Architecture acceptance matrix — invariant, test, evidence, and backend traceability #837
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opened 2026-07-22 19:51:24 -05:00 by jcwalker3
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Reference: Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools#837
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Candidate architecture requiring executable validation; not yet approved, production-ready, or certified.
Parent: #820. Depends on: #821–#836 (every ARCH-01/02/04 epic and leaf).
1. Summary / objective
Maintain a single acceptance matrix mapping every normative invariant across ARCH-01, ARCH-02, and ARCH-04 to a numbered acceptance criterion, a named test, an enforcement layer, an audit event, required evidence, and backend coverage. This is the program's completeness proof.
2. Problem
Distributed across 16 issues, invariants can silently lose test coverage or enforcement-layer accuracy. The matrix is the durable, auditable index that a fresh author or reviewer uses to confirm nothing is unproven.
3. Required columns (per invariant row)
Issue · numbered AC · unique test name · initial state · exact operation or raw-write bypass · expected structured result · expected committed state · backend coverage (SQLite/PostgreSQL) · enforcement layer (
[SCHEMA]/[TRUSTED-SERVICE]/[RUNTIME-ADAPTER]) · required evidence + audit event.4. Mandatory coverage (must appear as rows)
5. Enforcement classification rule
Each row's enforcement layer must match the implementation, not the aspiration. A
[SCHEMA]claim requires a passing raw-write bypass test; a[TRUSTED-SERVICE]claim requires a service-boundary test; a[RUNTIME-ADAPTER]claim requires an adapter test (altered/replay/unavailable). A row with no passing test is marked UNPROVEN.6. Acceptance criteria
7. Required tests
t_matrix_completeness(every invariant referenced by #822–#836 appears),t_matrix_enforcement_backed(each label has its test class),t_matrix_no_unproven(gate at program completion).8. Enforcement classification (this issue)
Matrix generation/validation is
[TRUSTED-SERVICE](a CI/tooling contract), reporting on[SCHEMA]/[TRUSTED-SERVICE]/[RUNTIME-ADAPTER]rows of the other issues.9. Dependencies / parent
Parent #820; depends #821–#836.
10. Definition of done
Matrix exists, is CI-validated, and shows zero UNPROVEN rows before any component is proposed as a production security boundary.
11. Known limitations / deferred
The matrix reports coverage; it does not itself enforce runtime security. Enabling any component in production remains gated by its own readiness checks.