease store simply could not be read. The renderer printed both as
"none" and "unbound", contradicting the ownership_authority_complete
invariant documented on InventorySnapshot.
SessionRow now carries lease_authority and worktree_authority. A
worktree binding is correlated through lease work numbers, so it is
unproven when either the leases or the locks section fails to read --
this covers the narrow variant where locks hold real worktree paths but
a degraded leases section leaves work_numbers empty. The renderer emits
"unknown (inventory <status>)" with an authority-unproven badge instead
of none/unbound, the card names the unreadable sections, and an empty
session list from an unreadable sessions section no longer reads as
"no sessions recorded". snapshot_to_dict exports
ownership_authority_complete, ownership_section_status, and per-row
lease_authority / worktree_authority so /api/sessions consumers can
distinguish the two cases.
B2 - contamination payload strings bypassed redaction.
_inspect_contamination copied command_summary, session_id, role and
reason_class out of the marker payload with only str(), while every
inventory-sourced field on the same page arrives through
webui.inventory.scrub(). The write-time redactor
stable_branch_push_guard.redact_command is a narrow denylist that leaves
absolute $HOME paths, -H 'X-Api-Key: <value>', --password <value>, and
PRIVATE_KEY=<value> intact, and this is the first web surface to render
command_summary at all.
Adds webui.inventory.scrub_text(), which collapses $HOME and redacts
credential-shaped tokens and URL userinfo anywhere inside a string rather
than only at its start, and routes the marker payload through it. scrub()
and every existing caller are untouched. The command_summary field is
kept: it is the #630 evidence naming which daemon was killed. The module
docstring claiming absolute paths were already collapsed is corrected.
Also: removes the locks_by_session_hint dead loop and its discard (N1),
adds the missing trailing newline to webui/runtime_views.py (N4), drops
an unused dataclasses.field import, and documents both honesty rules in
docs/webui-local-dev.md.
Tests: tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py grows from 12 to 26 cases,
covering degraded and unavailable ownership sections in both the HTML and
JSON paths, the locks-readable/leases-degraded variant, a guard against
over-correcting clean inventory into "unknown", the previously untested
expired-lease flag, HTML escaping of hostile values in clean and degraded
renders, and each secret class the write-time denylist misses. The
STATUS_UNAVAILABLE import that was present but unused is now exercised.
Validation, from the issue worktree with venv/bin/python (Python 3.14.5,
pytest 9.1.1):
pytest tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py tests/test_webui_*.py -q
-> 512 passed, 376 subtests (was 498 / 372; +14 new tests)
pytest tests/test_issue_854_semantic_container_exclusion.py -q
-> 13 passed, 8 subtests
13-file runtime/health/inventory/restart set
-> 1 failed, 223 passed; the single failure is
test_runtime_clarity.py::TestRuntimeClarity::
test_activate_profile_succeeds_when_enabled, the identical test and
assertion the reviewer recorded on master at 7af40fb5, so it is
baseline-equivalent and not introduced here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
jcwalker3andClaude Opus 5
sysadmin
