The independent review reproduced a real hole: the production first-bind path
never pinned repository/org, so the drift checks it feeds were skipped.
Root cause
----------
gitea_whoami, gitea_get_runtime_context, gitea_resolve_task_capability and
gitea_activate_profile all seeded the session context without repository or
org. First-bind-wins then made the mutation gate's later seed a no-op, and
assess_session_context only compares repository/org when the bound fields are
non-null. Result, reproduced in production order with the real REMOTES:
after whoami: repository=None org=None
same-host repo=Other-Tools -> NOT BLOCKED
same-host org=Other-Org -> NOT BLOCKED
cross-host -> blocked (this part always worked)
Binding REMOTES defaults would not fix it: REMOTES['prgs'].repo is 'Timesheet'
(a default *target*, not an authorization scope, see #530), so pinning it fails
closed on every legitimate Gitea-Tools mutation. There was no trusted source
for repository scope, so this adds one.
Design
------
- New optional profile field `allowed_repositories`: canonical owner/repository
slugs. An authorization boundary, never the binding itself. Config-only —
no env var can widen or forge it.
- The session repository is derived from the verified, workspace-aligned git
remote, never from caller-supplied org/repo, and validated against that
allowlist. The session binds immutably to exactly one canonical slug; org is
derived from it. A profile authorizing several repositories still binds to
the single verified one.
- Every first-bind entry point now pins the same complete context. Activation
rejects an unauthorized/unverifiable workspace. Mutations fail closed when
repository/org is unverified, and a tool-level org/repo override that
disagrees with the binding is rejected before the write.
- A mutation request can no longer establish, complete, or replace the binding
(it previously seeded from `org or REMOTES[...]`, i.e. caller-controlled).
- Enforcement is opt-in per profile: a profile without the field keeps prior
behaviour, so existing static-profile namespaces stay functional.
First-bind-wins, immutability, the RLock, profile isolation, host/identity
validation and the private pytest-only reset are unchanged.
gitea_auth.get_profile() built an explicit whitelist dict and silently dropped
`allowed_repositories`; the new integration tests caught that the scope was
never enforced through the real path.
Tests
-----
New tests/test_issue_714_production_first_bind.py drives the real entry points
in production order rather than constructing _SessionContext directly. Covers
complete first bind via each entry point, same-host repo/org drift, Timesheet
and other-repo/other-org rejection, unverified and unauthorized workspaces,
caller values unable to establish the binding, concurrent init selecting one
repository, and the PR #715 author path staying functional. Mutation-verified:
disabling trusted derivation, override validation, the scope check, or the
get_profile passthrough each fails these tests (9/8/4/5 failures).
No security assertion was weakened, removed, skipped, or rewritten.
Focused: 26 passed. Issue #714 total: 46 passed. Prior failing modules: 240
passed. Config/profile/remote modules: 130 passed. Full suite: 2739 passed,
6 skipped, 1 pre-existing warning, 161 subtests in 25.80s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Remove the public allow_test_bootstrap production seam so caller-controlled
flags cannot forge native mutation provenance. Bind provenance to the resolved
canonical entrypoint path plus a live stdio transport bind; basename-only
mcp_server.py stack frames and import-only launch no longer authorize
mutations. Test-mode install_test_native_runtime is pytest-only and cannot
reach production Gitea mutation endpoints. Add AC9 regressions for both
reviewer-found bypasses and related spoof vectors.
Refs: PR #696 REQUEST_CHANGES at 253269c; issue #695 comments 11002/11005.
Bind mutation/credential paths to a process-local native MCP runtime so env
spoofing, direct imports, and offline helpers cannot reconstruct session gates
after native transport failure. Quarantine contaminated formal reviews under
controller authority and honor quarantine in review feedback, merge eligibility,
merge mutation, and canonical handoff validation. Add regression coverage for
the second (PR #694 / review 427) incident class.
Merged-PR source-branch cleanup is reconciler work (task_capability_map maps
cleanup_merged_pr_branch -> reconciler / gitea.branch.delete), but the
reconciler profile schema, execution-profile docs, and tests never covered
the permission, so no configured profile could run the guarded
gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path.
- reconciler_profile.py: add gitea.branch.delete to
RECONCILER_RECOMMENDED_OPERATIONS (not required; not forbidden)
- docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md: document merged-branch cleanup
ownership, least-privilege constraints, and the no-alias caveat
- tests/test_reconciler_profile.py: reconciler profile with branch.delete
stays valid and classified reconciler; missing grant is reported as
missing-recommended
- tests/test_branch_cleanup_guard.py: author- and merger-shaped profiles
without gitea.branch.delete fail closed on gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Add an env-var-gated, off-by-default Sentry SDK integration so MCP runtime
errors, fail-closed workflow blockers, lease/terminal-lock/stale-runtime
collisions, and recurring watchdog check-ins are visible in a self-hosted
Sentry at https://sentry.prgs.cc/. Gitea stays the source of truth; Sentry is
observe-only.
New module `sentry_observability.py` mirrors the `gitea_audit` conventions
(env-gated, best-effort, redacting):
- Config from MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED / SENTRY_DSN / SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT /
SENTRY_RELEASE / MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE / MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS.
Active only when enabled AND a DSN is present; otherwise a hard no-op.
- Fail OPEN for observability (never blocks a tool success path) and fail
CLOSED for redaction (drop a field rather than risk leaking it).
- `scrub_event` before_send/before_send_log hook + allowlisted tags: no
tokens/passwords/keychain ids/DSNs/cookies, no raw session-state or full
prompt bodies (session_id -> 12-char hash), no full filesystem paths
(worktree path -> coarse category). Reuses incident_bridge + gitea_audit
scrubbers.
- capture_exception, capture_workflow_blocker (with canonical next action),
and monitor_checkin with six stable cron slugs (stale lease scan, terminal
lock scan, allocator health, namespace health, dashboard freshness,
reconciler cleanup).
- `sentry_sdk` is a lazily-imported optional dependency; the module imports
and no-ops cleanly when the package is absent.
Wiring in gitea_mcp_server.py (additive, guarded, best-effort):
- init_sentry() in __main__ before mcp.run.
- capture_exception in the `_audited` failure path; capture_workflow_blocker
in `_audit_pr_result` BLOCKED/FAILED path.
- allocator + namespace-health watchdog check-ins at their MCP tool sites
(domain modules left pure).
Also: pin `sentry-sdk==2.20.0` (optional), document the six env vars in
`.env.example`, and add `docs/observability/sentry-integration.md` covering
project creation in https://sentry.prgs.cc/, DSN handling, local/dev/prod
config, redaction guarantees, and coexistence with the #612 incident bridge.
Tests: tests/test_sentry_observability.py (36 cases) cover disabled / enabled /
missing-DSN / missing-SDK, redaction, exception capture, workflow-blocker
capture, and cron check-in behaviour. Full suite: 2632 passed, 6 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Add orthogonal role:* (single-active owner) and hazard:* (additive warning)
lifecycle labels plus status:changes-requested, folding the #603 state:*
vocabulary into the canonical status:* set rather than a conflicting parallel
prefix.
- issue_workflow_labels.py: ROLE_/HAZARD_ specs + frozensets; role/hazard
transition maps and helpers (transition_role_labels, add/clear_hazard_label,
canonical_role_label, canonical_hazard_label, is_discussion,
is_implementation_candidate, requires_blocking_reason); state:* -> status:*
synonym transitions; assess_issue_labels surfaces role/hazard dims and flags
multiple active role labels
- docs/label-taxonomy.md: role, hazard, state->canonical migration, and
allocator cross-check sections
- tests: role/hazard/discussion/blocking-reason/state-synonym coverage
- manage_labels.py seeds the new labels automatically via CANONICAL_LABEL_SPECS
Labels remain advisory; control-plane leases (#601) and live PR state stay the
source of truth for mutations (#603 AC2).
Closes#603
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Add phase-1 observability bridge that turns provider observations into
normal Gitea issues and control-plane incident_links rows. Dry-run is
default; apply creates/links through sanctioned Gitea issue paths only.
Raw incidents remain non-assignable; the #600 allocator sees bridge work
only as ordinary Gitea issues. Builds on #613 substrate and #600 allocator.
Closes#612
Add gitea_allocate_next_work and allocator_service routing policy on top of
the #613 ControlPlaneDB substrate. Workers get atomic assign+lease results
(or wait/no_safe_work/terminal-path outcomes) without self-selecting work
via file locks or comment-only leases. #612 remains downstream.
Closes#600
Legacy NULL-scope dedupe only compared Gitea targets, so duplicate rows
with the same provider key and issue but different fingerprint/status/
event_count/etc. collapsed to the lowest link_id and silently dropped
observation data. Migration now compares all meaningful observation
fields and refuses to discard conflicts (#619 RC3 / #613).
Address REQUEST_CHANGES on PR #619:
- require_valid_assignment rejects terminal work states and head drift
- incident_links scope keys normalize NULL/blank to '' for UNIQUE
- remove trailing whitespace in control-plane-db-substrate.md
Add SQLite single-writer MVP control plane per the allocator ADR:
sessions, work_items (issue/pr only), atomic assign+lease, mutation
gates, terminal-lock index, and provider-neutral incident_links.
DB coordinates concurrency; Gitea remains assignable work; raw
Sentry/GlitchTip incidents are never work items. #600 and #612 build on
this substrate.
- Distinguish client_namespace vs offline_spawn probe sources; only IDE
client probes prove namespace health and feed mutation gates.
- Record assessments in session; gate gitea_submit_pr_review and
gitea_merge_pr when client-namespace health is unhealthy/non-proven.
- Mark test_mcp_conn.py offline-only; align recovery docs to client
reconnect (no PID-kill/config-touch as canonical recovery).
- Rebase onto current master so #590 ledger isolation keeps
TestMergePR.test_unknown_profile_blocks green.
Adds docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md documenting the correct recovery
path when a Gitea MCP namespace (gitea-author/reviewer/merger/tools)
returns `client is closing: EOF`.
Satisfies acceptance criterion 7 of #543: symptom, root cause (closed
client transport vs a live-but-stale process), the sanctioned
reconnect/relaunch sequence, diagnostics to capture, and how
test_mcp_conn.py reproduces the registered-vs-callable gap. Distinguishes
this transport-close failure from the ps-based stale-runtime family in
#531/#544 and reinforces the no-direct-import guard (#558).
Docs-only; no code or test behavior changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The namespace health check (05fdcee) classified a false-ready namespace but
only returned an advisory blocks_merge_workflow flag; nothing in the merge
gate consumed it. Wire it in so a broken live namespace hard-blocks merge.
- review_merge_state_machine.assess_workflow_blockers: add live_namespace_broken
blocker (registered-in-FastMCP but not callable-through-namespace).
- assess_state_advancement: forward **blocker_kwargs so can_approve/can_merge/
workflow_status honor the full blocker set (also fixes latent drop of
mcp_reconnect_failed/stale_capability_state through those paths).
- gitea_assess_review_merge_state_machine tool: accept live_namespace_broken and
thread it through all state-machine calls.
- Tests: prove can_merge/workflow_status/tool block on live_namespace_broken even
with every review state + pre-merge gate satisfied; bridge classify verdict.
- Docs: enforcement section wiring blocks_merge_workflow -> live_namespace_broken.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Durable review-decision locks (#559) can outlive the PR they protect.
When the last terminal mutation references a PR that is already
merged/closed, expose gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock so a
reviewer can clear the lock with identity/profile gates and a durable
audit trail — without weakening #332 for open PRs or deleting
session-state files by hand.
Also auto-clear same-profile locks after a successful merge of the
approved PR, and document allowed vs forbidden cleanup.
Closes#594
Add consolidated MVP route/read-only tests, path-filter helpers, and
scripts/test-webui plus scripts/ci-webui-check for Jenkins path-filtered
runs on PRs touching web UI surfaces.
Closes#436
Add bind-host assessment that refuses 0.0.0.0/:: without override,
warns on non-loopback binds, and documents internal-only MVP serving.
Health endpoint exposes deployment metadata; docs cover Access/VPN/WARP
and runtime env assumptions without embedding secrets in the client.
Closes#435
Add categorize-and-probe helpers for shell spawn failures, expose
gitea_diagnose_terminal, and fail closed on mutation capability resolve
when the terminal launcher is unhealthy (BLOCKED + DIAGNOSE). Document
the operator path in the workflow runbooks.
sysadmin
jcwalker3
