ARCH-02 — Transport identity authorities, external bindings, and reconciliation lifecycle #829
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opened 2026-07-22 19:45:52 -05:00 by jcwalker3
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Reference: Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools#829
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Candidate architecture requiring executable validation; not yet approved, production-ready, or certified.
Parents: #820, #828. Depends on: #822 (principals/actor context), #826 (evidence stores for external-id proof).
1. Summary / objective
Implement transport identity authorities, external-id repository bindings, and the archival/re-encounter/reconciliation lifecycle, with canonical host/locator handling.
2. Security/correctness problem
A repository binding must have stable identity under rename/transfer only when the transport proves an external id; otherwise it is a local record with no continuity claim. Without an explicit transport→identity-store relationship,
external_id_transport_boundcannot be checked.3. Threat model / failure modes
External id bound to the wrong transport; malformed host/port; case/Unicode ambiguity aliasing repos; archived external id re-encountered (repo recreated); locator collision across binding modes; identity-authority rotation losing prior proofs.
4. In-scope behavior
transport_identity_authorities(transport_id PK, store_id, status)— explicit relationship; lifecycle + one active authority per transport.[SCHEMA].host_canon_v1[TRUSTED-SERVICE]: strip scheme, remove default port, bracket+lowercase IPv6, IDNA→A-label, reject malformed colon/port; storable shape enforced by CHECK[SCHEMA]. Valid IPv4/IPv6/hostname handled; reject malformed combinations.repository_external_idsubject) whose store = the transport's active identity authority store.[SCHEMA].ARCHIVED_EXTERNAL_ID_REENCOUNTER→ reconciliation), locator conflict, reconciliation dispositions (same_object_confirmed/distinct_object/refused) with typed canonical prior/new values.[SCHEMA]CHECKs.registered_byenforced via the authorized operation + actor context, not merely stored.[TRUSTED-SERVICE]+[SCHEMA]actor trigger.UNIQUE(store,ref)prohibits reuse for the store lifetime).5. Exclusions
No canonical resources/refs (→ next child), no project associations (→ lookup child), no workspaces.
6. Schema/operation contracts
transports,transport_identity_authorities,repository_bindings,binding_reconciliations. Operations:register_transport,bind_transport_identity_authority,register_repository_binding,record_locator_change,archive_binding,decide_binding_reconciliation,resolve_binding.7. SQLite behavior
Partial unique indexes:
rb_ext_id(real external ids unique per transport, NULLs allowed),rb_active_locator(one active binding per(transport,owner,name)across modes). Host/locator CHECKs.8. PostgreSQL behavior
Same constraints; canonicalizers in the service; parity tested.
9. Concurrency / transaction requirements
Concurrent bindings on one locator: one active survives; re-encounter routes to reconciliation rather than silently reactivating.
10. Structured results
BINDING_REGISTERED,AMBIGUOUS_LOCATOR,EXTERNAL_ID_PROOF_REQUIRED,ARCHIVED_EXTERNAL_ID_REENCOUNTER,RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED,TRANSPORT_HAS_ACTIVE_BINDINGS,RETIRED_AUTHORITY.11. Enforcement classification
Uniqueness/CHECK/immutability/external-id binding
[SCHEMA]; host/locator canonicalization[TRUSTED-SERVICE]; external-id issuance proof[RUNTIME-ADAPTER](via #826).12. Acceptance criteria
registered_by= authenticated caller.13. Named tests
t_extid_wrong_store(−),t_locator_collision_cross_mode(−),t_extid_unique(−),t_host_ipv6(+),t_host_bad_port(−),t_continuity_immutable(raw-bypass),t_archived_reencounter(−),t_transport_retire_guard(−),t_registered_by_foreign(−).14. Audit events / evidence
transport_registered,identity_authority_bound,binding_registered,binding_reconciled. Test output evidence.15. Dependencies / parent
Parents #820, #828; depends #822, #826.
16. Definition of done
Executable SQLite (+PG section); ACs pass incl. raw-bypass; bounded PR; no self-review/merge.
17. Known limitations / deferred
local_record_onlybindings remain unattended-ineligible (no upgrade path in this program). Ref/resource identity in the next child.