feat(restart): pre-restart drain proof and hard gate (#661)

Add `drain_proof.py`: a machine-verifiable DrainProof artifact plus a
fail-closed verifier and the hard gate the sanctioned restart-apply path
must consult, so a restart can never proceed on a stale or false "ready"
claim (#655 umbrella, child of #658 coordinator / #659 drain / #660
checkpoints).

- DrainProof: HMAC-SHA256 keyed proof-id over a canonical body using a
  per-process secret -> non-forgeable within the process; a proof minted in
  a prior daemon process will not verify after restart. Short TTL (120s).
- build_drain_proof(): mints the proof from the #658 impact report + the
  drain-mode outcomes. Checklist: no in-flight mutations, assignments
  stopped, checkpoints complete, handoffs ok, leases handled, acks-or-
  timeout. Every check fails closed on missing/ambiguous evidence; the
  no-in-flight-mutations and leases-handled checks are derived from the
  authoritative impact report, not self-reported.
- verify_drain_proof(): fail-closed — rejects missing, malformed, expired,
  signature-mismatched (forged/tampered/prior-process), unclean, or
  stale-fingerprint proofs; recomputes cleanliness from the checks rather
  than trusting the flag.
- gate_apply_restart(): allow only on a valid clean proof; deny -> durable
  incident descriptor; break-glass is the only bypass and is never silent.
- Checkpoint completeness is a supplied input, not a hard dependency on the
  (still-unmerged #660) checkpoint schema.

Wire the gate into gitea_request_mcp_restart: dry_run=False now enforces the
hard gate (drain_proof_json required; break-glass via request_break_glass +
GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION env). The tool still performs no
actual restart — execution remains a further child.

Tests: tests/test_drain_proof.py — 25 cases covering AC#1-4 (apply without
proof denied, successful drain verifiable, open unsafe mutation fails,
pass/fail/expired), forgery/tamper/wrong-secret/stale-fingerprint rejection,
break-glass bypass, and secret hygiene. 25/25 pass (coordinator suite
unaffected: 40/40 together).

Links #652 #653 #655 #658 #659 #660.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E7Fv9Bp2XWgvaWa4M1kdR7
(cherry picked from commit e7bcc952bb3e820fda95acbecefeaebfa5f8fcff)

drain_proof.py

@@ -0,0 +1,726 @@
+"""Pre-restart drain proof and hard gate (#661).
+
+A sanctioned MCP restart may only proceed after a machine-verifiable *drain
+proof* attests that unsafe work is clear and checkpoints are complete. Drain
+mode alone (#659) is not enough: without a proof, an apply path could still
+restart on a stale or false "ready" claim, dropping mutations and orphaning
+leases. This module defines the :class:`DrainProof` artifact, a fail-closed
+verifier, and the hard gate the sanctioned restart-apply path must consult.
+
+Design rules (mirror :mod:`restart_coordinator` / :mod:`lease_lifecycle`):
+
+* **Pure classification.** Every function here operates on already-gathered
+  inputs and returns a structured result. Nothing touches the network, the
+  filesystem, or a live process, so multi-session fixtures drive every branch.
+  This module never restarts anything; the gate only *authorizes or denies*.
+* **Fail closed.** A missing, expired, tampered, or unclean proof denies the
+  restart. Unknown checkpoint completeness is treated as *not complete*. An
+  incomplete impact report can never yield a clean proof.
+* **Non-forgeable within the process.** The proof id is a keyed hash over the
+  canonical proof contents using a per-process secret. A worker session cannot
+  hand-craft a passing proof without that secret, and a proof minted in a prior
+  daemon process will not verify after a restart (the secret is regenerated).
+* **No secrets leak.** The per-process secret never appears in a proof, an
+  ``as_dict``, an audit record, or an incident descriptor.
+
+Relationship to siblings (#655 umbrella):
+
+* **#658** ``restart_coordinator.evaluate_restart_impact`` — produces the
+  blast-radius impact report this proof consumes ("what would a restart
+  disrupt?"). ``mutations`` / ``critical_sections`` being empty is what the
+  no-in-flight-mutations check verifies.
+* **#659** graceful drain mode — performs the drain actions and calls
+  :func:`build_drain_proof` to mint the artifact once its checklist passes.
+* **#660** durable session checkpoints — supplies checkpoint completeness.
+  Because that schema may not yet be present, completeness is an *input* here,
+  never a hard table dependency; unknown fails closed.
+
+Non-goals (separate children): the emergency break-glass *workflow* (this gate
+only leaves a sanctioned bypass hole authorized elsewhere), the console UI, and
+the actual restart execution.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import os
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION = "1.0.0-issue-661"
+
+# Short default lifetime for a drain proof. A proof attests to a *point-in-time*
+# drained state; live work can resume the moment drain mode relaxes, so the
+# window in which a proof is honoured must be small (#661 security: short TTL).
+DEFAULT_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS = 120
+
+# Gate verdicts.
+GATE_ALLOW = "allow"
+GATE_DENY = "deny"
+GATE_BREAK_GLASS = "break_glass"
+
+# The mandatory drain checklist. A proof is *clean* only when every one of these
+# checks passed. Names are stable identifiers surfaced in audit + incidents.
+CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS = "no_inflight_mutations"
+CHECK_ASSIGNMENTS_STOPPED = "assignments_stopped"
+CHECK_CHECKPOINTS_COMPLETE = "checkpoints_complete"
+CHECK_HANDOFFS_OK = "handoffs_ok"
+CHECK_LEASES_HANDLED = "leases_handled"
+CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT = "acks_or_timeout"
+
+REQUIRED_CHECKS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS,
+    CHECK_ASSIGNMENTS_STOPPED,
+    CHECK_CHECKPOINTS_COMPLETE,
+    CHECK_HANDOFFS_OK,
+    CHECK_LEASES_HANDLED,
+    CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT,
+)
+
+
+def _utc_now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _parse_ts(value: str | None) -> datetime | None:
+    if not value:
+        return None
+    text = str(value).strip()
+    if not text:
+        return None
+    if text.endswith("Z"):
+        text = text[:-1] + "+00:00"
+    try:
+        dt = datetime.fromisoformat(text)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    if dt.tzinfo is None:
+        dt = dt.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    return dt
+
+
+def _canonical(payload: Any) -> str:
+    """Deterministic JSON encoding for hashing (stable key order, no spaces)."""
+
+    return json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), default=str)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Per-process secret. Generated once per daemon process; regenerated on restart.
+# Injectable for tests so build + verify share a secret. Never serialized.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+_PROCESS_SECRET = os.urandom(32)
+
+
+def process_secret() -> bytes:
+    """Return the per-process proof-signing secret (never serialized)."""
+
+    return _PROCESS_SECRET
+
+
+def _resolve_secret(secret: bytes | None) -> bytes:
+    return secret if secret is not None else _PROCESS_SECRET
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class DrainCheck:
+    """One mandatory drain checklist result."""
+
+    name: str
+    passed: bool
+    detail: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {"name": self.name, "passed": self.passed, "detail": self.detail}
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class DrainProof:
+    """Machine-verifiable proof that a restart's blast radius has been drained.
+
+    The ``proof_id`` is a keyed hash over the canonical proof body; it is the
+    tamper-evident signature verified at the gate. ``clean`` is True only when
+    every required check passed. The proof is honoured only until ``expires_at``.
+    """
+
+    version: str
+    proof_id: str
+    clean: bool
+    issued_at: str
+    expires_at: str
+    requesting_session_id: str | None
+    impact_fingerprint: str
+    checks: list[DrainCheck]
+    failed_checks: list[str]
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "version": self.version,
+            "proof_id": self.proof_id,
+            "clean": self.clean,
+            "issued_at": self.issued_at,
+            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
+            "requesting_session_id": self.requesting_session_id,
+            "impact_fingerprint": self.impact_fingerprint,
+            "checks": [c.as_dict() for c in self.checks],
+            "failed_checks": list(self.failed_checks),
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class VerifyResult:
+    """Outcome of :func:`verify_drain_proof` (fail closed)."""
+
+    valid: bool
+    reasons: list[str]
+    proof_id: str | None
+    clean: bool
+    expired: bool
+    tampered: bool
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "valid": self.valid,
+            "reasons": list(self.reasons),
+            "proof_id": self.proof_id,
+            "clean": self.clean,
+            "expired": self.expired,
+            "tampered": self.tampered,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GateDecision:
+    """Outcome of :func:`gate_apply_restart`."""
+
+    allow: bool
+    verdict: str
+    reasons: list[str]
+    proof_id: str | None
+    break_glass: bool
+    incident: dict[str, Any] | None
+    audit_record: dict[str, Any]
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "allow": self.allow,
+            "verdict": self.verdict,
+            "reasons": list(self.reasons),
+            "proof_id": self.proof_id,
+            "break_glass": self.break_glass,
+            "incident": self.incident,
+            "audit_record": dict(self.audit_record),
+        }
+
+
+def impact_fingerprint(impact_report: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> str:
+    """Stable fingerprint of the blast-radius state a proof was minted against.
+
+    Binds a proof to the specific impact evaluation. If the live state changes
+    (a new mutation appears) between minting and gate, the caller can pass the
+    fresh fingerprint and the proof will be rejected as stale.
+    """
+
+    report = impact_report or {}
+    counts = report.get("counts") or {}
+    material = {
+        "inventory_complete": bool(report.get("inventory_complete", False)),
+        "verdict": report.get("verdict"),
+        "affected_issues": sorted(report.get("affected_issues") or []),
+        "affected_prs": sorted(report.get("affected_prs") or []),
+        "mutations": sorted(
+            str(m.get("lease_id"))
+            for m in (report.get("mutations") or [])
+            if isinstance(m, Mapping)
+        ),
+        "critical_sections": sorted(
+            str(c.get("lease_id"))
+            for c in (report.get("critical_sections") or [])
+            if isinstance(c, Mapping)
+        ),
+        "terminal_lock": bool(report.get("terminal_lock")),
+        "counts": {
+            k: counts.get(k)
+            for k in (
+                "sessions_live_other",
+                "leases_disruptive",
+                "critical_sections",
+                "mutations",
+            )
+        },
+    }
+    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(material).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _sign(body: Mapping[str, Any], secret: bytes) -> str:
+    """Keyed (HMAC-SHA256) signature over the canonical proof body."""
+
+    return hmac.new(
+        secret, _canonical(body).encode("utf-8"), hashlib.sha256
+    ).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _proof_body(
+    *,
+    clean: bool,
+    issued_at: str,
+    expires_at: str,
+    requesting_session_id: str | None,
+    fingerprint: str,
+    checks: Sequence[DrainCheck],
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """The exact fields covered by the signature. Order-independent (canonical)."""
+
+    return {
+        "version": DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION,
+        "clean": clean,
+        "issued_at": issued_at,
+        "expires_at": expires_at,
+        "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
+        "impact_fingerprint": fingerprint,
+        "checks": [c.as_dict() for c in checks],
+    }
+
+
+def _bool_input(value: Any) -> bool:
+    """Strictly interpret a drain-state flag; anything not explicitly True fails."""
+
+    return value is True
+
+
+def _evaluate_checks(
+    impact_report: Mapping[str, Any],
+    drain_state: Mapping[str, Any],
+) -> list[DrainCheck]:
+    """Compute the mandatory checklist from the impact report + drain outcomes.
+
+    The report answers "is unsafe work still in flight?"; ``drain_state`` reports
+    the drain-mode actions the coordinator/#659 performed. Every check fails
+    closed when its evidence is missing or ambiguous.
+    """
+
+    checks: list[DrainCheck] = []
+
+    inventory_complete = bool(impact_report.get("inventory_complete", False))
+    mutations = list(impact_report.get("mutations") or [])
+    critical = list(impact_report.get("critical_sections") or [])
+    disruptive = [
+        l
+        for l in (impact_report.get("affected_leases") or [])
+        if isinstance(l, Mapping) and l.get("disruptive")
+    ]
+
+    # 1. No in-flight mutations. Derived from the authoritative impact report,
+    #    not self-reported: a proof cannot claim "no mutations" while the report
+    #    still shows mutations or unsevered critical sections.
+    if not inventory_complete:
+        checks.append(
+            DrainCheck(
+                CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS,
+                False,
+                "impact report inventory incomplete; cannot confirm mutations "
+                "cleared (fail closed)",
+            )
+        )
+    elif mutations or critical:
+        checks.append(
+            DrainCheck(
+                CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS,
+                False,
+                f"{len(mutations)} mutation(s) and {len(critical)} critical "
+                "section(s) still in flight",
+            )
+        )
+    else:
+        checks.append(
+            DrainCheck(
+                CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS,
+                True,
+                "no in-flight mutations or critical sections in impact report",
+            )
+        )
+
+    # 2. New assignment halted (maintenance-drain entered).
+    checks.append(
+        DrainCheck(
+            CHECK_ASSIGNMENTS_STOPPED,
+            _bool_input(drain_state.get("assignments_stopped")),
+            "new work assignment halted"
+            if _bool_input(drain_state.get("assignments_stopped"))
+            else "assignments not confirmed stopped (fail closed)",
+        )
+    )
+
+    # 3. Durable checkpoints complete (#660). Unknown => not complete.
+    cp = drain_state.get("checkpoints_complete")
+    checks.append(
+        DrainCheck(
+            CHECK_CHECKPOINTS_COMPLETE,
+            _bool_input(cp),
+            "all live sessions checkpointed"
+            if _bool_input(cp)
+            else "checkpoint completeness unconfirmed (fail closed)",
+        )
+    )
+
+    # 4. Handoffs verified.
+    checks.append(
+        DrainCheck(
+            CHECK_HANDOFFS_OK,
+            _bool_input(drain_state.get("handoffs_verified")),
+            "pending handoffs verified"
+            if _bool_input(drain_state.get("handoffs_verified"))
+            else "handoffs not verified (fail closed)",
+        )
+    )
+
+    # 5. Leases resolved/transferred/preserved AND none left disruptive. Requires
+    #    both the drain-mode assertion and the report showing no disruptive lease.
+    leases_asserted = _bool_input(drain_state.get("leases_handled"))
+    if not leases_asserted:
+        checks.append(
+            DrainCheck(
+                CHECK_LEASES_HANDLED,
+                False,
+                "lease disposition not asserted by drain (fail closed)",
+            )
+        )
+    elif disruptive:
+        checks.append(
+            DrainCheck(
+                CHECK_LEASES_HANDLED,
+                False,
+                f"{len(disruptive)} disruptive lease(s) still active in report",
+            )
+        )
+    else:
+        checks.append(
+            DrainCheck(
+                CHECK_LEASES_HANDLED,
+                True,
+                "leases resolved/transferred/preserved; none left disruptive",
+            )
+        )
+
+    # 6. Acknowledgements received, or an explicit timeout policy was applied.
+    acks = drain_state.get("acks") or {}
+    ack_values = list(acks.values()) if isinstance(acks, Mapping) else []
+    all_acked = bool(ack_values) and all(
+        str(v).strip().lower() in {"ack", "acked", "acknowledged"}
+        for v in ack_values
+    )
+    no_sessions_to_ack = isinstance(acks, Mapping) and len(ack_values) == 0
+    timeout_policy = _bool_input(drain_state.get("ack_timeout_policy_applied"))
+    acks_ok = all_acked or no_sessions_to_ack or timeout_policy
+    if acks_ok:
+        if timeout_policy and not all_acked:
+            detail = "explicit ack timeout policy applied"
+        elif no_sessions_to_ack:
+            detail = "no other live sessions required to acknowledge"
+        else:
+            detail = "all affected sessions acknowledged"
+    else:
+        detail = "outstanding acks with no timeout policy (fail closed)"
+    checks.append(DrainCheck(CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT, acks_ok, detail))
+
+    return checks
+
+
+def build_drain_proof(
+    *,
+    impact_report: Mapping[str, Any],
+    drain_state: Mapping[str, Any],
+    requesting_session_id: str | None = None,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+    ttl_seconds: int = DEFAULT_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS,
+    secret: bytes | None = None,
+) -> DrainProof:
+    """Mint a drain proof from an impact report and the drain-mode outcomes.
+
+    A successful drain (every checklist item passes) yields a *clean* proof with
+    a valid signature (AC#2). An unclean drain still yields a signed proof, but
+    with ``clean=False`` and the failing checks named — the gate will deny it —
+    so the artifact is auditable rather than silently absent.
+    """
+
+    moment = now or _utc_now()
+    ttl = max(1, int(ttl_seconds))
+    issued_at = moment.isoformat()
+    expires_at = (moment + timedelta(seconds=ttl)).isoformat()
+    fingerprint = impact_fingerprint(impact_report)
+
+    checks = _evaluate_checks(impact_report, drain_state)
+    failed = [c.name for c in checks if not c.passed]
+    clean = not failed
+
+    body = _proof_body(
+        clean=clean,
+        issued_at=issued_at,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id,
+        fingerprint=fingerprint,
+        checks=checks,
+    )
+    proof_id = _sign(body, _resolve_secret(secret))
+
+    return DrainProof(
+        version=DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION,
+        proof_id=proof_id,
+        clean=clean,
+        issued_at=issued_at,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id,
+        impact_fingerprint=fingerprint,
+        checks=checks,
+        failed_checks=failed,
+    )
+
+
+def verify_drain_proof(
+    proof: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+    *,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+    secret: bytes | None = None,
+    expected_impact_fingerprint: str | None = None,
+) -> VerifyResult:
+    """Verify a drain proof, failing closed on any doubt.
+
+    A proof is valid only when: it is present and well-formed; its signature
+    recomputes with the per-process secret (not forged/tampered, not minted in a
+    prior process); it has not expired; every required check is present and
+    passed; and — when ``expected_impact_fingerprint`` is supplied — it was
+    minted against the current blast-radius state.
+    """
+
+    moment = now or _utc_now()
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+
+    if not isinstance(proof, Mapping):
+        return VerifyResult(
+            valid=False,
+            reasons=["drain proof missing or not an object (fail closed)"],
+            proof_id=None,
+            clean=False,
+            expired=False,
+            tampered=False,
+        )
+
+    proof_id = proof.get("proof_id")
+    presented_clean = bool(proof.get("clean", False))
+
+    # Rebuild the signed body from the presented fields and re-sign. Any mutation
+    # of a covered field (including flipping ``clean`` to True) breaks the match.
+    raw_checks = proof.get("checks")
+    checks: list[DrainCheck] = []
+    checks_wellformed = isinstance(raw_checks, Sequence) and not isinstance(
+        raw_checks, (str, bytes)
+    )
+    if checks_wellformed:
+        for c in raw_checks:
+            if not isinstance(c, Mapping) or "name" not in c or "passed" not in c:
+                checks_wellformed = False
+                break
+            checks.append(
+                DrainCheck(
+                    name=str(c.get("name")),
+                    passed=bool(c.get("passed")),
+                    detail=str(c.get("detail") or ""),
+                )
+            )
+
+    tampered = False
+    if not checks_wellformed:
+        reasons.append("drain proof checks malformed (fail closed)")
+        tampered = True
+    else:
+        body = _proof_body(
+            clean=presented_clean,
+            issued_at=str(proof.get("issued_at") or ""),
+            expires_at=str(proof.get("expires_at") or ""),
+            requesting_session_id=proof.get("requesting_session_id"),
+            fingerprint=str(proof.get("impact_fingerprint") or ""),
+            checks=checks,
+        )
+        expected_sig = _sign(body, _resolve_secret(secret))
+        if not (
+            isinstance(proof_id, str)
+            and hmac.compare_digest(expected_sig, proof_id)
+        ):
+            tampered = True
+            reasons.append(
+                "drain proof signature mismatch: forged, tampered, or minted "
+                "in a prior process (fail closed)"
+            )
+
+    expires = _parse_ts(proof.get("expires_at"))
+    expired = expires is None or moment >= expires
+    if expires is None:
+        reasons.append("drain proof has no valid expiry (fail closed)")
+    elif expired:
+        reasons.append(f"drain proof expired at {proof.get('expires_at')}")
+
+    # Recompute cleanliness from the checks themselves — never trust the flag.
+    recomputed_failed = [c.name for c in checks if not c.passed]
+    present_names = {c.name for c in checks}
+    missing = [name for name in REQUIRED_CHECKS if name not in present_names]
+    recomputed_clean = checks_wellformed and not recomputed_failed and not missing
+    if missing:
+        reasons.append(f"drain proof missing required checks: {', '.join(missing)}")
+    if checks_wellformed and recomputed_failed:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"drain checks failed: {', '.join(sorted(set(recomputed_failed)))}"
+        )
+    if presented_clean and not recomputed_clean:
+        tampered = True
+        reasons.append("proof claims clean but its checks do not support it")
+
+    if expected_impact_fingerprint is not None:
+        if str(proof.get("impact_fingerprint") or "") != str(
+            expected_impact_fingerprint
+        ):
+            reasons.append(
+                "drain proof was minted against a different blast-radius state "
+                "(stale; fail closed)"
+            )
+
+    valid = (not tampered) and (not expired) and recomputed_clean and not reasons
+    return VerifyResult(
+        valid=valid,
+        reasons=reasons,
+        proof_id=proof_id if isinstance(proof_id, str) else None,
+        clean=recomputed_clean,
+        expired=expired,
+        tampered=tampered,
+    )
+
+
+def _incident_descriptor(
+    *,
+    reasons: Sequence[str],
+    requesting_session_id: str | None,
+    proof_id: str | None,
+    at: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Durable incident descriptor for a denied restart (caller creates issue).
+
+    Kept as data (not a live Gitea call) so this module stays pure and testable;
+    the MCP tool layer turns it into a durable issue via the incident bridge.
+    """
+
+    return {
+        "kind": "restart_drain_gate_denied",
+        "title": "Restart denied: drain proof failed the hard gate",
+        "labels": ["mcp-health", "safety", "stale-runtime", "workflow-hardening"],
+        "reasons": list(reasons),
+        "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
+        "proof_id": proof_id,
+        "at": at,
+        "drain_proof_version": DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION,
+    }
+
+
+def gate_apply_restart(
+    *,
+    proof: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+    secret: bytes | None = None,
+    break_glass: bool = False,
+    expected_impact_fingerprint: str | None = None,
+    requesting_session_id: str | None = None,
+) -> GateDecision:
+    """Hard gate for a sanctioned restart apply (#661 AC#1/#3).
+
+    Restart apply is authorized only with a valid, unexpired, clean drain proof.
+    A missing, expired, tampered, or unclean proof denies the restart and emits
+    a durable incident descriptor. ``break_glass`` is the *only* sanctioned
+    bypass — authorization for it is the caller's responsibility (the emergency
+    workflow is a separate child); when set, the gate allows without a proof but
+    records the bypass so it is never silent.
+    """
+
+    moment = now or _utc_now()
+    at = moment.isoformat()
+
+    if break_glass:
+        reasons = ["break-glass restart authorized; drain proof gate bypassed"]
+        audit = {
+            "event": "restart_gate_evaluated",
+            "drain_proof_version": DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION,
+            "evaluated_at": at,
+            "verdict": GATE_BREAK_GLASS,
+            "allow": True,
+            "break_glass": True,
+            "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
+            "proof_id": None,
+        }
+        return GateDecision(
+            allow=True,
+            verdict=GATE_BREAK_GLASS,
+            reasons=reasons,
+            proof_id=None,
+            break_glass=True,
+            incident=None,
+            audit_record=audit,
+        )
+
+    result = verify_drain_proof(
+        proof,
+        now=moment,
+        secret=secret,
+        expected_impact_fingerprint=expected_impact_fingerprint,
+    )
+
+    if result.valid:
+        reasons = ["valid unexpired clean drain proof present; restart authorized"]
+        audit = {
+            "event": "restart_gate_evaluated",
+            "drain_proof_version": DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION,
+            "evaluated_at": at,
+            "verdict": GATE_ALLOW,
+            "allow": True,
+            "break_glass": False,
+            "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
+            "proof_id": result.proof_id,
+        }
+        return GateDecision(
+            allow=True,
+            verdict=GATE_ALLOW,
+            reasons=reasons,
+            proof_id=result.proof_id,
+            break_glass=False,
+            incident=None,
+            audit_record=audit,
+        )
+
+    deny_reasons = ["restart denied: drain proof invalid (fail closed)"] + list(
+        result.reasons
+    )
+    incident = _incident_descriptor(
+        reasons=deny_reasons,
+        requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id,
+        proof_id=result.proof_id,
+        at=at,
+    )
+    audit = {
+        "event": "restart_gate_evaluated",
+        "drain_proof_version": DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION,
+        "evaluated_at": at,
+        "verdict": GATE_DENY,
+        "allow": False,
+        "break_glass": False,
+        "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
+        "proof_id": result.proof_id,
+        "incident_kind": incident["kind"],
+    }
+    return GateDecision(
+        allow=False,
+        verdict=GATE_DENY,
+        reasons=deny_reasons,
+        proof_id=result.proof_id,
+        break_glass=False,
+        incident=incident,
+        audit_record=audit,
+    )

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -2068,6 +2068,7 @@ import lease_lifecycle  # noqa: E402
 import lease_policy  # noqa: E402
 import workflow_dashboard  # noqa: E402  # #605 live queue/lease dashboard
 import restart_coordinator  # noqa: E402  # #658 MCP restart coordinator/impact
+import drain_proof  # noqa: E402  # #661 pre-restart drain proof and hard gate
 import incident_bridge  # noqa: E402
 import sentry_observability  # noqa: E402  (#606 optional Sentry observability)
 import sentry_incident_bridge  # noqa: E402  (#607 Sentry→Gitea incident bridge)
@@ -22342,6 +22343,8 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
     request_override: bool = False,
     session_id: str | None = None,
     limit: int = 200,
+    drain_proof_json: str | None = None,
+    request_break_glass: bool = False,
 ) -> dict:
     """Evaluate a proposed MCP restart and return an impact preview (#658).
 
@@ -22351,10 +22354,15 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
     verdict, so the console (#642/#652) and operators can see what a restart
     would disrupt *before* any concurrent LLM work is destroyed.
 
-    This tool is **dry-run and never restarts anything.** The mutative apply
-    path is a separate child gated by a drain proof (non-goal here); calling
-    with ``dry_run=False`` still performs no restart and reports that apply is
-    not yet available.
+    This tool **never restarts a process.** In dry-run (the default) it returns
+    only the impact preview. With ``dry_run=False`` it enforces the #661 hard
+    gate: the apply request must present a valid, unexpired, clean drain proof
+    (``drain_proof_json``) or it is denied and a durable incident descriptor is
+    returned under ``incident``. Break-glass is the only bypass and is honoured
+    only when ``request_break_glass`` is set *and* the environment carries
+    ``GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION``. Even an authorized gate performs
+    no restart here; actual execution is a further child. The gate outcome is
+    reported under ``apply_gate`` / ``apply_authorized``.
 
     Operator override authority is read from the process environment
     (``GITEA_OPERATOR_RESTART_OVERRIDE_AUTHORIZATION``), never self-asserted by
@@ -22473,12 +22481,54 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
     payload["requesting_session_id"] = sid
     payload["operator_override_requested"] = bool(request_override)
     payload["operator_override_authorized"] = operator_authorized
+    # Actual restart execution remains a further child; this tool never restarts
+    # a process. What #661 adds is the *hard gate*: an apply request (dry_run
+    # False) must present a valid, unexpired, clean drain proof, or it is denied
+    # and a durable incident is raised. Break-glass is the only bypass and its
+    # authorization is read from the environment, never self-asserted.
     payload["apply_supported"] = False
     if not dry_run:
-        payload["reasons"] = list(payload.get("reasons") or []) + [
-            "apply requested but not supported: sanctioned restart apply is "
-            "gated by a drain proof (separate child); no restart performed (#658)"
-        ]
+        proof_obj: dict | None = None
+        proof_parse_error: str | None = None
+        if drain_proof_json:
+            try:
+                parsed = json.loads(drain_proof_json)
+                proof_obj = parsed if isinstance(parsed, dict) else None
+                if proof_obj is None:
+                    proof_parse_error = "drain_proof_json is not a JSON object"
+            except (ValueError, TypeError) as exc:
+                proof_parse_error = f"invalid drain_proof_json: {_redact(str(exc))}"
+
+        break_glass_authorized = bool(
+            (
+                os.environ.get("GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION") or ""
+            ).strip()
+        )
+        break_glass = bool(request_break_glass and break_glass_authorized)
+
+        expected_fp = drain_proof.impact_fingerprint(report.as_dict())
+        gate = drain_proof.gate_apply_restart(
+            proof=proof_obj,
+            break_glass=break_glass,
+            expected_impact_fingerprint=expected_fp,
+            requesting_session_id=sid,
+        )
+        gate_payload = gate.as_dict()
+        if proof_parse_error and not break_glass:
+            gate_payload["reasons"] = [proof_parse_error] + list(
+                gate_payload.get("reasons") or []
+            )
+        payload["apply_gate"] = gate_payload
+        payload["apply_authorized"] = gate.allow
+        payload["break_glass_requested"] = bool(request_break_glass)
+        payload["break_glass_authorized"] = break_glass_authorized
+        # Even an authorized gate performs no restart here: execution is a later
+        # child. The gate proves the apply path *would* be permitted.
+        payload["reasons"] = list(payload.get("reasons") or []) + list(
+            gate_payload.get("reasons") or []
+        )
+        if not gate.allow and gate.incident is not None:
+            payload["incident"] = gate.incident
     return payload
 
 

requirements.txt

@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ cryptography==49.0.0
 h11==0.16.0
 httpcore==1.0.9
 httpx==0.28.1
-# Starlette 1.3.x TestClient prefers httpx2; plain httpx remains for MCP/runtime (#682).
-httpx2==2.9.1
 httpx-sse==0.4.3
 idna==3.18
 iniconfig==2.3.0

tests/test_drain_proof.py

@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
+"""Tests for the pre-restart drain proof and hard gate (#661).
+
+Covers the acceptance criteria:
+
+1. Restart apply without a proof fails closed.
+2. A successful drain produces a verifiable proof.
+3. An open unsafe mutation makes the proof fail (multi-session fixture).
+4. Pass / fail / expired verification paths.
+
+Plus the security posture: forged/tampered proofs are rejected, break-glass is
+the only bypass and is never silent, a stale blast-radius fingerprint rejects a
+proof, and no per-process secret ever leaks into a serialized artifact.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+
+import drain_proof as dp
+import restart_coordinator as rc
+
+
+NOW = datetime(2026, 7, 24, 6, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+SECRET = b"unit-test-drain-proof-secret-0123456789abcdef"
+
+
+def _live_pid() -> int:
+    return os.getpid()
+
+
+def _clean_drain_state() -> dict:
+    """Every drain action succeeded, no sessions outstanding."""
+
+    return {
+        "assignments_stopped": True,
+        "checkpoints_complete": True,
+        "handoffs_verified": True,
+        "leases_handled": True,
+        "acks": {},  # no other live sessions to acknowledge
+        "ack_timeout_policy_applied": False,
+    }
+
+
+def _safe_report() -> dict:
+    """Impact report with no other live work: a restart here is safe."""
+
+    report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+        {"sessions": [], "leases": [], "inventory_complete": True},
+        now=NOW,
+        requesting_session_id="prgs-controller-1-req",
+    )
+    return report.as_dict()
+
+
+def _unsafe_mutation_report() -> dict:
+    """Multi-session report: a second session holds a live author mutation."""
+
+    sessions = [
+        {
+            "session_id": "prgs-controller-1-req",
+            "role": "controller",
+            "profile": "prgs-controller",
+            "pid": _live_pid(),
+            "status": "active",
+            "last_heartbeat_at": NOW.isoformat(),
+        },
+        {
+            "session_id": "prgs-author-99",
+            "role": "author",
+            "profile": "prgs-author",
+            "pid": _live_pid(),
+            "status": "active",
+            "last_heartbeat_at": NOW.isoformat(),
+        },
+    ]
+    leases = [
+        {
+            "lease_id": "lease-mut",
+            "session_id": "prgs-author-99",
+            "role": "author",
+            "phase": "implementing",
+            "work_kind": "issue",
+            "work_number": 661,
+            "worktree_path": "branches/issue-661",
+            "freshness": {"freshness": "active"},
+        }
+    ]
+    report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+        {"sessions": sessions, "leases": leases, "inventory_complete": True},
+        now=NOW,
+        requesting_session_id="prgs-controller-1-req",
+    )
+    return report.as_dict()
+
+
+class BuildDrainProofTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_clean_drain_produces_verifiable_clean_proof(self):
+        """AC#2: a successful drain produces a verifiable proof."""
+
+        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=_safe_report(),
+            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
+            requesting_session_id="prgs-controller-1-req",
+            now=NOW,
+            secret=SECRET,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(proof.clean)
+        self.assertEqual(proof.failed_checks, [])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            {c.name for c in proof.checks}, set(dp.REQUIRED_CHECKS)
+        )
+        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(
+            proof.as_dict(), now=NOW, secret=SECRET
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result.valid, result.reasons)
+        self.assertFalse(result.expired)
+        self.assertFalse(result.tampered)
+
+    def test_open_mutation_makes_proof_unclean(self):
+        """AC#3: an unsafe mutation still in flight fails the proof."""
+
+        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=_unsafe_mutation_report(),
+            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
+            now=NOW,
+            secret=SECRET,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(proof.clean)
+        self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS, proof.failed_checks)
+        # Leases-handled also fails: the report still shows a disruptive lease.
+        self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_LEASES_HANDLED, proof.failed_checks)
+        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof.as_dict(), now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
+        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
+
+    def test_incomplete_inventory_fails_no_mutations_check(self):
+        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report={"inventory_complete": False},
+            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
+            now=NOW,
+            secret=SECRET,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(proof.clean)
+        self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS, proof.failed_checks)
+
+    def test_missing_checkpoint_flag_fails_closed(self):
+        state = _clean_drain_state()
+        del state["checkpoints_complete"]
+        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(proof.clean)
+        self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_CHECKPOINTS_COMPLETE, proof.failed_checks)
+
+    def test_non_true_flags_fail_closed(self):
+        """A truthy-but-not-True value (e.g. the string 'yes') must not pass."""
+
+        state = _clean_drain_state()
+        state["assignments_stopped"] = "yes"
+        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
+        )
+        self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_ASSIGNMENTS_STOPPED, proof.failed_checks)
+
+    def test_ack_timeout_policy_satisfies_ack_check(self):
+        state = _clean_drain_state()
+        state["acks"] = {"prgs-author-99": "pending"}
+        state["ack_timeout_policy_applied"] = True
+        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
+        )
+        names = {c.name: c.passed for c in proof.checks}
+        self.assertTrue(names[dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT])
+
+    def test_outstanding_acks_without_timeout_fail(self):
+        state = _clean_drain_state()
+        state["acks"] = {"prgs-author-99": "pending"}
+        state["ack_timeout_policy_applied"] = False
+        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
+        )
+        self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT, proof.failed_checks)
+
+    def test_all_acked_satisfies_ack_check(self):
+        state = _clean_drain_state()
+        state["acks"] = {"prgs-author-99": "acked", "prgs-author-2": "acknowledged"}
+        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
+        )
+        names = {c.name: c.passed for c in proof.checks}
+        self.assertTrue(names[dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT])
+
+
+class VerifyDrainProofTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def _clean_proof_dict(self) -> dict:
+        return dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=_safe_report(),
+            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
+            now=NOW,
+            secret=SECRET,
+        ).as_dict()
+
+    def test_missing_proof_is_invalid(self):
+        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(None, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
+        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
+        self.assertIsNone(result.proof_id)
+
+    def test_expired_proof_is_invalid(self):
+        """AC#4: an expired proof fails verification."""
+
+        proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
+        later = NOW + timedelta(seconds=dp.DEFAULT_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS + 1)
+        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof, now=later, secret=SECRET)
+        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
+        self.assertTrue(result.expired)
+
+    def test_proof_valid_just_before_expiry(self):
+        proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
+        almost = NOW + timedelta(seconds=dp.DEFAULT_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS - 1)
+        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof, now=almost, secret=SECRET)
+        self.assertTrue(result.valid, result.reasons)
+
+    def test_wrong_secret_rejected(self):
+        """A proof minted in a prior process (different secret) will not verify."""
+
+        proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
+        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof, now=NOW, secret=b"other-secret")
+        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
+        self.assertTrue(result.tampered)
+
+    def test_flipping_clean_flag_is_detected(self):
+        """Forging clean=True on an unclean proof breaks the signature."""
+
+        unclean = dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=_unsafe_mutation_report(),
+            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
+            now=NOW,
+            secret=SECRET,
+        ).as_dict()
+        self.assertFalse(unclean["clean"])
+        unclean["clean"] = True  # forge
+        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(unclean, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
+        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
+        self.assertTrue(result.tampered)
+
+    def test_tampering_a_check_is_detected(self):
+        unclean = dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=_unsafe_mutation_report(),
+            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
+            now=NOW,
+            secret=SECRET,
+        ).as_dict()
+        for c in unclean["checks"]:
+            if c["name"] == dp.CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS:
+                c["passed"] = True  # forge the failing check to pass
+        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(unclean, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
+        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
+        self.assertTrue(result.tampered)
+
+    def test_missing_required_check_rejected(self):
+        proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
+        proof["checks"] = [
+            c for c in proof["checks"] if c["name"] != dp.CHECK_HANDOFFS_OK
+        ]
+        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
+        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
+
+    def test_stale_fingerprint_rejected(self):
+        proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
+        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(
+            proof,
+            now=NOW,
+            secret=SECRET,
+            expected_impact_fingerprint="deadbeef",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
+
+    def test_matching_fingerprint_accepted(self):
+        report = _safe_report()
+        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=report,
+            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
+            now=NOW,
+            secret=SECRET,
+        ).as_dict()
+        fp = dp.impact_fingerprint(report)
+        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(
+            proof, now=NOW, secret=SECRET, expected_impact_fingerprint=fp
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result.valid, result.reasons)
+
+
+class GateApplyRestartTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def _clean_proof_dict(self) -> dict:
+        return dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=_safe_report(),
+            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
+            now=NOW,
+            secret=SECRET,
+        ).as_dict()
+
+    def test_apply_without_proof_denied(self):
+        """AC#1: restart apply without a proof fails closed + raises incident."""
+
+        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(proof=None, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
+        self.assertEqual(decision.verdict, dp.GATE_DENY)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(decision.incident)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            decision.incident["kind"], "restart_drain_gate_denied"
+        )
+
+    def test_apply_with_valid_proof_allowed(self):
+        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
+            proof=self._clean_proof_dict(), now=NOW, secret=SECRET
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(decision.allow)
+        self.assertEqual(decision.verdict, dp.GATE_ALLOW)
+        self.assertIsNone(decision.incident)
+
+    def test_apply_with_expired_proof_denied_with_incident(self):
+        later = NOW + timedelta(seconds=dp.DEFAULT_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS + 5)
+        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
+            proof=self._clean_proof_dict(), now=later, secret=SECRET
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(decision.incident)
+
+    def test_apply_with_unclean_proof_denied(self):
+        """AC#3 at the gate: an unsafe-mutation proof is denied."""
+
+        unclean = dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=_unsafe_mutation_report(),
+            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
+            now=NOW,
+            secret=SECRET,
+        ).as_dict()
+        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(proof=unclean, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(decision.incident)
+
+    def test_break_glass_allows_without_proof_but_records_bypass(self):
+        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
+            proof=None, now=NOW, secret=SECRET, break_glass=True
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(decision.allow)
+        self.assertEqual(decision.verdict, dp.GATE_BREAK_GLASS)
+        self.assertTrue(decision.break_glass)
+        self.assertIsNone(decision.incident)
+        self.assertTrue(decision.audit_record["break_glass"])
+
+    def test_denied_gate_carries_stale_fingerprint_reason(self):
+        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
+            proof=self._clean_proof_dict(),
+            now=NOW,
+            secret=SECRET,
+            expected_impact_fingerprint="not-the-fingerprint",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
+
+
+class SecretHygieneTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_secret_never_serialized(self):
+        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=_safe_report(),
+            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
+            now=NOW,
+            secret=SECRET,
+        )
+        blob = dp._canonical(proof.as_dict())
+        self.assertNotIn(SECRET.decode(), blob)
+        # The signature is a hex digest, not the raw secret.
+        self.assertNotIn(SECRET.hex(), blob)
+
+    def test_incident_descriptor_has_no_secret(self):
+        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(proof=None, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
+        blob = dp._canonical(decision.incident)
+        self.assertNotIn(SECRET.decode(), blob)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_682_starlette_httpx2.py

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-"""Starlette TestClient uses httpx2 without deprecation warning (#682)."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import importlib
-import sys
-import unittest
-import warnings
-from pathlib import Path
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-
-class TestHttpx2Installed(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_httpx2_importable(self) -> None:
-        httpx2 = importlib.import_module("httpx2")
-        self.assertTrue(hasattr(httpx2, "Client") or hasattr(httpx2, "AsyncClient"))
-
-
-class TestNoStarletteTestClientDeprecation(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_starlette_testclient_import_does_not_warn(self) -> None:
-        # Force a fresh import path so a previous httpx-fallback warning cannot
-        # hide a regression after httpx2 is present. Restore sys.modules afterwards.
-        saved = {
-            name: sys.modules[name]
-            for name in list(sys.modules)
-            if name == "starlette.testclient" or name.startswith("starlette.testclient.")
-        }
-        try:
-            for name in list(saved):
-                del sys.modules[name]
-
-            with warnings.catch_warnings(record=True) as caught:
-                warnings.simplefilter("always")
-                import starlette.testclient as testclient  # noqa: F401
-
-            dep = [
-                w
-                for w in caught
-                if "httpx" in str(w.message).lower()
-                and "deprecated" in str(w.message).lower()
-            ]
-            self.assertEqual(
-                dep,
-                [],
-                f"expected no Starlette httpx deprecation warning; got: "
-                f"{[str(w.message) for w in dep]}",
-            )
-        finally:
-            sys.modules.update(saved)
-
-    def test_canonical_webui_testclient_import(self) -> None:
-        with warnings.catch_warnings(record=True) as caught:
-            warnings.simplefilter("always")
-            from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
-            from webui.app import create_app
-
-            client = TestClient(create_app())
-            response = client.get("/")
-            self.assertIn(response.status_code, {200, 302, 404})
-
-        dep = [
-            w
-            for w in caught
-            if "httpx" in str(w.message).lower()
-            and "deprecated" in str(w.message).lower()
-        ]
-        self.assertEqual(dep, [], [str(w.message) for w in dep])
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_analytics.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import os
 import tempfile
 import unittest
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 import control_plane_db
 from webui.analytics_loader import (

tests/test_webui_audit.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.audit_validator import audit_report, infer_task_kind

tests/test_webui_console_authz_audit.py

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import sys
 import tempfile
 import unittest
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
 

tests/test_webui_deployment_boundary.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.deployment_boundary import (

tests/test_webui_gated_actions.py

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from unittest.mock import patch
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP
 from webui.app import create_app

tests/test_webui_inventory.py

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 import control_plane_db
 from webui.app import create_app

tests/test_webui_lease_visibility.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.lease_loader import (

tests/test_webui_mvp_suite.py

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 from starlette.routing import Route
 
 from webui.app import create_app

tests/test_webui_project_registry.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.project_registry import (

tests/test_webui_prompt_library.py

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.prompt_library import find_prompt, library_to_dict, load_prompt_library, prompt_to_dict

tests/test_webui_queue_dashboard.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from unittest import mock
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.queue_loader import (

tests/test_webui_runtime_health.py

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from unittest import mock
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.runtime_health import _role_kind, load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict

tests/test_webui_shell.py

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
 from starlette.routing import Route
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui import layout
 from webui.app import create_app

tests/test_webui_skeleton.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 

tests/test_webui_system_health.py

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ from unittest import mock
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 import control_plane_db
 from webui.app import create_app

tests/test_webui_system_health_dashboard.py

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.deployment_boundary import scan_text_for_client_secrets

tests/test_webui_timeline.py

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 import control_plane_db
 from canonical_thread_handoff import (

tests/test_webui_worktree_hygiene.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.worktree_scanner import (

tests/webui_testclient.py

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-"""Canonical Web UI ``TestClient`` import for the Gitea-Tools suite (#682).
-
-Starlette 1.3+ builds ``starlette.testclient.TestClient`` on ``httpx2``.
-Plain ``httpx`` still works but emits ``StarletteDeprecationWarning``.
-
-All Web UI tests import ``TestClient`` from this module so:
-
-* dependency intent is single-sourced (``httpx2`` in ``requirements.txt``);
-* a future client-construction helper has one place to land;
-* import-site audits do not need to re-scan every ``test_webui_*.py``.
-
-Runtime MCP / FastMCP code continues to use ``httpx``; this module is
-test-only and does not change production clients.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
-
-__all__ = ["TestClient"]