Extend whoami and profile metadata for environment.service.identity addressing #104

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2026-07-02T17:37:14-05:00

sysadmin commented

2026-07-02 17:37:14 -05:00

Summary

Extend safe profile metadata and whoami output to support the profiles.json v2 environment → service → identity model.

Source discussion

Refs #100

Scope

Expose safe metadata such as:

environment
service
identity
role
profile address
execution profile
audit label
auth source type only, not secret value
normalized allowed operations
normalized forbidden operations

Security requirements

Never expose tokens, passwords, API keys, or raw keychain secret values.
Runtime whoami identity remains the source of truth.
Config-declared role is metadata only and must not bypass self-review/self-merge checks.
Metadata must make it obvious whether the active identity is author, reviewer, reader, or another service role.

Expected behavior

Examples:

prgs.gitea.author
prgs.gitea.reviewer
mdcps.gitea.author
mdcps.gitea.reviewer
mdcps.jenkins.reader
mdcps.glitchtip.reader

should surface safe context for handoff reports and controller debugging.

Non-goals

Do not implement v2 parser unless Issue #103 is already complete or this work is deliberately combined.
Do not change merge eligibility logic except to consume safe metadata if needed.
Do not expose secrets.
Do not create tags or release changes.

Acceptance criteria

whoami or equivalent profile inspection shows safe v2 metadata.
output includes environment/service/identity/role where available.
output remains safe for handoff reports.
tests confirm no secret values are exposed.
tests confirm runtime authenticated user remains separate from config-declared username/role.

## Summary Extend safe profile metadata and `whoami` output to support the `profiles.json v2` environment → service → identity model. ## Source discussion Refs #100 ## Scope Expose safe metadata such as: - environment - service - identity - role - profile address - execution profile - audit label - auth source type only, not secret value - normalized allowed operations - normalized forbidden operations ## Security requirements - Never expose tokens, passwords, API keys, or raw keychain secret values. - Runtime `whoami` identity remains the source of truth. - Config-declared role is metadata only and must not bypass self-review/self-merge checks. - Metadata must make it obvious whether the active identity is author, reviewer, reader, or another service role. ## Expected behavior Examples: ```text prgs.gitea.author prgs.gitea.reviewer mdcps.gitea.author mdcps.gitea.reviewer mdcps.jenkins.reader mdcps.glitchtip.reader ``` should surface safe context for handoff reports and controller debugging. ## Non-goals * Do not implement v2 parser unless Issue #103 is already complete or this work is deliberately combined. * Do not change merge eligibility logic except to consume safe metadata if needed. * Do not expose secrets. * Do not create tags or release changes. ## Acceptance criteria * `whoami` or equivalent profile inspection shows safe v2 metadata. * output includes environment/service/identity/role where available. * output remains safe for handoff reports. * tests confirm no secret values are exposed. * tests confirm runtime authenticated user remains separate from config-declared username/role.

sysadmin added the mcp security enhancement labels 2026-07-02 17:38:18 -05:00

jcwalker3 referenced this issue

2026-07-02 17:38:48 -05:00

Discussion: profiles.json v2 model for multi-service environments #100

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Reference: Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools#104