Merge pull request 'feat: extend whoami and profile metadata for environments (#104)' (#124) from feat/issue-104-whoami-metadata into master

Closes #104

.gitignore

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ __pycache__/
 # Real JSON runtime-profile configs may reference private hosts; keep only the example.
 gitea-mcp*.json
 !gitea-mcp.example.json
+!gitea-mcp.v2-contexts.example.json
 .vscode/
 graphify-out/
 branches/

docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md

@@ -134,8 +134,50 @@ Rules:
   appears in both, it is forbidden.
 - An operation not present in `allowed_operations` is treated as **not
   allowed** (deny by default).
-- These categories are descriptive for this issue. Their runtime enforcement is
-  out of scope here (see roadmap links).
+
+## Operation-name normalization (#106)
+
+Canonical operation names are namespaced: `{service}.{area}.{verb}` (e.g.
+`gitea.pr.merge`, `jenkins.build.read`). Legacy unqualified spellings are
+accepted **only** through the explicit alias table below (the code of record
+is `GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES` in `gitea_config.py`; the enforcement matrix is
+`tests/test_op_normalization.py`).
+
+| Legacy spelling   | Canonical operation        |
+|-------------------|----------------------------|
+| `read`            | `gitea.read`               |
+| `review`          | `gitea.pr.review`          |
+| `comment`         | `gitea.pr.comment`         |
+| `approve`         | `gitea.pr.approve`         |
+| `request_changes` | `gitea.pr.request_changes` |
+| `merge`           | `gitea.pr.merge`           |
+| `pr.create`       | `gitea.pr.create`          |
+| `branch.push`     | `gitea.branch.push`        |
+| `branch`          | `gitea.branch.create`      |
+| `commit`          | `gitea.repo.commit`        |
+| `push`            | `gitea.branch.push`        |
+| `open_pr`         | `gitea.pr.create`          |
+
+For non-Gitea services, a single unqualified word namespaces to the checked
+service (`read` → `jenkins.read` when checking Jenkins); names already
+prefixed with that service pass through unchanged.
+
+Enforcement rules (`gitea_config.check_operation`, run **before** any
+allowed/forbidden membership check):
+
+- Unknown operation names fail closed (denied).
+- Ambiguous names — dotted names that are neither service-prefixed nor in the
+  alias table — fail closed.
+- Cross-service names are never accepted by the wrong service
+  (`jenkins.read` never matches a Gitea check, and a Gitea alias is never
+  applied to another service).
+- `forbidden_operations` overrides `allowed_operations` after both sides are
+  normalized, so a legacy spelling can never bypass a canonical forbidden
+  entry (or vice versa).
+- An allowed entry that cannot be normalized grants nothing; a forbidden
+  entry that cannot be normalized denies the request. Normalization can
+  therefore never silently widen permissions.
+- An empty or missing `allowed_operations` list denies everything.
 
 ## Identity and fail-closed rules
 

docs/llm-workflow-runbooks.md

@@ -423,6 +423,9 @@ with the profile and authenticated user when `GITEA_AUDIT_LOG` is set (see
 
 ## Releases and version tags
 
+All release tagging, version bumps, and validation must comply with the [Release / Version Process SOP](release-version-sop.md).
+
+
 Versions follow SemVer — **`vMAJOR.MINOR.PATCH`**, using **`v0.x.y`** while
 unstable. Pick the bump by the largest change since the last tag:
 

docs/release-version-sop.md

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+# Release / Version Process SOP
+
+Operator standard operating procedure for cutting a versioned release of
+Gitea-Tools: version bump, checks, merge, tag, and cleanup.
+
+> **Scope.** This is the **human/operator** SOP. It is deliberately distinct
+> from [`release-workflows.md`](release-workflows.md), which describes the
+> **future `release-mcp` orchestrator** boundary (a coordination concept), not
+> the day-to-day tagging process. When they disagree, this document governs how
+> a release is actually cut today.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Branch flow
+
+The repo is **`master`-based**. Releases are cut from `master`; there is no
+separate `dev`/`release` branch unless and until that is explicitly introduced
+and this SOP is updated to match. All work lands on `master` via reviewed PRs
+from short-lived, issue-linked branches (e.g. `docs/issue-68-...`).
+
+## 2. Where "the version" lives
+
+There is **no `VERSION` file and no `CHANGELOG` file** in the repo today. The
+released version is expressed **only as an annotated git tag** of the form
+`vMAJOR.MINOR.PATCH` (existing tags: `v1.0.0`, `v1.0.1`). Release notes are
+carried as the **annotated tag's message** (via `--notes-file`), not a tracked
+changelog.
+
+> Do **not** confuse this with `SUPPORTED_VERSION` in `gitea_config.py` — that is
+> the **config-schema** version, unrelated to the application release version.
+
+If a `VERSION`/`CHANGELOG` file is added later, update this SOP to list it under
+"files to update".
+
+## 3. Deciding the version bump (SemVer)
+
+Pick the bump against the last tag using semantic-versioning intent:
+
+* **PATCH** (`v1.0.1 → v1.0.2`): bug fixes, docs, tests, internal cleanups — no
+  change to tool names, parameters, return payloads, or behavior.
+* **MINOR** (`v1.0.1 → v1.1.0`): backward-compatible additions — new MCP tool,
+  new optional parameter, new script, additive behavior.
+* **MAJOR** (`v1.1.0 → v2.0.0`): backward-**incompatible** changes — renamed or
+  removed tools, changed return-payload shape, changed default behavior, or a
+  tightened safety gate that rejects previously-accepted input.
+
+When unsure between two levels, choose the higher one.
+
+## 4. Preparing a version-bump / release PR
+
+Releases are still gated by the normal issue-first, PR-reviewed flow.
+
+1. Open (or use) a tracking issue for the release and **claim it** with
+   `status:in-progress` (see §9).
+2. Create an isolated, issue-linked branch + worktree from latest `master`
+   (e.g. `chore/issue-63-v1.1.0`). Never commit directly to `master`.
+3. Include in the PR:
+   * Any code/docs changes that belong to the release.
+   * The **release notes** for the annotated tag (draft them in the PR body or a
+     notes file you will pass to `scripts/release-tag --notes-file`).
+   * If a `VERSION`/`CHANGELOG` file exists at that time, its update.
+4. Open the PR **targeting `master`**.
+
+The tag is **not** created in the PR. Tagging happens only after merge (§6).
+
+## 5. Required checks before release
+
+Run all of these green before merging the release PR and before tagging:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m py_compile mcp_server.py
+python3 -m py_compile manage_labels.py
+bash -n scripts/clear-provenance
+./venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q
+git diff --check
+```
+
+Plus a secret sweep (there is no third-party scanner wired in; do a staged-diff
+sweep — see [`developer-testing-guidelines.md`](developer-testing-guidelines.md)
+§7):
+
+```bash
+git diff --cached | grep -nEi "authorization: (basic|bearer)|password[:=]|token=[A-Za-z0-9]" || echo "clean"
+```
+
+`scripts/release-tag` **also** runs the test suite itself before tagging (unless
+`--skip-tests` is passed), so tests are enforced twice by default.
+
+## 6. Running `scripts/release-tag`
+
+Tag **only after** the release PR is merged to `master`. `scripts/release-tag`
+enforces the tagging policy and is **safe by default** (creates nothing on a
+dry-run; never pushes without `--push`).
+
+Before it tags, it requires **all** of:
+
+* version matches `vMAJOR.MINOR.PATCH` (SemVer);
+* `fetch --prune` has run;
+* you are **on `master`**;
+* the worktree is **clean** (no uncommitted changes);
+* local `master` **equals** `<remote>/master`;
+* `HEAD` is that same commit (the commit is present on remote master);
+* the tag does **not** already exist locally or on the remote;
+* the test suite passes (unless `--skip-tests`, which warns).
+
+Typical sequence:
+
+```bash
+# 1. Dry-run to confirm the plan (changes nothing)
+scripts/release-tag --dry-run v1.1.0
+
+# 2. Create the annotated tag locally, with release notes
+scripts/release-tag v1.1.0 --notes-file /path/to/release-notes.md
+
+# 3. Push the tag only when ready
+scripts/release-tag v1.1.0 --notes-file /path/to/release-notes.md --push
+```
+
+Env injection points (mainly for CI/tests):
+`RELEASE_TAG_REMOTE` (default `prgs`), `RELEASE_TAG_TEST_CMD`
+(default `./venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q`).
+
+## 7. Who may merge / tag
+
+* The release PR must be **merged by someone other than its author** — the
+  author-cannot-merge safety gate applies to releases exactly as to any other PR.
+* Merge uses the gated `gitea_merge_pr` workflow; CLI/legacy merge is disabled.
+* Whoever tags must operate on clean master synced to the remote (enforced by
+  `scripts/release-tag`). Tagging is an operator action performed after merge.
+
+## 8. Self-review / self-merge restrictions
+
+Release PRs are **not** exempt from the safety model:
+
+* No self-review — the author may not approve their own release PR.
+* No self-merge — a different eligible identity merges.
+* These gates are enforced by the MCP tooling and must not be bypassed.
+
+## 9. Handling `status:in-progress` during release work
+
+* **Claim** the release tracking issue with `status:in-progress` before starting.
+* Keep it claimed while the release PR is open and under review.
+* On merge/close, the tracker-hygiene automation releases `status:in-progress`
+  for issues the PR closes; if it remains after the release lands, release it
+  explicitly. Do not leave a shipped release issue marked in-progress.
+
+## 10. Branch / worktree cleanup after merge
+
+After the release PR merges and the tag is pushed:
+
+* Delete the remote release branch (if repo policy allows).
+* Remove the local worktree and delete the local branch:
+
+  ```bash
+  git worktree remove branches/<release-worktree>
+  git branch -d <release-branch>
+  git worktree prune
+  ```
+* Confirm the root repo is clean and on `master` synced to the remote.
+
+## 11. What NOT to do
+
+* **No direct commits to `master`.** All changes land via reviewed PRs.
+* **No force-push** (to `master` or to tags).
+* **No self-merge** of a release PR.
+* **No tagging before merge** — tag only commits already on remote `master`.
+* **No release from a dirty worktree** — `scripts/release-tag` refuses, and so
+  should you.
+* **No `--skip-tests`** for a real release unless there is an explicit,
+  documented reason.
+* **No re-tagging / moving an existing tag** — pick the next version instead.
+
+## 12. Post-Merge Verification & Audit Lessons (v1.1.0)
+
+During the v1.1.0 release audit, we identified a critical reconciliation issue (captured in historical PRs/issues #68 and #82):
+* **The "Closed" State Trap:** Gitea PRs marked as `closed` are not guaranteed to be `merged` (they can be closed without merging, leading to silent omissions of code/documentation changes).
+* **Mandatory Post-Merge File/Commit Presence Probe:** Reviewers/mergers must perform explicit post-merge validation. Do not assume a merge succeeded.
+  - Check that the merged branch head is an ancestor of the target branch (`master`):
+    ```bash
+    git fetch <remote> --prune
+    git merge-base --is-ancestor <pr-head-sha> <remote>/master
+    ```
+  - Probe file presence for expected modifications/additions:
+    ```bash
+    git log --oneline -- <expected-file>
+    # and confirm file presence:
+    ls -la docs/release-version-sop.md
+    ```
+* **Verify in Handoff:** Final report blocks must explicitly document the verification method and probe results.

gitea-mcp.v2-contexts.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+{
+  "version": 2,
+  "contexts": {
+    "example-context": {
+      "enabled": true,
+      "label": "Example environment",
+      "description": "One deployment environment: its Gitea plus non-Gitea services.",
+      "default_owner": "Example-Org",
+      "gitea": {
+        "enabled": true,
+        "kind": "gitea",
+        "base_url": "https://gitea.example.invalid"
+      },
+      "services": {
+        "jenkins": {
+          "enabled": true,
+          "kind": "jenkins",
+          "label": "Example Jenkins",
+          "base_url": "https://jenkins.example.invalid",
+          "auth": { "type": "keychain", "id": "example-jenkins-token" },
+          "capabilities": ["read"]
+        },
+        "glitchtip": {
+          "enabled": false,
+          "kind": "glitchtip",
+          "label": "Example GlitchTip (disabled: defined but unavailable)",
+          "base_url": "",
+          "auth": { "type": "keychain", "id": "example-glitchtip-token" },
+          "capabilities": ["read"],
+          "allow_raw_events": false
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "profiles": {
+    "example-author": {
+      "enabled": true,
+      "context": "example-context",
+      "role": "author",
+      "username": "author-user",
+      "execution_profile": "example-author",
+      "audit_label": "example-author",
+      "auth": { "type": "keychain", "id": "example-gitea-author-token" },
+      "allowed_operations": ["read", "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr", "comment"],
+      "forbidden_operations": ["approve", "request_changes", "merge"]
+    },
+    "example-reviewer": {
+      "enabled": true,
+      "context": "example-context",
+      "role": "reviewer",
+      "username": "reviewer-user",
+      "execution_profile": "example-reviewer",
+      "audit_label": "example-reviewer",
+      "auth": { "type": "keychain", "id": "example-gitea-reviewer-token" },
+      "allowed_operations": ["read", "review", "comment", "approve", "request_changes", "merge"],
+      "forbidden_operations": ["branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr"]
+    }
+  },
+  "projects": {
+    "/absolute/path/to/local/repo": {
+      "enabled": true,
+      "context": "example-context",
+      "default_owner": "Example-Org",
+      "default_repo": "Example-Repo",
+      "default_author_profile": "example-author",
+      "default_reviewer_profile": "example-reviewer"
+    }
+  },
+  "rules": {
+    "disabled_behavior": "Defined but unavailable for action. MCP tools may report disabled entries during audits, but must not use them automatically.",
+    "no_silent_fallback": true,
+    "tokens_in_json": false,
+    "token_storage": "keychain",
+    "identity_must_match_task": true,
+    "same_username_cannot_review_own_pr": true,
+    "hide_service_urls_from_llm": true,
+    "hide_keychain_ids_from_llm": true,
+    "mcp_resolves_endpoints": true
+  }
+}

gitea_auth.py

@@ -123,13 +123,17 @@ def get_auth_header(host):
             token = os.environ.get("GITEA_TOKEN")
 
     # 3. Fall back to a JSON runtime-profile token reference (token_env).
-    #    Explicit env tokens above take precedence. A broken config never breaks
-    #    auth here — it fails closed to "no token"; the clear error surfaces via
-    #    get_profile() / startup instead.
+    #    Explicit env tokens above take precedence. When GITEA_MCP_CONFIG is
+    #    configured, a broken config or unresolvable profile/credential fails
+    #    closed here (no silent fallback to Basic auth or another source,
+    #    #120). Without a configured JSON layer, env-only behaviour is
+    #    unchanged.
     if not token:
         try:
             token = gitea_config.resolve_token(gitea_config.resolve_profile())
         except gitea_config.ConfigError:
+            if gitea_config.config_path():
+                raise
             token = None
 
     if token:
@@ -469,13 +473,29 @@ def get_profile():
     token_source = (os.environ.get("GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE") or "").strip() \
         or gitea_config.auth_source_name(jp)
     base_url = os.environ.get("GITEA_BASE_URL") or jp.get("base_url") or None
+    auth_type = None
+    if isinstance(jp.get("auth"), dict):
+        auth_type = jp["auth"].get("type")
+    elif token_source:
+        if token_source.startswith("keychain:"):
+            auth_type = "keychain"
+        else:
+            auth_type = "env"
+
     return {
         "profile_name": name,
         "allowed_operations": ops,
         "forbidden_operations": forbidden,
         "audit_label": audit_label,
         "token_source_name": token_source,
+        "auth_source_type": auth_type,
         "base_url": base_url,
         "username": jp.get("username") or None,
         "default_owner": jp.get("default_owner") or None,
-    }
+        "profile_path": jp.get("profile_path") or None,
+        "environment": jp.get("environment") or None,
+        "service": jp.get("service") or None,
+        "identity": jp.get("identity") or None,
+        "role": jp.get("role") or None,
+        "execution_profile": jp.get("execution_profile") or None,
+    }

gitea_config.py

@@ -70,11 +70,13 @@ _TBD_RE = re.compile(r"(?i)^tbd(-|$)")
 # Keys that would mean an inline secret wherever they appear.
 _INLINE_SECRET_KEYS = ("token", "password", "secret")
 
-# ── Minimal operation normalization (#103) ─────────────────────────────────────
-# Only what the #103 invariants need. The full normalization table, deprecation
-# handling, and enforcement test matrix belong to issue #106 — do not grow this
-# beyond invariant safety here.
-_MINIMAL_GITEA_OP_MAP = {
+# ── Operation-name normalization table (#106; minimal subset landed in #103) ───
+# Canonical operations are namespaced ({service}.{area}.{verb}). Legacy
+# unqualified spellings are accepted ONLY through this explicit table — never
+# by guessing. The same table is the documentation of record (see
+# docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md) and is exercised by
+# tests/test_op_normalization.py.
+GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES = {
     "read": "gitea.read",
     "review": "gitea.pr.review",
     "comment": "gitea.pr.comment",
@@ -83,32 +85,94 @@ _MINIMAL_GITEA_OP_MAP = {
     "merge": "gitea.pr.merge",
     "pr.create": "gitea.pr.create",
     "branch.push": "gitea.branch.push",
+    # Contexts-shape author verbs (#120) — the invariant checks below depend on
+    # "push"/"open_pr" normalizing to the two author-only ops.
+    "branch": "gitea.branch.create",
+    "commit": "gitea.repo.commit",
+    "push": "gitea.branch.push",
+    "open_pr": "gitea.pr.create",
 }
 _REVIEW_MERGE_OPS = frozenset({"gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge"})
 _AUTHOR_ONLY_OPS = frozenset({"gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"})
 
 
-def _normalize_op(service, op, addr):
-    """Normalize *op* for *service*, or fail closed (#103 minimal subset).
+def normalize_operation(op, service="gitea"):
+    """Return the canonical namespaced name for *op*, or fail closed (#106).
 
     - already namespaced for this service (``{service}.*``) → unchanged
-    - known unqualified Gitea ops → mapped via ``_MINIMAL_GITEA_OP_MAP``
+    - known unqualified Gitea ops → mapped via ``GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES``
     - unqualified single-word ops on non-Gitea services → ``{service}.{op}``
-    - anything else (foreign prefixes, unknown unqualified names) → ConfigError
+    - anything else — foreign service prefixes, dotted names outside the
+      table, unknown unqualified names — is unknown or ambiguous → ConfigError
+
+    Normalization never crosses services (a Gitea alias is never applied to
+    another service) and never widens permissions: an operation that cannot
+    be normalized grants and matches nothing.
     """
     if not isinstance(op, str) or not op:
-        raise ConfigError(f"identity '{addr}' has an empty or non-string operation")
+        raise ConfigError("operation must be a non-empty string (fail closed)")
     if op.startswith(service + "."):
         return op
-    if service == "gitea" and op in _MINIMAL_GITEA_OP_MAP:
-        return _MINIMAL_GITEA_OP_MAP[op]
+    if service == "gitea" and op in GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES:
+        return GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES[op]
     if service != "gitea" and "." not in op:
         return f"{service}.{op}"
     raise ConfigError(
-        f"identity '{addr}' has operation {op!r} that cannot be normalized "
-        f"safely for service '{service}' (fail closed; full table is issue #106)"
+        f"operation {op!r} cannot be normalized safely for service "
+        f"'{service}' (unknown, ambiguous, or cross-service; fail closed)"
     )
 
+
+def check_operation(op, allowed, forbidden=(), service="gitea"):
+    """Decide whether *op* is permitted. Returns ``(bool, reason)`` (#106).
+
+    Everything is normalized via :func:`normalize_operation` BEFORE any
+    membership check, so legacy and canonical spellings always compare equal.
+    Reasons: ``allowed``, ``invalid-operation``, ``invalid-forbidden-entry``,
+    ``forbidden``, ``no-allowed-operations``, ``not-allowed``.
+
+    Fail-closed rules:
+    - an *op* that cannot be normalized is denied (``invalid-operation``)
+    - a forbidden entry that cannot be normalized denies the request
+      (``invalid-forbidden-entry``) — dropping it would silently narrow the
+      forbidden set, i.e. widen permissions
+    - an allowed entry that cannot be normalized is ignored — it grants
+      nothing, so permissions never widen
+    - ``forbidden`` always overrides ``allowed``
+    - an empty or missing allowed list denies everything
+    """
+    try:
+        op_n = normalize_operation(op, service)
+    except ConfigError:
+        return (False, "invalid-operation")
+    forbidden_n = set()
+    for entry in (forbidden or ()):
+        try:
+            forbidden_n.add(normalize_operation(entry, service))
+        except ConfigError:
+            return (False, "invalid-forbidden-entry")
+    if op_n in forbidden_n:
+        return (False, "forbidden")
+    if not allowed:
+        return (False, "no-allowed-operations")
+    allowed_n = set()
+    for entry in allowed:
+        try:
+            allowed_n.add(normalize_operation(entry, service))
+        except ConfigError:
+            continue
+    if op_n in allowed_n:
+        return (True, "allowed")
+    return (False, "not-allowed")
+
+
+def _normalize_op(service, op, addr):
+    """Normalize *op* for identity *addr*, or fail closed with context."""
+    try:
+        return normalize_operation(op, service)
+    except ConfigError as exc:
+        raise ConfigError(f"identity '{addr}': {exc}") from None
+
 # Default canonical config location (one file shared by all LLM launchers).
 DEFAULT_CONFIG_PATH = os.path.join(
     os.path.expanduser("~"), ".config", "gitea-tools", "profiles.json"
@@ -169,7 +233,7 @@ def load_config(path=None):
             f"expected one of {list(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)}"
         )
     if version == 2:
-        return _load_v2(data, path)
+        return _load_v2_any(data, path)
     if version != SUPPORTED_VERSION:
         raise ConfigError(
             f"{path} has unsupported version {version!r}; "
@@ -345,6 +409,363 @@ def _load_v2(data, path):
     }
 
 
+# ── profiles.json version 2 *contexts* shape (#120) ───────────────────────────
+# The canonical machine config groups everything by context: top-level
+# "contexts" (each with a gitea block and non-Gitea "services"), flat
+# "profiles" (Gitea identities pointing at a context), "projects" (local repo
+# paths mapped to a context), and "rules". Every context/profile/service/
+# project carries a required boolean "enabled": disabled entries are surfaced
+# in audits but fail closed at selection — never a silent fallback. Loading
+# flattens profiles into the same {"profiles": {...}, "unavailable": {...}}
+# model v1 consumers and select_profile() already understand, and carries the
+# validated "contexts"/"projects"/"rules" through for service resolution.
+
+def _load_v2_any(data, path):
+    """Dispatch a version-2 file to its shape loader; ambiguity fails closed."""
+    has_contexts = "contexts" in data
+    has_environments = "environments" in data
+    if has_contexts and has_environments:
+        raise ConfigError(
+            f"{path} version 2 config must not mix 'contexts' and "
+            "'environments' shapes (ambiguous; fail closed)"
+        )
+    if has_contexts:
+        return _load_v2_contexts(data, path)
+    return _load_v2(data, path)
+
+
+def _require_enabled(kind, name, obj):
+    """Return the required boolean ``enabled`` flag, failing closed."""
+    enabled = obj.get("enabled")
+    if not isinstance(enabled, bool):
+        raise ConfigError(
+            f"{kind} '{name}' requires a boolean 'enabled' flag (fail closed)"
+        )
+    return enabled
+
+
+def _reject_inline_secrets(kind, name, obj):
+    for key in _INLINE_SECRET_KEYS:
+        if key in obj:
+            raise ConfigError(
+                f"{kind} '{name}' must not contain an inline '{key}'; "
+                "store secrets in the keychain and reference them by id"
+            )
+
+
+def _validate_context_service(ctx_name, svc_name, svc):
+    """Validate one context service entry (auth reference only, no secrets)."""
+    addr = f"{ctx_name}.{svc_name}"
+    if not isinstance(svc, dict):
+        raise ConfigError(f"service '{addr}' must be a JSON object")
+    _require_enabled("service", addr, svc)
+    _reject_inline_secrets("service", addr, svc)
+    if "auth" in svc:
+        _validate_auth(addr, svc["auth"])
+
+
+def _load_v2_contexts(data, path):
+    """Validate a v2 contexts-shape config and return the resolvable structure."""
+    contexts = data.get("contexts")
+    if not isinstance(contexts, dict) or not contexts:
+        raise ConfigError(
+            f"{path} version 2 contexts config requires a non-empty "
+            "'contexts' object"
+        )
+    for ctx_name, ctx in contexts.items():
+        if not _PROFILE_NAME_RE.match(ctx_name or ""):
+            raise ConfigError(f"invalid context name {ctx_name!r}")
+        if not isinstance(ctx, dict):
+            raise ConfigError(f"context '{ctx_name}' must be a JSON object")
+        _require_enabled("context", ctx_name, ctx)
+        gitea = ctx.get("gitea")
+        if gitea is not None:
+            if not isinstance(gitea, dict):
+                raise ConfigError(
+                    f"context '{ctx_name}' has a non-object 'gitea' block")
+            _require_enabled("service", f"{ctx_name}.gitea", gitea)
+            _reject_inline_secrets("service", f"{ctx_name}.gitea", gitea)
+        services = ctx.get("services") or {}
+        if not isinstance(services, dict):
+            raise ConfigError(
+                f"context '{ctx_name}' has a non-object 'services' block")
+        for svc_name, svc in services.items():
+            _validate_context_service(ctx_name, svc_name, svc)
+
+    raw_profiles = data.get("profiles")
+    if not isinstance(raw_profiles, dict) or not raw_profiles:
+        raise ConfigError(
+            f"{path} version 2 contexts config requires a non-empty "
+            "'profiles' object"
+        )
+    profiles = {}
+    unavailable = {}
+    for name, raw in raw_profiles.items():
+        if not is_valid_profile_name(name):
+            raise ConfigError(f"invalid profile name {name!r}")
+        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+            raise ConfigError(f"profile '{name}' must be a JSON object")
+        enabled = _require_enabled("profile", name, raw)
+        _reject_inline_secrets("profile", name, raw)
+        _validate_identity_auth(name, raw.get("auth"))
+        ctx_name = raw.get("context")
+        if ctx_name not in contexts:
+            raise ConfigError(
+                f"profile '{name}' references unknown context {ctx_name!r}")
+        context = contexts[ctx_name]
+
+        allowed = raw.get("allowed_operations") or []
+        forbidden = raw.get("forbidden_operations") or []
+        if not isinstance(allowed, list) or not isinstance(forbidden, list):
+            raise ConfigError(f"profile '{name}' operation fields must be lists")
+        allowed_n = {_normalize_op("gitea", op, name) for op in allowed}
+        forbidden_n = {_normalize_op("gitea", op, name) for op in forbidden}
+        # Reviewer-identity deadlock rule (#100/#103) applies here unchanged.
+        if allowed_n & _REVIEW_MERGE_OPS:
+            missing = sorted(_AUTHOR_ONLY_OPS - forbidden_n)
+            if missing:
+                raise ConfigError(
+                    f"profile '{name}' allows PR approve/merge but does not "
+                    f"forbid {missing}; reviewer identities must forbid "
+                    "gitea.pr.create and gitea.branch.push "
+                    "(reviewer-identity deadlock rule)"
+                )
+
+        profile = dict(raw)
+        profile["allowed_operations"] = sorted(allowed_n)
+        profile["forbidden_operations"] = sorted(forbidden_n)
+        gitea = context.get("gitea") or {}
+        if not profile.get("base_url") and gitea.get("enabled"):
+            profile["base_url"] = gitea.get("base_url")
+
+        username = profile.get("username") or ""
+        if not enabled:
+            unavailable[name] = (
+                f"profile '{name}' is disabled (enabled: false); defined but "
+                "unavailable for action — refusing, no fallback"
+            )
+        elif not context.get("enabled"):
+            unavailable[name] = (
+                f"profile '{name}' belongs to context '{ctx_name}' which is "
+                "disabled (enabled: false); refusing, no fallback"
+            )
+        elif not profile.get("base_url"):
+            unavailable[name] = (
+                f"profile '{name}' has no usable base_url (none set and the "
+                f"context '{ctx_name}' gitea service is disabled or has none); "
+                "fail closed"
+            )
+        elif _TBD_RE.match(username):
+            unavailable[name] = (
+                f"profile '{name}' username {username!r} is a TBD placeholder; "
+                "provision the account before use (fail closed)"
+            )
+        else:
+            profiles[name] = profile
+            continue
+        # Unavailable profiles keep their (secret-free) body for audits only.
+        profile["_unavailable_reason"] = unavailable[name]
+        profiles.setdefault("_audit_only", {})
+        profiles["_audit_only"][name] = profile
+
+    projects = data.get("projects") or {}
+    if not isinstance(projects, dict):
+        raise ConfigError(f"{path} 'projects' must be a JSON object")
+    for proj_path, proj in projects.items():
+        if not isinstance(proj, dict):
+            raise ConfigError(f"project '{proj_path}' must be a JSON object")
+        _require_enabled("project", proj_path, proj)
+        if proj.get("context") not in contexts:
+            raise ConfigError(
+                f"project '{proj_path}' references unknown context "
+                f"{proj.get('context')!r}"
+            )
+
+    rules = data.get("rules") or {}
+    if not isinstance(rules, dict):
+        raise ConfigError(f"{path} 'rules' must be a JSON object")
+
+    audit_only = profiles.pop("_audit_only", {})
+    return {
+        "version": 2,
+        "shape": "contexts",
+        "profiles": profiles,
+        "unavailable": unavailable,
+        "audit_only_profiles": audit_only,
+        "contexts": contexts,
+        "projects": projects,
+        "rules": rules,
+    }
+
+
+def resolve_service(config, context_name, service_name):
+    """Return one context service's config for *internal* MCP use.
+
+    The returned dict includes the endpoint base_url and the keychain auth
+    *reference* — both are for MCP-internal resolution only and must never be
+    echoed into normal LLM-facing output (see audit_config/service_summaries).
+    Fails closed on an unknown or disabled context/service; never falls back
+    to another service.
+    """
+    contexts = (config or {}).get("contexts")
+    if not isinstance(contexts, dict):
+        raise ConfigError(
+            "service resolution requires a version 2 contexts config")
+    ctx = contexts.get(context_name)
+    if ctx is None:
+        raise ConfigError(
+            f"unknown context '{context_name}' (fail closed, no fallback)")
+    if not ctx.get("enabled"):
+        raise ConfigError(
+            f"context '{context_name}' is disabled; its services are defined "
+            "but unavailable for action (no fallback)"
+        )
+    if service_name == "gitea":
+        service = ctx.get("gitea")
+    else:
+        service = (ctx.get("services") or {}).get(service_name)
+    if service is None:
+        raise ConfigError(
+            f"unknown service '{service_name}' in context '{context_name}' "
+            "(fail closed, no fallback)"
+        )
+    if not service.get("enabled"):
+        raise ConfigError(
+            f"service '{context_name}.{service_name}' is disabled; defined "
+            "but unavailable for action — refusing, no fallback"
+        )
+    return dict(service)
+
+
+def project_for_path(config, path):
+    """Map a local project *path* to its context entry, failing closed.
+
+    Returns None when the path is not configured (feature off for that repo).
+    Raises :class:`ConfigError` when the project or its context is disabled —
+    a configured-but-disabled project must never be acted on.
+    """
+    projects = (config or {}).get("projects") or {}
+    project = projects.get(path)
+    if project is None:
+        return None
+    if not project.get("enabled"):
+        raise ConfigError(
+            f"project '{path}' is disabled (enabled: false); refusing, "
+            "no fallback"
+        )
+    contexts = (config or {}).get("contexts") or {}
+    ctx = contexts.get(project.get("context")) or {}
+    if not ctx.get("enabled"):
+        raise ConfigError(
+            f"project '{path}' maps to context '{project.get('context')}' "
+            "which is disabled; refusing, no fallback"
+        )
+    return dict(project)
+
+
+def _audit_profile_entry(name, profile, enabled, reveal_endpoints):
+    """One LLM-safe audit row: no endpoint URLs, no keychain ids, no tokens."""
+    auth = profile.get("auth") if isinstance(profile, dict) else None
+    entry = {
+        "name": name,
+        "enabled": enabled,
+        "context": profile.get("context") or profile.get("environment"),
+        "role": profile.get("role"),
+        "username": profile.get("username"),
+        "auth": (auth or {}).get("type") if isinstance(auth, dict) else None,
+    }
+    reason = profile.get("_unavailable_reason")
+    if reason:
+        entry["reason"] = reason
+    if reveal_endpoints:
+        entry["base_url"] = profile.get("base_url")
+        entry["auth_source"] = auth_source_name(profile)
+    return entry
+
+
+def audit_config(config, reveal_endpoints=False):
+    """Report enabled/disabled profiles and services without secrets.
+
+    Default output is LLM-safe: names, contexts, enabled state, capability
+    labels, and the auth *type* only — never endpoint URLs, keychain ids,
+    token values, or auth source names. ``reveal_endpoints=True`` is the
+    explicit admin/debug opt-in for local diagnostics: it adds base URLs and
+    non-secret auth source names (``keychain:<id>`` / env var name). Token
+    values are never included on any path.
+    """
+    if config is None:
+        return {"version": None, "profiles": [], "services": []}
+    report = {
+        "version": config.get("version"),
+        "shape": config.get("shape") or ("environments"
+                                         if config.get("aliases") is not None
+                                         else "profiles"),
+        "profiles": [],
+        "services": [],
+    }
+    for name, profile in (config.get("profiles") or {}).items():
+        if not isinstance(profile, dict):
+            continue
+        report["profiles"].append(_audit_profile_entry(
+            name, profile, True, reveal_endpoints))
+    for name, profile in (config.get("audit_only_profiles") or {}).items():
+        report["profiles"].append(_audit_profile_entry(
+            name, profile, False, reveal_endpoints))
+
+    for ctx_name, ctx in (config.get("contexts") or {}).items():
+        ctx_enabled = bool(ctx.get("enabled"))
+        for svc_name, svc in (ctx.get("services") or {}).items():
+            entry = {
+                "context": ctx_name,
+                "name": svc_name,
+                "kind": svc.get("kind"),
+                "label": svc.get("label"),
+                "enabled": ctx_enabled and bool(svc.get("enabled")),
+                "capabilities": list(svc.get("capabilities") or []),
+                "auth": (svc.get("auth") or {}).get("type"),
+            }
+            if reveal_endpoints:
+                entry["base_url"] = svc.get("base_url")
+                entry["auth_source"] = auth_source_name(svc)
+            report["services"].append(entry)
+    return report
+
+
+def service_summaries(config, auth_check=None):
+    """Safe one-line service summaries for LLM sessions.
+
+    Each line reports label + state only (e.g. ``PRGS Jenkins: enabled,
+    read-only, authenticated`` / ``PRGS Sentry: disabled``) — never endpoint
+    URLs, keychain ids, or token values. *auth_check* is a callable taking the
+    service dict and returning True when its credential resolves; it defaults
+    to a local keychain presence check and its result is reported only as
+    ``authenticated`` / ``no credential``.
+    """
+    if auth_check is None:
+        def auth_check(service):
+            auth = service.get("auth") or {}
+            if auth.get("type") == "keychain":
+                return _keychain_token(auth.get("id")) is not None
+            if auth.get("type") == "env":
+                return bool(os.environ.get(auth.get("name") or ""))
+            return False
+
+    lines = []
+    for ctx_name, ctx in (config.get("contexts") or {}).items():
+        ctx_enabled = bool(ctx.get("enabled"))
+        for svc_name, svc in (ctx.get("services") or {}).items():
+            label = svc.get("label") or f"{ctx_name} {svc_name}"
+            if not (ctx_enabled and svc.get("enabled")):
+                lines.append(f"{label}: disabled")
+                continue
+            caps = list(svc.get("capabilities") or [])
+            cap_part = "read-only" if caps == ["read"] else ", ".join(caps)
+            auth_part = "authenticated" if auth_check(svc) else "no credential"
+            parts = ["enabled"] + ([cap_part] if cap_part else []) + [auth_part]
+            lines.append(f"{label}: " + ", ".join(parts))
+    return lines
+
+
 def _validate_auth(name, auth):
     """Validate a profile's optional ``auth`` reference. Never echoes secrets."""
     if auth is None:
@@ -534,7 +955,7 @@ def validate_config(config):
     elif version == 2:
         # v2 validation is all-or-nothing via the loader's invariants.
         try:
-            _load_v2(config, "<config>")
+            _load_v2_any(config, "<config>")
         except ConfigError as exc:
             problems.append(str(exc))
         return problems
@@ -691,5 +1112,20 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover - thin CLI dispatch
     if len(sys.argv) > 1 and sys.argv[1] == "menu":
         import gitea_config_menu
         raise SystemExit(gitea_config_menu.main(sys.argv[2:]))
-    print("usage: python gitea_config.py menu", file=sys.stderr)
+    if len(sys.argv) > 1 and sys.argv[1] == "audit":
+        # Local admin/debug diagnostics (#120). --reveal-endpoints is the
+        # explicit opt-in that adds base URLs and non-secret auth source
+        # names; token values are never printed on any path.
+        try:
+            config = load_config(config_path() or DEFAULT_CONFIG_PATH)
+            report = audit_config(
+                config, reveal_endpoints="--reveal-endpoints" in sys.argv[2:])
+            report["summaries"] = service_summaries(config)
+        except ConfigError as exc:
+            print(f"config error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+            raise SystemExit(1)
+        print(json.dumps(report, indent=2))
+        raise SystemExit(0)
+    print("usage: python gitea_config.py menu | audit [--reveal-endpoints]",
+          file=sys.stderr)
     raise SystemExit(2)

mcp_server.py

@@ -43,6 +43,16 @@ from gitea_auth import (  # noqa: E402
     get_profile,
 )
 import gitea_audit  # noqa: E402
+import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
+
+
+def _reveal_endpoints() -> bool:
+    """Admin/debug opt-in (#120): include endpoint URLs and token source
+    names in tool output. Off by default so normal LLM-facing responses
+    expose only logical names and status. Never affects token values, which
+    are excluded on every path."""
+    return (os.environ.get("GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS") or "").strip().lower() \
+        in ("1", "true", "yes")
 
 mcp = FastMCP("gitea-tools", instructions=(
     "Gitea issue tracker and PR management for dadeschools and prgs instances. "
@@ -511,14 +521,24 @@ def gitea_check_pr_eligibility(
         return result
 
     # Profile capability check (metadata only; not enforcement of the action).
+    # Both the action and the profile lists are normalized before comparison
+    # (#106), so legacy spellings ("merge") and canonical namespaced ops
+    # ("gitea.pr.merge") always match each other and never cross services.
     allowed = profile["allowed_operations"]
     forbidden = profile["forbidden_operations"]
-    if not allowed:
-        reasons.append("profile has no configured allowed operations (fail closed)")
-    if action in forbidden:
-        reasons.append(f"profile forbids '{action}'")
-    elif action not in allowed:
-        reasons.append(f"profile is not allowed to {action}")
+    op_ok, op_reason = gitea_config.check_operation(action, allowed, forbidden)
+    if not op_ok:
+        if op_reason == "no-allowed-operations":
+            reasons.append(
+                "profile has no configured allowed operations (fail closed)")
+        elif op_reason == "forbidden":
+            reasons.append(f"profile forbids '{action}'")
+        elif op_reason == "invalid-forbidden-entry":
+            reasons.append(
+                "profile has an unrecognized forbidden operation entry "
+                "(fail closed)")
+        else:
+            reasons.append(f"profile is not allowed to {action}")
 
     h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
 
@@ -1382,21 +1402,35 @@ def gitea_whoami(
             "Verify the configured token is valid for this instance."
         )
     # Runtime profile metadata is non-secret (name + allowed op categories).
-    # The token is resolved separately and is never included here.
+    # The token is resolved separately and is never included here. Endpoint
+    # URLs stay out of normal LLM-facing output (#120): the logical remote
+    # name is the addressing surface; 'server' appears only under the
+    # GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS admin opt-in.
     profile = get_profile()
-    return {
+    result = {
         "authenticated": True,
         "username": data.get("login"),
         "display_name": data.get("full_name") or None,
         "user_id": data.get("id"),
         "email": data.get("email") or None,
-        "server": f"https://{h}",
         "remote": remote,
         "profile": {
             "profile_name": profile["profile_name"],
             "allowed_operations": profile["allowed_operations"],
+            "forbidden_operations": profile["forbidden_operations"],
+            "environment": profile.get("environment"),
+            "service": profile.get("service"),
+            "identity": profile.get("identity"),
+            "role": profile.get("role"),
+            "profile_address": profile.get("profile_path"),
+            "execution_profile": profile.get("execution_profile"),
+            "audit_label": profile.get("audit_label"),
+            "auth_source_type": profile.get("auth_source_type"),
         },
     }
+    if _reveal_endpoints():
+        result["server"] = f"https://{h}"
+    return result
 
 
 
@@ -1427,9 +1461,11 @@ def gitea_get_profile(
 
     Read-only. Reports the non-secret configuration of the running MCP
     process (profile name, allowed/forbidden operation categories, audit
-    label, token *source name*, base URL) plus the resolved server for the
-    given remote. Optionally resolves the authenticated username via
-    ``gitea_whoami``'s endpoint so an LLM can see who this runtime acts as.
+    label, auth *status*). Endpoint URLs and token source names are hidden
+    from normal output (#120) and appear only under the
+    GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS admin opt-in. Optionally resolves the
+    authenticated username via ``gitea_whoami``'s endpoint so an LLM can see
+    who this runtime acts as.
 
     This tool never mutates Gitea and never approves, merges, comments, or
     creates anything. It never returns the token value, Authorization header,
@@ -1447,18 +1483,32 @@ def gitea_get_profile(
         'verified', 'unknown', 'unavailable', or 'not_resolved'.
     """
     profile = get_profile()
+    reveal = _reveal_endpoints()
     result = {
         "profile_name": profile["profile_name"],
         "allowed_operations": profile["allowed_operations"],
         "forbidden_operations": profile["forbidden_operations"],
         "audit_label": profile["audit_label"],
-        "token_source_name": profile["token_source_name"],
-        "base_url": profile["base_url"],
+        "environment": profile.get("environment"),
+        "service": profile.get("service"),
+        "identity": profile.get("identity"),
+        "role": profile.get("role"),
+        "profile_address": profile.get("profile_path"),
+        "execution_profile": profile.get("execution_profile"),
+        "auth_source_type": profile.get("auth_source_type"),
+        # Auth is reported as a status only (#120): the token source *name*
+        # (env var name / keychain id) joins endpoint URLs behind the
+        # GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS admin opt-in. Token values never appear.
+        "auth_status": ("configured" if profile["token_source_name"]
+                        else "unconfigured"),
         "remote": remote if remote in REMOTES else None,
-        "server": None,
         "authenticated_username": None,
         "identity_status": "not_resolved",
     }
+    if reveal:
+        result["token_source_name"] = profile["token_source_name"]
+        result["base_url"] = profile["base_url"]
+        result["server"] = None
 
     if remote not in REMOTES:
         # Mark ambiguity rather than raising: the tool stays inspectable.
@@ -1467,7 +1517,8 @@ def gitea_get_profile(
         return result
 
     h = host or REMOTES[remote]["host"]
-    result["server"] = f"https://{h}"
+    if reveal:
+        result["server"] = f"https://{h}"
 
     if resolve_identity:
         try:
@@ -1487,6 +1538,33 @@ def gitea_get_profile(
     return result
 
 
+@mcp.tool()
+def gitea_audit_config() -> dict:
+    """Audit the configured profiles/services: enabled state, no secrets.
+
+    Read-only and local-only: loads the canonical profiles.json named by
+    GITEA_MCP_CONFIG and reports profile/service names, contexts, enabled
+    state, capabilities, auth *status*, and one-line service summaries (e.g.
+    ``PRGS Jenkins: enabled, read-only, authenticated``). Disabled entries
+    are listed so they can be audited, but the server refuses to act with
+    them and never falls back to another profile or service.
+
+    Never includes endpoint URLs, keychain ids, token source names, or token
+    values. Endpoint-revealing diagnostics exist only in the local admin CLI
+    (``python3 gitea_config.py audit --reveal-endpoints``), never over MCP.
+    """
+    config = gitea_config.load_config()
+    if config is None:
+        return {
+            "configured": False,
+            "message": "No GITEA_MCP_CONFIG configured; env-only mode.",
+        }
+    report = gitea_config.audit_config(config)
+    report["configured"] = True
+    report["summaries"] = gitea_config.service_summaries(config)
+    return report
+
+
 @mcp.tool()
 def gitea_mark_issue(
     issue_number: int,

migrate_profiles.py

@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Migration helper to convert profiles.json from version 1 to version 2 environments shape.
+
+This script preserves existing keychain references (auth.id) and maps old profile
+names as aliases so that existing IDE configurations continue to function.
+"""
+
+import os
+import sys
+import json
+import argparse
+import shutil
+import tempfile
+
+# Resolve path to import gitea_config
+PROJECT_ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
+if PROJECT_ROOT not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, PROJECT_ROOT)
+
+import gitea_config
+
+
+AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = ["read", "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr", "comment"]
+AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = ["approve", "request_changes", "merge"]
+REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
+    "read", "review", "comment", "approve", "request_changes", "merge"
+]
+REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = ["branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr"]
+
+
+def infer_role(name, execution_profile):
+    """Return the unambiguous role for a legacy profile name, or None."""
+    haystack = f"{name} {execution_profile or ''}".lower()
+    has_author = "author" in haystack
+    has_reviewer = "reviewer" in haystack
+    if has_author == has_reviewer:
+        return None
+    return "reviewer" if has_reviewer else "author"
+
+
+def migration_summary(v2_data):
+    """Return a redacted summary of the migrated config."""
+    environments = v2_data.get("environments", {})
+    service_count = 0
+    identity_count = 0
+    for env in environments.values():
+        services = env.get("services", {})
+        service_count += len(services)
+        for service in services.values():
+            identity_count += len(service.get("identities", {}))
+    return {
+        "version": v2_data.get("version"),
+        "environments": len(environments),
+        "services": service_count,
+        "identities": identity_count,
+        "aliases": len(v2_data.get("aliases", {})),
+    }
+
+
+def migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data):
+    """Convert version 1 profiles.json format to version 2 environments format."""
+    environments = {}
+    aliases = {}
+
+    profiles = v1_data.get("profiles", {})
+    if not isinstance(profiles, dict):
+        raise ValueError("Malformed input: 'profiles' field must be a JSON object")
+
+    for name, prof in profiles.items():
+        if not isinstance(prof, dict):
+            raise ValueError(f"Malformed input: profile '{name}' must be a JSON object")
+
+        # Infer environment and identity name
+        if "-" in name:
+            parts = name.split("-", 1)
+            env_name = parts[0]
+            ident_name = parts[1]
+        else:
+            env_name = name
+            ident_name = "author"
+
+        # Determine role and identity based on name / execution_profile.
+        # Ambiguous profiles may still migrate only when they carry explicit
+        # permissions; otherwise role-based defaults could widen permissions.
+        exec_prof = prof.get("execution_profile") or ""
+        role = infer_role(name, exec_prof)
+        if role == "reviewer":
+            ident_name = "reviewer"
+        elif role == "author":
+            ident_name = "author"
+        else:
+            role = prof.get("role")
+            if role not in (None, "author", "reviewer"):
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"Profile '{name}' has unsupported role {role!r}"
+                )
+
+        # Construct identity block
+        identity_data = {
+            "username": prof.get("username"),
+            "auth": prof.get("auth"),
+        }
+        if role:
+            identity_data["role"] = role
+        if prof.get("execution_profile"):
+            identity_data["execution_profile"] = prof["execution_profile"]
+
+        # Set audit label (default to old name to preserve context)
+        identity_data["audit_label"] = prof.get("audit_label") or name
+
+        has_allowed = "allowed_operations" in prof
+        has_forbidden = "forbidden_operations" in prof
+        if has_allowed != has_forbidden:
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"Profile '{name}' must define both allowed_operations and "
+                "forbidden_operations, or neither (fail closed)"
+            )
+        if has_allowed:
+            allowed = prof.get("allowed_operations")
+            forbidden = prof.get("forbidden_operations")
+            if not isinstance(allowed, list) or not isinstance(forbidden, list):
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"Profile '{name}' operation fields must be lists"
+                )
+            identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(allowed)
+            identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(forbidden)
+        elif role == "author":
+            identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
+            identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
+        elif role == "reviewer":
+            identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
+            identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
+        else:
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"Profile '{name}' has no explicit operation lists and no "
+                "unambiguous author/reviewer role marker (fail closed)"
+            )
+
+        # Nest inside environments/services structure
+        env = environments.setdefault(env_name, {})
+        services = env.setdefault("services", {})
+        gitea_svc = services.setdefault("gitea", {})
+
+        # Copy service-level attributes
+        if prof.get("base_url"):
+            gitea_svc["base_url"] = prof["base_url"]
+        if prof.get("default_owner"):
+            gitea_svc["default_owner"] = prof["default_owner"]
+        if prof.get("default_repo"):
+            gitea_svc["default_repo"] = prof["default_repo"]
+
+        identities = gitea_svc.setdefault("identities", {})
+        identities[ident_name] = identity_data
+
+        # Alias resolution targets
+        alias_target = f"{env_name}.gitea.{ident_name}"
+        if name != alias_target:
+            aliases[name] = alias_target
+
+        # Extra convenience alias for standard old-profile compatibility (e.g. prgs-author)
+        convenience_alias = f"{env_name}-{ident_name}"
+        if convenience_alias != alias_target and convenience_alias not in aliases:
+            aliases[convenience_alias] = alias_target
+
+    v2_data = {
+        "version": 2,
+        "environments": environments,
+        "aliases": aliases
+    }
+    return v2_data
+
+
+def validate_v2_data(v2_data):
+    """Validate generated v2 structure using gitea_config parser."""
+    fd, temp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".json")
+    os.close(fd)
+    try:
+        with open(temp_path, "w") as f:
+            json.dump(v2_data, f)
+        # Attempt to load using load_config to run all validation rules
+        gitea_config.load_config(temp_path)
+        return True
+    except Exception as e:
+        raise ValueError(f"Generated v2 config failed validation: {e}")
+    finally:
+        try:
+            os.remove(temp_path)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+
+
+def main():
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description="Migrate profiles.json from version 1 to version 2 environments shape."
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "-i", "--input",
+        default=gitea_config.DEFAULT_CONFIG_PATH,
+        help="Path to the version 1 profiles.json file (default: ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json)"
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "-o", "--output",
+        help="Path to write the migrated version 2 profiles.json file (default: overwrite input)"
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "-w", "--write",
+        action="store_true",
+        help="Actually write the migrated config and create a backup (default is dry-run)"
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--backup",
+        help="Path to write the backup file (default: <input_path>.bak)"
+    )
+
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    input_path = os.path.abspath(args.input)
+    output_path = os.path.abspath(args.output or input_path)
+    backup_path = args.backup or f"{input_path}.bak"
+
+    if not os.path.isfile(input_path):
+        print(f"Error: Input file not found: {input_path}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    try:
+        with open(input_path, "r") as f:
+            v1_data = json.load(f)
+    except json.JSONDecodeError as e:
+        print(f"Error: Input file is not valid JSON: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+    except Exception as e:
+        print(f"Error reading input file: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    # Validate version
+    version = v1_data.get("version")
+    if version is not None and version != 1:
+        print(f"Error: Unsupported profiles.json version: {version}. Expected version 1.", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    try:
+        v2_data = migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+        validate_v2_data(v2_data)
+    except Exception as e:
+        print(f"Error: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    if not args.write:
+        print("=== DRY-RUN MODE (No files modified) ===")
+        print("Generated v2 config validated successfully.")
+        print("Only aggregate counts are shown.")
+        summary = migration_summary(v2_data)
+        print("Summary:")
+        print(f"  version: {summary['version']}")
+        print(f"  environments: {summary['environments']}")
+        print(f"  services: {summary['services']}")
+        print(f"  identities: {summary['identities']}")
+        print(f"  aliases: {summary['aliases']}")
+        sys.exit(0)
+
+    # Write Mode: Create Backup first
+    try:
+        print(f"Creating backup: {backup_path}")
+        shutil.copy2(input_path, backup_path)
+    except Exception as e:
+        print(f"Error creating backup: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    # Write migrated config
+    try:
+        print(f"Writing migrated version 2 config: {output_path}")
+        # Ensure target directory exists
+        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(output_path), exist_ok=True)
+        with open(output_path, "w") as f:
+            json.dump(v2_data, f, indent=2)
+            f.write("\n")
+        print("Migration completed successfully!")
+    except Exception as e:
+        print(f"Error writing output file: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

tests/test_config.py

@@ -284,11 +284,13 @@ class TestAuthIntegration(_ConfigBase):
         self.assertEqual(header, "token process-token")
 
     def test_auth_header_unresolvable_ref_fails_closed(self):
-        # env token ref points at an unset var -> ConfigError inside resolve is
-        # swallowed to "no token"; auth falls through to (mocked-empty) basic.
+        # env token ref points at an unset var -> with GITEA_MCP_CONFIG set the
+        # ConfigError propagates (fail closed, #120): no silent fallback to
+        # Basic auth or another credential source.
         with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("mdcps-env"), clear=True):
             with patch("gitea_auth.get_credentials", return_value=("", "")):
-                self.assertIsNone(gitea_auth.get_auth_header("gitea.example.com"))
+                with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
+                    gitea_auth.get_auth_header("gitea.example.com")
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

tests/test_config_v2_contexts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
+"""Tests for profiles.json version 2 *contexts* shape (#120).
+
+The canonical machine config uses ``contexts`` / ``profiles`` / ``projects`` /
+``rules`` with explicit ``enabled`` flags. Covers: loading + active-profile
+resolution via GITEA_MCP_PROFILE, fail-closed refusal of disabled profiles /
+contexts / services / projects, project-to-context mapping, base-URL fallback
+from the context's gitea block, keychain-only auth references, LLM-safe audit
+output (no endpoint URLs, no keychain ids, no tokens) with an explicit
+admin/debug opt-in, v1 compatibility, and the no-silent-fallback rule in
+gitea_auth.get_auth_header. No network, no real secrets.
+"""
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
+import gitea_auth  # noqa: E402
+
+FAKE_TOKEN = "fake-token-for-tests"  # not a real credential
+
+
+def contexts_config():
+    """A fresh, valid v2 contexts-shape config with enabled/disabled entries."""
+    return {
+        "version": 2,
+        "contexts": {
+            "prgs": {
+                "enabled": True,
+                "label": "Local / PRGS",
+                "default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                "gitea": {
+                    "enabled": True,
+                    "kind": "gitea",
+                    "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+                },
+                "services": {
+                    "jenkins": {
+                        "enabled": True,
+                        "kind": "jenkins",
+                        "label": "PRGS Jenkins",
+                        "base_url": "https://jenkins.prgs.cc",
+                        "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-jenkins-token"},
+                        "capabilities": ["read"],
+                    },
+                    "sentry": {
+                        "enabled": False,
+                        "kind": "sentry",
+                        "label": "PRGS Sentry",
+                        "base_url": "",
+                        "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-sentry-token"},
+                        "capabilities": ["read"],
+                    },
+                },
+            },
+            "lab": {
+                "enabled": False,
+                "gitea": {"enabled": False, "kind": "gitea", "base_url": ""},
+                "services": {
+                    "jenkins": {
+                        "enabled": False,
+                        "kind": "jenkins",
+                        "label": "Lab Jenkins",
+                        "base_url": "http://localhost:8080",
+                        "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "lab-jenkins-token"},
+                        "capabilities": ["read"],
+                    },
+                },
+            },
+        },
+        "profiles": {
+            "prgs-author": {
+                "enabled": True,
+                "context": "prgs",
+                "role": "author",
+                "username": "jcwalker3",
+                "execution_profile": "prgs-author",
+                "audit_label": "prgs-author",
+                "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+                "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-gitea-author-token"},
+                "allowed_operations": [
+                    "read", "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr", "comment",
+                ],
+                "forbidden_operations": [
+                    "approve", "request_changes", "merge",
+                ],
+            },
+            "prgs-reviewer": {
+                "enabled": True,
+                "context": "prgs",
+                "role": "reviewer",
+                "username": "sysadmin",
+                "execution_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
+                "audit_label": "prgs-reviewer",
+                # no base_url on purpose: must fall back to context gitea
+                "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-gitea-reviewer-token"},
+                "allowed_operations": [
+                    "read", "review", "comment", "approve",
+                    "request_changes", "merge",
+                ],
+                "forbidden_operations": [
+                    "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr",
+                ],
+            },
+            "retired-author": {
+                "enabled": False,
+                "context": "prgs",
+                "role": "author",
+                "username": "jcwalker3",
+                "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+                "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "retired-token-ref"},
+                "allowed_operations": ["read"],
+                "forbidden_operations": [],
+            },
+            "lab-author": {
+                "enabled": True,
+                "context": "lab",
+                "role": "author",
+                "username": "jcwalker3",
+                "base_url": "http://localhost:3000",
+                "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "lab-gitea-author-token"},
+                "allowed_operations": ["read"],
+                "forbidden_operations": [],
+            },
+        },
+        "projects": {
+            "/repo/one": {
+                "enabled": True,
+                "context": "prgs",
+                "default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                "default_repo": "One",
+                "default_author_profile": "prgs-author",
+                "default_reviewer_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
+            },
+            "/repo/lab": {
+                "enabled": False,
+                "context": "lab",
+            },
+        },
+        "rules": {
+            "disabled_behavior": "report in audits, never act",
+            "no_silent_fallback": True,
+            "tokens_in_json": False,
+            "token_storage": "keychain",
+            "hide_service_urls_from_llm": True,
+            "hide_keychain_ids_from_llm": True,
+            "mcp_resolves_endpoints": True,
+        },
+    }
+
+
+def write_config(data):
+    """Write *data* to a temp JSON file and return its path."""
+    fd, path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".json")
+    with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+        json.dump(data, fh)
+    return path
+
+
+def load(data):
+    """Load *data* through gitea_config via a temp file, then clean up."""
+    path = write_config(data)
+    try:
+        return gitea_config.load_config(path)
+    finally:
+        os.unlink(path)
+
+
+class LoadContextsShapeTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_contexts_shape_loads(self):
+        config = load(contexts_config())
+        self.assertEqual(config["version"], 2)
+        self.assertIn("prgs-author", config["profiles"])
+        self.assertIn("prgs-reviewer", config["profiles"])
+
+    def test_active_profile_resolved_from_env(self):
+        path = write_config(contexts_config())
+        try:
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, {
+                gitea_config.ENV_CONFIG_PATH: path,
+                gitea_config.ENV_PROFILE: "prgs-author",
+            }):
+                profile = gitea_config.resolve_profile()
+        finally:
+            os.unlink(path)
+        self.assertEqual(profile["username"], "jcwalker3")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["base_url"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["context"], "prgs")
+
+    def test_base_url_falls_back_to_context_gitea(self):
+        profile = gitea_config.select_profile(load(contexts_config()),
+                                              "prgs-reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["base_url"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
+
+    def test_profile_without_any_base_url_is_refused(self):
+        data = contexts_config()
+        del data["profiles"]["prgs-author"]["base_url"]
+        data["contexts"]["prgs"]["gitea"]["enabled"] = False
+        config = load(data)
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
+            gitea_config.select_profile(config, "prgs-author")
+
+    def test_v1_config_still_loads(self):
+        config = load({
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs": {
+                    "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-gitea-token"},
+                },
+            },
+        })
+        profile = gitea_config.select_profile(config, "prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["base_url"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
+
+    def test_mixed_contexts_and_environments_rejected(self):
+        data = contexts_config()
+        data["environments"] = {"x": {"services": {}}}
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
+            load(data)
+
+    def test_missing_enabled_flag_is_refused(self):
+        data = contexts_config()
+        del data["profiles"]["prgs-author"]["enabled"]
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
+            load(data)
+        self.assertIn("enabled", str(ctx.exception))
+
+
+class DisabledRefusalTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.config = load(contexts_config())
+
+    def test_disabled_profile_refused(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
+            gitea_config.select_profile(self.config, "retired-author")
+        self.assertIn("disabled", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_profile_in_disabled_context_refused(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
+            gitea_config.select_profile(self.config, "lab-author")
+        self.assertIn("disabled", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_enabled_profile_still_selectable(self):
+        profile = gitea_config.select_profile(self.config, "prgs-author")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["context"], "prgs")
+
+    def test_disabled_service_refused(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
+            gitea_config.resolve_service(self.config, "prgs", "sentry")
+        self.assertIn("disabled", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_enabled_service_resolves_internally_with_auth_reference(self):
+        # Internal resolution keeps the URL + auth reference for MCP's own use;
+        # they must never appear in LLM-facing (audit/summary) output.
+        service = gitea_config.resolve_service(self.config, "prgs", "jenkins")
+        self.assertEqual(service["base_url"], "https://jenkins.prgs.cc")
+        self.assertEqual(service["auth"], {"type": "keychain",
+                                           "id": "prgs-jenkins-token"})
+        self.assertNotIn("token", service)
+
+    def test_service_in_disabled_context_refused(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
+            gitea_config.resolve_service(self.config, "lab", "jenkins")
+        self.assertIn("disabled", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_unknown_service_fails_closed(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
+            gitea_config.resolve_service(self.config, "prgs", "nope")
+
+
+class ProjectMappingTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.config = load(contexts_config())
+
+    def test_project_maps_to_context(self):
+        project = gitea_config.project_for_path(self.config, "/repo/one")
+        self.assertEqual(project["context"], "prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(project["default_reviewer_profile"], "prgs-reviewer")
+
+    def test_unknown_project_returns_none(self):
+        self.assertIsNone(
+            gitea_config.project_for_path(self.config, "/repo/unknown"))
+
+    def test_disabled_project_refused(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
+            gitea_config.project_for_path(self.config, "/repo/lab")
+        self.assertIn("disabled", str(ctx.exception))
+
+
+class SecretHandlingTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_inline_profile_token_rejected(self):
+        data = contexts_config()
+        data["profiles"]["prgs-author"]["token"] = FAKE_TOKEN
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
+            load(data)
+        self.assertNotIn(FAKE_TOKEN, str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_inline_service_token_rejected(self):
+        data = contexts_config()
+        data["contexts"]["prgs"]["services"]["jenkins"]["token"] = FAKE_TOKEN
+        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
+            load(data)
+        self.assertNotIn(FAKE_TOKEN, str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_selected_profile_resolves_token_via_keychain(self):
+        profile = gitea_config.select_profile(load(contexts_config()),
+                                              "prgs-author")
+        token = gitea_config.resolve_token(
+            profile, keychain_lookup=lambda item_id: FAKE_TOKEN
+            if item_id == "prgs-gitea-author-token" else None)
+        self.assertEqual(token, FAKE_TOKEN)
+
+
+class AuditTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    """LLM-facing audit output: enabled/disabled state only — no endpoint
+    URLs, no keychain ids, no token values. Admin opt-in reveals endpoints
+    and auth source names (never token values)."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.config = load(contexts_config())
+
+    def test_audit_reports_enabled_and_disabled(self):
+        report = gitea_config.audit_config(self.config)
+        profiles = {p["name"]: p for p in report["profiles"]}
+        self.assertTrue(profiles["prgs-author"]["enabled"])
+        self.assertFalse(profiles["retired-author"]["enabled"])
+        services = {(s["context"], s["name"]): s for s in report["services"]}
+        self.assertTrue(services[("prgs", "jenkins")]["enabled"])
+        self.assertFalse(services[("prgs", "sentry")]["enabled"])
+        self.assertFalse(services[("lab", "jenkins")]["enabled"])
+
+    def test_audit_hides_urls_keychain_ids_and_tokens_by_default(self):
+        rendered = json.dumps(gitea_config.audit_config(self.config))
+        for leaked in ("https://", "http://", "prgs-gitea-author-token",
+                       "prgs-jenkins-token", "base_url", FAKE_TOKEN):
+            self.assertNotIn(leaked, rendered)
+        # Auth is reported as a status, not a reference.
+        report = gitea_config.audit_config(self.config)
+        profiles = {p["name"]: p for p in report["profiles"]}
+        self.assertEqual(profiles["prgs-author"]["auth"], "keychain")
+
+    def test_audit_admin_optin_reveals_endpoints_but_never_tokens(self):
+        report = gitea_config.audit_config(self.config, reveal_endpoints=True)
+        rendered = json.dumps(report)
+        self.assertIn("https://jenkins.prgs.cc", rendered)
+        self.assertIn("keychain:prgs-gitea-author-token", rendered)
+        self.assertNotIn(FAKE_TOKEN, rendered)
+
+    def test_audit_works_for_v1_config(self):
+        report = gitea_config.audit_config({
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs": {
+                    "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-gitea-token"},
+                },
+            },
+        })
+        profiles = {p["name"]: p for p in report["profiles"]}
+        self.assertTrue(profiles["prgs"]["enabled"])
+        self.assertEqual(profiles["prgs"]["auth"], "keychain")
+        self.assertNotIn("https://", json.dumps(report))
+
+
+class ServiceSummaryTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Safe one-line summaries for LLM sessions: label + state only."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.config = load(contexts_config())
+
+    def test_summaries_show_state_without_urls_or_ids(self):
+        lines = gitea_config.service_summaries(
+            self.config, auth_check=lambda service: True)
+        text = "\n".join(lines)
+        self.assertIn("PRGS Jenkins: enabled, read-only, authenticated", text)
+        self.assertIn("PRGS Sentry: disabled", text)
+        self.assertIn("Lab Jenkins: disabled", text)
+        for leaked in ("https://", "http://", "keychain",
+                       "prgs-jenkins-token"):
+            self.assertNotIn(leaked, text)
+
+    def test_summary_reports_missing_auth_without_secrets(self):
+        lines = gitea_config.service_summaries(
+            self.config, auth_check=lambda service: False)
+        text = "\n".join(lines)
+        self.assertIn("PRGS Jenkins: enabled, read-only, no credential", text)
+
+
+class NoSilentFallbackTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_broken_config_fails_auth_instead_of_falling_back(self):
+        """With GITEA_MCP_CONFIG set but unloadable, auth must fail closed."""
+        path = write_config({"version": 2})  # invalid: no contexts/environments
+        env = {
+            gitea_config.ENV_CONFIG_PATH: path,
+            gitea_config.ENV_PROFILE: "prgs-author",
+        }
+        try:
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False), \
+                 patch.object(gitea_auth, "get_credentials",
+                              return_value=(None, None)):
+                for var in ("GITEA_TOKEN", "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS",
+                            "GITEA_TOKEN_DADESCHOOLS"):
+                    os.environ.pop(var, None)
+                with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
+                    gitea_auth.get_auth_header("https://gitea.prgs.cc")
+        finally:
+            os.unlink(path)
+
+    def test_env_only_users_unaffected(self):
+        """Without GITEA_MCP_CONFIG, a missing token still degrades quietly."""
+        env = dict(os.environ)
+        env.pop(gitea_config.ENV_CONFIG_PATH, None)
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True), \
+             patch.object(gitea_auth, "get_credentials",
+                          return_value=(None, None)):
+            for var in ("GITEA_TOKEN", "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS",
+                        "GITEA_TOKEN_DADESCHOOLS"):
+                os.environ.pop(var, None)
+            self.assertIsNone(
+                gitea_auth.get_auth_header("https://gitea.prgs.cc"))
+
+
+class ValidateConfigTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_valid_contexts_config_has_no_problems(self):
+        self.assertEqual(gitea_config.validate_config(contexts_config()), [])
+
+    def test_repo_example_file_validates(self):
+        example = __import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent \
+            / "gitea-mcp.v2-contexts.example.json"
+        with open(example, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            self.assertEqual(gitea_config.validate_config(json.load(fh)), [])
+
+    def test_broken_contexts_config_reports_problems(self):
+        data = contexts_config()
+        data["profiles"]["prgs-author"]["context"] = "nope"
+        problems = gitea_config.validate_config(data)
+        self.assertTrue(problems)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_mcp_server.py

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 Each tool is tested by calling the underlying function directly (not through
 the MCP protocol) with mocked API responses.
 """
+import json
 import os
 import sys
 import unittest
@@ -880,7 +881,9 @@ class TestWhoami(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(result["username"], "reviewer-bot")
         self.assertEqual(result["display_name"], "Reviewer Bot")
         self.assertEqual(result["user_id"], 42)
-        self.assertEqual(result["server"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
+        # Endpoint URLs are hidden from normal LLM-facing output (#120);
+        # the logical remote name is the addressing surface.
+        self.assertNotIn("server", result)
         self.assertEqual(result["remote"], "prgs")
         # Read-only: GET against the authenticated-user endpoint.
         call_args = mock_api.call_args
@@ -992,6 +995,65 @@ class TestRuntimeProfile(unittest.TestCase):
         for secret in ("super-secret-token", "token", "authorization", "basic "):
             self.assertNotIn(secret, blob)
 
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    def test_whoami_v2_metadata(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {"id": 7, "login": "rev"}
+        env = {
+            "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
+            "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve",
+            "GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS": "merge",
+            "GITEA_AUDIT_LABEL": "reviewer-runtime",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE": "keychain:prgs-reviewer-token",
+        }
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            result = gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+        profile = result["profile"]
+        self.assertEqual(profile["environment"], None)
+        self.assertEqual(profile["service"], None)
+        self.assertEqual(profile["identity"], None)
+        self.assertEqual(profile["role"], None)
+        self.assertEqual(profile["profile_address"], None)
+        self.assertEqual(profile["execution_profile"], None)
+        self.assertEqual(profile["audit_label"], "reviewer-runtime")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["auth_source_type"], "keychain")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["forbidden_operations"], ["merge"])
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_profile")
+    def test_whoami_v2_resolved_metadata(self, mock_get_profile, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {"id": 7, "login": "rev"}
+        mock_get_profile.return_value = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs.gitea.reviewer",
+            "allowed_operations": ["read", "review"],
+            "forbidden_operations": ["merge"],
+            "audit_label": "rev-audit",
+            "token_source_name": "keychain:prgs-reviewer-token",
+            "auth_source_type": "keychain",
+            "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+            "username": "sysadmin",
+            "default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            "profile_path": "prgs.gitea.reviewer",
+            "environment": "prgs",
+            "service": "gitea",
+            "identity": "reviewer",
+            "role": "reviewer",
+            "execution_profile": "reviewer-profile",
+        }
+        result = gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+        profile = result["profile"]
+        self.assertEqual(profile["environment"], "prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["service"], "gitea")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["identity"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["role"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["profile_address"], "prgs.gitea.reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["execution_profile"], "reviewer-profile")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["audit_label"], "rev-audit")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["auth_source_type"], "keychain")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["forbidden_operations"], ["merge"])
+
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Profile discovery (read-only) — issue #13
@@ -1035,8 +1097,12 @@ class TestProfileDiscovery(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(result["allowed_operations"], ["read", "review", "approve"])
         self.assertEqual(result["authenticated_username"], "reviewer-bot")
         self.assertEqual(result["identity_status"], "verified")
-        self.assertEqual(result["server"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
-        self.assertEqual(result["token_source_name"], "GITEA_TOKEN")
+        # Endpoint URLs and token source names are hidden from normal
+        # LLM-facing output (#120); auth is reported as a status only.
+        self.assertNotIn("server", result)
+        self.assertNotIn("base_url", result)
+        self.assertNotIn("token_source_name", result)
+        self.assertEqual(result["auth_status"], "configured")
         # Read-only: only a GET to the user endpoint was issued.
         self.assertEqual(mock_api.call_args[0][0], "GET")
         self.assertTrue(mock_api.call_args[0][1].endswith("/api/v1/user"))
@@ -1075,6 +1141,39 @@ class TestProfileDiscovery(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIsNone(result["remote"])
         self.assertIn("remote_error", result)
 
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_profile")
+    def test_get_profile_v2_resolved_metadata(self, mock_get_profile, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {"id": 7, "login": "rev"}
+        mock_get_profile.return_value = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs.gitea.reviewer",
+            "allowed_operations": ["read", "review"],
+            "forbidden_operations": ["merge"],
+            "audit_label": "rev-audit",
+            "token_source_name": "keychain:prgs-reviewer-token",
+            "auth_source_type": "keychain",
+            "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+            "username": "sysadmin",
+            "default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            "profile_path": "prgs.gitea.reviewer",
+            "environment": "prgs",
+            "service": "gitea",
+            "identity": "reviewer",
+            "role": "reviewer",
+            "execution_profile": "reviewer-profile",
+        }
+        result = gitea_get_profile(remote="prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(result["environment"], "prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(result["service"], "gitea")
+        self.assertEqual(result["identity"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(result["role"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(result["profile_address"], "prgs.gitea.reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(result["execution_profile"], "reviewer-profile")
+        self.assertEqual(result["auth_source_type"], "keychain")
+        self.assertEqual(result["forbidden_operations"], ["merge"])
+
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # PR eligibility checks (read-only) — issue #14
@@ -1669,3 +1768,138 @@ class TestTrackerHygieneCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
         # branch name fallback
         self.assertEqual(extract_linked_issue_numbers("", branch_name="issue-123"), [123])
         self.assertEqual(extract_linked_issue_numbers("", branch_name="feat/issue-123-foo"), [123])
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Endpoint/keychain redaction in LLM-facing output — issue #120
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestEndpointRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Normal MCP output hides endpoint URLs and keychain ids; the admin
+    opt-in (GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS) restores them for local diagnostics
+    without ever revealing token values."""
+
+    def _contexts_config_file(self):
+        import tempfile
+        config = {
+            "version": 2,
+            "contexts": {
+                "prgs": {
+                    "enabled": True,
+                    "gitea": {"enabled": True, "kind": "gitea",
+                              "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc"},
+                    "services": {
+                        "jenkins": {
+                            "enabled": True, "kind": "jenkins",
+                            "label": "PRGS Jenkins",
+                            "base_url": "https://jenkins.prgs.cc",
+                            "auth": {"type": "keychain",
+                                     "id": "prgs-jenkins-token"},
+                            "capabilities": ["read"],
+                        },
+                        "sentry": {
+                            "enabled": False, "kind": "sentry",
+                            "label": "PRGS Sentry", "base_url": "",
+                            "auth": {"type": "keychain",
+                                     "id": "prgs-sentry-token"},
+                            "capabilities": ["read"],
+                        },
+                    },
+                },
+            },
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-author": {
+                    "enabled": True, "context": "prgs", "role": "author",
+                    "username": "jcwalker3",
+                    "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain",
+                             "id": "prgs-gitea-author-token"},
+                    "allowed_operations": ["read"],
+                    "forbidden_operations": [],
+                },
+            },
+            "projects": {},
+            "rules": {"hide_service_urls_from_llm": True,
+                      "hide_keychain_ids_from_llm": True,
+                      "mcp_resolves_endpoints": True},
+        }
+        fd, path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".json")
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            json.dump(config, fh)
+        return path
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    def test_whoami_hides_endpoint_url_by_default(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {"id": 1, "login": "someone"}
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
+            result = gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+        self.assertNotIn("server", result)
+        self.assertNotIn("https://", repr(result))
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    def test_whoami_reveals_endpoint_with_admin_optin(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {"id": 1, "login": "someone"}
+        with patch.dict(os.environ,
+                        {"GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS": "1"}, clear=True):
+            result = gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(result["server"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
+
+    def test_get_profile_hides_url_and_token_source_by_default(self):
+        env = {
+            "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
+            "GITEA_BASE_URL": "https://gitea.example.invalid",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE": "keychain:some-item-id",
+        }
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            result = gitea_get_profile(remote="prgs",
+                                       resolve_identity=False)
+        blob = repr(result)
+        for leaked in ("https://", "keychain:", "some-item-id",
+                       "base_url", "server", "token_source_name"):
+            self.assertNotIn(leaked, blob)
+        self.assertEqual(result["auth_status"], "configured")
+
+    def test_get_profile_reports_unconfigured_auth(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ,
+                        {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author"}, clear=True):
+            result = gitea_get_profile(remote="prgs",
+                                       resolve_identity=False)
+        self.assertEqual(result["auth_status"], "unconfigured")
+
+    def test_get_profile_reveals_with_admin_optin(self):
+        env = {
+            "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE": "keychain:some-item-id",
+            "GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS": "1",
+        }
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            result = gitea_get_profile(remote="prgs",
+                                       resolve_identity=False)
+        self.assertEqual(result["server"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
+        self.assertEqual(result["token_source_name"], "keychain:some-item-id")
+
+    def test_audit_tool_reports_state_without_urls_or_ids(self):
+        from mcp_server import gitea_audit_config
+        path = self._contexts_config_file()
+        try:
+            env = {"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": path,
+                   "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author"}
+            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True), \
+                 patch("gitea_config._keychain_token", return_value="x"):
+                result = gitea_audit_config()
+        finally:
+            os.unlink(path)
+        blob = json.dumps(result)
+        self.assertIn("PRGS Jenkins: enabled, read-only, authenticated",
+                      result["summaries"])
+        self.assertIn("PRGS Sentry: disabled", result["summaries"])
+        for leaked in ("https://", "http://", "prgs-jenkins-token",
+                       "prgs-gitea-author-token", "base_url"):
+            self.assertNotIn(leaked, blob)
+
+    def test_audit_tool_without_config_reports_off(self):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
+            from mcp_server import gitea_audit_config
+            result = gitea_audit_config()
+        self.assertFalse(result["configured"])

tests/test_migrate_profiles.py

@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+"""Unit tests for migrate_profiles.py migration helper."""
+
+import os
+import sys
+import json
+import unittest
+import tempfile
+import shutil
+from unittest.mock import patch
+from io import StringIO
+
+# Add project root to sys.path
+PROJECT_ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+if PROJECT_ROOT not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, PROJECT_ROOT)
+
+import migrate_profiles
+
+
+class TestMigrateProfiles(unittest.TestCase):
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.temp_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp()
+        self.v1_content = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "jcwalker3",
+                    "auth": {
+                        "type": "keychain",
+                        "id": "redacted-author-ref"
+                    },
+                    "default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                    "execution_profile": "personal-prgs",
+                    "allowed_operations": ["read", "comment"],
+                    "forbidden_operations": ["approve", "merge"]
+                },
+                "mdcps": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-mdcps-service",
+                    "username": "913443",
+                    "auth": {
+                        "type": "keychain",
+                        "id": "redacted-mdcps-ref"
+                    },
+                    "default_owner": "Contractor",
+                    "execution_profile": "mdcps",
+                    "allowed_operations": ["read"],
+                    "forbidden_operations": ["merge"]
+                },
+                "prgs-reviewer": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "sysadmin",
+                    "auth": {
+                        "type": "keychain",
+                        "id": "redacted-reviewer-ref"
+                    },
+                    "default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                    "execution_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
+                    "allowed_operations": [
+                        "read", "review", "comment", "approve",
+                        "request_changes", "merge"
+                    ],
+                    "forbidden_operations": ["branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr"]
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        self.input_file = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "profiles.json")
+        with open(self.input_file, "w") as f:
+            json.dump(self.v1_content, f)
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        shutil.rmtree(self.temp_dir)
+
+    def test_migration_logic(self):
+        """Test the structural transformation and capability mapping."""
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(self.v1_content)
+        self.assertEqual(v2_data["version"], 2)
+
+        # Check environment structure
+        envs = v2_data["environments"]
+        self.assertIn("prgs", envs)
+        self.assertIn("mdcps", envs)
+
+        # Check service and identity structure
+        prgs_gitea = envs["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]
+        self.assertEqual(prgs_gitea["base_url"], "redacted-prgs-service")
+        self.assertEqual(prgs_gitea["default_owner"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
+
+        author = prgs_gitea["identities"]["author"]
+        self.assertEqual(author["username"], "jcwalker3")
+        self.assertEqual(author["auth"]["id"], "redacted-author-ref")
+        self.assertEqual(author["allowed_operations"], ["read", "comment"])
+        self.assertEqual(author["forbidden_operations"], ["approve", "merge"])
+
+        reviewer = prgs_gitea["identities"]["reviewer"]
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["role"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["username"], "sysadmin")
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["auth"]["id"], "redacted-reviewer-ref")
+        self.assertIn("merge", reviewer["allowed_operations"])
+
+    def test_alias_generation(self):
+        """Test that aliases are correctly generated to support old profile names."""
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(self.v1_content)
+        aliases = v2_data["aliases"]
+
+        self.assertEqual(aliases["prgs"], "prgs.gitea.author")
+        self.assertEqual(aliases["prgs-author"], "prgs.gitea.author")
+        self.assertEqual(aliases["prgs-reviewer"], "prgs.gitea.reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(aliases["mdcps"], "mdcps.gitea.author")
+
+    def test_no_secret_behavior(self):
+        """Ensure secrets are never extracted, printed, or processed."""
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(self.v1_content)
+        # Check that auth structures only contain keychain references, not credentials
+        for env in v2_data["environments"].values():
+            for svc in env["services"].values():
+                for ident in svc["identities"].values():
+                    auth = ident["auth"]
+                    self.assertEqual(auth["type"], "keychain")
+                    self.assertIn("id", auth)
+                    self.assertNotIn("token", auth)
+                    self.assertNotIn("password", auth)
+
+    def test_validation(self):
+        """Test that the generated v2 configuration validates against Gitea-Tools v2 loader."""
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(self.v1_content)
+        self.assertTrue(migrate_profiles.validate_v2_data(v2_data))
+
+    @patch("sys.stdout", new_callable=StringIO)
+    def test_dry_run_default(self, mock_stdout):
+        """Verify that running without -w prints generated config without modifying files."""
+        output_file = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "migrated_dry.json")
+        test_args = [
+            "migrate_profiles.py",
+            "-i", self.input_file,
+            "-o", output_file
+        ]
+        with patch.object(sys, "argv", test_args):
+            with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as cm:
+                migrate_profiles.main()
+            self.assertEqual(cm.exception.code, 0)
+
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(output_file))
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(f"{self.input_file}.bak"))
+
+        stdout_output = mock_stdout.getvalue()
+        self.assertIn("DRY-RUN MODE", stdout_output)
+        self.assertIn("version", stdout_output)
+        self.assertIn("identities", stdout_output)
+        self.assertIn("aliases", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("redacted-prgs-service", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("redacted-mdcps-service", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("redacted-author-ref", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("redacted-mdcps-ref", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("redacted-reviewer-ref", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("keychain", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("auth", stdout_output)
+
+    def test_dry_run_hides_token_like_values(self):
+        """Verify dry-run summary does not expose token-like auth metadata."""
+        sensitive = json.loads(json.dumps(self.v1_content))
+        sensitive["profiles"]["prgs"]["auth"]["id"] = "super-secret-token-value"
+        with open(self.input_file, "w") as f:
+            json.dump(sensitive, f)
+
+        test_args = ["migrate_profiles.py", "-i", self.input_file]
+        with patch("sys.stdout", new_callable=StringIO) as mock_stdout:
+            with patch.object(sys, "argv", test_args):
+                with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as cm:
+                    migrate_profiles.main()
+                self.assertEqual(cm.exception.code, 0)
+
+        stdout_output = mock_stdout.getvalue()
+        self.assertNotIn("super-secret-token-value", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("token", stdout_output.lower())
+
+    def test_explicit_operations_are_preserved(self):
+        """Explicit v1 permissions must not be replaced by role defaults."""
+        v1_data = json.loads(json.dumps(self.v1_content))
+        v1_data["profiles"]["prgs-reviewer"]["allowed_operations"] = ["read"]
+        v1_data["profiles"]["prgs-reviewer"]["forbidden_operations"] = ["merge"]
+
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+        reviewer = (
+            v2_data["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]
+            ["identities"]["reviewer"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["allowed_operations"], ["read"])
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["forbidden_operations"], ["merge"])
+
+    def test_inferred_role_defaults_only_when_unambiguous(self):
+        """Role defaults are allowed only for clear author/reviewer profiles."""
+        v1_data = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-author": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "jcwalker3",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "hidden-author-ref"},
+                    "execution_profile": "prgs-author",
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+        author = (
+            v2_data["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]
+            ["identities"]["author"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            author["allowed_operations"],
+            migrate_profiles.AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            author["forbidden_operations"],
+            migrate_profiles.AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN,
+        )
+
+    def test_ambiguous_permission_source_fails_closed(self):
+        """A profile without explicit permissions or clear role must not widen."""
+        v1_data = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "jcwalker3",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "hidden-author-ref"},
+                    "execution_profile": "personal-prgs",
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "fail closed"):
+            migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+
+    def test_partial_permission_source_fails_closed(self):
+        """Allowed without forbidden, or vice versa, is ambiguous."""
+        v1_data = json.loads(json.dumps(self.v1_content))
+        del v1_data["profiles"]["prgs"]["forbidden_operations"]
+
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "fail closed"):
+            migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+
+    def test_write_mode_and_backup(self):
+        """Verify that write mode creates a backup and correctly saves the validated config."""
+        output_file = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "migrated.json")
+        backup_file = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "profiles_backup.json.bak")
+
+        test_args = [
+            "migrate_profiles.py",
+            "-i", self.input_file,
+            "-o", output_file,
+            "--backup", backup_file,
+            "-w"
+        ]
+        with patch.object(sys, "argv", test_args):
+            migrate_profiles.main()
+
+        # Verify backup exists and matches original v1 config
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(backup_file))
+        with open(backup_file, "r") as f:
+            backup_data = json.load(f)
+        self.assertEqual(backup_data["version"], 1)
+        self.assertIn("prgs", backup_data["profiles"])
+
+        # Verify migrated v2 config exists and validates
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(output_file))
+        with open(output_file, "r") as f:
+            v2_data = json.load(f)
+        self.assertEqual(v2_data["version"], 2)
+        self.assertIn("environments", v2_data)
+        self.assertEqual(v2_data["aliases"]["prgs"], "prgs.gitea.author")
+
+    def test_malformed_input_fails_safely(self):
+        """Test that malformed JSON or invalid version numbers cause a clean exit with code 1."""
+        bad_json_file = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "bad.json")
+        with open(bad_json_file, "w") as f:
+            f.write("{invalid-json}")
+
+        test_args = ["migrate_profiles.py", "-i", bad_json_file]
+        with patch.object(sys, "argv", test_args):
+            with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as cm:
+                migrate_profiles.main()
+            self.assertEqual(cm.exception.code, 1)
+
+        bad_version_file = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "bad_version.json")
+        with open(bad_version_file, "w") as f:
+            json.dump({"version": 3, "profiles": {}}, f)
+
+        test_args = ["migrate_profiles.py", "-i", bad_version_file]
+        with patch.object(sys, "argv", test_args):
+            with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as cm:
+                migrate_profiles.main()
+            self.assertEqual(cm.exception.code, 1)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_op_normalization.py

@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+"""Operation-name normalization table and enforcement tests — issue #106.
+
+Covers the required matrix from #106:
+
+- fully qualified allowed / forbidden operations
+- legacy unqualified allowed / forbidden operations
+- unknown operations (fail closed)
+- ambiguous operations (fail closed)
+- service mismatch (cross-service names never accepted by the wrong service)
+- forbidden-overrides-allowed
+- empty / missing allowed list
+- duplicate operations after normalization
+- no silent permission widening
+- eligibility enforcement normalizes before checking
+"""
+
+import os
+import sys
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
+from gitea_config import (  # noqa: E402
+    ConfigError,
+    check_operation,
+    normalize_operation,
+)
+from mcp_server import gitea_check_pr_eligibility  # noqa: E402
+
+FAKE_AUTH = "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# normalize_operation — canonical table
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestNormalizeOperation(unittest.TestCase):
+
+    def test_fully_qualified_gitea_op_unchanged(self):
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("gitea.pr.merge"), "gitea.pr.merge")
+
+    def test_legacy_aliases_map_to_canonical_names(self):
+        expected = {
+            "merge": "gitea.pr.merge",
+            "approve": "gitea.pr.approve",
+            "request_changes": "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+            "review": "gitea.pr.review",
+            "comment": "gitea.pr.comment",
+            "read": "gitea.read",
+        }
+        for legacy, canonical in expected.items():
+            self.assertEqual(normalize_operation(legacy), canonical)
+
+    def test_contexts_shape_author_verbs(self):
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("branch"), "gitea.branch.create")
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("commit"), "gitea.repo.commit")
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("push"), "gitea.branch.push")
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("open_pr"), "gitea.pr.create")
+
+    def test_unknown_unqualified_op_fails_closed(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ConfigError):
+            normalize_operation("frobnicate")
+
+    def test_ambiguous_dotted_op_fails_closed(self):
+        # Dotted but neither gitea-prefixed nor an explicit alias: refuse to
+        # guess which namespace was meant.
+        with self.assertRaises(ConfigError):
+            normalize_operation("build.read")
+
+    def test_cross_service_name_rejected_by_wrong_service(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ConfigError):
+            normalize_operation("jenkins.read", service="gitea")
+        with self.assertRaises(ConfigError):
+            normalize_operation("gitea.read", service="jenkins")
+
+    def test_non_gitea_single_word_namespaced_to_service(self):
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("read", service="jenkins"),
+                         "jenkins.read")
+
+    def test_non_gitea_qualified_own_prefix_unchanged(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            normalize_operation("jenkins.build.read", service="jenkins"),
+            "jenkins.build.read",
+        )
+
+    def test_empty_and_non_string_fail_closed(self):
+        for bad in ("", None, 3, ["merge"]):
+            with self.assertRaises(ConfigError):
+                normalize_operation(bad)
+
+    def test_gitea_alias_not_applied_to_other_services(self):
+        # "merge" on jenkins must not resolve to the *gitea* merge permission.
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("merge", service="jenkins"),
+                         "jenkins.merge")
+
+    def test_table_is_documented_and_matches_normalization(self):
+        table = gitea_config.GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES
+        self.assertIsInstance(table, dict)
+        self.assertTrue(table)
+        for legacy, canonical in table.items():
+            self.assertEqual(normalize_operation(legacy), canonical)
+            self.assertTrue(canonical.startswith("gitea."))
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# check_operation — enforcement semantics (normalize BEFORE checking)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestCheckOperation(unittest.TestCase):
+
+    def test_fully_qualified_allowed(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("gitea.pr.merge", ["gitea.pr.merge"])
+        self.assertTrue(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "allowed")
+
+    def test_fully_qualified_forbidden(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation(
+            "gitea.pr.merge", ["gitea.pr.merge"], ["gitea.pr.merge"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "forbidden")
+
+    def test_legacy_unqualified_allowed(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("merge", ["gitea.pr.merge"])
+        self.assertTrue(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "allowed")
+
+    def test_legacy_unqualified_forbidden(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("merge", ["gitea.pr.merge"], ["merge"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "forbidden")
+
+    def test_unknown_operation_fails_closed(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("frobnicate", ["gitea.read"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "invalid-operation")
+
+    def test_ambiguous_operation_fails_closed(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("build.read", ["gitea.read"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "invalid-operation")
+
+    def test_service_mismatch_rejected(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("jenkins.read", ["gitea.read"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "invalid-operation")
+
+    def test_forbidden_overrides_allowed_across_spellings(self):
+        # Allowed via legacy spelling, forbidden via canonical spelling: the
+        # forbidden entry must win after both normalize to the same op.
+        ok, reason = check_operation("merge", ["merge"], ["gitea.pr.merge"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "forbidden")
+
+    def test_empty_allowed_list_denies(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("gitea.read", [])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "no-allowed-operations")
+
+    def test_missing_allowed_list_denies(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("gitea.read", None)
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "no-allowed-operations")
+
+    def test_duplicates_after_normalization_are_harmless(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation(
+            "merge", ["merge", "gitea.pr.merge", "merge"])
+        self.assertTrue(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "allowed")
+
+    def test_unnormalizable_allowed_entry_grants_nothing(self):
+        # A junk allowed entry must not widen permissions to anything.
+        ok, reason = check_operation("gitea.read", ["frobnicate"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "not-allowed")
+
+    def test_unnormalizable_forbidden_entry_fails_closed(self):
+        # If a forbidden entry cannot be understood, deny rather than risk
+        # silently narrowing the forbidden set (which would widen permissions).
+        ok, reason = check_operation(
+            "gitea.read", ["gitea.read"], ["frobnicate"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "invalid-forbidden-entry")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Eligibility enforcement — normalization happens before checking (#106)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestEligibilityNormalizesOperations(unittest.TestCase):
+
+    def _pr(self, author, state="open", sha="abc123", mergeable=True):
+        return {
+            "user": {"login": author},
+            "state": state,
+            "head": {"sha": sha},
+            "mergeable": mergeable,
+        }
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    def test_namespaced_profile_ops_allow_legacy_action(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        # JSON-config profiles carry canonical namespaced ops; the raw action
+        # "merge" must still match them after normalization.
+        mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "merger-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot")]
+        env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
+               "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.read,gitea.pr.merge"}
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=9, action="merge",
+                                           remote="prgs")
+        self.assertTrue(r["eligible"])
+        self.assertNotIn("profile is not allowed to merge", r["reasons"])
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    def test_namespaced_forbidden_op_blocks_legacy_action(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "merger-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot")]
+        env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
+               "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.read,gitea.pr.merge",
+               "GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS": "gitea.pr.merge"}
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=9, action="merge",
+                                           remote="prgs")
+        self.assertFalse(r["eligible"])
+        self.assertIn("profile forbids 'merge'", r["reasons"])
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    def test_legacy_env_ops_still_work(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        # v1/env behaviour stays compatible: unqualified env ops keep working.
+        mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "reviewer-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot")]
+        env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
+               "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=5, action="review",
+                                           remote="prgs")
+        self.assertTrue(r["eligible"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()