fix(profiles): canonical reconciler ops and guard raw branch delete (#687)

Address REQUEST_CHANGES on PR #688:

- migrate_profiles: emit fully canonical reconciler/author/reviewer defaults;
  canonicalize explicit ops; fail if reconciler loses required pr.close/read
- gitea_delete_branch: deny reconciler (and non-author roles); refuse
  preservation/protected branches before any API call
- gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch: require reconciler role only; block
  preservation/evidence branches via branch_cleanup_guard
- docs: end-to-end operator runbook for profile migrate/apply/reconnect/cleanup
- tests: migration canonicalization, idempotency, raw-delete denial, guarded
  cleanup success and unmerged/preserve rejections

Closes #687.
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-12 22:35:14 -04:00
parent c7a444eb4b
commit 4a63578003
8 changed files with 702 additions and 55 deletions
+164 -7
View File
@@ -259,17 +259,21 @@ Least-privilege constraints:
reviewer, and merger profiles must never hold it; `gitea_delete_branch`
and `gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch` fail closed on any profile without
the permission.
- Even with the permission, deletion is only supported through the guarded
`gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch` path (#514): the PR must be merged, the
head an ancestor of the target, the branch not protected
(`master`/`main`/`dev`), no open PR may still use the head, and an
explicit `CLEANUP MERGED PR <n> BRANCH <branch>` confirmation is
required.
- Even with the permission, reconciler deletion is only supported through the
guarded `gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch` path (#514 / #687): the PR must be
merged, the head an ancestor of the target, the branch not protected
(`master`/`main`/`dev`), the branch not a preservation/evidence ref (e.g.
`chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip`), no open PR may still use the
head, and an explicit `CLEANUP MERGED PR <n> BRANCH <branch>` confirmation is
required. Raw `gitea_delete_branch` is **denied** to reconciler even when
`gitea.branch.delete` is present.
- Raw `git branch -d` / `git push --delete` cleanup remains blocked by
`branch_cleanup_guard` and the final-report validator regardless of
profile permissions.
- `gitea.branch.delete` has no short alias in `GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES`;
write it fully qualified in `allowed_operations`.
write it fully qualified in `allowed_operations`. Migration must emit
canonical names such as `gitea.pr.close` (never bare `pr.close` /
`issue.close`, which the production normalizer rejects or drops).
Launch a static `gitea-reconciler` MCP namespace with
`GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler`. Profile shape is validated by
@@ -279,6 +283,159 @@ Launch a static `gitea-reconciler` MCP namespace with
fresh target-branch fetch, recorded target SHA, and ancestor proof. PRs whose
heads are not already landed cannot be closed through this path.
### Operational runbook: grant reconciler `gitea.branch.delete` (#687)
Merging a code PR that updates `migrate_profiles.py` / `reconciler_profile.py`
**does not** change the live operator profile on disk. Apply the profile
change deliberately, then reconnect the client-managed namespace.
1. **Approved migration / profile-update command** (from the repo root, using
the project venv if present):
```bash
# Dry-run first (default): validates v2 output, writes nothing
python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json
# Apply: creates backup then writes migrated v2 config
python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json -w
# Optional explicit paths:
# python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json \
# -o ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json \
# --backup ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json.bak -w
```
If the live file is already v2, edit the reconciler identitys
`allowed_operations` / `forbidden_operations` under
`environments.<env>.services.gitea.identities.reconciler` (or the
`prgs-reconciler` alias target) so allowed includes the canonical set
below — then re-validate with a load of the config (see step 3).
2. **Inspect the generated (or edited) profile** — confirm the reconciler
identity, for example:
```bash
python3 - <<'PY'
import json
from pathlib import Path
cfg = json.loads(Path.home().joinpath(".config/gitea-tools/profiles.json").read_text())
# v2 environments shape:
ident = cfg["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]["identities"]["reconciler"]
print("role:", ident.get("role"))
print("allowed:", ident.get("allowed_operations"))
print("forbidden:", ident.get("forbidden_operations"))
PY
```
3. **Validate canonical operation names and least privilege**
Expected canonical **allowed** (defaults after migration):
- `gitea.read`
- `gitea.pr.close` (required)
- `gitea.pr.comment`
- `gitea.issue.comment`
- `gitea.issue.close`
- `gitea.branch.delete` (recommended; cleanup only)
Expected **forbidden** includes at least: `gitea.pr.approve`,
`gitea.pr.merge`, `gitea.pr.review`, `gitea.pr.create`,
`gitea.branch.push`, `gitea.repo.commit`.
No shorthand (`pr.close`, `issue.close`, `pr.comment`) may remain.
Validate with the production loader:
```bash
python3 - <<'PY'
import gitea_config, reconciler_profile
from pathlib import Path
path = str(Path.home() / ".config/gitea-tools/profiles.json")
gitea_config.load_config(path) # fails closed on invalid config
# Or assess the reconciler lists directly after extracting them:
# print(reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile(allowed, forbidden))
PY
```
4. **Merging PR #688 (or any code PR) does not update the live profile.**
Code changes only the migration helper, schema, docs, and tests. The
operator must still run `migrate_profiles.py -w` or an equivalent
authorized edit of `~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json`.
5. **Supported apply method:** `python3 migrate_profiles.py … -w` (backup
created automatically) **or** operator-authorized edit of the live
profiles file after backup. Unsupported: silent mtime tricks, manual
process kill to “reload”, or undocumented env overrides.
6. **Backup and validation:** `-w` copies the input to
`<input_path>.bak` (or `--backup PATH`) before writing. Re-run
`load_config` / `assess_reconciler_profile` after write. Keep the
`.bak` until live whoami/capability checks pass.
7. **Client-managed namespace reconnect/reload:** reconnect or reload the
IDE MCP client so `gitea-reconciler` restarts from current `master` and
the updated `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler` config. Do not hand-launch
`mcp_server.py` / `gitea_mcp_server.py` with ad hoc `GITEA_*` env
(see #686 / #630).
8. **Live reverification** (through the client-managed `gitea-reconciler`
namespace only):
- `gitea_whoami` → identity + profile `prgs-reconciler`
- `gitea_assess_master_parity` → `stale=false`, `restart_required=false`
- `gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="cleanup_merged_pr_branch")` →
`allowed_in_current_session=true` only when permission and role match
- `gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="delete_branch")` →
**not** allowed for reconciler (role denial must be enforced)
9. **Guarded cleanup usage** (example for a merged PR whose source branch
remains on the remote):
```text
gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
pr_number=<N>,
branch=<exact PR head branch>,
confirmation="CLEANUP MERGED PR <N> BRANCH <exact PR head branch>",
remote="prgs",
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
repo="Gitea-Tools",
worktree_path="<path under branches/>",
)
```
The tool refuses unmerged PRs, protected branches, preservation/evidence
branches, open-PR heads, mismatched branch names, and wrong confirmation.
10. **Prohibitions**
- No raw `git push --delete`, `git branch -d` / `-D`, or delete refspecs
- No arbitrary `gitea_delete_branch` from reconciler
- No unsupported profile switching mid-run without full re-preflight
- No ad hoc hand-edits of live profiles **unless** operator-authorized,
backed up, and revalidated as above
Canonical migrated reconciler example:
```json
{
"role": "reconciler",
"allowed_operations": [
"gitea.read",
"gitea.pr.close",
"gitea.pr.comment",
"gitea.issue.comment",
"gitea.issue.close",
"gitea.branch.delete"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"gitea.pr.approve",
"gitea.pr.merge",
"gitea.pr.review",
"gitea.pr.create",
"gitea.branch.push",
"gitea.repo.commit"
]
}
```
## Identity and fail-closed rules
Before **any** mutating action, a workflow must know both: