Merge remote-tracking branch 'prgs/master' into feat/issue-648-notifications-console

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2026-07-25 18:37:17 -04:00
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# ADR: High-availability and rolling-restart architecture for Gitea MCP control plane
- **Status:** Proposed (Design ADR under [#668](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/668))
- **Date:** 2026-07-25
- **Tracking Issue:** [#668](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/668)
- **Policy Version:** `mcp-ha-rolling-restart/v1`
- **Related:**
- Parent: [#655](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/655) — Governed MCP restart coordination and zero-disruption recovery
- Governance Policy: [#656](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/656) / `docs/architecture/mcp-restart-governance.md`
- Control-Plane DB Substrate: [#613](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/613) / `docs/architecture/control-plane-db-substrate.md`
- Runtime Policy: [#615](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/615) / `docs/architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md`
- Product Vision: [#652](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/652) (Phase 5 Maturity)
- Delivery Roadmap: [#653](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/653)
---
## 1. Context & Problem Statement
The Gitea MCP server operates as the authoritative **control plane** for managing issues, Pull Requests, code mutations, formal reviews, and workflow reconciliations. Under single-process governance ([#656](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/656)), process restarts are strictly controlled using pre-flight checks, drain phases, and operator approvals.
However, a single-instance control plane inherently presents fundamental constraints:
1. **Downtime during updates:** Even a perfectly executed single-process drain requires a window where incoming client requests must be paused or rejected while the server binary or python environment reloads.
2. **Single point of failure:** Infrastructure issues, process crashes, or unhandled host-level terminations immediately disconnect active LLM sessions and leave transient workflows incomplete.
3. **Multi-agent concurrency bottlenecks:** High volumes of concurrent multi-LLM tasks put all lock management, lease allocation, and Gitea API interactions through a single process event loop.
To achieve true zero-disruption operation and seamless rolling deployments without stopping active work, the system requires a high-availability (HA), multi-instance MCP architecture.
---
## 2. Architectural Principles & Non-Goals
### 2.1 Core Architectural Principles
* **Gitea as Canonical Work SoT:** Gitea remains the ultimate System of Record (SoT) for issue states, pull requests, labels, and audit comments. The MCP control plane does not duplicate domain entities.
* **Control-Plane DB as Multi-Instance State Substrate:** The control-plane SQLite/durable database ([#613](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/613)) acts as the single source of truth for workflow leases, session tokens, assignment records, and lock fences across all MCP nodes.
* **Stateless Worker Nodes:** MCP role server processes (`gitea-author`, `gitea-reviewer`, `gitea-merger`, `gitea-reconciler`, `gitea-controller`) maintain no unique in-memory state; any node can handle any request given a valid session resume token.
* **Fail-Closed Split-Brain Defense:** In any network partition or quorum loss scenario, nodes must fail closed rather than risk double-mutations or conflicting Gitea states.
### 2.2 Non-Goals
* **Replacing Gitea:** We do not replace Gitea issue/PR tracking with an independent database.
* **Immediate Multi-Node Cluster Execution in v1:** This ADR defines the target architecture and phased roadmap; immediate implementation occurs incrementally post-[#655] v1.
---
## 3. High-Availability & Rolling-Restart Architecture
### 3.1 Architecture Overview
```
+----------------------------+
| LLM Clients / IDE Sessions |
+--------------+-------------+
|
v
+----------------------------+
| HA Proxy / Router |
| (Health-based & Affinity) |
+------+--------------+------+
| |
+--------------+ +--------------+
v v
+--------------------+ +--------------------+
| MCP Instance Node A| | MCP Instance Node B|
| (Version N) | | (Version N+1) |
+---------+----------+ +---------+----------+
| |
+----------------------+----------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------+
| Control-Plane DB Substrate|
| (Shared Lease & Locks) |
+--------------+-------------+
|
v
+----------------------------+
| Gitea API |
+----------------------------+
```
---
### 3.2 Key System Components
#### A. Multiple MCP Instance Cohorts
* The control plane runs across $N \ge 2$ redundant process nodes.
* Dual-namespace deployment allows running the old version (Node A) alongside a updated version (Node B) during rolling upgrades.
#### B. Shared Durable Session Storage & Resume Tokens
* Session context, preflight verification proofs, and capability resolution states are stored in the shared control-plane database.
* Client requests carry an explicit `session_id` and `resume_token`. If an MCP instance restarts or a request routes to a different instance, the target node validates the token against the database without requiring full session re-initialization.
#### C. Shared Lease Authority & Fencing Counters
* Workflow leases (`gitea_allocate_next_work`, `gitea_adopt_workflow_lease`) use monotonic fencing tokens (`lease_generation_id`).
* When Node B acquires or renews a lease, it increments the generation counter. Any delayed or out-of-order write attempt from Node A using an older generation token is rejected by database constraints.
#### D. Leader Election & Coordinated Drain
* Node clusters elect a primary coordinator node for administrative background tasks (such as stale lease cleanup or incident Watchdogs).
* During a rolling deployment:
1. Node B (new version) is launched and registers as healthy.
2. Router directs new session creations to Node B.
3. Node A enters `MAINTENANCE_DRAIN` status ([#659](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/659)), completing in-flight mutations while refusing new tasks.
4. Once all active sessions migrate or complete, Node A shuts down cleanly.
#### E. Idempotent Mutations & Failover Safety
* All state-changing tool executions (PR creation, review submission, merge operations, label changes) carry a deterministic `idempotency_key`.
* If a network connection flaps or a node fails mid-mutation, the re-issued request with the same `idempotency_key` is recognized by the control-plane substrate, returning the existing recorded result without repeating side effects on Gitea.
#### F. Schema Version Compatibility
* Database migrations follow non-breaking additive patterns.
* During rolling upgrades where Node A (Version $N$) and Node B (Version $N+1$) run concurrently, both versions operate against the shared schema without structural conflicts.
---
## 4. Split-Brain & Failure Behavior
### 4.1 Split-Brain Risk Scenarios & Mitigation
| Scenario | Risk | Mitigation Strategy |
|---|---|---|
| **Network Partition between Nodes** | Both Node A and Node B attempt to process operations for the same issue/PR. | **Generation Fencing:** Lease renewal requires updating the DB generation counter. The node isolated from the DB fails closed immediately. |
| **Stale Node Recovery** | Node A recovers after a long pause and executes a queued mutation. | **Lease Expiry & TTL Fencing:** Transactions verify that `expires_at > NOW()` within the atomic SQLite transaction boundaries. |
| **Database Connection Loss** | Node loses access to shared control-plane DB substrate. | **Strict Fail-Closed:** The node immediately marks all task capabilities as `blocked` and rejects mutation tools until DB connectivity is re-established. |
---
## 5. Phased Implementation Milestones
```mermaid
flowchart TD
M1[Milestone 1: Shared Control-Plane DB Schema & Resume Tokens] --> M2[Milestone 2: Idempotent Mutation Layer]
M2 --> M3[Milestone 3: Health Routing & Standby Failover]
M3 --> M4[Milestone 4: Active-Active Rolling Deployment & Auto-Drain]
```
### Milestone 1: Shared Control-Plane DB Schema & Resume Tokens (Post-#655)
* Extend [#613] Control-Plane DB schema to store multi-instance node heartbeat records and session resume tokens.
* Enable session lookup across instances via `session_id`.
### Milestone 2: Idempotent Mutation Layer & Lease Fencing
* Add mandatory `idempotency_key` tracking to all Gitea mutation tools.
* Implement monotonic lease fencing counters in `gitea_allocate_next_work` and `gitea_adopt_workflow_lease`.
### Milestone 3: Health-Based Routing & Active-Passive Standby
* Introduce lightweight proxy/router capable of checking node health endpoints.
* Implement active-standby failover where standby node automatically assumes work if active node fails health checks.
### Milestone 4: Active-Active Horizontal Deployment & Rolling Upgrade Automation
* Enable true active-active multi-instance execution.
* Integrate automated zero-downtime rolling upgrades coordinated with `gitea_request_mcp_restart` maintenance drain.
---
## 6. Observability & Audit Requirements
High-availability control plane operations must expose clear telemetry and audit trails:
* **Node Registry Telemetry:** Active nodes, version numbers, uptime, and heartbeat timestamps reported via `gitea_get_runtime_context`.
* **Lease Fencing Metrics:** Tracking lease acquire latency, fence rejection counts, and lease handoff durations.
* **Failover & Re-route Audit Logs:** Durable logging of session migrations between nodes, drain initiation, and process retirement events.
---
## 7. Tradeoffs & Accepted Risks
* **Increased Architectural Complexity:** Moving from a single process to a multi-instance control plane requires robust DB locking, proxy routing, and migration governance.
* **Database Dependency:** The control-plane database substrate becomes a critical shared dependency for multi-node deployments. High availability for the underlying SQLite file system / DB must be guaranteed.
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# Web Console: restart status, impact preview, and approval state (#667)
Phase 1 of the console restart surface. It consumes the #655 coordinator
substrate and displays it. It performs no restart, reload, drain, approval, or
process action, and it registers no write endpoint.
Issue #667's rollout is explicit — *status views first, write approval after the
backend gates are green* — and this change delivers only the status half.
## Surfaces
| Path | Method | Purpose |
|------|--------|---------|
| `/runtime/restart` | GET | Restart status page |
| `/api/v1/system/restart/status` | GET | Same snapshot as JSON |
Both accept an optional `restart_class` query parameter (default
`full_mcp_restart`). An unrecognised class is not an error: the coordinator
resolves it as unknown and fails closed, and the page shows the resulting deny.
Neither path accepts `POST`; a write attempt returns `405`, and a test asserts
it.
## What it shows
* **Impact preview (#658)** — verdict, blast radius, affected sessions, leases,
critical sections, mutations, and the counts behind them, evaluated
`dry_run=True` against live control-plane state.
* **Drain proof (#661)** — verification of a supplied proof: valid, clean,
expired, tampered, and the reasons behind a refusal.
* **Post-restart reconcile (#662)** — the most recent completion proof, its
overall status, and which dimensions still require follow-up.
* **Restart classes (#663)** — the least-privilege matrix, with *you may
request* and *you may execute* computed for the viewing role rather than for a
generic operator.
* **Approval controls (#633)** — the authorization state of
`system.restart_namespace` and `system.reload_namespace`.
* **Break-glass (#664)** — declared and marked unavailable; see below.
## Three rules this surface holds itself to
A status page that is wrong is worse than one that is missing, because an
operator acts on it. Three properties are enforced by tests, and each was
verified by reverting the guard and watching a test fail.
### An unreadable source reports unavailable, never green
Every source carries its own `SourceStatus`. Nothing substitutes a default,
placeholder, or self-comparison for a reading that failed. An unreadable
control-plane database yields `inventory_complete: false`, which the coordinator
itself turns into a fail-closed verdict, and the page says the blast radius is
unknown rather than showing an empty affected-sessions table.
An absent drain proof is reported as absent — not as a pass. The #661 gate
authorizes a restart only against a valid, unexpired, clean proof, so no proof
is precisely the state that gate denies on.
### Authorization is asked the way execution would ask it
Every probe passes `for_execution=True`.
Asked without it, an admin is `allowed` for `system.restart_namespace`. On a
control surface that reads as a live button. Asked the way an execution attempt
would ask, the same principal is refused `phase_not_active`, because the console
is in Phase 1 and the action is Phase 2. This surface reports the second answer.
`execution_enabled` is therefore `false` for every action and every role today,
and a test asserts that across the whole role matrix.
### The control-plane database is opened read-only
`ControlPlaneDB()` creates directories and runs migrations on construction — a
write. This surface never constructs one. It opens the sqlite file with
`mode=ro`, exactly as `webui/inventory.py` does, and treats a missing file as
missing authority rather than as an empty inventory.
The test that protects this points at a path inside a directory that already
exists, so a read-write `connect` would really create the file. A nested
missing-directory path would have passed for the wrong reason.
## Break-glass is declared, not offered
The break-glass workflow (#664) is not available on this branch's base. The
panel is rendered to operator-class roles as **unavailable**, naming the issue
that tracks it. It is not silently omitted, because an operator who has been
told a governance path exists needs to see that it is not wired here; and it is
not rendered as a control, because there is nothing behind it.
Unprivileged viewers see only a note that the surface is operator-class.
## Redaction and escaping
Every interpolated value passes through `_esc` (`html.escape(..., quote=True)`).
Free-form text and anything that can carry a filesystem path additionally passes
through `webui.inventory.scrub_text`, which redacts credential-shaped tokens
inside a string rather than only at its start. The impact payload is passed
through `webui.inventory.scrub` before rendering.
## Linkage
Parent #655 · extends #642 · consumes #658, #661, #662, #663 · RBAC #633 ·
console #631 · vision #652 · roadmap #653 · break-glass #664.
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"""Read-only restart console: views, gates, and honesty rules (#667).
The console consumes the #655 substrate. These tests hold it to the three
properties that make a status surface trustworthy:
* an unreadable source is reported unavailable, never rendered as green;
* authorization is probed the way execution would probe it, so an allow is
never shown for something that could not run;
* the surface performs no mutation, including no write to the control-plane DB.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import sqlite3
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from pathlib import Path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
from starlette.testclient import TestClient # noqa: E402
import restart_coordinator # noqa: E402
from webui import console_authz, restart_console, restart_views # noqa: E402
from webui.app import create_app # noqa: E402
NOW = datetime(2026, 7, 25, 21, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
def _principal(role: str) -> console_authz.Principal:
return console_authz.Principal(
subject="[email protected]",
role=role,
identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV,
authenticated=True,
)
def _inventory(*, complete: bool = True, sessions=(), leases=()):
def _read(**_kwargs):
return {
"sessions": list(sessions),
"leases": list(leases),
"terminal_lock": None,
"prior_recovery_attempts": [],
"inventory_complete": complete,
"incomplete_reasons": (
[] if complete else ["fixture: inventory withheld"]
),
}
return _read
def _live_session(session_id: str = "prgs-author-1234-abcd") -> dict:
return {
"session_id": session_id,
"role": "author",
"profile": "prgs-author",
"pid": os.getpid(),
"status": "active",
"last_heartbeat_at": (NOW - timedelta(seconds=30)).isoformat(),
}
def drain_proof_fixture() -> dict:
"""A structurally complete but unsigned drain proof."""
return {
"version": "drain-proof/v1",
"proof_id": "deadbeef" * 8,
"clean": True,
"issued_at": (NOW - timedelta(minutes=1)).isoformat(),
"expires_at": (NOW + timedelta(minutes=5)).isoformat(),
"requesting_session_id": "s-live",
"impact_fingerprint": "f" * 64,
"checks": [],
"failed_checks": [],
}
class RestartClassMatrixTest(unittest.TestCase):
def test_every_policy_class_is_rendered(self) -> None:
views = restart_console.build_restart_class_views("operator")
self.assertEqual(len(views), len(restart_coordinator.RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES))
def test_viewer_capability_is_role_scoped_not_generic(self) -> None:
"""A worker role must not be shown as able to request a full restart."""
author = {
v.restart_class: v
for v in restart_console.build_restart_class_views("author")
}
operator = {
v.restart_class: v
for v in restart_console.build_restart_class_views("operator")
}
full = restart_coordinator.RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART.value
self.assertFalse(author[full].viewer_may_request)
self.assertFalse(author[full].viewer_may_execute)
self.assertTrue(operator[full].viewer_may_request)
self.assertTrue(operator[full].viewer_may_execute)
def test_unknown_role_may_do_nothing(self) -> None:
views = restart_console.build_restart_class_views("not-a-role")
self.assertTrue(all(not v.viewer_may_request for v in views))
self.assertTrue(all(not v.viewer_may_execute for v in views))
class AuthorizationProbeTest(unittest.TestCase):
def test_probe_asks_for_execution_so_phase_gate_is_reported(self) -> None:
"""An admin clears the role bar and still cannot execute in Phase 1.
This is the case that distinguishes the two probes. Asked without
``for_execution`` an admin is *allowed* for ``system.restart_namespace``,
which on a control surface reads as a live button. Asked the way
execution asks, the same principal is refused ``phase_not_active``. The
console must report the second answer.
"""
by_id = {
a.action_id: a
for a in restart_console.build_action_authorizations(
_principal(console_authz.ADMIN)
)
}
restart = by_id["system.restart_namespace"]
self.assertFalse(restart.execution_enabled)
self.assertEqual(restart.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE)
permissive = console_authz.authorize(
"system.restart_namespace", _principal(console_authz.ADMIN)
)
self.assertTrue(
permissive.allowed,
"guard precondition: without for_execution an admin is allowed, "
"which is exactly why the console must not probe that way",
)
def test_operator_is_refused_the_admin_only_restart_action(self) -> None:
"""Role refusal precedes the phase gate and is reported as such."""
by_id = {
a.action_id: a
for a in restart_console.build_action_authorizations(
_principal(console_authz.OPERATOR)
)
}
self.assertEqual(
by_id["system.restart_namespace"].reason_code,
console_authz.DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE,
)
def test_anonymous_is_denied_unauthenticated(self) -> None:
by_id = {
a.action_id: a for a in restart_console.build_action_authorizations(None)
}
self.assertEqual(
by_id["system.restart_namespace"].reason_code,
console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED,
)
def test_no_authorization_ever_reports_execution_enabled(self) -> None:
for role in (
console_authz.VIEWER,
console_authz.OPERATOR,
console_authz.CONTROLLER,
console_authz.ADMIN,
):
for auth in restart_console.build_action_authorizations(_principal(role)):
self.assertFalse(
auth.execution_enabled,
f"{role} reported execution_enabled for {auth.action_id}",
)
class ImpactPreviewTest(unittest.TestCase):
def test_impact_renders_from_coordinator_dto(self) -> None:
impact, source = restart_console.load_impact_report(
principal=_principal(console_authz.OPERATOR),
read_inventory=_inventory(sessions=[_live_session()]),
now=NOW,
)
self.assertTrue(source.available)
self.assertIsNotNone(impact)
self.assertEqual(
impact["restart_class"],
restart_coordinator.RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART.value,
)
self.assertIn("verdict", impact)
self.assertFalse(impact["restart_performed"])
self.assertTrue(impact["dry_run"])
def test_incomplete_inventory_is_surfaced_and_denies(self) -> None:
impact, source = restart_console.load_impact_report(
principal=_principal(console_authz.OPERATOR),
read_inventory=_inventory(complete=False),
now=NOW,
)
self.assertFalse(impact["inventory_complete"])
self.assertFalse(impact["allow_restart"])
self.assertTrue(source.detail, "incomplete inventory must explain itself")
def test_inventory_reader_failure_is_unavailable_not_empty(self) -> None:
"""A reader that raises must not be rendered as 'no sessions affected'."""
def _boom(**_kwargs):
raise RuntimeError("control-plane unreachable")
impact, source = restart_console.load_impact_report(
principal=_principal(console_authz.OPERATOR),
read_inventory=_boom,
now=NOW,
)
self.assertIsNone(impact)
self.assertFalse(source.available)
self.assertIn("control-plane unreachable", source.detail)
class ControlPlaneReadTest(unittest.TestCase):
def test_missing_database_is_incomplete_not_empty(self) -> None:
inventory = restart_console.read_control_plane_inventory(
db_path="/nonexistent/control-plane.sqlite3"
)
self.assertFalse(inventory["inventory_complete"])
self.assertEqual(inventory["sessions"], [])
self.assertTrue(inventory["incomplete_reasons"])
def test_reader_never_creates_the_database(self) -> None:
"""Reading status must not bring a control-plane DB into existence.
The path deliberately sits in a directory that already exists: a
read-write ``sqlite3.connect`` would happily create the file there, so
this fails if the reader ever stops opening the database ``mode=ro``.
A nested-missing-directory path would pass for the wrong reason,
because sqlite cannot create the parent directory either way.
"""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
path = os.path.join(tmp, "control_plane.sqlite3")
self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(os.path.dirname(path)))
inventory = restart_console.read_control_plane_inventory(db_path=path)
self.assertFalse(
os.path.exists(path),
"reading restart status created a control-plane database",
)
self.assertFalse(inventory["inventory_complete"])
def test_reads_active_sessions_from_a_real_database(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
path = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3")
conn = sqlite3.connect(path)
conn.execute(
"CREATE TABLE sessions (session_id TEXT, role TEXT, profile TEXT,"
" pid INTEGER, status TEXT, last_heartbeat_at TEXT)"
)
conn.execute(
"CREATE TABLE work_items (work_item_id INTEGER, kind TEXT,"
" number INTEGER)"
)
conn.execute(
"CREATE TABLE leases (lease_id TEXT, session_id TEXT, role TEXT,"
" phase TEXT, status TEXT, worktree_path TEXT,"
" work_item_id INTEGER, expires_at TEXT)"
)
conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO sessions VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
("s-live", "author", "prgs-author", 4242, "active", NOW.isoformat()),
)
conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO sessions VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
("s-done", "author", "prgs-author", 11, "closed", NOW.isoformat()),
)
conn.execute("INSERT INTO work_items VALUES (1, 'issue', 667)")
conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO leases VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
(
"l-1",
"s-live",
"author",
"allocated",
"active",
None,
1,
NOW.isoformat(),
),
)
conn.commit()
conn.close()
inventory = restart_console.read_control_plane_inventory(db_path=path)
self.assertTrue(inventory["inventory_complete"])
self.assertEqual([s["session_id"] for s in inventory["sessions"]], ["s-live"])
self.assertEqual(inventory["leases"][0]["work_number"], 667)
class DrainAndReconcileTest(unittest.TestCase):
def test_absent_drain_proof_is_not_a_pass(self) -> None:
drain, source = restart_console.load_drain_status(proof=None, now=NOW)
self.assertIsNone(drain)
self.assertFalse(source.available)
self.assertIn("denies", source.detail)
def test_tampered_drain_proof_is_reported_invalid(self) -> None:
proof = drain_proof_fixture()
proof["clean"] = True
proof["proof_id"] = "0" * 64
drain, source = restart_console.load_drain_status(proof=proof, now=NOW)
self.assertTrue(source.available)
self.assertFalse(drain["valid"])
def test_absent_reconcile_proof_is_unavailable(self) -> None:
reconcile, source = restart_console.load_reconcile_status(load_proof=None)
self.assertIsNone(reconcile)
self.assertFalse(source.available)
def test_reconcile_proof_is_rendered_when_supplied(self) -> None:
payload = {
"overall_status": "degraded",
"mode": "log_only",
"resolved_count": 3,
"unresolved_count": 2,
"items": [
{
"dimension": "leases",
"status": "unresolved",
"summary": "2 orphaned leases",
"follow_up_required": True,
}
],
}
reconcile, source = restart_console.load_reconcile_status(
load_proof=lambda: payload
)
self.assertTrue(source.available)
self.assertEqual(reconcile["unresolved_count"], 2)
class RenderingTest(unittest.TestCase):
def _snapshot(self, **kwargs):
params = {
"principal": _principal(console_authz.OPERATOR),
"read_inventory": _inventory(sessions=[_live_session()]),
"now": NOW,
}
params.update(kwargs)
return restart_console.load_restart_console_snapshot(**params)
def test_page_renders_every_section(self) -> None:
html = restart_views.render_restart_console_page(self._snapshot())
for heading in (
"Impact preview",
"Drain proof",
"Post-restart reconcile",
"Restart classes",
"Approval controls",
"Break-glass",
):
self.assertIn(heading, html)
def test_hostile_session_id_is_escaped(self) -> None:
hostile = "<script>alert('x')</script>"
html = restart_views.render_restart_console_page(
self._snapshot(read_inventory=_inventory(sessions=[_live_session(hostile)]))
)
self.assertNotIn("<script>alert", html)
self.assertIn("&lt;script&gt;", html)
def test_unavailable_impact_says_unsafe_rather_than_clean(self) -> None:
def _boom(**_kwargs):
raise RuntimeError("nope")
snapshot = self._snapshot(read_inventory=_boom)
html = restart_views.render_restart_console_page(snapshot)
self.assertIn("blast radius of a restart is unknown", html)
self.assertIn("unavailable", html)
def test_break_glass_is_hidden_from_unprivileged_viewers(self) -> None:
viewer_html = restart_views.render_restart_console_page(
self._snapshot(principal=_principal(console_authz.VIEWER))
)
self.assertIn("visible to operator-class", viewer_html)
self.assertNotIn(
f"#{restart_console.BREAK_GLASS_ISSUE}", viewer_html
)
def test_break_glass_shown_to_operator_is_marked_unavailable(self) -> None:
html = restart_views.render_restart_console_page(self._snapshot())
self.assertIn("unavailable", html)
self.assertIn(f"#{restart_console.BREAK_GLASS_ISSUE}", html)
def test_snapshot_always_declares_itself_read_only(self) -> None:
self.assertTrue(self._snapshot().read_only)
class RestartConsoleRouteTest(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self.client = TestClient(create_app())
def test_page_route_renders(self) -> None:
res = self.client.get("/runtime/restart")
self.assertEqual(res.status_code, 200)
self.assertIn("Restart status and impact", res.text)
def test_api_route_exports_snapshot(self) -> None:
res = self.client.get("/api/v1/system/restart/status")
self.assertEqual(res.status_code, 200)
payload = res.json()
self.assertTrue(payload["read_only"])
self.assertEqual(payload["links"]["issue"], 667)
self.assertEqual(
len(payload["restart_classes"]),
len(restart_coordinator.RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES),
)
def test_restart_class_is_selectable(self) -> None:
res = self.client.get(
"/api/v1/system/restart/status?restart_class=client_reconnect"
)
self.assertEqual(res.status_code, 200)
self.assertEqual(res.json()["impact"]["restart_class"], "client_reconnect")
def test_unknown_restart_class_fails_closed(self) -> None:
res = self.client.get(
"/api/v1/system/restart/status?restart_class=obliterate-everything"
)
self.assertEqual(res.status_code, 200)
impact = res.json()["impact"]
self.assertFalse(impact["allow_restart"])
def test_anonymous_api_reader_gets_no_execution_grant(self) -> None:
payload = self.client.get("/api/v1/system/restart/status").json()
self.assertFalse(payload["break_glass"]["available"])
for auth in payload["authorizations"]:
self.assertFalse(auth["execution_enabled"])
def test_route_is_registered_in_nav(self) -> None:
from webui.nav import nav_hrefs
self.assertIn("/runtime/restart", nav_hrefs())
def test_no_write_method_is_exposed(self) -> None:
"""The surface is read-only: nothing accepts a POST."""
for path in ("/runtime/restart", "/api/v1/system/restart/status"):
self.assertEqual(self.client.post(path).status_code, 405, path)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+37
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ from webui.traffic_views import render_traffic_page
from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as worktree_snapshot_to_dict
from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
import restart_coordinator
from webui.restart_console import load_restart_console_snapshot
from webui.restart_views import render_restart_console_page
from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
from webui.session_loader import (
load_session_view_snapshot,
@@ -421,6 +424,33 @@ async def api_runtime(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
return JSONResponse(runtime_snapshot_to_dict(load_runtime_snapshot()))
def _restart_console_snapshot(request: Request):
"""Build the read-only restart snapshot for the requesting principal (#667)."""
principal = resolve_principal(request.headers)
restart_class = (
request.query_params.get("restart_class")
or restart_coordinator.RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART.value
)
return load_restart_console_snapshot(
principal=principal, restart_class=restart_class
)
async def restart_console_page(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
"""Restart status, impact preview, and approval state (#667). Read-only."""
snapshot = _restart_console_snapshot(request)
return HTMLResponse(
render_page(
title="Restart", body_html=render_restart_console_page(snapshot)
)
)
async def api_restart_status(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
"""JSON export of the read-only restart console snapshot (#667)."""
return JSONResponse(_restart_console_snapshot(request).as_dict())
async def sessions(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
"""Runtime and session view (#641) — read-only composition of health + inventory."""
snapshot = load_session_view_snapshot()
@@ -1028,6 +1058,13 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
Route("/api/prompts", api_prompts, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/runtime", runtime, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/runtime", api_runtime, methods=["GET"]),
# #667 read-only restart status / impact preview / approval state.
Route("/runtime/restart", restart_console_page, methods=["GET"]),
Route(
"/api/v1/system/restart/status",
api_restart_status,
methods=["GET"],
),
Route("/sessions", sessions, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/sessions", api_sessions, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/v1/sessions", api_sessions, methods=["GET"]),
+1
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
)),
NavGroup("Runtime/Sessions", (
NavItem("/runtime", "Runtime health"),
NavItem("/runtime/restart", "Restart status"),
NavItem("/sessions", "Sessions"),
)),
NavGroup("Projects", (
+579
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,579 @@
"""Read-only restart status, impact preview, and approval state (#667).
Phase 1 of the console restart surface. It *consumes* the #655 coordinator
substrate and renders it; it never restarts, reloads, drains, approves, or kills
anything. There is no apply path in this module, so there is no execution gate
here to arm incorrectly — the only writes the console could perform are the ones
it does not implement.
Sources, each independently fail-soft and each reported with its own
:class:`SourceStatus`:
* :mod:`restart_coordinator` — restart-class policy matrix (#663) and the
blast-radius impact report (#658).
* :mod:`drain_proof` — drain checklist and gate verdict (#661), verified
read-only against a caller-supplied proof.
* :mod:`post_restart_reconcile` — post-restart completion proof (#662).
* :mod:`webui.console_authz` — role authorization for the approval controls
(#633).
Three rules this module holds itself to, because a status surface that lies is
worse than one that is absent:
**A source that could not be read is reported unavailable, never green.** No
default, placeholder, or self-comparison is substituted for a reading that
failed. An unreadable control-plane DB yields ``inventory_complete=False``,
which the coordinator itself turns into a fail-closed verdict.
**Authorization is asked the way execution would ask it.** Every authorization
probe passes ``for_execution=True``, so the console reports whether the action
could actually run rather than the weaker "this principal is the right role".
While the console is in Phase 1 that answer is ``phase_not_active`` for every
phase-2 action, and the surface says so plainly instead of showing an allow.
**The database is opened read-only.** ``ControlPlaneDB()`` creates directories
and runs migrations on construction, which is a write; this module opens the
sqlite file with ``mode=ro`` exactly as :mod:`webui.inventory` does, and treats
a missing file as missing authority rather than an empty inventory.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import sqlite3
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
import control_plane_db
import drain_proof
import restart_coordinator
from webui import console_authz
from webui.inventory import redact_path, scrub
# --- Source status ----------------------------------------------------------
STATUS_OK = "ok"
STATUS_UNAVAILABLE = "unavailable"
#: Console actions whose authorization state this surface reports. Both are
#: pre-existing #642 actions; this module adds no new console action because it
#: performs no console action.
REPORTED_ACTIONS: tuple[str, ...] = (
"system.restart_namespace",
"system.reload_namespace",
)
#: The break-glass workflow (#664) is not consumed here. It is declared so the
#: surface is honest about the gap rather than silently omitting a governance
#: path the operator has been told exists.
BREAK_GLASS_ISSUE = 664
BREAK_GLASS_PENDING_REASON = (
"The break-glass workflow (#664) is not yet available on this branch's "
"base; no break-glass control is offered and none is implied."
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SourceStatus:
"""Whether one backing source could be read, and why not when it could not."""
name: str
status: str
detail: str = ""
@property
def available(self) -> bool:
return self.status == STATUS_OK
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"name": self.name,
"status": self.status,
"available": self.available,
"detail": self.detail,
}
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RestartClassView:
"""One row of the #663 restart-class matrix, scoped to the viewer's role."""
restart_class: str
required_permission: str
expected_blast_radius: str
drain_requirement: str
full_drain_required: bool
approval_requirement: str
request_roles: tuple[str, ...]
execution_roles: tuple[str, ...]
viewer_may_request: bool
viewer_may_execute: bool
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"restart_class": self.restart_class,
"required_permission": self.required_permission,
"expected_blast_radius": self.expected_blast_radius,
"drain_requirement": self.drain_requirement,
"full_drain_required": self.full_drain_required,
"approval_requirement": self.approval_requirement,
"request_roles": list(self.request_roles),
"execution_roles": list(self.execution_roles),
"viewer_may_request": self.viewer_may_request,
"viewer_may_execute": self.viewer_may_execute,
}
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ActionAuthorization:
"""Authorization state for one console action, asked as execution would."""
action_id: str
summary: str
required_role: str
allowed: bool
execution_enabled: bool
reason_code: str
detail: str
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"action_id": self.action_id,
"summary": self.summary,
"required_role": self.required_role,
"allowed": self.allowed,
"execution_enabled": self.execution_enabled,
"reason_code": self.reason_code,
"detail": self.detail,
}
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class BreakGlassSurface:
"""Declared-but-unavailable break-glass panel (#664 is not on this base)."""
available: bool
issue: int
reason: str
viewer_is_privileged: bool
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"available": self.available,
"issue": self.issue,
"reason": self.reason,
"viewer_is_privileged": self.viewer_is_privileged,
}
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RestartConsoleSnapshot:
"""Everything the read-only restart console renders."""
generated_at: str
viewer_role: str
viewer_authenticated: bool
read_only: bool
impact: dict[str, Any] | None
impact_source: SourceStatus
drain: dict[str, Any] | None
drain_source: SourceStatus
reconcile: dict[str, Any] | None
reconcile_source: SourceStatus
restart_classes: tuple[RestartClassView, ...]
authorizations: tuple[ActionAuthorization, ...]
break_glass: BreakGlassSurface
notes: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"generated_at": self.generated_at,
"viewer_role": self.viewer_role,
"viewer_authenticated": self.viewer_authenticated,
"read_only": self.read_only,
"impact": self.impact,
"impact_source": self.impact_source.as_dict(),
"drain": self.drain,
"drain_source": self.drain_source.as_dict(),
"reconcile": self.reconcile,
"reconcile_source": self.reconcile_source.as_dict(),
"restart_classes": [c.as_dict() for c in self.restart_classes],
"authorizations": [a.as_dict() for a in self.authorizations],
"break_glass": self.break_glass.as_dict(),
"notes": list(self.notes),
"links": {
"issue": 667,
"extends": 642,
"umbrella": 655,
"coordinator": 658,
"drain_proof": 661,
"reconcile": 662,
"restart_classes": 663,
"break_glass": BREAK_GLASS_ISSUE,
"vision": 652,
"roadmap": 653,
},
}
def _utc_now() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
# --- Control-plane inventory (read-only) ------------------------------------
def read_control_plane_inventory(
*,
db_path: str | None = None,
limit: int = 200,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Read sessions and leases for an impact evaluation, read-only.
Returns the inventory mapping
:func:`restart_coordinator.evaluate_restart_impact` expects.
``inventory_complete`` is True only when every read succeeded, so a partial
read denies rather than under-reporting the blast radius.
The database is never created, migrated, or written: a missing file means
the console has no session authority, which is not the same as there being
no sessions.
"""
path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path() or "").strip()
incomplete: list[str] = []
def _incomplete(reason: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"sessions": [],
"leases": [],
"terminal_lock": None,
"prior_recovery_attempts": [],
"inventory_complete": False,
"incomplete_reasons": [reason],
}
if not path:
return _incomplete("control-plane database path is not configured")
if not os.path.exists(path):
return _incomplete(
f"control-plane database not present at {redact_path(path)}; "
"no session or lease authority available"
)
try:
conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=5)
conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
except sqlite3.Error as exc:
return _incomplete(f"control-plane database could not be opened: {exc}")
sessions: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
leases: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
capped = max(1, int(limit))
try:
tables = {
str(row[0])
for row in conn.execute(
"SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type = 'table'"
).fetchall()
}
if "sessions" not in tables:
incomplete.append("control-plane database has no sessions table")
else:
sessions = [
dict(row)
for row in conn.execute(
"SELECT session_id, role, profile, pid, status,"
" last_heartbeat_at FROM sessions"
" WHERE status = 'active'"
" ORDER BY last_heartbeat_at DESC LIMIT ?",
(capped,),
).fetchall()
]
if "leases" not in tables:
incomplete.append("control-plane database has no leases table")
elif "work_items" not in tables:
incomplete.append(
"control-plane database has no work_items table; lease work "
"identity cannot be resolved"
)
else:
leases = [
dict(row)
for row in conn.execute(
"SELECT l.lease_id, l.session_id, l.role, l.phase,"
" l.status AS freshness, l.worktree_path,"
" w.kind AS work_kind, w.number AS work_number"
" FROM leases l"
" JOIN work_items w ON w.work_item_id = l.work_item_id"
" WHERE l.status = 'active'"
" ORDER BY l.expires_at DESC LIMIT ?",
(capped,),
).fetchall()
]
except sqlite3.Error as exc:
return _incomplete(f"control-plane database read failed: {exc}")
finally:
conn.close()
return {
"sessions": sessions,
"leases": leases,
"terminal_lock": None,
"prior_recovery_attempts": [],
"inventory_complete": not incomplete,
"incomplete_reasons": incomplete,
}
# --- Composition ------------------------------------------------------------
def build_restart_class_views(viewer_role: str | None) -> tuple[RestartClassView, ...]:
"""Render the #663 class matrix, marking what this viewer may request."""
normalized = str(viewer_role or "").strip().lower()
views: list[RestartClassView] = []
for policy in restart_coordinator.RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES.values():
views.append(
RestartClassView(
restart_class=policy.restart_class.value,
required_permission=policy.required_permission,
expected_blast_radius=policy.expected_blast_radius,
drain_requirement=policy.drain_requirement,
full_drain_required=policy.full_drain_required,
approval_requirement=policy.approval_requirement,
request_roles=tuple(policy.request_roles),
execution_roles=tuple(policy.execution_roles),
viewer_may_request=normalized in policy.request_roles,
viewer_may_execute=normalized in policy.execution_roles,
)
)
return tuple(views)
def build_action_authorizations(
principal: console_authz.Principal | None,
) -> tuple[ActionAuthorization, ...]:
"""Authorization state for the approval controls, asked as execution.
``for_execution=True`` is deliberate. Asking without it answers "is this
principal senior enough", which is not the question an operator looking at a
control needs answered; asking with it answers "would this run", and while
the console is in Phase 1 the honest answer is no.
"""
results: list[ActionAuthorization] = []
for action_id in REPORTED_ACTIONS:
action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=True)
results.append(
ActionAuthorization(
action_id=action_id,
summary=action.summary if action else "",
required_role=(
action.minimum_role if action else console_authz.OPERATOR
),
allowed=bool(decision.allowed),
execution_enabled=bool(decision.execution_enabled),
reason_code=str(decision.reason_code or ""),
detail=str(decision.detail or ""),
)
)
return tuple(results)
def viewer_is_privileged(principal: console_authz.Principal | None) -> bool:
"""True when the viewer holds at least the operator role."""
who = principal if principal is not None else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
if not who.authenticated:
return False
return who.rank >= console_authz.ROLE_ORDER.index(console_authz.OPERATOR)
def load_impact_report(
*,
principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
restart_class: str = restart_coordinator.RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART.value,
db_path: str | None = None,
limit: int = 200,
read_inventory: Callable[..., Mapping[str, Any]] | None = None,
now: datetime | None = None,
) -> tuple[dict[str, Any] | None, SourceStatus]:
"""Evaluate the blast radius for *restart_class*, always dry-run."""
reader = read_inventory or read_control_plane_inventory
try:
inventory = dict(reader(db_path=db_path, limit=limit))
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
return None, SourceStatus(
"impact",
STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
f"control-plane inventory failed: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}",
)
who = principal if principal is not None else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
viewer_role = str(who.role or "").strip().lower()
try:
report = restart_coordinator.evaluate_restart_impact(
inventory,
now=now,
dry_run=True,
restart_class=restart_class,
requester_role=viewer_role,
requester_permissions=restart_coordinator.permissions_for_role(
viewer_role
),
)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
return None, SourceStatus(
"impact",
STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
f"impact evaluation failed: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}",
)
payload = scrub(report.as_dict())
detail = ""
if not report.inventory_complete:
detail = "; ".join(report.incomplete_reasons) or "inventory incomplete"
return payload, SourceStatus("impact", STATUS_OK, detail)
def load_drain_status(
*,
proof: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
now: datetime | None = None,
expected_impact_fingerprint: str | None = None,
) -> tuple[dict[str, Any] | None, SourceStatus]:
"""Verify a supplied drain proof read-only and report the verdict.
No proof supplied is not a failure and not a pass: it is reported as the
absence of a proof, which is exactly what the #661 gate would deny on.
"""
if proof is None:
return None, SourceStatus(
"drain",
STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
"no drain proof supplied; the #661 gate denies a restart without a "
"valid unexpired clean proof",
)
try:
verified = drain_proof.verify_drain_proof(
proof,
now=now,
expected_impact_fingerprint=expected_impact_fingerprint,
)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
return None, SourceStatus(
"drain",
STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
f"drain proof verification failed: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}",
)
return scrub(verified.as_dict()), SourceStatus("drain", STATUS_OK)
def load_reconcile_status(
*,
load_proof: Callable[[], Any] | None = None,
) -> tuple[dict[str, Any] | None, SourceStatus]:
"""Report the most recent post-restart completion proof (#662)."""
if load_proof is None:
return None, SourceStatus(
"reconcile",
STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
"no post-restart completion proof source is wired into this view",
)
try:
proof = load_proof()
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
return None, SourceStatus(
"reconcile",
STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
f"reconcile proof unavailable: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}",
)
if proof is None:
return None, SourceStatus(
"reconcile",
STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
"no post-restart reconcile has been recorded",
)
payload = proof.as_dict() if hasattr(proof, "as_dict") else dict(proof)
return scrub(payload), SourceStatus("reconcile", STATUS_OK)
def load_restart_console_snapshot(
*,
principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
restart_class: str = restart_coordinator.RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART.value,
db_path: str | None = None,
limit: int = 200,
drain_proof_payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
read_inventory: Callable[..., Mapping[str, Any]] | None = None,
load_reconcile_proof: Callable[[], Any] | None = None,
now: datetime | None = None,
) -> RestartConsoleSnapshot:
"""Compose the read-only restart console snapshot."""
who = principal if principal is not None else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
moment = now or _utc_now()
impact, impact_source = load_impact_report(
principal=who,
restart_class=restart_class,
db_path=db_path,
limit=limit,
read_inventory=read_inventory,
now=moment,
)
fingerprint = None
if impact is not None:
try:
fingerprint = drain_proof.impact_fingerprint(impact)
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
fingerprint = None
drain, drain_source = load_drain_status(
proof=drain_proof_payload,
now=moment,
expected_impact_fingerprint=fingerprint,
)
reconcile, reconcile_source = load_reconcile_status(
load_proof=load_reconcile_proof
)
notes: list[str] = [
"This surface is read-only: it evaluates and displays, and performs no "
"restart, reload, drain, approval, or process action.",
]
if not impact_source.available:
notes.append(
"Impact preview unavailable — a restart decision must not be made "
"from this page while the blast radius is unknown."
)
return RestartConsoleSnapshot(
generated_at=moment.isoformat(),
viewer_role=str(who.role or "anonymous"),
viewer_authenticated=bool(who.authenticated),
read_only=True,
impact=impact,
impact_source=impact_source,
drain=drain,
drain_source=drain_source,
reconcile=reconcile,
reconcile_source=reconcile_source,
restart_classes=build_restart_class_views(who.role),
authorizations=build_action_authorizations(who),
break_glass=BreakGlassSurface(
available=False,
issue=BREAK_GLASS_ISSUE,
reason=BREAK_GLASS_PENDING_REASON,
viewer_is_privileged=viewer_is_privileged(who),
),
notes=tuple(notes),
)
+299
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
"""HTML views for the read-only restart console (#667).
Every interpolated value passes through :func:`_esc`. Values that can carry a
filesystem path or free-form operator text additionally pass through
:func:`webui.inventory.scrub_text`, which redacts credential-shaped tokens
*inside* a string rather than only at its start.
The page renders state and never offers a control that would mutate anything:
the approval and break-glass panels report authorization and availability, and
there is no form, button, or endpoint behind them.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import html
from webui.inventory import scrub_text
from webui.restart_console import RestartConsoleSnapshot, SourceStatus
def _esc(value: object) -> str:
"""Escape any value for HTML text or a quoted attribute."""
if value is None:
return ""
return html.escape(str(value), quote=True)
def _esc_text(value: object) -> str:
"""Escape free-form text after redacting secrets embedded inside it."""
if value is None:
return ""
return _esc(scrub_text(str(value)))
def _bool_badge(
value: bool, *, true_label: str = "yes", false_label: str = "no"
) -> str:
css = "badge-ok" if value else "badge-blocked"
label = true_label if value else false_label
return f'<span class="badge {css}">{_esc(label)}</span>'
def _source_badge(source: SourceStatus) -> str:
css = "badge-ok" if source.available else "badge-blocked"
badge = f'<span class="badge {css}">{_esc(source.status)}</span>'
if source.detail:
badge += f' <span class="muted">{_esc_text(source.detail)}</span>'
return badge
def _notes_block(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
if not snapshot.notes:
return ""
items = "".join(f"<li>{_esc_text(note)}</li>" for note in snapshot.notes)
return f"<ul class='reasons'>{items}</ul>"
def _impact_section(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
head = (
"<section class='health-card'>"
f"<h3>Impact preview {_source_badge(snapshot.impact_source)}</h3>"
)
impact = snapshot.impact
if impact is None:
return (
head
+ "<p class='muted'>No impact preview is available, so the blast "
"radius of a restart is unknown. Treat this as unsafe.</p></section>"
)
counts = impact.get("counts") or {}
verdict = str(impact.get("verdict") or "unknown")
verdict_css = "badge-ok" if verdict == "safe" else "badge-blocked"
rows = "".join(
f"<tr><th>{_esc(key.replace('_', ' '))}</th><td>{_esc(value)}</td></tr>"
for key, value in sorted(counts.items())
)
reasons = "".join(
f"<li>{_esc_text(reason)}</li>" for reason in (impact.get("reasons") or [])
)
incomplete = ""
if not impact.get("inventory_complete", False):
detail = "; ".join(str(r) for r in (impact.get("incomplete_reasons") or []))
incomplete = (
"<p class='error'><strong>Inventory incomplete:</strong> "
f"{_esc_text(detail or 'unspecified')}. The coordinator fails "
"closed on an incomplete inventory.</p>"
)
sessions = impact.get("affected_sessions") or []
session_rows = "".join(
"<tr>"
f"<td><code>{_esc(s.get('session_id'))}</code></td>"
f"<td>{_esc(s.get('role'))}</td>"
f"<td>{_esc(s.get('pid'))}</td>"
f"<td>{_bool_badge(bool(s.get('live')), true_label='live', false_label='idle')}</td>"
f"<td>{_bool_badge(not s.get('heartbeat_stale'), true_label='fresh', false_label='stale')}</td>"
"</tr>"
for s in sessions[:50]
)
session_table = (
"<h4>Sessions a restart would terminate</h4>"
"<div class='table-scroll'><table class='registry'><thead><tr>"
"<th>Session</th><th>Role</th><th>PID</th><th>State</th>"
"<th>Heartbeat</th></tr></thead><tbody>"
f"{session_rows}</tbody></table></div>"
if session_rows
else "<p class='muted'>No affected sessions reported.</p>"
)
truncated = (
f"<p class='muted'>Showing the first 50 of {_esc(len(sessions))} "
"affected sessions.</p>"
if len(sessions) > 50
else ""
)
return (
head
+ "<p class='health-headline'>Verdict "
f"<span class='badge {verdict_css}'>{_esc(verdict)}</span> · "
f"blast radius <code>{_esc(impact.get('blast_radius'))}</code> · "
f"class <code>{_esc(impact.get('restart_class'))}</code></p>"
+ incomplete
+ (f"<ul class='reasons'>{reasons}</ul>" if reasons else "")
+ (f"<table class='registry'><tbody>{rows}</tbody></table>" if rows else "")
+ session_table
+ truncated
+ "</section>"
)
def _drain_section(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
head = (
"<section class='health-card'>"
f"<h3>Drain proof {_source_badge(snapshot.drain_source)}</h3>"
)
drain = snapshot.drain
if drain is None:
return (
head
+ "<p class='muted'>No drain proof has been presented to this view. "
"The #661 gate authorizes a restart only against a valid, unexpired, "
"clean proof, so the absence of one is a denial, not a pass.</p>"
"</section>"
)
reasons = "".join(
f"<li>{_esc_text(reason)}</li>" for reason in (drain.get("reasons") or [])
)
return (
head
+ "<table class='registry'><tbody>"
f"<tr><th>Valid</th><td>{_bool_badge(bool(drain.get('valid')))}</td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Clean</th><td>{_bool_badge(bool(drain.get('clean')))}</td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Expired</th><td>{_bool_badge(not drain.get('expired'), true_label='no', false_label='yes')}</td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Tampered</th><td>{_bool_badge(not drain.get('tampered'), true_label='no', false_label='yes')}</td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Proof id</th><td><code>{_esc(drain.get('proof_id'))}</code></td></tr>"
"</tbody></table>"
+ (f"<ul class='reasons'>{reasons}</ul>" if reasons else "")
+ "</section>"
)
def _reconcile_section(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
head = (
"<section class='health-card'>"
f"<h3>Post-restart reconcile {_source_badge(snapshot.reconcile_source)}</h3>"
)
proof = snapshot.reconcile
if proof is None:
return (
head
+ "<p class='muted'>No post-restart completion proof is recorded. "
"Until one is, the last restart's recovery state is unproven.</p>"
"</section>"
)
items = "".join(
"<tr>"
f"<td>{_esc(item.get('dimension'))}</td>"
f"<td>{_esc(item.get('status'))}</td>"
f"<td>{_esc_text(item.get('summary'))}</td>"
f"<td>{_bool_badge(not item.get('follow_up_required'), true_label='no', false_label='yes')}</td>"
"</tr>"
for item in (proof.get("items") or [])
)
return (
head
+ "<p class='health-headline'>Status "
f"<code>{_esc(proof.get('overall_status'))}</code> · mode "
f"<code>{_esc(proof.get('mode'))}</code> · resolved "
f"{_esc(proof.get('resolved_count'))} · unresolved "
f"{_esc(proof.get('unresolved_count'))}</p>"
+ (
"<div class='table-scroll'><table class='registry'><thead><tr>"
"<th>Dimension</th><th>Status</th><th>Summary</th>"
"<th>Follow-up required</th></tr></thead><tbody>"
f"{items}</tbody></table></div>"
if items
else "<p class='muted'>No reconcile dimensions reported.</p>"
)
+ "</section>"
)
def _class_matrix_section(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
rows = "".join(
"<tr>"
f"<td><code>{_esc(view.restart_class)}</code></td>"
f"<td><code>{_esc(view.required_permission)}</code></td>"
f"<td>{_esc(view.expected_blast_radius)}</td>"
f"<td>{_esc(view.drain_requirement)}</td>"
f"<td>{_esc(view.approval_requirement)}</td>"
f"<td>{_bool_badge(view.viewer_may_request)}</td>"
f"<td>{_bool_badge(view.viewer_may_execute)}</td>"
"</tr>"
for view in snapshot.restart_classes
)
return (
"<section class='health-card'>"
"<h3>Restart classes</h3>"
"<p class='muted'>The least-privilege matrix each restart request is "
"resolved against. &ldquo;You may request&rdquo; and &ldquo;you may "
"execute&rdquo; are computed for the current viewer role, not for a "
"generic operator.</p>"
"<div class='table-scroll'><table class='registry'><thead><tr>"
"<th>Class</th><th>Permission</th><th>Blast radius</th>"
"<th>Drain</th><th>Approval</th><th>You may request</th>"
"<th>You may execute</th></tr></thead><tbody>"
f"{rows}</tbody></table></div>"
"</section>"
)
def _approval_section(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
rows = "".join(
"<tr>"
f"<td><code>{_esc(a.action_id)}</code></td>"
f"<td>{_esc(a.required_role)}</td>"
f"<td>{_bool_badge(a.allowed)}</td>"
f"<td>{_bool_badge(a.execution_enabled)}</td>"
f"<td><code>{_esc(a.reason_code)}</code></td>"
f"<td>{_esc_text(a.detail)}</td>"
"</tr>"
for a in snapshot.authorizations
)
return (
"<section class='health-card'>"
"<h3>Approval controls</h3>"
"<p class='muted'>Authorization is probed the way execution would probe "
"it, so &ldquo;execution enabled&rdquo; answers whether the action would "
"actually run — not merely whether this role outranks the requirement. "
"No control on this page performs the action.</p>"
"<div class='table-scroll'><table class='registry'><thead><tr>"
"<th>Action</th><th>Required role</th><th>Authorized</th>"
"<th>Execution enabled</th><th>Reason</th><th>Detail</th>"
"</tr></thead><tbody>"
f"{rows}</tbody></table></div>"
"</section>"
)
def _break_glass_section(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
bg = snapshot.break_glass
if not bg.viewer_is_privileged:
return (
"<section class='health-card'>"
"<h3>Break-glass</h3>"
"<p class='muted'>Break-glass status is visible to operator-class "
"roles only. Your role does not carry that authority, so no "
"emergency surface is shown.</p>"
"</section>"
)
return (
"<section class='health-card'>"
"<h3>Break-glass "
f"{_bool_badge(bg.available, true_label='available', false_label='unavailable')}"
"</h3>"
f"<p class='muted'>{_esc_text(bg.reason)}</p>"
f"<p class='meta'>Tracked by issue #{_esc(bg.issue)}.</p>"
"</section>"
)
def render_restart_console_page(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
"""Render the whole read-only restart console body."""
return (
"<h2>Restart status and impact</h2>"
f"<p class='meta'>Generated <code>{_esc(snapshot.generated_at)}</code> · "
f"viewer role <code>{_esc(snapshot.viewer_role)}</code> · "
f"authenticated {_bool_badge(snapshot.viewer_authenticated)} · "
f"read-only {_bool_badge(snapshot.read_only)}</p>"
+ _notes_block(snapshot)
+ _impact_section(snapshot)
+ _drain_section(snapshot)
+ _reconcile_section(snapshot)
+ _class_matrix_section(snapshot)
+ _approval_section(snapshot)
+ _break_glass_section(snapshot)
)