fix(webui): package-qualify webui_testclient import across test suite (Closes #682)

Starlette 1.3.x prefers httpx2 for starlette.testclient.TestClient; plain
httpx still works but emits StarletteDeprecationWarning.

- Pin httpx2==2.9.1 (keep httpx for MCP/runtime)
- Centralize Web UI TestClient import via tests/webui_testclient.py
- Point all test_webui_* modules at the helper
- Add regression tests that the deprecation warning is gone

Closes #682

drain_proof.py

@@ -1,726 +0,0 @@
-"""Pre-restart drain proof and hard gate (#661).
-
-A sanctioned MCP restart may only proceed after a machine-verifiable *drain
-proof* attests that unsafe work is clear and checkpoints are complete. Drain
-mode alone (#659) is not enough: without a proof, an apply path could still
-restart on a stale or false "ready" claim, dropping mutations and orphaning
-leases. This module defines the :class:`DrainProof` artifact, a fail-closed
-verifier, and the hard gate the sanctioned restart-apply path must consult.
-
-Design rules (mirror :mod:`restart_coordinator` / :mod:`lease_lifecycle`):
-
-* **Pure classification.** Every function here operates on already-gathered
-  inputs and returns a structured result. Nothing touches the network, the
-  filesystem, or a live process, so multi-session fixtures drive every branch.
-  This module never restarts anything; the gate only *authorizes or denies*.
-* **Fail closed.** A missing, expired, tampered, or unclean proof denies the
-  restart. Unknown checkpoint completeness is treated as *not complete*. An
-  incomplete impact report can never yield a clean proof.
-* **Non-forgeable within the process.** The proof id is a keyed hash over the
-  canonical proof contents using a per-process secret. A worker session cannot
-  hand-craft a passing proof without that secret, and a proof minted in a prior
-  daemon process will not verify after a restart (the secret is regenerated).
-* **No secrets leak.** The per-process secret never appears in a proof, an
-  ``as_dict``, an audit record, or an incident descriptor.
-
-Relationship to siblings (#655 umbrella):
-
-* **#658** ``restart_coordinator.evaluate_restart_impact`` — produces the
-  blast-radius impact report this proof consumes ("what would a restart
-  disrupt?"). ``mutations`` / ``critical_sections`` being empty is what the
-  no-in-flight-mutations check verifies.
-* **#659** graceful drain mode — performs the drain actions and calls
-  :func:`build_drain_proof` to mint the artifact once its checklist passes.
-* **#660** durable session checkpoints — supplies checkpoint completeness.
-  Because that schema may not yet be present, completeness is an *input* here,
-  never a hard table dependency; unknown fails closed.
-
-Non-goals (separate children): the emergency break-glass *workflow* (this gate
-only leaves a sanctioned bypass hole authorized elsewhere), the console UI, and
-the actual restart execution.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import hmac
-import json
-import os
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
-
-DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION = "1.0.0-issue-661"
-
-# Short default lifetime for a drain proof. A proof attests to a *point-in-time*
-# drained state; live work can resume the moment drain mode relaxes, so the
-# window in which a proof is honoured must be small (#661 security: short TTL).
-DEFAULT_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS = 120
-
-# Gate verdicts.
-GATE_ALLOW = "allow"
-GATE_DENY = "deny"
-GATE_BREAK_GLASS = "break_glass"
-
-# The mandatory drain checklist. A proof is *clean* only when every one of these
-# checks passed. Names are stable identifiers surfaced in audit + incidents.
-CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS = "no_inflight_mutations"
-CHECK_ASSIGNMENTS_STOPPED = "assignments_stopped"
-CHECK_CHECKPOINTS_COMPLETE = "checkpoints_complete"
-CHECK_HANDOFFS_OK = "handoffs_ok"
-CHECK_LEASES_HANDLED = "leases_handled"
-CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT = "acks_or_timeout"
-
-REQUIRED_CHECKS: tuple[str, ...] = (
-    CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS,
-    CHECK_ASSIGNMENTS_STOPPED,
-    CHECK_CHECKPOINTS_COMPLETE,
-    CHECK_HANDOFFS_OK,
-    CHECK_LEASES_HANDLED,
-    CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT,
-)
-
-
-def _utc_now() -> datetime:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-
-
-def _parse_ts(value: str | None) -> datetime | None:
-    if not value:
-        return None
-    text = str(value).strip()
-    if not text:
-        return None
-    if text.endswith("Z"):
-        text = text[:-1] + "+00:00"
-    try:
-        dt = datetime.fromisoformat(text)
-    except ValueError:
-        return None
-    if dt.tzinfo is None:
-        dt = dt.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-    return dt
-
-
-def _canonical(payload: Any) -> str:
-    """Deterministic JSON encoding for hashing (stable key order, no spaces)."""
-
-    return json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), default=str)
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Per-process secret. Generated once per daemon process; regenerated on restart.
-# Injectable for tests so build + verify share a secret. Never serialized.
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-_PROCESS_SECRET = os.urandom(32)
-
-
-def process_secret() -> bytes:
-    """Return the per-process proof-signing secret (never serialized)."""
-
-    return _PROCESS_SECRET
-
-
-def _resolve_secret(secret: bytes | None) -> bytes:
-    return secret if secret is not None else _PROCESS_SECRET
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class DrainCheck:
-    """One mandatory drain checklist result."""
-
-    name: str
-    passed: bool
-    detail: str
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {"name": self.name, "passed": self.passed, "detail": self.detail}
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class DrainProof:
-    """Machine-verifiable proof that a restart's blast radius has been drained.
-
-    The ``proof_id`` is a keyed hash over the canonical proof body; it is the
-    tamper-evident signature verified at the gate. ``clean`` is True only when
-    every required check passed. The proof is honoured only until ``expires_at``.
-    """
-
-    version: str
-    proof_id: str
-    clean: bool
-    issued_at: str
-    expires_at: str
-    requesting_session_id: str | None
-    impact_fingerprint: str
-    checks: list[DrainCheck]
-    failed_checks: list[str]
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "version": self.version,
-            "proof_id": self.proof_id,
-            "clean": self.clean,
-            "issued_at": self.issued_at,
-            "expires_at": self.expires_at,
-            "requesting_session_id": self.requesting_session_id,
-            "impact_fingerprint": self.impact_fingerprint,
-            "checks": [c.as_dict() for c in self.checks],
-            "failed_checks": list(self.failed_checks),
-        }
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class VerifyResult:
-    """Outcome of :func:`verify_drain_proof` (fail closed)."""
-
-    valid: bool
-    reasons: list[str]
-    proof_id: str | None
-    clean: bool
-    expired: bool
-    tampered: bool
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "valid": self.valid,
-            "reasons": list(self.reasons),
-            "proof_id": self.proof_id,
-            "clean": self.clean,
-            "expired": self.expired,
-            "tampered": self.tampered,
-        }
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class GateDecision:
-    """Outcome of :func:`gate_apply_restart`."""
-
-    allow: bool
-    verdict: str
-    reasons: list[str]
-    proof_id: str | None
-    break_glass: bool
-    incident: dict[str, Any] | None
-    audit_record: dict[str, Any]
-
-    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "allow": self.allow,
-            "verdict": self.verdict,
-            "reasons": list(self.reasons),
-            "proof_id": self.proof_id,
-            "break_glass": self.break_glass,
-            "incident": self.incident,
-            "audit_record": dict(self.audit_record),
-        }
-
-
-def impact_fingerprint(impact_report: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> str:
-    """Stable fingerprint of the blast-radius state a proof was minted against.
-
-    Binds a proof to the specific impact evaluation. If the live state changes
-    (a new mutation appears) between minting and gate, the caller can pass the
-    fresh fingerprint and the proof will be rejected as stale.
-    """
-
-    report = impact_report or {}
-    counts = report.get("counts") or {}
-    material = {
-        "inventory_complete": bool(report.get("inventory_complete", False)),
-        "verdict": report.get("verdict"),
-        "affected_issues": sorted(report.get("affected_issues") or []),
-        "affected_prs": sorted(report.get("affected_prs") or []),
-        "mutations": sorted(
-            str(m.get("lease_id"))
-            for m in (report.get("mutations") or [])
-            if isinstance(m, Mapping)
-        ),
-        "critical_sections": sorted(
-            str(c.get("lease_id"))
-            for c in (report.get("critical_sections") or [])
-            if isinstance(c, Mapping)
-        ),
-        "terminal_lock": bool(report.get("terminal_lock")),
-        "counts": {
-            k: counts.get(k)
-            for k in (
-                "sessions_live_other",
-                "leases_disruptive",
-                "critical_sections",
-                "mutations",
-            )
-        },
-    }
-    return hashlib.sha256(_canonical(material).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
-
-
-def _sign(body: Mapping[str, Any], secret: bytes) -> str:
-    """Keyed (HMAC-SHA256) signature over the canonical proof body."""
-
-    return hmac.new(
-        secret, _canonical(body).encode("utf-8"), hashlib.sha256
-    ).hexdigest()
-
-
-def _proof_body(
-    *,
-    clean: bool,
-    issued_at: str,
-    expires_at: str,
-    requesting_session_id: str | None,
-    fingerprint: str,
-    checks: Sequence[DrainCheck],
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """The exact fields covered by the signature. Order-independent (canonical)."""
-
-    return {
-        "version": DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION,
-        "clean": clean,
-        "issued_at": issued_at,
-        "expires_at": expires_at,
-        "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
-        "impact_fingerprint": fingerprint,
-        "checks": [c.as_dict() for c in checks],
-    }
-
-
-def _bool_input(value: Any) -> bool:
-    """Strictly interpret a drain-state flag; anything not explicitly True fails."""
-
-    return value is True
-
-
-def _evaluate_checks(
-    impact_report: Mapping[str, Any],
-    drain_state: Mapping[str, Any],
-) -> list[DrainCheck]:
-    """Compute the mandatory checklist from the impact report + drain outcomes.
-
-    The report answers "is unsafe work still in flight?"; ``drain_state`` reports
-    the drain-mode actions the coordinator/#659 performed. Every check fails
-    closed when its evidence is missing or ambiguous.
-    """
-
-    checks: list[DrainCheck] = []
-
-    inventory_complete = bool(impact_report.get("inventory_complete", False))
-    mutations = list(impact_report.get("mutations") or [])
-    critical = list(impact_report.get("critical_sections") or [])
-    disruptive = [
-        l
-        for l in (impact_report.get("affected_leases") or [])
-        if isinstance(l, Mapping) and l.get("disruptive")
-    ]
-
-    # 1. No in-flight mutations. Derived from the authoritative impact report,
-    #    not self-reported: a proof cannot claim "no mutations" while the report
-    #    still shows mutations or unsevered critical sections.
-    if not inventory_complete:
-        checks.append(
-            DrainCheck(
-                CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS,
-                False,
-                "impact report inventory incomplete; cannot confirm mutations "
-                "cleared (fail closed)",
-            )
-        )
-    elif mutations or critical:
-        checks.append(
-            DrainCheck(
-                CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS,
-                False,
-                f"{len(mutations)} mutation(s) and {len(critical)} critical "
-                "section(s) still in flight",
-            )
-        )
-    else:
-        checks.append(
-            DrainCheck(
-                CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS,
-                True,
-                "no in-flight mutations or critical sections in impact report",
-            )
-        )
-
-    # 2. New assignment halted (maintenance-drain entered).
-    checks.append(
-        DrainCheck(
-            CHECK_ASSIGNMENTS_STOPPED,
-            _bool_input(drain_state.get("assignments_stopped")),
-            "new work assignment halted"
-            if _bool_input(drain_state.get("assignments_stopped"))
-            else "assignments not confirmed stopped (fail closed)",
-        )
-    )
-
-    # 3. Durable checkpoints complete (#660). Unknown => not complete.
-    cp = drain_state.get("checkpoints_complete")
-    checks.append(
-        DrainCheck(
-            CHECK_CHECKPOINTS_COMPLETE,
-            _bool_input(cp),
-            "all live sessions checkpointed"
-            if _bool_input(cp)
-            else "checkpoint completeness unconfirmed (fail closed)",
-        )
-    )
-
-    # 4. Handoffs verified.
-    checks.append(
-        DrainCheck(
-            CHECK_HANDOFFS_OK,
-            _bool_input(drain_state.get("handoffs_verified")),
-            "pending handoffs verified"
-            if _bool_input(drain_state.get("handoffs_verified"))
-            else "handoffs not verified (fail closed)",
-        )
-    )
-
-    # 5. Leases resolved/transferred/preserved AND none left disruptive. Requires
-    #    both the drain-mode assertion and the report showing no disruptive lease.
-    leases_asserted = _bool_input(drain_state.get("leases_handled"))
-    if not leases_asserted:
-        checks.append(
-            DrainCheck(
-                CHECK_LEASES_HANDLED,
-                False,
-                "lease disposition not asserted by drain (fail closed)",
-            )
-        )
-    elif disruptive:
-        checks.append(
-            DrainCheck(
-                CHECK_LEASES_HANDLED,
-                False,
-                f"{len(disruptive)} disruptive lease(s) still active in report",
-            )
-        )
-    else:
-        checks.append(
-            DrainCheck(
-                CHECK_LEASES_HANDLED,
-                True,
-                "leases resolved/transferred/preserved; none left disruptive",
-            )
-        )
-
-    # 6. Acknowledgements received, or an explicit timeout policy was applied.
-    acks = drain_state.get("acks") or {}
-    ack_values = list(acks.values()) if isinstance(acks, Mapping) else []
-    all_acked = bool(ack_values) and all(
-        str(v).strip().lower() in {"ack", "acked", "acknowledged"}
-        for v in ack_values
-    )
-    no_sessions_to_ack = isinstance(acks, Mapping) and len(ack_values) == 0
-    timeout_policy = _bool_input(drain_state.get("ack_timeout_policy_applied"))
-    acks_ok = all_acked or no_sessions_to_ack or timeout_policy
-    if acks_ok:
-        if timeout_policy and not all_acked:
-            detail = "explicit ack timeout policy applied"
-        elif no_sessions_to_ack:
-            detail = "no other live sessions required to acknowledge"
-        else:
-            detail = "all affected sessions acknowledged"
-    else:
-        detail = "outstanding acks with no timeout policy (fail closed)"
-    checks.append(DrainCheck(CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT, acks_ok, detail))
-
-    return checks
-
-
-def build_drain_proof(
-    *,
-    impact_report: Mapping[str, Any],
-    drain_state: Mapping[str, Any],
-    requesting_session_id: str | None = None,
-    now: datetime | None = None,
-    ttl_seconds: int = DEFAULT_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS,
-    secret: bytes | None = None,
-) -> DrainProof:
-    """Mint a drain proof from an impact report and the drain-mode outcomes.
-
-    A successful drain (every checklist item passes) yields a *clean* proof with
-    a valid signature (AC#2). An unclean drain still yields a signed proof, but
-    with ``clean=False`` and the failing checks named — the gate will deny it —
-    so the artifact is auditable rather than silently absent.
-    """
-
-    moment = now or _utc_now()
-    ttl = max(1, int(ttl_seconds))
-    issued_at = moment.isoformat()
-    expires_at = (moment + timedelta(seconds=ttl)).isoformat()
-    fingerprint = impact_fingerprint(impact_report)
-
-    checks = _evaluate_checks(impact_report, drain_state)
-    failed = [c.name for c in checks if not c.passed]
-    clean = not failed
-
-    body = _proof_body(
-        clean=clean,
-        issued_at=issued_at,
-        expires_at=expires_at,
-        requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id,
-        fingerprint=fingerprint,
-        checks=checks,
-    )
-    proof_id = _sign(body, _resolve_secret(secret))
-
-    return DrainProof(
-        version=DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION,
-        proof_id=proof_id,
-        clean=clean,
-        issued_at=issued_at,
-        expires_at=expires_at,
-        requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id,
-        impact_fingerprint=fingerprint,
-        checks=checks,
-        failed_checks=failed,
-    )
-
-
-def verify_drain_proof(
-    proof: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
-    *,
-    now: datetime | None = None,
-    secret: bytes | None = None,
-    expected_impact_fingerprint: str | None = None,
-) -> VerifyResult:
-    """Verify a drain proof, failing closed on any doubt.
-
-    A proof is valid only when: it is present and well-formed; its signature
-    recomputes with the per-process secret (not forged/tampered, not minted in a
-    prior process); it has not expired; every required check is present and
-    passed; and — when ``expected_impact_fingerprint`` is supplied — it was
-    minted against the current blast-radius state.
-    """
-
-    moment = now or _utc_now()
-    reasons: list[str] = []
-
-    if not isinstance(proof, Mapping):
-        return VerifyResult(
-            valid=False,
-            reasons=["drain proof missing or not an object (fail closed)"],
-            proof_id=None,
-            clean=False,
-            expired=False,
-            tampered=False,
-        )
-
-    proof_id = proof.get("proof_id")
-    presented_clean = bool(proof.get("clean", False))
-
-    # Rebuild the signed body from the presented fields and re-sign. Any mutation
-    # of a covered field (including flipping ``clean`` to True) breaks the match.
-    raw_checks = proof.get("checks")
-    checks: list[DrainCheck] = []
-    checks_wellformed = isinstance(raw_checks, Sequence) and not isinstance(
-        raw_checks, (str, bytes)
-    )
-    if checks_wellformed:
-        for c in raw_checks:
-            if not isinstance(c, Mapping) or "name" not in c or "passed" not in c:
-                checks_wellformed = False
-                break
-            checks.append(
-                DrainCheck(
-                    name=str(c.get("name")),
-                    passed=bool(c.get("passed")),
-                    detail=str(c.get("detail") or ""),
-                )
-            )
-
-    tampered = False
-    if not checks_wellformed:
-        reasons.append("drain proof checks malformed (fail closed)")
-        tampered = True
-    else:
-        body = _proof_body(
-            clean=presented_clean,
-            issued_at=str(proof.get("issued_at") or ""),
-            expires_at=str(proof.get("expires_at") or ""),
-            requesting_session_id=proof.get("requesting_session_id"),
-            fingerprint=str(proof.get("impact_fingerprint") or ""),
-            checks=checks,
-        )
-        expected_sig = _sign(body, _resolve_secret(secret))
-        if not (
-            isinstance(proof_id, str)
-            and hmac.compare_digest(expected_sig, proof_id)
-        ):
-            tampered = True
-            reasons.append(
-                "drain proof signature mismatch: forged, tampered, or minted "
-                "in a prior process (fail closed)"
-            )
-
-    expires = _parse_ts(proof.get("expires_at"))
-    expired = expires is None or moment >= expires
-    if expires is None:
-        reasons.append("drain proof has no valid expiry (fail closed)")
-    elif expired:
-        reasons.append(f"drain proof expired at {proof.get('expires_at')}")
-
-    # Recompute cleanliness from the checks themselves — never trust the flag.
-    recomputed_failed = [c.name for c in checks if not c.passed]
-    present_names = {c.name for c in checks}
-    missing = [name for name in REQUIRED_CHECKS if name not in present_names]
-    recomputed_clean = checks_wellformed and not recomputed_failed and not missing
-    if missing:
-        reasons.append(f"drain proof missing required checks: {', '.join(missing)}")
-    if checks_wellformed and recomputed_failed:
-        reasons.append(
-            f"drain checks failed: {', '.join(sorted(set(recomputed_failed)))}"
-        )
-    if presented_clean and not recomputed_clean:
-        tampered = True
-        reasons.append("proof claims clean but its checks do not support it")
-
-    if expected_impact_fingerprint is not None:
-        if str(proof.get("impact_fingerprint") or "") != str(
-            expected_impact_fingerprint
-        ):
-            reasons.append(
-                "drain proof was minted against a different blast-radius state "
-                "(stale; fail closed)"
-            )
-
-    valid = (not tampered) and (not expired) and recomputed_clean and not reasons
-    return VerifyResult(
-        valid=valid,
-        reasons=reasons,
-        proof_id=proof_id if isinstance(proof_id, str) else None,
-        clean=recomputed_clean,
-        expired=expired,
-        tampered=tampered,
-    )
-
-
-def _incident_descriptor(
-    *,
-    reasons: Sequence[str],
-    requesting_session_id: str | None,
-    proof_id: str | None,
-    at: str,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Durable incident descriptor for a denied restart (caller creates issue).
-
-    Kept as data (not a live Gitea call) so this module stays pure and testable;
-    the MCP tool layer turns it into a durable issue via the incident bridge.
-    """
-
-    return {
-        "kind": "restart_drain_gate_denied",
-        "title": "Restart denied: drain proof failed the hard gate",
-        "labels": ["mcp-health", "safety", "stale-runtime", "workflow-hardening"],
-        "reasons": list(reasons),
-        "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
-        "proof_id": proof_id,
-        "at": at,
-        "drain_proof_version": DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION,
-    }
-
-
-def gate_apply_restart(
-    *,
-    proof: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
-    now: datetime | None = None,
-    secret: bytes | None = None,
-    break_glass: bool = False,
-    expected_impact_fingerprint: str | None = None,
-    requesting_session_id: str | None = None,
-) -> GateDecision:
-    """Hard gate for a sanctioned restart apply (#661 AC#1/#3).
-
-    Restart apply is authorized only with a valid, unexpired, clean drain proof.
-    A missing, expired, tampered, or unclean proof denies the restart and emits
-    a durable incident descriptor. ``break_glass`` is the *only* sanctioned
-    bypass — authorization for it is the caller's responsibility (the emergency
-    workflow is a separate child); when set, the gate allows without a proof but
-    records the bypass so it is never silent.
-    """
-
-    moment = now or _utc_now()
-    at = moment.isoformat()
-
-    if break_glass:
-        reasons = ["break-glass restart authorized; drain proof gate bypassed"]
-        audit = {
-            "event": "restart_gate_evaluated",
-            "drain_proof_version": DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION,
-            "evaluated_at": at,
-            "verdict": GATE_BREAK_GLASS,
-            "allow": True,
-            "break_glass": True,
-            "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
-            "proof_id": None,
-        }
-        return GateDecision(
-            allow=True,
-            verdict=GATE_BREAK_GLASS,
-            reasons=reasons,
-            proof_id=None,
-            break_glass=True,
-            incident=None,
-            audit_record=audit,
-        )
-
-    result = verify_drain_proof(
-        proof,
-        now=moment,
-        secret=secret,
-        expected_impact_fingerprint=expected_impact_fingerprint,
-    )
-
-    if result.valid:
-        reasons = ["valid unexpired clean drain proof present; restart authorized"]
-        audit = {
-            "event": "restart_gate_evaluated",
-            "drain_proof_version": DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION,
-            "evaluated_at": at,
-            "verdict": GATE_ALLOW,
-            "allow": True,
-            "break_glass": False,
-            "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
-            "proof_id": result.proof_id,
-        }
-        return GateDecision(
-            allow=True,
-            verdict=GATE_ALLOW,
-            reasons=reasons,
-            proof_id=result.proof_id,
-            break_glass=False,
-            incident=None,
-            audit_record=audit,
-        )
-
-    deny_reasons = ["restart denied: drain proof invalid (fail closed)"] + list(
-        result.reasons
-    )
-    incident = _incident_descriptor(
-        reasons=deny_reasons,
-        requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id,
-        proof_id=result.proof_id,
-        at=at,
-    )
-    audit = {
-        "event": "restart_gate_evaluated",
-        "drain_proof_version": DRAIN_PROOF_VERSION,
-        "evaluated_at": at,
-        "verdict": GATE_DENY,
-        "allow": False,
-        "break_glass": False,
-        "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
-        "proof_id": result.proof_id,
-        "incident_kind": incident["kind"],
-    }
-    return GateDecision(
-        allow=False,
-        verdict=GATE_DENY,
-        reasons=deny_reasons,
-        proof_id=result.proof_id,
-        break_glass=False,
-        incident=incident,
-        audit_record=audit,
-    )

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -2068,7 +2068,6 @@ import lease_lifecycle  # noqa: E402
 import lease_policy  # noqa: E402
 import workflow_dashboard  # noqa: E402  # #605 live queue/lease dashboard
 import restart_coordinator  # noqa: E402  # #658 MCP restart coordinator/impact
-import drain_proof  # noqa: E402  # #661 pre-restart drain proof and hard gate
 import incident_bridge  # noqa: E402
 import sentry_observability  # noqa: E402  (#606 optional Sentry observability)
 import sentry_incident_bridge  # noqa: E402  (#607 Sentry→Gitea incident bridge)
@@ -22343,8 +22342,6 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
     request_override: bool = False,
     session_id: str | None = None,
     limit: int = 200,
-    drain_proof_json: str | None = None,
-    request_break_glass: bool = False,
 ) -> dict:
     """Evaluate a proposed MCP restart and return an impact preview (#658).
 
@@ -22354,15 +22351,10 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
     verdict, so the console (#642/#652) and operators can see what a restart
     would disrupt *before* any concurrent LLM work is destroyed.
 
-    This tool **never restarts a process.** In dry-run (the default) it returns
-    only the impact preview. With ``dry_run=False`` it enforces the #661 hard
-    gate: the apply request must present a valid, unexpired, clean drain proof
-    (``drain_proof_json``) or it is denied and a durable incident descriptor is
-    returned under ``incident``. Break-glass is the only bypass and is honoured
-    only when ``request_break_glass`` is set *and* the environment carries
-    ``GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION``. Even an authorized gate performs
-    no restart here; actual execution is a further child. The gate outcome is
-    reported under ``apply_gate`` / ``apply_authorized``.
+    This tool is **dry-run and never restarts anything.** The mutative apply
+    path is a separate child gated by a drain proof (non-goal here); calling
+    with ``dry_run=False`` still performs no restart and reports that apply is
+    not yet available.
 
     Operator override authority is read from the process environment
     (``GITEA_OPERATOR_RESTART_OVERRIDE_AUTHORIZATION``), never self-asserted by
@@ -22481,54 +22473,12 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
     payload["requesting_session_id"] = sid
     payload["operator_override_requested"] = bool(request_override)
     payload["operator_override_authorized"] = operator_authorized
-    # Actual restart execution remains a further child; this tool never restarts
-    # a process. What #661 adds is the *hard gate*: an apply request (dry_run
-    # False) must present a valid, unexpired, clean drain proof, or it is denied
-    # and a durable incident is raised. Break-glass is the only bypass and its
-    # authorization is read from the environment, never self-asserted.
     payload["apply_supported"] = False
     if not dry_run:
-        proof_obj: dict | None = None
-        proof_parse_error: str | None = None
-        if drain_proof_json:
-            try:
-                parsed = json.loads(drain_proof_json)
-                proof_obj = parsed if isinstance(parsed, dict) else None
-                if proof_obj is None:
-                    proof_parse_error = "drain_proof_json is not a JSON object"
-            except (ValueError, TypeError) as exc:
-                proof_parse_error = f"invalid drain_proof_json: {_redact(str(exc))}"
-
-        break_glass_authorized = bool(
-            (
-                os.environ.get("GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION") or ""
-            ).strip()
-        )
-        break_glass = bool(request_break_glass and break_glass_authorized)
-
-        expected_fp = drain_proof.impact_fingerprint(report.as_dict())
-        gate = drain_proof.gate_apply_restart(
-            proof=proof_obj,
-            break_glass=break_glass,
-            expected_impact_fingerprint=expected_fp,
-            requesting_session_id=sid,
-        )
-        gate_payload = gate.as_dict()
-        if proof_parse_error and not break_glass:
-            gate_payload["reasons"] = [proof_parse_error] + list(
-                gate_payload.get("reasons") or []
-            )
-        payload["apply_gate"] = gate_payload
-        payload["apply_authorized"] = gate.allow
-        payload["break_glass_requested"] = bool(request_break_glass)
-        payload["break_glass_authorized"] = break_glass_authorized
-        # Even an authorized gate performs no restart here: execution is a later
-        # child. The gate proves the apply path *would* be permitted.
-        payload["reasons"] = list(payload.get("reasons") or []) + list(
-            gate_payload.get("reasons") or []
-        )
-        if not gate.allow and gate.incident is not None:
-            payload["incident"] = gate.incident
+        payload["reasons"] = list(payload.get("reasons") or []) + [
+            "apply requested but not supported: sanctioned restart apply is "
+            "gated by a drain proof (separate child); no restart performed (#658)"
+        ]
     return payload
 
 

requirements.txt

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ cryptography==49.0.0
 h11==0.16.0
 httpcore==1.0.9
 httpx==0.28.1
+# Starlette 1.3.x TestClient prefers httpx2; plain httpx remains for MCP/runtime (#682).
+httpx2==2.9.1
 httpx-sse==0.4.3
 idna==3.18
 iniconfig==2.3.0

tests/test_drain_proof.py

@@ -1,383 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for the pre-restart drain proof and hard gate (#661).
-
-Covers the acceptance criteria:
-
-1. Restart apply without a proof fails closed.
-2. A successful drain produces a verifiable proof.
-3. An open unsafe mutation makes the proof fail (multi-session fixture).
-4. Pass / fail / expired verification paths.
-
-Plus the security posture: forged/tampered proofs are rejected, break-glass is
-the only bypass and is never silent, a stale blast-radius fingerprint rejects a
-proof, and no per-process secret ever leaks into a serialized artifact.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import unittest
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-
-import drain_proof as dp
-import restart_coordinator as rc
-
-
-NOW = datetime(2026, 7, 24, 6, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-SECRET = b"unit-test-drain-proof-secret-0123456789abcdef"
-
-
-def _live_pid() -> int:
-    return os.getpid()
-
-
-def _clean_drain_state() -> dict:
-    """Every drain action succeeded, no sessions outstanding."""
-
-    return {
-        "assignments_stopped": True,
-        "checkpoints_complete": True,
-        "handoffs_verified": True,
-        "leases_handled": True,
-        "acks": {},  # no other live sessions to acknowledge
-        "ack_timeout_policy_applied": False,
-    }
-
-
-def _safe_report() -> dict:
-    """Impact report with no other live work: a restart here is safe."""
-
-    report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
-        {"sessions": [], "leases": [], "inventory_complete": True},
-        now=NOW,
-        requesting_session_id="prgs-controller-1-req",
-    )
-    return report.as_dict()
-
-
-def _unsafe_mutation_report() -> dict:
-    """Multi-session report: a second session holds a live author mutation."""
-
-    sessions = [
-        {
-            "session_id": "prgs-controller-1-req",
-            "role": "controller",
-            "profile": "prgs-controller",
-            "pid": _live_pid(),
-            "status": "active",
-            "last_heartbeat_at": NOW.isoformat(),
-        },
-        {
-            "session_id": "prgs-author-99",
-            "role": "author",
-            "profile": "prgs-author",
-            "pid": _live_pid(),
-            "status": "active",
-            "last_heartbeat_at": NOW.isoformat(),
-        },
-    ]
-    leases = [
-        {
-            "lease_id": "lease-mut",
-            "session_id": "prgs-author-99",
-            "role": "author",
-            "phase": "implementing",
-            "work_kind": "issue",
-            "work_number": 661,
-            "worktree_path": "branches/issue-661",
-            "freshness": {"freshness": "active"},
-        }
-    ]
-    report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
-        {"sessions": sessions, "leases": leases, "inventory_complete": True},
-        now=NOW,
-        requesting_session_id="prgs-controller-1-req",
-    )
-    return report.as_dict()
-
-
-class BuildDrainProofTests(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_clean_drain_produces_verifiable_clean_proof(self):
-        """AC#2: a successful drain produces a verifiable proof."""
-
-        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=_safe_report(),
-            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
-            requesting_session_id="prgs-controller-1-req",
-            now=NOW,
-            secret=SECRET,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(proof.clean)
-        self.assertEqual(proof.failed_checks, [])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            {c.name for c in proof.checks}, set(dp.REQUIRED_CHECKS)
-        )
-        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(
-            proof.as_dict(), now=NOW, secret=SECRET
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result.valid, result.reasons)
-        self.assertFalse(result.expired)
-        self.assertFalse(result.tampered)
-
-    def test_open_mutation_makes_proof_unclean(self):
-        """AC#3: an unsafe mutation still in flight fails the proof."""
-
-        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=_unsafe_mutation_report(),
-            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
-            now=NOW,
-            secret=SECRET,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(proof.clean)
-        self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS, proof.failed_checks)
-        # Leases-handled also fails: the report still shows a disruptive lease.
-        self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_LEASES_HANDLED, proof.failed_checks)
-        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof.as_dict(), now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
-        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
-
-    def test_incomplete_inventory_fails_no_mutations_check(self):
-        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report={"inventory_complete": False},
-            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
-            now=NOW,
-            secret=SECRET,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(proof.clean)
-        self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS, proof.failed_checks)
-
-    def test_missing_checkpoint_flag_fails_closed(self):
-        state = _clean_drain_state()
-        del state["checkpoints_complete"]
-        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(proof.clean)
-        self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_CHECKPOINTS_COMPLETE, proof.failed_checks)
-
-    def test_non_true_flags_fail_closed(self):
-        """A truthy-but-not-True value (e.g. the string 'yes') must not pass."""
-
-        state = _clean_drain_state()
-        state["assignments_stopped"] = "yes"
-        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
-        )
-        self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_ASSIGNMENTS_STOPPED, proof.failed_checks)
-
-    def test_ack_timeout_policy_satisfies_ack_check(self):
-        state = _clean_drain_state()
-        state["acks"] = {"prgs-author-99": "pending"}
-        state["ack_timeout_policy_applied"] = True
-        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
-        )
-        names = {c.name: c.passed for c in proof.checks}
-        self.assertTrue(names[dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT])
-
-    def test_outstanding_acks_without_timeout_fail(self):
-        state = _clean_drain_state()
-        state["acks"] = {"prgs-author-99": "pending"}
-        state["ack_timeout_policy_applied"] = False
-        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
-        )
-        self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT, proof.failed_checks)
-
-    def test_all_acked_satisfies_ack_check(self):
-        state = _clean_drain_state()
-        state["acks"] = {"prgs-author-99": "acked", "prgs-author-2": "acknowledged"}
-        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
-        )
-        names = {c.name: c.passed for c in proof.checks}
-        self.assertTrue(names[dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT])
-
-
-class VerifyDrainProofTests(unittest.TestCase):
-    def _clean_proof_dict(self) -> dict:
-        return dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=_safe_report(),
-            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
-            now=NOW,
-            secret=SECRET,
-        ).as_dict()
-
-    def test_missing_proof_is_invalid(self):
-        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(None, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
-        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
-        self.assertIsNone(result.proof_id)
-
-    def test_expired_proof_is_invalid(self):
-        """AC#4: an expired proof fails verification."""
-
-        proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
-        later = NOW + timedelta(seconds=dp.DEFAULT_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS + 1)
-        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof, now=later, secret=SECRET)
-        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
-        self.assertTrue(result.expired)
-
-    def test_proof_valid_just_before_expiry(self):
-        proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
-        almost = NOW + timedelta(seconds=dp.DEFAULT_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS - 1)
-        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof, now=almost, secret=SECRET)
-        self.assertTrue(result.valid, result.reasons)
-
-    def test_wrong_secret_rejected(self):
-        """A proof minted in a prior process (different secret) will not verify."""
-
-        proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
-        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof, now=NOW, secret=b"other-secret")
-        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
-        self.assertTrue(result.tampered)
-
-    def test_flipping_clean_flag_is_detected(self):
-        """Forging clean=True on an unclean proof breaks the signature."""
-
-        unclean = dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=_unsafe_mutation_report(),
-            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
-            now=NOW,
-            secret=SECRET,
-        ).as_dict()
-        self.assertFalse(unclean["clean"])
-        unclean["clean"] = True  # forge
-        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(unclean, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
-        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
-        self.assertTrue(result.tampered)
-
-    def test_tampering_a_check_is_detected(self):
-        unclean = dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=_unsafe_mutation_report(),
-            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
-            now=NOW,
-            secret=SECRET,
-        ).as_dict()
-        for c in unclean["checks"]:
-            if c["name"] == dp.CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS:
-                c["passed"] = True  # forge the failing check to pass
-        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(unclean, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
-        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
-        self.assertTrue(result.tampered)
-
-    def test_missing_required_check_rejected(self):
-        proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
-        proof["checks"] = [
-            c for c in proof["checks"] if c["name"] != dp.CHECK_HANDOFFS_OK
-        ]
-        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
-        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
-
-    def test_stale_fingerprint_rejected(self):
-        proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
-        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(
-            proof,
-            now=NOW,
-            secret=SECRET,
-            expected_impact_fingerprint="deadbeef",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result.valid)
-
-    def test_matching_fingerprint_accepted(self):
-        report = _safe_report()
-        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=report,
-            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
-            now=NOW,
-            secret=SECRET,
-        ).as_dict()
-        fp = dp.impact_fingerprint(report)
-        result = dp.verify_drain_proof(
-            proof, now=NOW, secret=SECRET, expected_impact_fingerprint=fp
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result.valid, result.reasons)
-
-
-class GateApplyRestartTests(unittest.TestCase):
-    def _clean_proof_dict(self) -> dict:
-        return dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=_safe_report(),
-            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
-            now=NOW,
-            secret=SECRET,
-        ).as_dict()
-
-    def test_apply_without_proof_denied(self):
-        """AC#1: restart apply without a proof fails closed + raises incident."""
-
-        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(proof=None, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
-        self.assertEqual(decision.verdict, dp.GATE_DENY)
-        self.assertIsNotNone(decision.incident)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            decision.incident["kind"], "restart_drain_gate_denied"
-        )
-
-    def test_apply_with_valid_proof_allowed(self):
-        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
-            proof=self._clean_proof_dict(), now=NOW, secret=SECRET
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(decision.allow)
-        self.assertEqual(decision.verdict, dp.GATE_ALLOW)
-        self.assertIsNone(decision.incident)
-
-    def test_apply_with_expired_proof_denied_with_incident(self):
-        later = NOW + timedelta(seconds=dp.DEFAULT_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS + 5)
-        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
-            proof=self._clean_proof_dict(), now=later, secret=SECRET
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
-        self.assertIsNotNone(decision.incident)
-
-    def test_apply_with_unclean_proof_denied(self):
-        """AC#3 at the gate: an unsafe-mutation proof is denied."""
-
-        unclean = dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=_unsafe_mutation_report(),
-            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
-            now=NOW,
-            secret=SECRET,
-        ).as_dict()
-        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(proof=unclean, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
-        self.assertIsNotNone(decision.incident)
-
-    def test_break_glass_allows_without_proof_but_records_bypass(self):
-        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
-            proof=None, now=NOW, secret=SECRET, break_glass=True
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(decision.allow)
-        self.assertEqual(decision.verdict, dp.GATE_BREAK_GLASS)
-        self.assertTrue(decision.break_glass)
-        self.assertIsNone(decision.incident)
-        self.assertTrue(decision.audit_record["break_glass"])
-
-    def test_denied_gate_carries_stale_fingerprint_reason(self):
-        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
-            proof=self._clean_proof_dict(),
-            now=NOW,
-            secret=SECRET,
-            expected_impact_fingerprint="not-the-fingerprint",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
-
-
-class SecretHygieneTests(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_secret_never_serialized(self):
-        proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
-            impact_report=_safe_report(),
-            drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
-            now=NOW,
-            secret=SECRET,
-        )
-        blob = dp._canonical(proof.as_dict())
-        self.assertNotIn(SECRET.decode(), blob)
-        # The signature is a hex digest, not the raw secret.
-        self.assertNotIn(SECRET.hex(), blob)
-
-    def test_incident_descriptor_has_no_secret(self):
-        decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(proof=None, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
-        blob = dp._canonical(decision.incident)
-        self.assertNotIn(SECRET.decode(), blob)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_682_starlette_httpx2.py

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+"""Starlette TestClient uses httpx2 without deprecation warning (#682)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib
+import sys
+import unittest
+import warnings
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+
+class TestHttpx2Installed(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_httpx2_importable(self) -> None:
+        httpx2 = importlib.import_module("httpx2")
+        self.assertTrue(hasattr(httpx2, "Client") or hasattr(httpx2, "AsyncClient"))
+
+
+class TestNoStarletteTestClientDeprecation(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_starlette_testclient_import_does_not_warn(self) -> None:
+        # Force a fresh import path so a previous httpx-fallback warning cannot
+        # hide a regression after httpx2 is present. Restore sys.modules afterwards.
+        saved = {
+            name: sys.modules[name]
+            for name in list(sys.modules)
+            if name == "starlette.testclient" or name.startswith("starlette.testclient.")
+        }
+        try:
+            for name in list(saved):
+                del sys.modules[name]
+
+            with warnings.catch_warnings(record=True) as caught:
+                warnings.simplefilter("always")
+                import starlette.testclient as testclient  # noqa: F401
+
+            dep = [
+                w
+                for w in caught
+                if "httpx" in str(w.message).lower()
+                and "deprecated" in str(w.message).lower()
+            ]
+            self.assertEqual(
+                dep,
+                [],
+                f"expected no Starlette httpx deprecation warning; got: "
+                f"{[str(w.message) for w in dep]}",
+            )
+        finally:
+            sys.modules.update(saved)
+
+    def test_canonical_webui_testclient_import(self) -> None:
+        with warnings.catch_warnings(record=True) as caught:
+            warnings.simplefilter("always")
+            from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+            from webui.app import create_app
+
+            client = TestClient(create_app())
+            response = client.get("/")
+            self.assertIn(response.status_code, {200, 302, 404})
+
+        dep = [
+            w
+            for w in caught
+            if "httpx" in str(w.message).lower()
+            and "deprecated" in str(w.message).lower()
+        ]
+        self.assertEqual(dep, [], [str(w.message) for w in dep])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_analytics.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import os
 import tempfile
 import unittest
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 import control_plane_db
 from webui.analytics_loader import (

tests/test_webui_audit.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.audit_validator import audit_report, infer_task_kind

tests/test_webui_console_authz_audit.py

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import sys
 import tempfile
 import unittest
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
 

tests/test_webui_deployment_boundary.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.deployment_boundary import (

tests/test_webui_gated_actions.py

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from unittest.mock import patch
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP
 from webui.app import create_app

tests/test_webui_inventory.py

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 import control_plane_db
 from webui.app import create_app

tests/test_webui_lease_visibility.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.lease_loader import (

tests/test_webui_mvp_suite.py

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 from starlette.routing import Route
 
 from webui.app import create_app

tests/test_webui_project_registry.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.project_registry import (

tests/test_webui_prompt_library.py

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.prompt_library import find_prompt, library_to_dict, load_prompt_library, prompt_to_dict

tests/test_webui_queue_dashboard.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from unittest import mock
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.queue_loader import (

tests/test_webui_runtime_health.py

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from unittest import mock
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.runtime_health import _role_kind, load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict

tests/test_webui_shell.py

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
 from starlette.routing import Route
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui import layout
 from webui.app import create_app

tests/test_webui_skeleton.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 

tests/test_webui_system_health.py

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ from unittest import mock
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 import control_plane_db
 from webui.app import create_app

tests/test_webui_system_health_dashboard.py

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.deployment_boundary import scan_text_for_client_secrets

tests/test_webui_timeline.py

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 import control_plane_db
 from canonical_thread_handoff import (

tests/test_webui_worktree_hygiene.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.worktree_scanner import (

tests/webui_testclient.py

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+"""Canonical Web UI ``TestClient`` import for the Gitea-Tools suite (#682).
+
+Starlette 1.3+ builds ``starlette.testclient.TestClient`` on ``httpx2``.
+Plain ``httpx`` still works but emits ``StarletteDeprecationWarning``.
+
+All Web UI tests import ``TestClient`` from this module so:
+
+* dependency intent is single-sourced (``httpx2`` in ``requirements.txt``);
+* a future client-construction helper has one place to land;
+* import-site audits do not need to re-scan every ``test_webui_*.py``.
+
+Runtime MCP / FastMCP code continues to use ``httpx``; this module is
+test-only and does not change production clients.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+__all__ = ["TestClient"]