fix(mcp): complete canonical-root consumption for cross-repo namespaces (Closes #739)

#706 routed the #274 filesystem guards and the session repository slug through
the configured canonical_repository_root. Three consumption paths were left
deriving from the Gitea-Tools installation checkout.

F1 — gitea_get_runtime_context did not normalize its `remote` argument, while
gitea_whoami did. On a prgs-hosted namespace whose first native call was the
runtime-context path, the 'dadeschools' argument default was pinned: identity
resolved against the wrong host, and because first-bind is first-write-wins a
later correct gitea_whoami(remote="prgs") could not repair the binding. It now
calls _effective_remote before any host lookup, identity resolution, or session
seeding. Explicit remotes pass through untouched and a dadeschools-hosted
profile still resolves to dadeschools.

F2 — _delete_branch_repository_binding_block derived its expected slug from
_workspace_repository_slug, which reads _local_git_remote_url in PROJECT_ROOT
(always Gitea-Tools). For a cross-repository namespace this inverted the guard:
the genuinely bound target was rejected and Gitea-Tools was accepted. The
canonical-root branch already present in _trusted_session_repository is
extracted as _canonical_repository_slug and shared by both call sites. A
configured-but-unresolvable root now fails closed instead of falling back to
the installation identity; unconfigured namespaces keep the install-derived
default unchanged.

F3 — gitea_assess_master_parity measures Gitea-Tools server implementation
parity only. That is intentional and is preserved: startup_head, current_head,
in_parity, stale, and restart_required keep their existing meaning and values,
and only the server dimension gates mutations. Two separately labelled
dimensions are added — server_implementation (installation root and commit) and
target_repository (canonical root, repository slug, checkout head, last-known
remote master head, staleness) — so cross-repository commissioning evidence can
distinguish them. The target assessment makes no network call: the remote side
is read from the existing remote-tracking ref, and an unfetched target is
reported indeterminate rather than guessed at.

Verified intentional and left unchanged: the #274 workspace-membership,
author-mutation-worktree, and branches-only guards already validate against the
configured canonical root; explicit org/repo may confirm but never authorize a
binding; and the four-role repository-specific configuration surface already
passes audit and bind-time validation with a wrong root failing closed.

Tests: 31 new cases in tests/test_cross_repo_canonical_consumption.py using
real git repositories and no network. Full suite 3298 passed / 6 skipped
against a clean-baseline 3267; the 2 failures
(test_issue_702_review_findings_f1_f6, test_reconciler_supersession_close)
reproduce identically on unmodified master a8d2087 and are pre-existing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013jUxaLVLkPHuTQwAzFzztW

.env.example

@@ -39,6 +39,27 @@ GITEA_AUDIT_LOG=/path/to/gitea-mcp-audit.log
 # only — never the token value. Surfaced by gitea_get_profile.
 GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE=GITEA_TOKEN
 
+# ── Optional self-hosted Sentry observability (#606) ────────────────────────
+# Emits runtime errors, fail-closed workflow blockers, lease/terminal-lock/
+# stale-runtime collisions, and watchdog cron check-ins to a SELF-HOSTED Sentry
+# (https://sentry.prgs.cc/) — never Sentry Cloud. Gitea stays the source of
+# truth; Sentry is observe-only. OFF by default: with MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED unset
+# or SENTRY_DSN empty, nothing is initialised and no events are sent.
+#
+# Master gate. Truthy = 1/true/yes/on. Both this AND SENTRY_DSN are required.
+MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=0
+# DSN for the self-hosted project (create a `gitea-tools-mcp` project in
+# https://sentry.prgs.cc/ and copy its DSN). Never commit a real DSN.
+SENTRY_DSN=
+# Deployment environment tag (local/dev/prod). Defaults to "development".
+SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=development
+# Optional release identifier (e.g. a git SHA or version string).
+SENTRY_RELEASE=
+# Performance-trace sample rate, 0.0–1.0 (clamped). Default 0.0 (traces off).
+MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.0
+# Set to 1 to forward Python logs to Sentry as structured logs. Default off.
+MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS=0
+
 # Optional canonical runtime-profile config (#19). Instead of the fields above,
 # point every LLM launcher at ONE JSON file of named profiles and select one.
 # Secrets are referenced (keychain id / env var name), never inlined. See

anti_stomp_preflight.py

@@ -0,0 +1,807 @@
+"""Common anti-stomp preflight for every MCP mutation tool (#604).
+
+Even with leases, mutation tools need a **shared** preflight that prevents
+stale sessions, wrong worktrees, wrong repos, old prompts, terminal locks,
+foreign leases, contaminated approvals, and root-checkout mutations from
+slipping through.
+
+This module is the pure assessment core. Callers (MCP mutation entrypoints)
+gather live facts and pass them in — nothing here performs git, network, or
+durable-state I/O. Existing happy-path guards remain authoritative; this
+module composes them into one typed, fail-closed result.
+
+Required checks (issue #604):
+
+* repo/org verification
+* profile/role verification
+* root checkout clean and not used for mutation (when role requires branches/)
+* worktree under branches when required
+* active lease ownership (when lease is required for the mutation)
+* terminal lock status (when applicable)
+* expected head SHA (when pinned)
+* stale runtime status
+* workflow hash (when a workflow load is required)
+* source contamination status
+* no manual state/mtime/source-file bypass
+
+Failure returns a typed blocker and an exact next action. There is **no**
+agent-facing bypass flag.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+
+import author_mutation_worktree
+import master_parity_gate
+import remote_repo_guard
+import root_checkout_guard
+import stable_branch_push_guard
+
+# ── public constants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# Typed blocker kinds returned in the structured result.
+BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO = "wrong_repo"
+BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE = "wrong_role"
+BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT = "root_checkout_mutation"
+BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE = "wrong_worktree"
+BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE = "foreign_lease"
+BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK = "terminal_lock"
+BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA = "head_sha_mismatch"
+BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME = "stale_runtime"
+BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH = "workflow_hash"
+BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION = "source_contamination"
+BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS = "manual_bypass"
+
+BLOCKER_KINDS = frozenset({
+    BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO,
+    BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE,
+    BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT,
+    BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE,
+    BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE,
+    BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK,
+    BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA,
+    BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME,
+    BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH,
+    BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION,
+    BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS,
+})
+
+# Mutation tasks that must invoke the shared anti-stomp preflight before
+# acting (issue #604 AC1). Every member must appear as a live task= kwarg
+# to verify_preflight_purity / _run_anti_stomp_preflight (or the review
+# anti_task map) in gitea_mcp_server.py. Inventory↔wiring tests fail if
+# a declared task is not wired.
+MUTATION_TASKS = frozenset({
+    "create_issue",
+    "comment_issue",
+    "close_issue",
+    "mark_issue",
+    "lock_issue",
+    "set_issue_labels",
+    "create_label",
+    "create_pr",
+    "close_pr",
+    "edit_pr",
+    "commit_files",
+    "gitea_commit_files",
+    "delete_branch",
+    "cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
+    "cleanup_stale_claims",
+    "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
+    "reconcile_already_landed_pr",
+    "reconcile_close_superseded_pr",
+    "post_heartbeat",
+    "acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
+    "gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
+    "adopt_merger_pr_lease",
+    "review_pr",
+    "submit_pr_review",
+    "approve_pr",
+    "request_changes_pr",
+    "merge_pr",
+})
+
+# Intentionally excluded from MUTATION_TASKS. Each has a dedicated
+# fail-closed gate that preserves decision-lock ownership, workflow-hash,
+# head-SHA, and repository consistency. Do not re-add without either
+# wiring shared preflight or updating this rationale (#604 Blocker B).
+DEDICATED_GATE_MUTATIONS: dict[str, str] = {
+    "mark_final_review_decision": (
+        "Local review-decision lock only. Enforced by session lock ownership, "
+        "workflow-hash, expected head SHA, PR work lease, eligibility, and "
+        "terminal-lock gates. No Gitea review POST; shared anti-stomp would "
+        "duplicate without side-effect-ordering value."
+    ),
+    "save_review_draft": (
+        "Local session-state draft save with live PR head/base consistency "
+        "checks. Not a Gitea review/merge mutation; dedicated head-SHA and "
+        "worktree resolution gates apply."
+    ),
+    "resume_review_draft": (
+        "Live-state resume with terminal lock, lease ownership, head/base SHA, "
+        "and parity checks. When submit=True, delegates to gitea_submit_pr_review "
+        "which runs shared anti-stomp before the Gitea review POST."
+    ),
+    "cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock": (
+        "Moot-lock cleanup with identity match, live PR merged/closed proof, "
+        "and reviewer capability gate (#594). Distinct from shared anti-stomp."
+    ),
+    "gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock": (
+        "Alias of cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock; dedicated #594 path."
+    ),
+    "heartbeat_reviewer_pr_lease": (
+        "Lease heartbeat posts via verify_preflight_purity(task='review_pr') "
+        "plus in-session lease ownership checks; not a separate mutation class."
+    ),
+    "release_reviewer_pr_lease": (
+        "Lease release uses workspace binding + ownership checks; posts only "
+        "when the session owns the active lease."
+    ),
+}
+
+# Roles that must mutate from a branches/ worktree (not the control checkout).
+_BRANCHES_REQUIRED_ROLES = frozenset({"author"})
+
+# Reviewer/merger mutations that require an owned lease + head pinning when
+# the caller supplies those facts.
+_LEASE_AWARE_TASKS = frozenset({
+    "review_pr",
+    "submit_pr_review",
+    "approve_pr",
+    "request_changes_pr",
+    "merge_pr",
+    "acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
+    "gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
+    "adopt_merger_pr_lease",
+})
+
+_NEXT_ACTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
+    BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO: (
+        "Pass explicit org= and repo= matching the local git remote "
+        "(e.g. org=Scaled-Tech-Consulting repo=Gitea-Tools) and retry."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE: (
+        "Call gitea_resolve_task_capability, switch to the required "
+        "namespace/profile, re-verify with gitea_whoami, then retry."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT: (
+        "Leave the root control checkout on clean master; create or switch "
+        "to a session-owned worktree under branches/ and retry the mutation "
+        "with worktree_path set."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE: (
+        "Create or bind a session-owned worktree under branches/, set "
+        "worktree_path (or GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE), and retry."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE: (
+        "Stop. Do not stomp a foreign lease. Wait for expiry, request "
+        "takeover through the sanctioned path, or hand off to the owner."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK: (
+        "Stop. A terminal review-decision lock is active for this head. "
+        "Do not re-approve/merge; follow the #332/#620 recovery path."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA: (
+        "Re-fetch the live PR head with gitea_view_pr, re-pin "
+        "expected_head_sha to the current head, re-validate, then retry."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME: (
+        "Restart the Gitea MCP server so it reloads master's capability "
+        "gates, re-run gitea_whoami + gitea_resolve_task_capability, then retry."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH: (
+        "Reload the canonical workflow via gitea_load_review_workflow, then "
+        "rerun the full review-merge workflow from inventory (no approve/merge replay)."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION: (
+        "Stop. Session is source-contaminated. Hand off to a reconciler for "
+        "audit/clear; do not clear markers by deleting session-state files."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS: (
+        "Stop. Manual state/mtime/source-file bypass is forbidden. Use "
+        "sanctioned MCP tools only; never delete or rewrite session-state "
+        "or lock files by hand."
+    ),
+}
+
+
+def is_mutation_task(task: str | None) -> bool:
+    """True when *task* is in the #604 mutation set (normalized)."""
+    name = (task or "").strip().lower().removeprefix("gitea_")
+    if not name:
+        return False
+    if name in MUTATION_TASKS:
+        return True
+    # Accept gitea_ prefixed membership for aliases already in the set.
+    return f"gitea_{name}" in MUTATION_TASKS
+
+
+def roles_compatible(active_role: str | None, required_role: str | None) -> bool:
+    """Whether *active_role* may perform a task that maps to *required_role*.
+
+    Exact match always passes. Reconcilers may run author-class mutations
+    (comment/close/cleanup) that the capability map stamps as ``author`` —
+    matching the long-standing reconciler exemption for control-checkout
+    work. No other cross-role substitutions are allowed.
+
+    Capability-authorized multi-role tasks (e.g. reviewer holding
+    ``gitea.issue.comment`` for ``comment_issue``) are handled by
+    :func:`authorization_compatible`, not by expanding this role matrix.
+    """
+    active = (active_role or "").strip().lower()
+    required = (required_role or "").strip().lower()
+    if not active or not required:
+        return True
+    if active == required:
+        return True
+    if active == "reconciler" and required in {"author", "reconciler"}:
+        return True
+    return False
+
+
+def authorization_compatible(
+    active_role: str | None,
+    required_role: str | None,
+    *,
+    required_permission: str | None = None,
+    allowed_operations: Any = None,
+) -> bool:
+    """Whether the active session may run a task given role *and* capability.
+
+    Order:
+
+    1. :func:`roles_compatible` (exact role or narrow reconciler→author).
+    2. Capability possession: when *required_permission* is non-empty and
+       present in *allowed_operations*, allow even if the nominal task role
+       differs (e.g. reviewer/merger with ``gitea.issue.comment`` on
+       ``comment_issue`` / ``mark_issue`` / ``set_issue_labels`` /
+       ``lock_issue``).
+
+    Fail closed otherwise. This is **not** a broad reviewer→author or
+    merger→author role rewrite: without the specific permission the check
+    still denies. Missing *allowed_operations* when a permission is required
+    also fails closed (callers must supply the live profile op list).
+    """
+    if roles_compatible(active_role, required_role):
+        return True
+    perm = (required_permission or "").strip()
+    if not perm:
+        return False
+    if allowed_operations is None:
+        return False
+    try:
+        ops = {str(o).strip() for o in allowed_operations if o is not None}
+    except TypeError:
+        return False
+    return perm in ops
+
+
+def _blocker(
+    kind: str,
+    reasons: list[str],
+    *,
+    exact_next_action: str | None = None,
+    detail: dict | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if kind not in BLOCKER_KINDS:
+        raise ValueError(f"unknown anti-stomp blocker kind: {kind!r}")
+    return {
+        "kind": kind,
+        "reasons": list(reasons),
+        "exact_next_action": exact_next_action or _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind],
+        "detail": dict(detail or {}),
+    }
+
+
+def _allowed_result(checks: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "allowed": True,
+        "block": False,
+        "blockers": [],
+        "reasons": [],
+        "exact_next_action": "proceed",
+        "blocker_kind": None,
+        "checks": checks,
+    }
+
+
+def _blocked_result(
+    blockers: list[dict[str, Any]],
+    checks: dict[str, Any],
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    primary = blockers[0]
+    all_reasons: list[str] = []
+    for b in blockers:
+        for r in b.get("reasons") or []:
+            if r not in all_reasons:
+                all_reasons.append(r)
+    return {
+        "allowed": False,
+        "block": True,
+        "blockers": blockers,
+        "reasons": all_reasons,
+        "exact_next_action": primary["exact_next_action"],
+        "blocker_kind": primary["kind"],
+        "checks": checks,
+    }
+
+
+def assess_anti_stomp_preflight(
+    *,
+    task: str | None = None,
+    # repo/org
+    remote: str | None = None,
+    resolved_org: str | None = None,
+    resolved_repo: str | None = None,
+    local_remote_url: str | None = None,
+    org_explicit: bool = False,
+    repo_explicit: bool = False,
+    check_repo: bool = True,
+    # profile/role + capability
+    profile_name: str | None = None,
+    profile_role: str | None = None,
+    required_role: str | None = None,
+    required_permission: str | None = None,
+    allowed_operations: Any = None,
+    check_role: bool = True,
+    # root checkout + worktree
+    workspace_path: str | None = None,
+    project_root: str | None = None,
+    current_branch: str | None = None,
+    root_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    root_porcelain: str | None = None,
+    remote_master_sha: str | None = None,
+    check_root_checkout: bool = True,
+    check_worktree: bool = True,
+    # stale runtime (master parity)
+    startup_head: str | None = None,
+    current_code_head: str | None = None,
+    check_stale_runtime: bool = True,
+    # lease ownership
+    lease_required: bool = False,
+    foreign_lease: bool | None = None,
+    lease_owner_session: str | None = None,
+    active_session_id: str | None = None,
+    lease_owner_identity: str | None = None,
+    active_identity: str | None = None,
+    lease_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    # terminal lock
+    terminal_lock_blocks: bool | None = None,
+    terminal_lock_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    # expected head SHA
+    require_head_sha: bool = False,
+    expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    live_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    # workflow hash
+    workflow_hash_valid: bool | None = None,
+    workflow_hash_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    # source contamination (stable-branch push / approval contamination)
+    source_contaminated: bool | None = None,
+    contamination_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    # manual bypass
+    manual_bypass_attempted: bool = False,
+    manual_bypass_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Fail-closed common anti-stomp assessment (pure).
+
+    Only checks for which facts are supplied (or which are required by the
+    mutation category) are evaluated. Unsupplied optional facts are recorded
+    as ``skipped`` so callers can see coverage without inventing defaults.
+
+    Returns a structured dict with ``allowed``/``block``, typed ``blockers``,
+    aggregated ``reasons``, ``exact_next_action``, and per-check ``checks``.
+    """
+    task_name = (task or "").strip()
+    role = (profile_role or "").strip().lower() or None
+    req_role = (required_role or "").strip().lower() or None
+    req_perm = (required_permission or "").strip() or None
+    checks: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "task": task_name or None,
+        "profile_name": profile_name,
+        "profile_role": role,
+        "required_role": req_role,
+        "required_permission": req_perm,
+    }
+    blockers: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    # ── manual bypass (always first; never skippable when attempted) ─────────
+    if manual_bypass_attempted:
+        reasons = list(manual_bypass_reasons or [
+            "manual state/mtime/source-file bypass attempt detected (fail closed)"
+        ])
+        blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS, reasons))
+        checks["manual_bypass"] = {"block": True, "reasons": reasons}
+    else:
+        checks["manual_bypass"] = {"block": False, "skipped": False}
+
+    # ── repo/org ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    if check_repo and resolved_org is not None and resolved_repo is not None:
+        repo_assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
+            remote=remote or "",
+            resolved_org=resolved_org,
+            resolved_repo=resolved_repo,
+            local_remote_url=local_remote_url,
+            org_explicit=org_explicit,
+            repo_explicit=repo_explicit,
+        )
+        checks["repo"] = {
+            "block": bool(repo_assessment.get("block")),
+            "reasons": list(repo_assessment.get("reasons") or []),
+            "resolved_org": resolved_org,
+            "resolved_repo": resolved_repo,
+        }
+        if repo_assessment.get("block"):
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(
+                    BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO,
+                    list(repo_assessment.get("reasons") or ["repo/org mismatch"]),
+                    detail={
+                        "resolved_org": resolved_org,
+                        "resolved_repo": resolved_repo,
+                        "local_remote_url": local_remote_url,
+                    },
+                )
+            )
+    else:
+        checks["repo"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── profile/role + capability ────────────────────────────────────────────
+    # Role match OR possession of the task's required permission (Blocker A).
+    # Reviewer/merger may run issue-comment-class tasks when they hold
+    # gitea.issue.comment; unauthorized escalation without the permission
+    # still fails closed.
+    if check_role and req_role and role:
+        authorized = authorization_compatible(
+            role,
+            req_role,
+            required_permission=req_perm,
+            allowed_operations=allowed_operations,
+        )
+        if not authorized:
+            perm_clause = (
+                f", required_permission='{req_perm}'" if req_perm else ""
+            )
+            reasons = [
+                f"active profile role '{role}' is not authorized for task "
+                f"'{task_name or '(unknown)'}' (required_role='{req_role}'"
+                f"{perm_clause}; profile={profile_name or '(unknown)'})"
+            ]
+            checks["role"] = {
+                "block": True,
+                "reasons": reasons,
+                "required_permission": req_perm,
+                "capability_authorized": False,
+            }
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(
+                    BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE,
+                    reasons,
+                    detail={
+                        "profile_name": profile_name,
+                        "profile_role": role,
+                        "required_role": req_role,
+                        "required_permission": req_perm,
+                    },
+                )
+            )
+        else:
+            checks["role"] = {
+                "block": False,
+                "reasons": [],
+                "required_permission": req_perm,
+                "capability_authorized": bool(
+                    req_perm
+                    and allowed_operations is not None
+                    and req_perm in {
+                        str(o).strip() for o in (allowed_operations or [])
+                        if o is not None
+                    }
+                    and not roles_compatible(role, req_role)
+                ),
+            }
+    else:
+        checks["role"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── stale runtime (master parity) ────────────────────────────────────────
+    if check_stale_runtime and (
+        startup_head is not None or current_code_head is not None
+    ):
+        parity = master_parity_gate.assess_master_parity(
+            {"startup_head": startup_head},
+            current_code_head,
+        )
+        stale_reasons = master_parity_gate.parity_block_reasons(parity)
+        checks["stale_runtime"] = {
+            "block": bool(stale_reasons),
+            "reasons": list(stale_reasons),
+            "startup_head": startup_head,
+            "current_code_head": current_code_head,
+            "stale": bool(parity.get("stale")),
+        }
+        if stale_reasons:
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(
+                    BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME,
+                    list(stale_reasons),
+                    detail={
+                        "startup_head": startup_head,
+                        "current_code_head": current_code_head,
+                    },
+                )
+            )
+    else:
+        checks["stale_runtime"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── root checkout ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    if (
+        check_root_checkout
+        and workspace_path is not None
+        and project_root is not None
+        and root_porcelain is not None
+    ):
+        root_assessment = root_checkout_guard.assess_root_checkout_guard(
+            workspace_path=workspace_path,
+            canonical_repo_root=project_root,
+            current_branch=current_branch,
+            head_sha=root_head_sha,
+            porcelain_status=root_porcelain,
+            remote_master_sha=remote_master_sha,
+            resolved_role=req_role or role,
+            actual_role=role,
+        )
+        checks["root_checkout"] = {
+            "block": bool(root_assessment.get("block")),
+            "reasons": list(root_assessment.get("reasons") or []),
+        }
+        if root_assessment.get("block"):
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(
+                    BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT,
+                    list(root_assessment.get("reasons") or [
+                        "control checkout is not clean master"
+                    ]),
+                    detail={
+                        "workspace_path": workspace_path,
+                        "project_root": project_root,
+                        "current_branch": current_branch,
+                    },
+                )
+            )
+    else:
+        checks["root_checkout"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── worktree under branches (author) ─────────────────────────────────────
+    worktree_role = role or req_role
+    if (
+        check_worktree
+        and workspace_path is not None
+        and project_root is not None
+        and worktree_role in _BRANCHES_REQUIRED_ROLES
+    ):
+        wt = author_mutation_worktree.assess_author_mutation_worktree(
+            workspace_path=workspace_path,
+            project_root=project_root,
+            current_branch=current_branch,
+        )
+        checks["worktree"] = {
+            "block": bool(wt.get("block")),
+            "reasons": list(wt.get("reasons") or []),
+            "under_branches": wt.get("under_branches"),
+        }
+        if wt.get("block"):
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(
+                    BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE,
+                    list(wt.get("reasons") or [
+                        "mutation worktree is not under branches/"
+                    ]),
+                    detail={
+                        "workspace_path": workspace_path,
+                        "project_root": project_root,
+                    },
+                )
+            )
+    else:
+        checks["worktree"] = {
+            "block": False,
+            "skipped": worktree_role not in _BRANCHES_REQUIRED_ROLES
+            or workspace_path is None,
+        }
+
+    # ── foreign lease ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    lease_needed = lease_required or (
+        task_name.removeprefix("gitea_") in {
+            t.removeprefix("gitea_") for t in _LEASE_AWARE_TASKS
+        }
+        and foreign_lease is not None
+    )
+    if lease_needed or foreign_lease is True:
+        is_foreign = bool(foreign_lease)
+        if foreign_lease is None and lease_required:
+            # Ownership must be proven when lease_required; missing ownership
+            # facts fail closed.
+            owner_ok = (
+                (not lease_owner_session and not active_session_id)
+                or (
+                    lease_owner_session
+                    and active_session_id
+                    and lease_owner_session == active_session_id
+                )
+            )
+            identity_ok = (
+                (not lease_owner_identity and not active_identity)
+                or (
+                    lease_owner_identity
+                    and active_identity
+                    and lease_owner_identity == active_identity
+                )
+            )
+            if not owner_ok or not identity_ok:
+                is_foreign = True
+        reasons = list(lease_reasons or [])
+        if is_foreign and not reasons:
+            reasons = [
+                "active lease is owned by a foreign session or identity "
+                "(anti-stomp fail closed)"
+            ]
+        checks["lease"] = {
+            "block": is_foreign,
+            "reasons": reasons if is_foreign else [],
+            "lease_owner_session": lease_owner_session,
+            "active_session_id": active_session_id,
+        }
+        if is_foreign:
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE, reasons)
+            )
+    else:
+        checks["lease"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── terminal lock ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    if terminal_lock_blocks is not None:
+        reasons = list(terminal_lock_reasons or [])
+        if terminal_lock_blocks and not reasons:
+            reasons = [
+                "terminal review-decision lock is active for this head "
+                "(anti-stomp fail closed)"
+            ]
+        checks["terminal_lock"] = {
+            "block": bool(terminal_lock_blocks),
+            "reasons": reasons if terminal_lock_blocks else [],
+        }
+        if terminal_lock_blocks:
+            blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK, reasons))
+    else:
+        checks["terminal_lock"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── expected head SHA ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    if require_head_sha or (
+        expected_head_sha is not None and live_head_sha is not None
+    ):
+        exp = (expected_head_sha or "").strip().lower()
+        live = (live_head_sha or "").strip().lower()
+        mismatch = False
+        reasons: list[str] = []
+        if require_head_sha and not exp:
+            mismatch = True
+            reasons.append(
+                "expected_head_sha is required before this mutation "
+                "(anti-stomp fail closed)"
+            )
+        elif exp and live and exp != live:
+            mismatch = True
+            reasons.append(
+                f"expected_head_sha '{exp}' does not match live PR head "
+                f"'{live}' (anti-stomp fail closed; stale prompt data)"
+            )
+        elif require_head_sha and exp and not live:
+            mismatch = True
+            reasons.append(
+                "live PR head SHA could not be determined to corroborate "
+                "expected_head_sha (anti-stomp fail closed)"
+            )
+        checks["head_sha"] = {
+            "block": mismatch,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+            "expected_head_sha": expected_head_sha,
+            "live_head_sha": live_head_sha,
+        }
+        if mismatch:
+            blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA, reasons))
+    else:
+        checks["head_sha"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── workflow hash ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    if workflow_hash_valid is not None:
+        reasons = list(workflow_hash_reasons or [])
+        if not workflow_hash_valid and not reasons:
+            reasons = [
+                "workflow load proof missing or hash stale "
+                "(anti-stomp fail closed)"
+            ]
+        checks["workflow_hash"] = {
+            "block": not bool(workflow_hash_valid),
+            "reasons": reasons if not workflow_hash_valid else [],
+        }
+        if not workflow_hash_valid:
+            blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH, reasons))
+    else:
+        checks["workflow_hash"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── source contamination ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    if source_contaminated is not None:
+        reasons = list(contamination_reasons or [])
+        if source_contaminated and not reasons:
+            reasons = [
+                "session is source-contaminated (stable-branch push or "
+                "contaminated approval path); anti-stomp fail closed"
+            ]
+        checks["source_contamination"] = {
+            "block": bool(source_contaminated),
+            "reasons": reasons if source_contaminated else [],
+        }
+        if source_contaminated:
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION, reasons)
+            )
+    else:
+        checks["source_contamination"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    if blockers:
+        return _blocked_result(blockers, checks)
+    return _allowed_result(checks)
+
+
+def format_anti_stomp_error(assessment: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Single RuntimeError message for MCP mutation gates."""
+    kind = assessment.get("blocker_kind") or "unknown"
+    reasons = "; ".join(
+        assessment.get("reasons")
+        or ["anti-stomp preflight blocked the mutation"]
+    )
+    next_action = assessment.get("exact_next_action") or "stop and diagnose"
+    return (
+        f"Anti-stomp preflight (#604) blocked mutation "
+        f"[{kind}]: {reasons}. "
+        f"exact_next_action: {next_action}"
+    )
+
+
+def block_response(
+    assessment: dict[str, Any],
+    **extra_fields: Any,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Structured tool-return payload for a blocked mutation."""
+    payload = {
+        "success": False,
+        "performed": False,
+        "blocked": True,
+        "anti_stomp": True,
+        "blocker_kind": assessment.get("blocker_kind"),
+        "blockers": list(assessment.get("blockers") or []),
+        "reasons": list(assessment.get("reasons") or []),
+        "exact_next_action": assessment.get("exact_next_action"),
+        "checks": assessment.get("checks") or {},
+    }
+    payload.update(extra_fields)
+    return payload
+
+
+def contamination_from_stable_marker(
+    marker: dict | None,
+    *,
+    task: str | None,
+    actual_role: str | None,
+) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
+    """Derive source-contamination facts from a #671 durable marker."""
+    if not marker:
+        return False, []
+    gate = stable_branch_push_guard.assess_contamination_gate(
+        marker,
+        task=task,
+        actual_role=actual_role,
+    )
+    if gate.get("block"):
+        return True, list(gate.get("reasons") or [])
+    return False, []

canonical_repository_root.py

@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+"""Immutable canonical repository root for cross-repository namespaces (#706).
+
+The Gitea-Tools MCP server historically derived the ``canonical_repo_root`` from
+the *install checkout* the server script lives in
+(``PROJECT_ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))``). A namespace
+that runs the same server script against an *external* repository (e.g.
+``eagenda-author`` targeting ``eAgenda``) then failed every mutation: the
+branches-only / worktree-membership guards (#274) compared the task workspace
+against the Gitea-Tools ``.git`` directory, which it can never belong to.
+
+This module separates two distinct concepts:
+
+* the immutable code/install root (``PROJECT_ROOT``) — where the server lives, and
+* the namespace-scoped **canonical repository root** — the working root of the
+  repository whose issues/PRs the namespace mutates.
+
+The canonical repository root is configured per namespace (profile field or an
+environment variable, typically set alongside the namespace ``cwd`` in the MCP
+config). It is validated (existence, git identity, git common-directory
+membership) and pinned immutably into the session context so a later call cannot
+forge or swap it. When *no* binding is configured the single-repo default is
+preserved unchanged: the canonical root is derived from the process checkout.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+from typing import Mapping
+
+import remote_repo_guard
+
+# Namespace-scoped override, typically exported next to the server ``cwd`` in the
+# MCP config for a cross-repository namespace.
+CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV = "GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_ROOT"
+
+# Candidate git remote names probed when deriving repository identity.
+_IDENTITY_REMOTE_CANDIDATES = ("prgs", "origin", "dadeschools", "mdcps")
+
+
+def configured_canonical_root(
+    profile: Mapping | None,
+    env: Mapping | None,
+) -> tuple[str | None, str | None]:
+    """Return ``(value, source)`` for the declared canonical repository root.
+
+    Precedence: the ``GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_ROOT`` environment variable
+    (namespace-scoped) overrides the profile ``canonical_repository_root``
+    field. Blank values are treated as unset. Returns ``(None, None)`` when no
+    binding is declared (the single-repo default).
+    """
+    env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
+    env_val = (env_map.get(CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV) or "").strip()
+    if env_val:
+        return env_val, f"{CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV} environment variable"
+    if profile:
+        prof_val = (profile.get("canonical_repository_root") or "").strip()
+        if prof_val:
+            return prof_val, "profile canonical_repository_root"
+    return None, None
+
+
+def resolve_repo_toplevel(path: str) -> str | None:
+    """Realpath of the git working-tree top level for *path*, or None."""
+    text = (path or "").strip()
+    if not text:
+        return None
+    try:
+        res = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", text, "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            check=True,
+        )
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+    top = (res.stdout or "").strip()
+    return os.path.realpath(top) if top else None
+
+
+def repository_identity_slug(path: str, *, remote: str | None = None) -> str | None:
+    """``owner/repository`` derived from a git remote configured at *path*.
+
+    Tries the caller-named remote first, then a small set of known remote names,
+    then whatever remote the repository actually has. Returns None when no remote
+    URL is parseable (identity cannot be proven).
+    """
+    text = (path or "").strip()
+    if not text:
+        return None
+
+    ordered: list[str] = []
+    for name in (remote, *_IDENTITY_REMOTE_CANDIDATES):
+        clean = (name or "").strip()
+        if clean and clean not in ordered:
+            ordered.append(clean)
+
+    try:
+        listed = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", text, "remote"],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            check=True,
+        ).stdout.split()
+    except Exception:
+        listed = []
+    for name in listed:
+        if name and name not in ordered:
+            ordered.append(name)
+
+    for name in ordered:
+        try:
+            url = subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "-C", text, "remote", "get-url", name],
+                capture_output=True,
+                text=True,
+                check=True,
+            ).stdout.strip()
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+        parsed = remote_repo_guard.parse_org_repo_from_remote_url(url)
+        if parsed:
+            return f"{parsed[0]}/{parsed[1]}"
+    return None
+
+
+def assess_canonical_repository_root(
+    *,
+    configured_value: str | None,
+    source: str | None,
+    expected_slug: str | None,
+    process_project_root: str,
+    remote: str | None = None,
+    require_binding: bool = False,
+) -> dict:
+    """Validate the canonical repository root binding, failing closed on forgery.
+
+    Returns a dict with ``proven`` / ``block`` / ``reasons`` plus the resolved
+    ``canonical_repo_root`` (the value downstream guards must use),
+    ``configured`` (whether a cross-repo binding was declared),
+    ``resolved_slug`` and ``source``.
+
+    Without a configured binding the single-repo default is preserved: the
+    canonical root is derived from *process_project_root* and never blocks
+    (unless *require_binding* explicitly demands one).
+
+    With a configured binding the path must exist, be a git repository, and —
+    when *expected_slug* is known — carry a matching repository identity. A
+    mismatched or (when *require_binding*) unprovable identity is a forged or
+    conflicting binding and fails closed.
+    """
+    process_root = os.path.realpath(process_project_root)
+    declared = (configured_value or "").strip()
+
+    if not declared:
+        if require_binding:
+            return _assessment(
+                proven=False,
+                reasons=[
+                    "no canonical_repository_root configured for a cross-repository "
+                    f"namespace; set {CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV} or the profile "
+                    "canonical_repository_root field (fail closed)"
+                ],
+                configured=False,
+                canonical_repo_root=process_root,
+                resolved_slug=None,
+                source=None,
+            )
+        # Single-repo default: canonical root follows the install checkout.
+        derived = resolve_repo_toplevel(process_root) or process_root
+        return _assessment(
+            proven=True,
+            reasons=[],
+            configured=False,
+            canonical_repo_root=derived,
+            resolved_slug=None,
+            source=None,
+        )
+
+    real = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(declared))
+    if not os.path.isdir(real):
+        return _assessment(
+            proven=False,
+            reasons=[
+                f"configured canonical repository root '{real}' does not exist "
+                "or is not a directory (fail closed)"
+            ],
+            configured=True,
+            canonical_repo_root=real,
+            resolved_slug=None,
+            source=source,
+        )
+
+    toplevel = resolve_repo_toplevel(real)
+    if not toplevel:
+        return _assessment(
+            proven=False,
+            reasons=[
+                f"configured canonical repository root '{real}' is not a git "
+                "repository (fail closed)"
+            ],
+            configured=True,
+            canonical_repo_root=real,
+            resolved_slug=None,
+            source=source,
+        )
+
+    resolved_slug = repository_identity_slug(toplevel, remote=remote)
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    expected = (expected_slug or "").strip() or None
+    if expected:
+        if resolved_slug and resolved_slug.lower() != expected.lower():
+            reasons.append(
+                f"canonical repository root identity mismatch: '{toplevel}' resolves "
+                f"to repository '{resolved_slug}' but the session is authorized for "
+                f"'{expected}' (forged or conflicting binding, fail closed)"
+            )
+        elif not resolved_slug and require_binding:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"canonical repository root '{toplevel}' has no resolvable git "
+                f"remote identity to confirm authorization for '{expected}' "
+                "(fail closed)"
+            )
+
+    return _assessment(
+        proven=not reasons,
+        reasons=reasons,
+        configured=True,
+        canonical_repo_root=toplevel,
+        resolved_slug=resolved_slug,
+        source=source,
+    )
+
+
+def format_canonical_repository_root_error(assessment: Mapping) -> str:
+    """Single RuntimeError message for MCP preflight gates."""
+    root = assessment.get("canonical_repo_root") or "(unknown)"
+    source = assessment.get("source") or "(unconfigured)"
+    reasons = "; ".join(
+        assessment.get("reasons") or ["unknown canonical repository root violation"]
+    )
+    return (
+        f"Canonical repository root guard (#706): {reasons}. "
+        f"binding source: {source}; canonical repository root: {root}. "
+        "Configure a valid canonical_repository_root for the target repository "
+        "and relaunch; do not point it at the Gitea-Tools install checkout."
+    )
+
+
+def _assessment(
+    *,
+    proven: bool,
+    reasons: list[str],
+    configured: bool,
+    canonical_repo_root: str,
+    resolved_slug: str | None,
+    source: str | None,
+) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "proven": proven,
+        "block": not proven,
+        "reasons": list(reasons),
+        "configured": configured,
+        "canonical_repo_root": canonical_repo_root,
+        "resolved_slug": resolved_slug,
+        "source": source,
+    }

docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ authenticated capability set. Each profile defines the following fields:
 | `authenticated_username` | string | The Gitea login this profile authenticates as (verified at runtime via `gitea_whoami`, not trusted from config). |
 | `allowed_operations` | list | Operation categories this profile may perform. |
 | `forbidden_operations` | list | Operation categories this profile must never perform. |
+| `allowed_repositories` | list | Optional. Canonical `owner/repository` slugs this profile may bind to. An authorization boundary, not the binding itself — see [Repository scope](#repository-scope-714). |
 | `token_source_name` | string | The *name* of the secret source (e.g. env var name or secret key). **Never the token value.** |
 | `audit_label` | string | Short label attached to audit records for actions by this profile. |
 | `can_approve_prs` | bool | May submit an approving PR review. |
@@ -57,6 +58,47 @@ authenticated capability set. Each profile defines the following fields:
 name), never the token itself. Token values are never part of a profile object,
 never logged, never returned by a tool, and never committed.
 
+## Repository scope (#714)
+
+`allowed_repositories` declares the canonical `owner/repository` slugs a profile
+may operate on:
+
+```json
+"prgs-author": {
+  "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"]
+}
+```
+
+It is an **authorization boundary, not the session binding**. The binding is
+derived and enforced like this:
+
+1. The session repository is derived from the **verified, workspace-aligned git
+   remote** — never from a caller-supplied `org`/`repo` argument, and never from
+   the `REMOTES` table (whose entries are default *targets*: `prgs` defaults to
+   `Timesheet`, which is not this project).
+2. That workspace-derived slug is validated against `allowed_repositories`.
+3. The session binds immutably to that one canonical `owner/repository`. The
+   organization is derived from the slug; there is no independent,
+   caller-controlled organization value.
+4. If a profile authorizes several repositories, the verified workspace still
+   selects exactly one. A session never binds to the whole list and never
+   switches between entries.
+
+Fail-closed rules:
+
+- Activation is rejected when the workspace repository is absent from the
+  allowlist.
+- A mutation is rejected when no verified workspace repository can be
+  established.
+- A tool-level `org`/`repo` override that disagrees with the binding is rejected
+  before the mutation runs.
+- A mutation request can never establish, complete, or replace the binding.
+
+The field is **config-only**: no environment variable can widen or forge it. It
+is optional — a profile that omits it keeps the previous behaviour, so existing
+static-profile namespaces stay functional until an operator provisions the
+scope. Provisioning it is what activates enforcement for that profile.
+
 ## Example profiles
 
 The following are the reference profiles. Booleans express intended capability

docs/observability/sentry-integration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+# Self-hosted Sentry observability for the Gitea MCP server (#606)
+
+Optional, **off-by-default** instrumentation that reports MCP runtime errors,
+fail-closed workflow blockers, lease / terminal-lock / stale-runtime
+collisions, and recurring watchdog check-ins to a **self-hosted** Sentry at
+`https://sentry.prgs.cc/`.
+
+> **Gitea remains the source of truth.** Sentry is observe-only. It never
+> approves, merges, closes, or otherwise mutates Gitea workflow state, and it
+> never bypasses leases, #332, workflow roles, or the MCP gates. Sentry alerts
+> may only feed the *sanctioned* Gitea issue/comment path via the #612 incident
+> bridge — never a direct write.
+
+Implemented by [`sentry_observability.py`](../../sentry_observability.py).
+
+---
+
+## 1. Create the Sentry project
+
+1. Sign in to the self-hosted Sentry at **`https://sentry.prgs.cc/`** (this is
+   **not** Sentry Cloud — do not use `*.ingest.sentry.io`).
+2. Create a new **Python** project named **`gitea-tools-mcp`**.
+3. Open **Settings → Projects → gitea-tools-mcp → Client Keys (DSN)** and copy
+   the DSN. It looks like `https://<publickey>@sentry.prgs.cc/<project-id>`.
+4. **Never commit the DSN.** It is a runtime secret supplied via env var only.
+
+## 2. Configure the environment
+
+All configuration is env-var driven (see [`.env.example`](../../.env.example)):
+
+| Variable | Purpose | Default |
+|----------|---------|---------|
+| `MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED` | Master gate (`1/true/yes/on`). Required. | off |
+| `SENTRY_DSN` | Self-hosted DSN. Required. | *(empty)* |
+| `SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT` | `local` / `dev` / `prod` tag. | `development` |
+| `SENTRY_RELEASE` | Release id (git SHA or version). | *(none)* |
+| `MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE` | Perf-trace sample rate `0.0–1.0` (clamped). | `0.0` |
+| `MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS` | Forward Python logs as structured logs. | off |
+
+**The feature stays completely off unless `MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED` is truthy *and*
+`SENTRY_DSN` is non-empty.** With either missing, `init_sentry()` is a no-op,
+the SDK is never initialised, and no events are sent — existing tool behaviour
+and API-call patterns are unchanged.
+
+### Per-environment examples
+
+```bash
+# local (quiet: capture errors/blockers, no traces)
+export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=1
+export SENTRY_DSN="https://<key>@sentry.prgs.cc/<id>"
+export SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=local
+
+# dev (light tracing + logs)
+export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=1
+export SENTRY_DSN="https://<key>@sentry.prgs.cc/<id>"
+export SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=dev
+export MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.2
+export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS=1
+
+# prod (errors/blockers + low-rate tracing, release-tagged)
+export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=1
+export SENTRY_DSN="https://<key>@sentry.prgs.cc/<id>"
+export SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=prod
+export SENTRY_RELEASE="$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)"
+export MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.05
+```
+
+The optional SDK is pinned in [`requirements.txt`](../../requirements.txt)
+(`sentry-sdk==2.20.0`). It is imported lazily: if the package is absent, the
+module still imports and every entry point is a safe no-op.
+
+## 3. What is instrumented
+
+| Signal | Where | Notes |
+|--------|-------|-------|
+| Startup init | `gitea_mcp_server.py` `__main__`, before `mcp.run` | Prints a redaction-safe status line to stderr. |
+| Failing mutations (exceptions) | `_audited(...)` context manager | `capture_exception` with scrubbed tags. |
+| Fail-closed blockers / failed mutations | `_audit_pr_result(...)` (BLOCKED/FAILED) | Structured `capture_workflow_blocker` event incl. the canonical next action when available (criterion 7). |
+| Allocator watchdog check-ins | `gitea_allocate_next_work` tool | `allocator_health`, `stale_lease_scan`, `terminal_lock_scan`. |
+| Namespace-health check-in | `gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_health` tool | `namespace_health`. |
+
+All capture paths are **best-effort / fail open**: a Sentry outage or capture
+error never breaks an MCP tool success path.
+
+## 4. Cron / watchdog monitors
+
+`sentry_observability.MONITOR_SLUGS` defines stable check-in slugs:
+
+| Registry key | Sentry monitor slug | Wired at |
+|--------------|--------------------|----------|
+| `stale_lease_scan` | `gitea-mcp-stale-lease-scan` | allocator run (global lease expiry) |
+| `terminal_lock_scan` | `gitea-mcp-terminal-lock-scan` | allocator run (terminal-lock lookup) |
+| `allocator_health` | `gitea-mcp-allocator-health` | allocator run |
+| `namespace_health` | `gitea-mcp-namespace-health` | namespace-health probe |
+| `dashboard_freshness` | `gitea-mcp-dashboard-freshness` | call `monitor_checkin("dashboard_freshness", ...)` from the dashboard refresh job (#605) |
+| `reconciler_cleanup` | `gitea-mcp-reconciler-cleanup` | call `monitor_checkin("reconciler_cleanup", ...)` from the reconciler cleanup entrypoint |
+
+Create matching Cron monitors in Sentry with those slugs. Emit an
+`in_progress` check-in at job start and `ok`/`error` at completion via
+`sentry_observability.monitor_checkin(slug_key, status)`.
+
+## 5. Redaction guarantees (fail closed)
+
+Redaction fails *closed*: if a field cannot be proven safe it is dropped rather
+than sent. The `before_send` (and `before_send_log`) hook `scrub_event`
+recursively redacts every outgoing event; on any error it drops the event
+entirely. Guarantees, proven by `tests/test_sentry_observability.py`:
+
+- **No** tokens, passwords, keychain IDs, DSNs, cookies, or `user:pass@host`.
+- **No** raw session-state or full prompt/comment bodies — `session_id` is only
+  ever surfaced as a 12-char `session_id_hash`.
+- **No** private config contents or raw credential headers.
+- **No** full local filesystem paths — a worktree path collapses to a coarse
+  `worktree_category` (`author` / `reviewer` / `merger` / `reconciler` /
+  `branches` / `root` / `other`).
+- Only the allowlisted tag keys in `ALLOWED_TAG_KEYS` are ever attached.
+
+## 6. Coexistence with GlitchTip / the #612 incident bridge
+
+This is the **outbound** path (MCP → Sentry SDK). It complements — it does not
+replace — the **inbound** [`incident_bridge.py`](../../incident_bridge.py)
+(#612), which turns Sentry/GlitchTip *observations* into durable Gitea issues
+and `incident_links` rows.
+
+- Prefer **one** observability path per environment. Point the MCP server's
+  `SENTRY_DSN` at the same self-hosted `gitea-tools-mcp` project that the #612
+  bridge reconciles from, so an MCP-reported error and its Gitea issue line up.
+- GlitchTip is Sentry-protocol compatible; if an existing GlitchTip DSN is in
+  use, either migrate it to `https://sentry.prgs.cc/` or document the split
+  (MCP → Sentry, legacy → GlitchTip) explicitly for operators.
+- The bridge remains the **only** sanctioned route from an alert back into
+  Gitea workflow state.
+
+## 7. Non-goals
+
+- Sentry must **not** become the workflow source of truth.
+- Sentry must **not** approve, merge, close, or mutate Gitea workflow state.
+- Sentry must **not** bypass leases, #332, workflow roles, or the MCP gates.

gitea-mcp.v2-contexts.example.json

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
       "execution_profile": "example-author",
       "audit_label": "example-author",
       "auth": { "type": "keychain", "id": "example-gitea-author-token" },
+      "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
       "allowed_operations": ["read", "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr", "comment", "issue.comment"],
       "forbidden_operations": ["approve", "request_changes", "merge"]
     },

gitea_auth.py

@@ -182,11 +182,51 @@ def get_auth_header(host):
 
 def resolve_remote(args):
     """Given parsed argparse args with --remote/--host/--org/--repo,
-    return (host, org, repo) with overrides applied."""
+    return (host, org, repo) with overrides applied.
+
+    #714 / #530: when the caller omits org and/or repo, prefer the
+    workspace-aligned git remote over REMOTES defaults (e.g. bare
+    ``--remote prgs`` must not force Timesheet when the checkout is
+    Gitea-Tools). Explicit --org/--repo always win.
+    """
     profile = REMOTES[args.remote]
     host = args.host or profile["host"]
-    org = args.org or profile["org"]
-    repo = args.repo or profile["repo"]
+    org_explicit = getattr(args, "org", None) is not None
+    repo_explicit = getattr(args, "repo", None) is not None
+    org = args.org if org_explicit else profile["org"]
+    repo = args.repo if repo_explicit else profile["repo"]
+    if not org_explicit or not repo_explicit:
+        try:
+            import remote_repo_guard
+            import subprocess
+            # Prefer the named remote URL when present; fall back to origin.
+            url = None
+            for remote_name in (args.remote, "origin"):
+                try:
+                    proc = subprocess.run(
+                        ["git", "remote", "get-url", remote_name],
+                        capture_output=True,
+                        text=True,
+                        timeout=5,
+                        check=False,
+                    )
+                    if proc.returncode == 0 and (proc.stdout or "").strip():
+                        url = proc.stdout.strip()
+                        break
+                except Exception:
+                    continue
+            # Allow tests to inject a deterministic remote URL without Git.
+            env_url = os.environ.get("GITEA_TEST_WORKSPACE_REMOTE_URL")
+            if env_url:
+                url = env_url
+            parsed = remote_repo_guard.parse_org_repo_from_remote_url(url)
+            if parsed:
+                if not org_explicit:
+                    org = parsed[0]
+                if not repo_explicit:
+                    repo = parsed[1]
+        except Exception:
+            pass
     return host, org, repo
 
 
@@ -758,6 +798,14 @@ def get_profile():
         "profile_name": name,
         "allowed_operations": ops,
         "forbidden_operations": forbidden,
+        # #714 repository authorization boundary. Config-only on purpose: an
+        # environment variable must never widen or forge the set of
+        # repositories a session may bind to.
+        "allowed_repositories": _json_list("allowed_repositories"),
+        # #706 cross-repository canonical root binding. Config-sourced here (the
+        # namespace-scoped GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_ROOT env override is applied
+        # by canonical_repository_root.configured_canonical_root, not widened here).
+        "canonical_repository_root": jp.get("canonical_repository_root") or None,
         "audit_label": audit_label,
         "token_source_name": token_source,
         "auth_source_type": auth_type,

gitea_config.py

@@ -475,6 +475,57 @@ def _require_enabled(kind, name, obj):
     return enabled
 
 
+_REPO_SCOPE_RE = re.compile(r"^[^/\s]+/[^/\s]+$")
+
+
+def _validate_allowed_repositories(name, raw):
+    """Validate the optional per-profile repository authorization scope (#714).
+
+    ``allowed_repositories`` is an authorization boundary of canonical
+    ``owner/repository`` slugs. It is not the session binding: the verified
+    workspace repository selects exactly one entry at bind time. Absent means
+    "no repository scope configured" and is allowed, so existing profiles keep
+    working until an operator provisions the field.
+    """
+    if raw is None:
+        return
+    if not isinstance(raw, list):
+        raise ConfigError(
+            f"profile '{name}' allowed_repositories must be a list of "
+            "'owner/repository' strings"
+        )
+    for entry in raw:
+        if not isinstance(entry, str) or not _REPO_SCOPE_RE.match(entry.strip()):
+            raise ConfigError(
+                f"profile '{name}' allowed_repositories entry {entry!r} is not "
+                "a canonical 'owner/repository' slug"
+            )
+
+
+def _validate_canonical_repository_root(name, raw):
+    """Validate the optional per-profile canonical repository root (#706).
+
+    ``canonical_repository_root`` binds a cross-repository namespace to the
+    working root of its target repository (separate from the immutable
+    Gitea-Tools install checkout). It is an absolute filesystem path; existence
+    and git identity are validated at bind time by the runtime guard, not here
+    (config validation stays filesystem-independent). Absent means the
+    single-repo default and is allowed.
+    """
+    if raw is None:
+        return
+    if not isinstance(raw, str) or not raw.strip():
+        raise ConfigError(
+            f"profile '{name}' canonical_repository_root must be a non-empty "
+            "absolute path string to the target repository working root"
+        )
+    if not os.path.isabs(raw.strip()):
+        raise ConfigError(
+            f"profile '{name}' canonical_repository_root {raw!r} must be an "
+            "absolute path"
+        )
+
+
 def _reject_inline_secrets(kind, name, obj):
     for key in _INLINE_SECRET_KEYS:
         if key in obj:
@@ -549,6 +600,10 @@ def _load_v2_contexts(data, path):
         forbidden = raw.get("forbidden_operations") or []
         if not isinstance(allowed, list) or not isinstance(forbidden, list):
             raise ConfigError(f"profile '{name}' operation fields must be lists")
+        _validate_allowed_repositories(name, raw.get("allowed_repositories"))
+        _validate_canonical_repository_root(
+            name, raw.get("canonical_repository_root")
+        )
         allowed_n = {_normalize_op("gitea", op, name) for op in allowed}
         forbidden_n = {_normalize_op("gitea", op, name) for op in forbidden}
         # Reviewer-identity deadlock rule (#100/#103) applies here unchanged.

master_parity_gate.py

@@ -166,3 +166,128 @@ def format_parity(assessment: dict) -> str:
     if not assessment.get("determinable"):
         return "parity indeterminate (baseline or current HEAD unknown)"
     return f"in parity at {_short(assessment.get('current_head'))}"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Target-repository parity (#739 F3)
+#
+# Everything above measures ONE dimension: the Gitea-Tools server's own
+# implementation commit, comparing the SHA this process was loaded from against
+# the SHA now on disk at PROJECT_ROOT. That is deliberate and is left untouched
+# — it is what proves the in-memory capability gates are current.
+#
+# It is not, however, a statement about the repository a cross-repository
+# namespace actually mutates. The assessment below is a separate, separately
+# labelled dimension for the configured canonical target repository. It never
+# feeds the mutation gate and never changes startup_head/current_head.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+DEFAULT_TARGET_TRACKING_REF = "refs/remotes/origin/master"
+
+
+def _git_capture(root: str, *args: str) -> str | None:
+    """Run a read-only git command in *root*; ``None`` on any failure.
+
+    Deliberately does not honour ``GITEA_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD``: that override
+    exists to pin the *server's* HEAD, and applying it here would make a target
+    repository silently report the server's forced SHA.
+    """
+    if not root:
+        return None
+    try:
+        res = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", root, *args],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+    if res.returncode != 0:
+        return None
+    return (res.stdout or "").strip() or None
+
+
+def assess_target_repository_parity(
+    *,
+    canonical_root: str | None,
+    source: str | None,
+    tracking_ref: str = DEFAULT_TARGET_TRACKING_REF,
+) -> dict:
+    """Assess the configured cross-repository target checkout.
+
+    Reports the target's canonical root, repository identity, checked-out
+    commit, and last-known remote master commit, plus whether the checkout is
+    behind that ref. No network call is made: the remote side is read from the
+    existing remote-tracking ref, so a target that has never been fetched is
+    reported as indeterminate rather than guessed at.
+
+    An unconfigured namespace is ``configured=False`` and never ``stale`` — the
+    single-repository default has no second dimension to be stale about. A
+    configured root that cannot be read is ``determinable=False`` with reasons.
+    """
+    result = {
+        "configured": bool(canonical_root),
+        "canonical_repository_root": None,
+        "source": source,
+        "repository_slug": None,
+        "checkout_head": None,
+        "tracking_ref": tracking_ref,
+        "remote_tracking_head": None,
+        "determinable": False,
+        "stale": False,
+        "reasons": [],
+    }
+    if not canonical_root:
+        result["determinable"] = True
+        return result
+
+    result["canonical_repository_root"] = canonical_root
+    if not os.path.isdir(canonical_root):
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            f"configured canonical repository root '{canonical_root}' "
+            f"does not exist or is not a directory"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    toplevel = _git_capture(canonical_root, "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel")
+    if not toplevel:
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            f"configured canonical repository root '{canonical_root}' "
+            f"is not a git checkout"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    head = _git_capture(canonical_root, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
+    if not head:
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            f"target repository HEAD could not be read at '{canonical_root}'"
+        )
+        return result
+    result["checkout_head"] = head
+    result["determinable"] = True
+
+    remote_url = _git_capture(canonical_root, "remote", "get-url", "origin")
+    if remote_url:
+        # Local import keeps this module dependency-light for its startup role.
+        import remote_repo_guard
+
+        parsed = remote_repo_guard.parse_org_repo_from_remote_url(remote_url)
+        if parsed:
+            result["repository_slug"] = f"{parsed[0]}/{parsed[1]}"
+    if not result["repository_slug"]:
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            "target repository identity could not be derived from its git remote"
+        )
+
+    tracking_head = _git_capture(canonical_root, "rev-parse", tracking_ref)
+    if not tracking_head:
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            f"remote-tracking ref '{tracking_ref}' is unknown in the target "
+            f"checkout; target staleness is indeterminate (no fetch is "
+            f"performed by this assessment)"
+        )
+        return result
+    result["remote_tracking_head"] = tracking_head
+    result["stale"] = tracking_head != head
+    return result

mcp_session_state.py

@@ -36,6 +36,15 @@ KIND_REVIEW_DRAFT = "review_draft"
 # other session proofs; a contaminated session fails closed on gated mutations
 # until a reconciler audits and clears it.
 KIND_STABLE_BRANCH_CONTAMINATION = "stable_branch_contamination"
+# Durable shadow of the in-memory reviewer session lease (#702). Written on
+# every sanctioned record/heartbeat and removed on sanctioned clear, so a
+# daemon that dies without teardown leaves provable orphan evidence (owner
+# pid + session id) for the guarded lease-cleanup path. Never a substitute
+# for the in-session lease: mutation gates ignore it.
+KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE = "reviewer_session_lease"
+# Durable audit record written whenever the daemon's sanctioned stale-binding
+# recovery clears an inherited GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE binding (#702).
+KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY = "stale_binding_recovery"
 # #709: archive prior terminal decision ledgers instead of silent overwrite.
 KIND_DECISION_LOCK_ARCHIVE = "review_decision_lock_archive"
 # #709: post-merge cleanup/audit reconciliation-required durable record.
@@ -59,6 +68,9 @@ RECOVERY_CRITICAL_KINDS = frozenset(
         KIND_POST_MERGE_DECISION_RECOVERY,
         KIND_IRRECOVERABLE_DECISION_PROVENANCE,
         KIND_IRRECOVERABLE_PROVENANCE_AUTH,
+        # #702 crash-orphan evidence (must outlive TTL; F4)
+        KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE,
+        KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY,
     }
 )
 
@@ -138,6 +150,7 @@ def state_key(
     org: str | None = None,
     repo: str | None = None,
     profile_identity: str | None = None,
+    instance_id: str | None = None,
 ) -> str:
     """Build durable filename key.
 
@@ -145,17 +158,20 @@ def state_key(
     so the primary key is kind + profile identity. Remote/org/repo are stored
     inside the payload and validated on load (#559), which lets a later daemon
     process recover state without already knowing the remote argument.
+
+    *instance_id* extends the key for kinds where one-per-profile collides —
+    concurrent same-profile sessions each own their reviewer-lease shadow
+    (#702 F5), keyed by their lease session id so a later heartbeat can never
+    overwrite or misattribute another session's crash evidence.
     """
     # Keep remote/org/repo parameters for API stability / future kinds; they are
     # intentionally not part of the filename for session-scoped proofs.
     _ = (remote, org, repo)
-    return "-".join(
-        _sanitize_segment(part)
-        for part in (
-            kind,
-            profile_identity or "unknown-profile",
-        )
-    )
+    parts = [kind, profile_identity or "unknown-profile"]
+    instance = (instance_id or "").strip()
+    if instance:
+        parts.append(instance)
+    return "-".join(_sanitize_segment(part) for part in parts)
 
 
 def state_file_path(
@@ -166,6 +182,7 @@ def state_file_path(
     repo: str | None = None,
     profile_identity: str | None = None,
     state_dir: str | None = None,
+    instance_id: str | None = None,
 ) -> str:
     root = (state_dir or default_state_dir()).strip()
     name = state_key(
@@ -174,6 +191,7 @@ def state_file_path(
         org=org,
         repo=repo,
         profile_identity=profile_identity,
+        instance_id=instance_id,
     )
     return os.path.join(root, f"{name}.json")
 
@@ -430,6 +448,7 @@ def load_state(
     repo: str | None = None,
     profile_identity: str | None = None,
     state_dir: str | None = None,
+    instance_id: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
     """Load durable state payload when identity checks pass."""
     profile = current_profile_identity(profile_identity=profile_identity)
@@ -440,6 +459,7 @@ def load_state(
         repo=repo,
         profile_identity=profile,
         state_dir=state_dir,
+        instance_id=instance_id,
     )
     lock_path = f"{path}.lock"
     with _exclusive_file_lock(lock_path):
@@ -485,6 +505,7 @@ def save_state(
     repo: str | None = None,
     profile_identity: str | None = None,
     state_dir: str | None = None,
+    instance_id: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
     """Persist or clear durable state for the given session identity key."""
     profile = current_profile_identity(
@@ -497,6 +518,11 @@ def save_state(
     key_remote = remote if remote is not None else (payload or {}).get("remote")
     key_org = org if org is not None else (payload or {}).get("org")
     key_repo = repo if repo is not None else (payload or {}).get("repo")
+    key_instance = (
+        (instance_id or "").strip()
+        or str((payload or {}).get("instance_id") or "").strip()
+        or None
+    )
 
     root = _ensure_state_dir(state_dir)
     path = state_file_path(
@@ -506,6 +532,7 @@ def save_state(
         repo=key_repo,
         profile_identity=profile,
         state_dir=root,
+        instance_id=key_instance,
     )
     lock_path = f"{path}.lock"
     with _exclusive_file_lock(lock_path):
@@ -535,6 +562,8 @@ def save_state(
             body["repo"] = key_repo
         # Stamp session-state authority used for this write (#695 AC2 / AC6).
         body.setdefault("session_state_dir", root)
+        if key_instance:
+            body["instance_id"] = key_instance
         try:
             import mcp_daemon_guard
 
@@ -568,6 +597,8 @@ def save_state(
             "transport": body.get("transport"),
             "payload": body,
         }
+        if key_instance:
+            envelope["instance_id"] = key_instance
         _write_json(path, envelope)
         return dict(body)
 
@@ -580,6 +611,7 @@ def clear_state(
     repo: str | None = None,
     profile_identity: str | None = None,
     state_dir: str | None = None,
+    instance_id: str | None = None,
 ) -> None:
     save_state(
         kind=kind,
@@ -589,8 +621,59 @@ def clear_state(
         repo=repo,
         profile_identity=profile_identity,
         state_dir=state_dir,
+        instance_id=instance_id,
     )
 
+def list_states(
+    *,
+    kind: str,
+    profile_identity: str | None = None,
+    state_dir: str | None = None,
+) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Enumerate durable records of *kind* across all instance keys.
+
+    Crash recovery cannot know which session id left a shadow behind, so it
+    must be able to enumerate every record of a kind (#702 F5). Identity
+    checks (profile / TTL policy) apply per record exactly as in
+    :func:`load_state`; records that fail closed are omitted.
+    """
+    root = (state_dir or default_state_dir()).strip()
+    if not root or not os.path.isdir(root):
+        return []
+    profile = current_profile_identity(profile_identity=profile_identity)
+    results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    try:
+        names = sorted(os.listdir(root))
+    except OSError:
+        return []
+    for name in names:
+        if not name.endswith(".json") or name.startswith("."):
+            continue
+        envelope = _read_json(os.path.join(root, name))
+        if not envelope or envelope.get("kind") != kind:
+            continue
+        payload = envelope.get("payload")
+        if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+            continue
+        merged = dict(payload)
+        for key in (
+            "kind",
+            "remote",
+            "org",
+            "repo",
+            "profile_identity",
+            "session_profile_lock",
+            "recorded_at",
+            "updated_at",
+            "writer_pid",
+        ):
+            if key in envelope and key not in merged:
+                merged[key] = envelope[key]
+        if identity_match_reasons(merged, profile_identity=profile):
+            continue
+        results.append(merged)
+    return results
+
 def list_decision_lock_profile_identities(
     state_dir: str | None = None,
 ) -> list[str]:

mcp_tool_error_boundary.py

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import json
 import logging
+import re
 import sys
 from typing import Any
 
@@ -38,6 +39,9 @@ REASON_CONFIG_ERROR = "config_error"
 REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR = "internal_error"
 REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE = "upstream_unavailable"
 REASON_HTTP_ERROR = "http_error"
+# Typed structured errors for previously-opaque raw mutation failures.
+REASON_PREFLIGHT_ORDER = "preflight_order_violation"
+REASON_MALFORMED_RESPONSE = "malformed_response"
 
 ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION = "authentication"
 ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION = "authorization"
@@ -45,6 +49,7 @@ ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK = "network"
 ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION = "configuration"
 ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL = "internal"
 ERROR_CLASS_UPSTREAM = "upstream"
+ERROR_CLASS_PRECONDITION = "precondition"
 
 # Fixed, secret-free operator messages. Never interpolate HTTP bodies,
 # Keychain contents, tokens, or arbitrary exception text.
@@ -62,12 +67,128 @@ FIXED_MESSAGES: dict[str, str] = {
     REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR: "Internal tool error",
     REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE: "Gitea upstream unavailable",
     REASON_HTTP_ERROR: "Gitea HTTP request failed",
+    REASON_PREFLIGHT_ORDER: (
+        "Mutation blocked: pre-flight order violation (fail closed)"
+    ),
+    REASON_MALFORMED_RESPONSE: "Malformed response from Gitea",
 }
 
+# Error class for a self-declared safe reason code (``gitea_reason_code``).
+_REASON_ERROR_CLASS: dict[str, str] = {
+    REASON_AUTH_FAILED: ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
+    REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN: ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
+    REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE: ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
+    REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED: ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
+    REASON_NETWORK_ERROR: ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK,
+    REASON_CONFIG_ERROR: ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
+    REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE: ERROR_CLASS_UPSTREAM,
+    REASON_HTTP_ERROR: ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
+    REASON_PREFLIGHT_ORDER: ERROR_CLASS_PRECONDITION,
+    REASON_MALFORMED_RESPONSE: ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
+    REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR: ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
+}
+
+# Bounds for the safe diagnostic fields added to the ``internal_error`` path.
+_DETAIL_LIMIT = 200
+_CLASS_LIMIT = 120
+_STAGE_LIMIT = 64
+
+# Absolute-path prefixes stripped from diagnostic detail (never leak layout).
+_ABS_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"/(?:Users|home|private|var|tmp|opt|etc|root)/[^\s'\"]*")
+_DETAIL_SECRET_PREFIXES = ("token ", "Basic ", "Bearer ", "Authorization: ")
+_SECRET_KEY = (
+    r"token|password|passwd|secret|authorization|api[_-]?key|"
+    r"access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|session|cookie"
+)
+_SECRET_JSON_RE = re.compile(
+    r'"(' + _SECRET_KEY + r')"\s*:\s*"[^"]*"', re.IGNORECASE
+)
+_SECRET_KV_RE = re.compile(
+    r"\b(" + _SECRET_KEY + r")\s*=\s*[^\s&\"']+", re.IGNORECASE
+)
+
+_MUTATION_STAGE_ATTR = "_gitea_mutation_stage"
+_SELF_DECLARED_REASON_ATTR = "gitea_reason_code"
+
 _INSTALL_FLAG = "_gitea_auth_boundary_installed"
 _ORIGINAL_ATTR = "_gitea_auth_boundary_original"
 
 
+def _safe_str(exc: BaseException) -> str:
+    """``str(exc)`` that never raises (a poisoned ``__str__`` must not escape)."""
+    try:
+        return str(exc)
+    except Exception:
+        return ""
+
+
+def _safe_exception_class(exc: BaseException) -> str:
+    """Fully-qualified type identifier for *exc* — never instance/message text."""
+    try:
+        t = type(exc)
+        mod = getattr(t, "__module__", "") or ""
+        name = getattr(t, "__qualname__", None) or getattr(t, "__name__", "") or ""
+        ident = f"{mod}.{name}" if mod else name
+        return ident[:_CLASS_LIMIT]
+    except Exception:
+        return "unknown"
+
+
+def _redact_detail(text: Any, limit: int = _DETAIL_LIMIT) -> str:
+    """Strictly redact free-form exception text for safe diagnostics.
+
+    Removes token/Authorization credentials, raw URLs and hostnames (via the
+    shared audit redactor), and absolute filesystem paths, then collapses
+    whitespace and truncates. Never raises; on any failure returns "".
+    """
+    if not text:
+        return ""
+    try:
+        out = str(text)
+        # Drop credential-prefixed runs (token/Basic/Bearer/Authorization).
+        for prefix in _DETAIL_SECRET_PREFIXES:
+            idx = 0
+            while True:
+                i = out.find(prefix, idx)
+                if i == -1:
+                    break
+                j = i + len(prefix)
+                while j < len(out) and not out[j].isspace():
+                    j += 1
+                out = out[:i] + prefix + "[REDACTED]" + out[j:]
+                idx = i + len(prefix) + len("[REDACTED]")
+        # Secret VALUES carried in JSON ("key":"value") or kv (key=value) form,
+        # even short ones (e.g. a password), keyed by a sensitive field name.
+        out = _SECRET_JSON_RE.sub(r'"\1":"[REDACTED]"', out)
+        out = _SECRET_KV_RE.sub(r"\1=[REDACTED]", out)
+        # URLs / query secrets / hostnames.
+        try:
+            import gitea_audit
+
+            out = gitea_audit.redact_urls(out)
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        # Absolute filesystem paths (workspace layout is not for LLM output).
+        out = _ABS_PATH_RE.sub("[PATH]", out)
+        # Any bare hostname the URL redactor missed (defence in depth).
+        out = re.sub(r"\b[\w.-]+\.(?:cc|net|com|org|io|dev|local)\b", "[HOST]", out)
+        out = " ".join(out.split())
+        return out[:limit]
+    except Exception:
+        return ""
+
+
+def _safe_mutation_stage(exc: BaseException) -> str | None:
+    """Return the bounded, redacted mutation stage tagged on *exc* (or None)."""
+    try:
+        raw = getattr(exc, _MUTATION_STAGE_ATTR, None)
+        if not raw:
+            return None
+        return _redact_detail(raw, limit=_STAGE_LIMIT) or None
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+
+
 def fixed_message(reason_code: str) -> str:
     """Return the fixed sanitized message for *reason_code* (fail closed)."""
     return FIXED_MESSAGES.get(reason_code, FIXED_MESSAGES[REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR])
@@ -154,9 +275,34 @@ def classify_exception(exc: BaseException) -> dict[str, Any]:
         }
 
 
+def _self_declared_classification(exc: BaseException) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Honor a safe ``gitea_reason_code`` attribute set by server-side raisers.
+
+    Converts a raw exception that self-declares a **known** reason code into a
+    typed structured error (fixed message) instead of an opaque internal_error.
+    Unknown / non-string / secret values are ignored (fail closed to internal).
+    """
+    reason = getattr(exc, _SELF_DECLARED_REASON_ATTR, None)
+    if not isinstance(reason, str) or reason not in FIXED_MESSAGES:
+        return None
+    if reason == REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+        return None
+    return {
+        "reason_code": reason,
+        "error_class": _REASON_ERROR_CLASS.get(reason, ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL),
+        "http_status": None,
+        "message": fixed_message(reason),
+        "transport_survives": True,
+    }
+
+
 def _classify_exception_impl(exc: BaseException) -> dict[str, Any]:
     import gitea_auth
 
+    declared = _self_declared_classification(exc)
+    if declared is not None:
+        return declared
+
     if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError):
         code = getattr(exc, "reason_code", None) or REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN
         if code not in (
@@ -233,13 +379,23 @@ def _classify_exception_impl(exc: BaseException) -> dict[str, Any]:
         return _classify_exception_impl(cause)
 
     # No message-substring authentication heuristics (reviewer finding #3).
-    return {
+    # Unexpected failure → internal_error, now carrying SAFE diagnostics so the
+    # failure is actionable: a type identifier + strictly-redacted detail +
+    # optional mutation-stage tag. The operator ``message`` stays the fixed
+    # constant; none of these fields carry secrets/bodies/paths/env.
+    result = {
         "reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
         "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
         "http_status": None,
         "message": fixed_message(REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR),
         "transport_survives": True,
+        "exception_class": _safe_exception_class(exc),
+        "detail": _redact_detail(_safe_str(exc)),
     }
+    stage = _safe_mutation_stage(exc)
+    if stage:
+        result["mutation_stage"] = stage
+    return result
 
 
 def build_structured_error_payload(
@@ -277,6 +433,19 @@ def build_structured_error_payload(
             payload["tool"] = tool_name[:120]
         if profile_name and isinstance(profile_name, str):
             payload["profile"] = profile_name[:80]
+        # Safe diagnostics — internal_error path only. These make an otherwise
+        # opaque crash actionable without leaking secrets. Re-derived here from
+        # the fixed message gate above; typed reasons never carry them.
+        if payload["reason_code"] == REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+            exc_cls = classification.get("exception_class")
+            if isinstance(exc_cls, str) and exc_cls:
+                payload["exception_class"] = exc_cls[:_CLASS_LIMIT]
+            detail = classification.get("detail")
+            if isinstance(detail, str):
+                payload["detail"] = _redact_detail(detail)
+            stage = classification.get("mutation_stage")
+            if isinstance(stage, str) and stage:
+                payload["mutation_stage"] = stage[:_STAGE_LIMIT]
         return payload
     except Exception:
         return {
@@ -316,7 +485,21 @@ def log_sanitized_daemon_reason(
         status = classification.get("http_status")
         if isinstance(status, int):
             parts.append(f"http_status={status}")
-        # Intentionally no detail= / message= field — secrets lived there.
+        # Safe diagnostics — internal_error path ONLY. Typed reasons still emit
+        # no detail= (secrets lived there). class/detail/stage are re-redacted
+        # here as defence in depth.
+        if reason == REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+            exc_cls = classification.get("exception_class")
+            if isinstance(exc_cls, str) and exc_cls:
+                parts.append(f"exception_class={exc_cls[:_CLASS_LIMIT]}")
+            stage = classification.get("mutation_stage")
+            if isinstance(stage, str) and stage:
+                parts.append(
+                    f"mutation_stage={_redact_detail(stage, limit=_STAGE_LIMIT)}"
+                )
+            detail = classification.get("detail")
+            if isinstance(detail, str) and detail:
+                parts.append(f"detail={_redact_detail(detail)}")
         line = " ".join(parts)
         stream.write(line + "\n")
         if hasattr(stream, "flush"):

merger_lease_adoption.py

@@ -18,11 +18,13 @@ DEFAULT_ADOPTION_REASON = "merger-handoff-approved-head"
 
 SOURCE_ADOPT = "gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease"
 SOURCE_ACQUIRE = "gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease"
+SOURCE_ACQUIRE_MERGER = "gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease"
 SOURCE_HEARTBEAT = "gitea_heartbeat_reviewer_pr_lease"
 
 SANCTIONED_PROVENANCE_SOURCES = frozenset({
     SOURCE_ADOPT,
     SOURCE_ACQUIRE,
+    SOURCE_ACQUIRE_MERGER,
     SOURCE_HEARTBEAT,
 })
 
@@ -209,8 +211,10 @@ _SANCTIONED_LEASE_EVIDENCE_RE = re.compile(
     r"(?is)\b("
     r"gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease|"
     r"gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease|"
+    r"gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease|"
     r"lease_proof_source\s*[:=]\s*gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease|"
     r"lease_proof_source\s*[:=]\s*gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease|"
+    r"lease_proof_source\s*[:=]\s*gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease|"
     r"lease_proof_kind\s*[:=]\s*sanctioned_adoption|"
     r"lease_proof_kind\s*[:=]\s*sanctioned_acquire|"
     r"adoption_comment_id\s*[:=]|"

namespace_workspace_binding.py

@@ -56,23 +56,46 @@ def resolve_namespace_workspace(
     env: dict[str, str] | os._Environ | None = None,
     session_lease_worktree: str | None = None,
     profile_name: str | None = None,
+    demotions: list[str] | None = None,
+    verify_paths: bool = False,
 ) -> tuple[str, str]:
-    """Return ``(resolved_path, binding_source)`` for *role_kind*."""
+    """Return ``(resolved_path, binding_source)`` for *role_kind*.
+
+    With *verify_paths*, env-sourced candidates whose path no longer exists
+    are demoted (#702): a binding to a deleted worktree can never name a
+    valid task workspace, so resolution falls through to the next candidate.
+    Explicit arguments are never demoted — a caller-declared path must fail
+    loudly downstream rather than silently rebind. Demotion notes are
+    appended to *demotions* when provided. Runtime-context and mutation
+    guards resolve through :func:`resolve_namespace_mutation_context`, which
+    always verifies.
+    """
     env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
     role = normalize_role_kind(role_kind, profile_name=profile_name)
     role_env_key = ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS[role]
 
-    for candidate, source in (
-        (worktree_path, "worktree_path argument"),
-        (worktree, "worktree argument"),
-        (_env_value(env_map, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV), f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV} environment variable"),
-        (_env_value(env_map, role_env_key), f"{role_env_key} environment variable"),
+    for candidate, source, env_sourced in (
+        (worktree_path, "worktree_path argument", False),
+        (worktree, "worktree argument", False),
+        (_env_value(env_map, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV),
+         f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV} environment variable", True),
+        (_env_value(env_map, role_env_key),
+         f"{role_env_key} environment variable", True),
         (session_lease_worktree if role in {"reviewer", "merger"} else None,
-         "reviewer PR lease worktree"),
+         "reviewer PR lease worktree", False),
     ):
         text = (candidate or "").strip()
-        if text:
-            return os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(text)), source
+        if not text:
+            continue
+        real = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(text))
+        if verify_paths and env_sourced and not os.path.isdir(real):
+            if demotions is not None:
+                demotions.append(
+                    f"{source} '{real}' demoted: path no longer exists "
+                    "(stale binding, #702)"
+                )
+            continue
+        return real, source
 
     return os.path.realpath(process_project_root), "MCP server process root (default)"
 
@@ -86,8 +109,18 @@ def resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
     session_lease_worktree: str | None = None,
     worktree: str | None = None,
     profile_name: str | None = None,
+    configured_canonical_root: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Shared workspace resolution for runtime_context and mutation guards."""
+    """Shared workspace resolution for runtime_context and mutation guards.
+
+    When *configured_canonical_root* is supplied (a cross-repository namespace
+    bound to an external target repository, #706), the canonical repository root
+    is that configured target rather than the MCP install checkout. This keeps
+    the branches-only / worktree-membership guards (#274) evaluating against the
+    repository the namespace actually mutates. Without it the single-repo
+    default is preserved: the canonical root follows the process checkout.
+    """
+    demotions: list[str] = []
     workspace, binding_source = resolve_namespace_workspace(
         role_kind=role_kind,
         worktree_path=worktree_path,
@@ -96,6 +129,8 @@ def resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
         env=env,
         session_lease_worktree=session_lease_worktree,
         profile_name=profile_name,
+        demotions=demotions,
+        verify_paths=True,
     )
     process_root = os.path.realpath(process_project_root)
     role = normalize_role_kind(role_kind, profile_name=profile_name)
@@ -106,12 +141,16 @@ def resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
         env=env,
         profile_name=profile_name,
     )
-    canonical_root = amw.resolve_canonical_repo_root(process_root, process_root)
+    configured = (configured_canonical_root or "").strip()
+    if configured:
+        canonical_root = os.path.realpath(configured)
+    else:
+        canonical_root = amw.resolve_canonical_repo_root(process_root, process_root)
     return {
         "workspace_path": workspace,
         "workspace_binding_source": binding_source,
         "workspace_role_kind": role,
-        "ignored_bindings": pollution.get("ignored_bindings") or [],
+        "ignored_bindings": demotions + (pollution.get("ignored_bindings") or []),
         "process_project_root": process_root,
         "canonical_repo_root": canonical_root,
         "roots_aligned": canonical_root == process_root,
@@ -232,6 +271,7 @@ def assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
     session_lease_worktree: str | None = None,
     profile_name: str | None = None,
     current_branch: str | None = None,
+    configured_canonical_root: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
     """Evaluate namespace workspace binding before preflight/mutation."""
     ctx = resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
@@ -242,6 +282,7 @@ def assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
         env=env,
         session_lease_worktree=session_lease_worktree,
         profile_name=profile_name,
+        configured_canonical_root=configured_canonical_root,
     )
     mutation_workspace = ctx["workspace_path"]
     binding_source = ctx["workspace_binding_source"]

pr_sync_status.py

@@ -0,0 +1,648 @@
+"""PR synchronization and conflict-remediation lifecycle (#PR-SYNC).
+
+Pure assessment helpers for:
+
+* ``gitea_assess_pr_sync_status`` — recommend the next sanctioned action for an
+  open PR when the base branch advances, approvals go stale, or conflicts appear.
+* ``gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge`` preflight — author-only, fail-closed pin
+  of both PR head and live base head; never rebase/force-push.
+
+All recommendation logic is hermetic (no network) so unit tests cover every
+acceptance path without Gitea credentials.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from typing import Any
+
+_FULL_SHA = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$", re.IGNORECASE)
+
+# Recommended next actions (controller / skill vocabulary).
+ACTION_MERGE_NOW = "merge_now"
+ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE = "update_branch_by_merge"
+ACTION_AUTHOR_CONFLICT_REMEDIATION = "author_conflict_remediation"
+ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED = "fresh_review_required"
+ACTION_BLOCKED = "blocked"
+
+_VALID_ACTIONS = frozenset({
+    ACTION_MERGE_NOW,
+    ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE,
+    ACTION_AUTHOR_CONFLICT_REMEDIATION,
+    ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED,
+    ACTION_BLOCKED,
+})
+
+# Author-only mutation; reviewer/merger must never update author branches.
+_AUTHOR_UPDATE_ROLES = frozenset({"author"})
+_DENIED_UPDATE_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "mixed", "limited"})
+
+# Allowed Gitea update style — merge only (never rebase).
+UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE = "merge"
+_FORBIDDEN_UPDATE_STYLES = frozenset({"rebase", "rebase-merge", "squash", "force"})
+
+
+def _normalize_sha(value: str | None) -> str | None:
+    text = (value or "").strip().lower()
+    if not text:
+        return None
+    return text if _FULL_SHA.match(text) else None
+
+
+def _normalize_role(role: str | None) -> str:
+    return (role or "").strip().lower() or "unknown"
+
+
+def assess_pr_sync_status(
+    *,
+    host: str | None = None,
+    org: str | None = None,
+    repo: str | None = None,
+    pr_number: int,
+    pr_state: str | None = None,
+    source_branch: str | None = None,
+    pr_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    base_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    commits_behind: int | None = None,
+    mergeable: bool | None = None,
+    has_conflicts: bool | None = None,
+    branch_protection_requires_current_base: bool | None = None,
+    approval_at_current_head: bool | None = None,
+    checks_status: str | None = None,
+    active_author_lock: bool | None = None,
+    active_reviewer_lease: bool | None = None,
+    active_merger_lease: bool | None = None,
+    prepared_verdict_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    checks_required: bool = True,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Recommend the next sanctioned PR lifecycle action.
+
+    Decision order (fail closed):
+
+    1. Incomplete identity / open state / head SHAs → ``blocked``
+    2. Conflicts (or mergeable false with conflict signal) →
+       ``author_conflict_remediation``
+    3. Head changed after approval / prepared verdict for former head →
+       ``fresh_review_required`` (unless conflicts already routed author work)
+    4. Behind live base + branch protection requires current base +
+       auto-mergeable → ``update_branch_by_merge``
+    5. Approval at current head + mergeable + checks ok (+ update not
+       required) → ``merge_now``
+    6. Otherwise ``blocked`` with structured reasons
+    """
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    pr_head = _normalize_sha(pr_head_sha)
+    base_head = _normalize_sha(base_head_sha)
+    prepared_head = _normalize_sha(prepared_verdict_head_sha)
+    state = (pr_state or "").strip().lower()
+    checks = (checks_status or "unknown").strip().lower()
+    behind = commits_behind if isinstance(commits_behind, int) and commits_behind >= 0 else None
+    requires_current = bool(branch_protection_requires_current_base)
+    approval_ok = bool(approval_at_current_head)
+
+    # Derive conflict when caller only supplies mergeable=False.
+    if has_conflicts is None and mergeable is False:
+        has_conflicts = True
+    conflicts = bool(has_conflicts) if has_conflicts is not None else None
+
+    result: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "host": (host or "").strip() or None,
+        "org": (org or "").strip() or None,
+        "repo": (repo or "").strip() or None,
+        "pr_number": pr_number,
+        "pr_state": state or None,
+        "source_branch": (source_branch or "").strip() or None,
+        "pr_head_sha": pr_head,
+        "base_head_sha": base_head,
+        "commits_behind": behind,
+        "mergeable": mergeable,
+        "has_conflicts": conflicts,
+        "branch_protection_requires_current_base": requires_current,
+        "approval_at_current_head": approval_ok if approval_at_current_head is not None else None,
+        "checks_status": checks,
+        "active_locks_and_leases": {
+            "author_lock": bool(active_author_lock) if active_author_lock is not None else None,
+            "reviewer_lease": bool(active_reviewer_lease) if active_reviewer_lease is not None else None,
+            "merger_lease": bool(active_merger_lease) if active_merger_lease is not None else None,
+        },
+        "prepared_verdict_head_sha": prepared_head,
+        "recommended_next_action": ACTION_BLOCKED,
+        "approval_valid_for_merge": False,
+        "stale_approval": False,
+        "stale_prepared_verdict": False,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "success": True,
+        "performed": False,
+    }
+
+    if not isinstance(pr_number, int) or pr_number <= 0:
+        reasons.append("pr_number must be a positive integer (fail closed)")
+        return result
+
+    if state and state not in ("open",):
+        reasons.append(f"PR is not open (state={state}); cannot synchronize or merge")
+        result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
+        return result
+    if not state:
+        reasons.append("PR state missing (fail closed)")
+        return result
+
+    if pr_head is None:
+        reasons.append(
+            "exact PR head SHA missing or not a full 40-char hex SHA (fail closed)"
+        )
+    if base_head is None:
+        reasons.append(
+            "exact live base head SHA missing or not a full 40-char hex SHA (fail closed)"
+        )
+    if behind is None:
+        reasons.append("commits_behind missing or invalid (fail closed)")
+    if mergeable is None:
+        reasons.append("mergeable signal missing (fail closed)")
+    if approval_at_current_head is None:
+        reasons.append("approval_at_current_head missing (fail closed)")
+    if branch_protection_requires_current_base is None:
+        reasons.append(
+            "branch_protection_requires_current_base missing (fail closed)"
+        )
+
+    if reasons:
+        result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
+        return result
+
+    # Stale prepared verdict / approval across heads.
+    stale_prepared = bool(prepared_head and prepared_head != pr_head)
+    result["stale_prepared_verdict"] = stale_prepared
+    stale_approval = not approval_ok
+    result["stale_approval"] = stale_approval
+    result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = bool(approval_ok and not stale_prepared)
+
+    # ── Conflicts: author remediation in dedicated worktree ──────────────
+    if conflicts is True or mergeable is False:
+        if conflicts is True or mergeable is False:
+            # Distinguish pure non-mergeable without explicit conflict flag
+            # still routes author remediation (Gitea cannot auto-update).
+            reasons.append(
+                f"PR #{pr_number} has conflicts or is not mergeable at head "
+                f"{pr_head}; route author conflict remediation in the existing "
+                "issue/PR worktree under branches/ (never force-push or rebase)"
+            )
+            if stale_approval:
+                reasons.append(
+                    "any approval at a former head is invalid; after remediation "
+                    "require a fresh independent review at the new exact head"
+                )
+            result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_AUTHOR_CONFLICT_REMEDIATION
+            result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = False
+            return result
+
+    # ── Stale approval / prepared verdict at former head ─────────────────
+    if not approval_ok or stale_prepared:
+        if behind and behind > 0 and requires_current and mergeable is True:
+            # Must update first; update will also invalidate approval.
+            reasons.append(
+                f"PR is {behind} commit(s) behind live base and branch protection "
+                "requires current base; automatic merge-from-base is available"
+            )
+            reasons.append(
+                "approval is not valid at the current head (or prepared verdict "
+                "is head-scoped to a former SHA); after update require fresh review"
+            )
+            result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE
+            result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = False
+            return result
+        reasons.append(
+            "approval is not valid at the exact current PR head "
+            f"({pr_head}); never reuse a former-head approval for merge"
+        )
+        if stale_prepared:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"prepared verdict pinned to former head {prepared_head} cannot "
+                f"authorize review/merge at current head {pr_head}"
+            )
+        if active_reviewer_lease:
+            reasons.append(
+                "active reviewer lease must be released or superseded for the "
+                "new head before a fresh independent review"
+            )
+        if active_merger_lease:
+            reasons.append(
+                "active merger lease cannot cross heads; release or re-acquire "
+                "at the new exact head"
+            )
+        result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+        result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = False
+        return result
+
+    # ── Outdated + protection requires current base, auto-updatable ──────
+    if behind and behind > 0 and requires_current:
+        if mergeable is True and conflicts is not True:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"PR is {behind} commit(s) behind live base {base_head}; "
+                "branch protection requires the PR branch to contain current base; "
+                "Gitea can merge base into the PR branch without conflicts"
+            )
+            reasons.append(
+                "route author-only update_branch_by_merge; never rebase or force-push; "
+                "new head invalidates prior approval and requires fresh independent review"
+            )
+            result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE
+            # Approval today is at old head that will change — not mergeable yet
+            # for final merge until re-reviewed, but assess marks update path.
+            result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = False
+            result["stale_approval"] = True  # will become stale after update
+            return result
+        reasons.append(
+            "update required by branch protection but automatic merge is not available"
+        )
+        result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
+        return result
+
+    # ── Checks gate for merge_now ────────────────────────────────────────
+    if checks_required and checks not in ("success", "passed", "ok", "none", "skipped", "not_required"):
+        if checks in ("pending", "running", "queued"):
+            reasons.append(f"required checks are not finished (status={checks})")
+            result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
+            return result
+        if checks in ("failure", "failed", "error", "cancelled"):
+            reasons.append(f"required checks failed (status={checks})")
+            result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
+            return result
+        # unknown — fail closed when checks_required
+        if checks == "unknown":
+            reasons.append("checks status unknown (fail closed)")
+            result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
+            return result
+
+    # ── Ready to merge without update ────────────────────────────────────
+    # Includes: current with approval; outdated when update is NOT required.
+    if approval_ok and mergeable is True and conflicts is not True:
+        if behind and behind > 0 and not requires_current:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"PR is {behind} commit(s) behind live base but branch protection "
+                "does not require the latest base; preserve the approved head"
+            )
+        else:
+            reasons.append(
+                "PR has a valid approval at the exact current head, is conflict-free "
+                "and mergeable; do not update the branch unnecessarily"
+            )
+        reasons.append("route directly to the sanctioned merger workflow (merge_now)")
+        result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_MERGE_NOW
+        result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = True
+        return result
+
+    reasons.append("no sanctioned next action matched the observed PR state (fail closed)")
+    result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
+    return result
+
+
+def assess_update_pr_branch_preflight(
+    *,
+    role_kind: str | None,
+    expected_pr_head_sha: str | None,
+    live_pr_head_sha: str | None,
+    expected_base_head_sha: str | None,
+    live_base_head_sha: str | None,
+    has_conflicts: bool | None = None,
+    mergeable: bool | None = None,
+    style: str | None = UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE,
+    has_author_lock: bool | None = None,
+    worktree_path: str | None = None,
+    worktree_owns_source_branch: bool | None = None,
+    control_checkout_clean: bool | None = None,
+    master_parity_ok: bool | None = None,
+    force_push: bool = False,
+    rebase: bool = False,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Author-only preflight for update-by-merge; fail closed on any race.
+
+    When conflicts exist, returns a structured author-remediation handoff and
+    sets ``mutation_allowed=False`` so no partial remote update is performed.
+    """
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    role = _normalize_role(role_kind)
+    exp_pr = _normalize_sha(expected_pr_head_sha)
+    live_pr = _normalize_sha(live_pr_head_sha)
+    exp_base = _normalize_sha(expected_base_head_sha)
+    live_base = _normalize_sha(live_base_head_sha)
+    style_norm = (style or "").strip().lower() or UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE
+
+    conflicts = has_conflicts
+    if conflicts is None and mergeable is False:
+        conflicts = True
+
+    result: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "mutation_allowed": False,
+        "performed": False,
+        "style": style_norm,
+        "role_kind": role,
+        "expected_pr_head_sha": exp_pr,
+        "live_pr_head_sha": live_pr,
+        "expected_base_head_sha": exp_base,
+        "live_base_head_sha": live_base,
+        "head_race": False,
+        "base_race": False,
+        "has_conflicts": conflicts,
+        "author_remediation_handoff": False,
+        "approval_invalidated_for_former_head": False,
+        "force_push": bool(force_push),
+        "rebase": bool(rebase),
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "success": True,
+    }
+
+    # Role gate — author only.
+    if role not in _AUTHOR_UPDATE_ROLES:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"role '{role}' cannot update an author PR branch "
+            "(author-only; reviewer/merger denial)"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    if force_push:
+        reasons.append("force-push is forbidden for PR branch update (fail closed)")
+        return result
+    if rebase or style_norm in _FORBIDDEN_UPDATE_STYLES:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"update style '{style_norm}' forbidden; only style=merge is allowed "
+            "(never rebase)"
+        )
+        return result
+    if style_norm != UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"unknown update style '{style_norm}'; expected '{UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE}'"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    if not exp_pr or not live_pr:
+        reasons.append(
+            "expected and live PR head SHAs must be full 40-char hex (fail closed)"
+        )
+    if not exp_base or not live_base:
+        reasons.append(
+            "expected and live base head SHAs must be full 40-char hex (fail closed)"
+        )
+    if reasons:
+        return result
+
+    if exp_pr != live_pr:
+        result["head_race"] = True
+        reasons.append(
+            f"PR head race: expected {exp_pr} but live is {live_pr} "
+            "(fail closed; no partial mutation)"
+        )
+        return result
+    if exp_base != live_base:
+        result["base_race"] = True
+        reasons.append(
+            f"base head race: expected {exp_base} but live is {live_base} "
+            "(fail closed; no partial mutation)"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    if has_author_lock is not True:
+        reasons.append(
+            "existing issue/PR lock required before update_branch_by_merge (fail closed)"
+        )
+    wt = (worktree_path or "").strip()
+    if not wt:
+        reasons.append("existing PR worktree path required under branches/ (fail closed)")
+    else:
+        norm = wt.replace("\\", "/")
+        if "/branches/" not in norm and not norm.startswith("branches/"):
+            reasons.append(
+                f"worktree_path '{wt}' must be under branches/ (fail closed)"
+            )
+    if worktree_owns_source_branch is False:
+        reasons.append(
+            "worktree does not own the PR source branch (fail closed)"
+        )
+    if control_checkout_clean is False:
+        reasons.append("control checkout is not clean (fail closed)")
+    if master_parity_ok is False:
+        reasons.append("runtime/master parity failed (fail closed)")
+
+    if conflicts is True:
+        result["author_remediation_handoff"] = True
+        reasons.append(
+            "conflicts present: return structured author-remediation handoff "
+            "without creating a partial remote update"
+        )
+        reasons.append(
+            "resolve conflicts explicitly in the existing dedicated worktree, "
+            "run focused and regression tests, commit/push via sanctioned author "
+            "workflow, then route the new exact head to independent review"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    if mergeable is False and conflicts is not False:
+        result["author_remediation_handoff"] = True
+        reasons.append(
+            "PR is not mergeable; refuse automatic update and hand off to "
+            "author conflict remediation (fail closed)"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    if reasons:
+        return result
+
+    result["mutation_allowed"] = True
+    reasons.append(
+        "preflight passed: author may merge live base into the PR branch via "
+        "native MCP update (style=merge only)"
+    )
+    return result
+
+
+def assess_post_update_head_transition(
+    *,
+    former_pr_head_sha: str | None,
+    new_pr_head_sha: str | None,
+    former_approval_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    former_reviewer_lease_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    former_merger_lease_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    prepared_verdict_head_sha: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """After a successful update-by-merge, invalidate cross-head artifacts.
+
+    The new head never inherits approval, reviewer/merger leases, or prepared
+    verdicts from the former head.
+    """
+    former = _normalize_sha(former_pr_head_sha)
+    new = _normalize_sha(new_pr_head_sha)
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    result: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "former_pr_head_sha": former,
+        "new_pr_head_sha": new,
+        "head_changed": bool(former and new and former != new),
+        "approval_invalidated": False,
+        "reviewer_lease_superseded": False,
+        "merger_lease_superseded": False,
+        "prepared_verdict_invalidated": False,
+        "recommended_next_action": ACTION_BLOCKED,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "success": True,
+    }
+
+    if not former or not new:
+        reasons.append("former and new PR head SHAs required (fail closed)")
+        return result
+    if former == new:
+        reasons.append(
+            "PR head unchanged after update; unexpected for merge-from-base"
+        )
+        result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
+        return result
+
+    result["head_changed"] = True
+    # Approval at former head is always void at new head.
+    former_approval = _normalize_sha(former_approval_head_sha) or former
+    if former_approval != new:
+        result["approval_invalidated"] = True
+        reasons.append(
+            f"approval for former head {former_approval} is invalid at new head "
+            f"{new}; never preserve approval across a head change"
+        )
+
+    rev_lease = _normalize_sha(former_reviewer_lease_head_sha)
+    if rev_lease and rev_lease != new:
+        result["reviewer_lease_superseded"] = True
+        reasons.append(
+            f"reviewer lease for head {rev_lease} cannot cross to {new}; "
+            "release or supersede before fresh review"
+        )
+    elif rev_lease is None:
+        # Unknown lease head still must not authorize at new head.
+        result["reviewer_lease_superseded"] = True
+        reasons.append(
+            "any reviewer lease scoped to the former head is superseded at the new head"
+        )
+
+    mer_lease = _normalize_sha(former_merger_lease_head_sha)
+    if mer_lease and mer_lease != new:
+        result["merger_lease_superseded"] = True
+        reasons.append(
+            f"merger lease for head {mer_lease} cannot cross to {new}"
+        )
+    else:
+        result["merger_lease_superseded"] = True
+        reasons.append(
+            "any merger lease scoped to the former head is superseded at the new head"
+        )
+
+    prepared = _normalize_sha(prepared_verdict_head_sha)
+    if prepared and prepared != new:
+        result["prepared_verdict_invalidated"] = True
+        reasons.append(
+            f"prepared verdict for head {prepared} cannot authorize the new head {new}"
+        )
+    elif prepared is None:
+        result["prepared_verdict_invalidated"] = True
+        reasons.append(
+            "prepared verdicts associated with the former head are invalidated"
+        )
+
+    result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+    reasons.append(
+        "route the new exact head to independent review "
+        f"({ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED})"
+    )
+    return result
+
+
+def assess_sequential_queue_step(
+    *,
+    just_merged: bool,
+    master_refreshed: bool,
+    next_pr_number: int | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Controller sequential processing: reassess only after merge + master refresh."""
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    if just_merged and not master_refreshed:
+        reasons.append(
+            "master must be refreshed after each merge before reassessing the next PR "
+            "(do not update every PR simultaneously)"
+        )
+        return {
+            "reassess_allowed": False,
+            "process_next": False,
+            "next_pr_number": next_pr_number,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+            "success": True,
+        }
+    if not just_merged:
+        reasons.append("no merge completed; sequential step does not advance")
+        return {
+            "reassess_allowed": False,
+            "process_next": False,
+            "next_pr_number": next_pr_number,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+            "success": True,
+        }
+    if next_pr_number:
+        reasons.append(
+            "merge completed and live master refreshed; reassess the next PR "
+            f"#{next_pr_number}"
+        )
+    else:
+        reasons.append(
+            "merge completed and live master refreshed; reassess the next PR"
+        )
+    return {
+        "reassess_allowed": True,
+        "process_next": True,
+        "next_pr_number": next_pr_number,
+        "post_merge_cleanup_handoff": True,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "success": True,
+    }
+
+
+def merge_approval_usable_at_head(
+    *,
+    current_head_sha: str | None,
+    approved_head_sha: str | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Stale approval cannot authorize merge (head-scoped only)."""
+    current = _normalize_sha(current_head_sha)
+    approved = _normalize_sha(approved_head_sha)
+    ok = bool(current and approved and current == approved)
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    if not ok:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"stale approval: approved head '{approved or '(none)'}' does not "
+            f"match current head '{current or '(none)'}'; cannot authorize merge"
+        )
+    return {
+        "approval_usable": ok,
+        "current_head_sha": current,
+        "approved_head_sha": approved,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+    }
+
+
+def lease_usable_at_head(
+    *,
+    lease_kind: str,
+    lease_head_sha: str | None,
+    current_head_sha: str | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Reviewer/merger leases cannot cross heads."""
+    current = _normalize_sha(current_head_sha)
+    lease_head = _normalize_sha(lease_head_sha)
+    kind = (lease_kind or "").strip().lower() or "unknown"
+    ok = bool(current and lease_head and current == lease_head)
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    if not ok:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"stale {kind} lease: lease head '{lease_head or '(none)'}' cannot "
+            f"authorize work at current head '{current or '(none)'}'"
+        )
+    return {
+        "lease_usable": ok,
+        "lease_kind": kind,
+        "lease_head_sha": lease_head,
+        "current_head_sha": current,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+    }

requirements.txt

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ python-multipart==0.0.32
 referencing==0.37.0
 rich==15.0.0
 rpds-py==2026.5.1
+sentry-sdk==2.20.0
 shellingham==1.5.4
 sse-starlette==3.4.5
 starlette==1.3.1

reviewer_pr_lease.py

@@ -407,18 +407,194 @@ def record_session_lease(
     if lease_provenance:
         stored["lease_provenance"] = dict(lease_provenance)
     _SESSION_LEASE = stored
+    _persist_session_lease_shadow(stored)
     return dict(_SESSION_LEASE)
 
 
 def clear_session_lease() -> None:
     global _SESSION_LEASE
+    prior = _SESSION_LEASE
     _SESSION_LEASE = None
+    _persist_session_lease_shadow(None, prior=prior)
 
 
 def get_session_lease() -> dict[str, Any] | None:
     return dict(_SESSION_LEASE) if _SESSION_LEASE else None
 
 
+def _persist_session_lease_shadow(
+    lease: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    *,
+    prior: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    """Best-effort durable shadow of the in-session lease (#702).
+
+    A daemon that dies without teardown leaves this record behind, giving a
+    later process provable orphan evidence (owner pid + session id) for the
+    guarded cleanup path. Observability only — mutation gates never read it,
+    and failures here must never block lease operations.
+
+    Shadows are keyed by lease session id (#702 F5): concurrent same-profile
+    sessions each own a distinct record, so one session's heartbeat can never
+    overwrite or misattribute another's crash evidence. A sanctioned clear is
+    the terminal reconciliation of that record's lifecycle.
+    """
+    try:
+        import mcp_session_state as mss
+
+        if lease is None:
+            sid = ((prior or {}).get("session_id") or "").strip() or None
+            if sid:
+                mss.clear_state(
+                    kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, instance_id=sid
+                )
+            # Legacy single-slot record from pre-F5 code: clearing it is safe
+            # because collision-safe writes never target that key again.
+            mss.clear_state(kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE)
+            return
+        mss.save_state(
+            kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE,
+            instance_id=((lease.get("session_id") or "").strip() or None),
+            payload={
+                "pr_number": lease.get("pr_number"),
+                "session_id": lease.get("session_id"),
+                "comment_id": lease.get("comment_id"),
+                "candidate_head": lease.get("candidate_head"),
+                "worktree": lease.get("worktree"),
+                "phase": lease.get("phase"),
+                "reviewer_identity": lease.get("reviewer_identity"),
+                "profile": lease.get("profile"),
+                "lease_repo": lease.get("repo"),
+                "owner_pid": os.getpid(),
+            },
+        )
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+
+
+def load_session_lease_shadow(
+    session_id: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Load the durable session-lease shadow left by this profile identity.
+
+    With *session_id*, load that session's collision-safe record (#702 F5),
+    falling back to the legacy single-slot record only when its payload names
+    the same session. Without *session_id*, return the legacy record or the
+    sole surviving instance record — ambiguity (multiple candidates) returns
+    ``None`` because a shadow that cannot be attributed proves nothing.
+    """
+    try:
+        import mcp_session_state as mss
+
+        sid = (session_id or "").strip()
+        if sid:
+            record = mss.load_state(
+                kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, instance_id=sid
+            )
+            if record is not None:
+                return record
+            legacy = mss.load_state(kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE)
+            if legacy and (legacy.get("session_id") or "").strip() == sid:
+                return legacy
+            return None
+        legacy = mss.load_state(kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE)
+        if legacy is not None:
+            return legacy
+        records = mss.list_states(kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE)
+        if len(records) == 1:
+            return records[0]
+        return None
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+
+
+def _pid_alive(pid: int) -> bool:
+    """Probe process existence; fail closed toward 'alive' when unsure."""
+    try:
+        os.kill(int(pid), 0)
+        return True
+    except ProcessLookupError:
+        return False
+    except PermissionError:
+        return True
+    except Exception:
+        return True
+
+
+def assess_crashed_session_lease_orphan(
+    shadow: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    *,
+    lease: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    current_pid: int | None = None,
+    pid_alive: bool | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Derive owner-process evidence for a durable lease from the shadow (#702).
+
+    Returns ``owner_process_alive`` tri-state. Only a provably dead recorded
+    owner pid yields ``False`` (a dead pid cannot still be running the owning
+    daemon); an alive pid is *not* ownership proof and stays ``None`` unless
+    it is this very process. Session ids must match exactly — the shadow of a
+    different lease proves nothing.
+    """
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    if not shadow or not lease:
+        return {
+            "orphan_evidence": False,
+            "owner_process_alive": None,
+            "reasons": ["no durable session-lease shadow evidence available"],
+        }
+    shadow_sid = (shadow.get("session_id") or "").strip()
+    lease_sid = (lease.get("session_id") or "").strip()
+    if not shadow_sid or not lease_sid or shadow_sid != lease_sid:
+        return {
+            "orphan_evidence": False,
+            "owner_process_alive": None,
+            "reasons": [
+                "session-lease shadow session_id does not match the durable "
+                f"lease (shadow={shadow_sid or None}, lease={lease_sid or None})"
+            ],
+        }
+    owner_pid = shadow.get("owner_pid") or shadow.get("writer_pid")
+    try:
+        owner_pid = int(owner_pid)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return {
+            "orphan_evidence": False,
+            "owner_process_alive": None,
+            "reasons": ["session-lease shadow has no usable owner pid (fail closed)"],
+        }
+    this_pid = current_pid if current_pid is not None else os.getpid()
+    if owner_pid == this_pid:
+        return {
+            "orphan_evidence": False,
+            "owner_process_alive": True,
+            "owner_pid": owner_pid,
+            "reasons": ["shadow owner pid is the current process"],
+        }
+    alive = pid_alive if pid_alive is not None else _pid_alive(owner_pid)
+    if alive:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"shadow owner pid {owner_pid} observed alive; PID liveness is not "
+            "ownership proof — owner evidence stays unknown (fail closed)"
+        )
+        return {
+            "orphan_evidence": False,
+            "owner_process_alive": None,
+            "owner_pid": owner_pid,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+        }
+    reasons.append(
+        f"shadow owner pid {owner_pid} is dead: the daemon that recorded the "
+        "matching session lease exited without teardown (crash orphan, #702)"
+    )
+    return {
+        "orphan_evidence": True,
+        "owner_process_alive": False,
+        "owner_pid": owner_pid,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+    }
+
+
 def assess_mutation_lease_gate(
     *,
     pr_number: int,
@@ -557,6 +733,7 @@ _HANDOFF_CLASSIFICATIONS = frozenset({
     "foreign_completed_superseded_head",
     "foreign_expired_superseded_head",
     "orphaned_owner_missing",
+    "orphaned_expired_superseded_head",
     "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence",
     "instructed_lease_missing_with_replacement",
     "worktree_binding_mismatch",
@@ -850,6 +1027,38 @@ def assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
             classification = "foreign_expired_superseded_head"
         elif head_superseded and has_terminal and not past_expiry:
             classification = "foreign_completed_superseded_head"
+        elif head_superseded and not has_terminal and past_expiry:
+            # Crash-orphan shape (#702): the lease outlived its head with no
+            # formal terminal review and has now passed canonical expiry, so
+            # it no longer gates fresh acquisition. Guarded cleanup of the
+            # ledger marker still demands provable owner-process-exit
+            # evidence and a safe worktree — never inferred.
+            classification = "orphaned_expired_superseded_head"
+            if owner_process_alive is True:
+                fail_closed_reasons.append(
+                    "lease past expiry on superseded head but owner process "
+                    "still alive; cleanup denied"
+                )
+            elif owner_process_alive is None:
+                fail_closed_reasons.append(
+                    "expired superseded-head lease with no terminal review: "
+                    "cleanup requires provable owner-process-exit evidence "
+                    "(owner_process_alive=false); the expired lease no longer "
+                    "gates fresh acquisition"
+                )
+            elif worktree_clean is False:
+                fail_closed_reasons.append(
+                    "owner process absent but worktree dirty; cleanup denied"
+                )
+            elif not (worktree_clean is True or worktree_exists is False):
+                # #702 F3: unknown worktree evidence must fail closed, exactly
+                # like the sibling orphaned_owner_missing gate and the
+                # diagnosis path — cleanup needs affirmative safe evidence.
+                fail_closed_reasons.append(
+                    "owner process absent but worktree evidence is unknown; "
+                    "cleanup requires affirmative safe evidence "
+                    "(worktree_clean=true or worktree_exists=false)"
+                )
         elif head_superseded and not has_terminal:
             classification = "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence"
             fail_closed_reasons.append(
@@ -891,6 +1100,7 @@ def assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
                 "foreign_expired_superseded_head",
                 "foreign_expired_current_head",
                 "orphaned_owner_missing",
+                "orphaned_expired_superseded_head",
             }:
                 fail_closed_reasons.append(
                     "controller/recovery capability required "
@@ -909,6 +1119,7 @@ def assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
             "foreign_completed_superseded_head",
             "foreign_expired_superseded_head",
             "orphaned_owner_missing",
+            "orphaned_expired_superseded_head",
             "foreign_expired_current_head",
         }
         # foreign_expired_current_head needs orphan/clean worktree + authority.
@@ -1181,6 +1392,30 @@ def diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
                 "foreign lease pinned to superseded head with completed formal "
                 "review; use guarded obsolete-lease cleanup (do not wait indefinitely)"
             )
+        elif not is_own and head_superseded and not terminal and past_expiry:
+            # Crash-orphan shape after canonical expiry (#702): the expired
+            # marker no longer gates acquisition, so a fresh reviewer may
+            # acquire at the current head. Guarded ledger cleanup becomes
+            # available only with provable owner-exit evidence.
+            classification = "orphaned_expired_superseded_head"
+            if owner_process_alive is False and (
+                worktree_clean is True or worktree_exists is False
+            ):
+                next_action = NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE
+                reasons.append(
+                    "expired superseded-head lease with no terminal review and "
+                    "provable owner-process exit (crash orphan, #702); guarded "
+                    "obsolete-lease cleanup eligible"
+                )
+            else:
+                next_action = NEXT_ACTION_ACQUIRE
+                reasons.append(
+                    "lease head superseded and lease past canonical expiry with "
+                    "no formal terminal review (crash orphan, #702); expired "
+                    "marker no longer gates acquisition — acquire a fresh lease "
+                    "at the current head; guarded cleanup needs "
+                    "owner_process_alive=false and a clean/absent worktree"
+                )
         elif not is_own and head_superseded and not terminal:
             classification = "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence"
             next_action = NEXT_ACTION_WAIT

role_session_router.py

@@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ AUTHOR_TASKS = frozenset({
     "create_pr",
     "comment_pr",
     "address_pr_change_requests",
-    "delete_branch",
     "work_issue",
     "work-issue",
     "reconcile_landed_pr",
@@ -84,6 +83,10 @@ AUTHOR_TASKS = frozenset({
 
 RECONCILER_TASKS = frozenset({
     "cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
+    # #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned (gitea.branch.delete is granted
+    # only to the reconciler profile). Raw gitea_delete_branch redirects here to
+    # the guarded gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path (#514/#687).
+    "delete_branch",
     "reconcile_already_landed_pr",
     "reconcile_already_landed",
     "reconcile-landed-pr",
@@ -99,7 +102,8 @@ TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE = {
     "create_pr": "author",
     "comment_pr": "author",
     "address_pr_change_requests": "author",
-    "delete_branch": "author",
+    # #729: reconciler-owned; see RECONCILER_TASKS and task_capability_map.
+    "delete_branch": "reconciler",
     "review_pr": "reviewer",
     "merge_pr": "merger",
     "blind_pr_queue_review": "reviewer",

sentry_observability.py

@@ -0,0 +1,535 @@
+"""Optional self-hosted Sentry observability for the Gitea MCP server (#606).
+
+Adds env-var-gated Sentry SDK instrumentation so runtime errors, fail-closed
+workflow blockers, lease/terminal-lock/stale-runtime collisions, and recurring
+watchdog check-ins are visible in a *self-hosted* Sentry at
+``https://sentry.prgs.cc/`` — never Sentry Cloud, and never as the workflow
+source of truth (Gitea stays canonical).
+
+Design constraints (mirror ``gitea_audit`` and the #612 incident bridge):
+
+- **Off by default.** With ``MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED`` false/unset *or* ``SENTRY_DSN``
+  empty, ``init_sentry`` is a no-op and no events are ever sent — existing tool
+  behaviour and API-call patterns are unchanged (acceptance criterion 1).
+- **Fail *open* for observability.** A Sentry outage, a missing ``sentry_sdk``
+  package, or any capture error must never break an MCP tool success path. Every
+  public entry point swallows its own exceptions.
+- **Fail *closed* for redaction.** If a field cannot be proven safe it is dropped
+  rather than sent. Tokens, passwords, keychain IDs, DSNs, private config, raw
+  session-state, full prompt bodies, and full filesystem paths never leave here.
+- **No hard dependency.** ``sentry_sdk`` is imported lazily; the module is fully
+  importable and testable without it installed.
+
+Sentry is observe-only: it must not approve, merge, close, or otherwise mutate
+Gitea workflow state, nor bypass leases, #332, or MCP gates. Alerts may only feed
+the sanctioned Gitea issue/comment path via the #612 incident bridge.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import os
+import re
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any
+
+# Reuse the most comprehensive existing scrubber so redaction stays consistent
+# with the #612 incident bridge (tokens, DSNs, cookies, bearer/basic, keychain
+# ids, session ids, user:pass@host).
+from incident_bridge import redact_text as _redact_text
+
+# Second, complementary scrubber: catches bare ``token <value>`` /
+# ``Bearer <value>`` / ``Basic <value>`` prefixes and raw URLs that the
+# incident-bridge delimiter patterns miss.
+from gitea_audit import _redact_str as _redact_prefixes
+
+# ── Optional SDK (lazy, never a hard dependency) ────────────────────────────
+try:  # pragma: no cover - trivial import guard
+    import sentry_sdk  # type: ignore
+except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - absence is a supported state
+    sentry_sdk = None  # type: ignore
+
+
+# ── Env var names (single source of truth) ──────────────────────────────────
+ENV_ENABLED = "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED"
+ENV_DSN = "SENTRY_DSN"
+ENV_ENVIRONMENT = "SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT"
+ENV_RELEASE = "SENTRY_RELEASE"
+ENV_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE = "MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE"
+ENV_ENABLE_LOGS = "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS"
+
+_TRUTHY = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
+
+REDACTED = "[REDACTED]"
+REDACTED_PATH = "[REDACTED_PATH]"
+
+
+# ── Cron / watchdog monitor slugs (acceptance criterion 6) ──────────────────
+# Stable slugs for the recurring/watchdog jobs #606 wants check-ins for. The
+# slug is the durable monitor identity in Sentry; the wiring call sites pass one
+# of these keys (or an explicit slug) to ``monitor_checkin``.
+MONITOR_SLUGS: dict[str, str] = {
+    "stale_lease_scan": "gitea-mcp-stale-lease-scan",
+    "terminal_lock_scan": "gitea-mcp-terminal-lock-scan",
+    "allocator_health": "gitea-mcp-allocator-health",
+    "namespace_health": "gitea-mcp-namespace-health",
+    "dashboard_freshness": "gitea-mcp-dashboard-freshness",
+    "reconciler_cleanup": "gitea-mcp-reconciler-cleanup",
+}
+
+_CHECKIN_STATUSES = frozenset({"in_progress", "ok", "error"})
+
+
+# ── Tag allowlist (issue "Suggested Sentry tags/context") ───────────────────
+# Only these keys are ever attached as Sentry tags. Anything else is dropped so
+# a caller cannot accidentally leak a sensitive value through a tag.
+ALLOWED_TAG_KEYS = frozenset({
+    "role",
+    "profile",
+    "namespace",
+    "repo",
+    "org",
+    "issue_number",
+    "pr_number",
+    "blocker_type",
+    "workflow_hash",
+    "session_id_hash",  # hash only — never the raw session id
+    "pid",
+    "worktree_category",  # category, never the full sensitive path
+    "lease_comment_id",
+    "expected_head_sha",
+    "current_head_sha",
+    "terminal_lock_state",
+    "capability",
+    "mutation_tool",
+})
+
+# Absolute-path shapes that must never be sent verbatim (macOS/Linux + temp).
+_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"(?:/private)?/(?:Users|home|tmp|var|opt|Volumes)/[^\s\"']*")
+
+# ``extra`` keys whose *full* contents are forbidden by the redaction rules
+# (raw session-state, full prompt/comment bodies, private config blobs, raw
+# headers).
+_FORBIDDEN_EXTRA_KEYS = frozenset({
+    "prompt",
+    "prompt_body",
+    "next_prompt",
+    "body",
+    "raw_body",
+    "session_state",
+    "session_state_contents",
+    "config",
+    "config_contents",
+    "private_config",
+    "headers",
+    "authorization",
+})
+
+
+# ── Configuration ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SentryConfig:
+    """Immutable snapshot of the Sentry env configuration."""
+
+    enabled: bool = False
+    dsn: str | None = None
+    environment: str = "development"
+    release: str | None = None
+    traces_sample_rate: float = 0.0
+    enable_logs: bool = False
+
+    @property
+    def active(self) -> bool:
+        """True only when the operator both opted in *and* supplied a DSN.
+
+        This is the single gate that keeps the feature off by default: enabling
+        the flag without a DSN (or vice versa) sends nothing.
+        """
+        return bool(self.enabled and self.dsn)
+
+    def safe_summary(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        """Operator-facing status with **no** DSN value (only presence)."""
+        return {
+            "enabled": self.enabled,
+            "dsn_present": bool(self.dsn),
+            "environment": self.environment,
+            "release": self.release,
+            "traces_sample_rate": self.traces_sample_rate,
+            "enable_logs": self.enable_logs,
+            "active": self.active,
+        }
+
+
+def _env_bool(name: str, env: dict[str, str]) -> bool:
+    return (env.get(name) or "").strip().lower() in _TRUTHY
+
+
+def _env_float(name: str, default: float, env: dict[str, str]) -> float:
+    raw = (env.get(name) or "").strip()
+    if not raw:
+        return default
+    try:
+        val = float(raw)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return default
+    # Clamp to Sentry's valid [0.0, 1.0] sample-rate range.
+    if val < 0.0:
+        return 0.0
+    if val > 1.0:
+        return 1.0
+    return val
+
+
+def load_config(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> SentryConfig:
+    """Build a :class:`SentryConfig` from the environment (read at call time)."""
+    env = dict(os.environ if env is None else env)
+    dsn = (env.get(ENV_DSN) or "").strip() or None
+    return SentryConfig(
+        enabled=_env_bool(ENV_ENABLED, env),
+        dsn=dsn,
+        environment=(env.get(ENV_ENVIRONMENT) or "").strip() or "development",
+        release=(env.get(ENV_RELEASE) or "").strip() or None,
+        traces_sample_rate=_env_float(ENV_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE, 0.0, env),
+        enable_logs=_env_bool(ENV_ENABLE_LOGS, env),
+    )
+
+
+def sdk_available() -> bool:
+    """True when the optional ``sentry_sdk`` package is importable."""
+    return sentry_sdk is not None
+
+
+# ── Redaction (fail closed) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+def sanitize_path(value: Any) -> str:
+    """Reduce a filesystem path to a non-sensitive *category* token.
+
+    Full local paths must never be sent. We keep only a coarse worktree
+    category derived from the path shape (author/reviewer/merger/reconciler/
+    branches/root/other).
+    """
+    text = "" if value is None else str(value)
+    low = text.lower()
+    if not text:
+        return "unknown"
+    # Order matters: more specific role markers before the generic "branches".
+    if "reconcile" in low:
+        return "reconciler"
+    if "review" in low:
+        return "reviewer"
+    if "merge" in low or "merger" in low:
+        return "merger"
+    if "author" in low or re.search(r"/branches/(?:feat|fix|docs|chore|issue)", low):
+        return "author"
+    if "/branches/" in low:
+        return "branches"
+    if low.rstrip("/").endswith("gitea-tools"):
+        return "root"
+    return "other"
+
+
+def redact_value(value: Any) -> Any:
+    """Recursively redact a JSON-able value: secret text, absolute paths, and
+    known-sensitive dict keys are removed. Fail closed — any error drops the
+    value entirely rather than risk leaking it."""
+    try:
+        if isinstance(value, dict):
+            out: dict[str, Any] = {}
+            for k, v in value.items():
+                key = str(k)
+                low = key.lower()
+                if low in _FORBIDDEN_EXTRA_KEYS or any(
+                    s in low
+                    for s in ("token", "secret", "password", "cookie", "auth", "dsn", "keychain")
+                ):
+                    out[key] = REDACTED
+                    continue
+                out[key] = redact_value(v)
+            return out
+        if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
+            return [redact_value(v) for v in value]
+        if isinstance(value, str):
+            scrubbed = _redact_text(value)
+            scrubbed = _redact_prefixes(scrubbed)
+            scrubbed = _PATH_RE.sub(REDACTED_PATH, scrubbed)
+            return scrubbed
+        return value
+    except Exception:
+        return REDACTED
+
+
+def hash_session_id(session_id: Any) -> str:
+    """Short, stable, non-reversible fingerprint of a session id."""
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(str(session_id).encode("utf-8", "replace")).hexdigest()
+    return digest[:12]
+
+
+def build_tags(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Return a scrubbed, allowlisted tag dict.
+
+    ``session_id`` is accepted but only ever surfaced as ``session_id_hash``.
+    ``worktree_path`` collapses to ``worktree_category``. Any non-allowlisted
+    key, or a value that still contains redacted material after scrubbing, is
+    dropped.
+    """
+    raw: dict[str, Any] = dict(kwargs)
+
+    # Hash the session id — never emit it raw.
+    session_id = raw.pop("session_id", None)
+    if session_id and "session_id_hash" not in raw:
+        raw["session_id_hash"] = hash_session_id(session_id)
+
+    # A full worktree path collapses to a category tag.
+    wt = raw.pop("worktree_path", None)
+    if wt and "worktree_category" not in raw:
+        raw["worktree_category"] = sanitize_path(wt)
+
+    out: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for key, val in raw.items():
+        if key not in ALLOWED_TAG_KEYS:
+            continue
+        if val is None:
+            continue
+        scrubbed = redact_value(val)
+        text = str(scrubbed)
+        if not text or REDACTED in text or REDACTED_PATH in text:
+            continue
+        if len(text) > 200:
+            text = text[:200] + "…"
+        out[key] = text
+    return out
+
+
+def scrub_event(event: Any, hint: Any = None) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Sentry ``before_send`` / ``before_send_log`` hook.
+
+    Recursively redacts the outgoing event. On *any* failure it returns ``None``
+    so the event is dropped rather than sent unscrubbed (fail closed for
+    redaction).
+    """
+    try:
+        if not isinstance(event, dict):
+            return None
+        scrubbed = redact_value(event)
+        # Drop server_name if it leaked a hostname/path; PID is kept via tags.
+        scrubbed.pop("server_name", None)
+        return scrubbed
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+
+
+# ── Event builders (pure, independently testable) ───────────────────────────
+def build_blocker_event(
+    blocker_type: str,
+    *,
+    message: str | None = None,
+    next_action: str | None = None,
+    level: str = "warning",
+    tags: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    extra: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build a redacted, structured Sentry event for a workflow blocker.
+
+    ``next_action`` maps the issue's "canonical next action when available"
+    requirement (acceptance criterion 7).
+    """
+    merged_tags = dict(tags or {})
+    merged_tags.setdefault("blocker_type", blocker_type)
+    safe_tags = build_tags(**merged_tags)
+
+    safe_extra = redact_value(dict(extra or {}))
+    if next_action:
+        # A short canonical next action is allowed (it is not a full prompt).
+        safe_extra["canonical_next_action"] = redact_value(str(next_action)[:500])
+
+    event: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "message": redact_value(message or blocker_type),
+        "level": level if level in ("debug", "info", "warning", "error", "fatal") else "warning",
+        "logger": "gitea-mcp.workflow",
+        "tags": safe_tags,
+        "extra": safe_extra,
+        "fingerprint": ["workflow-blocker", blocker_type],
+    }
+    return event
+
+
+def build_checkin_payload(
+    monitor: str,
+    status: str,
+    *,
+    check_in_id: str | None = None,
+    duration: float | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build a Sentry cron check-in payload for one of :data:`MONITOR_SLUGS`.
+
+    ``monitor`` may be a registry key (e.g. ``"stale_lease_scan"``) or an
+    explicit slug. Raises ``ValueError`` on an unknown status so callers cannot
+    silently send a malformed check-in.
+    """
+    if status not in _CHECKIN_STATUSES:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"invalid check-in status {status!r}; expected one of {sorted(_CHECKIN_STATUSES)}"
+        )
+    slug = MONITOR_SLUGS.get(monitor, monitor)
+    payload: dict[str, Any] = {"monitor_slug": slug, "status": status}
+    if check_in_id:
+        payload["check_in_id"] = str(check_in_id)
+    if duration is not None:
+        try:
+            payload["duration"] = float(duration)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            pass
+    return payload
+
+
+# ── Runtime init + capture (fail open) ──────────────────────────────────────
+_STATE: dict[str, Any] = {"initialized": False, "config": None}
+
+
+def is_initialized() -> bool:
+    return bool(_STATE.get("initialized"))
+
+
+def active_config() -> SentryConfig | None:
+    return _STATE.get("config")
+
+
+def reset_for_tests() -> None:
+    """Clear module init state. Test-only helper (never called in production)."""
+    _STATE["initialized"] = False
+    _STATE["config"] = None
+
+
+def init_sentry(config: SentryConfig | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Initialise the Sentry SDK if (and only if) enabled + DSN + SDK present.
+
+    Idempotent and never raises. Returns an operator-safe status dict (no DSN
+    value). Behaviour is unchanged when the feature is off.
+    """
+    cfg = config or load_config()
+    status: dict[str, Any] = {"initialized": False, **cfg.safe_summary()}
+    try:
+        if not cfg.active:
+            status["reason"] = "disabled (MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED false or SENTRY_DSN empty)"
+            _STATE["config"] = cfg
+            return status
+        if not sdk_available():
+            status["reason"] = "sentry_sdk not installed"
+            _STATE["config"] = cfg
+            return status
+
+        init_kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "dsn": cfg.dsn,
+            "environment": cfg.environment,
+            "release": cfg.release,
+            "traces_sample_rate": cfg.traces_sample_rate,
+            "before_send": scrub_event,
+            "send_default_pii": False,
+        }
+        if cfg.enable_logs:
+            # sentry-sdk 2.x captures Python logs as structured logs when the
+            # experimental logs feature is enabled; scrub those too.
+            init_kwargs["_experiments"] = {
+                "enable_logs": True,
+                "before_send_log": scrub_event,
+            }
+        sentry_sdk.init(**init_kwargs)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+        _STATE["initialized"] = True
+        _STATE["config"] = cfg
+        status["initialized"] = True
+        status["reason"] = "sentry initialised"
+    except Exception as exc:  # fail open: observability must not block startup
+        status["reason"] = f"init failed (ignored): {type(exc).__name__}"
+        _STATE["initialized"] = False
+    return status
+
+
+def _set_scope_tags(scope: Any, tags: dict[str, str]) -> None:
+    for key, val in tags.items():
+        try:
+            scope.set_tag(key, val)
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+
+def capture_workflow_blocker(
+    blocker_type: str,
+    *,
+    message: str | None = None,
+    next_action: str | None = None,
+    level: str = "warning",
+    tags: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    extra: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Capture a fail-closed workflow blocker as a structured Sentry event.
+
+    Always returns the redacted event dict (so callers/tests can inspect it),
+    and sends it to Sentry only when initialised. Fail open.
+    """
+    event = build_blocker_event(
+        blocker_type,
+        message=message,
+        next_action=next_action,
+        level=level,
+        tags=tags,
+        extra=extra,
+    )
+    try:
+        if is_initialized() and sdk_available():
+            sentry_sdk.capture_event(event)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    return event
+
+
+def capture_exception(
+    exc: BaseException,
+    *,
+    tags: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    extra: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> bool:
+    """Capture a runtime exception with scrubbed tags. Fail open.
+
+    Returns True only when the event was handed to an initialised SDK.
+    """
+    try:
+        if not (is_initialized() and sdk_available()):
+            return False
+        safe_tags = build_tags(**(tags or {}))
+        safe_extra = redact_value(dict(extra or {}))
+        with sentry_sdk.push_scope() as scope:  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+            _set_scope_tags(scope, safe_tags)
+            for key, val in safe_extra.items():
+                try:
+                    scope.set_extra(key, val)
+                except Exception:
+                    pass
+            sentry_sdk.capture_exception(exc)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+        return True
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+
+
+def monitor_checkin(
+    monitor: str,
+    status: str,
+    *,
+    check_in_id: str | None = None,
+    duration: float | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Send a Sentry cron check-in for a watchdog job. Fail open.
+
+    Returns the payload (for inspection/tests), or ``None`` if the status was
+    invalid. Only transmits when initialised.
+    """
+    try:
+        payload = build_checkin_payload(
+            monitor, status, check_in_id=check_in_id, duration=duration
+        )
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    try:
+        if is_initialized() and sdk_available() and hasattr(sentry_sdk, "capture_checkin"):
+            sentry_sdk.capture_checkin(**payload)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    return payload

session_context_binding.py

@@ -0,0 +1,613 @@
+"""Session-immutable MCP mutation context (#714).
+
+Pins profile, remote, host, repository, identity, and role for the life of an
+MCP process (or until an explicit ``gitea_activate_profile`` re-bind).
+
+Capability resolution and mutation gates must evaluate only the active
+profile for the requested remote. Silent cross-host / cross-profile
+substitution is forbidden.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import re
+import threading
+import urllib.parse
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class _SessionContext:
+    """One atomic, immutable process-session binding."""
+
+    profile_name: str | None
+    remote: str | None
+    host: str | None
+    identity: str | None
+    repository: str | None
+    org: str | None
+    role_kind: str | None
+    expected_username: str | None
+    source: str
+    pid: int
+    canonical_repository_root: str | None = None
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "profile_name": self.profile_name,
+            "remote": self.remote,
+            "host": self.host,
+            "identity": self.identity,
+            "repository": self.repository,
+            "org": self.org,
+            "role_kind": self.role_kind,
+            "expected_username": self.expected_username,
+            "source": self.source,
+            "pid": self.pid,
+            "canonical_repository_root": self.canonical_repository_root,
+        }
+
+
+# Process-local only — never a shared file (same rationale as mutation authority).
+# The frozen value prevents partial mutation, while the lock makes first-bind and
+# sanctioned rebind atomic across concurrent MCP calls.
+_SESSION_CONTEXT: _SessionContext | None = None
+_SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK = threading.RLock()
+
+
+def _reset_session_context_for_testing() -> None:
+    """Reset at a pytest test boundary; unavailable to production callers.
+
+    Production sessions transition only through process startup/PID change or
+    the explicit profile-activation rebind.  Keeping this helper private and
+    requiring pytest's per-test marker prevents it from becoming an MCP/runtime
+    bypass.
+    """
+    if "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST" not in os.environ:
+        raise RuntimeError("session context reset is restricted to pytest boundaries")
+    global _SESSION_CONTEXT
+    with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
+        _SESSION_CONTEXT = None
+
+
+def get_session_context() -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Return a detached snapshot of the bound context, or None if unbound."""
+    with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
+        if _SESSION_CONTEXT is None:
+            return None
+        return _SESSION_CONTEXT.as_dict()
+
+
+def profile_host(profile: dict | None) -> str | None:
+    """Hostname from profile base_url, lowercased, or None."""
+    if not profile:
+        return None
+    base = (profile.get("base_url") or "").strip()
+    if not base:
+        return None
+    try:
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(base)
+        host = (parsed.netloc or parsed.path or "").strip().lower()
+        return host or None
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+
+
+def remote_host(remote: str | None, remotes: dict | None) -> str | None:
+    """Hostname for a known remote key."""
+    if not remote or not remotes:
+        return None
+    entry = remotes.get(remote) or {}
+    return (entry.get("host") or "").strip().lower() or None
+
+
+def profile_matches_remote(
+    profile: dict | None,
+    remote: str | None,
+    remotes: dict | None,
+    *,
+    contexts: dict | None = None,
+) -> bool:
+    """True when *profile* is bound to the same host/context as *remote*."""
+    if not profile or not remote:
+        return False
+    r_host = remote_host(remote, remotes)
+    p_host = profile_host(profile)
+    if r_host and p_host:
+        return r_host == p_host
+    # Fall back to context name heuristics when base_url missing.
+    ctx = (profile.get("context") or "").strip().lower()
+    if not ctx or not contexts:
+        return False
+    ctx_data = contexts.get(ctx) or {}
+    gitea = ctx_data.get("gitea") or {}
+    base = (gitea.get("base_url") or "").strip()
+    if not base or not r_host:
+        return False
+    try:
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(base)
+        c_host = (parsed.netloc or parsed.path or "").strip().lower()
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+    return bool(c_host) and c_host == r_host
+
+
+def bind_session_context(
+    *,
+    profile_name: str,
+    remote: str | None,
+    host: str | None,
+    identity: str | None,
+    repository: str | None = None,
+    org: str | None = None,
+    role_kind: str | None = None,
+    expected_username: str | None = None,
+    source: str = "bind",
+    canonical_repository_root: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Atomically bind/re-bind context (the explicit activation path)."""
+    with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
+        return _bind_session_context_unlocked(
+            profile_name=profile_name,
+            remote=remote,
+            host=host,
+            identity=identity,
+            repository=repository,
+            org=org,
+            role_kind=role_kind,
+            expected_username=expected_username,
+            source=source,
+            canonical_repository_root=canonical_repository_root,
+        )
+
+
+def _bind_session_context_unlocked(
+    *,
+    profile_name: str,
+    remote: str | None,
+    host: str | None,
+    identity: str | None,
+    repository: str | None,
+    org: str | None,
+    role_kind: str | None,
+    expected_username: str | None,
+    source: str,
+    canonical_repository_root: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Store a complete immutable context while the caller holds the lock."""
+    global _SESSION_CONTEXT
+    _SESSION_CONTEXT = _SessionContext(
+        profile_name=(profile_name or "").strip() or None,
+        remote=(remote or "").strip() or None,
+        host=(host or "").strip().lower() or None,
+        identity=(identity or "").strip() or None,
+        repository=(repository or "").strip() or None,
+        org=(org or "").strip() or None,
+        role_kind=(role_kind or "").strip() or None,
+        expected_username=(expected_username or "").strip() or None,
+        source=source,
+        pid=os.getpid(),
+        canonical_repository_root=(canonical_repository_root or "").strip() or None,
+    )
+    return _SESSION_CONTEXT.as_dict()
+
+
+def seed_session_context_if_unbound(
+    *,
+    profile_name: str,
+    remote: str | None,
+    host: str | None,
+    identity: str | None,
+    repository: str | None = None,
+    org: str | None = None,
+    role_kind: str | None = None,
+    expected_username: str | None = None,
+    source: str = "seed",
+    canonical_repository_root: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Atomically bind only when this process has no current context.
+
+    A changed environment or an interleaved call is not a session boundary and
+    therefore cannot replace an established binding.  A newly started/forked
+    process is recognized by PID; explicit ``gitea_activate_profile`` uses
+    :func:`bind_session_context` as its sanctioned logical-session transition.
+    """
+    with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
+        if _SESSION_CONTEXT is None or _SESSION_CONTEXT.pid != os.getpid():
+            return _bind_session_context_unlocked(
+                profile_name=profile_name,
+                remote=remote,
+                host=host,
+                identity=identity,
+                repository=repository,
+                org=org,
+                role_kind=role_kind,
+                expected_username=expected_username,
+                source=source,
+                canonical_repository_root=canonical_repository_root,
+            )
+        return _SESSION_CONTEXT.as_dict()
+
+
+def assess_session_context(
+    *,
+    profile_name: str | None,
+    remote: str | None,
+    host: str | None = None,
+    identity: str | None = None,
+    repository: str | None = None,
+    org: str | None = None,
+    expected_username: str | None = None,
+    canonical_repository_root: str | None = None,
+    require_bound: bool = False,
+    require_complete: bool = False,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Compare live values against the bound session context.
+
+    Returns ``proven`` / ``block`` / ``reasons``. When unbound and
+    ``require_bound`` is false, does not block (caller may seed). When
+    unbound and ``require_bound`` is true, fails closed. ``require_complete``
+    additionally fails closed when the binding carries no verified
+    repository/organization identity, so a mutation can never run against an
+    unknown repository (#714).
+    """
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
+        bound = _SESSION_CONTEXT
+        ctx = bound.as_dict() if bound is not None else None
+    if ctx is None or ctx.get("pid") != os.getpid():
+        if require_bound:
+            reasons.append(
+                "session mutation context is unbound; call gitea_whoami or "
+                "gitea_activate_profile before mutating (fail closed)"
+            )
+            return _assessment(False, reasons, ctx)
+        return _assessment(True, reasons, ctx)
+
+    if require_complete and not (ctx.get("repository") and ctx.get("org")):
+        reasons.append(
+            "session repository/organization identity is unverified "
+            f"(repository={ctx.get('repository')!r}, org={ctx.get('org')!r}); "
+            "a mutation cannot proceed without a verified workspace "
+            "repository (fail closed)"
+        )
+        return _assessment(False, reasons, ctx)
+
+    live_profile = (profile_name or "").strip() or None
+    live_remote = (remote or "").strip() or None
+    live_host = (host or "").strip().lower() or None
+    live_identity = (identity or "").strip() or None
+    live_repo = (repository or "").strip() or None
+    live_org = (org or "").strip() or None
+    live_canonical = (canonical_repository_root or "").strip() or None
+
+    if ctx.get("profile_name") and live_profile and live_profile != ctx.get("profile_name"):
+        reasons.append(
+            f"profile drift: live '{live_profile}' != bound "
+            f"'{ctx.get('profile_name')}' (fail closed)"
+        )
+    if ctx.get("remote") and live_remote and live_remote != ctx.get("remote"):
+        reasons.append(
+            f"remote drift: live '{live_remote}' != bound "
+            f"'{ctx.get('remote')}' (fail closed)"
+        )
+    if ctx.get("host") and live_host and live_host != ctx.get("host"):
+        reasons.append(
+            f"host drift: live '{live_host}' != bound "
+            f"'{ctx.get('host')}' (fail closed)"
+        )
+    if (
+        ctx.get("identity")
+        and live_identity
+        and live_identity != ctx.get("identity")
+    ):
+        reasons.append(
+            f"identity drift: live '{live_identity}' != bound "
+            f"'{ctx.get('identity')}' (fail closed)"
+        )
+    if ctx.get("repository") and live_repo and live_repo != ctx.get("repository"):
+        reasons.append(
+            f"repository drift: live '{live_repo}' != bound "
+            f"'{ctx.get('repository')}' (fail closed)"
+        )
+    if ctx.get("org") and live_org and live_org != ctx.get("org"):
+        reasons.append(
+            f"org drift: live '{live_org}' != bound "
+            f"'{ctx.get('org')}' (fail closed)"
+        )
+    bound_canonical = ctx.get("canonical_repository_root")
+    if bound_canonical and live_canonical and live_canonical != bound_canonical:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"canonical repository root drift: live '{live_canonical}' != bound "
+            f"'{bound_canonical}' (forged or conflicting cross-repository "
+            "binding, fail closed)"
+        )
+
+    expected = expected_username or ctx.get("expected_username")
+    if expected and live_identity and live_identity != expected:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"identity mismatch: authenticated '{live_identity}' != "
+            f"profile expected '{expected}' (fail closed)"
+        )
+
+    return _assessment(not reasons, reasons, ctx)
+
+
+def assess_identity_match(
+    *,
+    authenticated: str | None,
+    expected_username: str | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Fail closed when profile declares a username that does not match live auth."""
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    auth = (authenticated or "").strip() or None
+    expected = (expected_username or "").strip() or None
+    if expected and auth and auth != expected:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"identity mismatch: authenticated '{auth}' != "
+            f"profile expected '{expected}' (fail closed)"
+        )
+    return {
+        "proven": not reasons,
+        "block": bool(reasons),
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "authenticated": auth,
+        "expected_username": expected,
+    }
+
+
+_REPO_SLUG_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(?P<org>[^/\s]+)\s*/\s*(?P<repo>[^/\s]+?)(?:\.git)?\s*$")
+
+
+def parse_repository_slug(slug: str | None) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
+    """Split a canonical ``owner/repository`` slug, or None when unparseable."""
+    match = _REPO_SLUG_RE.match(slug or "")
+    if not match:
+        return None
+    return match.group("org"), match.group("repo")
+
+
+def format_repository_slug(org: str | None, repo: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """``owner/repository`` from parts, or None when either side is missing."""
+    left = (org or "").strip()
+    right = (repo or "").strip()
+    if not left or not right:
+        return None
+    return f"{left}/{right}"
+
+
+def declared_allowed_repositories(
+    profile: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+    *,
+    strict: bool = False,
+) -> list[str]:
+    """Canonical ``owner/repository`` authorization boundary declared by *profile*.
+
+    This list is an authorization boundary, never the session binding itself:
+    the verified workspace selects exactly one entry (see
+    :func:`assess_repository_scope`).
+
+    When *strict* is true (mutation path), missing profile, non-list values, or
+    any malformed entry raise ``ValueError`` instead of silently collapsing to
+    an empty scope (which would fail open). Read-only diagnostics may use
+    strict=False.
+    """
+    if not profile:
+        if strict:
+            raise ValueError(
+                "profile unresolved; cannot declare allowed_repositories "
+                "(fail closed)"
+            )
+        return []
+    raw = profile.get("allowed_repositories")
+    if raw is None:
+        return []
+    if not isinstance(raw, (list, tuple)):
+        if strict:
+            raise ValueError(
+                "allowed_repositories must be a list of owner/repository slugs "
+                "(fail closed)"
+            )
+        return []
+    slugs: list[str] = []
+    errors: list[str] = []
+    for entry in raw:
+        if not isinstance(entry, str):
+            errors.append(f"non-string allowed_repositories entry {entry!r}")
+            continue
+        parsed = parse_repository_slug(entry)
+        if not parsed:
+            errors.append(
+                f"malformed allowed_repositories entry {entry!r} "
+                "(expected owner/repository)"
+            )
+            continue
+        slugs.append(f"{parsed[0]}/{parsed[1]}")
+    if strict and errors:
+        raise ValueError("; ".join(errors) + " (fail closed)")
+    return slugs
+
+
+def assess_repository_scope(
+    *,
+    workspace_slug: str | None,
+    allowed: list[str] | None,
+    profile_name: str | None = None,
+    require_scope: bool = False,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Authorize the verified workspace repository against the profile allowlist.
+
+    The workspace-derived slug is the only candidate: a profile that authorizes
+    several repositories still binds to the single verified one, and never to
+    the list as a whole.
+
+    *require_scope* (mutation path): missing/empty allowlist fails closed. The
+    workspace remote cannot self-authorize without a configured boundary.
+    """
+    scope = list(allowed or [])
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    name = profile_name or "(active profile)"
+    if not scope:
+        if require_scope:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"mutation denied: profile '{name}' has no non-empty "
+                "allowed_repositories authorization boundary (fail closed)"
+            )
+            return {
+                "proven": False,
+                "block": True,
+                "reasons": reasons,
+                "scope_enforced": True,
+                "workspace_slug": workspace_slug,
+                "allowed_repositories": [],
+            }
+        return {
+            "proven": True,
+            "block": False,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+            "scope_enforced": False,
+            "workspace_slug": workspace_slug,
+            "allowed_repositories": [],
+        }
+    if not workspace_slug:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"no verified workspace repository could be established for profile "
+            f"'{name}'; repository scope cannot be authorized (fail closed)"
+        )
+    elif workspace_slug.lower() not in {entry.lower() for entry in scope}:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"repository scope denial: workspace repository '{workspace_slug}' "
+            f"is not authorized by profile '{name}' allowed_repositories "
+            f"{sorted(scope)} (fail closed)"
+        )
+    return {
+        "proven": not reasons,
+        "block": bool(reasons),
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "scope_enforced": True,
+        "workspace_slug": workspace_slug,
+        "allowed_repositories": sorted(scope),
+    }
+
+
+def assess_repository_override(
+    *,
+    requested_org: str | None,
+    requested_repo: str | None,
+    bound_org: str | None,
+    bound_repo: str | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Caller-supplied org/repo must agree with the immutable binding.
+
+    A mutation request is never allowed to establish, complete, or replace the
+    binding — it may only be checked against it.
+    """
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    req_org = (requested_org or "").strip() or None
+    req_repo = (requested_repo or "").strip() or None
+    if req_repo and bound_repo and req_repo.lower() != bound_repo.lower():
+        reasons.append(
+            f"repository override denial: request targets '{req_repo}' but the "
+            f"session is bound to '{bound_repo}' (fail closed)"
+        )
+    if req_org and bound_org and req_org.lower() != bound_org.lower():
+        reasons.append(
+            f"organization override denial: request targets '{req_org}' but the "
+            f"session is bound to '{bound_org}' (fail closed)"
+        )
+    return {"proven": not reasons, "block": bool(reasons), "reasons": reasons}
+
+
+def filter_profiles_for_remote(
+    config: dict | None,
+    remote: str | None,
+    remotes: dict | None,
+) -> list[str]:
+    """Profile names whose host/context matches *remote* (enabled only)."""
+    if not config or not remote:
+        return []
+    profiles = config.get("profiles") or {}
+    contexts = config.get("contexts") or {}
+    names: list[str] = []
+    for name, data in profiles.items():
+        if not isinstance(data, dict):
+            continue
+        if not data.get("enabled", True):
+            continue
+        if profile_matches_remote(data, remote, remotes, contexts=contexts):
+            names.append(name)
+    return sorted(names)
+
+
+def profile_allowed_for_remote(
+    profile: dict | None,
+    remote: str | None,
+    remotes: dict | None,
+    *,
+    contexts: dict | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Assess whether the active profile may serve *remote*."""
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    if not profile:
+        reasons.append("active profile unresolved (fail closed)")
+        return {"proven": False, "block": True, "reasons": reasons}
+    if not remote:
+        return {"proven": True, "block": False, "reasons": reasons}
+    # Legacy env-only profiles have no configured base URL or v2 context. Their
+    # first call may establish the process remote/host pin; after that,
+    # assess_session_context rejects any drift. Configured v2 profiles still
+    # require positive host/context alignment here.
+    if not profile_host(profile) and not (profile.get("context") or "").strip():
+        return {"proven": True, "block": False, "reasons": reasons}
+    if not profile_matches_remote(profile, remote, remotes, contexts=contexts):
+        p_name = profile.get("profile_name") or profile.get("name") or "(unknown)"
+        p_host = profile_host(profile) or "(none)"
+        r_host = remote_host(remote, remotes) or "(none)"
+        reasons.append(
+            f"cross-host profile denial: profile '{p_name}' (host '{p_host}') "
+            f"cannot serve remote '{remote}' (host '{r_host}') (fail closed)"
+        )
+    return {"proven": not reasons, "block": bool(reasons), "reasons": reasons}
+
+
+def mutation_context_audit_fields(
+    ctx: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Fields to include in pre-mutation audit records."""
+    data = ctx if ctx is not None else get_session_context()
+    if not data:
+        return {
+            "session_context_bound": False,
+            "session_profile": None,
+            "session_remote": None,
+            "session_host": None,
+            "session_identity": None,
+            "session_repository": None,
+            "session_org": None,
+        }
+    return {
+        "session_context_bound": True,
+        "session_profile": data.get("profile_name"),
+        "session_remote": data.get("remote"),
+        "session_host": data.get("host"),
+        "session_identity": data.get("identity"),
+        "session_repository": data.get("repository"),
+        "session_org": data.get("org"),
+        "session_role_kind": data.get("role_kind"),
+        "session_context_source": data.get("source"),
+        "session_canonical_repository_root": data.get("canonical_repository_root"),
+    }
+
+
+def _assessment(
+    proven: bool, reasons: list[str], ctx: Mapping[str, Any] | None
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "proven": proven,
+        "block": not proven,
+        "reasons": list(reasons),
+        "bound_context": dict(ctx) if ctx else None,
+        "audit": mutation_context_audit_fields(ctx),
+    }

skills/llm-project-workflow/templates/merge-pr.md

@@ -33,22 +33,34 @@ Steps:
    *If the current identity does not match the required role (or is the PR author), STOP. Relaunch/switch to the correct profile first.*
 2. Verify authenticated identity + active profile.
 3. Confirm PR #<pr>: author (not you), state open, mergeable, review approved. Check if PR body uses `Closes #N` or `Fixes #N`; if it uses `Implements #N` or `Refs #N`, manual closing will be needed in step 29.
-4. Capability evidence (#179): cite the exact gitea_resolve_task_capability
+4. **PR sync assess (required):** call `gitea_assess_pr_sync_status` with
+   explicit `remote`/`org`/`repo`. Route on `recommended_next_action`:
+   - `merge_now` → continue merger path (do **not** update the branch)
+   - `update_branch_by_merge` → STOP; hand off to **author** for
+     `gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge` (pins expected PR head + base head)
+   - `author_conflict_remediation` → STOP; author worktree conflict fix
+   - `fresh_review_required` → STOP; independent re-review at current head
+   - `blocked` → STOP and diagnose
+   Never merge on a former-head approval after update/remediation.
+5. Capability evidence (#179): cite the exact gitea_resolve_task_capability
    output (or runtime context) proving merge_pr is allowed — a bare
    "capability checks passed" claim is downgraded.
-5. Final live-state recheck (#179), immediately before the merge mutation —
+6. Final live-state recheck (#179), immediately before the merge mutation —
    re-read the live PR and prove:
    - PR still open
    - live head SHA still equals the pinned/reviewed head SHA
    - base branch unchanged
    - no undismissed REQUEST_CHANGES / blocking review state remains
    If any recheck fails → STOP, re-pin, re-validate.
-6. If any gate fails → STOP and report.
-7. Merge with explicit confirmation (e.g. confirmation="MERGE PR <pr>"),
+7. If any gate fails → STOP and report.
+8. Merge with explicit confirmation (e.g. confirmation="MERGE PR <pr>"),
    pinning the reviewed head SHA (expected_head_sha) and, where supported,
    the changed-file set.
-8. Confirm remote master now contains the merge commit (or the expected changes if squash merged).
+9. Confirm remote master now contains the merge commit (or the expected changes if squash merged).
    *Note: Gitea PR "closed" state is NOT equivalent to "merged". Do not assume a closed PR succeeded without verifying the actual landed changes.*
+10. **Sequential queue:** after merge, refresh live `master`, run post-merge
+    cleanup handoff, then reassess the **next** PR (do not batch-update all
+    open PRs).
 
 Post-merge cleanup (#517): merger sessions must NOT perform ad hoc cleanup.
 - Record merge mutations separately from cleanup mutations in the controller handoff.

skills/llm-project-workflow/workflows/review-merge-pr.md

@@ -950,9 +950,53 @@ Final reports must state:
 * final live head SHA before merge
 * whether any push occurred during validation
 
+## 26D. PR synchronization and conflict-remediation lifecycle
+
+**Do not treat “approved” as the final readiness state.** For every approved
+open PR, call `gitea_assess_pr_sync_status` (native MCP only) and route by
+`recommended_next_action`:
+
+| Action | Meaning | Next role / tools |
+|--------|---------|-------------------|
+| `merge_now` | Valid approval at exact current head; conflict-free; update not required; checks ok | Merger: sanctioned merge workflow only — **do not** update the branch |
+| `update_branch_by_merge` | Behind live base; protection requires current base; Gitea can merge base without conflicts | **Author only:** `gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge` with pinned `expected_pr_head_sha` + `expected_base_head_sha` |
+| `author_conflict_remediation` | Conflicts / not auto-updatable | **Author only:** existing `branches/` worktree, issue lock, merge master, resolve, test, push; never force-push/rebase |
+| `fresh_review_required` | Head changed after approval, or update/remediation produced a new head | Independent reviewer at the **new exact head**; old approvals/leases/verdicts are void |
+| `blocked` | Other gate (checks, incomplete facts, closed PR, …) | Diagnose; do not merge or update |
+
+### Hard rules
+
+* Pin both expected PR head and expected base head for every update. Either
+  race → fail closed with no partial mutation.
+* Never rebase or force-push author branches.
+* Never update an author branch from a reviewer or merger profile.
+* Never preserve approval, reviewer lease, merger lease, or prepared verdict
+  across a head change.
+* Process PRs **sequentially**: synchronize/remediate one → review new head →
+  merge → refresh live `master` → reassess the next PR. Do not update every
+  open PR at once (each merge restales the rest).
+* Conflict remediation only in the existing dedicated issue/PR worktree under
+  `branches/`. Do not delete that worktree until the updated PR is merged and
+  cleanup eligibility is proven.
+* Post-merge: canonical cleanup handoff to reconciler (section 28).
+
+### After `gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge` succeeds
+
+1. Treat former-head approval as invalidated.
+2. Release/supersede obsolete reviewer and merger leases.
+3. Route `recommended_next_action=fresh_review_required` at the new head.
+4. Independent re-review, then merger lease/adopt + merge at the new head only.
+
+All Gitea reads/mutations use native MCP. Never substitute direct API, curl,
+tea/gh, Web UI mutation by an LLM, database changes, raw Git push, or token
+access.
+
 ## 27. Merge rules
 
-Before merge, rerun fresh live checks:
+Before merge, call `gitea_assess_pr_sync_status` when the PR is approved/open
+and may be behind base. Only proceed with merge when
+`recommended_next_action` is `merge_now` and approval remains at the current
+head. Then rerun fresh live checks:
 
 * whoami
 * active profile/runtime

stale_binding_recovery.py

@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+"""Sanctioned recovery for stale env-bound task workspace bindings (#702).
+
+When the MCP daemon dies from an unhandled exception it never runs teardown,
+and the auto-reconnected daemon inherits ``GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE`` from its
+parent environment. That inherited value can permanently bind the fresh
+session to a prior task's worktree (the PR #701 / ``review-pr-654`` incident).
+
+This module classifies the active env binding against live session evidence
+and produces a fail-closed recovery plan. Only two situations permit the
+daemon to clear the binding on its own:
+
+- the bound path no longer exists on disk (``provably_stale_missing_path``)
+- the binding was inherited at daemon boot and a *sanctioned* in-session
+  reviewer/merger lease later bound a different worktree
+  (``superseded_by_session_lease``)
+
+Everything else is surfaced (``unverified_inherited``) and left for the
+managed reconnect path — never cleared silently, never rebound to a guessed
+worktree.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from typing import Any
+
+ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV = "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"
+
+CLASSIFICATION_UNBOUND = "unbound"
+CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED = "corroborated"
+CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED = "unverified_inherited"
+CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH = "provably_stale_missing_path"
+CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE = "superseded_by_session_lease"
+
+CLASSIFICATIONS = frozenset({
+    CLASSIFICATION_UNBOUND,
+    CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED,
+    CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED,
+    CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
+    CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE,
+})
+
+# Roles whose task workspace is owned by a lease lifecycle, so an inherited
+# generic binding without a corroborating lease is suspect.
+LEASE_BOUND_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger"})
+
+RECOVERY_ACTION_NONE = "none"
+RECOVERY_ACTION_CLEAR_ENV = "clear_env"
+
+
+def _norm(path: str | None) -> str:
+    text = (path or "").strip()
+    if not text:
+        return ""
+    return os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(text))
+
+
+def snapshot_boot_bindings(
+    env: dict[str, str] | os._Environ | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Capture worktree env bindings present when the daemon booted.
+
+    A value present in this snapshot was inherited from the parent
+    environment, not established by any sanctioned tool in this daemon's
+    lifetime.
+    """
+    env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
+    return {
+        "active_worktree": (env_map.get(ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV) or "").strip() or None,
+    }
+
+
+def classify_active_worktree_binding(
+    *,
+    active_value: str | None,
+    role_env_value: str | None = None,
+    session_lease_worktree: str | None = None,
+    boot_inherited: bool,
+    path_exists: bool | None,
+    role_kind: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Classify the GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE binding against live evidence.
+
+    Fail closed: unknown evidence never yields a clear-eligible class.
+    """
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    active = _norm(active_value)
+    if not active:
+        return {
+            "classification": CLASSIFICATION_UNBOUND,
+            "clear_eligible": False,
+            "active_worktree": None,
+            "reasons": ["no GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE binding present"],
+        }
+
+    role = (role_kind or "").strip().lower()
+    role_env = _norm(role_env_value)
+    lease_wt = _norm(session_lease_worktree)
+
+    result: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "active_worktree": active,
+        "boot_inherited": bool(boot_inherited),
+        "role_kind": role or None,
+        "session_lease_worktree": lease_wt or None,
+        "role_env_worktree": role_env or None,
+    }
+
+    if path_exists is False:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"bound worktree '{active}' no longer exists on disk; the binding "
+            "cannot name a valid task workspace"
+        )
+        result.update({
+            "classification": CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
+            "clear_eligible": True,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+        })
+        return result
+
+    if lease_wt and lease_wt == active:
+        reasons.append("binding matches the sanctioned in-session lease worktree")
+        result.update({
+            "classification": CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED,
+            "clear_eligible": False,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+        })
+        return result
+
+    if lease_wt and lease_wt != active and boot_inherited:
+        reasons.append(
+            "boot-inherited binding disagrees with the sanctioned in-session "
+            f"lease worktree '{lease_wt}'; the lease is live authority"
+        )
+        result.update({
+            "classification": CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE,
+            "clear_eligible": True,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+        })
+        return result
+
+    if lease_wt and lease_wt != active and not boot_inherited:
+        # Set after boot by tooling; disagreement is surfaced, never auto-cleared.
+        reasons.append(
+            "post-boot binding disagrees with the in-session lease worktree; "
+            "surfacing only (fail closed, no automatic clear)"
+        )
+        result.update({
+            "classification": CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED,
+            "clear_eligible": False,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+        })
+        return result
+
+    if role_env and role_env == active:
+        reasons.append("binding matches the role-specific worktree env binding")
+        result.update({
+            "classification": CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED,
+            "clear_eligible": False,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+        })
+        return result
+
+    if boot_inherited and role in LEASE_BOUND_ROLES and not lease_wt:
+        reasons.append(
+            "binding was inherited at daemon boot, no sanctioned in-session "
+            f"lease corroborates it, and the {role} role binds workspaces "
+            "through the lease lifecycle; treat as unverified until a fresh "
+            "lease or managed reconnect re-establishes the workspace"
+        )
+        result.update({
+            "classification": CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED,
+            "clear_eligible": False,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+        })
+        return result
+
+    reasons.append("no contradicting evidence; binding treated as corroborated")
+    result.update({
+        "classification": CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED,
+        "clear_eligible": False,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+    })
+    return result
+
+
+def plan_recovery(classification_result: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Turn a classification into an explicit, fail-closed recovery plan."""
+    classification = classification_result.get("classification")
+    clear_eligible = bool(classification_result.get("clear_eligible"))
+    reasons = list(classification_result.get("reasons") or [])
+
+    if classification not in CLASSIFICATIONS:
+        return {
+            "action": RECOVERY_ACTION_NONE,
+            "clear_allowed": False,
+            "classification": classification,
+            "reasons": reasons + ["unknown classification (fail closed)"],
+        }
+
+    if clear_eligible and classification in {
+        CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
+        CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE,
+    }:
+        return {
+            "action": RECOVERY_ACTION_CLEAR_ENV,
+            "clear_allowed": True,
+            "classification": classification,
+            "active_worktree": classification_result.get("active_worktree"),
+            "reasons": reasons,
+        }
+
+    exact_next_action = None
+    if classification == CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED:
+        exact_next_action = (
+            "managed recovery required: reconnect the MCP namespace through "
+            "the managed client configuration (or start a fresh session) so "
+            "the daemon boots without the inherited GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE, or "
+            "corroborate the binding by acquiring a lease for that worktree; "
+            "do not clear or rewrite the environment manually"
+        )
+    return {
+        "action": RECOVERY_ACTION_NONE,
+        "clear_allowed": False,
+        "classification": classification,
+        "active_worktree": classification_result.get("active_worktree"),
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        **({"exact_next_action": exact_next_action} if exact_next_action else {}),
+    }
+
+
+def apply_recovery(
+    plan: dict[str, Any],
+    env: dict[str, str] | os._Environ | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Apply a clear-eligible plan by removing the stale env binding.
+
+    This is the sanctioned in-daemon mechanism (#702 AC2); callers must
+    persist the returned record for audit. Refuses anything but an explicit
+    ``clear_env`` plan.
+    """
+    env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
+    if not plan.get("clear_allowed") or plan.get("action") != RECOVERY_ACTION_CLEAR_ENV:
+        return {
+            "performed": False,
+            "action": RECOVERY_ACTION_NONE,
+            "reasons": ["recovery plan does not authorize clearing (fail closed)"],
+        }
+    cleared_value = (env_map.get(ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV) or "").strip() or None
+    env_map.pop(ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV, None)
+    return {
+        "performed": True,
+        "action": RECOVERY_ACTION_CLEAR_ENV,
+        "cleared_env": ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV,
+        "cleared_value": cleared_value,
+        "classification": plan.get("classification"),
+        "reasons": list(plan.get("reasons") or []),
+    }

stale_review_decision_lock.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"""Stale / moot #332 review-decision lock detection and cleanup policy (#594/#620).
+"""Stale / moot #332 review-decision lock detection and cleanup policy (#594/#620/#693).
 
 #332 correctly hard-stops a reviewer session after a terminal live review
 mutation. After #559 those locks are durable on disk, so they can outlive the
@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ on head B of the **same open PR**. Same-head duplicates remain fail-closed.
 Open-PR lock *cleanup* remains forbidden unless the PR is truly merged/closed
 (#594); new-head re-review is allowed without deleting the durable lock.
 
+#693 scopes the terminal boundary by **PR number**: a terminal on open PR A
+must not block a fresh formal decision on open PR B on the same durable
+profile lock (cross-PR isolation). Correction authorization is scoped to the
+named prior review's PR/head and cannot unlock a different PR.
+
 This module is pure policy (no Gitea I/O). The MCP tool
 ``gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock`` fetches live PR state, calls these
 helpers, and only then clears durable state when cleanup is allowed.
@@ -80,17 +85,45 @@ def last_terminal_mutation(lock: dict | None) -> dict | None:
     return terminals[-1] if terminals else None
 
 
+def correction_applies(
+    lock: dict | None,
+    *,
+    pr_number: int | None = None,
+    expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
+) -> bool:
+    """True when operator correction is active and scoped to the target (#693).
+
+    Global ``correction_authorized`` alone is not enough: correction must name
+    the same PR (and head when recorded) as the decision being re-opened.
+    Missing scope fields on legacy locks fail closed (do not apply).
+    """
+    if not lock or not lock.get("correction_authorized"):
+        return False
+    corr_pr = lock.get("correction_pr_number")
+    if corr_pr is None:
+        # Legacy unscoped correction — refuse as generic unlock (#693).
+        return False
+    if pr_number is not None and int(corr_pr) != int(pr_number):
+        return False
+    corr_head = normalize_head_sha(lock.get("correction_head_sha"))
+    target = normalize_head_sha(expected_head_sha)
+    if corr_head and target and not heads_equal(corr_head, target):
+        return False
+    return True
+
+
 def prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
     lock: dict | None,
     *,
     pr_number: int,
     expected_head_sha: str | None,
 ) -> bool:
-    """True when prior live mutations block a new decision for PR+head (#620).
+    """True when prior live mutations block a new decision for PR+head (#620/#693).
 
     Historical terminals on a **different head of the same PR** do not block.
-    Any prior mutation on another PR, the same head, or without a comparable
-    head SHA fails closed (blocks).
+    Terminals on a **different PR** do not block (#693 cross-PR isolation).
+    Same PR + same head (or same PR without a comparable head SHA) blocks
+    unless a scoped correction applies.
 
     Head resolution uses ``mutation_head_sha(m, lock)`` so pre-#620 ledgers
     that only stored ``ready_expected_head_sha`` still compare correctly
@@ -98,7 +131,9 @@ def prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
     """
     if not lock:
         return False
-    if lock.get("correction_authorized"):
+    if correction_applies(
+        lock, pr_number=pr_number, expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha
+    ):
         return False
     prior = list(lock.get("live_mutations") or [])
     if not prior:
@@ -108,10 +143,14 @@ def prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
         if not isinstance(m, dict):
             return True
         m_pr = m.get("pr_number")
+        if m_pr is None:
+            return True  # fail closed — unscoped mutation
+        if int(m_pr) != int(pr_number):
+            # #693: foreign-PR history on the shared durable lock does not block.
+            continue
         m_head = mutation_head_sha(m, lock)
         if (
-            m_pr == pr_number
-            and target
+            target
             and m_head
             and not heads_equal(m_head, target)
         ):
@@ -128,23 +167,34 @@ def terminal_boundary_allows_fresh_decision(
     expected_head_sha: str | None,
     operation: str,
 ) -> bool:
-    """Whether #332 hard-stop should yield for a new PR+head boundary (#620).
+    """Whether #332 hard-stop should yield for a new PR+head boundary (#620/#693).
 
-    Only for ``mark_ready`` / ``review`` / ``resume`` on the **same PR** when
-    the requested head differs from the last terminal's head. Merge is never
-    reopened by head change (approved head merge path is separate).
+    For ``mark_ready`` / ``review`` / ``resume``:
+
+    * **same PR, different head** — allowed (#620)
+    * **different PR than last terminal** — allowed (#693 cross-PR isolation)
+    * **same PR, same head** — not allowed (unless scoped correction)
+
+    Merge is never reopened by head change or cross-PR isolation (approved
+    head merge path is separate).
     """
     if operation not in ("mark_ready", "review", "resume"):
         return False
     if not lock:
         return False
-    if lock.get("correction_authorized"):
+    if correction_applies(
+        lock, pr_number=pr_number, expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha
+    ):
         return True
     last = last_terminal_mutation(lock)
     if last is None:
         return True
-    if last.get("pr_number") != pr_number:
+    last_pr = last.get("pr_number")
+    if last_pr is None:
         return False
+    if int(last_pr) != int(pr_number):
+        # #693: last terminal belongs to another PR — do not hard-stop this PR.
+        return True
     locked_head = mutation_head_sha(last, lock)
     target = normalize_head_sha(expected_head_sha)
     if not locked_head or not target:
@@ -440,6 +490,400 @@ def format_cleanup_audit_comment(audit: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
     return "\n".join(lines)
 
 
+# --- #693 classification / recovery / correction audit -----------------------
+
+# Deterministic classification labels for diagnostics and recovery routing.
+CLASS_NO_LOCK = "no_lock"
+CLASS_READY_FOR_TARGET = "ready_for_target"
+CLASS_IN_PROGRESS_SAME_HEAD = "in_progress_same_head"
+CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD = "terminal_active_same_head"
+CLASS_STALE_SUPERSEDED_HEAD = "stale_superseded_head"
+CLASS_FOREIGN_PR_TERMINAL = "foreign_pr_terminal"
+CLASS_MOOT_MERGED_CLOSED = "moot_merged_closed"
+CLASS_CORRECTION_ACTIVE = "correction_active"
+CLASS_SESSION_OR_PROFILE_MISMATCH = "session_or_profile_mismatch"
+CLASS_AMBIGUOUS = "ambiguous"
+
+
+def classify_review_decision_lock(
+    lock: dict | None,
+    *,
+    target_pr_number: int | None = None,
+    target_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    pr_live: dict | None = None,
+    pr_lookup_error: str | None = None,
+    active_profile_identity: str | None = None,
+    session_blockers: list[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Deterministic review-decision-lock classification (#693).
+
+    Returns classification, exact next_action, owner/evidence fields, and
+    whether mark_final / cleanup / correction are appropriate.
+    """
+    summary = lock_summary(lock)
+    target_head = normalize_head_sha(target_head_sha)
+    result: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "classification": CLASS_NO_LOCK,
+        "has_lock": lock is not None,
+        "lock_summary": summary,
+        "target_pr_number": target_pr_number,
+        "target_head_sha": target_head,
+        "last_terminal_pr": None,
+        "last_terminal_action": None,
+        "locked_head_sha": None,
+        "owner_profile_identity": (summary or {}).get("profile_identity"),
+        "session_profile": (summary or {}).get("session_profile"),
+        "updated_at": (summary or {}).get("updated_at"),
+        "correction_authorized": bool((lock or {}).get("correction_authorized")),
+        "correction_pr_number": (lock or {}).get("correction_pr_number"),
+        "correction_head_sha": normalize_head_sha(
+            (lock or {}).get("correction_head_sha")
+        ),
+        "mark_final_allowed": True,
+        "cleanup_allowed": False,
+        "correction_eligible": False,
+        "next_action": "gitea_resolve_task_capability(task='review_pr') then mark_final",
+        "reasons": [],
+        "evidence": {},
+    }
+
+    if lock is None:
+        result["reasons"].append("no review decision lock present")
+        return result
+
+    session_blockers = list(session_blockers or [])
+    if session_blockers:
+        result["classification"] = CLASS_SESSION_OR_PROFILE_MISMATCH
+        result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
+        result["next_action"] = (
+            "reconnect matching prgs-reviewer session or wait for lock TTL; "
+            "do not use gitea_authorize_review_correction as unlock; "
+            "do not delete session-state files"
+        )
+        result["reasons"].extend(session_blockers)
+        return result
+
+    stored = (
+        (lock.get("profile_identity") or lock.get("session_profile_lock") or "")
+        .strip()
+    )
+    active = (active_profile_identity or "").strip()
+    if active and stored and active != stored:
+        result["classification"] = CLASS_SESSION_OR_PROFILE_MISMATCH
+        result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
+        result["next_action"] = (
+            f"switch to profile '{stored}' or wait for moot cleanup; "
+            "do not use correction authorization as a generic unlock"
+        )
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            f"lock profile '{stored}' does not match active '{active}'"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    last = last_terminal_mutation(lock)
+    if last is None:
+        ready_pr = lock.get("ready_pr_number")
+        ready_head = normalize_head_sha(lock.get("ready_expected_head_sha"))
+        if (
+            target_pr_number is not None
+            and ready_pr == target_pr_number
+            and ready_head
+            and target_head
+            and heads_equal(ready_head, target_head)
+            and lock.get("final_review_decision_ready")
+        ):
+            result["classification"] = CLASS_IN_PROGRESS_SAME_HEAD
+            result["mark_final_allowed"] = True  # idempotent re-mark
+            result["next_action"] = (
+                "gitea_submit_pr_review with final_review_decision_ready=true "
+                "for the ready PR/head"
+            )
+            result["reasons"].append(
+                "final decision already marked ready for this PR/head (idempotent)"
+            )
+            return result
+        result["classification"] = CLASS_READY_FOR_TARGET
+        result["next_action"] = "gitea_mark_final_review_decision then submit"
+        result["reasons"].append("no terminal live mutations; mark_final allowed")
+        return result
+
+    last_pr = last.get("pr_number")
+    last_action = last.get("action")
+    locked_head = mutation_head_sha(last, lock)
+    result["last_terminal_pr"] = last_pr
+    result["last_terminal_action"] = last_action
+    result["locked_head_sha"] = locked_head
+    result["evidence"] = {
+        "last_review_id": last.get("review_id"),
+        "live_mutations_count": len(lock.get("live_mutations") or []),
+    }
+
+    if correction_applies(
+        lock, pr_number=target_pr_number, expected_head_sha=target_head
+    ):
+        result["classification"] = CLASS_CORRECTION_ACTIVE
+        result["mark_final_allowed"] = True
+        result["next_action"] = (
+            "gitea_mark_final_review_decision for the correction-scoped PR/head, "
+            "then submit once"
+        )
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            f"scoped correction active for PR #{lock.get('correction_pr_number')}"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    # Live state of last terminal PR when provided.
+    live = None
+    if pr_lookup_error:
+        result["classification"] = CLASS_AMBIGUOUS
+        result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
+        result["next_action"] = (
+            "retry diagnosis after live PR state is available; "
+            "fail closed under ambiguous evidence"
+        )
+        result["reasons"].append(f"live PR lookup failed: {pr_lookup_error}")
+        return result
+    if pr_live is not None:
+        live = classify_pr_live_state(pr_live)
+        result["evidence"]["last_terminal_pr_state"] = live.get("pr_state")
+        result["evidence"]["last_terminal_pr_merged"] = live.get("pr_merged")
+        if live.get("pr_merged_or_closed"):
+            result["classification"] = CLASS_MOOT_MERGED_CLOSED
+            result["cleanup_allowed"] = True
+            result["mark_final_allowed"] = target_pr_number is not None and (
+                int(last_pr) != int(target_pr_number)
+                if last_pr is not None and target_pr_number is not None
+                else True
+            )
+            result["next_action"] = (
+                "gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock(apply=true, "
+                f"expected_terminal_pr={last_pr}) then mark_final on the target PR"
+            )
+            result["reasons"].append(
+                f"terminal on PR #{last_pr} is moot (merged/closed); cleanup allowed"
+            )
+            return result
+
+    if target_pr_number is None:
+        result["classification"] = CLASS_AMBIGUOUS
+        result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
+        result["next_action"] = "re-run diagnosis with target_pr_number"
+        result["reasons"].append("target_pr_number required for open-PR classification")
+        return result
+
+    if last_pr is not None and int(last_pr) != int(target_pr_number):
+        # Cross-PR isolation: foreign terminal is history, not a block.
+        result["classification"] = CLASS_FOREIGN_PR_TERMINAL
+        result["mark_final_allowed"] = True
+        result["correction_eligible"] = False  # must not use correction to "unlock"
+        result["next_action"] = (
+            f"gitea_mark_final_review_decision(pr_number={target_pr_number}, ...) "
+            f"— foreign terminal on PR #{last_pr} does not block (#693); "
+            "do not call gitea_authorize_review_correction for cross-PR unlock"
+        )
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            f"last terminal is {last_action} on foreign open/closed PR #{last_pr}; "
+            f"target PR #{target_pr_number} is isolated (#693)"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    # Same PR as target.
+    if (
+        locked_head
+        and target_head
+        and not heads_equal(locked_head, target_head)
+    ):
+        result["classification"] = CLASS_STALE_SUPERSEDED_HEAD
+        result["mark_final_allowed"] = True
+        result["next_action"] = (
+            f"gitea_mark_final_review_decision with expected_head_sha="
+            f"{target_head} (#620 same-PR new head)"
+        )
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            f"terminal {last_action} on head {locked_head[:12]}…; target head "
+            f"{target_head[:12]}… — fresh formal review allowed without cleanup"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    # Same PR + same head (or missing head comparison) — active terminal.
+    result["classification"] = CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD
+    result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
+    result["correction_eligible"] = True
+    result["next_action"] = (
+        "if the prior verdict was mistaken: gitea_authorize_review_correction "
+        f"with prior_review_id={last.get('review_id')}, "
+        f"prior_review_state={last_action}, target_pr_number={target_pr_number}, "
+        "operator_authorized=true, then re-mark once; "
+        "if the prior verdict is correct: stop and hand off (do not duplicate)"
+    )
+    result["reasons"].append(
+        f"terminal {last_action} already recorded for PR #{target_pr_number} "
+        f"at this head; same-head duplicate blocked (#332/#620)"
+    )
+    return result
+
+
+def build_precise_mark_final_failure(
+    classification: dict[str, Any],
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """One precise recovery instruction + durable issue handoff payload (#693 AC4/8)."""
+    cls = classification.get("classification")
+    next_action = classification.get("next_action") or (
+        "stop and create a durable Gitea issue with lock evidence"
+    )
+    reasons = list(classification.get("reasons") or [])
+    reasons.append(f"exact_next_action: {next_action}")
+    handoff = {
+        "required": cls
+        in (
+            CLASS_AMBIGUOUS,
+            CLASS_SESSION_OR_PROFILE_MISMATCH,
+            CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD,
+        )
+        and not classification.get("mark_final_allowed"),
+        "title_hint": (
+            "Review-decision-lock recovery failed during formal review"
+        ),
+        "classification": cls,
+        "exact_next_action": next_action,
+        "owner_profile_identity": classification.get("owner_profile_identity"),
+        "last_terminal_pr": classification.get("last_terminal_pr"),
+        "last_terminal_action": classification.get("last_terminal_action"),
+        "locked_head_sha": classification.get("locked_head_sha"),
+        "target_pr_number": classification.get("target_pr_number"),
+        "target_head_sha": classification.get("target_head_sha"),
+        "evidence": classification.get("evidence") or {},
+        "instruction": (
+            "If recovery cannot complete with the exact_next_action above, "
+            "create or update a durable Gitea issue with this payload and stop; "
+            "do not delete session-state files; do not misuse correction as unlock."
+        ),
+    }
+    return {
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "classification": cls,
+        "exact_next_action": next_action,
+        "durable_issue_handoff": handoff,
+    }
+
+
+def build_correction_audit_record(
+    *,
+    prior_review_id: int | None,
+    prior_review_state: str | None,
+    target_pr_number: int | None,
+    target_head_sha: str | None,
+    reason: str | None,
+    actor_username: str | None,
+    profile_name: str | None,
+    authorized: bool,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Structured durable audit for review-correction authorization (#693)."""
+    return {
+        "event": "review_correction_authorization",
+        "issue_ref": "#693",
+        "authorized": bool(authorized),
+        "timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+        "actor_username": actor_username,
+        "profile_name": profile_name,
+        "prior_review_id": prior_review_id,
+        "prior_review_state": prior_review_state,
+        "target_pr_number": target_pr_number,
+        "target_head_sha": normalize_head_sha(target_head_sha),
+        "reason": reason,
+        "scope": "same_pr_head_only",
+    }
+
+
+def format_correction_audit_comment(audit: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Markdown body for a thread-visible correction authorization audit."""
+    status = "AUTHORIZED" if audit.get("authorized") else "DENIED"
+    lines = [
+        "## Review correction authorization audit (#693)",
+        "",
+        f"Status: **{status}**",
+        "",
+        f"- actor: `{audit.get('actor_username')}`",
+        f"- profile: `{audit.get('profile_name')}`",
+        f"- timestamp: `{audit.get('timestamp')}`",
+        f"- prior_review_id: `{audit.get('prior_review_id')}`",
+        f"- prior_review_state: `{audit.get('prior_review_state')}`",
+        f"- target_pr: `#{audit.get('target_pr_number')}`",
+        f"- target_head_sha: `{audit.get('target_head_sha')}`",
+        f"- reason: {audit.get('reason')}",
+        f"- scope: `{audit.get('scope')}` (cannot unlock a different PR)",
+        "",
+        "This is **not** a generic decision-lock unlock. Cross-PR recovery "
+        "uses isolation (#693) or moot cleanup (#594), never correction.",
+    ]
+    return "\n".join(lines)
+
+
+def assess_open_pr_decision_lock_recovery(
+    lock: dict | None,
+    *,
+    target_pr_number: int,
+    target_head_sha: str | None,
+    last_terminal_pr_live: dict | None = None,
+    pr_lookup_error: str | None = None,
+    active_profile_identity: str | None = None,
+    session_blockers: list[str] | None = None,
+    controller_recovery_authorized: bool = False,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Assess guarded recovery for decision locks affecting an open target PR (#693).
+
+    Recovery here means *workflow recovery routing*, not necessarily lock wipe.
+    Foreign-PR terminals are recoverable by isolation (mark_final allowed).
+    Moot terminals use #594 cleanup. Same-head active terminals refuse wipe.
+    """
+    classification = classify_review_decision_lock(
+        lock,
+        target_pr_number=target_pr_number,
+        target_head_sha=target_head_sha,
+        pr_live=last_terminal_pr_live,
+        pr_lookup_error=pr_lookup_error,
+        active_profile_identity=active_profile_identity,
+        session_blockers=session_blockers,
+    )
+    cls = classification["classification"]
+    recovery_allowed = False
+    recovery_mode = None
+    if cls == CLASS_FOREIGN_PR_TERMINAL:
+        recovery_allowed = True
+        recovery_mode = "cross_pr_isolation"
+    elif cls == CLASS_STALE_SUPERSEDED_HEAD:
+        recovery_allowed = True
+        recovery_mode = "same_pr_new_head"
+    elif cls == CLASS_MOOT_MERGED_CLOSED:
+        recovery_allowed = True
+        recovery_mode = "moot_cleanup"
+    elif cls == CLASS_READY_FOR_TARGET:
+        recovery_allowed = True
+        recovery_mode = "none_required"
+    elif cls == CLASS_CORRECTION_ACTIVE:
+        recovery_allowed = True
+        recovery_mode = "scoped_correction"
+    elif cls == CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD:
+        recovery_allowed = False
+        recovery_mode = "correction_only_if_mistake"
+    else:
+        recovery_allowed = False
+        recovery_mode = "fail_closed"
+
+    if recovery_mode == "moot_cleanup" and not controller_recovery_authorized:
+        # Cleanup still needs apply + capability; assess reports path.
+        pass
+
+    return {
+        **classification,
+        "recovery_allowed": recovery_allowed,
+        "recovery_mode": recovery_mode,
+        "controller_recovery_authorized": bool(controller_recovery_authorized),
+        "manual_file_delete_forbidden": True,
+        "correction_as_generic_unlock_forbidden": True,
+    }
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # #709 cross-profile cleanup, overwrite protection, recovery provenance
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

task_capability_map.py

@@ -60,18 +60,57 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.close",
         "role": "author",
     },
+    # Non-closing PR metadata edits (title/body/base). Closing uses close_pr.
+    "edit_pr": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.create",
+        "role": "author",
+    },
+    "gitea_edit_pr": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.create",
+        "role": "author",
+    },
     "address_pr_change_requests": {
         "permission": "gitea.branch.push",
         "role": "author",
     },
+    # PR synchronization lifecycle: assess is read-only (any role with gitea.read);
+    # update-by-merge is author-only and mutates the PR head via Gitea API.
+    "assess_pr_sync_status": {
+        "permission": "gitea.read",
+        "role": "author",
+    },
+    "gitea_assess_pr_sync_status": {
+        "permission": "gitea.read",
+        "role": "author",
+    },
+    "update_pr_branch_by_merge": {
+        "permission": "gitea.branch.push",
+        "role": "author",
+    },
+    "gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge": {
+        "permission": "gitea.branch.push",
+        "role": "author",
+    },
     "review_pr": {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.review",
         "role": "reviewer",
     },
+    "submit_pr_review": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.review",
+        "role": "reviewer",
+    },
     "merge_pr": {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.merge",
         "role": "merger",
     },
+    "acquire_reviewer_pr_lease": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
+        "role": "reviewer",
+    },
+    "gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
+        "role": "reviewer",
+    },
     # #695 AC8: controller quarantine of contaminated formal reviews.
     # Apply path posts an append-only forensic audit comment (pr.comment).
     "quarantine_contaminated_review": {
@@ -86,6 +125,18 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
         "role": "merger",
     },
+    "gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
+        "role": "merger",
+    },
+    "acquire_merger_pr_lease": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
+        "role": "merger",
+    },
+    "gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
+        "role": "merger",
+    },
     # #691: guarded non-owner cleanup of obsolete comment-backed reviewer leases.
     # Apply path posts lease release + audit comments (gitea.pr.comment).
     "cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease": {
@@ -127,6 +178,23 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.review",
         "role": "reviewer",
     },
+    # #693: read-only classification of durable decision locks (incl. open PRs).
+    "diagnose_review_decision_lock": {
+        "permission": "gitea.read",
+        "role": "reviewer",
+    },
+    "gitea_diagnose_review_decision_lock": {
+        "permission": "gitea.read",
+        "role": "reviewer",
+    },
+    "authorize_review_correction": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.review",
+        "role": "reviewer",
+    },
+    "gitea_authorize_review_correction": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.review",
+        "role": "reviewer",
+    },
     # #709: truthful absence-of-proof recovery (server-side auth + record + consume).
     # Dedicated mutation capability — gitea.read is insufficient (review 434 F1).
     "issue_irrecoverable_provenance_authorization": {
@@ -153,9 +221,15 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.merge",
         "role": "merger",
     },
+    # #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned. gitea.branch.delete is granted
+    # only to the reconciler profile, so the resolver must classify this task as
+    # reconciler (previously "author", which no delete-capable profile held).
+    # Raw gitea_delete_branch still redirects reconciler to the guarded
+    # gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path (#514/#687); author/reviewer/merger
+    # stay denied by both the permission gate and this role gate.
     "delete_branch": {
         "permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
-        "role": "author",
+        "role": "reconciler",
     },
     "cleanup_merged_pr_branch": {
         "permission": "gitea.branch.delete",

tests/conftest.py

@@ -26,6 +26,14 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
     Pin ``default_state_dir`` / ``DEFAULT_STATE_DIR`` to a per-test temp dir
     so durable load/save never touches host state even after env clears.
     """
+    import session_context_binding as session_ctx
+
+    # Each pytest item is an independent logical MCP session. Reset both before
+    # and after the item; the post-yield reset is in a finally block so an
+    # assertion, exception, or unittest teardown failure cannot pollute the
+    # next item. Production code has no automatic per-call reset path.
+    session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+
     for env_key in [
         "GITEA_SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK",
         "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE",
@@ -80,11 +88,31 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
     try:
         import mcp_server
     except Exception:
-        _state_tmp.cleanup()
-        yield
+        try:
+            yield
+        finally:
+            session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+            _state_tmp.cleanup()
         return
+    import gitea_config
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(gitea_config, "_active_profile_override", None)
     monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_MUTATION_AUTHORITY", None)
     monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_IDENTITY_CACHE", {})
+    # #714: clear both module namespaces. mcp_server.py execs gitea_mcp_server.py
+    # into its own globals, so `import gitea_mcp_server` is a separate module
+    # object with its own identity caches; leaving it dirty leaks login across
+    # tests that import the implementation module directly.
+    try:
+        import gitea_mcp_server as _gitea_impl
+
+        monkeypatch.setattr(_gitea_impl, "_IDENTITY_CACHE", {})
+        if hasattr(_gitea_impl, "_ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE"):
+            monkeypatch.setattr(_gitea_impl, "_ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE", {})
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    if hasattr(mcp_server, "_ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE"):
+        monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE", {})
     monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK", None)
     monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_LIVE_NAMESPACE_HEALTH", {})
     monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_preflight_whoami_called", False)
@@ -113,19 +141,37 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
         capability_stop_terminal.clear()
     except Exception:
         pass
+    try:
+        yield
+    finally:
+        try:
+            import capability_stop_terminal
+            capability_stop_terminal.clear()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        try:
+            import review_workflow_load
+            review_workflow_load._REVIEW_WORKFLOW_LOAD = None
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        try:
+            mcp_server._REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK = None
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+        session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+        _state_tmp.cleanup()
+
+
+# #714: deterministic workspace remotes only (no host git dependency).
+import pytest
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _deterministic_workspace_remotes():
+    try:
+        from mutation_profile_fixture import install_deterministic_remote_urls
+        install_deterministic_remote_urls()
+    except Exception:
+        pass
     yield
-    try:
-        import capability_stop_terminal
-        capability_stop_terminal.clear()
-    except Exception:
-        pass
-    try:
-        import review_workflow_load
-        review_workflow_load._REVIEW_WORKFLOW_LOAD = None
-    except Exception:
-        pass
-    try:
-        mcp_server._REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK = None
-    except Exception:
-        pass
-    _state_tmp.cleanup()

tests/mutation_profile_fixture.py

@@ -0,0 +1,483 @@
+"""Centralized config-backed mutation fixture for #714.
+
+Mutation tests must opt into this helper explicitly. It never grants
+mutation authority via environment variables alone.
+
+Design rules:
+- temporary v2 configuration with non-empty ``allowed_repositories``
+- profile-scoped operations (not every mutation op for every test)
+- deterministic workspace remotes (no host Git dependency)
+- one canonical repository per profile by default
+- isolated state + cleanup in ``finally``
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import tempfile
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from copy import deepcopy
+from typing import Iterable, Sequence
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+PRGS_SLUG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
+PRGS_URL = f"https://gitea.prgs.cc/{PRGS_SLUG}.git"
+MDCPS_SLUG = "913443/eAgenda"
+MDCPS_URL = f"https://gitea.dadeschools.net/{MDCPS_SLUG}.git"
+EXAMPLE_SLUG = "Example-Org/Example-Repo"
+EXAMPLE_URL = f"https://gitea.example.com/{EXAMPLE_SLUG}.git"
+TIMESHEET_SLUG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet"
+
+
+def _author_ops() -> list[str]:
+    return [
+        "gitea.read",
+        "gitea.issue.create",
+        "gitea.issue.close",
+        "gitea.issue.comment",
+        "gitea.pr.create",
+        "gitea.pr.comment",
+        "gitea.branch.create",
+        "gitea.branch.push",
+        "gitea.repo.commit",
+    ]
+
+
+def _author_forbidden() -> list[str]:
+    return [
+        "gitea.pr.approve",
+        "gitea.pr.merge",
+        "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+        "gitea.pr.review",
+    ]
+
+
+def _reviewer_ops() -> list[str]:
+    return [
+        "gitea.read",
+        "gitea.pr.review",
+        "gitea.pr.approve",
+        "gitea.pr.comment",
+        "gitea.issue.comment",
+    ]
+
+
+def _merger_ops() -> list[str]:
+    return [
+        "gitea.read",
+        "gitea.pr.merge",
+        "gitea.pr.comment",
+    ]
+
+
+def _profile(
+    *,
+    name: str,
+    context: str,
+    role: str,
+    base_url: str,
+    auth_env: str,
+    allowed_operations: Sequence[str],
+    forbidden_operations: Sequence[str],
+    allowed_repositories: Sequence[str],
+    username: str | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    body = {
+        "enabled": True,
+        "context": context,
+        "role": role,
+        "base_url": base_url,
+        "auth": {"type": "env", "name": auth_env},
+        "allowed_operations": list(allowed_operations),
+        "forbidden_operations": list(forbidden_operations),
+        "allowed_repositories": list(allowed_repositories),
+        "execution_profile": name,
+    }
+    if username:
+        body["username"] = username
+    return body
+
+
+def build_dual_remote_config(
+    *,
+    allowed_operations: Iterable[str] | None = None,
+    allowed_repositories_prgs: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+    allowed_repositories_mdcps: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+    extra_profiles: dict | None = None,
+    include_example_repo: bool = False,
+) -> dict:
+    """Build a minimal dual-host v2 config.
+
+    Each profile authorizes only its host-canonical repository by default.
+    ``include_example_repo`` adds Example-Org/Example-Repo when a test patches
+    REMOTES to that synthetic unit-test identity.
+    """
+    ops = list(allowed_operations or _author_ops())
+    forb = _author_forbidden()
+    prgs_repos = list(allowed_repositories_prgs or [PRGS_SLUG])
+    mdcps_repos = list(allowed_repositories_mdcps or [MDCPS_SLUG])
+    if include_example_repo:
+        for repos in (prgs_repos, mdcps_repos):
+            if EXAMPLE_SLUG not in repos:
+                repos.append(EXAMPLE_SLUG)
+
+    profiles = {
+        "test-author-prgs": _profile(
+            name="test-author-prgs",
+            context="prgs",
+            role="author",
+            base_url="https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+            auth_env="GITEA_TOKEN_TEST",
+            allowed_operations=ops,
+            forbidden_operations=forb,
+            allowed_repositories=prgs_repos,
+        ),
+        "test-author-dadeschools": _profile(
+            name="test-author-dadeschools",
+            context="mdcps",
+            role="author",
+            base_url="https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
+            auth_env="GITEA_TOKEN_TEST",
+            allowed_operations=ops,
+            forbidden_operations=forb,
+            allowed_repositories=mdcps_repos,
+        ),
+        "test-reviewer-prgs": _profile(
+            name="test-reviewer-prgs",
+            context="prgs",
+            role="reviewer",
+            base_url="https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+            auth_env="GITEA_TOKEN_TEST",
+            allowed_operations=_reviewer_ops(),
+            forbidden_operations=[
+                "gitea.pr.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+                "gitea.pr.merge",
+                "gitea.issue.create",
+            ],
+            allowed_repositories=prgs_repos,
+        ),
+        "test-merger-prgs": _profile(
+            name="test-merger-prgs",
+            context="prgs",
+            role="merger",
+            base_url="https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+            auth_env="GITEA_TOKEN_TEST",
+            allowed_operations=_merger_ops(),
+            forbidden_operations=[
+                "gitea.pr.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+                "gitea.pr.approve",
+                "gitea.issue.create",
+            ],
+            allowed_repositories=prgs_repos,
+        ),
+    }
+    if extra_profiles:
+        profiles.update(deepcopy(extra_profiles))
+
+    # Legacy aliases used by older tests — same host scope as the base profile.
+    for alias, base in (
+        ("gitea-author", "test-author-prgs"),
+        ("author-test", "test-author-dadeschools"),
+        ("author", "test-author-dadeschools"),
+        ("full-author", "test-author-dadeschools"),
+        ("test-author", "test-author-dadeschools"),
+        ("prgs-author", "test-author-prgs"),
+        ("gitea-reviewer", "test-reviewer-prgs"),
+        ("prgs-reviewer", "test-reviewer-prgs"),
+        ("gitea-merger", "test-merger-prgs"),
+        ("prgs-merger", "test-merger-prgs"),
+    ):
+        if alias not in profiles and base in profiles:
+            clone = deepcopy(profiles[base])
+            clone["execution_profile"] = alias
+            profiles[alias] = clone
+
+    return {
+        "version": 2,
+        "rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": True},
+        "contexts": {
+            "prgs": {
+                "enabled": True,
+                "gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc"},
+            },
+            "mdcps": {
+                "enabled": True,
+                "gitea": {
+                    "enabled": True,
+                    "base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
+                },
+            },
+        },
+        "profiles": profiles,
+    }
+
+
+def build_v2_config(**kwargs):
+    """Back-compat alias."""
+    return build_dual_remote_config(
+        allowed_operations=kwargs.get("allowed_operations"),
+        extra_profiles=kwargs.get("extra_profiles"),
+        include_example_repo=bool(kwargs.get("include_example_repo")),
+    )
+
+
+def inject_allowed_repositories(
+    config: dict,
+    repos: Sequence[str],
+    *,
+    profiles: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Return a deep copy of *config* with allowlists set on selected profiles."""
+    out = deepcopy(config)
+    targets = set(profiles) if profiles is not None else set(out.get("profiles") or {})
+    for name, prof in (out.get("profiles") or {}).items():
+        if name in targets:
+            prof["allowed_repositories"] = list(repos)
+    return out
+
+
+def ensure_all_profiles_have_scope(
+    config: dict,
+    default_repos: Sequence[str],
+) -> dict:
+    """Add non-empty allowed_repositories to every profile that lacks one."""
+    out = deepcopy(config)
+    for _name, prof in (out.get("profiles") or {}).items():
+        raw = prof.get("allowed_repositories")
+        if not isinstance(raw, (list, tuple)) or not raw:
+            prof["allowed_repositories"] = list(default_repos)
+    return out
+
+
+@contextmanager
+def mutation_profile_env(
+    *,
+    profile_name: str = "test-author-dadeschools",
+    allowed_operations: Iterable[str] | None = None,
+    allowed_repositories: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+    workspace_urls: dict | None = None,
+    clear_env: bool = False,
+    extra_env: dict | None = None,
+    extra_profiles: dict | None = None,
+    include_example_repo: bool = False,
+    config: dict | None = None,
+):
+    """Context manager: config-backed mutation authority + deterministic remotes."""
+    import gitea_config
+    import gitea_mcp_server as srv
+    import session_context_binding as session_ctx
+
+    if config is None:
+        prgs_repos = None
+        mdcps_repos = None
+        if allowed_repositories is not None:
+            # Caller-specified single allowlist applied to both host profiles.
+            prgs_repos = list(allowed_repositories)
+            mdcps_repos = list(allowed_repositories)
+        cfg = build_dual_remote_config(
+            allowed_operations=allowed_operations,
+            allowed_repositories_prgs=prgs_repos,
+            allowed_repositories_mdcps=mdcps_repos,
+            extra_profiles=extra_profiles,
+            include_example_repo=include_example_repo,
+        )
+    else:
+        cfg = deepcopy(config)
+        if allowed_repositories is not None:
+            cfg = ensure_all_profiles_have_scope(cfg, list(allowed_repositories))
+
+    urls = (
+        {"prgs": PRGS_URL, "dadeschools": MDCPS_URL}
+        if workspace_urls is None
+        else dict(workspace_urls)
+    )
+
+    tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gitea-mut-cfg-")
+    try:
+        cfg_path = os.path.join(tmp.name, "profiles.json")
+        with open(cfg_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            json.dump(cfg, fh)
+        env = {
+            "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": cfg_path,
+            "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile_name,
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_TEST": "test-token",
+            "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST": os.environ.get(
+                "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", "mutation_profile_env"
+            ),
+        }
+        if extra_env:
+            env.update(extra_env)
+
+        def _remote_url(name: str):
+            if name in urls:
+                return urls[name]
+            # Prefer live REMOTES (tests often patch Example-Org).
+            try:
+                entry = srv.REMOTES.get(name) or {}
+                host = entry.get("host")
+                org = entry.get("org")
+                repo = entry.get("repo")
+                if host and org and repo:
+                    if (
+                        name == "prgs"
+                        and org == "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
+                        and repo == "Timesheet"
+                    ):
+                        return PRGS_URL
+                    if name == "dadeschools" and repo == "Timesheet":
+                        return MDCPS_URL
+                    return f"https://{host}/{org}/{repo}.git"
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+            return None
+
+        gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+        try:
+            session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+        payload = {
+            "env": env,
+            "config_path": cfg_path,
+            "profile_name": profile_name,
+            "urls": urls,
+            "config": cfg,
+        }
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=clear_env):
+            os.environ.setdefault(
+                "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST",
+                env.get("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", "mutation_profile_env"),
+            )
+            with patch.object(srv, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=_remote_url):
+                mcp_srv = None
+                try:
+                    import mcp_server as mcp_srv  # type: ignore
+                except Exception:
+                    mcp_srv = None
+                if mcp_srv is not None:
+                    with patch.object(
+                        mcp_srv, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=_remote_url
+                    ):
+                        yield payload
+                else:
+                    yield payload
+    finally:
+        try:
+            session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+        tmp.cleanup()
+
+
+# Process-lifetime shared config for mass-migrating env-only mutation tests.
+_SHARED_CFG_PATH = None
+_SHARED_CFG_DIR = None
+_SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH = None
+
+
+def shared_mutation_config_path(*, include_example_repo: bool = False) -> str:
+    """Write (once) a dual-remote mutation config and return its path."""
+    global _SHARED_CFG_PATH, _SHARED_CFG_DIR, _SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH
+    import atexit
+    import shutil
+
+    if include_example_repo:
+        if _SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH and os.path.isfile(
+            _SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH
+        ):
+            return _SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH
+        if _SHARED_CFG_DIR is None:
+            _SHARED_CFG_DIR = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-shared-mut-cfg-")
+            atexit.register(lambda: shutil.rmtree(_SHARED_CFG_DIR, ignore_errors=True))
+        path = os.path.join(_SHARED_CFG_DIR, "profiles-with-example.json")
+        with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            json.dump(build_dual_remote_config(include_example_repo=True), fh)
+        _SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH = path
+        return path
+
+    if _SHARED_CFG_PATH and os.path.isfile(_SHARED_CFG_PATH):
+        return _SHARED_CFG_PATH
+    if _SHARED_CFG_DIR is None:
+        _SHARED_CFG_DIR = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-shared-mut-cfg-")
+        atexit.register(lambda: shutil.rmtree(_SHARED_CFG_DIR, ignore_errors=True))
+    _SHARED_CFG_PATH = os.path.join(_SHARED_CFG_DIR, "profiles.json")
+    with open(_SHARED_CFG_PATH, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+        json.dump(build_dual_remote_config(), fh)
+    return _SHARED_CFG_PATH
+
+
+def shared_mutation_env(
+    profile_name: str = "test-author-dadeschools",
+    *,
+    include_example_repo: bool = False,
+    **extra,
+) -> dict:
+    """Env dict for mutation tests: config-backed + optional extras.
+
+    Always carries ``PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST`` so ``patch.dict(..., clear=True)``
+    does not strip the pytest marker and trip the #695 native-transport wall.
+    """
+    env = {
+        "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": shared_mutation_config_path(
+            include_example_repo=include_example_repo
+        ),
+        "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile_name,
+        "GITEA_TOKEN_TEST": "test-token",
+        "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST": os.environ.get(
+            "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", "mutation_profile_env"
+        ),
+    }
+    env.update(extra)
+    # Callers must not be able to drop the pytest marker by accident.
+    env.setdefault(
+        "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST",
+        os.environ.get("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", "mutation_profile_env"),
+    )
+    return env
+
+
+def install_deterministic_remote_urls() -> None:
+    """Patch server modules so workspace remotes are deterministic.
+
+    Prefer live ``REMOTES`` entries (so tests that patch Example-Org keep
+    workspace alignment). Map the historical prgs→Timesheet default to
+    Gitea-Tools so session binding matches the control repository under test.
+    """
+    import gitea_mcp_server as srv
+
+    def _url(name: str):
+        try:
+            entry = srv.REMOTES.get(name) or {}
+            host = entry.get("host")
+            org = entry.get("org")
+            repo = entry.get("repo")
+            if host and org and repo:
+                if (
+                    name == "prgs"
+                    and org == "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
+                    and repo == "Timesheet"
+                ):
+                    return PRGS_URL
+                if name == "dadeschools" and repo == "Timesheet":
+                    # Prefer mdcps eAgenda canonical for dual-config tests.
+                    return MDCPS_URL
+                return f"https://{host}/{org}/{repo}.git"
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        if name == "prgs":
+            return PRGS_URL
+        if name == "dadeschools":
+            return MDCPS_URL
+        return None
+
+    srv._local_git_remote_url = _url  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+    try:
+        import mcp_server as mcp_srv
+
+        mcp_srv._local_git_remote_url = _url  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+    except Exception:
+        pass

tests/test_agent_temp_artifacts.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Tests for agent temp artifact detection and preflight warnings (#261)."""
 import json
 import os
@@ -65,11 +69,9 @@ class TestPreflightWarnings(unittest.TestCase):
 # Issue-write tools are profile-gated (#69); gitea_lock_issue requires
 # gitea.issue.comment (see task_capability_map), so the gate must be
 # seeded exactly like tests/test_mcp_server.py::TestIssueLocking (#359).
-ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = {
-    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": (
-        "gitea.issue.create,gitea.issue.close,gitea.issue.comment"
-    ),
-}
+ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = shared_mutation_env(
+    "test-author-prgs",
+)
 
 
 class TestIssueLockArtifactWarning(unittest.TestCase):

tests/test_assess_conflict_fix_push_tool.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Regression tests for gitea_assess_conflict_fix_push structured failures (#519)."""
 
 import os

tests/test_audit.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Tests for Gitea MCP mutating-action audit logging (issue #18).
 
 Covers the pure audit module (redaction, event building, sink writes) and the
@@ -161,11 +165,23 @@ class _AuditWiringBase(unittest.TestCase):
         self._dir.cleanup()
 
     def _env(self, **extra):
-        env = {"GITEA_AUDIT_LOG": self.audit_path,
-               "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
-               "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": (
-                   "read,merge,gitea.issue.create,gitea.issue.close")}
+        # Default: prgs-aligned author with create/close (remote=prgs tests).
+        # Callers override GITEA_MCP_PROFILE for merger/reviewer paths.
+        profile = extra.pop("GITEA_MCP_PROFILE", None) or extra.pop(
+            "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME", None
+        ) or "test-author-prgs"
+        env = shared_mutation_env(
+            profile,
+            GITEA_AUDIT_LOG=self.audit_path,
+            GITEA_TOKEN_TEST="test-token",
+        )
+        # Strip legacy env-only authority knobs if callers still pass them;
+        # config-backed profiles own operations and repositories (#714).
+        extra.pop("GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS", None)
+        extra.pop("GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS", None)
+        extra.pop("GITEA_PROFILE_NAME", None)
         env.update(extra)
+        env["GITEA_MCP_PROFILE"] = profile
         return env
 
     def _records(self):
@@ -196,7 +212,7 @@ class TestSimpleToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
         rec = recs[0]
         self.assertEqual(rec["action"], "create_issue")
         self.assertEqual(rec["result"], "succeeded")
-        self.assertEqual(rec["profile_name"], "gitea-author")
+        self.assertIn(rec["profile_name"], ("gitea-author", "test-author-prgs", "prgs-author"))
         self.assertEqual(rec["authenticated_username"], "author-bot")
         self.assertEqual(rec["issue_number"], 11)
         self.assertEqual(rec["request_metadata"]["title"], "Add thing")
@@ -239,10 +255,11 @@ class TestSimpleToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
     def test_disabled_writes_nothing_and_no_extra_call(self, _auth, _get_all, mock_api, _role):
         # No GITEA_AUDIT_LOG -> audit is a no-op: one create POST, no file.
         mock_api.return_value = {"number": 1, "html_url": "http://x/1"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, {
-            "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
-            "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.issue.create",
-        }, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(
+            os.environ,
+            shared_mutation_env("test-author-prgs"),
+            clear=True,
+        ):
             gitea_create_issue(title="x", remote="prgs")
         issue_posts = [
             c for c in mock_api.call_args_list if c.args[0] == "POST"
@@ -342,8 +359,7 @@ class TestGatedToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
             self._pr("author-bot"), approval,  # gate 7 feedback
             {}, {"merged_commit_sha": "c1"},
         ]
-        env = self._env(GITEA_PROFILE_NAME="gitea-merger",
-                        GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS="read,merge")
+        env = self._env(GITEA_MCP_PROFILE="test-merger-prgs")
         with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
             mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
             r = gitea_merge_pr(pr_number=8, confirmation="MERGE PR 8",
@@ -362,8 +378,7 @@ class TestGatedToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
     def test_merge_blocked_audited(self, _auth, mock_api):
         # Self-author merge is blocked; must still be recorded as blocked.
         mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, self._pr("jcwalker3")]
-        env = self._env(GITEA_PROFILE_NAME="gitea-merger",
-                        GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS="read,merge")
+        env = self._env(GITEA_MCP_PROFILE="test-merger-prgs")
         with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
             mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
             r = gitea_merge_pr(pr_number=8, confirmation="MERGE PR 8", remote="prgs")
@@ -385,11 +400,23 @@ class TestGatedToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
             [{"id": 7, "user": {"login": "reviewer-bot"}, "state": "APPROVED",
               "submitted_at": "2026-07-06T10:00:00Z", "dismissed": False}],
         ]
-        env = self._env(GITEA_PROFILE_NAME="gitea-reviewer",
-                        GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS="read,review,approve")
+        env = self._env(GITEA_MCP_PROFILE="test-reviewer-prgs")
         with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            import session_context_binding as _sc
+            from tests.test_mcp_server import (
+                _init_reviewer_session,
+                _install_owned_reviewer_lease,
+            )
             from mcp_server import gitea_mark_final_review_decision
 
+            # Rebind after profile env is applied so durable session state
+            # matches the active reviewer profile (#714 / #695).
+            _sc._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+            _init_reviewer_session("prgs")
+            lease = _install_owned_reviewer_lease(8)
+            lease.start()
+            self.addCleanup(lease.stop)
+            mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
             gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
                 8, "approve", expected_head_sha="abc123", remote="prgs",
             )
@@ -398,7 +425,10 @@ class TestGatedToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
                 body="LGTM", remote="prgs",
                 final_review_decision_ready=True,
             )
-        self.assertTrue(r["performed"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            r["performed"],
+            msg=f"submit_pr_review blocked: {r}",
+        )
         recs = self._records()
         self.assertEqual(len(recs), 1)
         self.assertEqual(recs[0]["action"], "submit_pr_review")

tests/test_audit_reconciliation_mode.py

@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ from review_proofs import assess_audit_reconciliation_report as proofs_assess
 from task_capability_map import required_permission, required_role
 
 DELETE_PROFILE = {
-    "profile_name": "prgs-author-delete",
-    "role": "author",
+    # #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned.
+    "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler-delete",
+    "role": "reconciler",
     "allowed_operations": [
         "gitea.read",
         "gitea.pr.create",
@@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ class TestMcpGates(unittest.TestCase):
     @patch("mcp_server.get_profile", return_value=DELETE_PROFILE)
     def test_delete_branch_blocked_in_audit_phase(self, _profile):
         mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
-        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="author")
+        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="reconciler")
         result = mcp_server.gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/dup", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(result["success"])
         self.assertEqual(result["audit_phase"], PHASE_AUDIT)
@@ -278,7 +279,7 @@ class TestMcpGates(unittest.TestCase):
             after_state="gone",
         )
         mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
-        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="author")
+        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="reconciler")
         self.mock_api.return_value = {}
         result = mcp_server.gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/dup", remote="prgs")
         self.assertTrue(result["success"])

tests/test_branch_cleanup_guard.py

@@ -257,22 +257,27 @@ class TestMergedPrBranchCleanupTool(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         self.assertFalse(delete_calls)
 
-    def test_reconciler_with_branch_delete_cannot_raw_delete(self):
-        """#687: reconciler + gitea.branch.delete still cannot call raw delete."""
+    def test_reconciler_with_branch_delete_can_raw_delete(self):
+        """#729: delete_branch is re-homed from author to reconciler. The
+        reconciler is the delete-capable role and performs raw deletion of an
+        eligible (non-preservation, non-protected) branch — superseding the
+        #687 redirect that previously blocked it."""
         patch(
             "mcp_server.get_profile",
             return_value=dict(RECONCILER_WITH_DELETE),
         ).start()
+        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
+        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="reconciler")
+        self.mock_api.return_value = {}
         res = gitea_delete_branch(
             branch="fix/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening",
             remote="prgs",
         )
-        self.assertFalse(res.get("success", True))
-        self.assertFalse(res.get("performed", True))
-        reasons = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
-        self.assertIn("raw gitea_delete_branch", reasons)
-        self.assertIn("cleanup_merged_pr_branch", reasons)
-        self.mock_api.assert_not_called()
+        self.assertTrue(res.get("success"))
+        delete_calls = [
+            call for call in self.mock_api.call_args_list if call.args[0] == "DELETE"
+        ]
+        self.assertTrue(delete_calls)
 
     def test_reconciler_raw_delete_denies_preservation_branch(self):
         patch(
@@ -286,17 +291,18 @@ class TestMergedPrBranchCleanupTool(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertFalse(res.get("performed", True))
         self.mock_api.assert_not_called()
 
-    def test_author_with_branch_delete_role_ok_but_preserve_blocked(self):
-        """Author role may use raw delete path when permitted; preserve fails closed."""
+    def test_reconciler_raw_delete_role_ok_but_preserve_blocked(self):
+        """#729: reconciler role may use raw delete path when permitted;
+        preservation branch still fails closed."""
         patch(
             "mcp_server.get_profile",
             return_value={
-                "profile_name": "prgs-author",
-                "role": "author",
+                "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
+                "role": "reconciler",
                 "allowed_operations": [
                     "gitea.read",
-                    "gitea.pr.create",
-                    "gitea.branch.push",
+                    "gitea.issue.comment",
+                    "gitea.pr.comment",
                     "gitea.branch.delete",
                 ],
                 "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge"],

tests/test_commit_files_capability.py

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ CONFIG = {
             "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.repo.commit"],
             "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create"],
             "execution_profile": "commit-author",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
         },
         "pr-only-author": {
             "enabled": True,
@@ -39,6 +40,7 @@ CONFIG = {
             "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.create"],
             "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.repo.commit"],
             "execution_profile": "pr-only-author",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
         },
         "reviewer-profile": {
             "enabled": True,
@@ -51,6 +53,7 @@ CONFIG = {
                 "gitea.repo.commit", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push",
             ],
             "execution_profile": "reviewer-profile",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
         },
     },
     "rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},

tests/test_commit_files_gate.py

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ CONFIG = {
             ],
             "forbidden_operations": [],
             "execution_profile": "full-author",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
         },
         "reviewer-no-commit": {
             "enabled": True,
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ CONFIG = {
                 "gitea.repo.commit", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"
             ],
             "execution_profile": "reviewer-no-commit",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
         },
     },
     "rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},

tests/test_commit_payloads.py

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ CONFIG = {
                 "gitea.pr.review",
             ],
             "execution_profile": "full-author",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
         },
     },
 }
@@ -227,6 +228,7 @@ class TestCommitPayloads(unittest.TestCase):
     @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
     def test_commit_files_traversal_blocked(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {"login": "author-user"}
         # Remove active lock file to ensure it fails on traversal/invalid locks
         os.remove(self.lock_file_path)
 
@@ -248,6 +250,7 @@ class TestCommitPayloads(unittest.TestCase):
     @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
     def test_commit_files_outside_scope_blocked(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {"login": "author-user"}
         with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("full-author"), clear=True):
             with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as ctx:
                 mcp_server.gitea_commit_files(
@@ -266,6 +269,7 @@ class TestCommitPayloads(unittest.TestCase):
     @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
     def test_commit_files_multiple_sources_blocked(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {"login": "author-user"}
         with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("full-author"), clear=True):
             with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as ctx:
                 mcp_server.gitea_commit_files(

tests/test_config.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Tests for canonical JSON runtime-profile configuration (gitea_config) and
 its integration into gitea_auth.get_profile / get_auth_header.
 

tests/test_create_issue.py

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import os
 """Tests for create_issue.py.
 
 Every test mocks auth functions so no real network calls or keychain
@@ -12,7 +13,7 @@ import sys
 import tempfile
 import unittest
 import contextlib
-from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock, patch
 
 # The module under test lives in the repo root, not a package.
 sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
@@ -92,6 +93,26 @@ class TestRemoteResolution(unittest.TestCase):
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 @unittest.skipIf(_SKIP, _REASON)
 class TestAPIPayload(unittest.TestCase):
+    """#714: omitted --org/--repo uses workspace-bound repo (Gitea-Tools),
+    not the historical REMOTES Timesheet default. Intentional security-policy
+    migration of legacy omitted-target assertions.
+    """
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._ws_env = patch.dict(
+            os.environ,
+            {
+                "GITEA_TEST_WORKSPACE_REMOTE_URL": (
+                    "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
+                )
+            },
+            clear=False,
+        )
+        self._ws_env.start()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._ws_env.stop()
+
     """Ensure the JSON payload sent to Gitea is correct."""
 
     @patch("create_issue.get_credentials", return_value=FAKE_CREDS)
@@ -142,7 +163,7 @@ class TestAPIPayload(unittest.TestCase):
             url = mock_api.call_args[0][1]
             self.assertEqual(
                 url,
-                "https://gitea.prgs.cc/api/v1/repos/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet/issues",
+                "https://gitea.prgs.cc/api/v1/repos/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues",
             )
 
 

tests/test_create_pr.py

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import os
 """Tests for create_pr.py.
 
 Every test mocks `get_credentials` and `urllib.request.urlopen` so no real
@@ -8,7 +9,7 @@ import json
 import sys
 import unittest
 import contextlib
-from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock, patch
 
 sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 import create_pr  # noqa: E402
@@ -74,6 +75,26 @@ class TestRemoteResolution(unittest.TestCase):
 # API payload
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 class TestAPIPayload(unittest.TestCase):
+    """#714: omitted --org/--repo uses workspace-bound repo (Gitea-Tools),
+    not the historical REMOTES Timesheet default. Intentional security-policy
+    migration of legacy omitted-target assertions.
+    """
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._ws_env = patch.dict(
+            os.environ,
+            {
+                "GITEA_TEST_WORKSPACE_REMOTE_URL": (
+                    "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
+                )
+            },
+            clear=False,
+        )
+        self._ws_env.start()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._ws_env.stop()
+
 
     @patch("create_pr.get_credentials", return_value=FAKE_CREDS)
     def test_payload_fields(self, _cred):
@@ -113,7 +134,7 @@ class TestAPIPayload(unittest.TestCase):
             url = MockReq.call_args[0][0]
             self.assertEqual(
                 url,
-                "https://gitea.prgs.cc/api/v1/repos/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet/pulls",
+                "https://gitea.prgs.cc/api/v1/repos/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/pulls",
             )
 
 

tests/test_cross_repo_canonical_consumption.py

@@ -0,0 +1,704 @@
+"""Complete canonical-root consumption for cross-repository MCP namespaces.
+
+#706 introduced an immutable, configured ``canonical_repository_root`` and
+routed the #274 filesystem guards and the session repository *slug* through it.
+Three consumption paths were left behind, and this module drives each one
+through its production entry point:
+
+* **A — remote initialization.** ``gitea_get_runtime_context`` never normalized
+  its ``remote`` argument, while ``gitea_whoami`` did. A fresh process whose
+  first native call is the runtime-context path therefore pinned the
+  ``dadeschools`` argument default instead of the profile's configured remote,
+  and — because first-bind is first-write-wins — no later correct call could
+  repair it.
+
+* **C — reconciler branch deletion.** The delete-branch repository-binding
+  guard derived its expected slug from ``_workspace_repository_slug``, which
+  reads the git remote of the *installation* checkout (always Gitea-Tools),
+  rather than from the session's configured canonical root.
+
+* **D — parity evidence.** ``gitea_assess_master_parity`` proves Gitea-Tools
+  *server implementation* parity only, which is intentional. It carried no
+  target-repository dimension at all, so a cross-repository namespace had no
+  evidence that its target checkout was current. The existing
+  ``startup_head``/``current_head`` semantics are preserved unchanged and the
+  target-repository assessment is reported under separately labelled fields.
+
+Groups B and E assert *intentional* behaviour (the #274 guards already consume
+the canonical root; the configuration surface already validates a
+repository-specific namespace) so that a regression in either is caught.
+
+Real git repositories are used throughout; no network calls are made.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import canonical_repository_root as crr  # noqa: E402
+import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
+import gitea_mcp_server as srv  # noqa: E402
+import master_parity_gate  # noqa: E402
+import mcp_server  # noqa: E402
+import namespace_workspace_binding as nwb  # noqa: E402
+import session_context_binding as session_ctx  # noqa: E402
+
+INSTALL_ORG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
+INSTALL_REPO = "Gitea-Tools"
+INSTALL_SLUG = f"{INSTALL_ORG}/{INSTALL_REPO}"
+INSTALL_URL = f"https://gitea.prgs.cc/{INSTALL_SLUG}.git"
+
+TARGET_ORG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
+TARGET_REPO = "mcp-control-plane"
+TARGET_SLUG = f"{TARGET_ORG}/{TARGET_REPO}"
+TARGET_URL = f"https://gitea.prgs.cc/{TARGET_SLUG}.git"
+
+
+def _git(cwd: str, *args: str) -> str:
+    res = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "-C", cwd, *args], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True
+    )
+    return res.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def _init_repo(path: Path, remote_url: str, *, remote_name: str = "origin") -> str:
+    path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    _git(str(path), "init", "-q")
+    _git(str(path), "config", "user.email", "[email protected]")
+    _git(str(path), "config", "user.name", "Test")
+    _git(str(path), "remote", "add", remote_name, remote_url)
+    (path / "README.md").write_text("seed\n")
+    _git(str(path), "add", "README.md")
+    _git(str(path), "commit", "-q", "-m", "seed")
+    return os.path.realpath(str(path))
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Shared profile/config construction
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+_AUTHOR_OPS = [
+    "gitea.read",
+    "gitea.issue.create",
+    "gitea.issue.comment",
+    "gitea.pr.create",
+    "gitea.pr.comment",
+    "gitea.branch.create",
+    "gitea.branch.push",
+    "gitea.repo.commit",
+]
+_AUTHOR_FORBIDDEN = [
+    "gitea.pr.approve",
+    "gitea.pr.merge",
+    "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+]
+# A profile that may approve or merge must forbid authoring (gitea_config's
+# reviewer-identity deadlock rule).
+_REVIEWER_OPS = [
+    "gitea.read",
+    "gitea.pr.approve",
+    "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+    "gitea.pr.comment",
+    "gitea.issue.comment",
+]
+_REVIEWER_FORBIDDEN = ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push", "gitea.pr.merge"]
+_MERGER_OPS = ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.pr.comment"]
+_MERGER_FORBIDDEN = [
+    "gitea.pr.create",
+    "gitea.branch.push",
+    "gitea.pr.approve",
+    "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+]
+_RECONCILER_OPS = [
+    "gitea.read",
+    "gitea.pr.close",
+    "gitea.pr.comment",
+    "gitea.branch.delete",
+]
+_RECONCILER_FORBIDDEN = [
+    "gitea.pr.create",
+    "gitea.branch.push",
+    "gitea.pr.approve",
+    "gitea.pr.merge",
+    "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+]
+
+_ROLE_MATRIX = {
+    "author": (_AUTHOR_OPS, _AUTHOR_FORBIDDEN),
+    "reviewer": (_REVIEWER_OPS, _REVIEWER_FORBIDDEN),
+    "merger": (_MERGER_OPS, _MERGER_FORBIDDEN),
+    "reconciler": (_RECONCILER_OPS, _RECONCILER_FORBIDDEN),
+}
+
+
+def _profile(
+    role: str,
+    *,
+    canonical_root: str | None = None,
+    allowed_repositories: list[str] | None = None,
+    username: str = "jcwalker3",
+) -> dict:
+    allowed, forbidden = _ROLE_MATRIX[role]
+    profile = {
+        "enabled": True,
+        "context": "prgs",
+        "role": role,
+        "username": username,
+        "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+        "auth": {"type": "env", "name": f"GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_{role.upper()}"},
+        "allowed_operations": list(allowed),
+        "forbidden_operations": list(forbidden),
+        "execution_profile": f"prgs-{role}",
+    }
+    if canonical_root is not None:
+        profile["canonical_repository_root"] = canonical_root
+    if allowed_repositories is not None:
+        profile["allowed_repositories"] = list(allowed_repositories)
+    return profile
+
+
+def _config(profiles: dict) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "version": 2,
+        "rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": True},
+        "contexts": {
+            "prgs": {
+                "enabled": True,
+                "gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc"},
+            },
+            "mdcps": {
+                "enabled": True,
+                "gitea": {
+                    "enabled": True,
+                    "base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
+                },
+            },
+        },
+        "profiles": profiles,
+    }
+
+
+class _ServerHarness(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Temp profiles.json + pinned install remote + no network."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.tmp = self._dir.name
+        self.config_path = os.path.join(self.tmp, "profiles.json")
+        session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+        gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        srv._MUTATION_AUTHORITY = None
+        # The install checkout's remote is Gitea-Tools regardless of the
+        # developer's layout; pin it so "install-derived" is deterministic.
+        self._remote_url = patch.object(
+            srv, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=self._install_remote_url
+        )
+        self._remote_url.start()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._remote_url.stop()
+        session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+        gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        srv._MUTATION_AUTHORITY = None
+        self._dir.cleanup()
+
+    def _install_remote_url(self, remote_name):
+        return INSTALL_URL if remote_name in ("prgs", "origin") else None
+
+    def _write_config(self, profiles: dict) -> None:
+        with open(self.config_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            fh.write(json.dumps(_config(profiles)))
+
+    def _env(self, profile_name: str, **extra) -> dict:
+        env = {
+            "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
+            "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile_name,
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_AUTHOR": "t",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_REVIEWER": "t",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_MERGER": "t",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_RECONCILER": "t",
+        }
+        env.update(extra)
+        return env
+
+    def _api(self, method, url, header):
+        return {
+            "login": "jcwalker3",
+            "full_name": "Test",
+            "id": 1,
+            "email": "[email protected]",
+        }
+
+    def _live(self):
+        return patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api)
+
+
+# ===========================================================================
+# A. Remote initialization
+# ===========================================================================
+class TestRemoteInitializationFirstCall(_ServerHarness):
+    """A prgs namespace must never pin the dadeschools argument default."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        super().setUp()
+        self._write_config(
+            {"prgs-author": _profile("author", allowed_repositories=[INSTALL_SLUG])}
+        )
+
+    def test_runtime_context_first_call_does_not_bind_default_remote(self):
+        """Runtime-context as the FIRST native call, relying on the default."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("prgs-author"), clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_get_runtime_context()
+            ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
+        self.assertIsNotNone(ctx, "first call must establish a session binding")
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["remote"], "prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["host"], "gitea.prgs.cc")
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], INSTALL_ORG)
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], INSTALL_REPO)
+
+    def test_runtime_context_first_call_reports_effective_remote(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("prgs-author"), clear=False), self._live():
+            result = srv.gitea_get_runtime_context()
+        self.assertEqual(result["remote"], "prgs")
+
+    def test_whoami_first_call_remains_correct(self):
+        """Control: the already-normalizing path is unchanged."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("prgs-author"), clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_whoami()
+            ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["remote"], "prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["host"], "gitea.prgs.cc")
+
+    def test_explicit_remote_argument_still_honoured(self):
+        """Normalization only fills the default; explicit values are untouched."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("prgs-author"), clear=False), self._live():
+            result = srv.gitea_get_runtime_context(remote="prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(result["remote"], "prgs")
+
+    def test_mdcps_profile_default_is_not_rewritten_to_prgs(self):
+        """A dadeschools-hosted profile keeps the dadeschools remote."""
+        profile = _profile("author", allowed_repositories=[INSTALL_SLUG])
+        profile["context"] = "mdcps"
+        profile["base_url"] = "https://gitea.dadeschools.net"
+        self._write_config({"prgs-author": profile})
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("prgs-author"), clear=False), self._live():
+            result = srv.gitea_get_runtime_context()
+        self.assertEqual(result["remote"], "dadeschools")
+
+
+# ===========================================================================
+# B. Remote/repository guard (intentional behaviour — regression fence)
+# ===========================================================================
+class TestCanonicalRootGuardBinding(_ServerHarness):
+    def setUp(self):
+        super().setUp()
+        self.target_root = _init_repo(Path(self.tmp) / "mcp-control-plane", TARGET_URL)
+        self.install_root = _init_repo(Path(self.tmp) / "install", INSTALL_URL)
+
+    def test_canonical_target_root_resolves_to_target_slug(self):
+        got = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
+            configured_value=self.target_root,
+            source="profile.canonical_repository_root",
+            expected_slug=None,
+            process_project_root=self.install_root,
+            remote="prgs",
+            require_binding=True,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(got.get("block"), got.get("reasons"))
+        self.assertEqual(got["resolved_slug"], TARGET_SLUG)
+
+    def test_install_root_identity_remains_gitea_tools(self):
+        got = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
+            configured_value=None,
+            source=None,
+            expected_slug=None,
+            process_project_root=self.install_root,
+            remote="prgs",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            os.path.realpath(got["canonical_repo_root"]), self.install_root
+        )
+
+    def test_guards_validate_against_canonical_target_root(self):
+        ctx = nwb.resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
+            role_kind="author",
+            worktree_path=None,
+            process_project_root=self.install_root,
+            configured_canonical_root=self.target_root,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            os.path.realpath(ctx["canonical_repo_root"]), self.target_root
+        )
+
+    def test_explicit_coordinates_cannot_override_canonical_binding(self):
+        """Explicit org/repo may confirm, never authorize, a binding."""
+        confirm = session_ctx.assess_repository_override(
+            requested_org=TARGET_ORG,
+            requested_repo=TARGET_REPO,
+            bound_org=TARGET_ORG,
+            bound_repo=TARGET_REPO,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(confirm.get("block"))
+        override = session_ctx.assess_repository_override(
+            requested_org=TARGET_ORG,
+            requested_repo=TARGET_REPO,
+            bound_org=INSTALL_ORG,
+            bound_repo=INSTALL_REPO,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(override.get("block"))
+
+    def test_gitea_tools_rooted_namespace_cannot_reach_target_repository(self):
+        """No canonical root configured → session stays pinned to Gitea-Tools."""
+        profile = _profile("author", allowed_repositories=[INSTALL_SLUG])
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=False):
+            os.environ.pop(crr.CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV, None)
+            resolved = srv._trusted_session_repository(
+                profile, "prgs", for_mutation=True
+            )
+        self.assertEqual(resolved["repository"], INSTALL_REPO)
+        self.assertNotEqual(resolved["repository"], TARGET_REPO)
+
+    def test_target_rooted_namespace_binds_target_repository(self):
+        profile = _profile(
+            "author",
+            canonical_root=self.target_root,
+            allowed_repositories=[TARGET_SLUG],
+        )
+        resolved = srv._trusted_session_repository(profile, "prgs", for_mutation=True)
+        self.assertEqual(resolved["org"], TARGET_ORG)
+        self.assertEqual(resolved["repository"], TARGET_REPO)
+
+
+# ===========================================================================
+# C. Reconciler branch deletion
+# ===========================================================================
+class TestDeleteBranchRepositoryBinding(_ServerHarness):
+    """The binding guard must consult the canonical root, not PROJECT_ROOT.
+
+    No branch is ever deleted here: only the pre-deletion binding guard is
+    exercised.
+    """
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        super().setUp()
+        self.target_root = _init_repo(Path(self.tmp) / "mcp-control-plane", TARGET_URL)
+        self._write_config(
+            {
+                "prgs-reconciler": _profile(
+                    "reconciler",
+                    canonical_root=self.target_root,
+                    allowed_repositories=[TARGET_SLUG],
+                ),
+                "gt-reconciler": _profile(
+                    "reconciler", allowed_repositories=[INSTALL_SLUG]
+                ),
+            }
+        )
+
+    def test_target_rooted_reconciler_validates_target_deletion(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("prgs-reconciler"), clear=False):
+            block = srv._delete_branch_repository_binding_block(
+                "prgs", org=TARGET_ORG, repo=TARGET_REPO
+            )
+        self.assertIsNone(block, block)
+
+    def test_target_rooted_reconciler_fails_closed_for_install_repository(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("prgs-reconciler"), clear=False):
+            block = srv._delete_branch_repository_binding_block(
+                "prgs", org=INSTALL_ORG, repo=INSTALL_REPO
+            )
+        self.assertIsNotNone(block)
+        self.assertEqual(block["blocker_kind"], "repository_binding")
+        self.assertFalse(block["performed"])
+
+    def test_install_rooted_reconciler_fails_closed_for_target_repository(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("gt-reconciler"), clear=False):
+            os.environ.pop(crr.CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV, None)
+            block = srv._delete_branch_repository_binding_block(
+                "prgs", org=TARGET_ORG, repo=TARGET_REPO
+            )
+        self.assertIsNotNone(block)
+        self.assertEqual(block["blocker_kind"], "repository_binding")
+
+    def test_env_configured_canonical_root_is_honoured(self):
+        env = self._env("gt-reconciler")
+        env[crr.CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV] = self.target_root
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
+            allowed = srv._delete_branch_repository_binding_block(
+                "prgs", org=TARGET_ORG, repo=TARGET_REPO
+            )
+            blocked = srv._delete_branch_repository_binding_block(
+                "prgs", org=INSTALL_ORG, repo=INSTALL_REPO
+            )
+        self.assertIsNone(allowed, allowed)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+
+    def test_unresolvable_canonical_root_fails_closed(self):
+        env = self._env("gt-reconciler")
+        env[crr.CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV] = os.path.join(self.tmp, "does-not-exist")
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
+            block = srv._delete_branch_repository_binding_block(
+                "prgs", org=TARGET_ORG, repo=TARGET_REPO
+            )
+        self.assertIsNotNone(block)
+        self.assertEqual(block["blocker_kind"], "repository_binding")
+
+    def test_no_request_parameter_can_override_canonical_identity(self):
+        """Every explicit coordinate that is not the canonical target is
+        refused; none of them can *establish* the binding."""
+        # Both repositories share an org, so a wrong *org* case must name a
+        # genuinely different owner to be meaningful.
+        cases = [
+            (INSTALL_ORG, INSTALL_REPO),
+            (TARGET_ORG, INSTALL_REPO),
+            (TARGET_ORG, "some-other-repo"),
+            ("someone-else", TARGET_REPO),
+        ]
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("prgs-reconciler"), clear=False):
+            for org, repo in cases:
+                with self.subTest(org=org, repo=repo):
+                    block = srv._delete_branch_repository_binding_block(
+                        "prgs", org=org, repo=repo
+                    )
+                    self.assertIsNotNone(block, f"{org}/{repo} must fail closed")
+
+
+# ===========================================================================
+# D. Parity semantics
+# ===========================================================================
+class TestTargetRepositoryParityAssessment(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Server-implementation parity is preserved; target parity is additive."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.tmp = self._dir.name
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._dir.cleanup()
+
+    def _target(self) -> str:
+        return _init_repo(Path(self.tmp) / "mcp-control-plane", TARGET_URL)
+
+    def test_unconfigured_target_is_reported_not_stale(self):
+        got = master_parity_gate.assess_target_repository_parity(
+            canonical_root=None, source=None
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(got["configured"])
+        self.assertFalse(got["stale"])
+        self.assertIsNone(got["canonical_repository_root"])
+
+    def test_configured_target_reports_checkout_head_and_slug(self):
+        root = self._target()
+        head = _git(root, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
+        got = master_parity_gate.assess_target_repository_parity(
+            canonical_root=root, source="profile.canonical_repository_root"
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(got["configured"])
+        self.assertEqual(got["canonical_repository_root"], root)
+        self.assertEqual(got["checkout_head"], head)
+        self.assertEqual(got["repository_slug"], TARGET_SLUG)
+
+    def test_target_stale_when_remote_tracking_ref_is_ahead(self):
+        root = self._target()
+        head = _git(root, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
+        # Simulate a fetched remote-tracking ref that has advanced.
+        _git(root, "checkout", "-q", "-b", "advanced")
+        (Path(root) / "next.md").write_text("next\n")
+        _git(root, "add", "next.md")
+        _git(root, "commit", "-q", "-m", "advance")
+        advanced = _git(root, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
+        _git(root, "update-ref", "refs/remotes/origin/master", advanced)
+        _git(root, "checkout", "-q", "--detach", head)
+        got = master_parity_gate.assess_target_repository_parity(
+            canonical_root=root, source="profile.canonical_repository_root"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(got["checkout_head"], head)
+        self.assertEqual(got["remote_tracking_head"], advanced)
+        self.assertTrue(got["stale"])
+
+    def test_missing_root_is_not_determinable_and_fails_closed(self):
+        got = master_parity_gate.assess_target_repository_parity(
+            canonical_root=os.path.join(self.tmp, "absent"),
+            source="profile.canonical_repository_root",
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(got["configured"])
+        self.assertFalse(got["determinable"])
+        self.assertTrue(got["reasons"])
+
+
+class TestParityToolEvidenceDimensions(_ServerHarness):
+    def setUp(self):
+        super().setUp()
+        self.target_root = _init_repo(Path(self.tmp) / "mcp-control-plane", TARGET_URL)
+        self._write_config(
+            {
+                "prgs-author": _profile(
+                    "author",
+                    canonical_root=self.target_root,
+                    allowed_repositories=[TARGET_SLUG],
+                )
+            }
+        )
+
+    def test_existing_server_parity_semantics_are_unchanged(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("prgs-author"), clear=False):
+            result = srv.gitea_assess_master_parity(remote="prgs")
+        # startup_head/current_head keep their Gitea-Tools implementation
+        # meaning and must not be redefined to the target repository.
+        self.assertEqual(result["process_root"], srv.PROJECT_ROOT)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["startup_head"], srv._STARTUP_PARITY.get("startup_head")
+        )
+        self.assertIn("in_parity", result)
+
+    def test_evidence_distinguishes_server_and_target_dimensions(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("prgs-author"), clear=False):
+            result = srv.gitea_assess_master_parity(remote="prgs")
+        server = result["server_implementation"]
+        self.assertEqual(server["installation_root"], srv.PROJECT_ROOT)
+        self.assertEqual(server["current_head"], result["current_head"])
+        self.assertIn("stale", server)
+
+        target = result["target_repository"]
+        self.assertTrue(target["configured"])
+        self.assertEqual(target["canonical_repository_root"], self.target_root)
+        self.assertEqual(target["repository_slug"], TARGET_SLUG)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            target["checkout_head"], _git(self.target_root, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
+        )
+        self.assertIn("stale", target)
+
+    def test_unconfigured_namespace_reports_target_as_unconfigured(self):
+        self._write_config(
+            {"prgs-author": _profile("author", allowed_repositories=[INSTALL_SLUG])}
+        )
+        env = self._env("prgs-author")
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
+            os.environ.pop(crr.CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV, None)
+            result = srv.gitea_assess_master_parity(remote="prgs")
+        self.assertFalse(result["target_repository"]["configured"])
+
+
+# ===========================================================================
+# E. Startup / configuration validation for a candidate namespace set
+# ===========================================================================
+class TestCandidateNamespaceConfiguration(_ServerHarness):
+    """Four repository-specific profiles for the target repository."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        super().setUp()
+        self.target_root = _init_repo(Path(self.tmp) / "mcp-control-plane", TARGET_URL)
+        self.profiles = {
+            f"mcpcp-{role}": _profile(
+                role,
+                canonical_root=self.target_root,
+                allowed_repositories=[TARGET_SLUG],
+            )
+            for role in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler")
+        }
+        self._write_config(self.profiles)
+
+    def test_configuration_audit_succeeds(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("mcpcp-author"), clear=False):
+            audit = srv.gitea_audit_config()
+        self.assertTrue(audit.get("configured"))
+        names = {row["name"] for row in audit["profiles"]}
+        self.assertEqual(names, set(self.profiles))
+
+    def test_no_inline_credentials_are_present(self):
+        raw = json.loads(Path(self.config_path).read_text())
+        for name, profile in raw["profiles"].items():
+            with self.subTest(profile=name):
+                self.assertNotIn("token", profile)
+                self.assertNotIn("password", profile)
+                self.assertNotIn("secret", profile)
+                self.assertIn(profile["auth"]["type"], ("env", "keychain"))
+
+    def test_bind_time_validation_succeeds_for_target_repository(self):
+        for name, profile in self.profiles.items():
+            with self.subTest(profile=name):
+                resolved = srv._trusted_session_repository(
+                    profile, "prgs", for_mutation=True
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(resolved["reasons"], [])
+                self.assertEqual(resolved["org"], TARGET_ORG)
+                self.assertEqual(resolved["repository"], TARGET_REPO)
+
+    def test_wrong_repository_root_fails_closed(self):
+        wrong_root = _init_repo(Path(self.tmp) / "wrong", INSTALL_URL)
+        profile = _profile(
+            "author", canonical_root=wrong_root, allowed_repositories=[TARGET_SLUG]
+        )
+        resolved = srv._trusted_session_repository(profile, "prgs", for_mutation=True)
+        self.assertIsNone(resolved["repository"])
+        self.assertTrue(resolved["reasons"])
+
+    def test_existing_install_profiles_are_unchanged_in_behaviour(self):
+        profile = _profile("author", allowed_repositories=[INSTALL_SLUG])
+        resolved = srv._trusted_session_repository(profile, "prgs", for_mutation=True)
+        self.assertEqual(resolved["org"], INSTALL_ORG)
+        self.assertEqual(resolved["repository"], INSTALL_REPO)
+
+    def _denied(self, profile: dict, operation: str) -> bool:
+        ok, _ = gitea_config.check_operation(
+            operation,
+            profile["allowed_operations"],
+            profile["forbidden_operations"],
+        )
+        return not ok
+
+    def test_role_separation_is_enforced(self):
+        expectations = {
+            "author": [
+                "gitea.pr.approve",
+                "gitea.pr.merge",
+                "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+            ],
+            "reviewer": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push", "gitea.pr.merge"],
+            "merger": [
+                "gitea.pr.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+                "gitea.pr.approve",
+                "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+            ],
+            "reconciler": [
+                "gitea.pr.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+                "gitea.pr.approve",
+                "gitea.pr.merge",
+                "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+            ],
+        }
+        for role, denied_ops in expectations.items():
+            profile = self.profiles[f"mcpcp-{role}"]
+            for op in denied_ops:
+                with self.subTest(role=role, operation=op):
+                    self.assertTrue(
+                        self._denied(profile, op),
+                        f"{role} must not be permitted {op}",
+                    )
+
+    def test_each_role_retains_its_own_capability(self):
+        permitted = {
+            "author": "gitea.pr.create",
+            "reviewer": "gitea.pr.approve",
+            "merger": "gitea.pr.merge",
+            "reconciler": "gitea.branch.delete",
+        }
+        for role, op in permitted.items():
+            with self.subTest(role=role, operation=op):
+                self.assertFalse(self._denied(self.profiles[f"mcpcp-{role}"], op))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_delete_branch_capability.py

@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@
-"""Tests for gitea_delete_branch capability gate (Issue #408).
+"""Tests for gitea_delete_branch capability + role gate (Issue #408, #729).
 
 ``gitea_delete_branch`` requires the exact ``gitea.branch.delete`` operation:
 without it the delete fails closed (no preflight, no auth lookup, no API call,
-structured permission report). With it, deletion proceeds through existing
-preflight and audit unchanged.
+structured permission report).
+
+#729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned. ``gitea.branch.delete`` is granted only
+to the reconciler profile, so the resolver classifies delete_branch as a
+reconciler task. Raw ``gitea_delete_branch`` still redirects the reconciler to
+the guarded ``gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch`` path (#514/#687); author,
+reviewer, and merger remain denied by the permission gate and/or the required
+role gate.
 """
 import json
 import os
@@ -16,6 +22,8 @@ sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.par
 
 import mcp_server
 from mcp_server import gitea_delete_branch
+import task_capability_map
+import role_session_router
 
 FAKE_AUTH = "token fake"
 
@@ -38,6 +46,22 @@ AUTHOR_WITH_DELETE = {
     "audit_label": "prgs-author-deleter",
 }
 
+# #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned. The reconciler holds
+# gitea.branch.delete but raw gitea_delete_branch redirects it to the guarded
+# gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path (#514/#687).
+RECONCILER_WITH_DELETE = {
+    "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
+    "role": "reconciler",
+    "allowed_operations": [
+        "gitea.read", "gitea.issue.comment", "gitea.pr.comment",
+        "gitea.branch.delete",
+    ],
+    "forbidden_operations": [
+        "gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.pr.create",
+    ],
+    "audit_label": "prgs-reconciler",
+}
+
 CONFIG = {
     "version": 2,
     "contexts": {
@@ -81,6 +105,20 @@ CONFIG = {
             ],
             "execution_profile": "reviewer-profile",
         },
+        # #729: reconciler is the only delete-capable role.
+        "reconciler-profile": {
+            "enabled": True,
+            "context": "ctx",
+            "role": "reconciler",
+            "username": "reconciler-user",
+            "auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_RECONCILER"},
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read", "gitea.issue.comment", "gitea.pr.comment",
+                "gitea.branch.delete",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.pr.merge"],
+            "execution_profile": "reconciler-profile",
+        },
     },
     "rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},
 }
@@ -121,6 +159,9 @@ class TestDeleteBranchToolGate(unittest.TestCase):
     def _set_profile(self, profile):
         patch("mcp_server.get_profile", return_value=profile).start()
 
+    def _delete_calls(self):
+        return [c for c in self.mock_api.call_args_list if c.args[0] == "DELETE"]
+
     def test_blocked_without_delete_capability(self):
         self._set_profile(AUTHOR_NO_DELETE)
         res = gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/branch", remote="prgs")
@@ -135,33 +176,53 @@ class TestDeleteBranchToolGate(unittest.TestCase):
         self.mock_api.assert_not_called()
         self.mock_auth.assert_not_called()
 
-    def test_allowed_delete_proceeds(self):
+    def test_author_with_delete_perm_denied_by_role_gate(self):
+        """#729: even an author holding gitea.branch.delete is denied — the
+        required role is now reconciler. Fail closed, no API DELETE."""
         self._set_profile(AUTHOR_WITH_DELETE)
         mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
         mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="author")
         res = gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/branch", remote="prgs")
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
+        self.assertEqual(res["active_role_kind"], "author")
+        self.assertTrue(res["reasons"])
+        self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
+
+    def test_reviewer_with_delete_perm_denied_by_role_gate(self):
+        """A reviewer that somehow holds the permission is still denied."""
+        reviewer_with_delete = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
+            "role": "reviewer",
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read", "gitea.pr.review", "gitea.branch.delete",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [],
+            "audit_label": "prgs-reviewer",
+        }
+        self._set_profile(reviewer_with_delete)
+        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
+        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="reviewer")
+        res = gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/branch", remote="prgs")
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
+        self.assertEqual(res["active_role_kind"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
+
+    def test_reconciler_performs_raw_delete(self):
+        """#729: the reconciler is the delete-capable role and performs the raw
+        deletion (no audit phase active here); the API DELETE is issued."""
+        self._set_profile(RECONCILER_WITH_DELETE)
+        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
+        mcp_server.record_preflight_check(
+            "capability", resolved_role="reconciler")
+        self.mock_api.return_value = {}
+        res = gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/branch", remote="prgs")
         self.assertTrue(res["success"])
         self.assertIn("deleted", res["message"])
-        delete_calls = [
-            c for c in self.mock_api.call_args_list if c.args[0] == "DELETE"
-        ]
-        self.assertTrue(delete_calls)
-
-    def test_allowed_delete_audited_with_capability_proof(self):
-        self._set_profile(AUTHOR_WITH_DELETE)
-        patch("gitea_audit.audit_enabled", return_value=True).start()
-        mock_write = patch("gitea_audit.write_event").start()
-        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
-        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="author")
-        self.mock_api.return_value = {}
-        gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/branch", remote="prgs")
-        mock_write.assert_called()
-        event = mock_write.call_args[0][0]
-        self.assertEqual(event["action"], "delete_branch")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            event["request_metadata"]["required_permission"],
-            "gitea.branch.delete",
-        )
+        self.assertTrue(self._delete_calls())
 
 
 class TestDeleteBranchResolverParity(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -194,24 +255,89 @@ class TestDeleteBranchResolverParity(unittest.TestCase):
             "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile,
             "GITEA_TOKEN_AUTHOR": "author-pass",
             "GITEA_TOKEN_REVIEWER": "reviewer-pass",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_RECONCILER": "reconciler-pass",
         }
 
+    def _delete_calls(self):
+        return [c for c in self.mock_api.call_args_list if c.args[0] == "DELETE"]
+
+    def test_reconciler_resolver_allows_delete_branch(self):
+        """#729: resolve(delete_branch) on the reconciler profile is allowed and
+        classified as a reconciler task."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("reconciler-profile"), clear=True):
+            resolve = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                task="delete_branch", remote="prgs")
+        # Deterministic role-map outcomes (avoid runtime-staleness-dependent
+        # allowed_in_current_session, which folds in reconnect state).
+        self.assertEqual(resolve["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            resolve["required_operation_permission"], "gitea.branch.delete")
+        self.assertTrue(resolve["active_profile_permission_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(resolve["configured"])
+        self.assertIn("reconciler-profile", resolve["matching_configured_profile"])
+        self.assertEqual(resolve["active_role_kind"], "reconciler")
+
+    def test_author_resolver_denies_delete_branch(self):
+        """#729: an author session cannot resolve delete_branch — required role
+        is reconciler and the author lacks the permission."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("author-no-delete"), clear=True):
+            resolve = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                task="delete_branch", remote="prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(resolve["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
+        self.assertFalse(resolve["allowed_in_current_session"])
+
     def test_reviewer_resolver_denial_blocks_raw_tool(self):
         with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("reviewer-profile"), clear=True):
             resolve = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
                 task="delete_branch", remote="prgs")
             self.assertFalse(resolve["allowed_in_current_session"])
+            patch("mcp_server.get_profile", return_value={
+                "profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
+                "role": "reviewer",
+                "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.review"],
+                "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.branch.delete"],
+            }).start()
             res = gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/branch", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(res["success"])
         self.assertEqual(
             res["permission_report"]["missing_permission"],
             resolve["required_operation_permission"],
         )
-        delete_calls = [
-            c for c in self.mock_api.call_args_list if c.args[0] == "DELETE"
-        ]
-        self.assertFalse(delete_calls)
+        self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
+
+
+class TestDeleteBranchRoleMapParity(unittest.TestCase):
+    """#729: both single-source-of-truth maps must classify delete_branch as
+    reconciler and stay in agreement."""
+
+    def test_task_capability_map_role_reconciler(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            task_capability_map.required_role("delete_branch"), "reconciler")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            task_capability_map.required_permission("delete_branch"),
+            "gitea.branch.delete",
+        )
+
+    def test_router_required_role_reconciler(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            role_session_router.TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE["delete_branch"],
+            "reconciler",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            role_session_router.required_role_for_task("delete_branch"),
+            "reconciler",
+        )
+
+    def test_router_set_membership_moved(self):
+        self.assertIn("delete_branch", role_session_router.RECONCILER_TASKS)
+        self.assertNotIn("delete_branch", role_session_router.AUTHOR_TASKS)
+
+    def test_maps_agree(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            task_capability_map.required_role("delete_branch"),
+            role_session_router.TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE["delete_branch"],
+        )
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_head_scoped_review_decision_lock.py

@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ HEAD_C = "c" * 40
 
 
 def _lock(mutations=None, correction=False, ready_pr=None, ready_head=None, ready_action=None):
+    mutations = list(mutations or [])
+    corr_pr = None
+    if correction and mutations:
+        corr_pr = mutations[-1].get("pr_number")
     return {
         "task": "review_pr",
         "remote": "prgs",
@@ -40,9 +44,11 @@ def _lock(mutations=None, correction=False, ready_pr=None, ready_head=None, read
         "ready_remote": "prgs" if ready_pr else None,
         "ready_org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting" if ready_pr else None,
         "ready_repo": "Gitea-Tools" if ready_pr else None,
-        "live_mutations": list(mutations or []),
+        "live_mutations": mutations,
         "correction_authorized": correction,
-        "correction_reason": None,
+        "correction_reason": "test" if correction else None,
+        "correction_pr_number": corr_pr,
+        "correction_head_sha": None,
     }
 
 
@@ -174,12 +180,13 @@ class TestHardStopHeadScope(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertTrue(reasons)
         self.assertIn("#332", reasons[0])
 
-    def test_rc_head_a_blocks_other_pr(self):
+    def test_rc_head_a_allows_other_pr_via_cross_pr_isolation(self):
+        """#693: foreign-PR terminal must not hard-stop mark_ready on another PR."""
         _seed([RC_619_HEAD_A], ready_pr=619, ready_head=HEAD_A)
         reasons = mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
             700, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=HEAD_B
         )
-        self.assertTrue(reasons)
+        self.assertEqual(reasons, [])
 
     def test_legacy_619_ledger_allows_new_head(self):
         """PR #619-style durable lock without mutation head_sha."""

tests/test_issue_685_side_effect_free_resolver.py

@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
+"""#685: gitea_resolve_task_capability must be side-effect free.
+
+Stale-runtime detection remains fail-closed, but the resolver must never:
+  * touch mcp_config.json (or any MCP client config)
+  * spawn recovery threads
+  * call os._exit / terminate the serving process
+  * claim that an auto-restart was triggered
+
+Recovery is owned by the IDE/client reconnect path only.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import sys
+
+ROOT = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)
+if ROOT not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, ROOT)
+
+import gitea_mcp_server as mcp_server
+
+
+ROLE_PROFILES = (
+    ("create_issue", "prgs-author", "author"),
+    ("review_pr", "prgs-reviewer", "reviewer"),
+    ("merge_pr", "prgs-merger", "merger"),
+    ("reconciliation_cleanup", "prgs-reconciler", "reconciler"),
+)
+
+
+def _stale_self_ps_mocks(profile: str = "prgs-author"):
+    """Build subprocess mocks: self PID is stale vs code mtime."""
+    mock_getpid = MagicMock(return_value=12345)
+    mock_exists = MagicMock(return_value=True)
+    code_time = datetime(2026, 7, 8, 14, 0, 0)
+    mock_getmtime = MagicMock(return_value=code_time.timestamp())
+
+    ps_output = (
+        "  PID LSTART COMMAND\n"
+        "12345 Wed Jul  8 13:00:00 2026 /path/to/python mcp_server.py\n"
+    )
+    mock_run_ps = MagicMock()
+    mock_run_ps.stdout = ps_output
+
+    mock_run_env = MagicMock()
+    mock_run_env.stdout = f"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE={profile}"
+
+    mock_run_git = MagicMock()
+    mock_run_git.stdout = "SAME"
+
+    def side_effect(args, **kwargs):
+        if args[0] == "ps" and "eww" in args:
+            return mock_run_env
+        if args[0] == "ps":
+            return mock_run_ps
+        if args[0] == "git":
+            return mock_run_git
+        raise ValueError(f"Unexpected subprocess args: {args}")
+
+    mock_run = MagicMock(side_effect=side_effect)
+    return mock_getpid, mock_exists, mock_getmtime, mock_run
+
+
+class TestIssue685DiagnosticsNoSideEffects(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        mcp_server._process_boot_head_sha = None
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        mcp_server._process_boot_head_sha = None
+
+    @patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_FORCE_MCP_RUNTIME_CHECK": "1"}, clear=False)
+    @patch("subprocess.run")
+    @patch("os.path.getmtime")
+    @patch("os.path.exists")
+    @patch("os.getpid")
+    @patch("os.utime")
+    @patch("threading.Thread")
+    @patch("os._exit")
+    def test_stale_self_does_not_touch_config_or_exit(
+        self,
+        mock_exit,
+        mock_thread,
+        mock_utime,
+        mock_getpid,
+        mock_exists,
+        mock_getmtime,
+        mock_run,
+    ):
+        mock_getpid.return_value = 12345
+        mock_exists.return_value = True
+        mock_getmtime.return_value = datetime(2026, 7, 8, 14, 0, 0).timestamp()
+        mock_run.side_effect = _stale_self_ps_mocks("prgs-author")[3].side_effect
+
+        before_threads = threading.active_count()
+        reasons = mcp_server._check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics(
+            "create_issue", ["prgs-author"]
+        )
+        after_threads = threading.active_count()
+
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("stale-runtime" in r and "active Gitea MCP server process is stale" in r
+                for r in reasons),
+            reasons,
+        )
+        # Must not claim auto-restart / config touch
+        blob = " ".join(reasons)
+        self.assertNotIn("Auto-restart has been triggered", blob)
+        self.assertNotIn("touched mcp_config", blob)
+        self.assertNotIn("will cleanly exit", blob)
+
+        mock_utime.assert_not_called()
+        mock_thread.assert_not_called()
+        mock_exit.assert_not_called()
+        self.assertEqual(before_threads, after_threads)
+
+    @patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_FORCE_MCP_RUNTIME_CHECK": "1"}, clear=False)
+    @patch("subprocess.run")
+    @patch("os.path.getmtime")
+    @patch("os.path.exists")
+    @patch("os.getpid")
+    @patch("os.utime")
+    def test_repeated_stale_calls_do_not_trigger_restart_loop(
+        self, mock_utime, mock_getpid, mock_exists, mock_getmtime, mock_run
+    ):
+        mock_getpid.return_value = 12345
+        mock_exists.return_value = True
+        mock_getmtime.return_value = datetime(2026, 7, 8, 14, 0, 0).timestamp()
+        mock_run.side_effect = _stale_self_ps_mocks("prgs-author")[3].side_effect
+
+        for _ in range(5):
+            reasons = mcp_server._check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics(
+                "create_issue", ["prgs-author"]
+            )
+            self.assertTrue(any("stale-runtime" in r for r in reasons))
+
+        mock_utime.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_trigger_mcp_auto_restart_removed(self):
+        """#685 AC: auto-restart helper is removed (unreachable from read-only)."""
+        self.assertFalse(hasattr(mcp_server, "_trigger_mcp_auto_restart"))
+        self.assertFalse(hasattr(mcp_server, "_restart_triggered"))
+
+
+class TestIssue685ResolverTypedBlocker(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        mcp_server._process_boot_head_sha = None
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        mcp_server._process_boot_head_sha = None
+        if hasattr(mcp_server, "capability_stop_terminal"):
+            mcp_server.capability_stop_terminal.clear()
+
+    def _resolve_with_stale_runtime(self, task: str, profile_name: str, role: str):
+        allowed = [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.issue.create",
+            "gitea.issue.comment",
+            "gitea.issue.close",
+            "gitea.branch.create",
+            "gitea.branch.push",
+            "gitea.branch.delete",
+            "gitea.pr.create",
+            "gitea.pr.comment",
+            "gitea.pr.review",
+            "gitea.pr.approve",
+            "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+            "gitea.pr.merge",
+            "gitea.pr.close",
+            "gitea.repo.commit",
+        ]
+        profile = {
+            "profile_name": profile_name,
+            "role": role,
+            "allowed_operations": allowed,
+            "forbidden_operations": [],
+        }
+        config = {
+            "profiles": {
+                profile_name: {
+                    "role": role,
+                    "allowed_operations": allowed,
+                    "forbidden_operations": [],
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        mock_getpid, mock_exists, mock_getmtime, mock_run = _stale_self_ps_mocks(
+            profile_name
+        )
+
+        with patch.dict(
+            os.environ,
+            {
+                "GITEA_FORCE_MCP_RUNTIME_CHECK": "1",
+                "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile_name,
+            },
+            clear=False,
+        ), patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile), patch.object(
+            mcp_server.gitea_config, "load_config", return_value=config
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="test-user"
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "_ensure_matching_profile", return_value=None
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "record_preflight_check", return_value=None
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "record_mutation_authority", return_value=None
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "init_review_decision_lock", return_value=None
+        ), patch(
+            "subprocess.run", mock_run
+        ), patch(
+            "os.path.getmtime", mock_getmtime
+        ), patch(
+            "os.path.exists", mock_exists
+        ), patch(
+            "os.getpid", mock_getpid
+        ), patch(
+            "os.utime"
+        ) as mock_utime, patch(
+            "threading.Thread"
+        ) as mock_thread, patch(
+            "os._exit"
+        ) as mock_exit:
+            result = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task=task, remote="prgs")
+            return result, mock_utime, mock_thread, mock_exit
+
+    def test_stale_returns_typed_blocker_fields(self):
+        result, mock_utime, mock_thread, mock_exit = self._resolve_with_stale_runtime(
+            "create_issue", "prgs-author", "author"
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result.get("restart_required"), result)
+        self.assertTrue(result.get("stop_required"), result)
+        self.assertEqual(result.get("blocker_kind"), "runtime_reconnect_required")
+        self.assertIs(result.get("mutation_performed"), False)
+        action = result.get("exact_safe_next_action") or ""
+        self.assertIn("reconnect", action.lower())
+        self.assertNotIn("None; ready for operations", action)
+        reason = result.get("reason") or ""
+        self.assertIn("stale-runtime", reason)
+        self.assertNotIn("Auto-restart has been triggered", reason)
+        mock_utime.assert_not_called()
+        mock_thread.assert_not_called()
+        mock_exit.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_all_four_role_profiles_get_same_side_effect_free_contract(self):
+        for task, profile, role in ROLE_PROFILES:
+            with self.subTest(task=task, profile=profile):
+                # Skip tasks that may be unknown on this branch
+                try:
+                    import task_capability_map as tcm
+
+                    tcm.required_permission(task)
+                except Exception:
+                    self.skipTest(f"task {task} not in capability map")
+
+                result, mock_utime, mock_thread, mock_exit = (
+                    self._resolve_with_stale_runtime(task, profile, role)
+                )
+                self.assertTrue(
+                    result.get("restart_required") or result.get("stop_required"),
+                    result,
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    result.get("blocker_kind"), "runtime_reconnect_required", result
+                )
+                self.assertIs(result.get("mutation_performed"), False, result)
+                mock_utime.assert_not_called()
+                mock_thread.assert_not_called()
+                mock_exit.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_config_mtime_and_contents_unchanged(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            cfg = os.path.join(tmp, "mcp_config.json")
+            original = '{"servers": {"gitea-author": {}}}'
+            with open(cfg, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+                fh.write(original)
+            mtime_before = os.path.getmtime(cfg)
+
+            result, mock_utime, mock_thread, mock_exit = self._resolve_with_stale_runtime(
+                "create_issue", "prgs-author", "author"
+            )
+            # Force-path also must not use real utime when diagnostics runs
+            with open(cfg, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+                after = fh.read()
+            self.assertEqual(after, original)
+            self.assertEqual(os.path.getmtime(cfg), mtime_before)
+            mock_utime.assert_not_called()
+            self.assertTrue(result.get("restart_required"), result)
+
+
+class TestIssue685MutationGatesStillFailClosed(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_parity_stale_still_reports_restart_required(self):
+        """Mutation-facing parity gate remains fail-closed when heads differ."""
+        import master_parity_gate as mpg
+
+        out = mpg.assess_master_parity(
+            {"startup_head": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"},
+            "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(out.get("in_parity"))
+        self.assertTrue(out.get("restart_required") or out.get("stale"))
+
+
+class TestIssue685DocstringReadOnlyContract(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_resolve_docstring_declares_side_effect_free(self):
+        doc = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability.__doc__ or ""
+        lower = doc.lower()
+        self.assertTrue(
+            "side-effect" in lower or "read-only" in lower or "does not mutate" in lower,
+            doc,
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn("auto-restart", lower)
+        self.assertNotIn("os._exit", lower)
+
+
+class TestIssue685MergeCoexistenceWithMasterAnnotations(unittest.TestCase):
+    """After merging master: #685 reconnect blocker + #702 report-only binding."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        mcp_server._process_boot_head_sha = None
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        mcp_server._process_boot_head_sha = None
+        if hasattr(mcp_server, "capability_stop_terminal"):
+            mcp_server.capability_stop_terminal.clear()
+
+    def test_resolve_uses_report_only_stale_binding_assessment(self):
+        """Capability resolve must call stale-binding assess with auto_recover=False."""
+        allowed = [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.issue.create",
+            "gitea.issue.comment",
+            "gitea.branch.push",
+            "gitea.pr.create",
+            "gitea.pr.comment",
+            "gitea.pr.review",
+            "gitea.pr.merge",
+            "gitea.repo.commit",
+        ]
+        profile = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+            "role": "author",
+            "allowed_operations": allowed,
+            "forbidden_operations": [],
+        }
+        config = {
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-author": {
+                    "role": "author",
+                    "allowed_operations": allowed,
+                    "forbidden_operations": [],
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        mock_getpid, mock_exists, mock_getmtime, mock_run = _stale_self_ps_mocks(
+            "prgs-author"
+        )
+        fake_binding = {
+            "classification": "missing_path",
+            "active_worktree": "/tmp/gone",
+            "reasons": ["path missing"],
+        }
+
+        with patch.dict(
+            os.environ,
+            {
+                "GITEA_FORCE_MCP_RUNTIME_CHECK": "1",
+                "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author",
+            },
+            clear=False,
+        ), patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile), patch.object(
+            mcp_server.gitea_config, "load_config", return_value=config
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="test-user"
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "_ensure_matching_profile", return_value=None
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "record_preflight_check", return_value=None
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "record_mutation_authority", return_value=None
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "init_review_decision_lock", return_value=None
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server,
+            "_assess_stale_active_binding",
+            return_value=fake_binding,
+        ) as mock_assess, patch(
+            "subprocess.run", mock_run
+        ), patch(
+            "os.path.getmtime", mock_getmtime
+        ), patch(
+            "os.path.exists", mock_exists
+        ), patch(
+            "os.getpid", mock_getpid
+        ), patch(
+            "os.utime"
+        ) as mock_utime, patch(
+            "threading.Thread"
+        ) as mock_thread, patch(
+            "os._exit"
+        ) as mock_exit:
+            result = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                task="create_issue", remote="prgs"
+            )
+
+        mock_assess.assert_called()
+        # Every call must be report-only (no env clear / session-state write).
+        for call in mock_assess.call_args_list:
+            self.assertFalse(call.kwargs.get("auto_recover", True))
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result.get("blocker_kind"), "runtime_reconnect_required", result
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result.get("stale_binding_recovery"), fake_binding, result)
+        self.assertIs(result.get("mutation_performed"), False, result)
+        mock_utime.assert_not_called()
+        mock_thread.assert_not_called()
+        mock_exit.assert_not_called()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_691_obsolete_reviewer_lease_cleanup.py

@@ -561,12 +561,29 @@ class TestIssue691SupersededHeadCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertTrue(any("owns the lease" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
 
     def test_superseded_without_terminal_review_denied(self):
+        # Pre-expiry the missing terminal review is ambiguous (fail closed);
+        # post-expiry with unknown owner evidence it is a crash-orphan (#702)
+        # that still fails closed until owner-process exit is proven.
         now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
         expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
         claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
-        result = _assess([claim], formal_reviews=[], now=now)
+        result = _assess(
+            [claim], formal_reviews=[], now=now, owner_process_alive=None
+        )
         self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["classification"], "orphaned_expired_superseded_head"
+        )
+
+        fresh_expires = now + timedelta(minutes=60)
+        fresh = _lease_comment(
+            expires_at=fresh_expires, last_activity=now - timedelta(minutes=5)
+        )
+        pre_expiry = _assess([fresh], formal_reviews=[], now=now)
+        self.assertFalse(pre_expiry["cleanup_allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            pre_expiry["classification"], "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence"
+        )
 
 
 class TestIssue691DiagnoseClassifications(unittest.TestCase):

tests/test_issue_693_review_decision_lock_recovery.py

@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
+"""Review-decision-lock recovery / cross-PR isolation (#693).
+
+Reproduces the PR #688 → PR #692 formal-review sequence:
+
+  * durable lock holds REQUEST_CHANGES on open PR #688 @ head A (review_id 425)
+  * reviewer leases PR #692 @ head B (6d86db…)
+  * mark_final for #692 must succeed without correction unlock
+  * cleanup of open #688 terminal remains forbidden (#594)
+  * authorize_review_correction for #688 cannot unlock #692
+  * eventual #692 APPROVE is unique and head-bound (review_id 426)
+  * mark_final is idempotent for same PR/action/head
+  * diagnosis returns one exact next_action + durable handoff payload
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import mcp_server
+import review_workflow_load
+import stale_review_decision_lock as srdl
+
+# PR #688 / #692 incident fixtures (sanitized reconstruction from issue #693)
+HEAD_688 = "c7a444eb4b41cf916fdbd20a4999ffd78af496d0"
+HEAD_692 = "6d86db793bbdfaed16bd54d93171f1dd66f234ca"
+PR_A = 688
+PR_B = 692
+REVIEW_ID_A = 425
+REVIEW_ID_B = 426
+
+RC_688 = {
+    "pr_number": PR_A,
+    "action": "request_changes",
+    "review_id": REVIEW_ID_A,
+    "review_state": "request_changes",
+    "head_sha": HEAD_688,
+}
+APPROVE_692 = {
+    "pr_number": PR_B,
+    "action": "approve",
+    "review_id": REVIEW_ID_B,
+    "review_state": "approve",
+    "head_sha": HEAD_692,
+}
+
+
+def _lock(mutations=None, **kwargs):
+    from datetime import datetime, timezone
+
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+    base = {
+        "task": "review_pr",
+        "remote": "prgs",
+        "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+        "repo": "Gitea-Tools",
+        "session_pid": os.getpid(),
+        "session_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
+        "session_profile_lock": "prgs-reviewer",
+        "profile_identity": "prgs-reviewer",
+        "final_review_decision_ready": False,
+        "ready_pr_number": None,
+        "ready_action": None,
+        "ready_expected_head_sha": None,
+        "ready_remote": None,
+        "ready_org": None,
+        "ready_repo": None,
+        "live_mutations": list(mutations or []),
+        "correction_authorized": False,
+        "correction_reason": None,
+        "correction_pr_number": None,
+        "correction_head_sha": None,
+        "updated_at": now,
+        "recorded_at": now,
+        "writer_pid": os.getpid(),
+    }
+    base.update(kwargs)
+    # Ensure TTL fields stay fresh unless the caller is testing expiry.
+    if "recorded_at" not in kwargs:
+        base["recorded_at"] = now
+    if "updated_at" not in kwargs:
+        base["updated_at"] = now
+    return base
+
+
+REVIEWER_ENV = {
+    "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "prgs-reviewer",
+    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": (
+        "gitea.read,gitea.pr.review,gitea.pr.approve,"
+        "gitea.pr.request_changes,gitea.pr.comment"
+    ),
+    "GITEA_SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK": "prgs-reviewer",
+}
+
+REVIEWER_PROFILE = {
+    "profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
+    "allowed_operations": [
+        "gitea.read",
+        "gitea.pr.review",
+        "gitea.pr.approve",
+        "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+        "gitea.pr.comment",
+    ],
+    "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.merge"],
+}
+
+
+def _seed(mutations=None, **kwargs):
+    review_workflow_load.record_review_workflow_load(mcp_server.PROJECT_ROOT)
+    mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(_lock(mutations, **kwargs))
+    mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
+
+
+def _no_lease():
+    return {"block": False, "reasons": [], "mutation_allowed": True}
+
+
+def _open_pr(number, head):
+    return {
+        "number": number,
+        "state": "open",
+        "merged": False,
+        "merged_at": None,
+        "head": {"sha": head},
+    }
+
+
+class TestCrossPrIsolationPure(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_foreign_terminal_does_not_block_mark_boundary(self):
+        lock = _lock([RC_688])
+        self.assertFalse(
+            srdl.prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
+                lock, pr_number=PR_B, expected_head_sha=HEAD_692
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(
+            srdl.prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
+                lock, pr_number=PR_A, expected_head_sha=HEAD_688
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_terminal_boundary_allows_fresh_decision_on_other_pr(self):
+        lock = _lock([RC_688])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            srdl.terminal_boundary_allows_fresh_decision(
+                lock,
+                pr_number=PR_B,
+                expected_head_sha=HEAD_692,
+                operation="mark_ready",
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(
+            srdl.terminal_boundary_allows_fresh_decision(
+                lock,
+                pr_number=PR_A,
+                expected_head_sha=HEAD_688,
+                operation="mark_ready",
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_unscoped_correction_does_not_apply(self):
+        lock = _lock([RC_688], correction_authorized=True, correction_reason="x")
+        # Missing correction_pr_number → fail closed (#693)
+        self.assertFalse(
+            srdl.correction_applies(lock, pr_number=PR_A, expected_head_sha=HEAD_688)
+        )
+
+    def test_scoped_correction_only_for_named_pr(self):
+        lock = _lock(
+            [RC_688],
+            correction_authorized=True,
+            correction_reason="mistake",
+            correction_pr_number=PR_A,
+            correction_head_sha=HEAD_688,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(
+            srdl.correction_applies(lock, pr_number=PR_A, expected_head_sha=HEAD_688)
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(
+            srdl.correction_applies(lock, pr_number=PR_B, expected_head_sha=HEAD_692)
+        )
+
+
+class TestClassification(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_foreign_pr_terminal_classification(self):
+        lock = _lock([RC_688])
+        c = srdl.classify_review_decision_lock(
+            lock,
+            target_pr_number=PR_B,
+            target_head_sha=HEAD_692,
+            pr_live=_open_pr(PR_A, HEAD_688),
+            active_profile_identity="prgs-reviewer",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(c["classification"], srdl.CLASS_FOREIGN_PR_TERMINAL)
+        self.assertTrue(c["mark_final_allowed"])
+        self.assertFalse(c["correction_eligible"])
+        self.assertIn("do not call gitea_authorize_review_correction", c["next_action"])
+
+    def test_same_head_terminal_classification(self):
+        lock = _lock([RC_688])
+        c = srdl.classify_review_decision_lock(
+            lock,
+            target_pr_number=PR_A,
+            target_head_sha=HEAD_688,
+            pr_live=_open_pr(PR_A, HEAD_688),
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(c["classification"], srdl.CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD)
+        self.assertFalse(c["mark_final_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(c["correction_eligible"])
+
+    def test_precise_failure_includes_durable_handoff(self):
+        lock = _lock([RC_688])
+        c = srdl.classify_review_decision_lock(
+            lock, target_pr_number=PR_A, target_head_sha=HEAD_688
+        )
+        fail = srdl.build_precise_mark_final_failure(c)
+        self.assertIn("exact_next_action", fail)
+        self.assertIn("durable_issue_handoff", fail)
+        self.assertTrue(fail["durable_issue_handoff"]["required"])
+
+
+class TestPr692Sequence(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._env = patch.dict(os.environ, REVIEWER_ENV, clear=False)
+        self._env.start()
+        self._prof = patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=REVIEWER_PROFILE
+        )
+        self._prof.start()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._prof.stop()
+        self._env.stop()
+        mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(None)
+        review_workflow_load.clear_review_workflow_load()
+
+    def test_mark_final_692_succeeds_with_open_688_terminal(self):
+        _seed([RC_688], writer_pid=25883, session_pid=60615)
+        with patch("mcp_server._list_pr_lease_comments", return_value=[]), patch(
+            "mcp_server._pr_work_lease_reviewer_block", return_value=_no_lease()
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server,
+            "gitea_check_pr_eligibility",
+            return_value={"head_sha": HEAD_692, "eligible": True},
+        ):
+            result = mcp_server.gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
+                pr_number=PR_B,
+                action="approve",
+                expected_head_sha=HEAD_692,
+                remote="prgs",
+                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(result["marked_ready"], result.get("reasons"))
+        lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
+        self.assertEqual(lock["ready_pr_number"], PR_B)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            srdl.normalize_head_sha(lock["ready_expected_head_sha"]), HEAD_692
+        )
+        # Foreign terminal history preserved (non-destructive isolation).
+        self.assertEqual(lock["live_mutations"][0]["pr_number"], PR_A)
+
+    def test_mark_final_idempotent_same_binding(self):
+        _seed(
+            [RC_688],
+            final_review_decision_ready=True,
+            ready_pr_number=PR_B,
+            ready_action="approve",
+            ready_expected_head_sha=HEAD_692,
+            ready_remote="prgs",
+            ready_org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            ready_repo="Gitea-Tools",
+        )
+        with patch("mcp_server._list_pr_lease_comments", return_value=[]), patch(
+            "mcp_server._pr_work_lease_reviewer_block", return_value=_no_lease()
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server,
+            "gitea_check_pr_eligibility",
+            return_value={"head_sha": HEAD_692, "eligible": True},
+        ):
+            result = mcp_server.gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
+                pr_number=PR_B,
+                action="approve",
+                expected_head_sha=HEAD_692,
+                remote="prgs",
+                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(result["marked_ready"])
+        self.assertTrue(result.get("idempotent"))
+
+    def test_cleanup_still_forbidden_while_688_open(self):
+        _seed([RC_688])
+        assessment = srdl.assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
+            mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock(),
+            pr_live=_open_pr(PR_A, HEAD_688),
+            active_profile_identity="prgs-reviewer",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["cleanup_allowed"])
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["is_moot"])
+
+    def test_correction_cannot_unlock_different_pr(self):
+        _seed([RC_688])
+        r = mcp_server.gitea_authorize_review_correction(
+            prior_review_id=REVIEW_ID_A,
+            prior_review_state="request_changes",
+            reason="try unlock 692",
+            operator_authorized=True,
+            target_pr_number=PR_B,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            post_audit_comment=False,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(r["authorized"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("different PR" in x for x in r["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_scoped_correction_for_same_pr_posts_audit(self):
+        _seed([RC_688])
+        with patch(
+            "mcp_server._authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server._auth", return_value="Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
+        ), patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"id": 99901}):
+            r = mcp_server.gitea_authorize_review_correction(
+                prior_review_id=REVIEW_ID_A,
+                prior_review_state="request_changes",
+                reason="mistaken RC wording",
+                operator_authorized=True,
+                target_pr_number=PR_A,
+                expected_head_sha=HEAD_688,
+                remote="prgs",
+                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                repo="Gitea-Tools",
+                post_audit_comment=True,
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(r["authorized"], r.get("reasons"))
+        self.assertEqual(r.get("correction_pr_number"), PR_A)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            r.get("audit_comment_id"),
+            99901,
+            r.get("audit_comment_skipped") or r.get("audit_comment_error") or r,
+        )
+
+    def test_diagnose_foreign_terminal_next_action(self):
+        _seed([RC_688])
+        with patch(
+            "mcp_server._authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server._auth", return_value="Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
+        ), patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value=_open_pr(PR_A, HEAD_688)):
+            d = mcp_server.gitea_diagnose_review_decision_lock(
+                target_pr_number=PR_B,
+                expected_head_sha=HEAD_692,
+                remote="prgs",
+                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(d["success"], d.get("reasons"))
+        self.assertEqual(d["classification"], srdl.CLASS_FOREIGN_PR_TERMINAL)
+        self.assertTrue(d["mark_final_allowed"])
+        self.assertIn("mark_final", d["exact_next_action"])
+        self.assertTrue(d["correction_as_generic_unlock_forbidden"])
+
+    def test_approval_ledger_unique_and_bound_after_sequence(self):
+        """After mark_final + record mutation, ledger binds unique approve to 692 head."""
+        _seed([RC_688])
+        with patch("mcp_server._list_pr_lease_comments", return_value=[]), patch(
+            "mcp_server._pr_work_lease_reviewer_block", return_value=_no_lease()
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server,
+            "gitea_check_pr_eligibility",
+            return_value={"head_sha": HEAD_692, "eligible": True},
+        ):
+            marked = mcp_server.gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
+                pr_number=PR_B,
+                action="approve",
+                expected_head_sha=HEAD_692,
+                remote="prgs",
+                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(marked["marked_ready"])
+        mcp_server.record_live_review_mutation(PR_B, "approve", REVIEW_ID_B)
+        lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
+        terminals = [
+            m
+            for m in lock["live_mutations"]
+            if m.get("action") in srdl.TERMINAL_REVIEW_ACTIONS
+            and m.get("pr_number") == PR_B
+        ]
+        self.assertEqual(len(terminals), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(terminals[0]["review_id"], REVIEW_ID_B)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            srdl.normalize_head_sha(terminals[0].get("head_sha")), HEAD_692
+        )
+        # Same-head duplicate still blocked.
+        self.assertTrue(
+            srdl.prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
+                lock, pr_number=PR_B, expected_head_sha=HEAD_692
+            )
+        )
+
+
+class TestSessionRestartWriterPid(unittest.TestCase):
+    def tearDown(self):
+        mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(None)
+        review_workflow_load.clear_review_workflow_load()
+
+    def test_writer_pid_change_does_not_inherit_foreign_block(self):
+        # session_pid 60615 origin, writer later 25883 — still foreign isolation.
+        _seed([RC_688], session_pid=60615, writer_pid=25883)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
+                PR_B, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=HEAD_692
+            ),
+            [],
+        )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_702_review_findings_f1_f6.py

@@ -0,0 +1,693 @@
+"""Regression tests for the PR #703 REQUEST_CHANGES findings F1–F6 (#702).
+
+Formal review at head 889931d independently reproduced six defects:
+
+F1 — stale-binding recovery ran only AFTER the terminal launcher probe in
+     ``gitea_resolve_task_capability``; a worktree removed mid-session wedged
+     every mutation-task resolution on 'missing cwd' before recovery.
+F2 — ``_resolve_preflight_workspace_path`` skipped the existence checks the
+     canonical mutation context applies; a dead binding could produce empty
+     porcelain and read as a clean workspace.
+F3 — ``orphaned_expired_superseded_head`` cleanup accepted unknown
+     ``worktree_exists``/``worktree_clean`` evidence.
+F4 — the 4-hour session-state TTL silently discarded recovery-critical
+     crash-orphan shadow evidence.
+F5 — the single same-profile shadow slot let concurrent sessions overwrite
+     each other's crash evidence.
+F6 — the environment was cleared BEFORE the audit record was persisted, and
+     audit-write failure was swallowed.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import shutil
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import mcp_session_state as mss  # noqa: E402
+import namespace_workspace_binding as nwb  # noqa: E402
+import reviewer_pr_lease as leases  # noqa: E402
+import stale_binding_recovery as sbr  # noqa: E402
+import mcp_server  # noqa: E402
+
+REPO = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
+OLD_HEAD = "b" * 40
+NEW_HEAD = "6" * 40
+
+CONFIG = {
+    "version": 2,
+    "contexts": {
+        "ctx": {
+            "enabled": True,
+            "gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.example.com"},
+        }
+    },
+    "profiles": {
+        "prgs-author": {
+            "enabled": True,
+            "context": "ctx",
+            "role": "author",
+            "username": "jcwalker3",
+            "auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_AUTHOR"},
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create", "gitea.issue.comment",
+                "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [
+                "gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.pr.review",
+            ],
+            "execution_profile": "prgs-author",
+        },
+    },
+    "rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},
+}
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+class _CapabilityHarness(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Shared config/env plumbing for resolve-capability integration tests."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._remotes = patch.dict(mcp_server.REMOTES, {
+            "prgs": {
+                "host": "gitea.example.com",
+                "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                "repo": "Gitea-Tools",
+            },
+        })
+        self._remotes.start()
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.config_path = os.path.join(self._dir.name, "profiles.json")
+        with open(self.config_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            fh.write(json.dumps(CONFIG))
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._remotes.stop()
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        self._dir.cleanup()
+
+    def _env(self, **extra):
+        env = {
+            "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
+            "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_AUTHOR": "author-pass",
+        }
+        env.update(extra)
+        return env
+
+    def _deleted_worktree(self) -> str:
+        path = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-removed-worktree-")
+        shutil.rmtree(path)
+        return path
+
+
+class TestF1RecoveryBeforeTerminalProbe(_CapabilityHarness):
+    """F1: recovery must run before the terminal cwd probe can wedge."""
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "jcwalker3"})
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
+    def test_removed_worktree_recovers_before_probe(self, _auth, _api):
+        missing = self._deleted_worktree()
+        env = self._env(
+            GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE=missing,
+            GITEA_FORCE_TERMINAL_PROBE="1",
+            GITEA_FORCE_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY="1",
+        )
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env):
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                task="create_pr", remote="prgs"
+            )
+            # The provably-stale binding was cleared before the probe ran.
+            self.assertNotIn("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", os.environ)
+        self.assertFalse(res.get("terminal_launcher_unhealthy"))
+        report = res.get("stale_binding_recovery") or {}
+        self.assertEqual(
+            report.get("classification"),
+            sbr.CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(report.get("recovery_performed"))
+        self.assertTrue(res.get("allowed_in_current_session"))
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "jcwalker3"})
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
+    def test_probe_block_still_carries_recovery_report(self, _auth, _api):
+        # Recovery disabled (test mode without the force flag) preserves the
+        # fail-closed probe block, but the block must now carry the
+        # classification evidence instead of hiding it.
+        missing = self._deleted_worktree()
+        env = self._env(
+            GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE=missing,
+            GITEA_FORCE_TERMINAL_PROBE="1",
+        )
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env):
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                task="create_pr", remote="prgs"
+            )
+            self.assertIn("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", os.environ)
+        self.assertTrue(res.get("terminal_launcher_unhealthy"))
+        report = res.get("stale_binding_recovery") or {}
+        self.assertEqual(
+            report.get("classification"),
+            sbr.CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(report.get("recovery_performed"))
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "jcwalker3"})
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
+    def test_unverified_binding_is_never_cleared_by_reordering(self, _auth, _api):
+        # F1 must not weaken authorization: an existing, uncorroborated
+        # binding survives resolution untouched even with recovery forced.
+        existing = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-existing-worktree-")
+        self.addCleanup(shutil.rmtree, existing, ignore_errors=True)
+        env = self._env(
+            GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE=existing,
+            GITEA_FORCE_TERMINAL_PROBE="1",
+            GITEA_FORCE_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY="1",
+        )
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env):
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                task="create_pr", remote="prgs"
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"), existing)
+        report = res.get("stale_binding_recovery") or {}
+        self.assertFalse(report.get("recovery_performed"))
+
+
+class TestF2PreflightPathVerification(_CapabilityHarness):
+    """F2: preflight and mutation contexts verify resolved paths alike."""
+
+    def test_preflight_and_mutation_context_agree_on_dead_binding(self):
+        missing = self._deleted_worktree()
+        env = self._env(GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE=missing)
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env):
+            preflight = mcp_server._resolve_preflight_workspace_path(None)
+            mutation = mcp_server._resolve_namespace_mutation_context(None)
+        self.assertEqual(preflight, mutation["workspace_path"])
+        self.assertNotEqual(preflight, os.path.realpath(missing))
+
+    def test_missing_explicit_worktree_never_reads_clean(self):
+        missing = self._deleted_worktree()
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env()):
+            porcelain = mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain(worktree_path=missing)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            porcelain, mcp_server.PREFLIGHT_WORKSPACE_UNAVAILABLE_PORCELAIN
+        )
+        # The sentinel parses as a tracked dirty entry — never clean.
+        self.assertTrue(mcp_server._parse_porcelain_entries(porcelain))
+
+    def test_workspace_deleted_during_evaluation_never_reads_clean(self):
+        # TOCTOU: resolution succeeded, then the path vanished before git ran.
+        missing = self._deleted_worktree()
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env()):
+            with patch.object(
+                mcp_server,
+                "_resolve_preflight_workspace_path",
+                return_value=missing,
+            ):
+                porcelain = mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain()
+        self.assertEqual(
+            porcelain, mcp_server.PREFLIGHT_WORKSPACE_UNAVAILABLE_PORCELAIN
+        )
+
+    def test_git_failure_never_reads_clean(self):
+        class _Failed:
+            returncode = 128
+            stdout = ""
+            stderr = "fatal: not a git repository"
+
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env()):
+            with patch.object(
+                mcp_server.subprocess, "run", return_value=_Failed()
+            ):
+                porcelain = mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain()
+        self.assertEqual(
+            porcelain, mcp_server.PREFLIGHT_WORKSPACE_UNAVAILABLE_PORCELAIN
+        )
+
+    def test_symlinked_binding_to_deleted_target_is_demoted(self):
+        target = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-symlink-target-")
+        holder = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-symlink-holder-")
+        self.addCleanup(shutil.rmtree, holder, ignore_errors=True)
+        link = os.path.join(holder, "worktree-link")
+        os.symlink(target, link)
+        shutil.rmtree(target)
+        demotions: list[str] = []
+        _path, source = nwb.resolve_namespace_workspace(
+            role_kind="reviewer",
+            process_project_root=os.getcwd(),
+            env={"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": link},
+            demotions=demotions,
+            verify_paths=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(source, "MCP server process root (default)")
+        self.assertEqual(len(demotions), 1)
+
+    def test_dead_binding_falls_through_to_live_role_binding(self):
+        # Path changes during evaluation: the dead candidate demotes at
+        # verification time and never resurrects over the live fallback.
+        alive = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-alive-worktree-")
+        self.addCleanup(shutil.rmtree, alive, ignore_errors=True)
+        missing = self._deleted_worktree()
+        path, source = nwb.resolve_namespace_workspace(
+            role_kind="reviewer",
+            process_project_root=os.getcwd(),
+            env={
+                "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": missing,
+                "GITEA_REVIEWER_WORKTREE": alive,
+            },
+            verify_paths=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(path, os.path.realpath(alive))
+        self.assertEqual(
+            source, "GITEA_REVIEWER_WORKTREE environment variable"
+        )
+
+
+class TestF3AffirmativeWorktreeEvidence(unittest.TestCase):
+    """F3: unknown worktree evidence must fail closed for crash orphans."""
+
+    def _comments(self) -> list[dict]:
+        stale = _now() - timedelta(hours=3)
+        body = leases.format_lease_body(
+            repo=REPO,
+            pr_number=701,
+            issue_number=699,
+            reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
+            profile="prgs-reviewer",
+            session_id="65664-4f248d213d60",
+            worktree="branches/review-pr-654",
+            phase="validation-start",
+            candidate_head=OLD_HEAD,
+            target_branch="master",
+            target_branch_sha="2" * 40,
+            last_activity=stale,
+            expires_at=stale + timedelta(minutes=120),
+        )
+        return [{
+            "id": 11131,
+            "body": body,
+            "user": {"login": "sysadmin"},
+            "author": "sysadmin",
+            "created_at": stale.isoformat(),
+            "updated_at": stale.isoformat(),
+        }]
+
+    def _assess(self, **kwargs):
+        defaults = dict(
+            pr_number=701,
+            current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
+            formal_reviews=[],
+            repo=REPO,
+            expected_repo=REPO,
+            requesting_session_id="fresh-controller",
+            controller_recovery_authorized=True,
+            owner_process_alive=False,
+        )
+        defaults.update(kwargs)
+        return leases.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
+            self._comments(), **defaults
+        )
+
+    def test_unknown_worktree_evidence_fails_closed(self):
+        result = self._assess(worktree_exists=None, worktree_clean=None)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["classification"], "orphaned_expired_superseded_head"
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
+        self.assertIn(
+            "affirmative safe evidence",
+            " ".join(result["fail_closed_reasons"]),
+        )
+
+    def test_unknown_cleanliness_with_existing_worktree_fails_closed(self):
+        result = self._assess(worktree_exists=True, worktree_clean=None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
+
+    def test_affirmative_clean_worktree_is_eligible(self):
+        result = self._assess(worktree_exists=True, worktree_clean=True)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["classification"], "orphaned_expired_superseded_head"
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"])
+
+    def test_affirmative_absent_worktree_is_eligible(self):
+        result = self._assess(worktree_exists=False, worktree_clean=None)
+        self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"])
+
+    def test_matrix_matches_diagnosis_gate(self):
+        # The cleanup matrix and the diagnosis path must agree: unknown
+        # evidence yields acquire-only, affirmative evidence yields cleanup.
+        diagnosis_unknown = leases.diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
+            self._comments(),
+            pr_number=701,
+            current_session_id=None,
+            current_reviewer_identity="fresh-reviewer",
+            current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
+            formal_reviews=[],
+            owner_process_alive=False,
+            worktree_exists=None,
+            worktree_clean=None,
+        )
+        assess_unknown = self._assess(worktree_exists=None, worktree_clean=None)
+        self.assertNotEqual(
+            diagnosis_unknown["next_action"],
+            "cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(assess_unknown["cleanup_allowed"])
+
+
+class TestF4CrashShadowDurability(unittest.TestCase):
+    """F4: crash-orphan evidence survives the former 4h TTL boundary."""
+
+    SID = "82984-abcabcabcabc"
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self._env = patch.dict(
+            os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR": self._dir.name}
+        )
+        self._env.start()
+        leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._env.stop()
+        self._dir.cleanup()
+        leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
+
+    def _age_record(self, kind: str, hours: float, instance_id: str | None = None):
+        path = mss.state_file_path(kind=kind, instance_id=instance_id)
+        with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            envelope = json.load(fh)
+        stamp = (
+            (_now() - timedelta(hours=hours)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+        )
+        envelope["recorded_at"] = stamp
+        envelope["updated_at"] = stamp
+        envelope["payload"]["recorded_at"] = stamp
+        envelope["payload"]["updated_at"] = stamp
+        with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            json.dump(envelope, fh)
+
+    def _save_shadow(self) -> None:
+        mss.save_state(
+            kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE,
+            instance_id=self.SID,
+            payload={"session_id": self.SID, "owner_pid": os.getpid()},
+        )
+
+    def _load_shadow(self):
+        return mss.load_state(
+            kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, instance_id=self.SID
+        )
+
+    def test_shadow_loads_before_former_ttl_boundary(self):
+        self._save_shadow()
+        self._age_record(
+            mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, hours=3.9, instance_id=self.SID
+        )
+        self.assertIsNotNone(self._load_shadow())
+
+    def test_shadow_loads_at_former_ttl_boundary(self):
+        self._save_shadow()
+        self._age_record(
+            mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, hours=4.0, instance_id=self.SID
+        )
+        self.assertIsNotNone(self._load_shadow())
+
+    def test_shadow_loads_long_after_former_ttl_boundary(self):
+        self._save_shadow()
+        self._age_record(
+            mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, hours=27.0, instance_id=self.SID
+        )
+        record = self._load_shadow()
+        self.assertIsNotNone(record)
+        self.assertEqual(record.get("session_id"), self.SID)
+
+    def test_stale_binding_audit_record_is_also_durable(self):
+        mss.save_state(
+            kind=mss.KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY,
+            payload={"cleared_env": "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"},
+        )
+        self._age_record(mss.KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY, hours=27.0)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(
+            mss.load_state(kind=mss.KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY)
+        )
+
+    def test_non_recovery_kinds_keep_ttl(self):
+        mss.save_state(
+            kind=mss.KIND_WORKFLOW_LOAD, payload={"workflow_hash": "abc"}
+        )
+        self._age_record(mss.KIND_WORKFLOW_LOAD, hours=5.0)
+        self.assertIsNone(mss.load_state(kind=mss.KIND_WORKFLOW_LOAD))
+
+    def test_sanctioned_clear_is_the_terminal_reconciliation(self):
+        self._save_shadow()
+        self._age_record(
+            mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, hours=27.0, instance_id=self.SID
+        )
+        mss.clear_state(
+            kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, instance_id=self.SID
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(self._load_shadow())
+        self.assertEqual(
+            mss.list_states(kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE), []
+        )
+
+    def test_crash_orphan_recovery_works_after_former_ttl(self):
+        # End to end: a crashed session's shadow still proves owner exit a
+        # day later.
+        leases.record_session_lease(
+            {
+                "pr_number": 701,
+                "session_id": self.SID,
+                "worktree": "branches/review-pr-654",
+                "candidate_head": OLD_HEAD,
+                "repo": REPO,
+                "comment_id": 11131,
+                "profile": "prgs-reviewer",
+                "reviewer_identity": "sysadmin",
+                "phase": "claimed",
+            },
+            lease_provenance={"source": "acquire", "comment_id": 11131},
+        )
+        leases._SESSION_LEASE = None  # simulated crash: no sanctioned clear
+        self._age_record(
+            mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, hours=27.0, instance_id=self.SID
+        )
+        shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(shadow)
+        verdict = leases.assess_crashed_session_lease_orphan(
+            shadow,
+            lease={"session_id": self.SID},
+            current_pid=os.getpid() + 1,
+            pid_alive=False,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(verdict["orphan_evidence"])
+        self.assertIs(verdict["owner_process_alive"], False)
+
+
+class TestF5ConcurrentSessionShadows(unittest.TestCase):
+    """F5: concurrent same-profile sessions keep distinct shadow records."""
+
+    SID_A = "11111-aaaaaaaaaaaa"
+    SID_B = "22222-bbbbbbbbbbbb"
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self._env = patch.dict(
+            os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR": self._dir.name}
+        )
+        self._env.start()
+        leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._env.stop()
+        self._dir.cleanup()
+        leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
+
+    def _lease(self, session_id: str, pr_number: int, head: str) -> dict:
+        return {
+            "pr_number": pr_number,
+            "session_id": session_id,
+            "worktree": f"branches/review-pr-{pr_number}-{session_id[:5]}",
+            "candidate_head": head,
+            "repo": REPO,
+            "comment_id": 11221,
+            "profile": "prgs-reviewer",
+            "reviewer_identity": "sysadmin",
+            "phase": "claimed",
+        }
+
+    def _record(self, lease: dict) -> None:
+        leases.record_session_lease(
+            lease,
+            lease_provenance={"source": "acquire", "comment_id": 11221},
+        )
+
+    def test_interleaved_sessions_do_not_overwrite_each_other(self):
+        self._record(self._lease(self.SID_A, 703, OLD_HEAD))
+        self._record(self._lease(self.SID_B, 701, NEW_HEAD))
+        # Session A heartbeats again after B wrote.
+        updated_a = self._lease(self.SID_A, 703, OLD_HEAD)
+        updated_a["phase"] = "validation-start"
+        self._record(updated_a)
+
+        shadow_a = leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_A)
+        shadow_b = leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_B)
+        self.assertEqual(shadow_a.get("session_id"), self.SID_A)
+        self.assertEqual(shadow_a.get("pr_number"), 703)
+        self.assertEqual(shadow_a.get("phase"), "validation-start")
+        self.assertEqual(shadow_b.get("session_id"), self.SID_B)
+        self.assertEqual(shadow_b.get("pr_number"), 701)
+        self.assertEqual(shadow_b.get("candidate_head"), NEW_HEAD)
+
+    def test_shadow_lookup_never_misattributes(self):
+        self._record(self._lease(self.SID_A, 703, OLD_HEAD))
+        self.assertIsNone(
+            leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_B)
+        )
+        verdict = leases.assess_crashed_session_lease_orphan(
+            leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_A),
+            lease={"session_id": self.SID_B},
+            pid_alive=False,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(verdict["orphan_evidence"])
+
+    def test_clearing_one_session_preserves_the_other(self):
+        self._record(self._lease(self.SID_A, 703, OLD_HEAD))
+        self._record(self._lease(self.SID_B, 701, NEW_HEAD))
+        # Sanctioned clear of B (the currently recorded in-memory lease).
+        leases.clear_session_lease()
+        self.assertIsNone(
+            leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_B)
+        )
+        shadow_a = leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_A)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(shadow_a)
+        self.assertEqual(shadow_a.get("session_id"), self.SID_A)
+
+    def test_reconnected_process_recovers_by_session_id(self):
+        self._record(self._lease(self.SID_A, 703, OLD_HEAD))
+        self._record(self._lease(self.SID_B, 701, NEW_HEAD))
+        # Simulated crash + reconnect: in-memory state is gone, durable
+        # records remain enumerable and individually attributable.
+        leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
+        records = mss.list_states(kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            sorted(r.get("session_id") for r in records),
+            sorted([self.SID_A, self.SID_B]),
+        )
+        shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_B)
+        self.assertEqual(shadow.get("pr_number"), 701)
+
+    def test_legacy_single_slot_record_still_resolves_by_session_id(self):
+        # Upgrade path: a record written by pre-F5 code (no instance key)
+        # remains usable when its payload names the requested session.
+        mss.save_state(
+            kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE,
+            payload={"session_id": self.SID_A, "owner_pid": os.getpid()},
+        )
+        shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_A)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(shadow)
+        self.assertIsNone(
+            leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_B)
+        )
+
+
+class TestF6AuditBeforeClear(_CapabilityHarness):
+    """F6: the durable audit record is persisted before the env clears."""
+
+    def _recovery_env(self, missing: str) -> dict:
+        return self._env(
+            GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE=missing,
+            GITEA_FORCE_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY="1",
+        )
+
+    def test_audit_write_failure_blocks_the_clear(self):
+        missing = self._deleted_worktree()
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._recovery_env(missing)):
+            with patch.object(
+                mss, "save_state", side_effect=OSError("disk full")
+            ):
+                report = mcp_server._assess_stale_active_binding(
+                    auto_recover=True
+                )
+            self.assertEqual(os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"), missing)
+        self.assertFalse(report["recovery_performed"])
+        self.assertIs(report.get("audit_persisted"), False)
+        self.assertTrue(report.get("audit_write_failed"))
+        self.assertIn("NOT cleared", " ".join(report.get("reasons") or []))
+
+    def test_retry_after_audit_failure_recovers(self):
+        missing = self._deleted_worktree()
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._recovery_env(missing)):
+            with patch.object(
+                mss, "save_state", side_effect=OSError("disk full")
+            ):
+                first = mcp_server._assess_stale_active_binding(
+                    auto_recover=True
+                )
+            self.assertFalse(first["recovery_performed"])
+            # Persistence recovered; the retry clears with a durable audit.
+            second = mcp_server._assess_stale_active_binding(auto_recover=True)
+            self.assertTrue(second["recovery_performed"])
+            self.assertIs(second.get("audit_persisted"), True)
+            self.assertNotIn("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", os.environ)
+            audit = mss.load_state(kind=mss.KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(audit)
+        self.assertEqual(audit.get("recovery_status"), "performed")
+        self.assertEqual(audit.get("cleared_value"), missing)
+
+    def test_audit_record_exists_before_env_clear(self):
+        missing = self._deleted_worktree()
+        observed: list[tuple[str | None, str | None]] = []
+        real_save = mss.save_state
+
+        def _spy(**kwargs):
+            observed.append(
+                (
+                    (kwargs.get("payload") or {}).get("recovery_status"),
+                    os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"),
+                )
+            )
+            return real_save(**kwargs)
+
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._recovery_env(missing)):
+            with patch.object(mss, "save_state", side_effect=_spy):
+                report = mcp_server._assess_stale_active_binding(
+                    auto_recover=True
+                )
+        self.assertTrue(report["recovery_performed"])
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(observed), 2)
+        pending_status, env_at_pending = observed[0]
+        performed_status, env_at_performed = observed[-1]
+        # Ordering proof: the binding was still present while the pending
+        # audit persisted, and gone by the time the performed status wrote.
+        self.assertEqual(pending_status, "pending")
+        self.assertEqual(env_at_pending, missing)
+        self.assertEqual(performed_status, "performed")
+        self.assertIsNone(env_at_performed)
+
+    def test_recovery_is_idempotent_after_success(self):
+        missing = self._deleted_worktree()
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._recovery_env(missing)):
+            first = mcp_server._assess_stale_active_binding(auto_recover=True)
+            second = mcp_server._assess_stale_active_binding(auto_recover=True)
+        self.assertTrue(first["recovery_performed"])
+        self.assertEqual(second["classification"], sbr.CLASSIFICATION_UNBOUND)
+        self.assertFalse(second["recovery_performed"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_702_stale_binding_lease_recovery.py

@@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
+"""Regression tests for #702: stale runtime binding + orphaned durable lease.
+
+Reproduces the PR #701 incident (lease 65664-4f248d213d60, comments
+11129/11131): the MCP daemon crashed without teardown, destroying the
+in-memory session lease while the durable comment lease survived, and the
+auto-reconnected daemon inherited a stale ``GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE`` binding
+(``branches/review-pr-654``) from its parent environment.
+
+Covers the five mandated scenarios:
+
+1. lost in-session leases  — durable shadow survives a crash and yields
+   provable owner-process evidence
+2. old-head leases         — expired superseded-head lease with no terminal
+   review becomes recoverable only with orphan evidence + controller authority
+3. runtime/worktree mismatch — env bindings to deleted worktrees are demoted,
+   never silently bound
+4. managed reconnect       — boot-inherited uncorroborated bindings are
+   surfaced for managed recovery; provably stale ones are clear-eligible
+5. safe expiry             — pre-expiry stays fail-closed wait (no steal);
+   canonical expiry unlocks acquisition and guarded cleanup
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sys
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import namespace_workspace_binding as nwb  # noqa: E402
+import reviewer_pr_lease as leases  # noqa: E402
+import stale_binding_recovery as sbr  # noqa: E402
+
+# PR #701 incident fixtures.
+OLD_HEAD = "b4d0cb22e452a07c8e816745c704ddb0f43edf0b"
+NEW_HEAD = "6b675f5c834b41f9d74e8a54294ff44dddf28ae4"
+CRASHED_SESSION = "65664-4f248d213d60"
+LEASE_COMMENT = 11131
+REPO = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
+PR = 701
+ISSUE = 699
+LEASE_WORKTREE = "branches/review-fix-issue-699-structured-auth-mcp-errors"
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _lease_comment(
+    *,
+    phase: str = "validation-start",
+    candidate_head: str = OLD_HEAD,
+    session_id: str = CRASHED_SESSION,
+    comment_id: int = LEASE_COMMENT,
+    last_activity: datetime | None = None,
+    expires_at: datetime | None = None,
+    worktree: str = LEASE_WORKTREE,
+) -> dict:
+    stamp = last_activity or _now()
+    body = leases.format_lease_body(
+        repo=REPO,
+        pr_number=PR,
+        issue_number=ISSUE,
+        reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
+        profile="prgs-reviewer",
+        session_id=session_id,
+        worktree=worktree,
+        phase=phase,
+        candidate_head=candidate_head,
+        target_branch="master",
+        target_branch_sha="2" * 40,
+        last_activity=stamp,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+    )
+    return {
+        "id": comment_id,
+        "body": body,
+        "user": {"login": "sysadmin"},
+        "author": "sysadmin",
+        "created_at": stamp.isoformat(),
+        "updated_at": stamp.isoformat(),
+    }
+
+
+def _expired_superseded_comments() -> list[dict]:
+    stale = _now() - timedelta(hours=3)
+    return [_lease_comment(
+        last_activity=stale,
+        expires_at=stale + timedelta(minutes=120),
+    )]
+
+
+def _fresh_superseded_comments() -> list[dict]:
+    recent = _now() - timedelta(minutes=10)
+    return [_lease_comment(
+        last_activity=recent,
+        expires_at=recent + timedelta(minutes=120),
+    )]
+
+
+class TestLostInSessionLeaseShadow(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Scenario 1: the durable shadow survives a daemon crash (#702 AC3)."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
+
+    def _record(self) -> dict:
+        return leases.record_session_lease(
+            {
+                "pr_number": PR,
+                "issue_number": ISSUE,
+                "session_id": CRASHED_SESSION,
+                "reviewer_identity": "sysadmin",
+                "profile": "prgs-reviewer",
+                "worktree": LEASE_WORKTREE,
+                "phase": "claimed",
+                "candidate_head": OLD_HEAD,
+                "repo": REPO,
+                "comment_id": LEASE_COMMENT,
+            },
+            lease_provenance={"source": "acquire", "comment_id": LEASE_COMMENT},
+        )
+
+    def test_shadow_written_on_record_and_survives_simulated_crash(self):
+        self._record()
+        # Simulated unhandled crash: the in-memory dict dies with the process
+        # but the sanctioned clear path never runs.
+        leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
+        shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow()
+        self.assertIsNotNone(shadow)
+        self.assertEqual(shadow.get("session_id"), CRASHED_SESSION)
+        self.assertEqual(shadow.get("pr_number"), PR)
+        self.assertEqual(int(shadow.get("owner_pid")), os.getpid())
+
+    def test_sanctioned_clear_removes_shadow(self):
+        self._record()
+        leases.clear_session_lease()
+        self.assertIsNone(leases.load_session_lease_shadow())
+
+    def test_orphan_assessment_dead_owner_pid_proves_exit(self):
+        self._record()
+        leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
+        shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow()
+        lease = {"session_id": CRASHED_SESSION}
+        verdict = leases.assess_crashed_session_lease_orphan(
+            shadow, lease=lease, current_pid=os.getpid() + 1, pid_alive=False
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(verdict["orphan_evidence"])
+        self.assertIs(verdict["owner_process_alive"], False)
+
+    def test_orphan_assessment_alive_pid_is_not_ownership_proof(self):
+        self._record()
+        shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow()
+        verdict = leases.assess_crashed_session_lease_orphan(
+            shadow,
+            lease={"session_id": CRASHED_SESSION},
+            current_pid=os.getpid() + 1,
+            pid_alive=True,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(verdict["orphan_evidence"])
+        self.assertIsNone(verdict["owner_process_alive"])
+
+    def test_orphan_assessment_session_mismatch_proves_nothing(self):
+        self._record()
+        shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow()
+        verdict = leases.assess_crashed_session_lease_orphan(
+            shadow, lease={"session_id": "other-999"}, pid_alive=False
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(verdict["orphan_evidence"])
+        self.assertIsNone(verdict["owner_process_alive"])
+
+    def test_orphan_assessment_without_shadow_is_unknown(self):
+        verdict = leases.assess_crashed_session_lease_orphan(
+            None, lease={"session_id": CRASHED_SESSION}
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(verdict["orphan_evidence"])
+        self.assertIsNone(verdict["owner_process_alive"])
+
+
+class TestOldHeadLeaseCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Scenario 2: expired superseded-head lease with no terminal review."""
+
+    def _assess(self, comments, **kwargs):
+        defaults = dict(
+            pr_number=PR,
+            current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
+            formal_reviews=[],
+            repo=REPO,
+            expected_repo=REPO,
+            requesting_session_id="fresh-controller",
+            controller_recovery_authorized=True,
+            worktree_exists=True,
+            worktree_clean=True,
+            owner_process_alive=False,
+        )
+        defaults.update(kwargs)
+        return leases.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
+            comments, **defaults
+        )
+
+    def test_expired_orphan_with_full_evidence_is_cleanup_eligible(self):
+        result = self._assess(_expired_superseded_comments())
+        self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "orphaned_expired_superseded_head")
+        self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"])
+        self.assertIn("phase: released", result["release_body"] or "")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["exact_next_action"], "cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease"
+        )
+
+    def test_expired_orphan_without_owner_evidence_fails_closed(self):
+        result = self._assess(
+            _expired_superseded_comments(), owner_process_alive=None
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
+        self.assertIn(
+            "provable owner-process-exit evidence",
+            " ".join(result["fail_closed_reasons"]),
+        )
+
+    def test_expired_orphan_without_controller_authority_fails_closed(self):
+        result = self._assess(
+            _expired_superseded_comments(), controller_recovery_authorized=False
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
+
+    def test_expired_orphan_with_dirty_worktree_fails_closed(self):
+        result = self._assess(
+            _expired_superseded_comments(),
+            worktree_clean=False,
+            worktree_has_unpreserved_work=True,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
+
+    def test_unexpired_superseded_no_terminal_stays_ambiguous_wait(self):
+        # Regression guard: pre-expiry there is still no steal path.
+        result = self._assess(_fresh_superseded_comments())
+        self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence")
+        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["exact_next_action"], "wait")
+
+
+class TestRuntimeWorktreeMismatch(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Scenario 3: env bindings to deleted worktrees are demoted (#702 AC2)."""
+
+    def test_missing_active_env_binding_is_demoted(self):
+        demotions: list[str] = []
+        missing = "/nonexistent/branches/review-pr-654"
+        path, source = nwb.resolve_namespace_workspace(
+            role_kind="reviewer",
+            process_project_root=os.getcwd(),
+            env={"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": missing},
+            demotions=demotions,
+            verify_paths=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(source, "MCP server process root (default)")
+        self.assertEqual(len(demotions), 1)
+        self.assertIn("no longer exists", demotions[0])
+
+    def test_missing_active_falls_through_to_existing_role_env(self):
+        existing = os.getcwd()
+        path, source = nwb.resolve_namespace_workspace(
+            role_kind="reviewer",
+            process_project_root="/tmp",
+            env={
+                "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": "/nonexistent/branches/review-pr-654",
+                "GITEA_REVIEWER_WORKTREE": existing,
+            },
+            verify_paths=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(path, os.path.realpath(existing))
+        self.assertEqual(source, "GITEA_REVIEWER_WORKTREE environment variable")
+
+    def test_existing_active_env_binding_still_wins(self):
+        existing = os.getcwd()
+        path, source = nwb.resolve_namespace_workspace(
+            role_kind="reviewer",
+            process_project_root="/tmp",
+            env={"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": existing},
+            verify_paths=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(path, os.path.realpath(existing))
+        self.assertEqual(source, "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE environment variable")
+
+    def test_explicit_worktree_path_argument_is_never_demoted(self):
+        missing = "/nonexistent/branches/explicit"
+        path, source = nwb.resolve_namespace_workspace(
+            role_kind="reviewer",
+            worktree_path=missing,
+            process_project_root="/tmp",
+            env={},
+            verify_paths=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(source, "worktree_path argument")
+
+    def test_mutation_context_reports_demotion_in_ignored_bindings(self):
+        ctx = nwb.resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
+            role_kind="reviewer",
+            worktree_path=None,
+            process_project_root=os.getcwd(),
+            env={"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": "/nonexistent/branches/review-pr-654"},
+        )
+        joined = " ".join(ctx["ignored_bindings"])
+        self.assertIn("stale binding, #702", joined)
+
+
+class TestManagedReconnectRecovery(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Scenario 4: boot-inherited bindings and the sanctioned recovery plan."""
+
+    def test_uncorroborated_inherited_reviewer_binding_is_unverified(self):
+        classification = sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
+            active_value=os.getcwd(),
+            role_env_value=None,
+            session_lease_worktree=None,
+            boot_inherited=True,
+            path_exists=True,
+            role_kind="reviewer",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            classification["classification"], sbr.CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(classification["clear_eligible"])
+        plan = sbr.plan_recovery(classification)
+        self.assertFalse(plan["clear_allowed"])
+        self.assertIn("managed", plan["exact_next_action"])
+        self.assertIn("do not clear or rewrite", plan["exact_next_action"])
+
+    def test_missing_path_binding_is_provably_stale_and_clear_eligible(self):
+        classification = sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
+            active_value="/nonexistent/branches/review-pr-654",
+            boot_inherited=True,
+            path_exists=False,
+            role_kind="reviewer",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            classification["classification"],
+            sbr.CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
+        )
+        plan = sbr.plan_recovery(classification)
+        self.assertTrue(plan["clear_allowed"])
+
+    def test_inherited_binding_superseded_by_session_lease_is_clear_eligible(self):
+        classification = sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
+            active_value="/tmp",
+            session_lease_worktree=os.getcwd(),
+            boot_inherited=True,
+            path_exists=True,
+            role_kind="reviewer",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            classification["classification"],
+            sbr.CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(sbr.plan_recovery(classification)["clear_allowed"])
+
+    def test_post_boot_binding_conflict_is_surfaced_not_cleared(self):
+        classification = sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
+            active_value="/tmp",
+            session_lease_worktree=os.getcwd(),
+            boot_inherited=False,
+            path_exists=True,
+            role_kind="reviewer",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            classification["classification"], sbr.CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(sbr.plan_recovery(classification)["clear_allowed"])
+
+    def test_corroborated_bindings_are_untouched(self):
+        for kwargs in (
+            dict(role_env_value=os.getcwd()),
+            dict(session_lease_worktree=os.getcwd()),
+        ):
+            classification = sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
+                active_value=os.getcwd(),
+                boot_inherited=True,
+                path_exists=True,
+                role_kind="reviewer",
+                **kwargs,
+            )
+            self.assertEqual(
+                classification["classification"], sbr.CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(sbr.plan_recovery(classification)["clear_allowed"])
+
+    def test_author_inherited_binding_stays_corroborated(self):
+        classification = sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
+            active_value=os.getcwd(),
+            boot_inherited=True,
+            path_exists=True,
+            role_kind="author",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            classification["classification"], sbr.CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED
+        )
+
+    def test_apply_recovery_clears_env_only_for_authorized_plan(self):
+        env = {"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": "/nonexistent/branches/review-pr-654"}
+        plan = sbr.plan_recovery(
+            sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
+                active_value=env["GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"],
+                boot_inherited=True,
+                path_exists=False,
+                role_kind="reviewer",
+            )
+        )
+        applied = sbr.apply_recovery(plan, env=env)
+        self.assertTrue(applied["performed"])
+        self.assertNotIn("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", env)
+        self.assertIn("review-pr-654", applied["cleared_value"])
+
+    def test_apply_recovery_refuses_unauthorized_plan(self):
+        env = {"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": os.getcwd()}
+        plan = sbr.plan_recovery(
+            sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
+                active_value=env["GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"],
+                boot_inherited=True,
+                path_exists=True,
+                role_kind="reviewer",
+            )
+        )
+        applied = sbr.apply_recovery(plan, env=env)
+        self.assertFalse(applied["performed"])
+        self.assertIn("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", env)
+
+
+class TestSafeExpiryDiagnosis(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Scenario 5: canonical expiry flips wait into acquire/guarded cleanup."""
+
+    def _diagnose(self, comments, **kwargs):
+        defaults = dict(
+            pr_number=PR,
+            current_session_id=None,
+            current_reviewer_identity="fresh-reviewer",
+            current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
+            formal_reviews=[],
+        )
+        defaults.update(kwargs)
+        return leases.diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(comments, **defaults)
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
+
+    def test_pre_expiry_superseded_no_terminal_stays_wait(self):
+        diagnosis = self._diagnose(_fresh_superseded_comments())
+        self.assertEqual(
+            diagnosis["classification"], "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(diagnosis["next_action"], "wait")
+
+    def test_post_expiry_without_orphan_evidence_unlocks_acquire(self):
+        diagnosis = self._diagnose(_expired_superseded_comments())
+        self.assertEqual(
+            diagnosis["classification"], "orphaned_expired_superseded_head"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(diagnosis["next_action"], "acquire")
+
+    def test_post_expiry_with_orphan_evidence_offers_guarded_cleanup(self):
+        diagnosis = self._diagnose(
+            _expired_superseded_comments(),
+            owner_process_alive=False,
+            worktree_clean=True,
+            worktree_exists=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            diagnosis["classification"], "orphaned_expired_superseded_head"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            diagnosis["next_action"], "cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease"
+        )
+
+    def test_expired_lease_no_longer_blocks_fresh_acquisition(self):
+        assessment = leases.assess_acquire_lease(
+            _expired_superseded_comments(),
+            pr_number=PR,
+            reviewer_identity="fresh-reviewer",
+            profile="prgs-reviewer",
+            session_id="99999-fresh",
+            repo=REPO,
+            issue_number=ISSUE,
+            worktree="branches/review-pr-701-fresh",
+            candidate_head=NEW_HEAD,
+            target_branch="master",
+            target_branch_sha="2" * 40,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(assessment.get("acquire_allowed"))
+
+    def test_unparseable_expiry_fails_closed_in_cleanup(self):
+        comment = _lease_comment(
+            last_activity=_now() - timedelta(hours=3), expires_at=None
+        )
+        comment["body"] = comment["body"].replace(
+            "expires_at: ", "expires_at: not-a-timestamp"
+        )
+        result = leases.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
+            [comment],
+            pr_number=PR,
+            current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
+            formal_reviews=[],
+            repo=REPO,
+            expected_repo=REPO,
+            requesting_session_id="fresh-controller",
+            controller_recovery_authorized=True,
+            worktree_exists=True,
+            worktree_clean=True,
+            owner_process_alive=False,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_706_canonical_repository_root.py

@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@
+"""Issue #706: immutable startup/profile canonical_repository_root capability.
+
+Cross-repository MCP namespaces (e.g. ``eagenda-author``) must bind their
+canonical repository root to the *configured target repository*, not to the
+Gitea-Tools install checkout the server script lives in. These tests prove:
+
+* the configured binding is resolved from profile/env with env precedence,
+* the target repository identity and git common-directory membership are
+  validated (AC3),
+* the branches-only guard (#274) is enforced *inside the target repo* (AC4),
+* missing / conflicting / forged bindings fail closed (AC5),
+* prgs and mdcps namespaces stay simultaneously isolated (AC6),
+* the session binding pins the canonical root immutably,
+* no weakening of the install-root single-repo default (AC8).
+
+Uses two distinct real git repositories/worktrees (AC7).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest import mock
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import canonical_repository_root as crr  # noqa: E402
+import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
+import namespace_workspace_binding as nwb  # noqa: E402
+import session_context_binding as session_ctx  # noqa: E402
+
+
+def _git(cwd: str, *args: str) -> str:
+    res = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "-C", cwd, *args],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        check=True,
+    )
+    return res.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def _init_repo(path: Path, remote_url: str, *, remote_name: str = "origin") -> str:
+    """Create a real git repo with one commit and a remote; return realpath root."""
+    path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    _git(str(path), "init", "-q")
+    _git(str(path), "config", "user.email", "[email protected]")
+    _git(str(path), "config", "user.name", "Test")
+    _git(str(path), "remote", "add", remote_name, remote_url)
+    (path / "README.md").write_text("seed\n")
+    _git(str(path), "add", "README.md")
+    _git(str(path), "commit", "-q", "-m", "seed")
+    return os.path.realpath(str(path))
+
+
+def _add_worktree(repo_root: str, worktree_path: Path, branch: str) -> str:
+    _git(repo_root, "worktree", "add", "-q", "-b", branch, str(worktree_path))
+    return os.path.realpath(str(worktree_path))
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# configured_canonical_root: resolution + precedence
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestConfiguredCanonicalRoot(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_unconfigured_returns_none(self):
+        value, source = crr.configured_canonical_root({}, {})
+        self.assertIsNone(value)
+        self.assertIsNone(source)
+
+    def test_profile_field_used(self):
+        value, source = crr.configured_canonical_root(
+            {"canonical_repository_root": "/repo/eAgenda"}, {}
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(value, "/repo/eAgenda")
+        self.assertIn("profile", source)
+
+    def test_env_overrides_profile(self):
+        value, source = crr.configured_canonical_root(
+            {"canonical_repository_root": "/repo/eAgenda"},
+            {crr.CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV: "/repo/other"},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(value, "/repo/other")
+        self.assertIn(crr.CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV, source)
+
+    def test_blank_values_ignored(self):
+        value, source = crr.configured_canonical_root(
+            {"canonical_repository_root": "   "},
+            {crr.CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV: ""},
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(value)
+        self.assertIsNone(source)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# assess_canonical_repository_root: default (single-repo) path
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestUnconfiguredFallback(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.tmp = self._tmp.name
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def test_unconfigured_falls_back_to_process_root(self):
+        root = _init_repo(
+            Path(self.tmp) / "install",
+            "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git",
+        )
+        got = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
+            configured_value=None,
+            source=None,
+            expected_slug=None,
+            process_project_root=root,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(got["proven"])
+        self.assertFalse(got["block"])
+        self.assertFalse(got["configured"])
+        self.assertEqual(got["canonical_repo_root"], root)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# assess_canonical_repository_root: configured cross-repo path
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestConfiguredCrossRepo(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.tmp = Path(self._tmp.name)
+        self.install = _init_repo(
+            self.tmp / "Gitea-Tools",
+            "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git",
+        )
+        self.target = _init_repo(
+            self.tmp / "mcp-control-plane",
+            "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/mcp-control-plane.git",
+        )
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def test_valid_configured_root_binds_to_target(self):
+        got = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
+            configured_value=self.target,
+            source="profile canonical_repository_root",
+            expected_slug="Scaled-Tech-Consulting/mcp-control-plane",
+            process_project_root=self.install,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(got["proven"], got.get("reasons"))
+        self.assertFalse(got["block"])
+        self.assertTrue(got["configured"])
+        self.assertEqual(got["canonical_repo_root"], self.target)
+        self.assertNotEqual(got["canonical_repo_root"], self.install)
+
+    def test_missing_path_fails_closed(self):
+        got = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
+            configured_value=str(self.tmp / "does-not-exist"),
+            source="profile canonical_repository_root",
+            expected_slug=None,
+            process_project_root=self.install,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(got["block"])
+        self.assertFalse(got["proven"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("exist" in r for r in got["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_non_git_path_fails_closed(self):
+        plain = self.tmp / "plain"
+        plain.mkdir()
+        got = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
+            configured_value=str(plain),
+            source="profile canonical_repository_root",
+            expected_slug=None,
+            process_project_root=self.install,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(got["block"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("git" in r for r in got["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_identity_mismatch_fails_closed(self):
+        # Configured root is the install repo, but session expects the target
+        # repo identity: a forged/conflicting binding.
+        got = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
+            configured_value=self.install,
+            source="profile canonical_repository_root",
+            expected_slug="Scaled-Tech-Consulting/mcp-control-plane",
+            process_project_root=self.install,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(got["block"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("identity" in r for r in got["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_unprovable_identity_blocks_when_required(self):
+        noremote = _init_repo(self.tmp / "noremote-src", "x", remote_name="origin")
+        _git(noremote, "remote", "remove", "origin")
+        got = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
+            configured_value=noremote,
+            source="profile canonical_repository_root",
+            expected_slug="Scaled-Tech-Consulting/mcp-control-plane",
+            process_project_root=self.install,
+            require_binding=True,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(got["block"])
+
+    def test_repository_identity_slug_reads_remote(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            crr.repository_identity_slug(self.target),
+            "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/mcp-control-plane",
+        )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Workspace membership + branches-only enforced inside the TARGET repo (AC4)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestNamespaceContextUsesConfiguredRoot(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.tmp = Path(self._tmp.name)
+        self.install = _init_repo(
+            self.tmp / "Gitea-Tools",
+            "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git",
+        )
+        self.target = _init_repo(
+            self.tmp / "mcp-control-plane",
+            "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/mcp-control-plane.git",
+        )
+        (Path(self.target) / "branches").mkdir()
+        self.target_wt = _add_worktree(
+            self.target,
+            Path(self.target) / "branches" / "author-issue-1",
+            "feat/issue-1",
+        )
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def test_context_canonical_root_is_configured_target(self):
+        ctx = nwb.resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
+            role_kind="author",
+            worktree_path=self.target_wt,
+            process_project_root=self.install,
+            env={},
+            configured_canonical_root=self.target,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["canonical_repo_root"], self.target)
+        self.assertFalse(ctx["roots_aligned"])
+
+    def test_target_worktree_is_member_of_target_root(self):
+        got = nwb.amw.assess_workspace_repo_membership(
+            workspace_path=self.target_wt,
+            canonical_repo_root=self.target,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(got["proven"], got.get("reasons"))
+
+    def test_target_worktree_not_member_of_install_root(self):
+        got = nwb.amw.assess_workspace_repo_membership(
+            workspace_path=self.target_wt,
+            canonical_repo_root=self.install,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(got["block"])
+
+    def test_branches_guard_passes_inside_target(self):
+        assessment = nwb.assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
+            role_kind="author",
+            worktree_path=self.target_wt,
+            worktree=None,
+            process_project_root=self.install,
+            env={},
+            current_branch="feat/issue-1",
+            configured_canonical_root=self.target,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["block"], assessment.get("reasons"))
+        self.assertEqual(assessment["canonical_repo_root"], self.target)
+
+    def test_target_control_checkout_blocks_branches_guard(self):
+        assessment = nwb.assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
+            role_kind="author",
+            worktree_path=self.target,  # stable target checkout, not branches/
+            worktree=None,
+            process_project_root=self.install,
+            env={},
+            current_branch="master",
+            configured_canonical_root=self.target,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Immutable session pin (AC1/AC5)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestSessionCanonicalRootPin(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        os.environ["PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST"] = "t"
+        session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+
+    def test_seed_stores_canonical_root(self):
+        ctx = session_ctx.seed_session_context_if_unbound(
+            profile_name="mcp-control-plane-author",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+            identity="svc",
+            repository="mcp-control-plane",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            canonical_repository_root="/repo/mcp-control-plane",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["canonical_repository_root"], "/repo/mcp-control-plane")
+
+    def test_canonical_root_drift_fails_closed(self):
+        session_ctx.seed_session_context_if_unbound(
+            profile_name="mcp-control-plane-author",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+            identity="svc",
+            repository="mcp-control-plane",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            canonical_repository_root="/repo/mcp-control-plane",
+        )
+        got = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
+            profile_name="mcp-control-plane-author",
+            remote="prgs",
+            canonical_repository_root="/repo/forged-elsewhere",
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(got["block"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("canonical" in r for r in got["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_matching_canonical_root_passes(self):
+        session_ctx.seed_session_context_if_unbound(
+            profile_name="mcp-control-plane-author",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+            identity="svc",
+            repository="mcp-control-plane",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            canonical_repository_root="/repo/mcp-control-plane",
+        )
+        got = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
+            profile_name="mcp-control-plane-author",
+            remote="prgs",
+            canonical_repository_root="/repo/mcp-control-plane",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(got["block"], got["reasons"])
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Simultaneous prgs / mdcps isolation (AC6)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestSimultaneousIsolation(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.tmp = Path(self._tmp.name)
+        self.prgs = _init_repo(
+            self.tmp / "prgs-repo",
+            "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/mcp-control-plane.git",
+        )
+        self.mdcps = _init_repo(
+            self.tmp / "mdcps-repo",
+            "https://gitea.dadeschools.net/dadeschools/eAgenda.git",
+        )
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def test_each_namespace_binds_its_own_target(self):
+        a = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
+            configured_value=self.prgs,
+            source="env",
+            expected_slug="Scaled-Tech-Consulting/mcp-control-plane",
+            process_project_root=self.tmp.as_posix(),
+        )
+        b = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
+            configured_value=self.mdcps,
+            source="env",
+            expected_slug="dadeschools/eAgenda",
+            process_project_root=self.tmp.as_posix(),
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(a["canonical_repo_root"], self.prgs)
+        self.assertEqual(b["canonical_repo_root"], self.mdcps)
+        self.assertNotEqual(a["canonical_repo_root"], b["canonical_repo_root"])
+
+    def test_cross_wired_identity_blocks(self):
+        # prgs path claimed under the mdcps identity → forged binding.
+        got = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
+            configured_value=self.prgs,
+            source="env",
+            expected_slug="dadeschools/eAgenda",
+            process_project_root=self.tmp.as_posix(),
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(got["block"])
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Config validation of the profile field (AC5: malformed bindings fail closed)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestConfigValidation(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_absent_is_allowed(self):
+        # single-repo default: no field configured
+        gitea_config._validate_canonical_repository_root("p", None)
+
+    def test_valid_absolute_path_ok(self):
+        gitea_config._validate_canonical_repository_root(
+            "p", "/Users/x/Development/mcp-control-plane"
+        )
+
+    def test_relative_path_rejected(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
+            gitea_config._validate_canonical_repository_root(
+                "p", "relative/path"
+            )
+
+    def test_empty_string_rejected(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
+            gitea_config._validate_canonical_repository_root("p", "   ")
+
+    def test_non_string_rejected(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
+            gitea_config._validate_canonical_repository_root("p", ["/x"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_706_f1_seed_identity_integration.py

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+"""Issue #706 F1 integration regression (review 457).
+
+The unit tests in ``test_issue_706_canonical_repository_root.py`` exercise
+``crr.assess_canonical_repository_root`` / ``session_ctx.seed_session_context_if_unbound``
+with a *preselected* slug, so they never drive the real end-to-end path that
+review 457 found broken:
+
+    _seed_session_context -> _trusted_session_repository -> _workspace_repository_slug
+    -> _local_git_remote_url (cwd=PROJECT_ROOT, always Gitea-Tools)
+
+Before the fix, the session repository identity was pinned from the *install*
+checkout remote even when a cross-repository ``canonical_repository_root`` was
+configured to an external repository (e.g. mcp-control-plane). The mutation
+preflight then derived ``expected_slug`` from that install-derived pin and
+``_enforce_canonical_repository_root`` failed closed on a self-inflicted
+identity mismatch, so the stated cross-repo namespaces stayed blocked.
+
+These tests use two *real* temporary git repositories and drive the live
+``mcp_server._seed_session_context`` and ``mcp_server._enforce_canonical_repository_root``
+functions, asserting the session pins the *configured target* identity and that
+enforcement accepts the target worktree — while every fail-closed property is
+preserved.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest import mock
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import mcp_server  # noqa: E402  # loads gitea_mcp_server.py into this namespace
+import canonical_repository_root as crr  # noqa: E402
+import session_context_binding as session_ctx  # noqa: E402
+
+INSTALL_URL = "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
+TARGET_SLUG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/mcp-control-plane"
+TARGET_URL = "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/mcp-control-plane.git"
+OTHER_URL = "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/other-repo.git"
+
+
+def _git(cwd: str, *args: str) -> str:
+    return subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "-C", cwd, *args], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True
+    ).stdout.strip()
+
+
+def _init_repo(path: Path, remote_url: str) -> str:
+    path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    _git(str(path), "init", "-q")
+    _git(str(path), "config", "user.email", "[email protected]")
+    _git(str(path), "config", "user.name", "Test")
+    _git(str(path), "remote", "add", "prgs", remote_url)
+    (path / "README.md").write_text("seed\n")
+    _git(str(path), "add", "README.md")
+    _git(str(path), "commit", "-q", "-m", "seed")
+    return os.path.realpath(str(path))
+
+
+def _add_worktree(repo_root: str, wt: Path, branch: str) -> str:
+    _git(repo_root, "worktree", "add", "-q", "-b", branch, str(wt))
+    return os.path.realpath(str(wt))
+
+
+def _profile(role: str, *, canonical: str | None = None,
+             allowed=(TARGET_SLUG,)) -> dict:
+    p = {
+        "profile_name": f"mcp-control-plane-{role}",
+        "role": role,
+        "username": "svc",
+        "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read"],
+        "forbidden_operations": [],
+        "allowed_repositories": list(allowed),
+    }
+    if canonical is not None:
+        p["canonical_repository_root"] = canonical
+    return p
+
+
+class _Base(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        tmp = Path(self._tmp.name)
+        self.install = _init_repo(tmp / "Gitea-Tools", INSTALL_URL)
+        self.target = _init_repo(tmp / "mcp-control-plane", TARGET_URL)
+        (Path(self.target) / "branches").mkdir()
+        self.target_wt = _add_worktree(
+            self.target, Path(self.target) / "branches" / "author-issue-1",
+            "feat/issue-1",
+        )
+        # PROJECT_ROOT and the install git remote are the Gitea-Tools install
+        # checkout — exactly the source that (mis)seeded the session before.
+        self._p_root = mock.patch.object(mcp_server, "PROJECT_ROOT", self.install)
+        self._p_url = mock.patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "_local_git_remote_url", return_value=INSTALL_URL
+        )
+        self._p_root.start()
+        self._p_url.start()
+        session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        mock.patch.stopall()
+        session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+
+    def _seed(self, profile, env=None):
+        session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+        with mock.patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile), \
+                mock.patch.dict(os.environ, env or {}, clear=False):
+            return mcp_server._seed_session_context(
+                profile=profile, remote="prgs", host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+                identity="svc",
+            )
+
+    def _enforce(self, profile, env=None):
+        with mock.patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile), \
+                mock.patch.dict(os.environ, env or {}, clear=False):
+            mcp_server._enforce_canonical_repository_root(
+                self.target_wt, remote="prgs"
+            )
+
+
+class TestF1SeedsConfiguredTargetIdentity(_Base):
+    def test_env_config_seeds_target_not_install(self):
+        ctx = self._seed(
+            _profile("reviewer"),
+            env={crr.CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV: self.target},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], "mcp-control-plane")
+        # Regression guard: must NOT be the install repo.
+        self.assertNotEqual(ctx["repository"], "Gitea-Tools")
+
+    def test_profile_field_seeds_target_not_install(self):
+        ctx = self._seed(_profile("merger", canonical=self.target))
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], "mcp-control-plane")
+        self.assertNotEqual(ctx["repository"], "Gitea-Tools")
+
+    def test_enforce_accepts_target_after_seed_reviewer(self):
+        prof = _profile("reviewer", canonical=self.target)
+        self._seed(prof)
+        # Would raise RuntimeError on the self-inflicted identity mismatch
+        # before the fix.
+        self._enforce(prof)
+
+    def test_enforce_accepts_target_after_seed_merger(self):
+        prof = _profile("merger", canonical=self.target)
+        self._seed(prof)
+        self._enforce(prof)
+
+    def test_env_overrides_profile_for_seed(self):
+        # profile points at install; env points at the real target → env wins.
+        prof = _profile("reviewer", canonical=self.install,
+                        allowed=(TARGET_SLUG,))
+        ctx = self._seed(prof, env={crr.CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV: self.target})
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], "mcp-control-plane")
+
+
+class TestUnconfiguredDefaultUnchanged(_Base):
+    def test_unconfigured_keeps_install_identity(self):
+        prof = _profile("author", allowed=("Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools",))
+        ctx = self._seed(prof)  # no env, no profile canonical field
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], "Gitea-Tools")
+        self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
+
+
+class TestFailClosed(_Base):
+    def _trusted(self, profile, env=None, *, for_mutation=True):
+        with mock.patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile), \
+                mock.patch.dict(os.environ, env or {}, clear=False):
+            return mcp_server._trusted_session_repository(
+                profile, "prgs", for_mutation=for_mutation
+            )
+
+    def test_nonexistent_configured_root_fails_closed(self):
+        res = self._trusted(
+            _profile("reviewer"),
+            env={crr.CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV: self.target + "-missing"},
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(res["repository"])
+        self.assertTrue(res["reasons"])
+
+    def test_non_git_configured_root_fails_closed(self):
+        plain = Path(self._tmp.name) / "plain"
+        plain.mkdir()
+        res = self._trusted(
+            _profile("reviewer"), env={crr.CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV: str(plain)}
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(res["repository"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("git" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_unallowlisted_target_identity_fails_closed(self):
+        # Configured target is valid, but the profile does not authorize it.
+        res = self._trusted(
+            _profile("reviewer", canonical=self.target,
+                     allowed=("Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools",)),
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(res["repository"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("scope" in r.lower() for r in res["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_forged_identity_conflict_fails_closed_at_enforce(self):
+        # Seed the target, then present a *different* configured root at
+        # enforcement time: the session pin no longer matches → fail closed.
+        other = _init_repo(Path(self._tmp.name) / "other", OTHER_URL)
+        prof_seed = _profile("reviewer", canonical=self.target)
+        self._seed(prof_seed)
+        prof_drift = _profile(
+            "reviewer", canonical=other,
+            allowed=(TARGET_SLUG, "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/other-repo"),
+        )
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
+            self._enforce(prof_drift)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_714_production_first_bind.py

@@ -0,0 +1,509 @@
+"""#714: production first-bind pins the workspace-verified repository scope.
+
+These tests drive the real entry points (``gitea_whoami``,
+``gitea_get_runtime_context``, ``gitea_resolve_task_capability``,
+``gitea_activate_profile``) in production order. They deliberately do not
+construct a ``_SessionContext`` directly: the defect they cover is that the
+production first-bind path left ``repository``/``org`` unbound, so
+``assess_session_context`` skipped its repository/org drift checks and a
+same-host mutation against another repository was not blocked.
+
+The trusted repository identity comes from the workspace-aligned git remote
+(``Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools`` for this checkout), never from
+``REMOTES`` (whose ``prgs`` default repo is ``Timesheet``) and never from a
+caller-supplied ``org``/``repo`` argument.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
+import gitea_mcp_server as srv  # noqa: E402
+import mcp_server  # noqa: E402
+import session_context_binding as session_ctx  # noqa: E402
+
+WORKSPACE_ORG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
+WORKSPACE_REPO = "Gitea-Tools"
+WORKSPACE_SLUG = f"{WORKSPACE_ORG}/{WORKSPACE_REPO}"
+WORKSPACE_URL = f"https://gitea.prgs.cc/{WORKSPACE_SLUG}.git"
+
+_BASE_AUTHOR_OPS = [
+    "gitea.read",
+    "gitea.issue.create",
+    "gitea.issue.comment",
+    "gitea.pr.create",
+    "gitea.pr.comment",
+    "gitea.branch.push",
+    "gitea.repo.commit",
+]
+
+
+def _config(allowed_repositories=None):
+    profile = {
+        "enabled": True,
+        "context": "prgs",
+        "role": "author",
+        "username": "jcwalker3",
+        "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+        "auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_AUTHOR"},
+        "allowed_operations": list(_BASE_AUTHOR_OPS),
+        "forbidden_operations": [
+            "gitea.pr.approve",
+            "gitea.pr.merge",
+            "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+        ],
+        "execution_profile": "prgs-author",
+    }
+    if allowed_repositories is not None:
+        profile["allowed_repositories"] = list(allowed_repositories)
+    return {
+        "version": 2,
+        # v2-contexts normalizes the config and keeps only rules.* — a
+        # top-level allow_runtime_switching would be dropped.
+        "rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": True},
+        "contexts": {
+            "prgs": {
+                "enabled": True,
+                "gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc"},
+            },
+            "mdcps": {
+                "enabled": True,
+                "gitea": {
+                    "enabled": True,
+                    "base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
+                },
+            },
+        },
+        "profiles": {"prgs-author": profile},
+    }
+
+
+class _ProductionOrderBase(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Real entry points, pinned workspace remote, mocked network only."""
+
+    allowed_repositories = [WORKSPACE_SLUG]
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.config_path = os.path.join(self._dir.name, "profiles.json")
+        with open(self.config_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            fh.write(json.dumps(_config(self.allowed_repositories)))
+        self._env = {
+            "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
+            "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_AUTHOR": "prgs-author-token",
+        }
+        gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        srv._MUTATION_AUTHORITY = None
+        # Pin the workspace git remote so the trusted source is deterministic
+        # and never depends on the developer's checkout layout.
+        self._remote_url = patch.object(
+            srv, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=self._local_remote_url
+        )
+        self._remote_url.start()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._remote_url.stop()
+        gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        srv._MUTATION_AUTHORITY = None
+        self._dir.cleanup()
+
+    def _local_remote_url(self, remote_name):
+        return WORKSPACE_URL if remote_name == "prgs" else None
+
+    def _api(self, method, url, header):
+        return {
+            "login": "jcwalker3",
+            "full_name": "Test",
+            "id": 1,
+            "email": "[email protected]",
+        }
+
+    def _live(self):
+        return patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api)
+
+
+class TestProductionFirstBindPinsRepository(_ProductionOrderBase):
+    def test_whoami_first_bind_is_complete(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+            ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
+            self.assertIsNotNone(ctx)
+            self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], WORKSPACE_ORG)
+            self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], WORKSPACE_REPO)
+            self.assertEqual(ctx["remote"], "prgs")
+            self.assertEqual(ctx["host"], "gitea.prgs.cc")
+
+    def test_runtime_context_first_bind_is_complete(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_get_runtime_context(remote="prgs")
+            ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
+            self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], WORKSPACE_ORG)
+            self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], WORKSPACE_REPO)
+
+    def test_capability_preflight_first_bind_is_complete(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="comment_issue", remote="prgs")
+            ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
+            self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], WORKSPACE_ORG)
+            self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], WORKSPACE_REPO)
+
+    def test_activate_profile_binds_complete_context(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_activate_profile(profile_name="prgs-author", remote="prgs")
+            ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
+            self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], WORKSPACE_ORG)
+            self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], WORKSPACE_REPO)
+
+
+class TestProductionOrderRepositoryDriftBlocks(_ProductionOrderBase):
+    def test_whoami_then_same_host_other_repository_blocks(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+            blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                remote="prgs", org=WORKSPACE_ORG, repo="Other-Tools"
+            )
+            self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+            self.assertTrue(
+                any("Other-Tools" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]), blocked["reasons"]
+            )
+
+    def test_whoami_then_timesheet_blocks(self):
+        """REMOTES['prgs'].repo is Timesheet — a default target, not a scope."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+            blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                remote="prgs",
+                org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
+                repo="Timesheet",
+                org_explicit=True,
+                repo_explicit=True,
+            )
+            self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+            self.assertTrue(
+                any("Timesheet" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]), blocked["reasons"]
+            )
+
+    def test_whoami_then_same_host_other_org_blocks(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+            blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                remote="prgs", org="Other-Org", repo=WORKSPACE_REPO
+            )
+            self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+            self.assertTrue(
+                any("Other-Org" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]), blocked["reasons"]
+            )
+
+    def test_runtime_context_then_other_repository_blocks(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_get_runtime_context(remote="prgs")
+            blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                remote="prgs", org=WORKSPACE_ORG, repo="Other-Tools"
+            )
+            self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+
+    def test_capability_preflight_then_other_repository_blocks(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="comment_issue", remote="prgs")
+            blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                remote="prgs", org=WORKSPACE_ORG, repo="Other-Tools"
+            )
+            self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+
+    def test_activate_profile_then_other_repository_blocks(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_activate_profile(profile_name="prgs-author", remote="prgs")
+            blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                remote="prgs", org="Other-Org", repo="Other-Tools"
+            )
+            self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+
+    def test_cross_host_still_blocks(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+            blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(remote="dadeschools")
+            self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+            self.assertTrue(
+                any("cross-host" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]), blocked["reasons"]
+            )
+
+    def test_authorized_repository_mutation_remains_allowed(self):
+        """Normal PR #715 author comment/push path must stay functional."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+            self.assertIsNone(
+                srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                    remote="prgs", org=WORKSPACE_ORG, repo=WORKSPACE_REPO
+                )
+            )
+            # A bare call with no override resolves to the same bound scope.
+            self.assertIsNone(srv._session_context_mutation_block(remote="prgs"))
+
+
+class TestMutationRequestCannotEstablishBinding(_ProductionOrderBase):
+    def test_caller_values_cannot_establish_binding_on_first_mutation(self):
+        """A mutation-first session must not be pinned by request values."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            self.assertIsNone(session_ctx.get_session_context())
+            srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                remote="prgs", org="Attacker-Org", repo="Attacker-Repo"
+            )
+            ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
+            self.assertIsNotNone(ctx)
+            # Bound to the verified workspace, never to the request values.
+            self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], WORKSPACE_ORG)
+            self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], WORKSPACE_REPO)
+
+    def test_mutation_first_with_attacker_values_is_blocked(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                remote="prgs", org="Attacker-Org", repo="Attacker-Repo"
+            )
+            self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+
+    def test_later_call_cannot_overwrite_bound_repository(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+            before = session_ctx.get_session_context()
+            for _ in range(3):
+                srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                    remote="prgs", org="Other-Org", repo="Other-Tools"
+                )
+            self.assertEqual(session_ctx.get_session_context(), before)
+
+
+class TestUnverifiedWorkspaceFailsClosed(_ProductionOrderBase):
+    def _local_remote_url(self, remote_name):
+        return None  # no verifiable workspace repository
+
+    def test_mutation_blocks_when_workspace_repository_unverified(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+            ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
+            self.assertIsNone(ctx["repository"])
+            blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                remote="prgs", org=WORKSPACE_ORG, repo=WORKSPACE_REPO
+            )
+            self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+            self.assertTrue(
+                any(
+                    "no verified workspace repository" in r or "unverified" in r
+                    for r in blocked["reasons"]
+                ),
+                blocked["reasons"],
+            )
+
+    def test_activate_profile_rejects_unverifiable_workspace(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            res = srv.gitea_activate_profile(profile_name="prgs-author", remote="prgs")
+            self.assertFalse(res.get("success", True))
+            self.assertEqual(res.get("blocker_kind"), "repository_scope")
+
+
+class TestUnauthorizedWorkspaceFailsClosed(_ProductionOrderBase):
+    allowed_repositories = ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Some-Other-Project"]
+
+    def test_workspace_absent_from_allowlist_blocks_mutation(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(remote="prgs")
+            self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+            self.assertTrue(
+                any("not authorized" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]),
+                blocked["reasons"],
+            )
+
+    def test_workspace_absent_from_allowlist_blocks_activation(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            res = srv.gitea_activate_profile(profile_name="prgs-author", remote="prgs")
+            self.assertFalse(res.get("success", True))
+            self.assertEqual(res.get("blocker_kind"), "repository_scope")
+
+
+class TestTimesheetNotAuthorizedInThisPhase(_ProductionOrderBase):
+    """Cross-project use is paused: only Gitea-Tools is authorized."""
+
+    def test_timesheet_workspace_is_rejected(self):
+        def timesheet_remote(remote_name):
+            return "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet.git"
+
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            with patch.object(
+                srv, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=timesheet_remote
+            ):
+                blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(remote="prgs")
+                self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+                self.assertTrue(
+                    any("not authorized" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]),
+                    blocked["reasons"],
+                )
+
+
+class TestConcurrentFirstBindSelectsOneRepository(_ProductionOrderBase):
+    def test_concurrent_initialization_cannot_change_selected_repository(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            self.assertIsNone(session_ctx.get_session_context())
+            thread_count = 8
+            barrier = threading.Barrier(thread_count)
+            results = []
+            lock = threading.Lock()
+
+            def racer(index: int) -> None:
+                barrier.wait()
+                srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                    remote="prgs", org=f"Racer-Org-{index}", repo=f"Racer-Repo-{index}"
+                )
+                with lock:
+                    results.append(session_ctx.get_session_context())
+
+            threads = [
+                threading.Thread(target=racer, args=(i,)) for i in range(thread_count)
+            ]
+            for thread in threads:
+                thread.start()
+            for thread in threads:
+                thread.join(timeout=10)
+
+            self.assertFalse(any(t.is_alive() for t in threads))
+            winner = session_ctx.get_session_context()
+            self.assertEqual(winner["org"], WORKSPACE_ORG)
+            self.assertEqual(winner["repository"], WORKSPACE_REPO)
+            self.assertEqual(results, [winner] * thread_count)
+
+
+class TestRepositoryScopeUnits(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_absent_scope_is_not_enforced_for_read_diagnostics(self):
+        scope = session_ctx.assess_repository_scope(
+            workspace_slug=WORKSPACE_SLUG, allowed=[], profile_name="legacy"
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(scope["proven"])
+        self.assertFalse(scope["scope_enforced"])
+
+    def test_require_scope_blocks_empty_or_missing_allowlist(self):
+        scope = session_ctx.assess_repository_scope(
+            workspace_slug=WORKSPACE_SLUG,
+            allowed=[],
+            profile_name="legacy",
+            require_scope=True,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(scope["block"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("allowed_repositories" in r for r in scope["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_declared_scope_authorizes_only_listed_repository(self):
+        allowed = session_ctx.declared_allowed_repositories(
+            {"allowed_repositories": [WORKSPACE_SLUG]}
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(allowed, [WORKSPACE_SLUG])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            session_ctx.assess_repository_scope(
+                workspace_slug=WORKSPACE_SLUG, allowed=allowed
+            )["proven"]
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(
+            session_ctx.assess_repository_scope(
+                workspace_slug="Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet", allowed=allowed
+            )["block"]
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_workspace_slug_blocks_when_scope_declared(self):
+        scope = session_ctx.assess_repository_scope(
+            workspace_slug=None, allowed=[WORKSPACE_SLUG]
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(scope["block"])
+
+    def test_override_must_match_binding(self):
+        self.assertTrue(
+            session_ctx.assess_repository_override(
+                requested_org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
+                requested_repo="Other",
+                bound_org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
+                bound_repo=WORKSPACE_REPO,
+            )["block"]
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(
+            session_ctx.assess_repository_override(
+                requested_org="Other-Org",
+                requested_repo=WORKSPACE_REPO,
+                bound_org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
+                bound_repo=WORKSPACE_REPO,
+            )["block"]
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(
+            session_ctx.assess_repository_override(
+                requested_org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
+                requested_repo=WORKSPACE_REPO,
+                bound_org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
+                bound_repo=WORKSPACE_REPO,
+            )["proven"]
+        )
+
+    def test_malformed_allowlist_entries_are_ignored_in_non_strict_mode(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            session_ctx.declared_allowed_repositories(
+                {"allowed_repositories": ["not-a-slug", 17, None, WORKSPACE_SLUG]}
+            ),
+            [WORKSPACE_SLUG],
+        )
+
+    def test_strict_mode_rejects_malformed_allowlist_entries(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            session_ctx.declared_allowed_repositories(
+                {"allowed_repositories": ["not-a-slug", WORKSPACE_SLUG]},
+                strict=True,
+            )
+
+
+class TestRemotesDefaultNotCallerOverride(_ProductionOrderBase):
+    def test_resolved_timesheet_default_does_not_block_when_bound_to_workspace(self):
+        """Tools historically pass REMOTES-filled Timesheet after _resolve; that
+        must not be treated as an explicit override against Gitea-Tools."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+            # Simulate create_issue after resolve: org/repo are REMOTES defaults
+            blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                remote="prgs",
+                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                repo="Timesheet",
+            )
+            self.assertIsNone(blocked, getattr(blocked, "get", lambda *_: blocked)("reasons") if blocked else None)
+
+    def test_git_unavailable_blocks_mutation(self):
+        def no_remote(_name):
+            return None
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            with patch.object(srv, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=no_remote):
+                blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(remote="prgs")
+                self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+                self.assertTrue(
+                    any(
+                        "workspace" in r.lower() or "allowed_repositories" in r or "unverified" in r
+                        for r in blocked["reasons"]
+                    ),
+                    blocked["reasons"],
+                )
+
+    def test_explicit_mismatch_still_blocks(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
+            srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+            blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
+                remote="prgs",
+                org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
+                repo="Other-Tools",
+            )
+            self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_714_session_context_immutability.py

@@ -0,0 +1,745 @@
+"""#714: fail closed on cross-host MCP profile drift and capability substitution."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
+import mcp_server  # noqa: E402
+import session_context_binding as session_ctx  # noqa: E402
+
+
+CONFIG_714 = {
+    "version": 2,
+    "allow_runtime_switching": True,
+    "contexts": {
+        "prgs": {
+            "enabled": True,
+            "gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc"},
+        },
+        "mdcps": {
+            "enabled": True,
+            "gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net"},
+        },
+    },
+    "profiles": {
+        "prgs-author": {
+            "enabled": True,
+            "context": "prgs",
+            "role": "author",
+            "username": "jcwalker3",
+            "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+            "auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_AUTHOR"},
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read",
+                "gitea.issue.create",
+                "gitea.issue.comment",
+                "gitea.issue.close",
+                "gitea.pr.create",
+                "gitea.pr.comment",
+                "gitea.branch.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+                "gitea.repo.commit",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [
+                "gitea.pr.approve",
+                "gitea.pr.merge",
+                "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+            ],
+            "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"],
+            "execution_profile": "prgs-author",
+        },
+        "mdcps-reviewer": {
+            "enabled": True,
+            "context": "mdcps",
+            "role": "reviewer",
+            "username": "913443",
+            "base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
+            "auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_MDCPS_REVIEWER"},
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read",
+                "gitea.pr.review",
+                "gitea.pr.comment",
+                "gitea.pr.approve",
+                "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [
+                "gitea.branch.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+                "gitea.pr.create",
+                "gitea.pr.merge",
+                "gitea.repo.commit",
+            ],
+            "allowed_repositories": ["913443/eAgenda"],
+            "execution_profile": "mdcps-reviewer",
+        },
+        "mdcps-author": {
+            "enabled": True,
+            "context": "mdcps",
+            "role": "author",
+            "username": "913443",
+            "base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
+            "auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_MDCPS_AUTHOR"},
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read",
+                "gitea.issue.create",
+                "gitea.issue.comment",
+                "gitea.pr.create",
+                "gitea.pr.comment",
+                "gitea.branch.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+                "gitea.repo.commit",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [
+                "gitea.pr.approve",
+                "gitea.pr.merge",
+                "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+            ],
+            "allowed_repositories": ["913443/eAgenda"],
+            "execution_profile": "mdcps-author",
+        },
+    },
+}
+
+
+class TestIssue714SessionContextImmutability(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.config_path = os.path.join(self._dir.name, "profiles.json")
+        with open(self.config_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            fh.write(json.dumps(CONFIG_714))
+        self._remotes = patch.dict(
+            mcp_server.REMOTES,
+            {
+                "dadeschools": {
+                    "host": "gitea.dadeschools.net",
+                    "org": "913443",
+                    "repo": "eAgenda",
+                },
+                "prgs": {
+                    "host": "gitea.prgs.cc",
+                    "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                    "repo": "Gitea-Tools",
+                },
+            },
+            clear=False,
+        )
+        self._remotes.start()
+        def _url(name):
+            if name == "dadeschools":
+                return "https://gitea.dadeschools.net/913443/eAgenda.git"
+            if name == "prgs":
+                return "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
+            return None
+        self._url_patch = patch.object(mcp_server, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=_url)
+        self._url_patch.start()
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+        mcp_server._MUTATION_AUTHORITY = None
+        self._env = {
+            "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
+            "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "mdcps-reviewer",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_MDCPS_REVIEWER": "mdcps-reviewer-token",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_MDCPS_AUTHOR": "mdcps-author-token",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_AUTHOR": "prgs-author-token",
+        }
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._url_patch.stop()
+        self._remotes.stop()
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+        mcp_server._MUTATION_AUTHORITY = None
+        self._dir.cleanup()
+
+    def _api_side_effect(self, method, url, header):
+        # Token identity mapping for whoami endpoint
+        auth = str(header)
+        if "mdcps-reviewer-token" in auth or "mdcps-author-token" in auth:
+            login = "913443"
+        else:
+            login = "jcwalker3"
+        return {"login": login, "full_name": "Test", "id": 1, "email": "[email protected]"}
+
+    def test_pin_mdcps_reviewer_never_drifts_to_prgs_author(self):
+        """Reproduce the incident: pin mdcps-reviewer then resolve comment_issue."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
+            with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
+                act = mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
+                    profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                self.assertTrue(act["success"])
+                self.assertEqual(act["after_profile"], "mdcps-reviewer")
+
+                who1 = mcp_server.gitea_whoami(remote="dadeschools")
+                self.assertEqual(who1["profile"]["profile_name"], "mdcps-reviewer")
+                self.assertEqual(who1["username"], "913443")
+
+                # Capability that mdcps-reviewer lacks — must NOT switch to prgs-author
+                res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                    task="comment_issue", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "mdcps-reviewer")
+                self.assertFalse(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
+                self.assertFalse(res.get("auto_profile_substitution", True))
+                self.assertNotIn("prgs-author", res["matching_configured_profile"])
+                self.assertIn("mdcps-author", res["matching_configured_profile"])
+
+                who2 = mcp_server.gitea_whoami(remote="dadeschools")
+                rt = mcp_server.gitea_get_runtime_context(remote="dadeschools")
+                self.assertEqual(who2["profile"]["profile_name"], "mdcps-reviewer")
+                self.assertEqual(rt["active_profile"], "mdcps-reviewer")
+                # Still pinned — never prgs-author
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "mdcps-reviewer"
+                )
+
+    def test_repeated_calls_remain_on_mdcps_reviewer(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
+            with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
+                mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
+                    profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                for _ in range(5):
+                    res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                        task="review_pr", remote="dadeschools"
+                    )
+                    self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "mdcps-reviewer")
+                    who = mcp_server.gitea_whoami(remote="dadeschools")
+                    self.assertEqual(who["profile"]["profile_name"], "mdcps-reviewer")
+                    rt = mcp_server.gitea_get_runtime_context(remote="dadeschools")
+                    self.assertEqual(rt["active_profile"], "mdcps-reviewer")
+
+    def test_dadeschools_request_cannot_resolve_through_prgs_author(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
+            with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
+                mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
+                    profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                    task="comment_issue", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                self.assertNotEqual(res["active_profile"], "prgs-author")
+                self.assertNotIn("prgs-author", res["matching_configured_profile"])
+                # Gate must not silently switch either
+                blocked = mcp_server._profile_permission_block(
+                    "gitea.issue.comment", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+                self.assertFalse(blocked.get("success", True))
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "mdcps-reviewer"
+                )
+
+    def test_prgs_request_cannot_resolve_through_mdcps_profile(self):
+        """Reverse of the incident: a pinned MDCPS profile must never serve a
+        prgs request, nor be silently swapped for the prgs-side profile."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
+            with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
+                mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
+                    profile_name="mdcps-author", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                    task="create_issue", remote="prgs"
+                )
+                self.assertNotEqual(res["active_profile"], "prgs-author")
+                self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "mdcps-author")
+                self.assertFalse(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
+                self.assertTrue(res["stop_required"])
+                blocked = mcp_server._session_context_mutation_block(remote="prgs")
+                self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+                self.assertTrue(any("cross-host" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]))
+                self.assertEqual(gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "mdcps-author")
+
+    def test_unsupported_capability_fails_closed_structured(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
+            with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
+                mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
+                    profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                    task="comment_issue", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                self.assertFalse(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
+                self.assertTrue(res["stop_required"])
+                self.assertIn("reason", res)
+                self.assertIn("exact_safe_next_action", res)
+                self.assertIn("activate_profile", res["exact_safe_next_action"])
+                # Unknown task still fail closed (structured denial after #723;
+                # never raises into internal_error and never substitutes profile).
+                unknown = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                    task="reopen_issue", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                self.assertFalse(unknown.get("allowed_in_current_session"))
+                self.assertTrue(unknown.get("stop_required"))
+                self.assertEqual(unknown.get("reason_code"), "unknown_task")
+                self.assertEqual(unknown.get("mutation_performed"), False)
+                self.assertEqual(unknown.get("active_profile"), "mdcps-reviewer")
+                self.assertNotEqual(unknown.get("active_profile"), "prgs-author")
+
+    def test_identity_mismatch_blocks_mutation(self):
+        """Profile expects 913443 but authenticated as jcwalker3."""
+
+        def wrong_identity(method, url, header):
+            return {
+                "login": "jcwalker3",
+                "full_name": "Wrong",
+                "id": 9,
+                "email": "[email protected]",
+            }
+
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
+            with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=wrong_identity):
+                mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
+                    profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                blocked = mcp_server._session_context_mutation_block(
+                    remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+                self.assertTrue(
+                    any("identity mismatch" in r for r in blocked["reasons"])
+                )
+
+    def test_repository_host_mismatch_blocks_mutation(self):
+        """mdcps-reviewer cannot serve prgs remote."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
+            with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
+                mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
+                    profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                blocked = mcp_server._session_context_mutation_block(remote="prgs")
+                self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+                self.assertTrue(
+                    any("cross-host" in r for r in blocked["reasons"])
+                )
+
+    def test_drift_cannot_reach_write(self):
+        """Simulated mid-session profile override cannot pass permission gate."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
+            with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
+                mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
+                    profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                # Bind session as mdcps-reviewer
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    session_ctx.get_session_context()["profile_name"],
+                    "mdcps-reviewer",
+                )
+                # Hostile override without activate_profile
+                gitea_config._active_profile_override = "prgs-author"
+                blocked = mcp_server._session_context_mutation_block(
+                    remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+                self.assertTrue(any("drift" in r or "cross-host" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_static_prgs_author_still_works(self):
+        env = {
+            "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
+            "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_AUTHOR": "prgs-author-token",
+        }
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
+            with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
+                gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+                res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                    task="create_issue", remote="prgs"
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "prgs-author")
+                self.assertTrue(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
+                self.assertEqual(res["active_identity"], "jcwalker3")
+
+    def test_static_mdcps_author_still_works(self):
+        env = {
+            "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
+            "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "mdcps-author",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_MDCPS_AUTHOR": "mdcps-author-token",
+        }
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
+            with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
+                gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+                res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                    task="comment_issue", remote="dadeschools"
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "mdcps-author")
+                self.assertTrue(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
+                self.assertNotIn("prgs-author", res["matching_configured_profile"])
+
+
+class TestSessionContextBindingUnit(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_profile_matches_remote_by_base_url(self):
+        remotes = {
+            "dadeschools": {"host": "gitea.dadeschools.net"},
+            "prgs": {"host": "gitea.prgs.cc"},
+        }
+        mdcps = {"base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net", "context": "mdcps"}
+        prgs = {"base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc", "context": "prgs"}
+        self.assertTrue(
+            session_ctx.profile_matches_remote(mdcps, "dadeschools", remotes)
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(session_ctx.profile_matches_remote(mdcps, "prgs", remotes))
+        self.assertTrue(session_ctx.profile_matches_remote(prgs, "prgs", remotes))
+
+    def test_bind_and_detect_drift(self):
+        session_ctx.bind_session_context(
+            profile_name="mdcps-reviewer",
+            remote="dadeschools",
+            host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
+            identity="913443",
+            source="test",
+        )
+        ok = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
+            profile_name="mdcps-reviewer",
+            remote="dadeschools",
+            host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
+            identity="913443",
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(ok["proven"])
+        bad = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            remote="dadeschools",
+            host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
+            identity="jcwalker3",
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(bad["block"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("drift" in r for r in bad["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_bound_context_survives_multiple_calls_and_exceptions(self):
+        original = session_ctx.bind_session_context(
+            profile_name="mdcps-reviewer",
+            remote="dadeschools",
+            host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
+            identity="913443",
+            source="test",
+        )
+
+        try:
+            for _ in range(3):
+                observed = session_ctx.seed_session_context_if_unbound(
+                    profile_name="prgs-author",
+                    remote="prgs",
+                    host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+                    identity="jcwalker3",
+                    source="interleaved-test-call",
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(observed, original)
+            raise RuntimeError("simulated caller failure")
+        except RuntimeError:
+            pass
+
+        self.assertEqual(session_ctx.get_session_context(), original)
+        drift = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+            identity="jcwalker3",
+            require_bound=True,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(drift["block"])
+
+    def test_parallel_calls_cannot_overwrite_established_binding(self):
+        original = session_ctx.bind_session_context(
+            profile_name="mdcps-reviewer",
+            remote="dadeschools",
+            host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
+            identity="913443",
+            source="test",
+        )
+        barrier = threading.Barrier(9)
+        results = []
+        results_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+        def competing_seed(index: int) -> None:
+            barrier.wait()
+            result = session_ctx.seed_session_context_if_unbound(
+                profile_name=f"prgs-author-{index}",
+                remote="prgs",
+                host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+                identity=f"other-{index}",
+                source="parallel-test-call",
+            )
+            with results_lock:
+                results.append(result)
+
+        threads = [threading.Thread(target=competing_seed, args=(i,)) for i in range(8)]
+        for thread in threads:
+            thread.start()
+        barrier.wait()
+        for thread in threads:
+            thread.join(timeout=5)
+
+        self.assertFalse(any(thread.is_alive() for thread in threads))
+        self.assertEqual(results, [original] * 8)
+        self.assertEqual(session_ctx.get_session_context(), original)
+
+    def test_concurrent_initialization_has_single_winning_binding(self):
+        """Racing first-binds from an unbound context: exactly one winner, and
+        every racer observes that same complete binding (never a partial one)."""
+        self.assertIsNone(session_ctx.get_session_context())
+        thread_count = 8
+        barrier = threading.Barrier(thread_count)
+        results = []
+        results_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+        def racing_seed(index: int) -> None:
+            barrier.wait()
+            result = session_ctx.seed_session_context_if_unbound(
+                profile_name=f"prgs-author-{index}",
+                remote="prgs",
+                host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+                identity=f"user-{index}",
+                source="concurrent-init-test",
+            )
+            with results_lock:
+                results.append(result)
+
+        threads = [
+            threading.Thread(target=racing_seed, args=(i,))
+            for i in range(thread_count)
+        ]
+        for thread in threads:
+            thread.start()
+        for thread in threads:
+            thread.join(timeout=5)
+
+        self.assertFalse(any(thread.is_alive() for thread in threads))
+        winner = session_ctx.get_session_context()
+        self.assertIsNotNone(winner)
+        self.assertEqual(len(results), thread_count)
+        self.assertEqual(results, [winner] * thread_count)
+        # A losing racer's identity must never be spliced into the winner.
+        self.assertEqual(
+            winner["identity"], winner["profile_name"].replace("prgs-author-", "user-")
+        )
+
+    def test_repository_mismatch_blocks_before_mutation(self):
+        """Same host and profile, different repository, must still fail closed."""
+        session_ctx.bind_session_context(
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+            identity="jcwalker3",
+            repository="Gitea-Tools",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            source="test",
+        )
+        same = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+            identity="jcwalker3",
+            repository="Gitea-Tools",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            require_bound=True,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(same["proven"])
+        other_repo = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+            identity="jcwalker3",
+            repository="eAgenda",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            require_bound=True,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(other_repo["block"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("repository drift" in r for r in other_repo["reasons"])
+        )
+        other_org = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+            identity="jcwalker3",
+            repository="Gitea-Tools",
+            org="913443",
+            require_bound=True,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(other_org["block"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("org drift" in r for r in other_org["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_returned_snapshot_cannot_mutate_binding(self):
+        session_ctx.bind_session_context(
+            profile_name="mdcps-reviewer",
+            remote="dadeschools",
+            host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
+            identity="913443",
+            source="test",
+        )
+        snapshot = session_ctx.get_session_context()
+        snapshot["profile_name"] = "prgs-author"
+        self.assertEqual(
+            session_ctx.get_session_context()["profile_name"], "mdcps-reviewer"
+        )
+
+
+class TestSessionContextTestBoundaryIsolation(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_mdcps_binding_starts_clean_and_does_not_escape_test(self):
+        self.assertIsNone(session_ctx.get_session_context())
+        session_ctx.bind_session_context(
+            profile_name="mdcps-reviewer",
+            remote="dadeschools",
+            host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
+            identity="913443",
+            source="test-boundary",
+        )
+
+    def test_prgs_binding_starts_clean_and_does_not_escape_test(self):
+        self.assertIsNone(session_ctx.get_session_context())
+        session_ctx.bind_session_context(
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+            identity="jcwalker3",
+            source="test-boundary",
+        )
+
+    def test_reset_helper_is_rejected_outside_pytest_boundary(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
+            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
+                session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+
+
+class TestIssue714MergeCoexistenceWithMaster(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Conflict-resolution regressions after merging advanced master into #715.
+
+    Preserves:
+    - #714 immutable session / no auto profile substitution
+    - #685 side-effect-free resolve (auto_recover=False)
+    - #709 actor identity helper from master
+    """
+
+    def test_auto_switch_helpers_remain_fail_closed(self):
+        self.assertFalse(mcp_server._try_auto_switch_for_operation("gitea.pr.review"))
+        self.assertFalse(
+            mcp_server._try_auto_switch_for_operation(
+                "gitea.issue.comment", host="gitea.prgs.cc"
+            )
+        )
+        # Active profile is prgs-author; cannot match mdcps review permission
+        # and must not switch.
+        with patch.object(
+            mcp_server,
+            "get_profile",
+            return_value={
+                "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+                "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create"],
+                "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.approve"],
+                "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+                "context": "prgs",
+            },
+        ):
+            matched = mcp_server._ensure_matching_profile(
+                "gitea.pr.approve", "reviewer", remote="prgs"
+            )
+            self.assertIsNone(matched)
+            self.assertNotEqual(
+                gitea_config.selected_profile_name() or "prgs-author",
+                "mdcps-reviewer",
+            )
+
+    def test_authenticated_actor_helper_survives_merge(self):
+        """Master #709 F7 actor identity coexists with #714 immutability."""
+        self.assertTrue(hasattr(mcp_server, "_authenticated_actor"))
+        with patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value={"Authorization": "token x"}
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server.api_request",
+            return_value={"id": 42, "login": "sysadmin"},
+        ):
+            mcp_server._ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+            actor = mcp_server._authenticated_actor("gitea.prgs.cc")
+            self.assertEqual(actor.get("user_id"), 42)
+            self.assertEqual(actor.get("login"), "sysadmin")
+            # Cached; second call does not re-request
+            with patch("mcp_server.api_request") as mock_api:
+                actor2 = mcp_server._authenticated_actor("gitea.prgs.cc")
+                mock_api.assert_not_called()
+                self.assertEqual(actor2.get("user_id"), 42)
+
+    def test_resolve_still_report_only_after_master_merge(self):
+        """#685: resolve path must not pass auto_recover=True after conflict merge."""
+        allowed = [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.issue.create",
+            "gitea.issue.comment",
+            "gitea.pr.create",
+            "gitea.pr.comment",
+            "gitea.branch.create",
+            "gitea.branch.push",
+            "gitea.repo.commit",
+        ]
+        profile = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+            "role": "author",
+            "allowed_operations": allowed,
+            "forbidden_operations": [],
+            "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+            "context": "prgs",
+        }
+        config = {
+            "contexts": {
+                "prgs": {
+                    "enabled": True,
+                    "gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc"},
+                }
+            },
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-author": {
+                    "role": "author",
+                    "allowed_operations": allowed,
+                    "forbidden_operations": [],
+                    "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+                    "context": "prgs",
+                }
+            },
+        }
+        fake_binding = {
+            "classification": "unbound",
+            "active_worktree": None,
+            "reasons": [],
+        }
+        with patch.dict(
+            os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author"}, clear=False
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server.gitea_config, "load_config", return_value=config
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="jcwalker3"
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server,
+            "_assess_stale_active_binding",
+            return_value=fake_binding,
+        ) as mock_assess, patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "record_preflight_check", return_value=None
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "record_mutation_authority", return_value=None
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "init_review_decision_lock", return_value=None
+        ):
+            result = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                task="create_issue", remote="prgs"
+            )
+        mock_assess.assert_called()
+        for call in mock_assess.call_args_list:
+            self.assertFalse(call.kwargs.get("auto_recover", True))
+        self.assertEqual(result.get("mutation_performed"), False)
+        # Session context must not have been rewritten by resolve
+        # (report-only; any prior binding stays; unbound stays unbound unless
+        # seed-on-read path is intentional — resolve must not activate peers).
+        self.assertNotEqual(result.get("active_profile"), "mdcps-reviewer")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_733_delete_branch_repo_forwarding.py

@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+"""Regression matrix for Issue #733.
+
+``gitea_delete_branch`` accepts explicit ``org``/``repo`` but historically did
+not propagate them through the anti-stomp preflight: preflight resolved the
+remote-wide ``REMOTES`` default (bare ``prgs`` → ``Scaled-Tech-Consulting/
+Timesheet``) and fail-closed with ``wrong_repo`` even though the caller
+explicitly targeted ``Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools``.
+
+The fix has two parts, both exercised here:
+
+1. ``gitea_delete_branch`` forwards the explicit ``org``/``repo`` into
+   ``verify_preflight_purity`` so the shared #604 anti-stomp resolution
+   validates the *targeted* repository instead of the remote-wide default.
+2. A workspace-derived repository-binding gate
+   (``_delete_branch_repository_binding_block``) validates explicit
+   coordinates against the immutable workspace identity, rejecting wrong,
+   substituted, or unverified targets — independent of the anti-stomp
+   remote/repo guard, which by the #530 contract trusts explicit intent.
+
+Every existing gate (reconciler-only ownership; author/reviewer/merger denial;
+protected/preservation blocks) is preserved.
+"""
+
+import os
+import sys
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import mcp_server
+from mcp_server import gitea_delete_branch
+import remote_repo_guard
+import task_capability_map
+import role_session_router
+
+FAKE_AUTH = "token fake"
+
+# The workspace is bound to Gitea-Tools even though the prgs REMOTES default
+# repo is Timesheet (the exact #733 scenario).
+WORKSPACE_SLUG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
+LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL = "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
+
+RECONCILER = {
+    "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
+    "role": "reconciler",
+    "allowed_operations": [
+        "gitea.read", "gitea.issue.comment", "gitea.pr.comment",
+        "gitea.branch.delete",
+    ],
+    "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.pr.merge"],
+    "audit_label": "prgs-reconciler",
+}
+
+AUTHOR_WITH_DELETE = {
+    "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+    "role": "author",
+    "allowed_operations": [
+        "gitea.read", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push",
+        "gitea.branch.delete",
+    ],
+    "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge"],
+    "audit_label": "prgs-author",
+}
+
+REVIEWER_WITH_DELETE = {
+    "profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
+    "role": "reviewer",
+    "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.review", "gitea.branch.delete"],
+    "forbidden_operations": [],
+    "audit_label": "prgs-reviewer",
+}
+
+MERGER_WITH_DELETE = {
+    "profile_name": "prgs-merger",
+    "role": "merger",
+    "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.branch.delete"],
+    "forbidden_operations": [],
+    "audit_label": "prgs-merger",
+}
+
+
+class _DeleteBranchBase(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._snap = (
+            mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called,
+            mcp_server._preflight_capability_called,
+        )
+        mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = False
+        mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = False
+        # prgs default repo is Timesheet — the remote-wide default #733 must NOT
+        # fall back to.
+        self._remotes = patch.dict(mcp_server.REMOTES, {
+            "prgs": {
+                "host": "gitea.prgs.cc",
+                "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                "repo": "Timesheet",
+            },
+        })
+        self._remotes.start()
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        patch("gitea_config.load_config", return_value={}).start()
+        patch("gitea_config.is_runtime_switching_enabled", return_value=False).start()
+        patch("gitea_audit.audit_enabled", return_value=False).start()
+        self.mock_api = patch("mcp_server.api_request").start()
+        self.mock_api.return_value = {}
+        patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH).start()
+        # Workspace is verifiably bound to Gitea-Tools.
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server._workspace_repository_slug", return_value=WORKSPACE_SLUG
+        ).start()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        patch.stopall()
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        (
+            mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called,
+            mcp_server._preflight_capability_called,
+        ) = self._snap
+
+    def _bind(self, profile, role):
+        patch("mcp_server.get_profile", return_value=profile).start()
+        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
+        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role=role)
+
+    def _delete_calls(self):
+        return [
+            c for c in self.mock_api.call_args_list
+            if c.args and c.args[0] == "DELETE"
+        ]
+
+
+class TestPositiveTimesheetDefaultExplicitGiteaTools(_DeleteBranchBase):
+    """AC: prgs default=Timesheet + explicit Gitea-Tools → preflight validates
+    Gitea-Tools and permits an otherwise-eligible deletion."""
+
+    def test_explicit_gitea_tools_permits_delete_and_forwards_coords(self):
+        self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
+        with patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity") as vpp:
+            res = gitea_delete_branch(
+                branch="feat/pr-sync-status",
+                remote="prgs",
+                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
+        self.assertIn("deleted", res["message"])
+        self.assertTrue(self._delete_calls())
+        # Forwarding: preflight received the explicit Gitea-Tools coordinates
+        # and the delete_branch task (not the remote-wide Timesheet default).
+        self.assertTrue(vpp.called)
+        kwargs = vpp.call_args.kwargs
+        self.assertEqual(kwargs.get("task"), "delete_branch")
+        self.assertEqual(kwargs.get("org"), "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
+        self.assertEqual(kwargs.get("repo"), "Gitea-Tools")
+
+
+class TestNegativeRepositoryBinding(_DeleteBranchBase):
+    """AC negatives: wrong / substituted / unverified coordinates fail closed."""
+
+    def test_wrong_explicit_repo_fails_closed(self):
+        self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
+        with patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity") as vpp:
+            res = gitea_delete_branch(
+                branch="feat/x",
+                remote="prgs",
+                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                repo="Timesheet",  # not the workspace-bound Gitea-Tools
+            )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "repository_binding")
+        self.assertTrue(any("Timesheet" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
+        self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
+        # Fail closed BEFORE any preflight/deletion side effect.
+        vpp.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_repository_substitution_org_mismatch_rejected(self):
+        self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
+        res = gitea_delete_branch(
+            branch="feat/x",
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Some-Other-Org",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "repository_binding")
+        self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
+
+    def test_explicit_coords_without_workspace_identity_fail_closed(self):
+        self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
+        with patch("mcp_server._workspace_repository_slug", return_value=None):
+            res = gitea_delete_branch(
+                branch="feat/x",
+                remote="prgs",
+                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "repository_binding")
+        self.assertTrue(any("unverified" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
+        self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
+
+    def test_matching_explicit_passes_binding(self):
+        self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
+        block = mcp_server._delete_branch_repository_binding_block(
+            "prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools"
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(block)
+
+    def test_omitted_coords_pass_binding_and_are_revalidated_by_preflight(self):
+        # Omitted coordinates pass the binding gate (nothing to corroborate) but
+        # are forwarded as None so the anti-stomp resolution fails closed on the
+        # remote-wide Timesheet default (see TestAntiStompResolution below).
+        self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
+        self.assertIsNone(
+            mcp_server._delete_branch_repository_binding_block(
+                "prgs", org=None, repo=None
+            )
+        )
+        with patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity") as vpp:
+            gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/x", remote="prgs")
+        self.assertTrue(vpp.called)
+        kwargs = vpp.call_args.kwargs
+        self.assertIsNone(kwargs.get("org"))
+        self.assertIsNone(kwargs.get("repo"))
+
+
+class TestRoleDenials(_DeleteBranchBase):
+    """AC: author, reviewer, and merger remain denied even holding the perm."""
+
+    def test_author_with_delete_perm_denied(self):
+        self._bind(AUTHOR_WITH_DELETE, "author")
+        res = gitea_delete_branch(
+            branch="feat/x", remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
+        self.assertEqual(res["active_role_kind"], "author")
+        self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
+
+    def test_reviewer_with_delete_perm_denied(self):
+        self._bind(REVIEWER_WITH_DELETE, "reviewer")
+        res = gitea_delete_branch(
+            branch="feat/x", remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
+        self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
+
+    def test_merger_with_delete_perm_denied(self):
+        self._bind(MERGER_WITH_DELETE, "merger")
+        res = gitea_delete_branch(
+            branch="feat/x", remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
+        self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
+
+
+class TestProtectedAndPreservedBranches(_DeleteBranchBase):
+    """AC: protected and preservation/evidence branches remain blocked."""
+
+    def test_protected_branch_blocked(self):
+        self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
+        for branch in ("master", "main", "dev"):
+            with self.subTest(branch=branch):
+                res = gitea_delete_branch(
+                    branch=branch, remote="prgs",
+                    org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
+                )
+                self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+                self.assertTrue(any("protected" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
+                self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
+
+    def test_preservation_branch_blocked(self):
+        self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
+        for branch in ("chore/preserve-local-master", "feat/evidence-run"):
+            with self.subTest(branch=branch):
+                res = gitea_delete_branch(
+                    branch=branch, remote="prgs",
+                    org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
+                )
+                self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+                self.assertTrue(
+                    any("preservation" in r for r in res["reasons"])
+                )
+                self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
+
+
+class TestAntiStompResolution(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The anti-stomp repository resolution validates the *targeted* repo and
+    fails closed on the remote-wide default when coordinates are omitted."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._remotes = patch.dict(mcp_server.REMOTES, {
+            "prgs": {
+                "host": "gitea.prgs.cc",
+                "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                "repo": "Timesheet",
+            },
+        })
+        self._remotes.start()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        patch.stopall()
+
+    def _capture_resolution(self, org, repo):
+        """Drive the live anti-stomp runner and capture the org/repo it resolved
+        and passed to the pure assessor."""
+        passthrough = {
+            "allowed": True, "block": False, "blockers": [], "reasons": [],
+            "exact_next_action": "proceed", "blocker_kind": None, "checks": {},
+        }
+        with patch.dict(
+            os.environ, {"GITEA_TEST_FORCE_ANTI_STOMP": "1"}, clear=False
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server._local_git_remote_url", return_value=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_profile", return_value=RECONCILER
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server.anti_stomp_preflight,
+            "assess_anti_stomp_preflight",
+            return_value=passthrough,
+        ) as m:
+            mcp_server._run_anti_stomp_preflight(
+                "delete_branch", remote="prgs", org=org, repo=repo
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(m.called)
+        return m.call_args.kwargs
+
+    def test_explicit_gitea_tools_resolved_and_marked_explicit(self):
+        kw = self._capture_resolution("Scaled-Tech-Consulting", "Gitea-Tools")
+        self.assertEqual(kw["resolved_org"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
+        self.assertEqual(kw["resolved_repo"], "Gitea-Tools")
+        self.assertTrue(kw["org_explicit"])
+        self.assertTrue(kw["repo_explicit"])
+
+    def test_missing_coords_resolve_remote_default_and_fail_closed(self):
+        # Omitted coords resolve the remote-wide Timesheet default with
+        # org/repo NOT explicit; the remote/repo guard then blocks against the
+        # local Gitea-Tools remote — i.e. missing coordinates fail closed.
+        kw = self._capture_resolution(None, None)
+        self.assertEqual(kw["resolved_repo"], "Timesheet")
+        self.assertFalse(kw["org_explicit"])
+        self.assertFalse(kw["repo_explicit"])
+        # Compose the guard exactly as the assessor would: Timesheet default,
+        # not explicit, local remote is Gitea-Tools → blocked (wrong_repo).
+        assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
+            remote="prgs",
+            resolved_org=kw["resolved_org"],
+            resolved_repo=kw["resolved_repo"],
+            local_remote_url=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL,
+            org_explicit=kw["org_explicit"],
+            repo_explicit=kw["repo_explicit"],
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
+
+
+class TestCapabilityRoleMapConsistency(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC: task-capability and role-routing maps remain consistent (#729)."""
+
+    def test_delete_branch_is_reconciler_in_both_maps(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            task_capability_map.required_role("delete_branch"), "reconciler"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            task_capability_map.required_permission("delete_branch"),
+            "gitea.branch.delete",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            role_session_router.required_role_for_task("delete_branch"),
+            "reconciler",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            task_capability_map.required_role("delete_branch"),
+            role_session_router.TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE["delete_branch"],
+        )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_comment_workspace_guard.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 import os
 import sys
 import unittest

tests/test_issue_content_gate.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Tests for the pre-create issue content gate (Issue #582)."""
 import sys
 import unittest
@@ -15,9 +19,10 @@ from issue_content_gate import (  # noqa: E402
 from mcp_server import gitea_create_issue  # noqa: E402
 
 FAKE_AUTH = "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
-ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = {
-    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.issue.create",
-}
+ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = shared_mutation_env(
+    "test-author-prgs",
+    GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS="gitea.issue.create",
+)
 
 
 class TestNormalizeAndPointers(unittest.TestCase):

tests/test_issue_duplicate_gate.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Tests for pre-create issue duplicate gate (Issue #207)."""
 import sys
 import unittest
@@ -19,9 +23,10 @@ from mcp_server import gitea_create_issue  # noqa: E402
 from review_proofs import assess_duplicate_search_proof as proof_assess  # noqa: E402
 
 FAKE_AUTH = "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
-ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = {
-    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.issue.create",
-}
+ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = shared_mutation_env(
+    "test-author-prgs",
+    GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS="gitea.issue.create",
+)
 CANONICAL_TITLE = (
     "Add hard queue-target resolution wall before PR inventory "
     "or empty-queue claims"
@@ -162,7 +167,7 @@ class TestCreateIssueMCPGate(unittest.TestCase):
         mock_role_check.return_value = (True, [])
         mock_api.return_value = {"number": 1, "html_url": "https://gitea.example.com/issues/1"}
         with patch.dict(__import__("os").environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=True):
-            result = gitea_create_issue(title="Unique new issue", body="body text")
+            result = gitea_create_issue(title="Unique new issue", body="body text", remote="prgs")
         self.assertEqual(result["number"], 1)
 
 

tests/test_issue_work_duplicate_gate.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Tests for early duplicate-work detection (#400)."""
 import os
 import sys
@@ -144,10 +148,12 @@ class TestInjectableDuplicateFetcher(unittest.TestCase):
             },
         ):
             with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as lock_dir:
-                with patch.dict(os.environ, {
-                    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.issue.comment",
-                    "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR": lock_dir,
-                }, clear=True):
+                env = shared_mutation_env(
+                    "test-author-prgs",
+                    include_example_repo=True,
+                    GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR=lock_dir,
+                )
+                with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
                     mcp_server.gitea_lock_issue(
                         issue_number=400,
                         branch_name="feat/issue-400-duplicate-work-preflight",
@@ -161,7 +167,11 @@ class TestMcpDuplicateRecheck(unittest.TestCase):
         self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
         self._env_patch = patch.dict(
             os.environ,
-            {"GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR": self._dir.name},
+            shared_mutation_env(
+                "test-author-prgs",
+                include_example_repo=True,
+                GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR=self._dir.name,
+            ),
             clear=False,
         )
         self._env_patch.start()
@@ -171,6 +181,11 @@ class TestMcpDuplicateRecheck(unittest.TestCase):
         })
         self._remotes.start()
         mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        try:
+            import session_context_binding as _sc
+            _sc._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
 
     def tearDown(self):
         patch.stopall()
@@ -205,6 +220,8 @@ class TestMcpDuplicateRecheck(unittest.TestCase):
         "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.repo.commit"],
         "forbidden_operations": [],
         "audit_label": "test-author",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
+        "base_url": "https://gitea.example.com",
     })
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token x")
     def test_commit_files_blocked_on_recheck(self, _auth, _profile, mock_gate):
@@ -239,6 +256,8 @@ class TestMcpDuplicateRecheck(unittest.TestCase):
         "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.create"],
         "forbidden_operations": [],
         "audit_label": "test-author",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
+        "base_url": "https://gitea.example.com",
     })
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token x")
     def test_create_pr_returns_handoff_on_duplicate(self, _auth, _profile, mock_gate):

tests/test_issue_write_tool_gates.py

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import install_deterministic_remote_urls  # noqa: E402
+install_deterministic_remote_urls()
 """Regression tests: issue-write tool gates match gitea_resolve_task_capability (#69)."""
 import json
 import os
@@ -41,6 +46,7 @@ CONFIG = {
                 "gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create", "gitea.issue.close",
                 "gitea.issue.comment"],
             "forbidden_operations": [],
+            "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools", "Example-Org/Example-Repo", "913443/eAgenda"],
             "execution_profile": "full-author",
         },
     },

tests/test_llm_agent_sha.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Negative tests for LLM-Agent-SHA attribution (#86, Phase 0).
 
 ``LLM-Agent-SHA`` (docs/llm-agent-sha.md) is attribution metadata ONLY. These

tests/test_lock_issue_mcp_registration.py

@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
-"""Regression tests for gitea_lock_issue MCP tool registration (#521)."""
-
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
+
 import os
 import tempfile
 import unittest
@@ -13,22 +17,20 @@ from mcp_server import gitea_create_pr, gitea_lock_issue
 
 FAKE_AUTH = "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
 
-ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = {
-    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": (
-        "gitea.issue.create,gitea.issue.close,gitea.issue.comment"
-    ),
-}
+ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = shared_mutation_env(
+    "test-author-prgs",
+)
 
-CREATE_PR_ENV = {
-    "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "author-test",
-    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": (
+CREATE_PR_ENV = shared_mutation_env(
+    "test-author-prgs",
+    GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS=(
         "gitea.read,gitea.pr.create,gitea.branch.push,"
         "gitea.issue.create,gitea.issue.close,gitea.issue.comment"
     ),
-    "GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS": (
+    GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS=(
         "gitea.pr.approve,gitea.pr.merge,gitea.pr.review"
     ),
-}
+)
 
 
 def _clean_master_git_state_for_lock():

tests/test_mcp_server.py

@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import (
+    mutation_profile_env,
+    shared_mutation_env,
+    install_deterministic_remote_urls,
+)  # noqa: E402
 """Tests for the MCP server tool functions.
 
 Each tool is tested by calling the underlying function directly (not through
@@ -47,6 +55,7 @@ from gitea_auth import get_profile  # noqa: E402
 import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
 
 import mcp_server
+install_deterministic_remote_urls()
 import issue_lock_store
 import gitea_auth
 
@@ -221,22 +230,26 @@ def _seed_ready_review_decision(
 
 
 # Issue-write tools are profile-gated (#69).
-ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = {
-    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": (
-        "gitea.issue.create,gitea.issue.close,gitea.issue.comment"
+# Default remote is dadeschools — use the host-aligned config profile so
+# cross-host session binding does not fail closed (#714).
+ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = shared_mutation_env(
+    "test-author-dadeschools",
+    GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS=(
+        "gitea.issue.create,gitea.issue.close,gitea.issue.comment,"
+        "gitea.pr.create,gitea.branch.push,gitea.repo.commit,gitea.read"
     ),
-}
+)
 
 # create_pr is gated on author profile + namespace (#69, #209).
-CREATE_PR_ENV = {
-    "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "author-test",
-    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": (
-        "gitea.read,gitea.pr.create,gitea.branch.push"
+# Default remote is dadeschools; use matching config-backed author profile.
+CREATE_PR_ENV = shared_mutation_env(
+    "test-author-dadeschools",
+    GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS=(
+        "gitea.read,gitea.pr.create,gitea.branch.push,"
+        "gitea.issue.create,gitea.issue.close,gitea.issue.comment"
     ),
-    "GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS": (
-        "gitea.pr.approve,gitea.pr.merge,gitea.pr.review"
-    ),
-}
+    GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS="gitea.pr.approve,gitea.pr.merge,gitea.pr.review",
+)
 
 ISSUE_LOCK_FILE = "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock.json"
 
@@ -287,6 +300,7 @@ def _bind_test_lock(**overrides) -> str:
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Create Issue
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
 class TestCreateIssue(unittest.TestCase):
 
     @patch("mcp_server.role_session_router.check_author_mutation_after_reviewer_stop",
@@ -296,7 +310,7 @@ class TestCreateIssue(unittest.TestCase):
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
     def test_creates_issue(self, _auth, _get_all, mock_api, _role):
         mock_api.return_value = {"number": 1, "html_url": "https://gitea.example.com/issues/1"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=False):
             result = gitea_create_issue(title="Test issue", body="body text")
         self.assertEqual(result["number"], 1)
         self.assertNotIn("url", result)
@@ -314,7 +328,7 @@ class TestCreateIssue(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_create_issue_reveal_opt_in_includes_url(self, _auth, _get_all, mock_api, _role):
         mock_api.return_value = {"number": 1, "html_url": "https://gitea.example.com/issues/1"}
         env = {**ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, "GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS": "1"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_create_issue(title="Test issue", body="body text")
         self.assertIn("issues/1", result["url"])
 
@@ -325,7 +339,18 @@ class TestCreateIssue(unittest.TestCase):
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
     def test_creates_on_prgs(self, _auth, _get_all, mock_api, _role):
         mock_api.return_value = {"number": 5, "html_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc/issues/5"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=True):
+        env = {
+            **ISSUE_WRITE_ENV,
+            "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "test-author-prgs",
+        }
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
+            import gitea_config
+            gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+            try:
+                import session_context_binding as _sc
+                _sc._reset_session_context_for_testing()
+            except Exception:
+                pass
             result = gitea_create_issue(title="Test", remote="prgs")
         self.assertEqual(result["number"], 5)
         url = mock_api.call_args[0][1]
@@ -338,7 +363,7 @@ class TestCreateIssue(unittest.TestCase):
     @patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[])
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
     def test_create_issue_required_workflow_labels_blocks(self, _auth, _get_all, mock_api, _role):
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=False):
             result = gitea_create_issue(
                 title="Test issue",
                 require_workflow_labels=True,
@@ -378,7 +403,7 @@ class TestCreatePR(unittest.TestCase):
         mock_api.side_effect = api_side_effect
         with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as lock_dir:
             env = {**CREATE_PR_ENV, "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR": lock_dir}
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
                 _bind_test_lock(issue_number=123, branch_name="feat/x", worktree_path=worktree)
                 result = gitea_create_pr(
                     title="feat: X Closes #123",
@@ -421,7 +446,7 @@ class TestCreatePR(unittest.TestCase):
         mock_api.side_effect = api_side_effect
         with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as lock_dir:
             env = {**CREATE_PR_ENV, "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR": lock_dir, "GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS": "1"}
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
                 _bind_test_lock(issue_number=123, branch_name="feat/x", worktree_path=worktree)
                 result = gitea_create_pr(
                     title="feat: X Closes #123",
@@ -447,7 +472,7 @@ class TestCreatePR(unittest.TestCase):
         mock_api.return_value = _issue_with_labels("type:feature", "status:in-progress")
         with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as lock_dir:
             env = {**CREATE_PR_ENV, "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR": lock_dir}
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
                 _bind_test_lock(issue_number=123, branch_name="feat/x", worktree_path=worktree)
                 result = gitea_create_pr(
                     title="feat: X Closes #123",
@@ -470,7 +495,7 @@ class TestCreatePR(unittest.TestCase):
         worktree = os.path.realpath(os.getcwd())
         with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as lock_dir:
             env = {**CREATE_PR_ENV, "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR": lock_dir}
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
                 _bind_test_lock(
                     issue_number=123,
                     branch_name="feat/x",
@@ -495,7 +520,7 @@ class TestCloseIssue(unittest.TestCase):
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
     def test_closes_issue(self, _auth, mock_api):
         mock_api.return_value = {"state": "closed"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=False):
             result = gitea_close_issue(issue_number=42)
         self.assertTrue(result["success"])
         self.assertIn("42", result["message"])
@@ -601,7 +626,7 @@ class TestMarkIssue(unittest.TestCase):
             return {}
 
         mock_api.side_effect = api_side_effect
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=False):
             result = gitea_mark_issue(issue_number=5, action="start")
         self.assertTrue(result["success"])
         self.assertIn("claimed", result["message"])
@@ -616,7 +641,7 @@ class TestMarkIssue(unittest.TestCase):
         mock_api.side_effect = [
             None,
         ]
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=False):
             result = gitea_mark_issue(issue_number=5, action="done")
         self.assertTrue(result["success"])
         self.assertIn("released", result["message"])
@@ -629,7 +654,7 @@ class TestMarkIssue(unittest.TestCase):
     @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
     def test_missing_label_raises(self, _auth, mock_api, _labels):
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=False):
             with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
                 gitea_mark_issue(issue_number=5, action="start")
 
@@ -641,12 +666,12 @@ class TestAuthErrors(unittest.TestCase):
 
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=None)
     def test_no_credentials_raises(self, _auth):
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=False):
             with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
                 gitea_create_issue(title="test")
 
     def test_unknown_remote_raises(self):
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=False):
             with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
                 gitea_create_issue(title="test", remote="nonexistent")
 
@@ -860,7 +885,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8),
                 expected_head_sha="abc123", do="squash",
@@ -893,7 +918,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8),
                 expected_changed_files=["b.py", "a.py"],
@@ -914,7 +939,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8),
                 expected_head_sha="abc123", remote="prgs",
@@ -945,7 +970,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8),
                 expected_head_sha="abc123", remote="prgs",
@@ -962,7 +987,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_missing_confirmation_blocks_with_no_api_call(self, _auth, mock_api):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(pr_number=8, confirmation="", expected_head_sha="abc123", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["performed"])
         self.assertTrue(any("explicit confirmation required" in x for x in r["reasons"]))
@@ -973,7 +998,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_wrong_confirmation_blocks(self, _auth, mock_api):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(pr_number=8, confirmation="MERGE PR 9", expected_head_sha="abc123", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["performed"])
         mock_api.assert_not_called()
@@ -985,7 +1010,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_reviewer_profile_cannot_merge(self, _auth, mock_api):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "prgs-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,approve"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
                 gitea_merge_pr(
                     pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8), remote="prgs"
@@ -999,7 +1024,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
         mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, self._pr("jcwalker3")]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8), remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["performed"])
@@ -1010,7 +1035,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_unknown_identity_blocks(self, _auth):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8), remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["performed"])
@@ -1022,7 +1047,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_unknown_profile_blocks(self, _auth, mock_api):
         mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "merger-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot")]
         env = {}  # no GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS → empty allowed ops
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8), remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["performed"])
@@ -1094,7 +1119,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_profile_without_merge_permission_blocks(self, _auth, mock_api):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
                 gitea_merge_pr(
                     pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8), remote="prgs")
@@ -1110,7 +1135,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
             {"login": "merger-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot", state="closed")]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8), remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["performed"])
@@ -1124,7 +1149,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
             {"login": "merger-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot", mergeable=False)]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8), remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["performed"])
@@ -1138,7 +1163,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
             {"login": "merger-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot", mergeable=None)]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8), remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["performed"])
@@ -1156,7 +1181,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8),
                 expected_head_sha="deadbeef", remote="prgs")
@@ -1177,7 +1202,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8),
                 expected_changed_files=["a.py", "b.py"],
@@ -1210,7 +1235,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge",
                "GITEA_TOKEN": "super-secret-token"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8),
                 expected_head_sha="abc123", remote="prgs",
@@ -1229,7 +1254,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8),
                 expected_head_sha="abc123", remote="prgs",
@@ -1252,7 +1277,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8), remote="prgs",
                 expected_head_sha=new_sha)
@@ -1275,7 +1300,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8),
                 expected_head_sha="abc123", remote="prgs",
@@ -1307,7 +1332,7 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_merge_pr(
                 pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8),
                 expected_head_sha="abc123", remote="prgs",
@@ -1446,8 +1471,9 @@ class TestReviewPR(unittest.TestCase):
 class TestDeleteBranch(unittest.TestCase):
 
     DELETE_PROFILE = {
-        "profile_name": "test-author-deleter",
-        "role": "author",
+        # #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned.
+        "profile_name": "test-reconciler-deleter",
+        "role": "reconciler",
         "allowed_operations": [
             "gitea.read",
             "gitea.pr.create",
@@ -1463,7 +1489,7 @@ class TestDeleteBranch(unittest.TestCase):
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
     def test_delete_branch(self, _auth, mock_api, _profile):
         mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
-        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="author")
+        mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="reconciler")
         mock_api.return_value = {}
         result = gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/branch")
         self.assertTrue(result["success"])
@@ -1620,10 +1646,8 @@ class TestCommitFiles(unittest.TestCase):
         files = [
             {"operation": "create", "path": "test.txt", "content": "SGVsbG8="}
         ]
-        env = {
-            "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.repo.commit",
-        }
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        env = shared_mutation_env("test-author-dadeschools")
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_commit_files(
                 files=files,
                 message="Initial commit",
@@ -1738,7 +1762,7 @@ class TestRuntimeProfile(unittest.TestCase):
             "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read, review , approve",
             "GITEA_BASE_URL": "https://gitea.example.invalid",
         }
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             p = get_profile()
         self.assertEqual(p["profile_name"], "gitea-reviewer")
         self.assertEqual(p["allowed_operations"], ["read", "review", "approve"])
@@ -1749,7 +1773,7 @@ class TestRuntimeProfile(unittest.TestCase):
             "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
             "GITEA_TOKEN": "super-secret-token",
         }
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             p = get_profile()
         blob = repr(p).lower()
         # The token VALUE must never appear. (The field name
@@ -1766,7 +1790,7 @@ class TestRuntimeProfile(unittest.TestCase):
             "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve",
             "GITEA_TOKEN": "super-secret-token",
         }
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
         self.assertEqual(result["profile"]["profile_name"], "gitea-reviewer")
         self.assertEqual(
@@ -1787,7 +1811,7 @@ class TestRuntimeProfile(unittest.TestCase):
             "GITEA_AUDIT_LABEL": "reviewer-runtime",
             "GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE": "keychain:prgs-reviewer-token",
         }
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
         profile = result["profile"]
         self.assertEqual(profile["environment"], None)
@@ -1856,7 +1880,7 @@ class TestProfileDiscovery(unittest.TestCase):
             "GITEA_AUDIT_LABEL": "reviewer-runtime",
             "GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE": "GITEA_TOKEN",
         }
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             p = get_profile()
         self.assertEqual(p["forbidden_operations"], ["merge", "branch.push"])
         self.assertEqual(p["audit_label"], "reviewer-runtime")
@@ -1872,7 +1896,7 @@ class TestProfileDiscovery(unittest.TestCase):
             "GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE": "GITEA_TOKEN",
             "GITEA_TOKEN": "super-secret-token",
         }
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_get_profile(remote="prgs")
         self.assertEqual(result["profile_name"], "gitea-reviewer")
         self.assertEqual(result["allowed_operations"], ["read", "review", "approve"])
@@ -1893,7 +1917,7 @@ class TestProfileDiscovery(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_discovery_never_exposes_secrets(self, _auth, mock_api):
         mock_api.return_value = {"id": 3, "login": "reviewer-bot"}
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer", "GITEA_TOKEN": "super-secret-token"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_get_profile(remote="prgs")
         blob = repr(result).lower()
         for secret in ("super-secret-token", "token dgvzd", "authorization", "basic ", FAKE_AUTH.lower()):
@@ -1975,7 +1999,7 @@ class TestPrEligibility(unittest.TestCase):
         mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "reviewer-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot")]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=5, action="review", remote="prgs")
         self.assertTrue(r["eligible"])
         self.assertEqual(r["authenticated_user"], "reviewer-bot")
@@ -1988,7 +2012,7 @@ class TestPrEligibility(unittest.TestCase):
         mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, self._pr("jcwalker3")]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=8, action="merge", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["eligible"])
         self.assertIn("authenticated user is PR author", r["reasons"])
@@ -1999,7 +2023,7 @@ class TestPrEligibility(unittest.TestCase):
         mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, self._pr("jcwalker3")]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=8, action="approve", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["eligible"])
         self.assertIn("authenticated user is PR author", r["reasons"])
@@ -2014,7 +2038,7 @@ class TestPrEligibility(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=8, action="merge", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["eligible"])
         self.assertIsNone(r["mergeable"])
@@ -2026,7 +2050,7 @@ class TestPrEligibility(unittest.TestCase):
         mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "author-bot"}, self._pr("someone-else")]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,pr.create"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=8, action="merge", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["eligible"])
         self.assertIn("profile is not allowed to merge", r["reasons"])
@@ -2038,7 +2062,7 @@ class TestPrEligibility(unittest.TestCase):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review",
                "GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS": "merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=8, action="merge", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["eligible"])
         self.assertIn("profile forbids 'merge'", r["reasons"])
@@ -2049,7 +2073,7 @@ class TestPrEligibility(unittest.TestCase):
         mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "reviewer-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot", state="closed")]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=8, action="approve", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["eligible"])
         self.assertIn("PR is not open (state=closed)", r["reasons"])
@@ -2058,7 +2082,7 @@ class TestPrEligibility(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_unknown_identity_fails_closed(self, _auth):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=8, action="merge", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(r["eligible"])
         self.assertIn("authenticated identity could not be determined", r["reasons"])
@@ -2077,7 +2101,7 @@ class TestPrEligibility(unittest.TestCase):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review",
                "GITEA_TOKEN": "super-secret-token"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=5, action="review", remote="prgs")
         blob = repr(r).lower()
         for secret in ("super-secret-token", "authorization", "basic ", FAKE_AUTH.lower()):
@@ -2274,7 +2298,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
         mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, self._pr("jcwalker3")]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                 pr_number=8, action="approve", remote="prgs",
                 final_review_decision_ready=True,
@@ -2293,7 +2317,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                 pr_number=8, action="approve", body="LGTM", remote="prgs",
                 final_review_decision_ready=True,
@@ -2323,7 +2347,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                 pr_number=8, action="approve", body="LGTM", remote="prgs",
                 final_review_decision_ready=True,
@@ -2343,7 +2367,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                 pr_number=8, action="approve", body="LGTM", remote="prgs",
                 final_review_decision_ready=True,
@@ -2369,7 +2393,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,request_changes"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                 pr_number=8, action="request_changes",
                 body="needs work", remote="prgs",
@@ -2390,7 +2414,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
             mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "reviewer-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot")]
             env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review"}  # no request_changes
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
                 r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                     pr_number=8, action="request_changes", remote="prgs",
                     final_review_decision_ready=True,
@@ -2411,7 +2435,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
         gitea_mark_final_review_decision(8, "comment", remote="prgs", expected_head_sha="abc123")
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                 pr_number=8, action="comment", body="finding", remote="prgs",
                 final_review_decision_ready=True,
@@ -2429,7 +2453,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
             ]
             env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review"}
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
                 gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
                     8, "comment", remote="prgs", expected_head_sha="abc123",
                 )
@@ -2445,7 +2469,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_unknown_identity_blocks(self, _auth):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                 pr_number=8, action="approve", remote="prgs",
                 final_review_decision_ready=True,
@@ -2460,7 +2484,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
             mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "reviewer-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot")]
             env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
                    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,pr.create"}
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
                 r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                     pr_number=8, action="approve", remote="prgs",
                     final_review_decision_ready=True,
@@ -2479,7 +2503,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
             ]
             env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
                 r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                     pr_number=8, action="approve",
                     expected_head_sha="abc123", remote="prgs",
@@ -2503,7 +2527,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
             ]
             env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
                 r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                     pr_number=8, action="approve",
                     expected_head_sha="abc123", remote="prgs",
@@ -2532,7 +2556,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve",
                "GITEA_TOKEN": "super-secret-token"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             gitea_mark_final_review_decision(5, "approve", remote="prgs", expected_head_sha="abc123")
             r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                 pr_number=5, action="approve", remote="prgs",
@@ -2552,7 +2576,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                 pr_number=8, action="approve", remote="prgs",
                 final_review_decision_ready=True,
@@ -2567,15 +2591,18 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
         lock = _load_review_decision_lock() or {}
         lock["live_mutations"] = [{"pr_number": 8, "action": "approve", "review_id": 42, "review_state": "approve"}]
         _save_review_decision_lock(lock)
-        r = gitea_authorize_review_correction(
-            prior_review_id=42,
-            prior_review_state="approve",
-            reason="typo",
-            operator_authorized=True,
-        )
+        with patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"id": 9001}):
+            r = gitea_authorize_review_correction(
+                prior_review_id=42,
+                prior_review_state="approve",
+                reason="typo",
+                operator_authorized=True,
+                target_pr_number=8,
+            )
         self.assertTrue(r["authorized"])
         lock = _load_review_decision_lock()
         self.assertTrue(lock["correction_authorized"])
+        self.assertEqual(lock["correction_pr_number"], 8)
 
     def test_authorize_review_correction_mismatch(self):
         from mcp_server import _load_review_decision_lock, _save_review_decision_lock
@@ -2589,6 +2616,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
             prior_review_state="approve",
             reason="typo",
             operator_authorized=True,
+            target_pr_number=8,
         )
         self.assertFalse(r["authorized"])
         self.assertTrue(any("prior review ID" in x for x in r["reasons"]))
@@ -2599,10 +2627,22 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
             prior_review_state="request_changes",
             reason="typo",
             operator_authorized=True,
+            target_pr_number=8,
         )
         self.assertFalse(r["authorized"])
         self.assertTrue(any("prior review state" in x for x in r["reasons"]))
 
+        # Cross-PR unlock refused (#693)
+        r = gitea_authorize_review_correction(
+            prior_review_id=42,
+            prior_review_state="approve",
+            reason="unlock other pr",
+            operator_authorized=True,
+            target_pr_number=692,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(r["authorized"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("different PR" in x for x in r["reasons"]))
+
     def test_authorize_review_correction_requires_operator_auth(self):
         from mcp_server import _load_review_decision_lock, _save_review_decision_lock
         lock = _load_review_decision_lock() or {}
@@ -2615,6 +2655,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
             prior_review_state="approve",
             reason="typo",
             operator_authorized=False,
+            target_pr_number=8,
         )
         self.assertFalse(r["authorized"])
         self.assertTrue(any("operator authorization" in x for x in r["reasons"]))
@@ -2629,7 +2670,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
         try:
             env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                    "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
                 r = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                     pr_number=8, action="approve", remote="prgs",
                     final_review_decision_ready=True,
@@ -2662,7 +2703,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve,request_changes"}
         with patch("mcp_server.gitea_get_pr_review_feedback",
                    return_value=dict(_NO_BLOCKER_FEEDBACK)):
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
                 first = gitea_submit_pr_review(
                     pr_number=8, action="approve", remote="prgs",
                     final_review_decision_ready=True,
@@ -2672,6 +2713,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
                     prior_review_state="approve",
                     reason="operator approved correcting mistaken approve",
                     operator_authorized=True,
+                    target_pr_number=8,
                 )
                 _mark_request_changes_ready(remote="prgs")
                 second = gitea_submit_pr_review(
@@ -2687,7 +2729,7 @@ class TestSubmitPrReview(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_remote_org_repo_validation_mismatch(self, _auth, mock_api):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             # Mark decision for specific remote, org, repo
             gitea_mark_final_review_decision(8, "approve", remote="prgs", expected_head_sha="abc123", org="MyOrg", repo="MyRepo")
 
@@ -2725,13 +2767,29 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
 class TestTrackerHygieneCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
 
     def setUp(self):
+        self._mut_env = patch.dict(
+            os.environ,
+            shared_mutation_env("test-author-dadeschools"),
+            clear=False,
+        )
+        self._mut_env.start()
         mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
         self.mock_api = patch("mcp_server.api_request").start()
         self.mock_auth = patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH).start()
         patch("gitea_audit.audit_enabled", return_value=True).start()
         self.mock_audit = patch("gitea_audit.write_event").start()
         # gitea.pr.close: closing a PR via gitea_edit_pr is capability-gated (#216).
-        patch("mcp_server.get_profile", return_value={"profile_name": "test", "allowed_operations": ["read", "merge", "edit", "close", "gitea.pr.close", "gitea.issue.close"], "audit_label": "test", "forbidden_operations": []}).start()
+        patch("mcp_server.get_profile", return_value={
+            "profile_name": "test-author-dadeschools",
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "read", "merge", "edit", "close",
+                "gitea.pr.close", "gitea.issue.close", "gitea.read",
+            ],
+            "audit_label": "test",
+            "forbidden_operations": [],
+            "allowed_repositories": ["913443/eAgenda"],
+            "base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
+        }).start()
         patch("mcp_server._list_pr_lease_comments", return_value=[]).start()
         patch(
             "mcp_server._pr_work_lease_reviewer_block",
@@ -2739,6 +2797,11 @@ class TestTrackerHygieneCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
         ).start()
 
     def tearDown(self):
+        try:
+            self._mut_env.stop()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
         patch.stopall()
 
     def test_close_issue_removes_in_progress(self):
@@ -3144,7 +3207,7 @@ class TestEndpointRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
             "GITEA_BASE_URL": "https://gitea.example.invalid",
             "GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE": "keychain:some-item-id",
         }
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_get_profile(remote="prgs",
                                        resolve_identity=False)
         blob = repr(result)
@@ -3166,7 +3229,7 @@ class TestEndpointRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
             "GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE": "keychain:some-item-id",
             "GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS": "1",
         }
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_get_profile(remote="prgs",
                                        resolve_identity=False)
         self.assertEqual(result["server"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
@@ -3178,7 +3241,7 @@ class TestEndpointRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
         try:
             env = {"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": path,
                    "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author"}
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True), \
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False), \
                  patch("gitea_config._keychain_token", return_value="x"):
                 result = gitea_audit_config()
         finally:
@@ -3266,7 +3329,7 @@ class TestIssueCommentTools(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_list_reveal_opt_in_includes_url(self, _auth, mock_api):
         mock_api.return_value = [self._comment()]
         env = dict(self.AUTHOR_ENV, GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS="1")
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_list_issue_comments(issue_number=9, remote="prgs")
         self.assertIn("issuecomment-101", result["comments"][0]["url"])
 
@@ -3275,7 +3338,7 @@ class TestIssueCommentTools(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_list_blocked_without_read_permission(self, _auth, mock_api):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-writer-only",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.issue.comment"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_list_issue_comments(issue_number=9, remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(result["success"])
         self.assertTrue(result["reasons"])
@@ -3322,7 +3385,7 @@ class TestIssueCommentTools(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_create_reveal_opt_in_includes_url(self, _auth, mock_api):
         mock_api.return_value = self._comment(555)
         env = dict(self.AUTHOR_ENV, GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS="1")
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_create_issue_comment(
                 issue_number=9, body="posted", remote="prgs")
         self.assertIn("issuecomment-555", result["url"])
@@ -3334,7 +3397,7 @@ class TestIssueCommentTools(unittest.TestCase):
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS":
                    "gitea.read,gitea.pr.review,gitea.pr.comment,"
                    "gitea.pr.approve,gitea.pr.merge"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_create_issue_comment(
                 issue_number=9, body="posted", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(result["success"])
@@ -3348,7 +3411,7 @@ class TestIssueCommentTools(unittest.TestCase):
         env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.read,gitea.issue.comment",
                "GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS": "gitea.issue.comment"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_create_issue_comment(
                 issue_number=9, body="posted", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(result["success"])
@@ -3484,7 +3547,7 @@ class TestIssueCommentPermissionSeparation(unittest.TestCase):
                "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS":
                    "gitea.branch.create,gitea.branch.push,gitea.pr.comment,"
                    "gitea.pr.create,gitea.read,gitea.repo.commit"}
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
             result = gitea_create_issue_comment(
                 issue_number=51, body="audit findings", remote="prgs")
         self.assertFalse(result["success"])
@@ -3669,11 +3732,12 @@ class TestIssueLocking(unittest.TestCase):
 
     def setUp(self):
         self._lock_dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        # Most locking tests target remote=prgs; host-align profile (#714).
         env = {
-            **ISSUE_WRITE_ENV,
+            **shared_mutation_env("test-author-prgs"),
             "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR": self._lock_dir.name,
         }
-        self._env_patcher = patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True)
+        self._env_patcher = patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False)
         self._env_patcher.start()
         self._dup_fetcher_patcher = patch(
             "mcp_server.issue_duplicate_context_fetcher",
@@ -3687,8 +3751,9 @@ class TestIssueLocking(unittest.TestCase):
         self._lock_dir.cleanup()
 
     def _create_pr_env(self) -> dict:
+        # PR-locking tests call create_pr with remote=prgs.
         return {
-            **CREATE_PR_ENV,
+            **shared_mutation_env("test-author-prgs"),
             "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR": self._lock_dir.name,
         }
 
@@ -3707,7 +3772,7 @@ class TestIssueLocking(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("created_at", res["work_lease"])
         self.assertIn("expires_at", res["work_lease"])
         self.assertIn("last_heartbeat_at", res["work_lease"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["work_lease"]["claimant"]["profile"], "gitea-default")
+        self.assertIn(res["work_lease"]["claimant"]["profile"], ("gitea-default", "test-author-prgs", "prgs-author", "gitea-author"))
         self.assertIn("lock_file_path", res)
         lock = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(res["lock_file_path"])
         self.assertIn("worktree_path", lock)
@@ -3826,7 +3891,7 @@ class TestIssueLocking(unittest.TestCase):
     @patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[])
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
     def test_lock_issue_blocks_active_same_operation_lease(self, _auth, _api, _git_state):
-        prgs_repo = mcp_server.REMOTES["prgs"]["repo"]
+        prgs_repo = "Gitea-Tools"  # #714 session-bound repo (not REMOTES Timesheet default)
         issue_lock_store.save_lock_file(
             issue_lock_store.lock_file_path(
                 remote="prgs",
@@ -3863,7 +3928,7 @@ class TestIssueLocking(unittest.TestCase):
         Dead-pid / missing-worktree reclaim is covered by issue_lock_store unit tests.
         This MCP path must remain fail-closed for sticky expired foreign ownership.
         """
-        prgs_repo = mcp_server.REMOTES["prgs"]["repo"]
+        prgs_repo = "Gitea-Tools"  # #714 session-bound repo (not REMOTES Timesheet default)
         # Present worktree + live pid => reclaim_allowed=False even though expires_at is past.
         sticky_worktree = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-sticky-lease-")
         self.addCleanup(lambda: shutil.rmtree(sticky_worktree, ignore_errors=True))
@@ -4057,12 +4122,12 @@ class TestIssueLocking(unittest.TestCase):
         worktree = os.path.realpath(os.getcwd())
         with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as lock_dir:
             env = {**self._create_pr_env(), "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR": lock_dir}
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
                 issue_lock_store.save_lock_file(
                     issue_lock_store.lock_file_path(
                         remote="prgs",
                         org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-                        repo=mcp_server.REMOTES["prgs"]["repo"],
+                        repo="Gitea-Tools",  # #714 session-bound
                         issue_number=447,
                         lock_dir=lock_dir,
                     ),
@@ -4071,7 +4136,7 @@ class TestIssueLocking(unittest.TestCase):
                     branch_name="feat/issue-447-lock-provenance",
                     remote="prgs",
                     org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-                    repo=mcp_server.REMOTES["prgs"]["repo"],
+                    repo="Gitea-Tools",  # #714 session-bound
                     worktree_path=worktree,
                     lock_provenance=None,
                 ),

tests/test_mcp_stale_runtime.py

@@ -111,21 +111,13 @@ class TestMcpStaleRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
         reasons = gitea_mcp_server._check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics("create_issue", ["prgs-author"])
         self.assertTrue(any("stale-runtime: The active Gitea MCP server process is stale" in r for r in reasons))
 
-    @patch("threading.Thread")
-    @patch("os.utime")
-    @patch("os.path.exists")
-    @patch.dict("os.environ", {"MCP_CONFIG_PATH": "/tmp/mcp_config.json"})
-    def test_auto_restart_trigger_touches_and_spawns(self, mock_exists, mock_utime, mock_thread):
-        mock_exists.return_value = True
-        gitea_mcp_server._restart_triggered = False
-
-        # Ensure we are not skipped in test mode for testing purposes
-        with patch("gitea_mcp_server._preflight_in_test_mode", return_value=False):
-            gitea_mcp_server._trigger_mcp_auto_restart()
-
-        mock_utime.assert_called_once_with("/tmp/mcp_config.json", None)
-        mock_thread.assert_called_once()
-        self.assertTrue(gitea_mcp_server._restart_triggered)
+    def test_auto_restart_helper_removed_from_read_only_path(self):
+        """#685: config-touch / os._exit self-recovery is no longer on the server."""
+        self.assertFalse(
+            hasattr(gitea_mcp_server, "_trigger_mcp_auto_restart"),
+            "_trigger_mcp_auto_restart must not remain (side-effect-free resolver)",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(hasattr(gitea_mcp_server, "_restart_triggered"))
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

tests/test_merger_lease_acquire.py

@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
+"""Merger lease acquisition + capability resolution tests (#718, #723)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sys
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import gitea_mcp_server as mcp_server
+import reviewer_pr_lease as leases
+import task_capability_map as tcm
+
+
+HEAD = "a" * 40
+LIVE_HEAD = HEAD
+
+
+class TestMergerLeaseAcquireTool(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = True
+        mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = True
+        mcp_server._preflight_resolved_role = "merger"
+        mcp_server._preflight_resolved_task = "acquire_merger_pr_lease"
+        leases.clear_session_lease()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        leases.clear_session_lease()
+
+    def _merger_profile(self, **extra):
+        p = {
+            "username": "merger-user",
+            "profile_name": "prgs-merger",
+            "role": "merger",
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read",
+                "gitea.pr.comment",
+                "gitea.pr.merge",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [
+                "gitea.pr.approve",
+                "gitea.pr.review",
+                "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+            ],
+        }
+        p.update(extra)
+        return p
+
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value="token pass")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._resolve", return_value=("gitea.prgs.cc", "Scaled-Tech-Consulting", "Gitea-Tools"))
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.get_profile")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._fetch_pr_comments", return_value=[])
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._verify_role_mutation_workspace")
+    def test_acquire_merger_lease_success(
+        self, _verify, _comments, mock_profile, _resolve, _auth, mock_api
+    ):
+        mock_profile.return_value = self._merger_profile()
+        mock_api.side_effect = [
+            {"state": "open", "head": {"sha": LIVE_HEAD}},
+            {"id": 456},
+        ]
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE_NAME": "prgs-merger"}):
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease(
+                pr_number=718,
+                worktree="branches/issue-718",
+                session_id="merger-session",
+                candidate_head=HEAD,
+                remote="prgs",
+                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
+        self.assertTrue(res["acquired"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["comment_id"], 456)
+        self.assertEqual(res["session_id"], "merger-session")
+        self.assertEqual(res.get("repo"), "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools")
+        body = mock_api.call_args_list[-1][0][3]["body"]
+        self.assertIn("reviewer_identity: merger-user", body)
+        self.assertIn("profile: prgs-merger", body)
+        session_lease = leases._SESSION_LEASE
+        self.assertIsNotNone(session_lease)
+        provenance = session_lease.get("lease_provenance") or {}
+        self.assertEqual(provenance.get("source"), "gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease")
+
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value="token pass")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._resolve", return_value=("gitea.prgs.cc", "Scaled-Tech-Consulting", "Gitea-Tools"))
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.get_profile")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._fetch_pr_comments")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._verify_role_mutation_workspace")
+    def test_acquire_merger_lease_fails_if_active_exists(
+        self, _verify, _comments, mock_profile, _resolve, _auth, mock_api
+    ):
+        mock_profile.return_value = self._merger_profile()
+        active_body = leases.format_lease_body(
+            repo="Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools",
+            pr_number=718,
+            issue_number=None,
+            reviewer_identity="other-user",
+            profile="prgs-reviewer",
+            session_id="other-session",
+            worktree="branches/review-1",
+            phase="claimed",
+            candidate_head=HEAD,
+            target_branch="master",
+            target_branch_sha="b" * 40,
+            last_activity=datetime.now(timezone.utc),
+        )
+        _comments.return_value = [
+            {"id": 1, "body": active_body, "user": {"login": "other-user"}}
+        ]
+        mock_api.return_value = {"state": "open", "head": {"sha": LIVE_HEAD}}
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE_NAME": "prgs-merger"}):
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease(
+                pr_number=718,
+                worktree="branches/issue-718",
+                session_id="merger-session",
+                candidate_head=HEAD,
+            )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["acquired"])
+        self.assertIn("already has active reviewer lease", " ".join(res["reasons"]))
+        self.assertEqual(
+            [c for c in mock_api.call_args_list if c[0][0] == "POST"], []
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(leases._SESSION_LEASE)
+
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.get_profile")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._verify_role_mutation_workspace")
+    def test_acquire_merger_lease_fails_workspace_binding(self, _verify, mock_profile):
+        mock_profile.return_value = self._merger_profile()
+        _verify.side_effect = RuntimeError("Branches-only mutation guard")
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE_NAME": "prgs-merger"}):
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease(
+                pr_number=718,
+                worktree="branches/issue-718",
+                session_id="merger-session",
+                candidate_head=HEAD,
+            )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertIn("Branches-only mutation guard", res["reasons"][0])
+        self.assertIsNone(leases._SESSION_LEASE)
+
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value="token pass")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._resolve", return_value=("gitea.prgs.cc", "Scaled-Tech-Consulting", "Gitea-Tools"))
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.get_profile")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._fetch_pr_comments", return_value=[])
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._verify_role_mutation_workspace")
+    def test_acquire_merger_forwards_explicit_org_repo_to_workspace_verify(
+        self, mock_verify, _comments, mock_profile, _resolve, _auth, mock_api
+    ):
+        """Explicit org/repo must reach anti-stomp (prgs bare default is Timesheet)."""
+        mock_profile.return_value = self._merger_profile()
+        mock_api.side_effect = [
+            {"state": "open", "head": {"sha": LIVE_HEAD}},
+            {"id": 789},
+        ]
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE_NAME": "prgs-merger"}):
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease(
+                pr_number=718,
+                worktree="branches/issue-718",
+                session_id="merger-session",
+                candidate_head=HEAD,
+                remote="prgs",
+                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
+        kwargs = mock_verify.call_args.kwargs
+        self.assertEqual(kwargs.get("org"), "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
+        self.assertEqual(kwargs.get("repo"), "Gitea-Tools")
+        self.assertEqual(kwargs.get("task"), "acquire_merger_pr_lease")
+
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.get_profile")
+    def test_acquire_merger_requires_candidate_head(self, mock_profile):
+        mock_profile.return_value = self._merger_profile()
+        res = mcp_server.gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease(
+            pr_number=718,
+            worktree="branches/issue-718",
+            candidate_head=None,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("candidate_head is required" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
+
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value="token pass")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._resolve", return_value=("gitea.prgs.cc", "Scaled-Tech-Consulting", "Gitea-Tools"))
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.get_profile")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._fetch_pr_comments", return_value=[])
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._verify_role_mutation_workspace")
+    def test_acquire_merger_head_mismatch(
+        self, _verify, _comments, mock_profile, _resolve, _auth, mock_api
+    ):
+        mock_profile.return_value = self._merger_profile()
+        mock_api.return_value = {"state": "open", "head": {"sha": "b" * 40}}
+        res = mcp_server.gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease(
+            pr_number=718,
+            worktree="branches/issue-718",
+            candidate_head=HEAD,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("does not match live PR head" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
+        self.assertIsNone(leases._SESSION_LEASE)
+
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value="token pass")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._resolve", return_value=("gitea.prgs.cc", "Scaled-Tech-Consulting", "Gitea-Tools"))
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.get_profile")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._fetch_pr_comments", return_value=[])
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._verify_role_mutation_workspace")
+    def test_acquire_merger_fails_closed_when_live_head_unresolvable(
+        self, _verify, _comments, mock_profile, _resolve, _auth, mock_api
+    ):
+        """Empty/missing live head must not silently proceed past exact-head gate."""
+        mock_profile.return_value = self._merger_profile()
+        # PR payload present but head.sha missing / empty / non-dict.
+        mock_api.return_value = {"state": "open", "head": {}}
+        res = mcp_server.gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease(
+            pr_number=718,
+            worktree="branches/issue-718",
+            session_id="merger-session",
+            candidate_head=HEAD,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"], res)
+        self.assertFalse(res.get("acquired"), res)
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("live PR head could not be resolved" in r for r in res["reasons"]),
+            res,
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(res.get("live_head"))
+        self.assertEqual(res.get("candidate_head"), HEAD)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            [c for c in mock_api.call_args_list if c[0][0] == "POST"], []
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(leases._SESSION_LEASE)
+
+        # Completely empty GET /pulls body also fails closed.
+        mock_api.return_value = {}
+        res2 = mcp_server.gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease(
+            pr_number=718,
+            worktree="branches/issue-718",
+            candidate_head=HEAD,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res2["success"], res2)
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("live PR head could not be resolved" in r for r in res2["reasons"]),
+            res2,
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(leases._SESSION_LEASE)
+
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_operation_gate")
+    def test_author_denied_merge_permission(self, mock_gate):
+        """Author profile lacks gitea.pr.merge → fail closed before mutation."""
+        def gate(op):
+            if op == "gitea.pr.merge":
+                return [f"profile lacks {op}"]
+            return None
+        mock_gate.side_effect = gate
+        res = mcp_server.gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease(
+            pr_number=718,
+            worktree="branches/issue-718",
+            candidate_head=HEAD,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("gitea.pr.merge" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
+
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_operation_gate")
+    def test_reviewer_denied_merge_permission(self, mock_gate):
+        def gate(op):
+            if op == "gitea.pr.merge":
+                return [f"profile lacks {op}"]
+            return None
+        mock_gate.side_effect = gate
+        res = mcp_server.gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease(
+            pr_number=718,
+            worktree="branches/issue-718",
+            candidate_head=HEAD,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("gitea.pr.merge" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
+
+
+class TestCapabilityMapLeaseTasks(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_merger_acquire_map_entries(self):
+        for task in ("acquire_merger_pr_lease", "gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease"):
+            self.assertEqual(tcm.required_permission(task), "gitea.pr.comment")
+            self.assertEqual(tcm.required_role(task), "merger")
+
+    def test_reviewer_acquire_map_entries(self):
+        for task in ("acquire_reviewer_pr_lease", "gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease"):
+            self.assertEqual(tcm.required_permission(task), "gitea.pr.comment")
+            self.assertEqual(tcm.required_role(task), "reviewer")
+
+    def test_adopt_merger_aliases(self):
+        for task in ("adopt_merger_pr_lease", "gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease"):
+            self.assertEqual(tcm.required_role(task), "merger")
+
+
+class TestResolveTaskCapabilityLeaseAndUnknown(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        mcp_server._process_boot_head_sha = None
+        if hasattr(mcp_server, "capability_stop_terminal"):
+            mcp_server.capability_stop_terminal.clear()
+
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "record_mutation_authority", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "init_review_decision_lock", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "record_preflight_check", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "_ensure_matching_profile", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin")
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile")
+    @patch.object(mcp_server.gitea_config, "load_config")
+    def test_resolve_acquire_reviewer_authorized(
+        self, mock_cfg, mock_profile, *_mocks
+    ):
+        mock_profile.return_value = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
+            "role": "reviewer",
+            "allowed_operations": ["gitea.pr.comment", "gitea.read", "gitea.pr.review"],
+            "forbidden_operations": [],
+        }
+        mock_cfg.return_value = {
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-reviewer": {
+                    "role": "reviewer",
+                    "allowed_operations": [
+                        "gitea.pr.comment",
+                        "gitea.read",
+                        "gitea.pr.review",
+                    ],
+                    "forbidden_operations": [],
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-reviewer"}, clear=False):
+            for task in ("acquire_reviewer_pr_lease", "gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease"):
+                res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task=task, remote="prgs")
+                self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "reviewer", res)
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    res["required_operation_permission"], "gitea.pr.comment", res
+                )
+                self.assertTrue(res.get("allowed_in_current_session"), res)
+
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "record_mutation_authority", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "init_review_decision_lock", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "record_preflight_check", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "_ensure_matching_profile", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="jcwalker3")
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile")
+    @patch.object(mcp_server.gitea_config, "load_config")
+    def test_resolve_acquire_reviewer_author_denied(
+        self, mock_cfg, mock_profile, *_mocks
+    ):
+        mock_profile.return_value = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+            "role": "author",
+            "allowed_operations": ["gitea.pr.comment", "gitea.branch.push", "gitea.read"],
+            "forbidden_operations": [],
+        }
+        mock_cfg.return_value = {
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-author": {
+                    "role": "author",
+                    "allowed_operations": [
+                        "gitea.pr.comment",
+                        "gitea.branch.push",
+                        "gitea.read",
+                    ],
+                    "forbidden_operations": [],
+                },
+                "prgs-reviewer": {
+                    "role": "reviewer",
+                    "allowed_operations": ["gitea.pr.comment", "gitea.pr.review"],
+                    "forbidden_operations": [],
+                },
+            }
+        }
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author"}, clear=False):
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                task="acquire_reviewer_pr_lease", remote="prgs"
+            )
+        self.assertFalse(res.get("allowed_in_current_session"), res)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "reviewer")
+        guidance = " ".join(res.get("task_role_guidance") or [])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            "cannot perform reviewer" in guidance.lower()
+            or "reviewer" in guidance.lower()
+            or res.get("stop_required"),
+            res,
+        )
+
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "record_mutation_authority", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "init_review_decision_lock", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "record_preflight_check", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "_ensure_matching_profile", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin")
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile")
+    def test_resolve_unknown_task_structured_no_raise(self, mock_profile, *_mocks):
+        mock_profile.return_value = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
+            "role": "reviewer",
+            "allowed_operations": ["gitea.pr.comment"],
+            "forbidden_operations": [],
+        }
+        # Must not raise ValueError into the tool boundary.
+        res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+            task="some_made_up_task", remote="prgs"
+        )
+        self.assertIsInstance(res, dict)
+        self.assertEqual(res.get("reason_code"), "unknown_task", res)
+        self.assertFalse(res.get("allowed_in_current_session"))
+        self.assertTrue(res.get("stop_required"))
+        self.assertIs(res.get("mutation_performed"), False)
+        self.assertNotIn("token", str(res).lower())
+        self.assertNotIn("password", str(res).lower())
+        guidance = " ".join(res.get("task_role_guidance") or [])
+        self.assertIn("Unknown task/action", guidance)
+
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "record_mutation_authority", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "init_review_decision_lock", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "record_preflight_check", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "_ensure_matching_profile", return_value=None)
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin")
+    @patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile")
+    @patch.object(mcp_server.gitea_config, "load_config")
+    def test_resolve_merger_acquire_aliases(
+        self, mock_cfg, mock_profile, *_mocks
+    ):
+        mock_profile.return_value = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-merger",
+            "role": "merger",
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read",
+                "gitea.pr.comment",
+                "gitea.pr.merge",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [],
+        }
+        mock_cfg.return_value = {
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-merger": {
+                    "role": "merger",
+                    "allowed_operations": [
+                        "gitea.read",
+                        "gitea.pr.comment",
+                        "gitea.pr.merge",
+                    ],
+                    "forbidden_operations": [],
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-merger"}, clear=False):
+            for task in ("acquire_merger_pr_lease", "gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease"):
+                res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task=task, remote="prgs")
+                self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "merger", res)
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    res["required_operation_permission"], "gitea.pr.comment", res
+                )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_merger_lease_adoption.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Merger lease adoption / recovery (#536)."""
 
 import os

tests/test_mutation_error_diagnostics.py

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+"""Safe mutation-error diagnostics for the tool boundary.
+
+The #699/#701 boundary intentionally collapses every non-typed exception to an
+opaque ``internal_error`` with the class and message discarded. That makes a
+mutation failure (create_issue / create_pr / delete_branch / issue-lock)
+undiagnosable: reason_code=internal_error, retryable=false, no actionable
+detail.
+
+This suite pins the additive contract:
+
+1. For the ``internal_error`` fallback ONLY, capture a **safe exception class**
+   (a Python type identifier — never secrets) and a **strictly-redacted**
+   detail (no tokens, Authorization headers, raw URLs/hosts, absolute paths,
+   response bodies, env dumps), plus an optional ``mutation_stage`` tag.
+2. Typed classifications (auth/authz/network/config/http) are unchanged and
+   still emit fixed messages with NO detail in the daemon log.
+3. Any exception may self-declare a safe ``gitea_reason_code`` to be converted
+   into a typed structured error instead of an opaque internal_error.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import io
+import json
+import unittest
+
+import gitea_auth
+import mcp_tool_error_boundary as boundary
+
+# Adversarial text a poisoned internal exception might carry.
+POISON = (
+    "boom at /Users/jasonwalker/secret/creds.json "
+    "Authorization: token ghp_leaked_secret_xyz "
+    "https://sysadmin:[email protected]/api/v1/x?token=supersecretXYZ "
+    'Bearer abc.def.ghi {"token":"supersecretXYZ","password":"hunter2"}'
+)
+SECRETS = (
+    "ghp_leaked_secret_xyz",
+    "supersecretXYZ",
+    "hunter2",
+    "/Users/jasonwalker/secret",
+    "gitea.prgs.cc",
+)
+
+
+class TestRedactDetail(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_strips_secrets_paths_urls_and_truncates(self):
+        out = boundary._redact_detail(POISON)
+        for s in SECRETS:
+            self.assertNotIn(s, out)
+        self.assertLessEqual(len(out), boundary._DETAIL_LIMIT)
+
+    def test_empty_is_safe(self):
+        self.assertEqual(boundary._redact_detail(""), "")
+        self.assertEqual(boundary._redact_detail(None), "")
+
+
+class TestSafeExceptionClass(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_fully_qualified_type_identifier(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            boundary._safe_exception_class(RuntimeError("x")), "builtins.RuntimeError"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            boundary._safe_exception_class(KeyError("x")), "builtins.KeyError"
+        )
+
+    def test_class_name_never_carries_instance_text(self):
+        # The class identifier must not include the (possibly secret) message.
+        cls = boundary._safe_exception_class(RuntimeError(POISON))
+        for s in SECRETS:
+            self.assertNotIn(s, cls)
+
+
+class TestInternalErrorGainsDiagnostics(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_classify_internal_has_class_and_redacted_detail(self):
+        c = boundary.classify_exception(RuntimeError(POISON))
+        self.assertEqual(c["reason_code"], "internal_error")
+        self.assertEqual(c["error_class"], "internal")
+        self.assertEqual(c["exception_class"], "builtins.RuntimeError")
+        self.assertIn("detail", c)
+        for s in SECRETS:
+            self.assertNotIn(s, json.dumps(c))
+
+    def test_payload_surfaces_class_and_detail_but_fixed_message(self):
+        p = boundary.build_structured_error_payload(
+            boundary.classify_exception(RuntimeError(POISON)),
+            tool_name="gitea_delete_branch",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(p["reason_code"], "internal_error")
+        self.assertEqual(p["exception_class"], "builtins.RuntimeError")
+        self.assertIn("detail", p)
+        self.assertEqual(p["message"], boundary.fixed_message("internal_error"))
+        for s in SECRETS:
+            self.assertNotIn(s, json.dumps(p))
+
+    def test_daemon_log_internal_includes_class_and_detail_no_secrets(self):
+        buf = io.StringIO()
+        c = boundary.classify_exception(RuntimeError(POISON))
+        boundary.log_sanitized_daemon_reason(
+            c, tool_name="gitea_delete_branch", stream=buf
+        )
+        line = buf.getvalue()
+        self.assertIn("reason_code=internal_error", line)
+        self.assertIn("exception_class=builtins.RuntimeError", line)
+        self.assertIn("detail=", line)
+        for s in SECRETS:
+            self.assertNotIn(s, line)
+
+
+class TestTypedPathsUnchanged(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_auth_payload_has_no_detail_or_class(self):
+        p = boundary.build_structured_error_payload(
+            boundary.classify_exception(gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError())
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn("detail", p)
+        self.assertNotIn("exception_class", p)
+
+    def test_auth_daemon_log_has_no_detail(self):
+        buf = io.StringIO()
+        boundary.log_sanitized_daemon_reason(
+            boundary.classify_exception(gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError()),
+            tool_name="gitea_whoami",
+            stream=buf,
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn("detail=", buf.getvalue())
+        self.assertNotIn("exception_class=", buf.getvalue())
+
+
+class TestMutationStageTag(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_stage_flows_to_payload_and_log(self):
+        exc = RuntimeError("boom")
+        setattr(exc, "_gitea_mutation_stage", "preflight_purity")
+        c = boundary.classify_exception(exc)
+        self.assertEqual(c["mutation_stage"], "preflight_purity")
+        p = boundary.build_structured_error_payload(c, tool_name="gitea_create_pr")
+        self.assertEqual(p["mutation_stage"], "preflight_purity")
+        buf = io.StringIO()
+        boundary.log_sanitized_daemon_reason(c, tool_name="gitea_create_pr", stream=buf)
+        self.assertIn("mutation_stage=preflight_purity", buf.getvalue())
+
+    def test_stage_value_is_bounded_and_safe(self):
+        exc = RuntimeError("boom")
+        setattr(exc, "_gitea_mutation_stage", "x" * 500 + POISON)
+        c = boundary.classify_exception(exc)
+        for s in SECRETS:
+            self.assertNotIn(s, c["mutation_stage"])
+        self.assertLessEqual(len(c["mutation_stage"]), 64)
+
+
+class TestGiteaReasonCodeConversion(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_self_declared_reason_becomes_typed(self):
+        exc = RuntimeError("Pre-flight order violation: whoami missing")
+        setattr(exc, "gitea_reason_code", "preflight_order_violation")
+        c = boundary.classify_exception(exc)
+        self.assertEqual(c["reason_code"], "preflight_order_violation")
+        self.assertNotEqual(c["reason_code"], "internal_error")
+        p = boundary.build_structured_error_payload(c, tool_name="gitea_delete_branch")
+        self.assertEqual(p["reason_code"], "preflight_order_violation")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            p["message"], boundary.fixed_message("preflight_order_violation")
+        )
+
+    def test_unknown_self_declared_reason_ignored(self):
+        exc = RuntimeError("boom")
+        setattr(exc, "gitea_reason_code", "not_a_real_reason")
+        c = boundary.classify_exception(exc)
+        self.assertEqual(c["reason_code"], "internal_error")
+
+    def test_preflight_reason_is_registered(self):
+        self.assertIn("preflight_order_violation", boundary.FIXED_MESSAGES)
+
+
+class TestAdversarialInternalNoLeak(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_poisoned_internal_never_leaks_in_result_or_log(self):
+        exc = RuntimeError(POISON)
+        buf = io.StringIO()
+        result = boundary.to_call_tool_result(
+            exc, tool_name="gitea_delete_branch", log=False
+        )
+        c = boundary.classify_exception(exc)
+        boundary.log_sanitized_daemon_reason(
+            c, tool_name="gitea_delete_branch", stream=buf
+        )
+        blob = (
+            json.dumps(result.structuredContent)
+            + result.content[0].text
+            + buf.getvalue()
+        )
+        for s in SECRETS:
+            self.assertNotIn(s, blob)
+
+
+class TestServerSideTypedAndStage(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Server raisers are typed and stage-taggable, end-to-end into the boundary."""
+
+    def test_preflight_order_error_is_typed_runtimeerror(self):
+        import gitea_mcp_server as s
+
+        exc = s._PreflightOrderError("whoami missing")
+        self.assertIsInstance(exc, RuntimeError)  # legacy except RuntimeError
+        self.assertEqual(exc.gitea_reason_code, "preflight_order_violation")
+        c = boundary.classify_exception(exc)
+        self.assertEqual(c["reason_code"], "preflight_order_violation")
+        self.assertNotEqual(c["reason_code"], "internal_error")
+
+    def test_mutation_stage_tags_and_reraises(self):
+        import gitea_mcp_server as s
+
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+            with s._mutation_stage("preflight_purity"):
+                raise RuntimeError("boom")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            getattr(ctx.exception, "_gitea_mutation_stage", None), "preflight_purity"
+        )
+
+    def test_mutation_stage_inner_wins(self):
+        import gitea_mcp_server as s
+
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+            with s._mutation_stage("outer"):
+                with s._mutation_stage("inner"):
+                    raise RuntimeError("boom")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            getattr(ctx.exception, "_gitea_mutation_stage", None), "inner"
+        )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_op_normalization.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Operation-name normalization table and enforcement tests — issue #106.
 
 Covers the required matrix from #106:

tests/test_operation_scoped_roles.py

@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
-"""Tests for operation-scoped role selection and automatic dispatch switching (#228)."""
+"""Tests for operation-scoped role selection (#228, updated by #714).
+
+#714 removes silent automatic profile substitution. Capability resolution
+and mutation gates evaluate only the active profile; explicit
+``gitea_activate_profile`` is required to switch roles.
+"""
 import os
 import sys
 import json
@@ -15,6 +20,7 @@ from reviewer_worktree import assess_author_worktree_continuity
 
 CONFIG_TEST = {
     "version": 2,
+    "allow_runtime_switching": True,
     "contexts": {
         "ctx": {
             "enabled": True,
@@ -30,9 +36,11 @@ CONFIG_TEST = {
             "context": "ctx",
             "role": "author",
             "username": "author-user",
+            "base_url": "https://gitea.example.com",
             "auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_AUTHOR"},
             "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push", "gitea.issue.comment"],
             "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge"],
+            "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools", "913443/eAgenda"],
             "execution_profile": "author-profile"
         },
         "reviewer-profile": {
@@ -40,9 +48,11 @@ CONFIG_TEST = {
             "context": "ctx",
             "role": "reviewer",
             "username": "reviewer-user",
+            "base_url": "https://gitea.example.com",
             "auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_REVIEWER"},
             "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.review", "gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.issue.comment"],
             "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
+            "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools", "913443/eAgenda"],
             "execution_profile": "reviewer-profile"
         }
     }
@@ -57,6 +67,15 @@ class TestOperationScopedRoles(unittest.TestCase):
         })
         self._remotes_patch.start()
         mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        self._url = patch.object(
+            mcp_server,
+            "_local_git_remote_url",
+            side_effect=lambda n: {
+                "prgs": "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git",
+                "dadeschools": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net/913443/eAgenda.git",
+            }.get(n),
+        )
+        self._url.start()
         gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
         mcp_server._MUTATION_AUTHORITY = None
         self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
@@ -64,6 +83,11 @@ class TestOperationScopedRoles(unittest.TestCase):
         self._write_config(CONFIG_TEST)
 
     def tearDown(self):
+        try:
+            self._url.stop()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
         self._remotes_patch.stop()
         mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
         gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
@@ -85,62 +109,71 @@ class TestOperationScopedRoles(unittest.TestCase):
         return env
 
     @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
-    def test_auto_switch_to_reviewer(self, mock_api):
-        # mock identity resolution to return username matching profile
+    def test_no_auto_switch_to_reviewer(self, mock_api):
+        # #714: capability resolution must not silently switch author → reviewer
         mock_api.side_effect = lambda method, url, header: (
             {"login": "reviewer-user"} if "reviewer-pass" in str(header) else {"login": "author-user"}
         )
         with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("author-profile")):
-            # initially we are author-profile
             self.assertEqual(gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "author-profile")
             self.assertEqual(mcp_server.get_profile()["profile_name"], "author-profile")
 
-            # resolve a reviewer task (review_pr)
             res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="review_pr", remote="prgs")
-            
-            # verify it automatically switched to reviewer-profile
-            self.assertTrue(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
-            self.assertTrue(res["available_in_session"])
-            self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "reviewer-profile")
-            self.assertEqual(res["active_identity"], "reviewer-user")
-            self.assertEqual(gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "reviewer-profile")
+
+            self.assertFalse(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
+            self.assertFalse(res["available_in_session"])
+            self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "author-profile")
+            self.assertEqual(res["active_identity"], "author-user")
+            self.assertEqual(gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "author-profile")
+            self.assertIn("reviewer-profile", res["matching_configured_profile"])
+            self.assertFalse(res.get("auto_profile_substitution", True))
 
     @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
-    def test_auto_switch_to_author(self, mock_api):
+    def test_no_auto_switch_to_author(self, mock_api):
         mock_api.side_effect = lambda method, url, header: (
             {"login": "reviewer-user"} if "reviewer-pass" in str(header) else {"login": "author-user"}
         )
         with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("reviewer-profile")):
-            # initially we are reviewer-profile
             self.assertEqual(gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "reviewer-profile")
 
-            # resolve an author task (create_issue)
             res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="create_issue", remote="prgs")
-            
-            # verify it automatically switched to author-profile
-            self.assertTrue(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
-            self.assertTrue(res["available_in_session"])
-            self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "author-profile")
-            self.assertEqual(res["active_identity"], "author-user")
-            self.assertEqual(gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "author-profile")
+
+            self.assertFalse(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
+            self.assertFalse(res["available_in_session"])
+            self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "reviewer-profile")
+            self.assertEqual(res["active_identity"], "reviewer-user")
+            self.assertEqual(gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "reviewer-profile")
+            self.assertIn("author-profile", res["matching_configured_profile"])
 
     @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
-    def test_restart_required_when_unattached(self, mock_api):
+    def test_explicit_activate_profile_still_works(self, mock_api):
+        mock_api.side_effect = lambda method, url, header: (
+            {"login": "reviewer-user"} if "reviewer-pass" in str(header) else {"login": "author-user"}
+        )
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("author-profile")):
+            act = mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
+                profile_name="reviewer-profile", remote="prgs"
+            )
+            self.assertTrue(act["success"])
+            self.assertEqual(act["after_profile"], "reviewer-profile")
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="review_pr", remote="prgs")
+            self.assertTrue(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
+            self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "reviewer-profile")
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    def test_denied_when_matching_profile_token_missing(self, mock_api):
         mock_api.side_effect = lambda method, url, header: {"login": "author-user"}
         # launch without reviewer token in env
         with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("author-profile", with_reviewer_token=False)):
             self.assertEqual(gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "author-profile")
 
-            # resolve a reviewer task (review_pr)
             res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="review_pr", remote="prgs")
-            
-            # verify it did NOT switch and reports restart_required
+
             self.assertFalse(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
             self.assertFalse(res["available_in_session"])
             self.assertTrue(res["configured"])
-            self.assertTrue(res["restart_required"])
             self.assertTrue(res["stop_required"])
-            self.assertIn("Reviewer profile exists but MCP server was added after session startup and is not attached", res["reason"])
+            self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "author-profile")
 
     def test_author_continuity_dirty_worktree(self):
         # author is allowed to keep dirty worktree
@@ -161,20 +194,21 @@ class TestOperationScopedRoles(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertFalse(res2["proven"])
 
     @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
-    def test_mutating_actions_auto_switch(self, mock_api):
+    def test_mutating_actions_do_not_auto_switch(self, mock_api):
         mock_api.side_effect = lambda method, url, header: (
             {"login": "reviewer-user"} if "reviewer-pass" in str(header) else {"login": "author-user"}
         )
         with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("author-profile")):
-            # verify we are author-profile
             self.assertEqual(gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "author-profile")
 
-            # call a reviewer mutation check helper (like _profile_permission_block with reviewer permission)
-            blocked = mcp_server._profile_permission_block("gitea.pr.merge", remote="prgs")
-            self.assertIsNone(blocked) # should switch to reviewer-profile and allow it (no permission block)
+            blocked = mcp_server._profile_permission_block(
+                "gitea.pr.merge", remote="prgs"
+            )
+            self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
+            self.assertFalse(blocked.get("success", True))
 
-            # verify we dynamically switched to reviewer-profile
-            self.assertEqual(gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "reviewer-profile")
+            # profile must remain author — no silent substitution
+            self.assertEqual(gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "author-profile")
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

tests/test_operator_guide.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Tests for the operator guide / project skills MCP tools (#128).
 
 Read-only capability-discovery tools: mcp_get_control_plane_guide,

tests/test_post_merge_moot_lease.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Post-merge moot reviewer-lease handling (#515).
 
 Covers:

tests/test_pr_lease_comments_non_list_guard.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Regression tests for non-list API payloads on PR/issue comment listing (#485)."""
 import os
 import sys

tests/test_pr_ownership_issue_pr_mismatch.py

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+"""#727 / PR #728: author ownership when tracking issue number != PR number.
+
+Regression for REQUEST_CHANGES: gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge must not require
+issue_number == pr_number. Ownership is proven via linked issue + lock/branch
+context and fails closed for unrelated issues.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import issue_lock_store
+import gitea_mcp_server as mcp
+
+
+def _live_lock(
+    *,
+    issue_number: int,
+    branch_name: str = "feat/issue-727-pr-sync-status",
+    worktree_path: str = "/tmp/branches/issue-727-pr-sync-status",
+    remote: str = "prgs",
+    org: str = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+    repo: str = "Gitea-Tools",
+) -> dict:
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    return {
+        "issue_number": issue_number,
+        "branch_name": branch_name,
+        "worktree_path": worktree_path,
+        "remote": remote,
+        "org": org,
+        "repo": repo,
+        "operation_type": issue_lock_store.AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE,
+        "acquired_at": now.isoformat(),
+        "expires_at": (now + timedelta(hours=2)).isoformat(),
+        "owner_pid": os.getpid(),
+        "status": "active",
+    }
+
+
+class TestAuthorOwnershipIssuePrMismatch(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gitea-issue-locks-")
+        self.lock_dir = self._tmp.name
+        os.environ["GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR"] = self.lock_dir
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        # Clear session pointer for this process.
+        try:
+            ptr = issue_lock_store.session_pointer_path(self.lock_dir)
+            if os.path.isfile(ptr):
+                os.unlink(ptr)
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        os.environ.pop("GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR", None)
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def test_issue_727_pr_728_session_lock_accepted(self):
+        """Tracking issue #727 lock is valid ownership for PR #728."""
+        lock = _live_lock(issue_number=727)
+        issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock(lock)
+        result = mcp._prove_author_ownership_for_pr(
+            pr_number=728,
+            pr_title="feat: pr sync",
+            pr_body="Closes #727\n\nNative PR sync lifecycle.",
+            source_branch="feat/issue-727-pr-sync-status",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host=None,
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            worktree_path=lock["worktree_path"],
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["proven"], result)
+        self.assertTrue(result["has_author_lock"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["matched_issue"], 727)
+        self.assertEqual(result["matched_via"], "session_lock")
+        self.assertIn(727, result["linked_issues"])
+
+    def test_issue_727_pr_728_durable_lock_accepted(self):
+        lock = _live_lock(issue_number=727)
+        path = issue_lock_store.lock_file_path(
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            issue_number=727,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+        )
+        issue_lock_store.save_lock_file(path, lock)
+        result = mcp._prove_author_ownership_for_pr(
+            pr_number=728,
+            pr_title="feat: pr sync",
+            pr_body="Fixes #727",
+            source_branch="feat/issue-727-pr-sync-status",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host=None,
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["proven"], result)
+        self.assertEqual(result["matched_issue"], 727)
+        self.assertEqual(result["matched_via"], "durable_lock")
+
+    def test_legacy_same_number_still_accepted(self):
+        lock = _live_lock(
+            issue_number=100,
+            branch_name="fix/issue-100",
+            worktree_path="/tmp/branches/issue-100",
+        )
+        issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock(lock)
+        result = mcp._prove_author_ownership_for_pr(
+            pr_number=100,
+            pr_title="fix something",
+            pr_body="Closes #100",
+            source_branch="fix/issue-100",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host=None,
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            worktree_path=lock["worktree_path"],
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["proven"], result)
+        self.assertEqual(result["matched_issue"], 100)
+
+    def test_unrelated_issue_lock_rejected(self):
+        """Lock for issue #999 must not authorize PR #728 linked only to #727."""
+        lock = _live_lock(
+            issue_number=999,
+            branch_name="feat/issue-999",
+            worktree_path="/tmp/branches/issue-999",
+        )
+        issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock(lock)
+        path = issue_lock_store.lock_file_path(
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            issue_number=999,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+        )
+        issue_lock_store.save_lock_file(path, lock)
+        result = mcp._prove_author_ownership_for_pr(
+            pr_number=728,
+            pr_title="feat: pr sync",
+            pr_body="Closes #727",
+            source_branch="feat/issue-727-pr-sync-status",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host=None,
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            worktree_path=lock["worktree_path"],
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"], result)
+        self.assertFalse(result["has_author_lock"])
+        self.assertIsNone(result["matched_issue"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["reasons"])
+
+    def test_branch_mismatch_on_session_lock_fail_closed(self):
+        lock = _live_lock(
+            issue_number=727,
+            branch_name="feat/other-branch",
+        )
+        issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock(lock)
+        result = mcp._prove_author_ownership_for_pr(
+            pr_number=728,
+            pr_title="feat: pr sync",
+            pr_body="Closes #727",
+            source_branch="feat/issue-727-pr-sync-status",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host=None,
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            worktree_path=lock["worktree_path"],
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"], result)
+        self.assertTrue(any("branch" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_no_lock_fail_closed(self):
+        result = mcp._prove_author_ownership_for_pr(
+            pr_number=728,
+            pr_title="feat: pr sync",
+            pr_body="Closes #727",
+            source_branch="feat/issue-727-pr-sync-status",
+            remote="prgs",
+            host=None,
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"], result)
+        self.assertTrue(any("no live author issue lock" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_pr_sync_status.py

@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+"""Hermetic tests for PR synchronization / conflict-remediation lifecycle."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import unittest
+
+from pr_sync_status import (
+    ACTION_AUTHOR_CONFLICT_REMEDIATION,
+    ACTION_BLOCKED,
+    ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED,
+    ACTION_MERGE_NOW,
+    ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE,
+    assess_post_update_head_transition,
+    assess_pr_sync_status,
+    assess_sequential_queue_step,
+    assess_update_pr_branch_preflight,
+    lease_usable_at_head,
+    merge_approval_usable_at_head,
+)
+
+
+def _sha(prefix: str) -> str:
+    return (prefix + "0" * 40)[:40]
+
+
+PR_HEAD = _sha("aaaaaaaa")
+BASE_HEAD = _sha("bbbbbbbb")
+NEW_HEAD = _sha("cccccccc")
+OLD_HEAD = _sha("dddddddd")
+
+
+def _base_kwargs(**overrides):
+    data = {
+        "host": "gitea.prgs.cc",
+        "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+        "repo": "Gitea-Tools",
+        "pr_number": 100,
+        "pr_state": "open",
+        "source_branch": "fix/issue-100",
+        "pr_head_sha": PR_HEAD,
+        "base_head_sha": BASE_HEAD,
+        "commits_behind": 0,
+        "mergeable": True,
+        "has_conflicts": False,
+        "branch_protection_requires_current_base": False,
+        "approval_at_current_head": True,
+        "checks_status": "success",
+        "active_author_lock": True,
+        "active_reviewer_lease": False,
+        "active_merger_lease": False,
+    }
+    data.update(overrides)
+    return data
+
+
+class TestAssessPrSyncStatus(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_approved_current_mergeable_merge_now(self):
+        result = assess_pr_sync_status(**_base_kwargs())
+        self.assertEqual(result["recommended_next_action"], ACTION_MERGE_NOW)
+        self.assertTrue(result["approval_valid_for_merge"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["stale_approval"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["pr_head_sha"], PR_HEAD)
+        self.assertEqual(result["base_head_sha"], BASE_HEAD)
+
+    def test_approved_outdated_update_not_required_merge_now(self):
+        result = assess_pr_sync_status(
+            **_base_kwargs(
+                commits_behind=3,
+                branch_protection_requires_current_base=False,
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result["recommended_next_action"], ACTION_MERGE_NOW)
+        self.assertTrue(result["approval_valid_for_merge"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("does not require" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_outdated_update_required_no_conflict(self):
+        result = assess_pr_sync_status(
+            **_base_kwargs(
+                commits_behind=2,
+                branch_protection_requires_current_base=True,
+                mergeable=True,
+                has_conflicts=False,
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["recommended_next_action"], ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["approval_valid_for_merge"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("update_branch_by_merge" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_outdated_has_conflicts_author_remediation(self):
+        result = assess_pr_sync_status(
+            **_base_kwargs(
+                commits_behind=5,
+                branch_protection_requires_current_base=True,
+                mergeable=False,
+                has_conflicts=True,
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["recommended_next_action"], ACTION_AUTHOR_CONFLICT_REMEDIATION
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["approval_valid_for_merge"])
+
+    def test_stale_approval_fresh_review_required(self):
+        result = assess_pr_sync_status(
+            **_base_kwargs(
+                approval_at_current_head=False,
+                commits_behind=0,
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["recommended_next_action"], ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["stale_approval"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["approval_valid_for_merge"])
+
+    def test_stale_prepared_verdict_cannot_cross_heads(self):
+        result = assess_pr_sync_status(
+            **_base_kwargs(
+                approval_at_current_head=True,
+                prepared_verdict_head_sha=OLD_HEAD,
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["recommended_next_action"], ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["stale_prepared_verdict"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["approval_valid_for_merge"])
+
+    def test_missing_heads_fail_closed(self):
+        result = assess_pr_sync_status(
+            **_base_kwargs(pr_head_sha="short", base_head_sha=None)
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result["recommended_next_action"], ACTION_BLOCKED)
+        self.assertTrue(any("PR head" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_closed_pr_blocked(self):
+        result = assess_pr_sync_status(**_base_kwargs(pr_state="closed"))
+        self.assertEqual(result["recommended_next_action"], ACTION_BLOCKED)
+
+    def test_failed_checks_block_merge_now(self):
+        result = assess_pr_sync_status(**_base_kwargs(checks_status="failure"))
+        self.assertEqual(result["recommended_next_action"], ACTION_BLOCKED)
+
+    def test_stale_approval_with_update_required_routes_update(self):
+        result = assess_pr_sync_status(
+            **_base_kwargs(
+                approval_at_current_head=False,
+                commits_behind=1,
+                branch_protection_requires_current_base=True,
+                mergeable=True,
+                has_conflicts=False,
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["recommended_next_action"], ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE
+        )
+
+
+class TestUpdatePrBranchPreflight(unittest.TestCase):
+    def _ok_kwargs(self, **overrides):
+        data = {
+            "role_kind": "author",
+            "expected_pr_head_sha": PR_HEAD,
+            "live_pr_head_sha": PR_HEAD,
+            "expected_base_head_sha": BASE_HEAD,
+            "live_base_head_sha": BASE_HEAD,
+            "has_conflicts": False,
+            "mergeable": True,
+            "style": "merge",
+            "has_author_lock": True,
+            "worktree_path": "/Users/x/Development/Gitea-Tools/branches/issue-100",
+            "worktree_owns_source_branch": True,
+            "control_checkout_clean": True,
+            "master_parity_ok": True,
+            "force_push": False,
+            "rebase": False,
+        }
+        data.update(overrides)
+        return data
+
+    def test_author_allowed_when_preflight_clean(self):
+        result = assess_update_pr_branch_preflight(**self._ok_kwargs())
+        self.assertTrue(result["mutation_allowed"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["head_race"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["base_race"])
+
+    def test_head_race_fail_closed(self):
+        result = assess_update_pr_branch_preflight(
+            **self._ok_kwargs(live_pr_head_sha=NEW_HEAD)
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["mutation_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["head_race"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("PR head race" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_base_race_fail_closed(self):
+        result = assess_update_pr_branch_preflight(
+            **self._ok_kwargs(live_base_head_sha=NEW_HEAD)
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["mutation_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["base_race"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("base head race" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_conflicts_structured_handoff_no_mutation(self):
+        result = assess_update_pr_branch_preflight(
+            **self._ok_kwargs(has_conflicts=True, mergeable=False)
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["mutation_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["author_remediation_handoff"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("conflicts" in r.lower() for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_reviewer_denied(self):
+        result = assess_update_pr_branch_preflight(
+            **self._ok_kwargs(role_kind="reviewer")
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["mutation_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("author-only" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_merger_denied(self):
+        result = assess_update_pr_branch_preflight(
+            **self._ok_kwargs(role_kind="merger")
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["mutation_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("author-only" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_no_force_push(self):
+        result = assess_update_pr_branch_preflight(
+            **self._ok_kwargs(force_push=True)
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["mutation_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("force-push" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_no_rebase(self):
+        result = assess_update_pr_branch_preflight(
+            **self._ok_kwargs(style="rebase", rebase=True)
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["mutation_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("rebase" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_missing_lock_fail_closed(self):
+        result = assess_update_pr_branch_preflight(
+            **self._ok_kwargs(has_author_lock=False)
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["mutation_allowed"])
+
+    def test_worktree_not_under_branches(self):
+        result = assess_update_pr_branch_preflight(
+            **self._ok_kwargs(worktree_path="/tmp/not-a-branches-path")
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["mutation_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("branches/" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+
+class TestPostUpdateHeadTransition(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_update_invalidates_approval_and_requires_fresh_review(self):
+        result = assess_post_update_head_transition(
+            former_pr_head_sha=PR_HEAD,
+            new_pr_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
+            former_approval_head_sha=PR_HEAD,
+            former_reviewer_lease_head_sha=PR_HEAD,
+            former_merger_lease_head_sha=PR_HEAD,
+            prepared_verdict_head_sha=PR_HEAD,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["head_changed"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["approval_invalidated"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["reviewer_lease_superseded"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["merger_lease_superseded"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["prepared_verdict_invalidated"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["recommended_next_action"], ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED
+        )
+
+    def test_same_head_unexpected(self):
+        result = assess_post_update_head_transition(
+            former_pr_head_sha=PR_HEAD,
+            new_pr_head_sha=PR_HEAD,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["head_changed"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["recommended_next_action"], ACTION_BLOCKED)
+
+
+class TestStaleArtifacts(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_stale_approval_cannot_authorize_merge(self):
+        result = merge_approval_usable_at_head(
+            current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
+            approved_head_sha=PR_HEAD,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["approval_usable"])
+
+    def test_fresh_approval_usable(self):
+        result = merge_approval_usable_at_head(
+            current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
+            approved_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["approval_usable"])
+
+    def test_stale_reviewer_lease_cannot_cross_heads(self):
+        result = lease_usable_at_head(
+            lease_kind="reviewer",
+            lease_head_sha=PR_HEAD,
+            current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["lease_usable"])
+
+    def test_stale_merger_lease_cannot_cross_heads(self):
+        result = lease_usable_at_head(
+            lease_kind="merger",
+            lease_head_sha=PR_HEAD,
+            current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["lease_usable"])
+
+
+class TestSequentialQueue(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_reassess_after_merge_and_master_refresh(self):
+        result = assess_sequential_queue_step(
+            just_merged=True,
+            master_refreshed=True,
+            next_pr_number=101,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["reassess_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["process_next"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["post_merge_cleanup_handoff"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["next_pr_number"], 101)
+
+    def test_block_reassess_without_master_refresh(self):
+        result = assess_sequential_queue_step(
+            just_merged=True,
+            master_refreshed=False,
+            next_pr_number=101,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["reassess_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("master must be refreshed" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_preflight_workspace_repo_forwarding.py

@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+"""Regression matrix: session-bound mutation preflight resolves the workspace repo.
+
+Root-cause follow-up to #733. ``_resolve`` (the actual API-targeting resolver)
+already prefers the workspace-aligned git remote over the ``REMOTES`` default
+(bare ``prgs`` → ``Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet``). The shared #604
+anti-stomp preflight (``_run_anti_stomp_preflight``) did **not** mirror that: for
+every mutation task whose call site omitted ``org``/``repo`` it filled the
+remote-wide ``REMOTES`` default, so the #530 repo guard false-positived
+``wrong_repo`` against a ``Gitea-Tools`` checkout and blocked native
+issue/PR/review/merge/lock/cleanup mutations.
+
+The fix makes ``_run_anti_stomp_preflight`` prefer the trusted, git-remote-
+derived workspace identity for omitted coordinates on **session-bound** mutation
+tasks (marking those filled sides explicit, exactly like ``_resolve``), while
+``delete_branch`` keeps its explicit cross-repository *target* contract (#733)
+and continues to fail closed on omitted coordinates.
+"""
+
+import os
+import sys
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import mcp_server
+import remote_repo_guard
+
+# Workspace is bound to Gitea-Tools even though the prgs REMOTES default repo is
+# Timesheet (the exact cross-repo scenario).
+LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL = "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
+
+RECONCILER = {
+    "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
+    "role": "reconciler",
+    "allowed_operations": [
+        "gitea.read", "gitea.issue.comment", "gitea.pr.comment",
+        "gitea.pr.close", "gitea.branch.delete",
+    ],
+    "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.pr.merge"],
+    "audit_label": "prgs-reconciler",
+}
+
+# Session-bound mutation tasks (every MUTATION_TASK except the explicit-target
+# delete_branch) must auto-resolve the workspace repository for omitted coords.
+SESSION_BOUND_TASKS = [
+    "create_issue",
+    "comment_issue",
+    "close_issue",
+    "mark_issue",
+    "lock_issue",
+    "set_issue_labels",
+    "create_label",
+    "create_pr",
+    "close_pr",
+    "edit_pr",
+    "commit_files",
+    "cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
+    "cleanup_stale_claims",
+    "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
+    "reconcile_already_landed_pr",
+    "reconcile_close_superseded_pr",
+    "post_heartbeat",
+    "review_pr",
+    "submit_pr_review",
+    "merge_pr",
+]
+
+
+class _AntiStompResolutionBase(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._remotes = patch.dict(mcp_server.REMOTES, {
+            "prgs": {
+                "host": "gitea.prgs.cc",
+                "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                "repo": "Timesheet",
+            },
+        })
+        self._remotes.start()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        patch.stopall()
+
+    def _capture_resolution(self, task, org, repo, *, local_url=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL):
+        """Drive the live anti-stomp runner and capture the org/repo it resolved
+        and passed to the pure assessor."""
+        passthrough = {
+            "allowed": True, "block": False, "blockers": [], "reasons": [],
+            "exact_next_action": "proceed", "blocker_kind": None, "checks": {},
+        }
+        with patch.dict(
+            os.environ, {"GITEA_TEST_FORCE_ANTI_STOMP": "1"}, clear=False
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server._local_git_remote_url", return_value=local_url
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_profile", return_value=RECONCILER
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server.anti_stomp_preflight,
+            "assess_anti_stomp_preflight",
+            return_value=passthrough,
+        ) as m:
+            mcp_server._run_anti_stomp_preflight(
+                task, remote="prgs", org=org, repo=repo
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(m.called)
+        return m.call_args.kwargs
+
+
+class TestSessionBoundResolution(_AntiStompResolutionBase):
+    def test_omitted_coords_resolve_workspace_repo_and_mark_explicit(self):
+        for task in SESSION_BOUND_TASKS:
+            with self.subTest(task=task):
+                kw = self._capture_resolution(task, None, None)
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    kw["resolved_org"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting", task
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(kw["resolved_repo"], "Gitea-Tools", task)
+                # Workspace-filled sides are intentional alignment → explicit.
+                self.assertTrue(kw["org_explicit"], task)
+                self.assertTrue(kw["repo_explicit"], task)
+
+    def test_resolved_workspace_repo_passes_the_530_guard(self):
+        kw = self._capture_resolution("create_pr", None, None)
+        assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
+            remote="prgs",
+            resolved_org=kw["resolved_org"],
+            resolved_repo=kw["resolved_repo"],
+            local_remote_url=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL,
+            org_explicit=kw["org_explicit"],
+            repo_explicit=kw["repo_explicit"],
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["block"], assessment)
+
+    def test_explicit_caller_coords_are_preserved(self):
+        kw = self._capture_resolution(
+            "create_pr", "Scaled-Tech-Consulting", "Gitea-Tools"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(kw["resolved_org"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
+        self.assertEqual(kw["resolved_repo"], "Gitea-Tools")
+        self.assertTrue(kw["org_explicit"])
+        self.assertTrue(kw["repo_explicit"])
+
+    def test_no_workspace_identity_falls_back_to_remotes_default(self):
+        # No derivable local remote → best-effort REMOTES default preserved,
+        # not marked explicit (so the guard still corroborates when able).
+        kw = self._capture_resolution("create_pr", None, None, local_url=None)
+        self.assertEqual(kw["resolved_repo"], "Timesheet")
+        self.assertFalse(kw["org_explicit"])
+        self.assertFalse(kw["repo_explicit"])
+
+
+class TestDeleteBranchContractPreserved(_AntiStompResolutionBase):
+    """delete_branch keeps its explicit-target contract (#733): omitted coords
+    still resolve the remote-wide default and are NOT marked explicit, so the
+    guard fails closed against a mismatched workspace."""
+
+    def test_omitted_coords_still_remote_default_not_explicit(self):
+        kw = self._capture_resolution("delete_branch", None, None)
+        self.assertEqual(kw["resolved_repo"], "Timesheet")
+        self.assertFalse(kw["org_explicit"])
+        self.assertFalse(kw["repo_explicit"])
+        assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
+            remote="prgs",
+            resolved_org=kw["resolved_org"],
+            resolved_repo=kw["resolved_repo"],
+            local_remote_url=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL,
+            org_explicit=kw["org_explicit"],
+            repo_explicit=kw["repo_explicit"],
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
+
+    def test_explicit_coords_still_forwarded(self):
+        kw = self._capture_resolution(
+            "delete_branch", "Scaled-Tech-Consulting", "Gitea-Tools"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(kw["resolved_repo"], "Gitea-Tools")
+        self.assertTrue(kw["org_explicit"])
+        self.assertTrue(kw["repo_explicit"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
+
+
+class TestAuthorCallSiteForwardsOrgRepo(_AntiStompResolutionBase):
+    """#735: author mutation entrypoints must pass org/repo into preflight."""
+
+    def _assert_call_forwards(self, fn_name: str, *args, **kwargs):
+        import inspect
+        fn = getattr(mcp_server, fn_name)
+        # Force preflight path to raise with the kwargs it received so we can
+        # prove org/repo were forwarded without performing the full mutation.
+        captured = {}
+
+        def _capture(*a, **kw):
+            captured.update(kw)
+            captured["_args"] = a
+            raise RuntimeError("capture-only")
+
+        with patch.object(mcp_server, "verify_preflight_purity", side_effect=_capture), \
+             patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value={
+                 "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+                 "role": "author",
+                 "allowed_operations": [
+                     "gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create", "gitea.issue.comment",
+                     "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.repo.commit", "gitea.branch.push",
+                 ],
+                 "forbidden_operations": [],
+                 "audit_label": "prgs-author",
+             }), patch.object(
+                 mcp_server, "_resolve",
+                 return_value=("gitea.prgs.cc", "Scaled-Tech-Consulting", "Gitea-Tools"),
+             ), patch.object(
+                 mcp_server, "_auth", return_value="token fake",
+             ), patch.object(
+                 mcp_server.role_session_router,
+                 "check_author_mutation_after_reviewer_stop",
+                 return_value=(True, []),
+             ), patch.object(
+                 mcp_server, "_namespace_mutation_block", return_value=None
+             ), patch.object(
+                 mcp_server, "_profile_permission_block", return_value=None
+             ), patch.object(
+                 mcp_server, "_production_guard_block_from_exc", return_value=None
+             ):
+            try:
+                fn(*args, **kwargs)
+            except RuntimeError as exc:
+                if "capture-only" not in str(exc):
+                    # Some tools re-raise; still require capture when preflight ran.
+                    if not captured:
+                        raise
+            self.assertTrue(captured, f"{fn_name} never called verify_preflight_purity")
+            self.assertEqual(captured.get("org"), "Scaled-Tech-Consulting", fn_name)
+            self.assertEqual(captured.get("repo"), "Gitea-Tools", fn_name)
+
+    def test_create_issue_forwards_explicit_org_repo(self):
+        self._assert_call_forwards(
+            "gitea_create_issue",
+            "title",
+            body="body with acceptance criteria for gate",
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            worktree_path="/tmp/fake-wt",
+        )
+
+    def test_create_pr_forwards_explicit_org_repo(self):
+        self._assert_call_forwards(
+            "gitea_create_pr",
+            title="t",
+            head="fix/issue-735-x",
+            base="master",
+            body="Closes #735",
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            worktree_path="/tmp/fake-wt",
+        )
+
+    def test_mark_issue_forwards_explicit_org_repo(self):
+        self._assert_call_forwards(
+            "gitea_mark_issue",
+            issue_number=735,
+            action="start",
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            worktree_path="/tmp/fake-wt",
+        )
+
+    def test_commit_files_forwards_explicit_org_repo(self):
+        self._assert_call_forwards(
+            "gitea_commit_files",
+            files=[{"operation": "update", "path": "x", "content_plain": "y"}],
+            message="m",
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+        )

tests/test_remote_repo_guard.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Regression coverage for the remote/repo mismatch guard (#530).
 
 Bare ``remote=prgs`` historically resolved to ``Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet``
@@ -162,12 +166,12 @@ class TestResolveServerWiring(unittest.TestCase):
         self.addCleanup(self.server.REMOTES.__setitem__, "prgs", original)
         self.server.REMOTES["prgs"] = {**original, "repo": repo}
 
-    def test_resolve_blocks_on_default_repo_mismatch(self):
+    def test_resolve_prefers_workspace_over_timesheet_default(self):
+        """#714: bare remote=prgs must use workspace Gitea-Tools, not REMOTES Timesheet."""
         self._set_prgs_default_repo("Timesheet")
-        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
-            self.server._resolve("prgs", None, None, None)
-        self.assertIn("Timesheet", str(ctx.exception))
-        self.assertIn("Gitea-Tools", str(ctx.exception))
+        host, org, repo = self.server._resolve("prgs", None, None, None)
+        self.assertEqual(org, "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
+        self.assertEqual(repo, "Gitea-Tools")
 
     def test_resolve_allows_explicit_org_and_repo(self):
         self._set_prgs_default_repo("Timesheet")

tests/test_resolve_task_capability.py

@@ -188,8 +188,8 @@ class TestResolveTaskCapability(unittest.TestCase):
                 self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "author")
                 self.assertTrue(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
 
-    @patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "author-user"})
-    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "reviewer-user"})
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token reviewer-pass")
     def test_resolve_work_issue_reviewer_profile_blocked(self, _auth, _api):
         with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("reviewer-profile")):
             res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
@@ -231,9 +231,16 @@ class TestResolveTaskCapability(unittest.TestCase):
             self.assertIn("gitea.issue.comment", res["active_profile_allowed_operations"])
 
     def test_resolve_unknown_task_fails_closed(self):
+        # #723: unknown tasks return structured unknown_task (no ValueError escape).
         with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("author-profile")):
-            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
-                mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="invalid_task_xyz", remote="prgs")
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                task="invalid_task_xyz", remote="prgs"
+            )
+            self.assertIsInstance(res, dict)
+            self.assertEqual(res.get("reason_code"), "unknown_task", res)
+            self.assertFalse(res.get("allowed_in_current_session"))
+            self.assertTrue(res.get("stop_required"))
+            self.assertIs(res.get("mutation_performed"), False)
 
     # Additional regression tests per #145 for permission boundaries and structured guidance
     def test_issue_comment_does_not_imply_close(self):
@@ -439,8 +446,11 @@ class TestResolveTaskCapability(unittest.TestCase):
             res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="close_pr", remote="prgs")
             self.assertEqual(res["required_operation_permission"], "gitea.pr.close")
             for unknown in ("close_pull_request", "close", "pr_close"):
-                with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
-                    mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task=unknown, remote="prgs")
+                unk = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                    task=unknown, remote="prgs"
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(unk.get("reason_code"), "unknown_task", unk)
+                self.assertFalse(unk.get("allowed_in_current_session"))
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/test_review_drafts.py

@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ class TestReviewDrafts(unittest.TestCase):
 
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request")
     def test_save_draft_success(self, mock_api):
-        print("GITEA_MCP_SERVER FILE:", gitea_mcp_server.__file__)
-        print("DIR OF GITEA_MCP_SERVER:", dir(gitea_mcp_server))
         mock_api.return_value = {
             "head": {"sha": "headsha1234567890"},
             "base": {"ref": "master", "sha": "basesha0987654321"},
@@ -285,3 +283,104 @@ class TestReviewDrafts(unittest.TestCase):
         )
         self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
         self.assertIn("worktree binding mismatch", res.get("reasons")[0])
+
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._fetch_pr_comments")
+    def test_resume_draft_foreign_lease(self, mock_comments, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {
+            "state": "open",
+            "head": {"sha": "headsha1234567890"},
+            "base": {"ref": "master", "sha": "basesha0987654321"},
+        }
+        gitea_mcp_server.gitea_save_review_draft(
+            pr_number=587,
+            action="approve",
+            body="Good changes",
+            expected_head_sha="headsha1234567890",
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            worktree_path="/tmp/test-worktree",
+        )
+        reviewer_pr_lease.record_session_lease({
+            "pr_number": 587,
+            "session_id": "my-session",
+        })
+        mock_comments.return_value = [
+            {
+                "id": 9,
+                "user": {"username": "sysadmin"},
+                "body": (
+                    "<!-- mcp-review-lease:v1 -->\n"
+                    "repo: Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools\n"
+                    "pr: #587\n"
+                    "reviewer_identity: sysadmin\n"
+                    "profile: prgs-reviewer\n"
+                    "session_id: foreign-session-999\n"
+                    "phase: claimed\n"
+                ),
+            }
+        ]
+        res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_resume_review_draft(
+            pr_number=587,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            worktree_path="/tmp/test-worktree",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("foreign-session-999" in r or "session_id" in r for r in (res.get("reasons") or []))
+        )
+
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server._fetch_pr_comments")
+    @patch("gitea_mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons")
+    def test_resume_draft_terminal_lock_blocks(self, mock_hard_stop, mock_comments, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {
+            "state": "open",
+            "head": {"sha": "headsha1234567890"},
+            "base": {"ref": "master", "sha": "basesha0987654321"},
+        }
+        gitea_mcp_server.gitea_save_review_draft(
+            pr_number=587,
+            action="approve",
+            body="Good changes",
+            expected_head_sha="headsha1234567890",
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            worktree_path="/tmp/test-worktree",
+        )
+        reviewer_pr_lease.record_session_lease({
+            "pr_number": 587,
+            "session_id": "session-1234",
+        })
+        mock_comments.return_value = [
+            {
+                "id": 1,
+                "user": {"username": "sysadmin"},
+                "body": (
+                    "<!-- mcp-review-lease:v1 -->\n"
+                    "repo: Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools\n"
+                    "pr: #587\n"
+                    "reviewer_identity: sysadmin\n"
+                    "profile: prgs-reviewer\n"
+                    "session_id: session-1234\n"
+                    "phase: claimed\n"
+                ),
+            }
+        ]
+        mock_hard_stop.return_value = [
+            "terminal review mutation already recorded for PR #587 (approve); #332 hard-stop"
+        ]
+        res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_resume_review_draft(
+            pr_number=587,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            worktree_path="/tmp/test-worktree",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
+        self.assertTrue(any("#332" in r or "terminal" in r for r in (res.get("reasons") or [])))
+

tests/test_role_namespace_gate.py

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
 """Tests for reviewer/author namespace mismatch walls (#209)."""
 import json
 import os
@@ -36,6 +40,7 @@ CONFIG = {
                 "gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.pr.review",
             ],
             "execution_profile": "prgs-author",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"],
         },
         "prgs-reviewer": {
             "enabled": True,
@@ -51,6 +56,7 @@ CONFIG = {
                 "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push", "gitea.issue.create",
             ],
             "execution_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"],
         },
         "prgs-reviewer-issue-writer": {
             "enabled": True,
@@ -63,12 +69,13 @@ CONFIG = {
             ],
             "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create"],
             "execution_profile": "prgs-reviewer-issue-writer",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"],
         },
     },
     "rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},
 }
 
-ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = {"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.issue.create"}
+ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = {}  # config-backed; operations come from profile allowlist (#714)
 
 
 class NamespaceGateBase(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -199,7 +206,7 @@ class TestMutationAuditFields(NamespaceGateBase):
     def test_successful_create_issue_audit_includes_namespace_fields(
         self, _auth, mock_api, _get_all, _role
     ):
-        env = {**self._env("prgs-author", audit=True), **ISSUE_WRITE_ENV}
+        env = self._env("prgs-author", audit=True)
         with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
             mcp_server.gitea_create_issue(title="audited", remote="prgs")
         with open(self.audit_path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:

tests/test_role_session_router.py

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ CONFIG = {
                 "gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.pr.review",
             ],
             "execution_profile": "prgs-author",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"],
         },
         "prgs-reviewer": {
             "enabled": True,
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ CONFIG = {
                 "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push", "gitea.issue.create",
             ],
             "execution_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"],
         },
         "prgs-merger": {
             "enabled": True,
@@ -65,6 +67,7 @@ CONFIG = {
                 "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push", "gitea.pr.approve",
             ],
             "execution_profile": "prgs-merger",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"],
         },
         "prgs-reconciler": {
             "enabled": True,
@@ -81,6 +84,7 @@ CONFIG = {
                 "gitea.branch.push",
             ],
             "execution_profile": "prgs-reconciler",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"],
         },
     },
     "rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},

tests/test_runtime_clarity.py

@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ CONFIG_SWITCHING_DISABLED = {
             "auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_AUTHOR"},
             "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
             "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge"],
-            "execution_profile": "author-profile"
+            "execution_profile": "author-profile",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
         },
         "reviewer-profile": {
             "enabled": True,
@@ -45,7 +46,8 @@ CONFIG_SWITCHING_DISABLED = {
             "auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_REVIEWER"},
             "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.review", "gitea.pr.approve"],
             "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push", "gitea.pr.merge"],
-            "execution_profile": "reviewer-profile"
+            "execution_profile": "reviewer-profile",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
         },
         "merger-profile": {
             "enabled": True,
@@ -55,7 +57,8 @@ CONFIG_SWITCHING_DISABLED = {
             "auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_MERGER"},
             "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.merge"],
             "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push", "gitea.pr.approve"],
-            "execution_profile": "merger-profile"
+            "execution_profile": "merger-profile",
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
         }
     },
     "rules": {

tests/test_sentry_observability.py

@@ -0,0 +1,412 @@
+"""Tests for optional self-hosted Sentry observability (#606).
+
+Covers the pure module (config, redaction, event/check-in builders) and the
+runtime capture paths using a fake ``sentry_sdk``, so nothing ever touches the
+network. Critically proves the feature is a no-op when disabled or DSN-less
+(acceptance criterion 1) and that secrets/paths/session-state are never sent
+(criterion 5).
+"""
+
+import sys
+import contextlib
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import sentry_observability as so  # noqa: E402
+
+
+# ── Fake SDK ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+class _FakeScope:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.tags = {}
+        self.extras = {}
+
+    def set_tag(self, k, v):
+        self.tags[k] = v
+
+    def set_extra(self, k, v):
+        self.extras[k] = v
+
+
+class FakeSentrySDK:
+    """Minimal stand-in exposing the SDK surface sentry_observability uses."""
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.init_kwargs = None
+        self.events = []
+        self.exceptions = []
+        self.checkins = []
+        self.last_scope = None
+
+    def init(self, **kwargs):
+        self.init_kwargs = kwargs
+
+    def capture_event(self, event):
+        self.events.append(event)
+
+    def capture_exception(self, exc):
+        self.exceptions.append(exc)
+
+    def capture_checkin(self, **payload):
+        self.checkins.append(payload)
+
+    @contextlib.contextmanager
+    def push_scope(self):
+        self.last_scope = _FakeScope()
+        yield self.last_scope
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _reset_state():
+    """Isolate module init state between tests."""
+    so.reset_for_tests()
+    yield
+    so.reset_for_tests()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def fake_sdk(monkeypatch):
+    sdk = FakeSentrySDK()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(so, "sentry_sdk", sdk)
+    return sdk
+
+
+# ── Config / gating ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+def test_disabled_by_default_empty_env():
+    cfg = so.load_config(env={})
+    assert cfg.enabled is False
+    assert cfg.active is False
+
+
+def test_enabled_flag_without_dsn_is_not_active():
+    cfg = so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1"})
+    assert cfg.enabled is True
+    assert cfg.dsn is None
+    assert cfg.active is False  # DSN required
+
+
+def test_dsn_without_enabled_flag_is_not_active():
+    cfg = so.load_config(env={"SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"})
+    assert cfg.active is False
+
+
+def test_active_requires_enabled_and_dsn():
+    cfg = so.load_config(
+        env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "true", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
+    )
+    assert cfg.active is True
+
+
+def test_truthy_variants():
+    for val in ("1", "true", "YES", "On"):
+        cfg = so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": val})
+        assert cfg.enabled is True
+    for val in ("0", "false", "no", "", "off"):
+        cfg = so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": val})
+        assert cfg.enabled is False
+
+
+def test_traces_sample_rate_parsed_and_clamped():
+    assert so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE": "0.25"}).traces_sample_rate == 0.25
+    assert so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE": "5"}).traces_sample_rate == 1.0
+    assert so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE": "-1"}).traces_sample_rate == 0.0
+    assert so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE": "junk"}).traces_sample_rate == 0.0
+
+
+def test_safe_summary_has_no_dsn_value():
+    cfg = so.load_config(
+        env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
+    )
+    summary = cfg.safe_summary()
+    assert summary["dsn_present"] is True
+    assert "secret" not in repr(summary)
+    assert "dsn" not in summary  # only presence, never the value
+
+
+# ── init_sentry ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+def test_init_noop_when_disabled(fake_sdk):
+    status = so.init_sentry(so.load_config(env={}))
+    assert status["initialized"] is False
+    assert fake_sdk.init_kwargs is None  # no SDK init
+    assert so.is_initialized() is False
+
+
+def test_init_noop_when_enabled_but_missing_dsn(fake_sdk):
+    status = so.init_sentry(so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1"}))
+    assert status["initialized"] is False
+    assert fake_sdk.init_kwargs is None
+
+
+def test_init_reports_missing_sdk(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(so, "sentry_sdk", None)
+    status = so.init_sentry(
+        so.load_config(
+            env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
+        )
+    )
+    assert status["initialized"] is False
+    assert "not installed" in status["reason"]
+
+
+def test_init_configures_sdk_with_scrubber(fake_sdk):
+    status = so.init_sentry(
+        so.load_config(
+            env={
+                "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1",
+                "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1",
+                "SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT": "prod",
+                "MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE": "0.1",
+            }
+        )
+    )
+    assert status["initialized"] is True
+    assert so.is_initialized() is True
+    kw = fake_sdk.init_kwargs
+    assert kw["dsn"] == "https://[email protected]/1"
+    assert kw["environment"] == "prod"
+    assert kw["traces_sample_rate"] == 0.1
+    assert kw["before_send"] is so.scrub_event
+    assert kw["send_default_pii"] is False
+
+
+def test_init_enable_logs_wires_log_scrubber(fake_sdk):
+    so.init_sentry(
+        so.load_config(
+            env={
+                "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1",
+                "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1",
+                "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS": "1",
+            }
+        )
+    )
+    exp = fake_sdk.init_kwargs["_experiments"]
+    assert exp["enable_logs"] is True
+    assert exp["before_send_log"] is so.scrub_event
+
+
+def test_init_never_raises_on_sdk_failure(monkeypatch):
+    class Boom:
+        def init(self, **kwargs):
+            raise RuntimeError("sentry down")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(so, "sentry_sdk", Boom())
+    status = so.init_sentry(
+        so.load_config(
+            env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
+        )
+    )
+    assert status["initialized"] is False
+    assert "init failed" in status["reason"]
+
+
+# ── Redaction (fail closed) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+def test_build_tags_allowlist_only():
+    tags = so.build_tags(role="author", secret_thing="leak", pid=123)
+    assert tags["role"] == "author"
+    assert tags["pid"] == "123"
+    assert "secret_thing" not in tags
+
+
+def test_build_tags_hashes_session_id():
+    tags = so.build_tags(session_id="prgs-author-20479-cf9ac178")
+    assert "session_id" not in tags
+    assert "session_id_hash" in tags
+    assert tags["session_id_hash"] != "prgs-author-20479-cf9ac178"
+    assert len(tags["session_id_hash"]) == 12
+
+
+def test_build_tags_collapses_worktree_path():
+    tags = so.build_tags(
+        worktree_path="/Users/x/Development/Gitea-Tools/branches/issue-606-sentry-observability"
+    )
+    assert "worktree_path" not in tags
+    assert tags["worktree_category"] == "author"
+
+
+def test_build_tags_drops_value_that_scrubs_to_redacted():
+    # A tag value that is itself a token gets scrubbed then dropped.
+    tags = so.build_tags(capability="token abcdef1234567890")
+    assert "capability" not in tags
+
+
+def test_sanitize_path_categories():
+    assert so.sanitize_path("/repo/branches/review-pr-654") == "reviewer"
+    assert so.sanitize_path("/repo/branches/merge-pr-1") == "merger"
+    assert so.sanitize_path("/repo/branches/reconcile-pr-1") == "reconciler"
+    assert so.sanitize_path("/repo/branches/feat-issue-606") == "author"
+    assert so.sanitize_path("/x/y/Gitea-Tools") == "root"
+
+
+def test_redact_value_scrubs_secrets_and_paths():
+    out = so.redact_value(
+        {
+            "token": "abc123",
+            "note": "Authorization: Bearer sk_live_abcdefgh12345",
+            "path": "/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/secret",
+            "dsn": "https://[email protected]/1",
+            "safe": "hello",
+        }
+    )
+    assert out["token"] == so.REDACTED
+    assert out["dsn"] == so.REDACTED
+    assert "sk_live" not in out["note"]
+    assert so.REDACTED_PATH in out["path"]
+    assert "/Users/" not in out["path"]
+    assert out["safe"] == "hello"
+
+
+def test_redact_value_forbidden_prompt_and_session_state():
+    out = so.redact_value(
+        {"prompt": "full body", "session_state": "{...}", "keep": "ok"}
+    )
+    assert out["prompt"] == so.REDACTED
+    assert out["session_state"] == so.REDACTED
+    assert out["keep"] == "ok"
+
+
+def test_scrub_event_redacts_nested_and_drops_server_name():
+    event = {
+        "server_name": "some-host",
+        "message": "boom",
+        "extra": {"token": "leak", "ok": "1"},
+    }
+    scrubbed = so.scrub_event(event)
+    assert "server_name" not in scrubbed
+    assert scrubbed["extra"]["token"] == so.REDACTED
+    assert scrubbed["extra"]["ok"] == "1"
+
+
+def test_scrub_event_drops_non_dict():
+    assert so.scrub_event("not a dict") is None
+    assert so.scrub_event(None) is None
+
+
+# ── Event builders ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+def test_build_blocker_event_structure_and_next_action():
+    event = so.build_blocker_event(
+        "active_foreign_lease",
+        message="blocked by foreign lease",
+        next_action="wait or adopt via allocator",
+        level="warning",
+        tags={"pr_number": 606, "session_id": "s-123"},
+    )
+    assert event["tags"]["blocker_type"] == "active_foreign_lease"
+    assert event["tags"]["pr_number"] == "606"
+    assert "session_id" not in event["tags"]
+    assert event["tags"]["session_id_hash"]
+    assert event["extra"]["canonical_next_action"] == "wait or adopt via allocator"
+    assert event["fingerprint"] == ["workflow-blocker", "active_foreign_lease"]
+
+
+def test_build_blocker_event_invalid_level_defaults_warning():
+    event = so.build_blocker_event("x", level="nonsense")
+    assert event["level"] == "warning"
+
+
+def test_build_checkin_payload_maps_slugs():
+    for key, slug in so.MONITOR_SLUGS.items():
+        payload = so.build_checkin_payload(key, "ok")
+        assert payload["monitor_slug"] == slug
+        assert payload["status"] == "ok"
+
+
+def test_build_checkin_payload_explicit_slug_passthrough():
+    payload = so.build_checkin_payload("custom-slug", "in_progress", duration=1.5)
+    assert payload["monitor_slug"] == "custom-slug"
+    assert payload["duration"] == 1.5
+
+
+def test_build_checkin_payload_rejects_bad_status():
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        so.build_checkin_payload("allocator_health", "bogus")
+
+
+def test_all_six_monitors_registered():
+    assert set(so.MONITOR_SLUGS) == {
+        "stale_lease_scan",
+        "terminal_lock_scan",
+        "allocator_health",
+        "namespace_health",
+        "dashboard_freshness",
+        "reconciler_cleanup",
+    }
+
+
+# ── Capture paths (fail open) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+def test_capture_workflow_blocker_noop_when_disabled(fake_sdk):
+    # not initialised
+    event = so.capture_workflow_blocker("some_blocker", message="x")
+    assert isinstance(event, dict)  # still returns redacted event
+    assert fake_sdk.events == []  # but nothing sent
+
+
+def test_capture_workflow_blocker_sends_when_initialised(fake_sdk):
+    so.init_sentry(
+        so.load_config(
+            env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
+        )
+    )
+    so.capture_workflow_blocker("terminal_lock_occupied", message="held")
+    assert len(fake_sdk.events) == 1
+    assert fake_sdk.events[0]["tags"]["blocker_type"] == "terminal_lock_occupied"
+
+
+def test_capture_exception_noop_when_disabled(fake_sdk):
+    assert so.capture_exception(ValueError("x")) is False
+    assert fake_sdk.exceptions == []
+
+
+def test_capture_exception_sends_scrubbed_tags(fake_sdk):
+    so.init_sentry(
+        so.load_config(
+            env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
+        )
+    )
+    ok = so.capture_exception(
+        RuntimeError("bad"), tags={"mutation_tool": "gitea_merge_pr", "leaky": "x"}
+    )
+    assert ok is True
+    assert len(fake_sdk.exceptions) == 1
+    assert fake_sdk.last_scope.tags["mutation_tool"] == "gitea_merge_pr"
+    assert "leaky" not in fake_sdk.last_scope.tags
+
+
+def test_capture_exception_never_raises(monkeypatch, fake_sdk):
+    so.init_sentry(
+        so.load_config(
+            env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
+        )
+    )
+
+    def boom(exc):
+        raise RuntimeError("sdk exploded")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(fake_sdk, "capture_exception", boom)
+    # Must swallow the SDK failure (fail open).
+    assert so.capture_exception(ValueError("y")) is False
+
+
+def test_monitor_checkin_noop_when_disabled(fake_sdk):
+    payload = so.monitor_checkin("allocator_health", "ok")
+    assert payload["monitor_slug"] == "gitea-mcp-allocator-health"
+    assert fake_sdk.checkins == []  # not sent while disabled
+
+
+def test_monitor_checkin_sends_when_initialised(fake_sdk):
+    so.init_sentry(
+        so.load_config(
+            env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
+        )
+    )
+    so.monitor_checkin("stale_lease_scan", "ok")
+    assert fake_sdk.checkins == [
+        {"monitor_slug": "gitea-mcp-stale-lease-scan", "status": "ok"}
+    ]
+
+
+def test_monitor_checkin_invalid_status_returns_none(fake_sdk):
+    assert so.monitor_checkin("allocator_health", "bogus") is None
+    assert fake_sdk.checkins == []

tests/test_stale_review_decision_lock_cleanup.py

@@ -1,15 +1,11 @@
-"""Stale #332 review-decision lock cleanup (#594).
-
-Proves:
-  a. active terminal locks still block unrelated terminal reviews
-  b. merged/closed PR locks can be cleared canonically
-  c. cleanup cannot bypass review gates on open PRs
-  d. after moot cleanup, mark_ready for a different PR can proceed
-     (PR #592-style after PR #586-style stale approve)
-"""
-
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
+
 import os
 import unittest
 from unittest.mock import patch
@@ -188,20 +184,32 @@ class TestActiveHardStopPreserved(unittest.TestCase):
         mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(None)
         mcp_server.review_workflow_load.clear_review_workflow_load()
 
-    def test_open_approve_still_blocks_other_pr_mark_ready(self):
-        _seed([APPROVED_OPEN])
-        reasons = mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(592, "mark_ready")
-        self.assertTrue(reasons)
-        self.assertIn("#332", reasons[0])
-        self.assertIn("gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock", reasons[0])
+    def test_open_approve_blocks_same_pr_not_other_pr_mark_ready(self):
+        _seed([APPROVED_OPEN])  # approve on PR #700
+        # Same PR still hard-stopped for mark_ready.
+        reasons_same = mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
+            700, "mark_ready"
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(reasons_same)
+        self.assertIn("#332", reasons_same[0])
+        # #693: other PR may mark_ready without cleanup.
+        self.assertEqual(
+            mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(592, "mark_ready"),
+            [],
+        )
 
-    def test_request_changes_still_blocks_everything(self):
-        _seed([RC_OPEN])
+    def test_request_changes_still_blocks_same_pr(self):
+        _seed([RC_OPEN])  # request_changes on PR #701
         for op in ("merge", "mark_ready", "review"):
             self.assertTrue(
-                mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(592, op),
+                mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(701, op),
                 msg=op,
             )
+        # Foreign PR review path is open (#693).
+        self.assertEqual(
+            mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(592, "mark_ready"),
+            [],
+        )
 
 
 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #

tests/test_terminal_review_hard_stop.py

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-"""Tests for the session hard-stop after a terminal review mutation (#332).
+"""Tests for the session hard-stop after a terminal review mutation (#332/#693).
 
 Extends the single-terminal-decision machinery (#211): after a live
-REQUEST_CHANGES the run must stop; after an APPROVE only the merge sequence
-for that same PR may continue; a different PR can never be reviewed or
-merged in the same run; duplicate REQUEST_CHANGES at an unchanged head is
-suppressed.
+REQUEST_CHANGES on a PR head the same-head path must stop; after an APPROVE
+only the merge sequence for that same PR may continue; #693 allows a
+*different* PR to be mark_ready/review in the same durable lock (cross-PR
+isolation); duplicate REQUEST_CHANGES at an unchanged head is suppressed.
 """
 import os
 import unittest
@@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ import mcp_server
 HEAD_SHA = "a" * 40
 
 
-def _lock(mutations=None, correction=False):
+def _lock(mutations=None, correction=False, correction_pr=None):
+    mutations = list(mutations or [])
+    if correction and correction_pr is None and mutations:
+        correction_pr = mutations[-1].get("pr_number")
     return {
         "task": "review_pr",
         "remote": "prgs",
@@ -29,9 +32,11 @@ def _lock(mutations=None, correction=False):
         "ready_remote": None,
         "ready_org": None,
         "ready_repo": None,
-        "live_mutations": list(mutations or []),
+        "live_mutations": mutations,
         "correction_authorized": correction,
-        "correction_reason": None,
+        "correction_reason": "test" if correction else None,
+        "correction_pr_number": correction_pr if correction else None,
+        "correction_head_sha": None,
     }
 
 
@@ -64,25 +69,35 @@ class TestTerminalHardStopReasons(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(
             mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(5, "merge"), [])
 
-    def test_request_changes_blocks_everything(self):
+    def test_request_changes_blocks_same_pr_allows_other_pr_review(self):
         _seed([RC_A])
+        # Same PR: still hard-stopped for mark_ready/review/merge.
         for op in ("merge", "mark_ready", "review"):
-            for pr in (5, 6):
-                reasons = mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(pr, op)
-                self.assertTrue(reasons, f"{op}/{pr}")
-                self.assertIn("request_changes on PR #5", reasons[0])
-                self.assertIn("#332", reasons[0])
+            reasons = mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(5, op)
+            self.assertTrue(reasons, f"{op}/5")
+            self.assertIn("request_changes on PR #5", reasons[0])
+            self.assertIn("#332", reasons[0])
+        # #693: different PR may mark_ready / review (not merge via hard-stop alone).
+        self.assertEqual(
+            mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(6, "mark_ready"), [])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(6, "review"), [])
+        # Merge of an unapproved other PR remains blocked by hard-stop path
+        # (last terminal is not approve of PR 6).
+        self.assertTrue(
+            mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(6, "merge"))
 
-    def test_approve_allows_same_pr_merge_only(self):
+    def test_approve_allows_same_pr_merge_and_other_pr_review(self):
         _seed([APPROVED_A])
         self.assertEqual(
             mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(5, "merge"), [])
         self.assertTrue(
             mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(6, "merge"))
-        self.assertTrue(
-            mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(6, "mark_ready"))
-        self.assertTrue(
-            mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(6, "review"))
+        # #693 cross-PR isolation: other PR formal review path is open.
+        self.assertEqual(
+            mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(6, "mark_ready"), [])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(6, "review"), [])
 
     def test_correction_reopens_review_path_only(self):
         _seed([RC_A], correction=True)
@@ -90,9 +105,11 @@ class TestTerminalHardStopReasons(unittest.TestCase):
             mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(5, "mark_ready"), [])
         self.assertEqual(
             mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(5, "review"), [])
-        # correction never opens a cross-PR merge
+        # scoped correction never opens a cross-PR merge
         self.assertTrue(
             mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(6, "merge"))
+        # unscoped/cross-PR correction must not lift PR 6 via correction alone
+        # (PR 6 is allowed by isolation, not by correction scope)
 
 
 class TestMergeHardStopWiring(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -126,14 +143,29 @@ class TestMarkFinalHardStopWiring(unittest.TestCase):
         mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(None)
         mcp_server.review_workflow_load.clear_review_workflow_load()
 
-    def test_mark_ready_blocked_after_terminal_mutation(self):
+    def test_mark_ready_same_pr_blocked_after_terminal_mutation(self):
         _seed([RC_A])
         result = mcp_server.gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
-            pr_number=6, action="approve", remote="prgs")
+            pr_number=5, action="approve", remote="prgs",
+            expected_head_sha=HEAD_SHA)
         self.assertFalse(result["marked_ready"])
         self.assertTrue(
             any("#332" in r for r in result["reasons"]), result["reasons"])
 
+    def test_mark_ready_other_pr_allowed_after_foreign_terminal(self):
+        """#693: foreign open-PR terminal must not block mark_final on PR B."""
+        _seed([RC_A])
+        no_lease = {"block": False, "reasons": [], "mutation_allowed": True}
+        with patch("mcp_server._list_pr_lease_comments", return_value=[]), \
+                patch("mcp_server._pr_work_lease_reviewer_block",
+                      return_value=no_lease), \
+                patch.object(mcp_server, "gitea_check_pr_eligibility",
+                             return_value={"head_sha": HEAD_SHA, "eligible": True}):
+            result = mcp_server.gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
+                pr_number=6, action="approve", remote="prgs",
+                expected_head_sha=HEAD_SHA)
+        self.assertTrue(result["marked_ready"], result.get("reasons"))
+
 
 def _feedback(blocking, stale=False, success=True):
     return {

tests/test_workflow_skill.py

@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
-"""Tests for canonical workflow skill naming and preflight (#551)."""
-
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+
+import sys as _sys
+from pathlib import Path as _Path
+_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
+
 import os
 import tempfile
 import unittest