fix(profiles): canonical reconciler ops and guard raw branch delete (#687)

Address REQUEST_CHANGES on PR #688:

- migrate_profiles: emit fully canonical reconciler/author/reviewer defaults;
  canonicalize explicit ops; fail if reconciler loses required pr.close/read
- gitea_delete_branch: deny reconciler (and non-author roles); refuse
  preservation/protected branches before any API call
- gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch: require reconciler role only; block
  preservation/evidence branches via branch_cleanup_guard
- docs: end-to-end operator runbook for profile migrate/apply/reconnect/cleanup
- tests: migration canonicalization, idempotency, raw-delete denial, guarded
  cleanup success and unmerged/preserve rejections

Closes #687.

.env.example

@@ -39,27 +39,6 @@ GITEA_AUDIT_LOG=/path/to/gitea-mcp-audit.log
 # only — never the token value. Surfaced by gitea_get_profile.
 GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE=GITEA_TOKEN
 
-# ── Optional self-hosted Sentry observability (#606) ────────────────────────
-# Emits runtime errors, fail-closed workflow blockers, lease/terminal-lock/
-# stale-runtime collisions, and watchdog cron check-ins to a SELF-HOSTED Sentry
-# (https://sentry.prgs.cc/) — never Sentry Cloud. Gitea stays the source of
-# truth; Sentry is observe-only. OFF by default: with MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED unset
-# or SENTRY_DSN empty, nothing is initialised and no events are sent.
-#
-# Master gate. Truthy = 1/true/yes/on. Both this AND SENTRY_DSN are required.
-MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=0
-# DSN for the self-hosted project (create a `gitea-tools-mcp` project in
-# https://sentry.prgs.cc/ and copy its DSN). Never commit a real DSN.
-SENTRY_DSN=
-# Deployment environment tag (local/dev/prod). Defaults to "development".
-SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=development
-# Optional release identifier (e.g. a git SHA or version string).
-SENTRY_RELEASE=
-# Performance-trace sample rate, 0.0–1.0 (clamped). Default 0.0 (traces off).
-MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.0
-# Set to 1 to forward Python logs to Sentry as structured logs. Default off.
-MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS=0
-
 # Optional canonical runtime-profile config (#19). Instead of the fields above,
 # point every LLM launcher at ONE JSON file of named profiles and select one.
 # Secrets are referenced (keychain id / env var name), never inlined. See

branch_cleanup_guard.py

@@ -7,6 +7,19 @@ from typing import Any
 
 PROTECTED_BRANCHES = frozenset({"master", "main", "dev"})
 
+# Evidence / preservation branches must never be removed by cleanup tools
+# (e.g. chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip).
+_PRESERVATION_MARKERS = ("preserve", "preservation", "evidence")
+
+
+def is_preservation_or_evidence_branch(branch: str | None) -> bool:
+    """Return True when *branch* is a preservation/evidence ref that must stay."""
+    if not branch:
+        return False
+    name = str(branch).lower()
+    return any(marker in name for marker in _PRESERVATION_MARKERS)
+
+
 _RAW_BRANCH_DELETE_PATTERNS = (
     re.compile(r"\bgit(?:\s+-C\s+\S+)?\s+branch\s+-[dD]\b[^\n\r]*", re.I),
     re.compile(r"\bgit(?:\s+-C\s+\S+)?\s+push\b[^\n\r]*\s--delete\b[^\n\r]*", re.I),
@@ -72,6 +85,11 @@ def assess_merged_pr_branch_cleanup(
         reasons.append("PR head branch is missing")
     if head_branch in protected:
         reasons.append(f"branch '{head_branch}' is protected")
+    if is_preservation_or_evidence_branch(head_branch):
+        reasons.append(
+            f"branch '{head_branch}' is a preservation/evidence branch and "
+            "cannot be deleted through merged-PR cleanup"
+        )
     if head_branch in open_pr_heads:
         reasons.append("an open PR still references this head branch")
     if head_on_target is False:

docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md

@@ -238,11 +238,43 @@ narrow operation set:
 - `gitea.issue.comment`
 - `gitea.issue.close`
 - `gitea.pr.close`
+- `gitea.branch.delete` (merged-branch cleanup only — see below)
 
 Forbidden on reconciler profiles: `gitea.pr.approve`, `gitea.pr.merge`,
 `gitea.pr.review`, `gitea.pr.create`, `gitea.branch.push`, and
 `gitea.repo.commit`.
 
+### Merged-branch cleanup ownership (`gitea.branch.delete`)
+
+The reconciler is the repository-supported owner of merged-PR source-branch
+cleanup: `task_capability_map` maps `cleanup_merged_pr_branch` (and
+`reconciliation_cleanup`) to role `reconciler` with permission
+`gitea.branch.delete`. Post-merge branch lifecycle is reconciliation work —
+it happens after the author, reviewer, and merger roles have completed, and
+it must not be reachable from those roles.
+
+Least-privilege constraints:
+
+- `gitea.branch.delete` is granted **only** to reconciler profiles. Author,
+  reviewer, and merger profiles must never hold it; `gitea_delete_branch`
+  and `gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch` fail closed on any profile without
+  the permission.
+- Even with the permission, reconciler deletion is only supported through the
+  guarded `gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch` path (#514 / #687): the PR must be
+  merged, the head an ancestor of the target, the branch not protected
+  (`master`/`main`/`dev`), the branch not a preservation/evidence ref (e.g.
+  `chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip`), no open PR may still use the
+  head, and an explicit `CLEANUP MERGED PR <n> BRANCH <branch>` confirmation is
+  required. Raw `gitea_delete_branch` is **denied** to reconciler even when
+  `gitea.branch.delete` is present.
+- Raw `git branch -d` / `git push --delete` cleanup remains blocked by
+  `branch_cleanup_guard` and the final-report validator regardless of
+  profile permissions.
+- `gitea.branch.delete` has no short alias in `GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES`;
+  write it fully qualified in `allowed_operations`. Migration must emit
+  canonical names such as `gitea.pr.close` (never bare `pr.close` /
+  `issue.close`, which the production normalizer rejects or drops).
+
 Launch a static `gitea-reconciler` MCP namespace with
 `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler`. Profile shape is validated by
 `reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile` (#304). Use the
@@ -251,6 +283,159 @@ Launch a static `gitea-reconciler` MCP namespace with
 fresh target-branch fetch, recorded target SHA, and ancestor proof. PRs whose
 heads are not already landed cannot be closed through this path.
 
+### Operational runbook: grant reconciler `gitea.branch.delete` (#687)
+
+Merging a code PR that updates `migrate_profiles.py` / `reconciler_profile.py`
+**does not** change the live operator profile on disk. Apply the profile
+change deliberately, then reconnect the client-managed namespace.
+
+1. **Approved migration / profile-update command** (from the repo root, using
+   the project venv if present):
+
+   ```bash
+   # Dry-run first (default): validates v2 output, writes nothing
+   python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json
+
+   # Apply: creates backup then writes migrated v2 config
+   python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json -w
+   # Optional explicit paths:
+   # python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json \
+   #   -o ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json \
+   #   --backup ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json.bak -w
+   ```
+
+   If the live file is already v2, edit the reconciler identity’s
+   `allowed_operations` / `forbidden_operations` under
+   `environments.<env>.services.gitea.identities.reconciler` (or the
+   `prgs-reconciler` alias target) so allowed includes the canonical set
+   below — then re-validate with a load of the config (see step 3).
+
+2. **Inspect the generated (or edited) profile** — confirm the reconciler
+   identity, for example:
+
+   ```bash
+   python3 - <<'PY'
+   import json
+   from pathlib import Path
+   cfg = json.loads(Path.home().joinpath(".config/gitea-tools/profiles.json").read_text())
+   # v2 environments shape:
+   ident = cfg["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]["identities"]["reconciler"]
+   print("role:", ident.get("role"))
+   print("allowed:", ident.get("allowed_operations"))
+   print("forbidden:", ident.get("forbidden_operations"))
+   PY
+   ```
+
+3. **Validate canonical operation names and least privilege**
+
+   Expected canonical **allowed** (defaults after migration):
+
+   - `gitea.read`
+   - `gitea.pr.close` (required)
+   - `gitea.pr.comment`
+   - `gitea.issue.comment`
+   - `gitea.issue.close`
+   - `gitea.branch.delete` (recommended; cleanup only)
+
+   Expected **forbidden** includes at least: `gitea.pr.approve`,
+   `gitea.pr.merge`, `gitea.pr.review`, `gitea.pr.create`,
+   `gitea.branch.push`, `gitea.repo.commit`.
+
+   No shorthand (`pr.close`, `issue.close`, `pr.comment`) may remain.
+   Validate with the production loader:
+
+   ```bash
+   python3 - <<'PY'
+   import gitea_config, reconciler_profile
+   from pathlib import Path
+   path = str(Path.home() / ".config/gitea-tools/profiles.json")
+   gitea_config.load_config(path)  # fails closed on invalid config
+   # Or assess the reconciler lists directly after extracting them:
+   # print(reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile(allowed, forbidden))
+   PY
+   ```
+
+4. **Merging PR #688 (or any code PR) does not update the live profile.**
+   Code changes only the migration helper, schema, docs, and tests. The
+   operator must still run `migrate_profiles.py -w` or an equivalent
+   authorized edit of `~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json`.
+
+5. **Supported apply method:** `python3 migrate_profiles.py … -w` (backup
+   created automatically) **or** operator-authorized edit of the live
+   profiles file after backup. Unsupported: silent mtime tricks, manual
+   process kill to “reload”, or undocumented env overrides.
+
+6. **Backup and validation:** `-w` copies the input to
+   `<input_path>.bak` (or `--backup PATH`) before writing. Re-run
+   `load_config` / `assess_reconciler_profile` after write. Keep the
+   `.bak` until live whoami/capability checks pass.
+
+7. **Client-managed namespace reconnect/reload:** reconnect or reload the
+   IDE MCP client so `gitea-reconciler` restarts from current `master` and
+   the updated `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler` config. Do not hand-launch
+   `mcp_server.py` / `gitea_mcp_server.py` with ad hoc `GITEA_*` env
+   (see #686 / #630).
+
+8. **Live reverification** (through the client-managed `gitea-reconciler`
+   namespace only):
+
+   - `gitea_whoami` → identity + profile `prgs-reconciler`
+   - `gitea_assess_master_parity` → `stale=false`, `restart_required=false`
+   - `gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="cleanup_merged_pr_branch")` →
+     `allowed_in_current_session=true` only when permission and role match
+   - `gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="delete_branch")` →
+     **not** allowed for reconciler (role denial must be enforced)
+
+9. **Guarded cleanup usage** (example for a merged PR whose source branch
+   remains on the remote):
+
+   ```text
+   gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
+     pr_number=<N>,
+     branch=<exact PR head branch>,
+     confirmation="CLEANUP MERGED PR <N> BRANCH <exact PR head branch>",
+     remote="prgs",
+     org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+     repo="Gitea-Tools",
+     worktree_path="<path under branches/>",
+   )
+   ```
+
+   The tool refuses unmerged PRs, protected branches, preservation/evidence
+   branches, open-PR heads, mismatched branch names, and wrong confirmation.
+
+10. **Prohibitions**
+
+    - No raw `git push --delete`, `git branch -d` / `-D`, or delete refspecs
+    - No arbitrary `gitea_delete_branch` from reconciler
+    - No unsupported profile switching mid-run without full re-preflight
+    - No ad hoc hand-edits of live profiles **unless** operator-authorized,
+      backed up, and revalidated as above
+
+Canonical migrated reconciler example:
+
+```json
+{
+  "role": "reconciler",
+  "allowed_operations": [
+    "gitea.read",
+    "gitea.pr.close",
+    "gitea.pr.comment",
+    "gitea.issue.comment",
+    "gitea.issue.close",
+    "gitea.branch.delete"
+  ],
+  "forbidden_operations": [
+    "gitea.pr.approve",
+    "gitea.pr.merge",
+    "gitea.pr.review",
+    "gitea.pr.create",
+    "gitea.branch.push",
+    "gitea.repo.commit"
+  ]
+}
+```
+
 ## Identity and fail-closed rules
 
 Before **any** mutating action, a workflow must know both:

docs/observability/sentry-integration.md

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-# Self-hosted Sentry observability for the Gitea MCP server (#606)
-
-Optional, **off-by-default** instrumentation that reports MCP runtime errors,
-fail-closed workflow blockers, lease / terminal-lock / stale-runtime
-collisions, and recurring watchdog check-ins to a **self-hosted** Sentry at
-`https://sentry.prgs.cc/`.
-
-> **Gitea remains the source of truth.** Sentry is observe-only. It never
-> approves, merges, closes, or otherwise mutates Gitea workflow state, and it
-> never bypasses leases, #332, workflow roles, or the MCP gates. Sentry alerts
-> may only feed the *sanctioned* Gitea issue/comment path via the #612 incident
-> bridge — never a direct write.
-
-Implemented by [`sentry_observability.py`](../../sentry_observability.py).
-
----
-
-## 1. Create the Sentry project
-
-1. Sign in to the self-hosted Sentry at **`https://sentry.prgs.cc/`** (this is
-   **not** Sentry Cloud — do not use `*.ingest.sentry.io`).
-2. Create a new **Python** project named **`gitea-tools-mcp`**.
-3. Open **Settings → Projects → gitea-tools-mcp → Client Keys (DSN)** and copy
-   the DSN. It looks like `https://<publickey>@sentry.prgs.cc/<project-id>`.
-4. **Never commit the DSN.** It is a runtime secret supplied via env var only.
-
-## 2. Configure the environment
-
-All configuration is env-var driven (see [`.env.example`](../../.env.example)):
-
-| Variable | Purpose | Default |
-|----------|---------|---------|
-| `MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED` | Master gate (`1/true/yes/on`). Required. | off |
-| `SENTRY_DSN` | Self-hosted DSN. Required. | *(empty)* |
-| `SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT` | `local` / `dev` / `prod` tag. | `development` |
-| `SENTRY_RELEASE` | Release id (git SHA or version). | *(none)* |
-| `MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE` | Perf-trace sample rate `0.0–1.0` (clamped). | `0.0` |
-| `MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS` | Forward Python logs as structured logs. | off |
-
-**The feature stays completely off unless `MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED` is truthy *and*
-`SENTRY_DSN` is non-empty.** With either missing, `init_sentry()` is a no-op,
-the SDK is never initialised, and no events are sent — existing tool behaviour
-and API-call patterns are unchanged.
-
-### Per-environment examples
-
-```bash
-# local (quiet: capture errors/blockers, no traces)
-export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=1
-export SENTRY_DSN="https://<key>@sentry.prgs.cc/<id>"
-export SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=local
-
-# dev (light tracing + logs)
-export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=1
-export SENTRY_DSN="https://<key>@sentry.prgs.cc/<id>"
-export SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=dev
-export MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.2
-export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS=1
-
-# prod (errors/blockers + low-rate tracing, release-tagged)
-export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=1
-export SENTRY_DSN="https://<key>@sentry.prgs.cc/<id>"
-export SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=prod
-export SENTRY_RELEASE="$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)"
-export MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.05
-```
-
-The optional SDK is pinned in [`requirements.txt`](../../requirements.txt)
-(`sentry-sdk==2.20.0`). It is imported lazily: if the package is absent, the
-module still imports and every entry point is a safe no-op.
-
-## 3. What is instrumented
-
-| Signal | Where | Notes |
-|--------|-------|-------|
-| Startup init | `gitea_mcp_server.py` `__main__`, before `mcp.run` | Prints a redaction-safe status line to stderr. |
-| Failing mutations (exceptions) | `_audited(...)` context manager | `capture_exception` with scrubbed tags. |
-| Fail-closed blockers / failed mutations | `_audit_pr_result(...)` (BLOCKED/FAILED) | Structured `capture_workflow_blocker` event incl. the canonical next action when available (criterion 7). |
-| Allocator watchdog check-ins | `gitea_allocate_next_work` tool | `allocator_health`, `stale_lease_scan`, `terminal_lock_scan`. |
-| Namespace-health check-in | `gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_health` tool | `namespace_health`. |
-
-All capture paths are **best-effort / fail open**: a Sentry outage or capture
-error never breaks an MCP tool success path.
-
-## 4. Cron / watchdog monitors
-
-`sentry_observability.MONITOR_SLUGS` defines stable check-in slugs:
-
-| Registry key | Sentry monitor slug | Wired at |
-|--------------|--------------------|----------|
-| `stale_lease_scan` | `gitea-mcp-stale-lease-scan` | allocator run (global lease expiry) |
-| `terminal_lock_scan` | `gitea-mcp-terminal-lock-scan` | allocator run (terminal-lock lookup) |
-| `allocator_health` | `gitea-mcp-allocator-health` | allocator run |
-| `namespace_health` | `gitea-mcp-namespace-health` | namespace-health probe |
-| `dashboard_freshness` | `gitea-mcp-dashboard-freshness` | call `monitor_checkin("dashboard_freshness", ...)` from the dashboard refresh job (#605) |
-| `reconciler_cleanup` | `gitea-mcp-reconciler-cleanup` | call `monitor_checkin("reconciler_cleanup", ...)` from the reconciler cleanup entrypoint |
-
-Create matching Cron monitors in Sentry with those slugs. Emit an
-`in_progress` check-in at job start and `ok`/`error` at completion via
-`sentry_observability.monitor_checkin(slug_key, status)`.
-
-## 5. Redaction guarantees (fail closed)
-
-Redaction fails *closed*: if a field cannot be proven safe it is dropped rather
-than sent. The `before_send` (and `before_send_log`) hook `scrub_event`
-recursively redacts every outgoing event; on any error it drops the event
-entirely. Guarantees, proven by `tests/test_sentry_observability.py`:
-
-- **No** tokens, passwords, keychain IDs, DSNs, cookies, or `user:pass@host`.
-- **No** raw session-state or full prompt/comment bodies — `session_id` is only
-  ever surfaced as a 12-char `session_id_hash`.
-- **No** private config contents or raw credential headers.
-- **No** full local filesystem paths — a worktree path collapses to a coarse
-  `worktree_category` (`author` / `reviewer` / `merger` / `reconciler` /
-  `branches` / `root` / `other`).
-- Only the allowlisted tag keys in `ALLOWED_TAG_KEYS` are ever attached.
-
-## 6. Coexistence with GlitchTip / the #612 incident bridge
-
-This is the **outbound** path (MCP → Sentry SDK). It complements — it does not
-replace — the **inbound** [`incident_bridge.py`](../../incident_bridge.py)
-(#612), which turns Sentry/GlitchTip *observations* into durable Gitea issues
-and `incident_links` rows.
-
-- Prefer **one** observability path per environment. Point the MCP server's
-  `SENTRY_DSN` at the same self-hosted `gitea-tools-mcp` project that the #612
-  bridge reconciles from, so an MCP-reported error and its Gitea issue line up.
-- GlitchTip is Sentry-protocol compatible; if an existing GlitchTip DSN is in
-  use, either migrate it to `https://sentry.prgs.cc/` or document the split
-  (MCP → Sentry, legacy → GlitchTip) explicitly for operators.
-- The bridge remains the **only** sanctioned route from an alert back into
-  Gitea workflow state.
-
-## 7. Non-goals
-
-- Sentry must **not** become the workflow source of truth.
-- Sentry must **not** approve, merge, close, or mutate Gitea workflow state.
-- Sentry must **not** bypass leases, #332, workflow roles, or the MCP gates.

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -623,101 +623,280 @@ def verify_preflight_purity(
     remote: str | None = None,
     worktree_path: str | None = None,
     task: str | None = None,
+    *,
+    target_issue_number: int | None = None,
+    require_author_lock: bool = False,
 ):
-    """Verify that identity and capability were verified prior to session edits."""
+    """Verify identity/capability order, then production workspace guards.
+
+    #683: pytest/unittest must not skip production root/branches/scope
+    enforcement when force-on signals request production behavior. The
+    early return below only skips *preflight-order* purity checks under
+    pure unit-test isolation — never when production guards are active.
+    """
     global _preflight_reviewer_violation_files
 
     in_test = _preflight_in_test_mode()
-    if in_test and not (
+    production_active = workflow_scope_guard.production_guards_active(
-        os.environ.get("GITEA_TEST_FORCE_DIRTY")
+        in_test_mode=in_test
-        or os.environ.get("GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN") is not None
+    )
-    ):
+    # Pure unit-test isolation: skip purity-order unless legacy dirty/porcelain
-        return
+    # force flags request the dirtiness path. #683 FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS alone
+    # runs production root/branches/scope without requiring whoami/capability.
+    skip_purity_order = in_test and not workflow_scope_guard.purity_order_forced()
 
-    if not _preflight_whoami_called:
+    if not skip_purity_order:
-        raise RuntimeError(
+        if not _preflight_whoami_called:
-            "Pre-flight order violation: Identity (gitea_whoami) has not been verified (fail closed)"
+            raise RuntimeError(
-        )
+                "Pre-flight order violation: Identity (gitea_whoami) has not been verified (fail closed)"
-    if not _preflight_capability_called:
-        raise RuntimeError(
-            "Pre-flight order violation: Task capability (gitea_resolve_task_capability) has not been resolved (fail closed)"
-        )
-    if (
-        task is not None
-        and _preflight_resolved_task is not None
-        and task != _preflight_resolved_task
-    ):
-        raise RuntimeError(
-            "Pre-flight task mismatch: "
-            f"resolved '{_preflight_resolved_task}' but mutation requires "
-            f"'{task}' (fail closed)"
-        )
-
-    # #671: block review/merge/close/completion mutations while the session is
-    # contaminated by a direct stable-branch push attempt (reconciler-exempt).
-    _enforce_stable_branch_contamination_gate(task, remote)
-
-    ctx = _resolve_namespace_mutation_context(worktree_path)
-    workspace = ctx["workspace_path"]
-    canonical_root = ctx["canonical_repo_root"]
-    process_root = ctx["process_project_root"]
-    real_workspace = os.path.realpath(workspace)
-    role = ctx.get("workspace_role_kind") or _effective_workspace_role()
-
-    if real_workspace != process_root:
-        if not _preflight_in_test_mode():
-            membership = author_mutation_worktree.assess_workspace_repo_membership(
-                workspace_path=workspace,
-                canonical_repo_root=canonical_root,
             )
-            if membership["block"]:
+        if not _preflight_capability_called:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                "Pre-flight order violation: Task capability (gitea_resolve_task_capability) has not been resolved (fail closed)"
+            )
+        if (
+            task is not None
+            and _preflight_resolved_task is not None
+            and task != _preflight_resolved_task
+        ):
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                "Pre-flight task mismatch: "
+                f"resolved '{_preflight_resolved_task}' but mutation requires "
+                f"'{task}' (fail closed)"
+            )
+
+        # #671: block review/merge/close/completion mutations while the session is
+        # contaminated by a direct stable-branch push attempt (reconciler-exempt).
+        _enforce_stable_branch_contamination_gate(task, remote)
+
+        ctx = _resolve_namespace_mutation_context(worktree_path)
+        workspace = ctx["workspace_path"]
+        canonical_root = ctx["canonical_repo_root"]
+        process_root = ctx["process_project_root"]
+        real_workspace = os.path.realpath(workspace)
+        role = ctx.get("workspace_role_kind") or _effective_workspace_role()
+
+        if real_workspace != process_root:
+            if not _preflight_in_test_mode():
+                membership = author_mutation_worktree.assess_workspace_repo_membership(
+                    workspace_path=workspace,
+                    canonical_repo_root=canonical_root,
+                )
+                if membership["block"]:
+                    raise RuntimeError(
+                        author_mutation_worktree.format_workspace_repo_membership_error(
+                            membership
+                        )
+                    )
+
+            dirty_files = sorted(
+                _parse_porcelain_entries(_get_workspace_porcelain(workspace))
+            )
+            if dirty_files:
                 raise RuntimeError(
-                    author_mutation_worktree.format_workspace_repo_membership_error(
+                    nwb.format_namespace_workspace_binding_error(
-                        membership
+                        role_kind=role,
+                        workspace_path=workspace,
+                        binding_source=ctx.get("workspace_binding_source")
+                        or "unknown binding source",
+                        dirty_files=dirty_files,
+                        ignored_bindings=ctx.get("ignored_bindings"),
                     )
                 )
-
+        else:
-        dirty_files = sorted(_parse_porcelain_entries(_get_workspace_porcelain(workspace)))
+            if _preflight_whoami_violation:
-        if dirty_files:
-            raise RuntimeError(
-                nwb.format_namespace_workspace_binding_error(
-                    role_kind=role,
-                    workspace_path=workspace,
-                    binding_source=ctx.get("workspace_binding_source")
-                    or "unknown binding source",
-                    dirty_files=dirty_files,
-                    ignored_bindings=ctx.get("ignored_bindings"),
-                )
-            )
-    else:
-        if _preflight_whoami_violation:
-            raise RuntimeError(
-                "Pre-flight order violation: Workspace file edits occurred before "
-                f"gitea_whoami verification (fail closed). Offending files: "
-                f"{_format_preflight_files(_preflight_whoami_violation_files)}"
-            )
-        if _preflight_capability_violation:
-            raise RuntimeError(
-                "Pre-flight order violation: Workspace file edits occurred before "
-                f"gitea_resolve_task_capability verification (fail closed). Offending files: "
-                f"{_format_preflight_files(_preflight_capability_violation_files)}"
-            )
-
-        if role in {"reviewer", "merger"}:
-            current = _get_workspace_porcelain()
-            baseline = _preflight_capability_baseline_porcelain or ""
-            reviewer_delta = _new_tracked_changes_since(baseline, current)
-            _preflight_reviewer_violation_files = reviewer_delta
-            if reviewer_delta:
                 raise RuntimeError(
-                    f"{role.title()} role violation: profile is forbidden from modifying "
+                    "Pre-flight order violation: Workspace file edits occurred before "
-                    "tracked workspace files (fail closed). Offending files: "
+                    f"gitea_whoami verification (fail closed). Offending files: "
-                    f"{_format_preflight_files(reviewer_delta)}"
+                    f"{_format_preflight_files(_preflight_whoami_violation_files)}"
+                )
+            if _preflight_capability_violation:
+                raise RuntimeError(
+                    "Pre-flight order violation: Workspace file edits occurred before "
+                    f"gitea_resolve_task_capability verification (fail closed). Offending files: "
+                    f"{_format_preflight_files(_preflight_capability_violation_files)}"
                 )
 
-    _enforce_root_checkout_guard(worktree_path)
+            if role in {"reviewer", "merger"}:
-    _enforce_branches_only_author_mutation(worktree_path)
+                current = _get_workspace_porcelain()
-    _clear_preflight_capability_state()
+                baseline = _preflight_capability_baseline_porcelain or ""
+                reviewer_delta = _new_tracked_changes_since(baseline, current)
+                _preflight_reviewer_violation_files = reviewer_delta
+                if reviewer_delta:
+                    raise RuntimeError(
+                        f"{role.title()} role violation: profile is forbidden from modifying "
+                        "tracked workspace files (fail closed). Offending files: "
+                        f"{_format_preflight_files(reviewer_delta)}"
+                    )
+
+        # Historical path: root + branches after purity-order when dirty paths live.
+        _enforce_root_checkout_guard(worktree_path)
+        _enforce_branches_only_author_mutation(worktree_path)
+        _enforce_issue_scope_guard(
+            worktree_path,
+            task=task,
+            target_issue_number=target_issue_number,
+            require_author_lock=require_author_lock,
+        )
+        _clear_preflight_capability_state()
+        return
+
+    # #683: under pytest unit isolation, FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS still runs
+    # production root + branches + issue scope (no silent no-op of guards).
+    if production_active:
+        _enforce_root_checkout_guard(worktree_path)
+        _enforce_branches_only_author_mutation(worktree_path)
+        _enforce_issue_scope_guard(
+            worktree_path,
+            task=task,
+            target_issue_number=target_issue_number,
+            require_author_lock=require_author_lock,
+        )
+
+
+def _session_issue_lock_snapshot(
+    workspace_path: str | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Return session lock fields relevant to #683 scope enforcement.
+
+    Branch-vs-lock comparison uses the live workspace branch only when the
+    lock's worktree matches the mutation workspace. That prevents a foreign
+    or leftover session lock from poisoning unrelated test worktrees while
+    still fail-closing when the bound worktree drifts to another issue.
+    """
+    lock = issue_lock_store.read_session_issue_lock() or {}
+    raw = lock.get("issue_number")
+    locked: int | None
+    try:
+        locked = int(raw) if raw is not None else None
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        locked = None
+    lock_wt = (lock.get("worktree_path") or "").strip()
+    workspace = (workspace_path or "").strip()
+    worktrees_match = False
+    if lock_wt and workspace:
+        try:
+            worktrees_match = os.path.realpath(lock_wt) == os.path.realpath(workspace)
+        except OSError:
+            worktrees_match = False
+    return {
+        "locked_issue_number": locked,
+        "lock_branch_name": (lock.get("branch_name") or "").strip() or None,
+        "lock_worktree_path": lock_wt or None,
+        "worktrees_match": worktrees_match,
+    }
+
+
+def _session_locked_issue_number() -> int | None:
+    """Return the active session issue lock number when present (#683)."""
+    return _session_issue_lock_snapshot().get("locked_issue_number")
+
+
+def _enforce_issue_scope_guard(
+    worktree_path: str | None = None,
+    *,
+    task: str | None = None,
+    target_issue_number: int | None = None,
+    require_author_lock: bool = False,
+) -> None:
+    """#683: fail closed on missing/out-of-scope issue ownership for mutations."""
+    ctx = _resolve_namespace_mutation_context(worktree_path)
+    workspace = ctx["workspace_path"]
+    git_state = issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state(workspace)
+    # Honour actual profile role as well as poisoned task role (#540 / #683):
+    # comment_issue preflight stamps required_role_kind=author, which must not
+    # strip a genuine reconciler of control-checkout exemptions.
+    role = ctx.get("workspace_role_kind") or _effective_workspace_role()
+    actual = _actual_profile_role()
+    if actual in nwb.NON_AUTHOR_ROLES:
+        role = actual
+    snap = _session_issue_lock_snapshot(workspace)
+    # Scope uses the lock's recorded branch for issue-number matching.
+    # Live workspace branch can inherit the parent control checkout's branch
+    # name when a temp branches/ dir is not its own worktree tip — that must
+    # not invent a false out-of-scope failure. Live branch drift is enforced
+    # by issue_lock_store.verify_lock_for_mutation elsewhere.
+    branch_for_scope = snap.get("lock_branch_name")
+    if (
+        snap.get("worktrees_match")
+        and workflow_scope_guard.production_guards_forced()
+    ):
+        live_branch = git_state.get("current_branch")
+        live_issue = workflow_scope_guard.extract_issue_number_from_branch(
+            live_branch
+        )
+        locked = snap.get("locked_issue_number")
+        if (
+            live_issue is not None
+            and locked is not None
+            and live_issue != locked
+        ):
+            branch_for_scope = live_branch
+    # Author implementation / source-adjacent mutations need ownership when forced.
+    authorish = role == "author" or (
+        task
+        in {
+            "create_issue",
+            "comment_issue",
+            "lock_issue",
+            "create_pr",
+            "commit_files",
+            "gitea_commit_files",
+            "mark_issue",
+        }
+    )
+    require_lock = bool(require_author_lock) or (
+        authorish
+        and workflow_scope_guard.production_guards_forced()
+        and role == "author"
+    )
+    assessment = workflow_scope_guard.assess_production_mutation_guards(
+        workspace_path=workspace,
+        canonical_repo_root=ctx["canonical_repo_root"],
+        porcelain_status=git_state.get("porcelain_status") or "",
+        current_branch=branch_for_scope,
+        locked_issue_number=snap.get("locked_issue_number"),
+        target_issue_number=target_issue_number,
+        role_kind=role,
+        require_author_lock=require_lock,
+        in_test_mode=_preflight_in_test_mode(),
+    )
+    workflow_scope_guard.raise_if_blocked(assessment)
+
+
+def _production_guard_block_from_exc(exc: BaseException, **extra) -> dict | None:
+    """Map production-guard exceptions to typed tool block responses (#683)."""
+    if isinstance(exc, workflow_scope_guard.ProductionGuardError):
+        return workflow_scope_guard.block_response(exc, **extra)
+    text = str(exc)
+    if "Workflow scope guard (#683)" in text or "Root checkout guard (#475)" in text:
+        kind = workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
+        if "root_diagnostic_edit" in text or "tracked source or test edits" in text:
+            kind = workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT
+        elif "Branches-only mutation guard" in text or "stable control checkout" in text:
+            kind = workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE
+        elif "out-of-scope" in text or "locked to issue" in text:
+            kind = workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE
+        elif "no owning issue" in text:
+            kind = workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE
+        return workflow_scope_guard.block_response(
+            blocker_kind=kind,
+            reasons=[text],
+            **extra,
+        )
+    if "Branches-only mutation guard" in text:
+        return workflow_scope_guard.block_response(
+            blocker_kind=workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE,
+            reasons=[text],
+            **extra,
+        )
+    if "Root checkout guard" in text:
+        return workflow_scope_guard.block_response(
+            blocker_kind=workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT,
+            reasons=[text],
+            **extra,
+        )
+    return None
 
 
 def _verify_role_mutation_workspace(
@@ -727,7 +906,12 @@ def _verify_role_mutation_workspace(
     worktree: str | None = None,
     task: str | None = None,
 ) -> str:
-    """Bind reviewer/merger mutations to the active namespace workspace (#510)."""
+    """Bind reviewer/merger mutations to the active namespace workspace (#510).
+
+    #683: must NOT early-return solely because pytest/unittest is loaded.
+    Production workspace binding always runs; test isolation uses explicit
+    env fixtures / force-on flags, never a production short-circuit here.
+    """
 
     # Check running runtimes to prevent stale mutations
     try:
@@ -918,7 +1102,6 @@ import allocator_service  # noqa: E402
 import control_plane_db  # noqa: E402
 import lease_lifecycle  # noqa: E402
 import incident_bridge  # noqa: E402
-import sentry_observability  # noqa: E402  (#606 optional Sentry observability)
 import agent_temp_artifacts
 import issue_lock_worktree  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_provenance  # noqa: E402
@@ -929,6 +1112,7 @@ import merge_approval_gate  # noqa: E402
 import already_landed_reconcile  # noqa: E402
 import author_mutation_worktree  # noqa: E402
 import root_checkout_guard  # noqa: E402
+import workflow_scope_guard  # noqa: E402  # #683 production scope / force-on guards
 import stable_branch_push_guard  # noqa: E402
 import remote_repo_guard  # noqa: E402
 import issue_claim_heartbeat  # noqa: E402
@@ -1778,18 +1962,6 @@ def _audited(action: str, *, host, remote, org=None, repo=None,
                result=gitea_audit.FAILED, reason=_redact(str(exc)),
                request_metadata=request_metadata, issue_number=issue_number,
                pr_number=pr_number, target_branch=target_branch)
-        # #606: best-effort Sentry capture of the failing mutation (fail open).
-        sentry_observability.capture_exception(
-            exc,
-            tags={
-                "mutation_tool": action,
-                "remote": remote,
-                "repo": repo,
-                "org": org,
-                "issue_number": issue_number,
-                "pr_number": pr_number,
-            },
-        )
         raise
     _audit(action, host=host, remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo,
            result=gitea_audit.SUCCEEDED, request_metadata=request_metadata,
@@ -1836,20 +2008,6 @@ def _audit_pr_result(action: str):
                             "merge_method": result.get("merge_method"),
                         },
                     )
-                    # #606: surface fail-closed blockers / failed mutations to
-                    # Sentry as structured events (best-effort, fail open).
-                    if status in (gitea_audit.BLOCKED, gitea_audit.FAILED):
-                        sentry_observability.capture_workflow_blocker(
-                            action,
-                            message="; ".join(reasons) or action,
-                            next_action=result.get("safe_next_action"),
-                            level="error" if status == gitea_audit.FAILED else "warning",
-                            tags={
-                                "mutation_tool": action,
-                                "pr_number": result.get("pr_number"),
-                                "current_head_sha": result.get("head_sha"),
-                            },
-                        )
             except Exception:
                 pass  # best-effort; never break the tool
             return result
@@ -1923,7 +2081,15 @@ def gitea_create_issue(
     )
     if blocked:
         return blocked
-    verify_preflight_purity(remote, worktree_path=worktree_path, task="create_issue")
+    try:
+        verify_preflight_purity(
+            remote, worktree_path=worktree_path, task="create_issue"
+        )
+    except Exception as exc:
+        typed = _production_guard_block_from_exc(exc, number=None)
+        if typed is not None:
+            return typed
+        raise
     content_gate = issue_content_gate.pre_create_issue_content_gate(
         title,
         body,
@@ -5759,6 +5925,65 @@ def gitea_delete_branch(
             "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.branch.delete"),
         }
 
+    # Possessing gitea.branch.delete alone is not enough for arbitrary deletion.
+    # task_capability_map maps delete_branch → author; reconciler must use the
+    # guarded cleanup_merged_pr_branch path only (#687 / #514).
+    profile = get_profile()
+    active_role = _profile_role_kind(profile)
+    required_role = task_capability_map.required_role("delete_branch")
+    if active_role == "reconciler":
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
+            "required_role_kind": required_role,
+            "active_role_kind": active_role,
+            "reasons": [
+                "reconciler profile cannot use raw gitea_delete_branch; "
+                "use gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch for a fully merged PR "
+                "source branch only (fail closed)"
+            ],
+            "exact_next_action": (
+                "Call gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch with pr_number, the "
+                "exact PR head branch, and confirmation "
+                "'CLEANUP MERGED PR <n> BRANCH <branch>' after capability "
+                "resolve for cleanup_merged_pr_branch."
+            ),
+            "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.branch.delete"),
+        }
+    if active_role != required_role:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
+            "required_role_kind": required_role,
+            "active_role_kind": active_role,
+            "reasons": [
+                f"Active profile role '{active_role}' cannot perform "
+                f"{required_role} task 'delete_branch' even when "
+                "gitea.branch.delete is present (fail closed)"
+            ],
+            "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.branch.delete"),
+        }
+
+    if branch_cleanup_guard.is_preservation_or_evidence_branch(branch):
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
+            "reasons": [
+                f"branch '{branch}' is a preservation/evidence branch and "
+                "cannot be deleted (fail closed)"
+            ],
+        }
+    if branch in branch_cleanup_guard.PROTECTED_BRANCHES:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
+            "reasons": [f"branch '{branch}' is protected (fail closed)"],
+        }
+
     audit_allowed, audit_reasons = (
         audit_reconciliation_mode.check_audit_mutation_allowed("delete_branch")
     )
@@ -5810,18 +6035,20 @@ def gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
         }
 
     profile = get_profile()
-    active_role = _role_kind(
+    active_role = _profile_role_kind(profile)
-        profile.get("allowed_operations", []),
+    # cleanup_merged_pr_branch is reconciler-owned (task_capability_map).
-        profile.get("forbidden_operations", []),
+    # Author/reviewer/merger must not reach this path even if they somehow
-    )
+    # hold gitea.branch.delete.
-    if active_role == "reviewer":
+    if active_role != "reconciler":
         return {
             "success": False,
             "performed": False,
             "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
+            "required_role_kind": "reconciler",
+            "active_role_kind": active_role,
             "reasons": [
-                "reviewer profile is not authorized for merged branch cleanup "
+                f"profile role '{active_role}' is not authorized for merged "
-                "(fail closed)"
+                "branch cleanup; required role is reconciler (fail closed)"
             ],
             "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.branch.delete"),
         }
@@ -8194,9 +8421,26 @@ def gitea_create_issue_comment(
         with the reveal opt-in); on a permission block or empty body,
         'success'/'performed' False and 'reasons' with no API call made
         (permission blocks also carry a structured 'permission_report',
-        #142).
+        #142). On production-guard blocks (#683): 'blocker_kind' and
+        'exact_next_action' with no API side effect.
     """
-    verify_preflight_purity(remote, worktree_path=worktree_path, task="comment_issue")
+    try:
+        # Do not pass target_issue_number: comments on other issues remain
+        # allowed while an author holds a different implementation lock.
+        # Scope ownership for source edits is enforced via branch/worktree
+        # binding + root diagnostic checks (#683).
+        verify_preflight_purity(
+            remote,
+            worktree_path=worktree_path,
+            task="comment_issue",
+        )
+    except Exception as exc:
+        typed = _production_guard_block_from_exc(
+            exc, issue_number=issue_number
+        )
+        if typed is not None:
+            return typed
+        raise
     gate_reasons = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.issue.comment")
     reasons = list(gate_reasons)
     if not (body or "").strip():
@@ -9981,11 +10225,6 @@ def gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_health(
         probe_source=probe_source,
     )
     _record_live_namespace_health(result)
-    # #606: namespace-health watchdog check-in (best-effort, fail open).
-    sentry_observability.monitor_checkin(
-        "namespace_health",
-        "ok" if result.get("healthy", result.get("callable", True)) else "error",
-    )
     return result
 
 
@@ -11091,6 +11330,8 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
         "gitea_commit_files",
         "address_pr_change_requests",
         "delete_branch",
+        "cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
+        "reconciliation_cleanup",
         "work_issue",
         "work-issue",
     }
@@ -11913,18 +12154,6 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
     result["inventory_source"] = (
         "candidates_json" if candidates_json else "gitea_live"
     )
-    # #606: watchdog check-ins for the recurring jobs this allocator run
-    # performs — global stale-lease expiry, terminal-lock lookup, and the
-    # allocator itself. Best-effort; a failed selection reports "error".
-    _alloc_ok = bool(result.get("success"))
-    sentry_observability.monitor_checkin(
-        "allocator_health", "ok" if _alloc_ok else "error"
-    )
-    if _alloc_ok:
-        # These two scans complete inside allocate_next_work before selection;
-        # a successful result proves both ran.
-        sentry_observability.monitor_checkin("stale_lease_scan", "ok")
-        sentry_observability.monitor_checkin("terminal_lock_scan", "ok")
     return result
 
 
@@ -12249,10 +12478,4 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
     # processes (e.g. review_pr.py) can detect and refuse profile
     # side-channel overrides (#199).
     _export_session_profile_lock()
-    # #606: optional self-hosted Sentry observability. No-op unless
-    # MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED is truthy and SENTRY_DSN is set; never blocks startup.
-    _sentry_status = sentry_observability.init_sentry()
-    sys.stderr.write(
-        f"--- Sentry observability: {_sentry_status.get('reason')} ---\n"
-    )
     mcp.run(transport="stdio")

migrate_profiles.py

@@ -20,12 +20,114 @@ if PROJECT_ROOT not in sys.path:
 import gitea_config
 
 
-AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = ["read", "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr", "comment"]
+# Defaults emit *canonical* operation names only. Shorthand that is not in
-AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = ["approve", "request_changes", "merge"]
+# gitea_config.GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES (e.g. ``pr.close``, ``issue.close``)
-REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
+# is silently dropped by the production loader and must never appear here.
-    "read", "review", "comment", "approve", "request_changes", "merge"
+AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
+    "gitea.read",
+    "gitea.branch.create",
+    "gitea.repo.commit",
+    "gitea.branch.push",
+    "gitea.pr.create",
+    "gitea.pr.comment",
 ]
-REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = ["branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr"]
+AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = [
+    "gitea.pr.approve",
+    "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+    "gitea.pr.merge",
+]
+REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
+    "gitea.read",
+    "gitea.pr.review",
+    "gitea.pr.comment",
+    "gitea.pr.approve",
+    "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+    "gitea.pr.merge",
+]
+REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = [
+    "gitea.branch.create",
+    "gitea.repo.commit",
+    "gitea.branch.push",
+    "gitea.pr.create",
+]
+# Required reconciler ops (read + pr.close) plus recommended comment/close and
+# branch.delete for guarded merged-PR cleanup. All names must normalize via
+# gitea_config.normalize_operation without being dropped.
+RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
+    "gitea.read",
+    "gitea.pr.close",
+    "gitea.pr.comment",
+    "gitea.issue.comment",
+    "gitea.issue.close",
+    "gitea.branch.delete",
+]
+RECONCILER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = [
+    "gitea.pr.approve",
+    "gitea.pr.merge",
+    "gitea.pr.review",
+    "gitea.pr.create",
+    "gitea.branch.push",
+    "gitea.repo.commit",
+]
+
+# Migration-only expansions for common shorthands that are *not* in
+# GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES. Emitted output is always the canonical form so a
+# second canonicalize pass is a no-op (idempotent).
+_MIGRATION_ONLY_ALIASES = {
+    "pr.close": "gitea.pr.close",
+    "pr.comment": "gitea.pr.comment",
+    "issue.close": "gitea.issue.close",
+    "branch.delete": "gitea.branch.delete",
+}
+
+# Reconciler required ops that must survive migration (from reconciler_profile).
+RECONCILER_REQUIRED_CANONICAL = ("gitea.read", "gitea.pr.close")
+
+
+def canonicalize_operation(op: str) -> str:
+    """Return a canonical operation name accepted by the production loader.
+
+    Fail closed on unknown/ambiguous spellings so required permissions cannot
+    be silently dropped by ``check_operation`` later.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(op, str) or not op.strip():
+        raise ValueError("operation must be a non-empty string (fail closed)")
+    op = op.strip()
+    try:
+        return gitea_config.normalize_operation(op)
+    except gitea_config.ConfigError:
+        pass
+    if op in _MIGRATION_ONLY_ALIASES:
+        return _MIGRATION_ONLY_ALIASES[op]
+    raise ValueError(
+        f"operation {op!r} cannot be canonicalized for migration "
+        "(unknown/ambiguous; fail closed — production loader would drop it)"
+    )
+
+
+def canonicalize_operations(ops, *, context: str = "operations") -> list[str]:
+    """Canonicalize a list of operations; preserve order, drop duplicates."""
+    if not isinstance(ops, list):
+        raise ValueError(f"{context} must be a list (fail closed)")
+    out: list[str] = []
+    seen: set[str] = set()
+    for entry in ops:
+        canon = canonicalize_operation(entry)
+        if canon not in seen:
+            seen.add(canon)
+            out.append(canon)
+    return out
+
+
+def _assert_reconciler_required_survive(allowed: list[str], profile_name: str) -> None:
+    """Fail visibly when migration would leave a reconciler without required ops."""
+    missing = [op for op in RECONCILER_REQUIRED_CANONICAL if op not in set(allowed)]
+    if missing:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"Profile '{profile_name}' (reconciler) is missing required "
+            f"operation(s) after migration: {missing}. Refusing to emit a "
+            "profile that would silently fail pr.close / read (fail closed)."
+        )
 
 
 def infer_role(name, execution_profile):
@@ -90,9 +192,11 @@ def migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data):
             ident_name = "reviewer"
         elif role == "author":
             ident_name = "author"
+        elif role == "reconciler":
+            ident_name = "reconciler"
         else:
             role = prof.get("role")
-            if role not in (None, "author", "reviewer"):
+            if role not in (None, "author", "reviewer", "reconciler"):
                 raise ValueError(
                     f"Profile '{name}' has unsupported role {role!r}"
                 )
@@ -124,20 +228,35 @@ def migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data):
                 raise ValueError(
                     f"Profile '{name}' operation fields must be lists"
                 )
-            identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(allowed)
+            try:
-            identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(forbidden)
+                identity_data["allowed_operations"] = canonicalize_operations(
+                    allowed, context=f"profile '{name}' allowed_operations"
+                )
+                identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = canonicalize_operations(
+                    forbidden, context=f"profile '{name}' forbidden_operations"
+                )
+            except ValueError as exc:
+                raise ValueError(f"Profile '{name}': {exc}") from exc
         elif role == "author":
             identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
             identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
         elif role == "reviewer":
             identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
             identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
+        elif role == "reconciler":
+            identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
+            identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(RECONCILER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
         else:
             raise ValueError(
                 f"Profile '{name}' has no explicit operation lists and no "
                 "unambiguous author/reviewer role marker (fail closed)"
             )
 
+        if role == "reconciler":
+            _assert_reconciler_required_survive(
+                identity_data["allowed_operations"], name
+            )
+
         # Nest inside environments/services structure
         env = environments.setdefault(env_name, {})
         services = env.setdefault("services", {})

reconciler_profile.py

@@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ RECONCILER_RECOMMENDED_OPERATIONS = (
     "gitea.pr.comment",
     "gitea.issue.comment",
     "gitea.issue.close",
+    # Merged-branch cleanup is reconciler-owned (task_capability_map maps
+    # cleanup_merged_pr_branch -> reconciler). The permission is only
+    # exercisable through the guarded gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path
+    # (#514): merged proof, protected-branch refusal, explicit confirmation.
+    "gitea.branch.delete",
 )
 
 RECONCILER_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS = (

requirements.txt

@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ python-multipart==0.0.32
 referencing==0.37.0
 rich==15.0.0
 rpds-py==2026.5.1
-sentry-sdk==2.20.0
 shellingham==1.5.4
 sse-starlette==3.4.5
 starlette==1.3.1

sentry_observability.py

@@ -1,535 +0,0 @@
-"""Optional self-hosted Sentry observability for the Gitea MCP server (#606).
-
-Adds env-var-gated Sentry SDK instrumentation so runtime errors, fail-closed
-workflow blockers, lease/terminal-lock/stale-runtime collisions, and recurring
-watchdog check-ins are visible in a *self-hosted* Sentry at
-``https://sentry.prgs.cc/`` — never Sentry Cloud, and never as the workflow
-source of truth (Gitea stays canonical).
-
-Design constraints (mirror ``gitea_audit`` and the #612 incident bridge):
-
-- **Off by default.** With ``MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED`` false/unset *or* ``SENTRY_DSN``
-  empty, ``init_sentry`` is a no-op and no events are ever sent — existing tool
-  behaviour and API-call patterns are unchanged (acceptance criterion 1).
-- **Fail *open* for observability.** A Sentry outage, a missing ``sentry_sdk``
-  package, or any capture error must never break an MCP tool success path. Every
-  public entry point swallows its own exceptions.
-- **Fail *closed* for redaction.** If a field cannot be proven safe it is dropped
-  rather than sent. Tokens, passwords, keychain IDs, DSNs, private config, raw
-  session-state, full prompt bodies, and full filesystem paths never leave here.
-- **No hard dependency.** ``sentry_sdk`` is imported lazily; the module is fully
-  importable and testable without it installed.
-
-Sentry is observe-only: it must not approve, merge, close, or otherwise mutate
-Gitea workflow state, nor bypass leases, #332, or MCP gates. Alerts may only feed
-the sanctioned Gitea issue/comment path via the #612 incident bridge.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import os
-import re
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import Any
-
-# Reuse the most comprehensive existing scrubber so redaction stays consistent
-# with the #612 incident bridge (tokens, DSNs, cookies, bearer/basic, keychain
-# ids, session ids, user:pass@host).
-from incident_bridge import redact_text as _redact_text
-
-# Second, complementary scrubber: catches bare ``token <value>`` /
-# ``Bearer <value>`` / ``Basic <value>`` prefixes and raw URLs that the
-# incident-bridge delimiter patterns miss.
-from gitea_audit import _redact_str as _redact_prefixes
-
-# ── Optional SDK (lazy, never a hard dependency) ────────────────────────────
-try:  # pragma: no cover - trivial import guard
-    import sentry_sdk  # type: ignore
-except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - absence is a supported state
-    sentry_sdk = None  # type: ignore
-
-
-# ── Env var names (single source of truth) ──────────────────────────────────
-ENV_ENABLED = "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED"
-ENV_DSN = "SENTRY_DSN"
-ENV_ENVIRONMENT = "SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT"
-ENV_RELEASE = "SENTRY_RELEASE"
-ENV_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE = "MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE"
-ENV_ENABLE_LOGS = "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS"
-
-_TRUTHY = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
-
-REDACTED = "[REDACTED]"
-REDACTED_PATH = "[REDACTED_PATH]"
-
-
-# ── Cron / watchdog monitor slugs (acceptance criterion 6) ──────────────────
-# Stable slugs for the recurring/watchdog jobs #606 wants check-ins for. The
-# slug is the durable monitor identity in Sentry; the wiring call sites pass one
-# of these keys (or an explicit slug) to ``monitor_checkin``.
-MONITOR_SLUGS: dict[str, str] = {
-    "stale_lease_scan": "gitea-mcp-stale-lease-scan",
-    "terminal_lock_scan": "gitea-mcp-terminal-lock-scan",
-    "allocator_health": "gitea-mcp-allocator-health",
-    "namespace_health": "gitea-mcp-namespace-health",
-    "dashboard_freshness": "gitea-mcp-dashboard-freshness",
-    "reconciler_cleanup": "gitea-mcp-reconciler-cleanup",
-}
-
-_CHECKIN_STATUSES = frozenset({"in_progress", "ok", "error"})
-
-
-# ── Tag allowlist (issue "Suggested Sentry tags/context") ───────────────────
-# Only these keys are ever attached as Sentry tags. Anything else is dropped so
-# a caller cannot accidentally leak a sensitive value through a tag.
-ALLOWED_TAG_KEYS = frozenset({
-    "role",
-    "profile",
-    "namespace",
-    "repo",
-    "org",
-    "issue_number",
-    "pr_number",
-    "blocker_type",
-    "workflow_hash",
-    "session_id_hash",  # hash only — never the raw session id
-    "pid",
-    "worktree_category",  # category, never the full sensitive path
-    "lease_comment_id",
-    "expected_head_sha",
-    "current_head_sha",
-    "terminal_lock_state",
-    "capability",
-    "mutation_tool",
-})
-
-# Absolute-path shapes that must never be sent verbatim (macOS/Linux + temp).
-_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"(?:/private)?/(?:Users|home|tmp|var|opt|Volumes)/[^\s\"']*")
-
-# ``extra`` keys whose *full* contents are forbidden by the redaction rules
-# (raw session-state, full prompt/comment bodies, private config blobs, raw
-# headers).
-_FORBIDDEN_EXTRA_KEYS = frozenset({
-    "prompt",
-    "prompt_body",
-    "next_prompt",
-    "body",
-    "raw_body",
-    "session_state",
-    "session_state_contents",
-    "config",
-    "config_contents",
-    "private_config",
-    "headers",
-    "authorization",
-})
-
-
-# ── Configuration ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class SentryConfig:
-    """Immutable snapshot of the Sentry env configuration."""
-
-    enabled: bool = False
-    dsn: str | None = None
-    environment: str = "development"
-    release: str | None = None
-    traces_sample_rate: float = 0.0
-    enable_logs: bool = False
-
-    @property
-    def active(self) -> bool:
-        """True only when the operator both opted in *and* supplied a DSN.
-
-        This is the single gate that keeps the feature off by default: enabling
-        the flag without a DSN (or vice versa) sends nothing.
-        """
-        return bool(self.enabled and self.dsn)
-
-    def safe_summary(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        """Operator-facing status with **no** DSN value (only presence)."""
-        return {
-            "enabled": self.enabled,
-            "dsn_present": bool(self.dsn),
-            "environment": self.environment,
-            "release": self.release,
-            "traces_sample_rate": self.traces_sample_rate,
-            "enable_logs": self.enable_logs,
-            "active": self.active,
-        }
-
-
-def _env_bool(name: str, env: dict[str, str]) -> bool:
-    return (env.get(name) or "").strip().lower() in _TRUTHY
-
-
-def _env_float(name: str, default: float, env: dict[str, str]) -> float:
-    raw = (env.get(name) or "").strip()
-    if not raw:
-        return default
-    try:
-        val = float(raw)
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        return default
-    # Clamp to Sentry's valid [0.0, 1.0] sample-rate range.
-    if val < 0.0:
-        return 0.0
-    if val > 1.0:
-        return 1.0
-    return val
-
-
-def load_config(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> SentryConfig:
-    """Build a :class:`SentryConfig` from the environment (read at call time)."""
-    env = dict(os.environ if env is None else env)
-    dsn = (env.get(ENV_DSN) or "").strip() or None
-    return SentryConfig(
-        enabled=_env_bool(ENV_ENABLED, env),
-        dsn=dsn,
-        environment=(env.get(ENV_ENVIRONMENT) or "").strip() or "development",
-        release=(env.get(ENV_RELEASE) or "").strip() or None,
-        traces_sample_rate=_env_float(ENV_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE, 0.0, env),
-        enable_logs=_env_bool(ENV_ENABLE_LOGS, env),
-    )
-
-
-def sdk_available() -> bool:
-    """True when the optional ``sentry_sdk`` package is importable."""
-    return sentry_sdk is not None
-
-
-# ── Redaction (fail closed) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
-def sanitize_path(value: Any) -> str:
-    """Reduce a filesystem path to a non-sensitive *category* token.
-
-    Full local paths must never be sent. We keep only a coarse worktree
-    category derived from the path shape (author/reviewer/merger/reconciler/
-    branches/root/other).
-    """
-    text = "" if value is None else str(value)
-    low = text.lower()
-    if not text:
-        return "unknown"
-    # Order matters: more specific role markers before the generic "branches".
-    if "reconcile" in low:
-        return "reconciler"
-    if "review" in low:
-        return "reviewer"
-    if "merge" in low or "merger" in low:
-        return "merger"
-    if "author" in low or re.search(r"/branches/(?:feat|fix|docs|chore|issue)", low):
-        return "author"
-    if "/branches/" in low:
-        return "branches"
-    if low.rstrip("/").endswith("gitea-tools"):
-        return "root"
-    return "other"
-
-
-def redact_value(value: Any) -> Any:
-    """Recursively redact a JSON-able value: secret text, absolute paths, and
-    known-sensitive dict keys are removed. Fail closed — any error drops the
-    value entirely rather than risk leaking it."""
-    try:
-        if isinstance(value, dict):
-            out: dict[str, Any] = {}
-            for k, v in value.items():
-                key = str(k)
-                low = key.lower()
-                if low in _FORBIDDEN_EXTRA_KEYS or any(
-                    s in low
-                    for s in ("token", "secret", "password", "cookie", "auth", "dsn", "keychain")
-                ):
-                    out[key] = REDACTED
-                    continue
-                out[key] = redact_value(v)
-            return out
-        if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
-            return [redact_value(v) for v in value]
-        if isinstance(value, str):
-            scrubbed = _redact_text(value)
-            scrubbed = _redact_prefixes(scrubbed)
-            scrubbed = _PATH_RE.sub(REDACTED_PATH, scrubbed)
-            return scrubbed
-        return value
-    except Exception:
-        return REDACTED
-
-
-def hash_session_id(session_id: Any) -> str:
-    """Short, stable, non-reversible fingerprint of a session id."""
-    digest = hashlib.sha256(str(session_id).encode("utf-8", "replace")).hexdigest()
-    return digest[:12]
-
-
-def build_tags(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, str]:
-    """Return a scrubbed, allowlisted tag dict.
-
-    ``session_id`` is accepted but only ever surfaced as ``session_id_hash``.
-    ``worktree_path`` collapses to ``worktree_category``. Any non-allowlisted
-    key, or a value that still contains redacted material after scrubbing, is
-    dropped.
-    """
-    raw: dict[str, Any] = dict(kwargs)
-
-    # Hash the session id — never emit it raw.
-    session_id = raw.pop("session_id", None)
-    if session_id and "session_id_hash" not in raw:
-        raw["session_id_hash"] = hash_session_id(session_id)
-
-    # A full worktree path collapses to a category tag.
-    wt = raw.pop("worktree_path", None)
-    if wt and "worktree_category" not in raw:
-        raw["worktree_category"] = sanitize_path(wt)
-
-    out: dict[str, str] = {}
-    for key, val in raw.items():
-        if key not in ALLOWED_TAG_KEYS:
-            continue
-        if val is None:
-            continue
-        scrubbed = redact_value(val)
-        text = str(scrubbed)
-        if not text or REDACTED in text or REDACTED_PATH in text:
-            continue
-        if len(text) > 200:
-            text = text[:200] + "…"
-        out[key] = text
-    return out
-
-
-def scrub_event(event: Any, hint: Any = None) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Sentry ``before_send`` / ``before_send_log`` hook.
-
-    Recursively redacts the outgoing event. On *any* failure it returns ``None``
-    so the event is dropped rather than sent unscrubbed (fail closed for
-    redaction).
-    """
-    try:
-        if not isinstance(event, dict):
-            return None
-        scrubbed = redact_value(event)
-        # Drop server_name if it leaked a hostname/path; PID is kept via tags.
-        scrubbed.pop("server_name", None)
-        return scrubbed
-    except Exception:
-        return None
-
-
-# ── Event builders (pure, independently testable) ───────────────────────────
-def build_blocker_event(
-    blocker_type: str,
-    *,
-    message: str | None = None,
-    next_action: str | None = None,
-    level: str = "warning",
-    tags: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    extra: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build a redacted, structured Sentry event for a workflow blocker.
-
-    ``next_action`` maps the issue's "canonical next action when available"
-    requirement (acceptance criterion 7).
-    """
-    merged_tags = dict(tags or {})
-    merged_tags.setdefault("blocker_type", blocker_type)
-    safe_tags = build_tags(**merged_tags)
-
-    safe_extra = redact_value(dict(extra or {}))
-    if next_action:
-        # A short canonical next action is allowed (it is not a full prompt).
-        safe_extra["canonical_next_action"] = redact_value(str(next_action)[:500])
-
-    event: dict[str, Any] = {
-        "message": redact_value(message or blocker_type),
-        "level": level if level in ("debug", "info", "warning", "error", "fatal") else "warning",
-        "logger": "gitea-mcp.workflow",
-        "tags": safe_tags,
-        "extra": safe_extra,
-        "fingerprint": ["workflow-blocker", blocker_type],
-    }
-    return event
-
-
-def build_checkin_payload(
-    monitor: str,
-    status: str,
-    *,
-    check_in_id: str | None = None,
-    duration: float | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build a Sentry cron check-in payload for one of :data:`MONITOR_SLUGS`.
-
-    ``monitor`` may be a registry key (e.g. ``"stale_lease_scan"``) or an
-    explicit slug. Raises ``ValueError`` on an unknown status so callers cannot
-    silently send a malformed check-in.
-    """
-    if status not in _CHECKIN_STATUSES:
-        raise ValueError(
-            f"invalid check-in status {status!r}; expected one of {sorted(_CHECKIN_STATUSES)}"
-        )
-    slug = MONITOR_SLUGS.get(monitor, monitor)
-    payload: dict[str, Any] = {"monitor_slug": slug, "status": status}
-    if check_in_id:
-        payload["check_in_id"] = str(check_in_id)
-    if duration is not None:
-        try:
-            payload["duration"] = float(duration)
-        except (TypeError, ValueError):
-            pass
-    return payload
-
-
-# ── Runtime init + capture (fail open) ──────────────────────────────────────
-_STATE: dict[str, Any] = {"initialized": False, "config": None}
-
-
-def is_initialized() -> bool:
-    return bool(_STATE.get("initialized"))
-
-
-def active_config() -> SentryConfig | None:
-    return _STATE.get("config")
-
-
-def reset_for_tests() -> None:
-    """Clear module init state. Test-only helper (never called in production)."""
-    _STATE["initialized"] = False
-    _STATE["config"] = None
-
-
-def init_sentry(config: SentryConfig | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Initialise the Sentry SDK if (and only if) enabled + DSN + SDK present.
-
-    Idempotent and never raises. Returns an operator-safe status dict (no DSN
-    value). Behaviour is unchanged when the feature is off.
-    """
-    cfg = config or load_config()
-    status: dict[str, Any] = {"initialized": False, **cfg.safe_summary()}
-    try:
-        if not cfg.active:
-            status["reason"] = "disabled (MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED false or SENTRY_DSN empty)"
-            _STATE["config"] = cfg
-            return status
-        if not sdk_available():
-            status["reason"] = "sentry_sdk not installed"
-            _STATE["config"] = cfg
-            return status
-
-        init_kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
-            "dsn": cfg.dsn,
-            "environment": cfg.environment,
-            "release": cfg.release,
-            "traces_sample_rate": cfg.traces_sample_rate,
-            "before_send": scrub_event,
-            "send_default_pii": False,
-        }
-        if cfg.enable_logs:
-            # sentry-sdk 2.x captures Python logs as structured logs when the
-            # experimental logs feature is enabled; scrub those too.
-            init_kwargs["_experiments"] = {
-                "enable_logs": True,
-                "before_send_log": scrub_event,
-            }
-        sentry_sdk.init(**init_kwargs)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
-        _STATE["initialized"] = True
-        _STATE["config"] = cfg
-        status["initialized"] = True
-        status["reason"] = "sentry initialised"
-    except Exception as exc:  # fail open: observability must not block startup
-        status["reason"] = f"init failed (ignored): {type(exc).__name__}"
-        _STATE["initialized"] = False
-    return status
-
-
-def _set_scope_tags(scope: Any, tags: dict[str, str]) -> None:
-    for key, val in tags.items():
-        try:
-            scope.set_tag(key, val)
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-
-
-def capture_workflow_blocker(
-    blocker_type: str,
-    *,
-    message: str | None = None,
-    next_action: str | None = None,
-    level: str = "warning",
-    tags: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    extra: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Capture a fail-closed workflow blocker as a structured Sentry event.
-
-    Always returns the redacted event dict (so callers/tests can inspect it),
-    and sends it to Sentry only when initialised. Fail open.
-    """
-    event = build_blocker_event(
-        blocker_type,
-        message=message,
-        next_action=next_action,
-        level=level,
-        tags=tags,
-        extra=extra,
-    )
-    try:
-        if is_initialized() and sdk_available():
-            sentry_sdk.capture_event(event)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
-    except Exception:
-        pass
-    return event
-
-
-def capture_exception(
-    exc: BaseException,
-    *,
-    tags: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    extra: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-) -> bool:
-    """Capture a runtime exception with scrubbed tags. Fail open.
-
-    Returns True only when the event was handed to an initialised SDK.
-    """
-    try:
-        if not (is_initialized() and sdk_available()):
-            return False
-        safe_tags = build_tags(**(tags or {}))
-        safe_extra = redact_value(dict(extra or {}))
-        with sentry_sdk.push_scope() as scope:  # type: ignore[union-attr]
-            _set_scope_tags(scope, safe_tags)
-            for key, val in safe_extra.items():
-                try:
-                    scope.set_extra(key, val)
-                except Exception:
-                    pass
-            sentry_sdk.capture_exception(exc)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
-        return True
-    except Exception:
-        return False
-
-
-def monitor_checkin(
-    monitor: str,
-    status: str,
-    *,
-    check_in_id: str | None = None,
-    duration: float | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Send a Sentry cron check-in for a watchdog job. Fail open.
-
-    Returns the payload (for inspection/tests), or ``None`` if the status was
-    invalid. Only transmits when initialised.
-    """
-    try:
-        payload = build_checkin_payload(
-            monitor, status, check_in_id=check_in_id, duration=duration
-        )
-    except ValueError:
-        return None
-    try:
-        if is_initialized() and sdk_available() and hasattr(sentry_sdk, "capture_checkin"):
-            sentry_sdk.capture_checkin(**payload)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
-    except Exception:
-        pass
-    return payload

tests/test_audit_reconciliation_mode.py

@@ -27,7 +27,13 @@ from task_capability_map import required_permission, required_role
 
 DELETE_PROFILE = {
     "profile_name": "prgs-author-delete",
-    "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.branch.delete"],
+    "role": "author",
+    "allowed_operations": [
+        "gitea.read",
+        "gitea.pr.create",
+        "gitea.branch.push",
+        "gitea.branch.delete",
+    ],
     "forbidden_operations": [],
     "audit_label": "prgs-author-delete",
 }

tests/test_branch_cleanup_guard.py

@@ -8,10 +8,33 @@ import branch_cleanup_guard as guard  # noqa: E402
 import mcp_server  # noqa: E402
 import task_capability_map  # noqa: E402
 from final_report_validator import assess_final_report_validator  # noqa: E402
-from mcp_server import gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch  # noqa: E402
+from mcp_server import gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch, gitea_delete_branch  # noqa: E402
 
 FAKE_AUTH = "token fake"
 
+# Reconciler-shaped profile that holds branch.delete (recommended) plus
+# required pr.close/read so _role_kind classifies as reconciler.
+RECONCILER_WITH_DELETE = {
+    "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
+    "role": "reconciler",
+    "allowed_operations": [
+        "gitea.read",
+        "gitea.pr.close",
+        "gitea.pr.comment",
+        "gitea.issue.comment",
+        "gitea.issue.close",
+        "gitea.branch.delete",
+    ],
+    "forbidden_operations": [
+        "gitea.pr.approve",
+        "gitea.pr.merge",
+        "gitea.pr.review",
+        "gitea.pr.create",
+        "gitea.branch.push",
+        "gitea.repo.commit",
+    ],
+}
+
 
 class TestRawBranchDeleteGuard(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_detects_local_and_remote_raw_git_delete_commands(self):
@@ -93,14 +116,48 @@ class TestMergedPrBranchCleanupTool(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(res["required_permission"], "gitea.branch.delete")
         self.mock_api.assert_not_called()
 
+    def test_author_and_merger_without_delete_authority_fail_closed(self):
+        role_profiles = {
+            "author": [
+                "gitea.read",
+                "gitea.branch.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+                "gitea.repo.commit",
+                "gitea.pr.create",
+            ],
+            "merger": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.merge"],
+        }
+        for name, allowed in role_profiles.items():
+            with self.subTest(role=name):
+                profile_patch = patch(
+                    "mcp_server.get_profile",
+                    return_value={
+                        "profile_name": name,
+                        "allowed_operations": allowed,
+                        "forbidden_operations": [],
+                    },
+                )
+                profile_patch.start()
+                try:
+                    res = gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
+                        pr_number=487,
+                        confirmation="CLEANUP MERGED PR 487 BRANCH feat/branch",
+                        branch="feat/branch",
+                        remote="prgs",
+                        worktree_path="/tmp/repo/branches/cleanup",
+                    )
+                finally:
+                    profile_patch.stop()
+                self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    res["required_permission"], "gitea.branch.delete"
+                )
+                self.mock_api.assert_not_called()
+
     def test_root_checkout_cleanup_fails_closed(self):
         patch(
             "mcp_server.get_profile",
-            return_value={
+            return_value=dict(RECONCILER_WITH_DELETE),
-                "profile_name": "branch-cleanup",
-                "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.branch.delete"],
-                "forbidden_operations": [],
-            },
         ).start()
         res = gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
             pr_number=487,
@@ -117,11 +174,7 @@ class TestMergedPrBranchCleanupTool(unittest.TestCase):
         branch = "feat/issue-485-lease-comments-non-list-guard"
         patch(
             "mcp_server.get_profile",
-            return_value={
+            return_value=dict(RECONCILER_WITH_DELETE),
-                "profile_name": "branch-cleanup",
-                "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.branch.delete"],
-                "forbidden_operations": [],
-            },
         ).start()
         self.mock_api.side_effect = [
             {
@@ -152,11 +205,7 @@ class TestMergedPrBranchCleanupTool(unittest.TestCase):
         branch = "feat/issue-485-lease-comments-non-list-guard"
         patch(
             "mcp_server.get_profile",
-            return_value={
+            return_value=dict(RECONCILER_WITH_DELETE),
-                "profile_name": "branch-cleanup",
-                "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.branch.delete"],
-                "forbidden_operations": [],
-            },
         ).start()
         self.mock_api.side_effect = [
             {
@@ -182,6 +231,168 @@ class TestMergedPrBranchCleanupTool(unittest.TestCase):
         ]
         self.assertFalse(delete_calls)
 
+    def test_reconciler_with_branch_delete_cannot_raw_delete(self):
+        """#687: reconciler + gitea.branch.delete still cannot call raw delete."""
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_profile",
+            return_value=dict(RECONCILER_WITH_DELETE),
+        ).start()
+        res = gitea_delete_branch(
+            branch="fix/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening",
+            remote="prgs",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res.get("success", True))
+        self.assertFalse(res.get("performed", True))
+        reasons = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
+        self.assertIn("raw gitea_delete_branch", reasons)
+        self.assertIn("cleanup_merged_pr_branch", reasons)
+        self.mock_api.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_reconciler_raw_delete_denies_preservation_branch(self):
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_profile",
+            return_value=dict(RECONCILER_WITH_DELETE),
+        ).start()
+        res = gitea_delete_branch(
+            branch="chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip",
+            remote="prgs",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res.get("performed", True))
+        self.mock_api.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_author_with_branch_delete_role_ok_but_preserve_blocked(self):
+        """Author role may use raw delete path when permitted; preserve fails closed."""
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_profile",
+            return_value={
+                "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+                "role": "author",
+                "allowed_operations": [
+                    "gitea.read",
+                    "gitea.pr.create",
+                    "gitea.branch.push",
+                    "gitea.branch.delete",
+                ],
+                "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge"],
+            },
+        ).start()
+        res = gitea_delete_branch(
+            branch="chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip",
+            remote="prgs",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res.get("performed", True))
+        self.assertIn("preservation", " ".join(res.get("reasons") or []))
+        self.mock_api.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_unmerged_branch_cleanup_rejected(self):
+        branch = "feat/unmerged-work"
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_profile",
+            return_value=dict(RECONCILER_WITH_DELETE),
+        ).start()
+        self.mock_api.side_effect = [
+            {
+                "number": 999,
+                "merged": False,
+                "merged_at": None,
+                "head": {"ref": branch, "sha": "b" * 40},
+                "base": {"ref": "master"},
+            },
+            {},
+        ]
+        res = gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
+            pr_number=999,
+            confirmation=f"CLEANUP MERGED PR 999 BRANCH {branch}",
+            branch=branch,
+            remote="prgs",
+            worktree_path="/tmp/repo/branches/cleanup",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("not merged" in r for r in (res.get("reasons") or []))
+        )
+        delete_calls = [
+            call for call in self.mock_api.call_args_list if call.args[0] == "DELETE"
+        ]
+        self.assertFalse(delete_calls)
+
+    def test_preservation_branch_cleanup_rejected(self):
+        branch = "chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip"
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_profile",
+            return_value=dict(RECONCILER_WITH_DELETE),
+        ).start()
+        self.mock_api.side_effect = [
+            {
+                "number": 681,
+                "merged": True,
+                "merged_at": "2026-07-08T01:00:00Z",
+                "head": {"ref": branch, "sha": "c" * 40},
+                "base": {"ref": "master"},
+            },
+            {},
+        ]
+        res = gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
+            pr_number=681,
+            confirmation=f"CLEANUP MERGED PR 681 BRANCH {branch}",
+            branch=branch,
+            remote="prgs",
+            worktree_path="/tmp/repo/branches/cleanup",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("preservation" in r for r in (res.get("reasons") or []))
+        )
+        delete_calls = [
+            call for call in self.mock_api.call_args_list if call.args[0] == "DELETE"
+        ]
+        self.assertFalse(delete_calls)
+
+    def test_non_reconciler_with_delete_denied_cleanup(self):
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_profile",
+            return_value={
+                "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+                "role": "author",
+                "allowed_operations": [
+                    "gitea.read",
+                    "gitea.pr.create",
+                    "gitea.branch.push",
+                    "gitea.branch.delete",
+                ],
+                "forbidden_operations": [],
+            },
+        ).start()
+        res = gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
+            pr_number=487,
+            confirmation="CLEANUP MERGED PR 487 BRANCH feat/branch",
+            branch="feat/branch",
+            remote="prgs",
+            worktree_path="/tmp/repo/branches/cleanup",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res.get("required_role_kind"), "reconciler")
+        self.mock_api.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_assess_guard_rejects_preservation_branch(self):
+        assessment = guard.assess_merged_pr_branch_cleanup(
+            pr_number=681,
+            head_branch="chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip",
+            merged=True,
+            remote_branch_exists=True,
+            open_pr_heads=set(),
+            head_on_target=True,
+            delete_capability_allowed=True,
+            confirmation=(
+                "CLEANUP MERGED PR 681 BRANCH "
+                "chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip"
+            ),
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["safe_to_delete"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("preservation" in r for r in assessment["block_reasons"])
+        )
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/test_create_issue_workspace_guard.py

@@ -57,9 +57,23 @@ class TestCreateIssueWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
         # Without worktree_path/env hints, workspace resolves to PROJECT_ROOT. When that
         # path is the stable control checkout (not under branches/), mutation must fail.
         with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
-            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+            try:
-                srv.gitea_create_issue(title="Test issue", body="body text")
+                res = srv.gitea_create_issue(title="Test issue", body="body text")
-        self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(ctx.exception))
+            except RuntimeError as exc:
+                self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(exc))
+            else:
+                # #683: production guards return typed blockers at entrypoints
+                self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
+                self.assertFalse(res.get("performed"))
+                blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or []) + " " + str(
+                    res.get("blocker_kind") or ""
+                )
+                self.assertTrue(
+                    "stable control checkout" in blob
+                    or "missing_issue_worktree" in blob
+                    or "control checkout" in blob.lower()
+                )
+                self.assertTrue(res.get("exact_next_action"))
 
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
@@ -105,11 +119,17 @@ class TestCreateIssueWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
         )
         
         with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
-            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+            try:
-                srv.gitea_create_issue(
+                res = srv.gitea_create_issue(
                     title="Test issue", body="body", worktree_path=missing_path
                 )
-        self.assertIn("does not exist (fail closed)", str(ctx.exception))
+            except RuntimeError as exc:
+                self.assertIn("does not exist", str(exc))
+            else:
+                self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
+                blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
+                self.assertIn("does not exist", blob)
+                self.assertTrue(res.get("exact_next_action") or res.get("reasons"))
 
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
@@ -142,11 +162,20 @@ class TestCreateIssueWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
 
         with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
             with patch("gitea_mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain", return_value=""):
-                with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+                try:
-                    srv.gitea_create_issue(
+                    res = srv.gitea_create_issue(
-                        title="Test issue", body="body", worktree_path=wrong_repo_path
+                        title="Test issue",
+                        body="body",
+                        worktree_path=wrong_repo_path,
                     )
-        self.assertIn("does not belong to the target repository", str(ctx.exception))
+                except RuntimeError as exc:
+                    self.assertIn(
+                        "does not belong to the target repository", str(exc)
+                    )
+                else:
+                    self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
+                    blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
+                    self.assertIn("does not belong to the target repository", blob)
 
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)

tests/test_issue_540_comment_role_poison.py

@@ -267,10 +267,19 @@ class TestReconcilerCommentThroughCanonicalPath(unittest.TestCase):
             with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=False):
                 os.environ.pop("GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE", None)
                 os.environ.pop("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", None)
-                with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
+                try:
-                    srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
+                    res = srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
                         515, "author note", remote="prgs"
                     )
+                except RuntimeError:
+                    pass  # legacy raise path
+                else:
+                    # #683: typed blocker at mutation entrypoint
+                    self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
+                    self.assertFalse(res.get("performed"))
+                    self.assertTrue(
+                        res.get("blocker_kind") or res.get("reasons")
+                    )
         mock_api.assert_not_called()
 
 

tests/test_issue_683_workflow_scope_guards.py

@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
+"""#683: block unattributed root WIP; pytest cannot disable production guards.
+
+Regression coverage required by issue #683:
+
+1. Session locked to issue A blocks unrelated target issue B until B is selected.
+2. Diagnostic source edit on the root checkout is blocked.
+3. Same legitimate edit succeeds after issue ownership + isolated worktree bind.
+4. Running under pytest does not deactivate production guards when force-on.
+5. Dirty tracked Python files remain visible to porcelain consumers.
+6. Monkeypatching one helper cannot silently turn the full guard path into a no-op.
+7. Real mutation entrypoint proves production guards run before side effects.
+8. Same-issue edits in a valid isolated worktree remain unaffected.
+9. Blocker includes stable reason + exact recovery action.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import textwrap
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import gitea_mcp_server as mcp_server  # noqa: E402
+import issue_lock_worktree  # noqa: E402
+import workflow_scope_guard as wsg  # noqa: E402
+
+CONTROL_ROOT = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)
+if "branches" in Path(__file__).resolve().parts:
+    # Running from a worktree under branches/ — parent of branches is control.
+    parts = Path(__file__).resolve().parts
+    idx = parts.index("branches")
+    CONTROL_ROOT = str(Path(*parts[:idx])) if idx > 0 else CONTROL_ROOT
+
+
+class TestProductionGuardsForceOn(unittest.TestCase):
+    def tearDown(self):
+        for key in (
+            wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV,
+            "GITEA_TEST_FORCE_DIRTY",
+            "GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN",
+            "GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE",
+            "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE",
+        ):
+            os.environ.pop(key, None)
+        wsg.clear_workflow_failure_ledger()
+
+    def test_force_on_under_pytest_keeps_production_active(self):
+        self.assertTrue(wsg.production_guards_active(in_test_mode=False))
+        self.assertFalse(wsg.production_guards_active(in_test_mode=True))
+        os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
+        self.assertTrue(wsg.production_guards_active(in_test_mode=True))
+        self.assertTrue(wsg.production_guards_forced())
+
+    def test_no_early_return_in_verify_role_mutation_workspace_source(self):
+        src = Path(mcp_server.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        # Rejected 300a4ca pattern must not exist.
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            "if _preflight_in_test_mode():\n        return _resolve_preflight_workspace_path",
+            src,
+        )
+        # Docstring contract for #683.
+        self.assertIn("#683", src)
+        self.assertIn("must NOT early-return solely because pytest", src)
+
+
+class TestPorcelainIntegrity(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_read_worktree_git_state_surfaces_dirty_py(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            # Use a real git repo so porcelain is truthful.
+            import subprocess
+
+            subprocess.run(["git", "init"], cwd=tmp, check=True, capture_output=True)
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "config", "user.email", "[email protected]"],
+                cwd=tmp,
+                check=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+            )
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "config", "user.name", "t"],
+                cwd=tmp,
+                check=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+            )
+            py_path = Path(tmp) / "sample_mod.py"
+            py_path.write_text("x = 1\n", encoding="utf-8")
+            subprocess.run(["git", "add", "sample_mod.py"], cwd=tmp, check=True)
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "commit", "-m", "init"],
+                cwd=tmp,
+                check=True,
+                capture_output=True,
+            )
+            py_path.write_text("x = 2\n", encoding="utf-8")
+            state = issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state(tmp)
+            porcelain = state.get("porcelain_status") or ""
+            self.assertIn("sample_mod.py", porcelain)
+            self.assertTrue(any(line.strip().endswith(".py") for line in porcelain.splitlines()))
+
+    def test_production_reader_source_rejects_pytest_py_filter(self):
+        src = Path(issue_lock_worktree.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        findings = wsg.assert_no_pytest_porcelain_filter(src)
+        self.assertEqual(findings, [])
+        # Negative: the rejected 300a4ca pattern is detected.
+        rejected = textwrap.dedent(
+            """
+            porcelain = status_res.stdout or ""
+            import sys
+            if "pytest" in sys.modules or "unittest" in sys.modules:
+                porcelain = "\\n".join(
+                    line for line in porcelain.splitlines()
+                    if not line.strip().endswith(".py")
+                )
+            """
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(wsg.assert_no_pytest_porcelain_filter(rejected))
+
+
+class TestIssueScopeOwnership(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_out_of_scope_issue_blocked_until_selected(self):
+        result = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
+            locked_issue_number=100,
+            target_issue_number=200,
+            branch_name="fix/issue-100-example",
+            role_kind="author",
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE)
+        self.assertIn("exact_next_action", result)
+        self.assertIn("owning issue", result["exact_next_action"].lower())
+        self.assertTrue(result["reasons"])
+
+    def test_same_issue_scope_allowed(self):
+        result = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
+            locked_issue_number=100,
+            target_issue_number=100,
+            branch_name="fix/issue-100-example",
+            role_kind="author",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["block"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["exact_next_action"], "proceed")
+
+    def test_missing_lock_when_required(self):
+        result = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
+            locked_issue_number=None,
+            target_issue_number=None,
+            role_kind="author",
+            require_lock_for_author=True,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE)
+
+    def test_branch_issue_mismatch(self):
+        result = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
+            locked_issue_number=50,
+            branch_name="fix/issue-99-other",
+            role_kind="author",
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE)
+
+
+class TestRootDiagnosticEdit(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_dirty_root_source_blocked(self):
+        result = wsg.assess_root_source_mutation(
+            workspace_path=CONTROL_ROOT,
+            canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
+            porcelain_status=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n M tests/test_x.py\n",
+            role_kind="author",
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT)
+        self.assertIn("gitea_mcp_server.py", result["dirty_source_files"])
+        self.assertIn("exact_next_action", result)
+        self.assertIn("branches/", result["exact_next_action"])
+
+    def test_isolated_worktree_same_issue_unaffected(self):
+        wt = f"{CONTROL_ROOT}/branches/issue-100-example"
+        result = wsg.assess_root_source_mutation(
+            workspace_path=wt,
+            canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
+            porcelain_status=" M helper.py\n",
+            current_branch="fix/issue-100-example",
+            locked_issue_number=100,
+            role_kind="author",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["block"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["under_branches"])
+
+    def test_legitimate_after_ownership_and_worktree(self):
+        wt = f"{CONTROL_ROOT}/branches/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening"
+        composed = wsg.assess_production_mutation_guards(
+            workspace_path=wt,
+            canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
+            porcelain_status=" M workflow_scope_guard.py\n",
+            current_branch="fix/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening",
+            locked_issue_number=683,
+            target_issue_number=683,
+            role_kind="author",
+            require_author_lock=True,
+            in_test_mode=True,
+        )
+        # Force-on required for production path under pytest.
+        os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
+        try:
+            composed = wsg.assess_production_mutation_guards(
+                workspace_path=wt,
+                canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
+                porcelain_status=" M workflow_scope_guard.py\n",
+                current_branch="fix/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening",
+                locked_issue_number=683,
+                target_issue_number=683,
+                role_kind="author",
+                require_author_lock=True,
+                in_test_mode=True,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(composed["block"])
+            self.assertFalse(composed.get("skipped"))
+        finally:
+            os.environ.pop(wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV, None)
+
+
+class TestTypedBlockerResponse(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_block_response_has_stable_kind_and_next_action(self):
+        assessment = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
+            locked_issue_number=1,
+            target_issue_number=2,
+            role_kind="author",
+        )
+        resp = wsg.block_response(assessment)
+        self.assertFalse(resp["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(resp["performed"])
+        self.assertEqual(resp["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE)
+        self.assertIsInstance(resp["exact_next_action"], str)
+        self.assertTrue(resp["exact_next_action"])
+        self.assertTrue(resp["reasons"])
+
+    def test_production_guard_error_roundtrip(self):
+        err = wsg.ProductionGuardError(
+            "blocked",
+            blocker_kind=wsg.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT,
+            reasons=["dirty root"],
+        )
+        resp = wsg.block_response(err, issue_number=683)
+        self.assertEqual(resp["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT)
+        self.assertEqual(resp["issue_number"], 683)
+        self.assertIn("exact_next_action", resp)
+
+
+class TestDurableFailureRecording(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        wsg.clear_workflow_failure_ledger()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        wsg.clear_workflow_failure_ledger()
+
+    def test_record_before_source_mutation(self):
+        pending = wsg.assess_durable_failure_recorded(
+            require_record=True, pending_source_mutation=True
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(pending["block"])
+        self.assertEqual(pending["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_UNRECORDED_FAILURE)
+
+        wsg.record_workflow_failure(
+            kind="transport_eof",
+            detail="EOF during review session (#584 cluster)",
+            issue_number=683,
+            task="comment_issue",
+        )
+        after = wsg.assess_durable_failure_recorded(
+            require_record=True, pending_source_mutation=True
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(after["block"])
+        self.assertEqual(len(wsg.workflow_failure_ledger()), 1)
+
+
+class TestMonkeypatchCannotNoopFullPath(unittest.TestCase):
+    def tearDown(self):
+        os.environ.pop(wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV, None)
+
+    def test_patching_branches_only_still_blocks_dirty_root_scope(self):
+        """Monkeypatching branches-only must not silence root diagnostic block."""
+        os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
+        with patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "_enforce_branches_only_author_mutation", lambda *a, **k: None
+        ):
+            with patch.object(
+                mcp_server, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard", lambda *a, **k: None
+            ):
+                # Even if both legacy helpers are patched, issue-scope composition
+                # still sees dirty root source via assess_production_mutation_guards.
+                assessment = wsg.assess_production_mutation_guards(
+                    workspace_path=CONTROL_ROOT,
+                    canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
+                    porcelain_status=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n",
+                    role_kind="author",
+                    in_test_mode=True,
+                )
+                self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    assessment["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT
+                )
+
+
+class TestRealEntrypointProductionGuard(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Real mutation entrypoint: production guard before side effects (#683)."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
+        for key in ("GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE", "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"):
+            os.environ.pop(key, None)
+        self._orig_whoami = mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called
+        self._orig_cap = mcp_server._preflight_capability_called
+        mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = False
+        mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = False
+        mcp_server._preflight_resolved_role = None
+        mcp_server._preflight_resolved_task = None
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        os.environ.pop(wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV, None)
+        for key in ("GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE", "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"):
+            os.environ.pop(key, None)
+        mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = self._orig_whoami
+        mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = self._orig_cap
+        mcp_server._preflight_resolved_role = None
+        mcp_server._preflight_resolved_task = None
+
+    def test_comment_issue_blocks_dirty_root_before_api(self):
+        api_mock = MagicMock()
+        with patch.object(mcp_server, "api_request", api_mock), patch.object(
+            mcp_server,
+            "_actual_profile_role",
+            return_value="author",
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server,
+            "_effective_workspace_role",
+            return_value="author",
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server,
+            "get_profile",
+            return_value={
+                "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+                "allowed_operations": [
+                    "gitea.issue.comment",
+                    "gitea.read",
+                    "gitea.pr.create",
+                    "gitea.branch.push",
+                ],
+                "forbidden_operations": [],
+            },
+        ), patch.object(
+            issue_lock_worktree,
+            "read_worktree_git_state",
+            side_effect=lambda path, **kw: {
+                "current_branch": "master",
+                "porcelain_status": (
+                    " M gitea_mcp_server.py\n"
+                    if os.path.realpath(path) == os.path.realpath(CONTROL_ROOT)
+                    or path == CONTROL_ROOT
+                    else ""
+                ),
+                "head_sha": "a" * 40,
+                "base_equivalent": True,
+            },
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server,
+            "_resolve_namespace_mutation_context",
+            return_value={
+                "workspace_path": CONTROL_ROOT,
+                "canonical_repo_root": CONTROL_ROOT,
+                "process_project_root": CONTROL_ROOT,
+                "workspace_role_kind": "author",
+                "workspace_binding_source": "process root",
+                "ignored_bindings": [],
+            },
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server,
+            "_resolve_author_mutation_context",
+            return_value={
+                "workspace_path": CONTROL_ROOT,
+                "canonical_repo_root": CONTROL_ROOT,
+                "process_project_root": CONTROL_ROOT,
+                "roots_aligned": True,
+            },
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server,
+            "_session_locked_issue_number",
+            return_value=None,
+        ):
+            result = mcp_server.gitea_create_issue_comment(
+                issue_number=683,
+                body="diagnostic note",
+                remote="prgs",
+                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                repo="Gitea-Tools",
+                worktree_path=CONTROL_ROOT,
+            )
+
+        api_mock.assert_not_called()
+        self.assertFalse(result.get("success"))
+        self.assertFalse(result.get("performed"))
+        self.assertIn(result.get("blocker_kind"), wsg.BLOCKER_KINDS)
+        self.assertTrue(result.get("exact_next_action"))
+        self.assertTrue(result.get("reasons"))
+
+    def test_comment_issue_succeeds_structure_after_worktree_bind(self):
+        """Same-issue isolated worktree is not blocked by root diagnostic path."""
+        wt = f"{CONTROL_ROOT}/branches/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening"
+        os.environ["GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE"] = wt
+        assessment = wsg.assess_production_mutation_guards(
+            workspace_path=wt,
+            canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
+            porcelain_status=" M workflow_scope_guard.py\n",
+            current_branch="fix/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening",
+            locked_issue_number=683,
+            target_issue_number=683,
+            role_kind="author",
+            require_author_lock=True,
+            in_test_mode=True,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["block"], assessment)
+
+
+class TestVerifyPreflightForceOn(unittest.TestCase):
+    def tearDown(self):
+        os.environ.pop(wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV, None)
+        for key in ("GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE", "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"):
+            os.environ.pop(key, None)
+
+    def test_force_on_runs_production_guards_under_pytest(self):
+        os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
+        called = {"root": 0, "branches": 0, "scope": 0}
+
+        def _root(*a, **k):
+            called["root"] += 1
+
+        def _branches(*a, **k):
+            called["branches"] += 1
+
+        def _scope(*a, **k):
+            called["scope"] += 1
+
+        with patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard", _root), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "_enforce_branches_only_author_mutation", _branches
+        ), patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_issue_scope_guard", _scope):
+            # No whoami/capability — purity-order skipped; production still runs.
+            mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="comment_issue")
+
+        self.assertEqual(called["root"], 1)
+        self.assertEqual(called["branches"], 1)
+        self.assertEqual(called["scope"], 1)
+
+    def test_without_force_on_pytest_skips_production_only_for_unit_isolation(self):
+        called = {"root": 0}
+
+        def _root(*a, **k):
+            called["root"] += 1
+
+        with patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard", _root), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "_enforce_branches_only_author_mutation", lambda *a, **k: None
+        ), patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_issue_scope_guard", lambda *a, **k: None):
+            mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="comment_issue")
+        self.assertEqual(called["root"], 0)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_comment_workspace_guard.py

@@ -108,13 +108,24 @@ class TestIssueCommentWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
                 "gitea_mcp_server.issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state",
                 side_effect=self._git_state(valid_worktree),
             ):
-                with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+                try:
-                    srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
+                    res = srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
                         issue_number=557,
                         body="evidence comment",
                         remote="prgs",
                     )
-        self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(ctx.exception))
+                except RuntimeError as exc:
+                    self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(exc))
+                else:
+                    # #683 typed blocker at mutation entrypoint
+                    self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
+                    self.assertFalse(res.get("performed"))
+                    blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
+                    self.assertTrue(
+                        "stable control checkout" in blob
+                        or res.get("blocker_kind")
+                    )
+                    self.assertTrue(res.get("exact_next_action") or res.get("reasons"))
         mock_api.assert_not_called()
 
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
@@ -184,14 +195,24 @@ class TestIssueCommentWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
                         side_effect=self._subprocess(valid_worktree, outside_worktree),
                     ):
                         with patch.dict(os.environ, self.AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
-                            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+                            try:
-                                srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
+                                res = srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
                                     issue_number=557,
                                     body="evidence comment",
                                     remote="prgs",
                                     worktree_path=outside_worktree,
                                 )
-        self.assertIn("does not belong to the target repository", str(ctx.exception))
+                            except RuntimeError as exc:
+                                self.assertIn(
+                                    "does not belong to the target repository",
+                                    str(exc),
+                                )
+                            else:
+                                self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
+                                blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
+                                self.assertIn(
+                                    "does not belong to the target repository", blob
+                                )
         mock_api.assert_not_called()
 
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)

tests/test_mcp_server.py

@@ -1425,10 +1425,16 @@ class TestReviewPR(unittest.TestCase):
 class TestDeleteBranch(unittest.TestCase):
 
     DELETE_PROFILE = {
-        "profile_name": "test-deleter",
+        "profile_name": "test-author-deleter",
-        "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.branch.delete"],
+        "role": "author",
+        "allowed_operations": [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.pr.create",
+            "gitea.branch.push",
+            "gitea.branch.delete",
+        ],
         "forbidden_operations": [],
-        "audit_label": "test-deleter",
+        "audit_label": "test-author-deleter",
     }
 
     @patch("mcp_server.get_profile", return_value=DELETE_PROFILE)

tests/test_migrate_profiles.py

@@ -92,14 +92,19 @@ class TestMigrateProfiles(unittest.TestCase):
         author = prgs_gitea["identities"]["author"]
         self.assertEqual(author["username"], "jcwalker3")
         self.assertEqual(author["auth"]["id"], "redacted-author-ref")
-        self.assertEqual(author["allowed_operations"], ["read", "comment"])
+        self.assertEqual(
-        self.assertEqual(author["forbidden_operations"], ["approve", "merge"])
+            author["allowed_operations"], ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.comment"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            author["forbidden_operations"],
+            ["gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge"],
+        )
 
         reviewer = prgs_gitea["identities"]["reviewer"]
         self.assertEqual(reviewer["role"], "reviewer")
         self.assertEqual(reviewer["username"], "sysadmin")
         self.assertEqual(reviewer["auth"]["id"], "redacted-reviewer-ref")
-        self.assertIn("merge", reviewer["allowed_operations"])
+        self.assertIn("gitea.pr.merge", reviewer["allowed_operations"])
 
     def test_alias_generation(self):
         """Test that aliases are correctly generated to support old profile names."""
@@ -188,7 +193,7 @@ class TestMigrateProfiles(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertNotIn("token", stdout_output.lower())
 
     def test_explicit_operations_are_preserved(self):
-        """Explicit v1 permissions must not be replaced by role defaults."""
+        """Explicit v1 permissions are canonicalized, not replaced by role defaults."""
         v1_data = json.loads(json.dumps(self.v1_content))
         v1_data["profiles"]["prgs-reviewer"]["allowed_operations"] = ["read"]
         v1_data["profiles"]["prgs-reviewer"]["forbidden_operations"] = ["merge"]
@@ -198,8 +203,8 @@ class TestMigrateProfiles(unittest.TestCase):
             v2_data["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]
             ["identities"]["reviewer"]
         )
-        self.assertEqual(reviewer["allowed_operations"], ["read"])
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["allowed_operations"], ["gitea.read"])
-        self.assertEqual(reviewer["forbidden_operations"], ["merge"])
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["forbidden_operations"], ["gitea.pr.merge"])
 
     def test_inferred_role_defaults_only_when_unambiguous(self):
         """Role defaults are allowed only for clear author/reviewer profiles."""
@@ -306,6 +311,171 @@ class TestMigrateProfiles(unittest.TestCase):
                 migrate_profiles.main()
             self.assertEqual(cm.exception.code, 1)
 
+    def test_reconciler_profile_migration(self):
+        """Legacy reconciler shorthands migrate to valid canonical operations."""
+        import gitea_config
+        import reconciler_profile
+
+        v1_data = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-reconciler": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "reconciler-agent",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "reconciler-ref"},
+                    "execution_profile": "prgs-reconciler",
+                    "allowed_operations": [
+                        "read",
+                        "pr.close",
+                        "pr.comment",
+                        "issue.comment",
+                        "issue.close",
+                        "gitea.branch.delete",
+                    ],
+                    "forbidden_operations": [
+                        "merge",
+                        "approve",
+                        "review",
+                        "pr.create",
+                        "branch.push",
+                        "commit",
+                    ],
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+        reconciler = (
+            v2_data["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]
+            ["identities"]["reconciler"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(reconciler["role"], "reconciler")
+        allowed = reconciler["allowed_operations"]
+        forbidden = reconciler["forbidden_operations"]
+        # No invalid shorthand remains
+        for bad in ("pr.close", "pr.comment", "issue.close", "read", "merge"):
+            self.assertNotIn(bad, allowed)
+            self.assertNotIn(bad, forbidden)
+        for required in (
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.pr.close",
+            "gitea.pr.comment",
+            "gitea.issue.comment",
+            "gitea.issue.close",
+            "gitea.branch.delete",
+        ):
+            self.assertIn(required, allowed)
+            # Production loader accepts every allowed op
+            self.assertEqual(
+                gitea_config.normalize_operation(required), required
+            )
+        self.assertEqual(v2_data["aliases"]["prgs-reconciler"], "prgs.gitea.reconciler")
+        assessment = reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile(allowed, forbidden)
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["valid"])
+        self.assertTrue(migrate_profiles.validate_v2_data(v2_data))
+
+    def test_reconciler_profile_defaults(self):
+        """Reconciler defaults are fully canonical and loader-valid."""
+        import gitea_config
+        import reconciler_profile
+
+        v1_data = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-reconciler": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "reconciler-agent",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "reconciler-ref"},
+                    "execution_profile": "prgs-reconciler",
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+        reconciler = (
+            v2_data["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]
+            ["identities"]["reconciler"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(reconciler["role"], "reconciler")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            reconciler["allowed_operations"],
+            migrate_profiles.RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            reconciler["forbidden_operations"],
+            migrate_profiles.RECONCILER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN,
+        )
+        for op in reconciler["allowed_operations"]:
+            self.assertEqual(gitea_config.normalize_operation(op), op)
+            self.assertTrue(op.startswith("gitea."))
+        assessment = reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile(
+            reconciler["allowed_operations"],
+            reconciler["forbidden_operations"],
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["valid"])
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            "gitea.branch.delete", assessment["missing_recommended_operations"]
+        )
+
+    def test_reconciler_migration_idempotent_canonicalize(self):
+        """Second canonicalize of already-canonical ops is a no-op."""
+        first = migrate_profiles.canonicalize_operations(
+            list(migrate_profiles.RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
+        )
+        second = migrate_profiles.canonicalize_operations(first)
+        self.assertEqual(first, second)
+        self.assertEqual(first, list(migrate_profiles.RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED))
+
+    def test_reconciler_missing_required_fails_visibly(self):
+        """Missing gitea.pr.close after migration fails closed (not silent drop)."""
+        v1_data = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-reconciler": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "reconciler-agent",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "reconciler-ref"},
+                    "execution_profile": "prgs-reconciler",
+                    "allowed_operations": ["read", "gitea.branch.delete"],
+                    "forbidden_operations": ["merge"],
+                }
+            },
+        }
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "missing required"):
+            migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+
+    def test_unknown_operation_fails_visibly(self):
+        v1_data = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-author": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "jcwalker3",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "hidden-author-ref"},
+                    "execution_profile": "prgs-author",
+                    "allowed_operations": ["read", "not.a.real.op"],
+                    "forbidden_operations": ["merge"],
+                }
+            },
+        }
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "cannot be canonicalized"):
+            migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+
+    def test_role_inference_author_reviewer_merger_reconciler(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            migrate_profiles.infer_role("prgs-author", "prgs-author"), "author"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            migrate_profiles.infer_role("prgs-reviewer", "prgs-reviewer"),
+            "reviewer",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            migrate_profiles.infer_role("prgs-reconciler", "prgs-reconciler"),
+            "reconciler",
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(
+            migrate_profiles.infer_role("prgs-merger", "prgs-merger")
+        )
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()
+

tests/test_preflight_read_survival.py

@@ -76,13 +76,17 @@ class TestPreflightReadSurvival(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("task mismatch", str(ctx.exception))
 
     def test_capability_consumed_after_mutation_gate(self):
+        # Use reconciler/close_pr so this purity-order test does not require a
+        # branches/ worktree (author create_issue would hit #274/#683 guards).
+        # Test isolation stays explicit; production author guards remain live
+        # under force-on (see tests/test_issue_683_workflow_scope_guards.py).
         mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
         mcp_server.record_preflight_check(
-            "capability", resolved_role="author", resolved_task="create_issue"
+            "capability", resolved_role="reconciler", resolved_task="close_pr"
         )
-        mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="create_issue")
+        mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="close_pr")
         with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
-            mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="create_issue")
+            mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="close_pr")
         self.assertIn("has not been resolved", str(ctx.exception))
 
     def test_whoami_recovery_after_violation_clears_capability(self):

tests/test_reconciler_close_workspace_guard.py

@@ -86,9 +86,21 @@ class TestReconcilerCloseWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
     ):
         srv._preflight_resolved_role = "author"
         with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
-            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+            try:
-                srv.gitea_create_issue(title="Test", body="body")
+                res = srv.gitea_create_issue(title="Test", body="body")
-        self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(ctx.exception))
+            except RuntimeError as exc:
+                self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(exc))
+            else:
+                # #683 typed blocker at mutation entrypoint
+                self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
+                blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or []) + str(
+                    res.get("blocker_kind") or ""
+                )
+                self.assertTrue(
+                    "stable control checkout" in blob
+                    or "missing_issue_worktree" in blob
+                    or "control checkout" in blob.lower()
+                )
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

tests/test_reconciler_profile.py

@@ -82,6 +82,42 @@ class TestReconcilerProfileModel(unittest.TestCase):
             "reconciler",
         )
 
+    def test_branch_delete_is_recommended_for_reconciler(self):
+        self.assertIn(
+            "gitea.branch.delete",
+            reconciler_profile.RECONCILER_RECOMMENDED_OPERATIONS,
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            "gitea.branch.delete",
+            reconciler_profile.RECONCILER_REQUIRED_OPERATIONS,
+        )
+
+    def test_reconciler_with_branch_delete_stays_valid(self):
+        allowed = PRGS_RECONCILER_ALLOWED + ["gitea.branch.delete"]
+        result = reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile(
+            allowed,
+            PRGS_RECONCILER_FORBIDDEN,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["is_reconciler_profile"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["valid"])
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            "gitea.branch.delete", result["missing_recommended_operations"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            mcp_server._role_kind(allowed, PRGS_RECONCILER_FORBIDDEN),
+            "reconciler",
+        )
+
+    def test_reconciler_without_branch_delete_reports_missing_recommended(self):
+        result = reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile(
+            PRGS_RECONCILER_ALLOWED,
+            PRGS_RECONCILER_FORBIDDEN,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["valid"])
+        self.assertIn(
+            "gitea.branch.delete", result["missing_recommended_operations"]
+        )
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/test_sentry_observability.py

@@ -1,412 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for optional self-hosted Sentry observability (#606).
-
-Covers the pure module (config, redaction, event/check-in builders) and the
-runtime capture paths using a fake ``sentry_sdk``, so nothing ever touches the
-network. Critically proves the feature is a no-op when disabled or DSN-less
-(acceptance criterion 1) and that secrets/paths/session-state are never sent
-(criterion 5).
-"""
-
-import sys
-import contextlib
-from pathlib import Path
-
-import pytest
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-import sentry_observability as so  # noqa: E402
-
-
-# ── Fake SDK ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-class _FakeScope:
-    def __init__(self):
-        self.tags = {}
-        self.extras = {}
-
-    def set_tag(self, k, v):
-        self.tags[k] = v
-
-    def set_extra(self, k, v):
-        self.extras[k] = v
-
-
-class FakeSentrySDK:
-    """Minimal stand-in exposing the SDK surface sentry_observability uses."""
-
-    def __init__(self):
-        self.init_kwargs = None
-        self.events = []
-        self.exceptions = []
-        self.checkins = []
-        self.last_scope = None
-
-    def init(self, **kwargs):
-        self.init_kwargs = kwargs
-
-    def capture_event(self, event):
-        self.events.append(event)
-
-    def capture_exception(self, exc):
-        self.exceptions.append(exc)
-
-    def capture_checkin(self, **payload):
-        self.checkins.append(payload)
-
-    @contextlib.contextmanager
-    def push_scope(self):
-        self.last_scope = _FakeScope()
-        yield self.last_scope
-
-
-@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
-def _reset_state():
-    """Isolate module init state between tests."""
-    so.reset_for_tests()
-    yield
-    so.reset_for_tests()
-
-
-@pytest.fixture
-def fake_sdk(monkeypatch):
-    sdk = FakeSentrySDK()
-    monkeypatch.setattr(so, "sentry_sdk", sdk)
-    return sdk
-
-
-# ── Config / gating ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-def test_disabled_by_default_empty_env():
-    cfg = so.load_config(env={})
-    assert cfg.enabled is False
-    assert cfg.active is False
-
-
-def test_enabled_flag_without_dsn_is_not_active():
-    cfg = so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1"})
-    assert cfg.enabled is True
-    assert cfg.dsn is None
-    assert cfg.active is False  # DSN required
-
-
-def test_dsn_without_enabled_flag_is_not_active():
-    cfg = so.load_config(env={"SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"})
-    assert cfg.active is False
-
-
-def test_active_requires_enabled_and_dsn():
-    cfg = so.load_config(
-        env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "true", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
-    )
-    assert cfg.active is True
-
-
-def test_truthy_variants():
-    for val in ("1", "true", "YES", "On"):
-        cfg = so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": val})
-        assert cfg.enabled is True
-    for val in ("0", "false", "no", "", "off"):
-        cfg = so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": val})
-        assert cfg.enabled is False
-
-
-def test_traces_sample_rate_parsed_and_clamped():
-    assert so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE": "0.25"}).traces_sample_rate == 0.25
-    assert so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE": "5"}).traces_sample_rate == 1.0
-    assert so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE": "-1"}).traces_sample_rate == 0.0
-    assert so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE": "junk"}).traces_sample_rate == 0.0
-
-
-def test_safe_summary_has_no_dsn_value():
-    cfg = so.load_config(
-        env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
-    )
-    summary = cfg.safe_summary()
-    assert summary["dsn_present"] is True
-    assert "secret" not in repr(summary)
-    assert "dsn" not in summary  # only presence, never the value
-
-
-# ── init_sentry ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-def test_init_noop_when_disabled(fake_sdk):
-    status = so.init_sentry(so.load_config(env={}))
-    assert status["initialized"] is False
-    assert fake_sdk.init_kwargs is None  # no SDK init
-    assert so.is_initialized() is False
-
-
-def test_init_noop_when_enabled_but_missing_dsn(fake_sdk):
-    status = so.init_sentry(so.load_config(env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1"}))
-    assert status["initialized"] is False
-    assert fake_sdk.init_kwargs is None
-
-
-def test_init_reports_missing_sdk(monkeypatch):
-    monkeypatch.setattr(so, "sentry_sdk", None)
-    status = so.init_sentry(
-        so.load_config(
-            env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
-        )
-    )
-    assert status["initialized"] is False
-    assert "not installed" in status["reason"]
-
-
-def test_init_configures_sdk_with_scrubber(fake_sdk):
-    status = so.init_sentry(
-        so.load_config(
-            env={
-                "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1",
-                "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1",
-                "SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT": "prod",
-                "MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE": "0.1",
-            }
-        )
-    )
-    assert status["initialized"] is True
-    assert so.is_initialized() is True
-    kw = fake_sdk.init_kwargs
-    assert kw["dsn"] == "https://[email protected]/1"
-    assert kw["environment"] == "prod"
-    assert kw["traces_sample_rate"] == 0.1
-    assert kw["before_send"] is so.scrub_event
-    assert kw["send_default_pii"] is False
-
-
-def test_init_enable_logs_wires_log_scrubber(fake_sdk):
-    so.init_sentry(
-        so.load_config(
-            env={
-                "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1",
-                "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1",
-                "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS": "1",
-            }
-        )
-    )
-    exp = fake_sdk.init_kwargs["_experiments"]
-    assert exp["enable_logs"] is True
-    assert exp["before_send_log"] is so.scrub_event
-
-
-def test_init_never_raises_on_sdk_failure(monkeypatch):
-    class Boom:
-        def init(self, **kwargs):
-            raise RuntimeError("sentry down")
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(so, "sentry_sdk", Boom())
-    status = so.init_sentry(
-        so.load_config(
-            env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
-        )
-    )
-    assert status["initialized"] is False
-    assert "init failed" in status["reason"]
-
-
-# ── Redaction (fail closed) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
-def test_build_tags_allowlist_only():
-    tags = so.build_tags(role="author", secret_thing="leak", pid=123)
-    assert tags["role"] == "author"
-    assert tags["pid"] == "123"
-    assert "secret_thing" not in tags
-
-
-def test_build_tags_hashes_session_id():
-    tags = so.build_tags(session_id="prgs-author-20479-cf9ac178")
-    assert "session_id" not in tags
-    assert "session_id_hash" in tags
-    assert tags["session_id_hash"] != "prgs-author-20479-cf9ac178"
-    assert len(tags["session_id_hash"]) == 12
-
-
-def test_build_tags_collapses_worktree_path():
-    tags = so.build_tags(
-        worktree_path="/Users/x/Development/Gitea-Tools/branches/issue-606-sentry-observability"
-    )
-    assert "worktree_path" not in tags
-    assert tags["worktree_category"] == "author"
-
-
-def test_build_tags_drops_value_that_scrubs_to_redacted():
-    # A tag value that is itself a token gets scrubbed then dropped.
-    tags = so.build_tags(capability="token abcdef1234567890")
-    assert "capability" not in tags
-
-
-def test_sanitize_path_categories():
-    assert so.sanitize_path("/repo/branches/review-pr-654") == "reviewer"
-    assert so.sanitize_path("/repo/branches/merge-pr-1") == "merger"
-    assert so.sanitize_path("/repo/branches/reconcile-pr-1") == "reconciler"
-    assert so.sanitize_path("/repo/branches/feat-issue-606") == "author"
-    assert so.sanitize_path("/x/y/Gitea-Tools") == "root"
-
-
-def test_redact_value_scrubs_secrets_and_paths():
-    out = so.redact_value(
-        {
-            "token": "abc123",
-            "note": "Authorization: Bearer sk_live_abcdefgh12345",
-            "path": "/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/secret",
-            "dsn": "https://[email protected]/1",
-            "safe": "hello",
-        }
-    )
-    assert out["token"] == so.REDACTED
-    assert out["dsn"] == so.REDACTED
-    assert "sk_live" not in out["note"]
-    assert so.REDACTED_PATH in out["path"]
-    assert "/Users/" not in out["path"]
-    assert out["safe"] == "hello"
-
-
-def test_redact_value_forbidden_prompt_and_session_state():
-    out = so.redact_value(
-        {"prompt": "full body", "session_state": "{...}", "keep": "ok"}
-    )
-    assert out["prompt"] == so.REDACTED
-    assert out["session_state"] == so.REDACTED
-    assert out["keep"] == "ok"
-
-
-def test_scrub_event_redacts_nested_and_drops_server_name():
-    event = {
-        "server_name": "some-host",
-        "message": "boom",
-        "extra": {"token": "leak", "ok": "1"},
-    }
-    scrubbed = so.scrub_event(event)
-    assert "server_name" not in scrubbed
-    assert scrubbed["extra"]["token"] == so.REDACTED
-    assert scrubbed["extra"]["ok"] == "1"
-
-
-def test_scrub_event_drops_non_dict():
-    assert so.scrub_event("not a dict") is None
-    assert so.scrub_event(None) is None
-
-
-# ── Event builders ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-def test_build_blocker_event_structure_and_next_action():
-    event = so.build_blocker_event(
-        "active_foreign_lease",
-        message="blocked by foreign lease",
-        next_action="wait or adopt via allocator",
-        level="warning",
-        tags={"pr_number": 606, "session_id": "s-123"},
-    )
-    assert event["tags"]["blocker_type"] == "active_foreign_lease"
-    assert event["tags"]["pr_number"] == "606"
-    assert "session_id" not in event["tags"]
-    assert event["tags"]["session_id_hash"]
-    assert event["extra"]["canonical_next_action"] == "wait or adopt via allocator"
-    assert event["fingerprint"] == ["workflow-blocker", "active_foreign_lease"]
-
-
-def test_build_blocker_event_invalid_level_defaults_warning():
-    event = so.build_blocker_event("x", level="nonsense")
-    assert event["level"] == "warning"
-
-
-def test_build_checkin_payload_maps_slugs():
-    for key, slug in so.MONITOR_SLUGS.items():
-        payload = so.build_checkin_payload(key, "ok")
-        assert payload["monitor_slug"] == slug
-        assert payload["status"] == "ok"
-
-
-def test_build_checkin_payload_explicit_slug_passthrough():
-    payload = so.build_checkin_payload("custom-slug", "in_progress", duration=1.5)
-    assert payload["monitor_slug"] == "custom-slug"
-    assert payload["duration"] == 1.5
-
-
-def test_build_checkin_payload_rejects_bad_status():
-    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
-        so.build_checkin_payload("allocator_health", "bogus")
-
-
-def test_all_six_monitors_registered():
-    assert set(so.MONITOR_SLUGS) == {
-        "stale_lease_scan",
-        "terminal_lock_scan",
-        "allocator_health",
-        "namespace_health",
-        "dashboard_freshness",
-        "reconciler_cleanup",
-    }
-
-
-# ── Capture paths (fail open) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
-def test_capture_workflow_blocker_noop_when_disabled(fake_sdk):
-    # not initialised
-    event = so.capture_workflow_blocker("some_blocker", message="x")
-    assert isinstance(event, dict)  # still returns redacted event
-    assert fake_sdk.events == []  # but nothing sent
-
-
-def test_capture_workflow_blocker_sends_when_initialised(fake_sdk):
-    so.init_sentry(
-        so.load_config(
-            env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
-        )
-    )
-    so.capture_workflow_blocker("terminal_lock_occupied", message="held")
-    assert len(fake_sdk.events) == 1
-    assert fake_sdk.events[0]["tags"]["blocker_type"] == "terminal_lock_occupied"
-
-
-def test_capture_exception_noop_when_disabled(fake_sdk):
-    assert so.capture_exception(ValueError("x")) is False
-    assert fake_sdk.exceptions == []
-
-
-def test_capture_exception_sends_scrubbed_tags(fake_sdk):
-    so.init_sentry(
-        so.load_config(
-            env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
-        )
-    )
-    ok = so.capture_exception(
-        RuntimeError("bad"), tags={"mutation_tool": "gitea_merge_pr", "leaky": "x"}
-    )
-    assert ok is True
-    assert len(fake_sdk.exceptions) == 1
-    assert fake_sdk.last_scope.tags["mutation_tool"] == "gitea_merge_pr"
-    assert "leaky" not in fake_sdk.last_scope.tags
-
-
-def test_capture_exception_never_raises(monkeypatch, fake_sdk):
-    so.init_sentry(
-        so.load_config(
-            env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
-        )
-    )
-
-    def boom(exc):
-        raise RuntimeError("sdk exploded")
-
-    monkeypatch.setattr(fake_sdk, "capture_exception", boom)
-    # Must swallow the SDK failure (fail open).
-    assert so.capture_exception(ValueError("y")) is False
-
-
-def test_monitor_checkin_noop_when_disabled(fake_sdk):
-    payload = so.monitor_checkin("allocator_health", "ok")
-    assert payload["monitor_slug"] == "gitea-mcp-allocator-health"
-    assert fake_sdk.checkins == []  # not sent while disabled
-
-
-def test_monitor_checkin_sends_when_initialised(fake_sdk):
-    so.init_sentry(
-        so.load_config(
-            env={"MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED": "1", "SENTRY_DSN": "https://[email protected]/1"}
-        )
-    )
-    so.monitor_checkin("stale_lease_scan", "ok")
-    assert fake_sdk.checkins == [
-        {"monitor_slug": "gitea-mcp-stale-lease-scan", "status": "ok"}
-    ]
-
-
-def test_monitor_checkin_invalid_status_returns_none(fake_sdk):
-    assert so.monitor_checkin("allocator_health", "bogus") is None
-    assert fake_sdk.checkins == []

workflow_scope_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,626 @@
+"""Workflow scope ownership and production-guard hardening (#683).
+
+Implements fail-closed enforcement so sessions cannot:
+
+* mutate source/tests on the root/control checkout (including temporary
+  diagnostic edits) without binding an issue-backed ``branches/`` worktree;
+* continue out-of-scope source work while locked to a different issue;
+* disable, skip, or conceal production root/branches/porcelain guards solely
+  because pytest/unittest is loaded.
+
+This module is pure assessment + small durable ledger helpers. Callers gather
+live facts (lock, branch, porcelain, worktree path) and pass them in. Existing
+root_checkout_guard / author_mutation_worktree assessors remain authoritative;
+this module composes typed blockers with exact recovery actions.
+
+Do **not** reintroduce the rejected #681 / ``300a4ca`` patterns:
+
+* early-return from workspace verification under ``_preflight_in_test_mode()``
+* porcelain filtering that strips ``*.py`` lines under pytest
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import re
+import threading
+from typing import Any
+
+import author_mutation_worktree
+from reviewer_worktree import parse_dirty_tracked_files
+
+# ── force-on / test isolation ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# When set, production root/branches/scope guards MUST run even under pytest.
+# Unit tests that only need preflight-order isolation leave this unset and
+# use GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN / fixtures; real-entrypoint proof sets this to "1".
+FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV = "GITEA_TEST_FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS"
+
+# Existing force signals also mean "exercise production dirtiness paths".
+_FORCE_DIRTY_ENV = "GITEA_TEST_FORCE_DIRTY"
+_FORCE_PORCELAIN_ENV = "GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN"
+
+# ── typed blocker kinds ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT = "root_diagnostic_edit"
+BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE = "missing_issue_scope"
+BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE = "out_of_scope_issue"
+BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE = "missing_issue_worktree"
+BLOCKER_UNRECORDED_FAILURE = "unrecorded_workflow_failure"
+BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD = "production_guard_violation"
+
+BLOCKER_KINDS = frozenset(
+    {
+        BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT,
+        BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE,
+        BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE,
+        BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE,
+        BLOCKER_UNRECORDED_FAILURE,
+        BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD,
+    }
+)
+
+_NEXT_ACTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
+    BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT: (
+        "Stop editing the control/root checkout. Preserve or discard root WIP "
+        "durably, restore root to clean master, lock or create the owning issue, "
+        "bind branches/issue-<N>-*, set GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE to that worktree, "
+        "then re-run the mutation."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE: (
+        "Select or create the owning Gitea issue, claim/lock it "
+        "(gitea_mark_issue + gitea_lock_issue), bind branches/issue-<N>-* "
+        "from clean master, then re-run the mutation from that worktree."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE: (
+        "Stop. The active issue lock does not own this work. Release or finish "
+        "the current issue lease, then select/create and lock the correct "
+        "owning issue, bind its branches/issue-<N>-* worktree, and re-run."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE: (
+        "Bind an issue-backed worktree under branches/ (scripts/worktree-start "
+        "or git worktree add branches/issue-<N>-*), set GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE / "
+        "worktree_path to that path, keep the control checkout clean on master, "
+        "then re-run the mutation."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_UNRECORDED_FAILURE: (
+        "Record the workflow/tool failure durably first (issue comment or "
+        "workflow_scope_guard.record_workflow_failure), then continue only "
+        "inside the owning issue-backed worktree."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD: (
+        "Resolve the production guard violation: clean or isolate the control "
+        "checkout, bind the owning issue worktree under branches/, and re-run "
+        "with production guards active."
+    ),
+}
+
+_ISSUE_IN_BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"issue-(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE)
+
+# In-process durable failure ledger (also written via optional sink callback).
+_ledger_lock = threading.Lock()
+_failure_ledger: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+
+class ProductionGuardError(RuntimeError):
+    """Fail-closed production guard with typed blocker metadata (#683)."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        message: str,
+        *,
+        blocker_kind: str,
+        exact_next_action: str | None = None,
+        reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+        details: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(message)
+        kind = (blocker_kind or "").strip()
+        if kind not in BLOCKER_KINDS:
+            kind = BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
+        self.blocker_kind = kind
+        self.exact_next_action = (
+            (exact_next_action or "").strip() or _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind]
+        )
+        self.reasons = list(reasons or [message])
+        self.details = dict(details or {})
+
+
+def production_guards_forced() -> bool:
+    """True when the explicit #683 force-on flag requests production guards."""
+    return (os.environ.get(FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {
+        "1",
+        "true",
+        "yes",
+        "on",
+    }
+
+
+def purity_order_forced() -> bool:
+    """True when tests force preflight-order dirtiness paths (legacy flags)."""
+    if os.environ.get(_FORCE_DIRTY_ENV):
+        return True
+    # GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN present (even empty) means dirtiness paths are live.
+    if os.environ.get(_FORCE_PORCELAIN_ENV) is not None:
+        return True
+    return False
+
+
+def production_guards_active(*, in_test_mode: bool) -> bool:
+    """Whether production root/branches/scope guards must execute.
+
+    Production (non-test) always active. Under pytest, active when either the
+    explicit #683 force-on flag or legacy dirty/porcelain force signals are
+    set — never skip production enforcement solely because tests are running
+    when force-on is requested.
+    """
+    if production_guards_forced() or purity_order_forced():
+        return True
+    return not bool(in_test_mode)
+
+
+def extract_issue_number_from_branch(branch_name: str | None) -> int | None:
+    """Return the first issue-N number embedded in a branch name, if any."""
+    text = (branch_name or "").strip()
+    if not text:
+        return None
+    match = _ISSUE_IN_BRANCH_RE.search(text)
+    if not match:
+        return None
+    try:
+        return int(match.group(1))
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+
+
+def is_source_or_test_path(path: str) -> bool:
+    """True for tracked source/test paths that must not land as root WIP."""
+    p = (path or "").replace("\\", "/").lstrip("./")
+    if not p:
+        return False
+    if p.startswith("tests/") or "/tests/" in f"/{p}":
+        return True
+    if p.endswith((".py", ".pyi", ".toml", ".cfg", ".ini", ".sh")):
+        return True
+    if p in {"requirements.txt", "pyproject.toml", "setup.py", "setup.cfg"}:
+        return True
+    return False
+
+
+def dirty_source_files(porcelain_status: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Tracked dirty paths that count as source/test contamination."""
+    dirty = parse_dirty_tracked_files(porcelain_status or "")
+    return [p for p in dirty if is_source_or_test_path(p)]
+
+
+def assess_issue_scope_ownership(
+    *,
+    locked_issue_number: int | None,
+    target_issue_number: int | None = None,
+    branch_name: str | None = None,
+    role_kind: str | None = None,
+    require_lock_for_author: bool = False,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Fail closed when the session issue lock does not own the attempted work.
+
+    * Author sessions that require a lock fail when none is held.
+    * When a lock exists, the target issue (tool argument) and/or the issue
+      number embedded in the branch must match the locked issue.
+    * Reviewer/merger/reconciler roles are not issue-scope owners of author
+      implementation work and skip the author lock requirement.
+    """
+    role = (role_kind or "").strip().lower()
+    locked = locked_issue_number
+    if isinstance(locked, str) and locked.isdigit():
+        locked = int(locked)
+    if locked is not None:
+        try:
+            locked = int(locked)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            locked = None
+
+    target = target_issue_number
+    if target is not None:
+        try:
+            target = int(target)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            target = None
+
+    branch_issue = extract_issue_number_from_branch(branch_name)
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    blocker_kind: str | None = None
+
+    # Non-author roles do not take author issue locks for implementation.
+    if role in {"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler"}:
+        return _scope_ok(locked, target, branch_issue)
+
+    if require_lock_for_author and locked is None:
+        reasons.append(
+            "no owning issue lock is bound for this author session; "
+            "source/test mutation requires selecting or creating an owning issue first"
+        )
+        blocker_kind = BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE
+
+    if locked is not None and target is not None and locked != target:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"session is locked to issue #{locked} but mutation targets issue "
+            f"#{target}; out-of-scope until the owning issue is selected"
+        )
+        blocker_kind = BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE
+
+    if locked is not None and branch_issue is not None and locked != branch_issue:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"session is locked to issue #{locked} but workspace branch is for "
+            f"issue #{branch_issue}; bind the matching issue-backed worktree"
+        )
+        blocker_kind = BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE
+
+    if reasons:
+        kind = blocker_kind or BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE
+        return {
+            "proven": False,
+            "block": True,
+            "blocker_kind": kind,
+            "exact_next_action": _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind],
+            "reasons": reasons,
+            "locked_issue_number": locked,
+            "target_issue_number": target,
+            "branch_issue_number": branch_issue,
+        }
+    return _scope_ok(locked, target, branch_issue)
+
+
+def assess_root_source_mutation(
+    *,
+    workspace_path: str,
+    canonical_repo_root: str,
+    porcelain_status: str,
+    current_branch: str | None = None,
+    locked_issue_number: int | None = None,
+    role_kind: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Fail closed for diagnostic/source edits on the control/root checkout.
+
+    Allowed only when the active workspace is under ``branches/``. Dirty
+    tracked source/test files on the control checkout always block, including
+    temporary/diagnostic/test-only intent.
+    """
+    role = (role_kind or "").strip().lower()
+    if role == "reconciler":
+        return {
+            "proven": True,
+            "block": False,
+            "blocker_kind": None,
+            "exact_next_action": "proceed",
+            "reasons": [],
+            "dirty_source_files": [],
+        }
+
+    root = os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root or "")
+    workspace = os.path.realpath(workspace_path or root or ".")
+    under_branches = author_mutation_worktree.is_path_under_branches(workspace, root)
+    dirty_src = dirty_source_files(porcelain_status)
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    blocker_kind: str | None = None
+
+    if not under_branches and workspace == root and dirty_src:
+        # Root workspace with source dirtiness is unattributed root WIP.
+        # (Clean-root author binding is enforced by branches-only #274.)
+        reasons.append(
+            "control/root checkout has tracked source or test edits "
+            f"(dirty files: {', '.join(dirty_src)}); diagnostic or temporary "
+            "edits on the root checkout are forbidden"
+        )
+        blocker_kind = BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT
+
+    if (
+        not under_branches
+        and workspace == root
+        and not dirty_src
+        and role == "author"
+    ):
+        # Explicit missing-worktree signal for force-on author entrypoints.
+        reasons.append(
+            "author source/test mutation from the stable control checkout is "
+            "forbidden; bind an issue-backed worktree under branches/ first"
+        )
+        blocker_kind = BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE
+
+    if reasons:
+        kind = blocker_kind or BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT
+        return {
+            "proven": False,
+            "block": True,
+            "blocker_kind": kind,
+            "exact_next_action": _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind],
+            "reasons": reasons,
+            "dirty_source_files": dirty_src,
+            "workspace_path": workspace,
+            "canonical_repo_root": root,
+            "under_branches": under_branches,
+            "locked_issue_number": locked_issue_number,
+        }
+    return {
+        "proven": True,
+        "block": False,
+        "blocker_kind": None,
+        "exact_next_action": "proceed",
+        "reasons": [],
+        "dirty_source_files": dirty_src,
+        "workspace_path": workspace,
+        "canonical_repo_root": root,
+        "under_branches": under_branches,
+        "locked_issue_number": locked_issue_number,
+    }
+
+
+def assess_production_mutation_guards(
+    *,
+    workspace_path: str,
+    canonical_repo_root: str,
+    porcelain_status: str,
+    current_branch: str | None = None,
+    locked_issue_number: int | None = None,
+    target_issue_number: int | None = None,
+    role_kind: str | None = None,
+    require_author_lock: bool = False,
+    in_test_mode: bool = False,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Compose root + scope production guards when they must be active (#683)."""
+    if not production_guards_active(in_test_mode=in_test_mode):
+        return {
+            "proven": True,
+            "block": False,
+            "blocker_kind": None,
+            "exact_next_action": "proceed",
+            "reasons": [],
+            "skipped": True,
+            "skip_reason": "production guards not active (test isolation without force-on)",
+        }
+
+    root_assess = assess_root_source_mutation(
+        workspace_path=workspace_path,
+        canonical_repo_root=canonical_repo_root,
+        porcelain_status=porcelain_status,
+        current_branch=current_branch,
+        locked_issue_number=locked_issue_number,
+        role_kind=role_kind,
+    )
+    if root_assess["block"]:
+        return {**root_assess, "skipped": False}
+
+    scope_assess = assess_issue_scope_ownership(
+        locked_issue_number=locked_issue_number,
+        target_issue_number=target_issue_number,
+        branch_name=current_branch,
+        role_kind=role_kind,
+        require_lock_for_author=require_author_lock,
+    )
+    if scope_assess["block"]:
+        return {**scope_assess, "skipped": False}
+
+    return {
+        "proven": True,
+        "block": False,
+        "blocker_kind": None,
+        "exact_next_action": "proceed",
+        "reasons": [],
+        "skipped": False,
+        "root": root_assess,
+        "scope": scope_assess,
+    }
+
+
+def raise_if_blocked(assessment: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    """Raise :class:`ProductionGuardError` when *assessment* blocks."""
+    if not assessment or not assessment.get("block"):
+        return
+    kind = assessment.get("blocker_kind") or BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
+    reasons = list(assessment.get("reasons") or ["production guard violation"])
+    message = (
+        f"Workflow scope guard (#683) [{kind}]: {'; '.join(reasons)}. "
+        f"exact_next_action: {assessment.get('exact_next_action') or _NEXT_ACTIONS.get(kind, '')}"
+    )
+    raise ProductionGuardError(
+        message,
+        blocker_kind=kind,
+        exact_next_action=assessment.get("exact_next_action"),
+        reasons=reasons,
+        details={
+            k: v
+            for k, v in assessment.items()
+            if k
+            not in {
+                "proven",
+                "block",
+                "blocker_kind",
+                "exact_next_action",
+                "reasons",
+            }
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def block_response(
+    assessment: dict[str, Any] | ProductionGuardError | None = None,
+    *,
+    blocker_kind: str | None = None,
+    reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    exact_next_action: str | None = None,
+    **extra: Any,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Structured fail-closed tool response with typed blocker fields."""
+    if isinstance(assessment, ProductionGuardError):
+        kind = assessment.blocker_kind
+        reason_list = list(assessment.reasons)
+        next_action = assessment.exact_next_action
+        extra = {**assessment.details, **extra}
+    elif isinstance(assessment, dict) and assessment.get("block"):
+        kind = assessment.get("blocker_kind") or BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
+        reason_list = list(assessment.get("reasons") or [])
+        next_action = assessment.get("exact_next_action") or _NEXT_ACTIONS.get(
+            kind, _NEXT_ACTIONS[BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD]
+        )
+    else:
+        kind = (blocker_kind or BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD).strip()
+        if kind not in BLOCKER_KINDS:
+            kind = BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
+        reason_list = list(reasons or ["production guard violation"])
+        next_action = exact_next_action or _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind]
+
+    if kind not in BLOCKER_KINDS:
+        kind = BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
+    if not reason_list:
+        reason_list = ["production guard violation"]
+    next_action = (next_action or "").strip() or _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind]
+
+    out: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "success": False,
+        "performed": False,
+        "blocker_kind": kind,
+        "exact_next_action": next_action,
+        "reasons": reason_list,
+    }
+    for key, value in extra.items():
+        if key not in out and value is not None:
+            out[key] = value
+    return out
+
+
+def format_production_guard_error(assessment: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Single RuntimeError string carrying kind + exact next action."""
+    kind = assessment.get("blocker_kind") or BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
+    reasons = "; ".join(assessment.get("reasons") or ["production guard violation"])
+    next_action = assessment.get("exact_next_action") or _NEXT_ACTIONS.get(
+        kind, _NEXT_ACTIONS[BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD]
+    )
+    return (
+        f"Workflow scope guard (#683) [{kind}]: {reasons}. "
+        f"exact_next_action: {next_action}"
+    )
+
+
+# ── durable failure recording ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def record_workflow_failure(
+    *,
+    kind: str,
+    detail: str,
+    issue_number: int | None = None,
+    task: str | None = None,
+    sink: Any | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Record a workflow/tool failure before source edits continue (#683 AC8).
+
+    *sink* may be a callable ``sink(record)`` (e.g. tests) or omitted for the
+    in-process ledger only. Returns the durable record.
+    """
+    record = {
+        "kind": (kind or "workflow_failure").strip() or "workflow_failure",
+        "detail": (detail or "").strip(),
+        "issue_number": issue_number,
+        "task": task,
+        "pid": os.getpid(),
+    }
+    with _ledger_lock:
+        _failure_ledger.append(dict(record))
+    if callable(sink):
+        sink(record)
+    return record
+
+
+def clear_workflow_failure_ledger() -> None:
+    """Test helper: reset the in-process failure ledger."""
+    with _ledger_lock:
+        _failure_ledger.clear()
+
+
+def workflow_failure_ledger() -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Copy of durable in-process failure records."""
+    with _ledger_lock:
+        return [dict(r) for r in _failure_ledger]
+
+
+def assess_durable_failure_recorded(
+    *,
+    require_record: bool,
+    pending_source_mutation: bool,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Block source mutation when a workflow failure was not recorded first."""
+    if not require_record or not pending_source_mutation:
+        return {
+            "proven": True,
+            "block": False,
+            "blocker_kind": None,
+            "exact_next_action": "proceed",
+            "reasons": [],
+        }
+    with _ledger_lock:
+        has_record = bool(_failure_ledger)
+    if has_record:
+        return {
+            "proven": True,
+            "block": False,
+            "blocker_kind": None,
+            "exact_next_action": "proceed",
+            "reasons": [],
+        }
+    return {
+        "proven": False,
+        "block": True,
+        "blocker_kind": BLOCKER_UNRECORDED_FAILURE,
+        "exact_next_action": _NEXT_ACTIONS[BLOCKER_UNRECORDED_FAILURE],
+        "reasons": [
+            "workflow/tool failure triggered a need for source changes but no "
+            "durable failure record exists yet"
+        ],
+    }
+
+
+def porcelain_preserves_python_paths(porcelain_status: str) -> bool:
+    """Regression helper: dirty ``*.py`` lines must remain visible (#683)."""
+    text = porcelain_status or ""
+    for line in text.splitlines():
+        stripped = line.strip()
+        if stripped.endswith(".py") or ".py " in stripped or stripped.endswith(".py"):
+            # Any py path present proves no silent strip of all *.py lines.
+            if " M " in f" {stripped}" or stripped[:1] in "MADRCTU" or len(line) >= 4:
+                return True
+    # Empty porcelain is fine; integrity means we did not strip when present.
+    return ".py" not in text
+
+
+def assert_no_pytest_porcelain_filter(source_text: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Static check: production reader must not strip ``*.py`` under pytest."""
+    findings: list[str] = []
+    lowered = source_text or ""
+    if "endswith(\".py\")" in lowered or "endswith('.py')" in lowered:
+        if "pytest" in lowered and "porcelain" in lowered.lower():
+            findings.append(
+                "production porcelain reader must not filter *.py under pytest "
+                "(rejected 300a4ca pattern)"
+            )
+    if "if \"pytest\" in sys.modules" in lowered and "porcelain" in lowered.lower():
+        if ".py" in lowered and ("join" in lowered or "endswith" in lowered):
+            findings.append(
+                "test-mode porcelain filtering of source files is forbidden (#683)"
+            )
+    return findings
+
+
+def _scope_ok(
+    locked: int | None,
+    target: int | None,
+    branch_issue: int | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "proven": True,
+        "block": False,
+        "blocker_kind": None,
+        "exact_next_action": "proceed",
+        "reasons": [],
+        "locked_issue_number": locked,
+        "target_issue_number": target,
+        "branch_issue_number": branch_issue,
+    }