Merge pull request 'feat: extend whoami and profile metadata for environments (#104)' (#124) from feat/issue-104-whoami-metadata into master

Closes #104

docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md

@@ -134,8 +134,50 @@ Rules:
   appears in both, it is forbidden.
 - An operation not present in `allowed_operations` is treated as **not
   allowed** (deny by default).
-- These categories are descriptive for this issue. Their runtime enforcement is
-  out of scope here (see roadmap links).
+
+## Operation-name normalization (#106)
+
+Canonical operation names are namespaced: `{service}.{area}.{verb}` (e.g.
+`gitea.pr.merge`, `jenkins.build.read`). Legacy unqualified spellings are
+accepted **only** through the explicit alias table below (the code of record
+is `GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES` in `gitea_config.py`; the enforcement matrix is
+`tests/test_op_normalization.py`).
+
+| Legacy spelling   | Canonical operation        |
+|-------------------|----------------------------|
+| `read`            | `gitea.read`               |
+| `review`          | `gitea.pr.review`          |
+| `comment`         | `gitea.pr.comment`         |
+| `approve`         | `gitea.pr.approve`         |
+| `request_changes` | `gitea.pr.request_changes` |
+| `merge`           | `gitea.pr.merge`           |
+| `pr.create`       | `gitea.pr.create`          |
+| `branch.push`     | `gitea.branch.push`        |
+| `branch`          | `gitea.branch.create`      |
+| `commit`          | `gitea.repo.commit`        |
+| `push`            | `gitea.branch.push`        |
+| `open_pr`         | `gitea.pr.create`          |
+
+For non-Gitea services, a single unqualified word namespaces to the checked
+service (`read` → `jenkins.read` when checking Jenkins); names already
+prefixed with that service pass through unchanged.
+
+Enforcement rules (`gitea_config.check_operation`, run **before** any
+allowed/forbidden membership check):
+
+- Unknown operation names fail closed (denied).
+- Ambiguous names — dotted names that are neither service-prefixed nor in the
+  alias table — fail closed.
+- Cross-service names are never accepted by the wrong service
+  (`jenkins.read` never matches a Gitea check, and a Gitea alias is never
+  applied to another service).
+- `forbidden_operations` overrides `allowed_operations` after both sides are
+  normalized, so a legacy spelling can never bypass a canonical forbidden
+  entry (or vice versa).
+- An allowed entry that cannot be normalized grants nothing; a forbidden
+  entry that cannot be normalized denies the request. Normalization can
+  therefore never silently widen permissions.
+- An empty or missing `allowed_operations` list denies everything.
 
 ## Identity and fail-closed rules
 

gitea_auth.py

@@ -473,13 +473,29 @@ def get_profile():
     token_source = (os.environ.get("GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE") or "").strip() \
         or gitea_config.auth_source_name(jp)
     base_url = os.environ.get("GITEA_BASE_URL") or jp.get("base_url") or None
+    auth_type = None
+    if isinstance(jp.get("auth"), dict):
+        auth_type = jp["auth"].get("type")
+    elif token_source:
+        if token_source.startswith("keychain:"):
+            auth_type = "keychain"
+        else:
+            auth_type = "env"
+
     return {
         "profile_name": name,
         "allowed_operations": ops,
         "forbidden_operations": forbidden,
         "audit_label": audit_label,
         "token_source_name": token_source,
+        "auth_source_type": auth_type,
         "base_url": base_url,
         "username": jp.get("username") or None,
         "default_owner": jp.get("default_owner") or None,
-    }
+        "profile_path": jp.get("profile_path") or None,
+        "environment": jp.get("environment") or None,
+        "service": jp.get("service") or None,
+        "identity": jp.get("identity") or None,
+        "role": jp.get("role") or None,
+        "execution_profile": jp.get("execution_profile") or None,
+    }

gitea_config.py

@@ -70,11 +70,13 @@ _TBD_RE = re.compile(r"(?i)^tbd(-|$)")
 # Keys that would mean an inline secret wherever they appear.
 _INLINE_SECRET_KEYS = ("token", "password", "secret")
 
-# ── Minimal operation normalization (#103) ─────────────────────────────────────
-# Only what the #103 invariants need. The full normalization table, deprecation
-# handling, and enforcement test matrix belong to issue #106 — do not grow this
-# beyond invariant safety here.
-_MINIMAL_GITEA_OP_MAP = {
+# ── Operation-name normalization table (#106; minimal subset landed in #103) ───
+# Canonical operations are namespaced ({service}.{area}.{verb}). Legacy
+# unqualified spellings are accepted ONLY through this explicit table — never
+# by guessing. The same table is the documentation of record (see
+# docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md) and is exercised by
+# tests/test_op_normalization.py.
+GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES = {
     "read": "gitea.read",
     "review": "gitea.pr.review",
     "comment": "gitea.pr.comment",
@@ -94,27 +96,83 @@ _REVIEW_MERGE_OPS = frozenset({"gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge"})
 _AUTHOR_ONLY_OPS = frozenset({"gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"})
 
 
-def _normalize_op(service, op, addr):
-    """Normalize *op* for *service*, or fail closed (#103 minimal subset).
+def normalize_operation(op, service="gitea"):
+    """Return the canonical namespaced name for *op*, or fail closed (#106).
 
     - already namespaced for this service (``{service}.*``) → unchanged
-    - known unqualified Gitea ops → mapped via ``_MINIMAL_GITEA_OP_MAP``
+    - known unqualified Gitea ops → mapped via ``GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES``
     - unqualified single-word ops on non-Gitea services → ``{service}.{op}``
-    - anything else (foreign prefixes, unknown unqualified names) → ConfigError
+    - anything else — foreign service prefixes, dotted names outside the
+      table, unknown unqualified names — is unknown or ambiguous → ConfigError
+
+    Normalization never crosses services (a Gitea alias is never applied to
+    another service) and never widens permissions: an operation that cannot
+    be normalized grants and matches nothing.
     """
     if not isinstance(op, str) or not op:
-        raise ConfigError(f"identity '{addr}' has an empty or non-string operation")
+        raise ConfigError("operation must be a non-empty string (fail closed)")
     if op.startswith(service + "."):
         return op
-    if service == "gitea" and op in _MINIMAL_GITEA_OP_MAP:
-        return _MINIMAL_GITEA_OP_MAP[op]
+    if service == "gitea" and op in GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES:
+        return GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES[op]
     if service != "gitea" and "." not in op:
         return f"{service}.{op}"
     raise ConfigError(
-        f"identity '{addr}' has operation {op!r} that cannot be normalized "
-        f"safely for service '{service}' (fail closed; full table is issue #106)"
+        f"operation {op!r} cannot be normalized safely for service "
+        f"'{service}' (unknown, ambiguous, or cross-service; fail closed)"
     )
 
+
+def check_operation(op, allowed, forbidden=(), service="gitea"):
+    """Decide whether *op* is permitted. Returns ``(bool, reason)`` (#106).
+
+    Everything is normalized via :func:`normalize_operation` BEFORE any
+    membership check, so legacy and canonical spellings always compare equal.
+    Reasons: ``allowed``, ``invalid-operation``, ``invalid-forbidden-entry``,
+    ``forbidden``, ``no-allowed-operations``, ``not-allowed``.
+
+    Fail-closed rules:
+    - an *op* that cannot be normalized is denied (``invalid-operation``)
+    - a forbidden entry that cannot be normalized denies the request
+      (``invalid-forbidden-entry``) — dropping it would silently narrow the
+      forbidden set, i.e. widen permissions
+    - an allowed entry that cannot be normalized is ignored — it grants
+      nothing, so permissions never widen
+    - ``forbidden`` always overrides ``allowed``
+    - an empty or missing allowed list denies everything
+    """
+    try:
+        op_n = normalize_operation(op, service)
+    except ConfigError:
+        return (False, "invalid-operation")
+    forbidden_n = set()
+    for entry in (forbidden or ()):
+        try:
+            forbidden_n.add(normalize_operation(entry, service))
+        except ConfigError:
+            return (False, "invalid-forbidden-entry")
+    if op_n in forbidden_n:
+        return (False, "forbidden")
+    if not allowed:
+        return (False, "no-allowed-operations")
+    allowed_n = set()
+    for entry in allowed:
+        try:
+            allowed_n.add(normalize_operation(entry, service))
+        except ConfigError:
+            continue
+    if op_n in allowed_n:
+        return (True, "allowed")
+    return (False, "not-allowed")
+
+
+def _normalize_op(service, op, addr):
+    """Normalize *op* for identity *addr*, or fail closed with context."""
+    try:
+        return normalize_operation(op, service)
+    except ConfigError as exc:
+        raise ConfigError(f"identity '{addr}': {exc}") from None
+
 # Default canonical config location (one file shared by all LLM launchers).
 DEFAULT_CONFIG_PATH = os.path.join(
     os.path.expanduser("~"), ".config", "gitea-tools", "profiles.json"

mcp_server.py

@@ -521,14 +521,24 @@ def gitea_check_pr_eligibility(
         return result
 
     # Profile capability check (metadata only; not enforcement of the action).
+    # Both the action and the profile lists are normalized before comparison
+    # (#106), so legacy spellings ("merge") and canonical namespaced ops
+    # ("gitea.pr.merge") always match each other and never cross services.
     allowed = profile["allowed_operations"]
     forbidden = profile["forbidden_operations"]
-    if not allowed:
-        reasons.append("profile has no configured allowed operations (fail closed)")
-    if action in forbidden:
-        reasons.append(f"profile forbids '{action}'")
-    elif action not in allowed:
-        reasons.append(f"profile is not allowed to {action}")
+    op_ok, op_reason = gitea_config.check_operation(action, allowed, forbidden)
+    if not op_ok:
+        if op_reason == "no-allowed-operations":
+            reasons.append(
+                "profile has no configured allowed operations (fail closed)")
+        elif op_reason == "forbidden":
+            reasons.append(f"profile forbids '{action}'")
+        elif op_reason == "invalid-forbidden-entry":
+            reasons.append(
+                "profile has an unrecognized forbidden operation entry "
+                "(fail closed)")
+        else:
+            reasons.append(f"profile is not allowed to {action}")
 
     h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
 
@@ -1407,6 +1417,15 @@ def gitea_whoami(
         "profile": {
             "profile_name": profile["profile_name"],
             "allowed_operations": profile["allowed_operations"],
+            "forbidden_operations": profile["forbidden_operations"],
+            "environment": profile.get("environment"),
+            "service": profile.get("service"),
+            "identity": profile.get("identity"),
+            "role": profile.get("role"),
+            "profile_address": profile.get("profile_path"),
+            "execution_profile": profile.get("execution_profile"),
+            "audit_label": profile.get("audit_label"),
+            "auth_source_type": profile.get("auth_source_type"),
         },
     }
     if _reveal_endpoints():
@@ -1470,6 +1489,13 @@ def gitea_get_profile(
         "allowed_operations": profile["allowed_operations"],
         "forbidden_operations": profile["forbidden_operations"],
         "audit_label": profile["audit_label"],
+        "environment": profile.get("environment"),
+        "service": profile.get("service"),
+        "identity": profile.get("identity"),
+        "role": profile.get("role"),
+        "profile_address": profile.get("profile_path"),
+        "execution_profile": profile.get("execution_profile"),
+        "auth_source_type": profile.get("auth_source_type"),
         # Auth is reported as a status only (#120): the token source *name*
         # (env var name / keychain id) joins endpoint URLs behind the
         # GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS admin opt-in. Token values never appear.

migrate_profiles.py

@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Migration helper to convert profiles.json from version 1 to version 2 environments shape.
+
+This script preserves existing keychain references (auth.id) and maps old profile
+names as aliases so that existing IDE configurations continue to function.
+"""
+
+import os
+import sys
+import json
+import argparse
+import shutil
+import tempfile
+
+# Resolve path to import gitea_config
+PROJECT_ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
+if PROJECT_ROOT not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, PROJECT_ROOT)
+
+import gitea_config
+
+
+AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = ["read", "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr", "comment"]
+AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = ["approve", "request_changes", "merge"]
+REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
+    "read", "review", "comment", "approve", "request_changes", "merge"
+]
+REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = ["branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr"]
+
+
+def infer_role(name, execution_profile):
+    """Return the unambiguous role for a legacy profile name, or None."""
+    haystack = f"{name} {execution_profile or ''}".lower()
+    has_author = "author" in haystack
+    has_reviewer = "reviewer" in haystack
+    if has_author == has_reviewer:
+        return None
+    return "reviewer" if has_reviewer else "author"
+
+
+def migration_summary(v2_data):
+    """Return a redacted summary of the migrated config."""
+    environments = v2_data.get("environments", {})
+    service_count = 0
+    identity_count = 0
+    for env in environments.values():
+        services = env.get("services", {})
+        service_count += len(services)
+        for service in services.values():
+            identity_count += len(service.get("identities", {}))
+    return {
+        "version": v2_data.get("version"),
+        "environments": len(environments),
+        "services": service_count,
+        "identities": identity_count,
+        "aliases": len(v2_data.get("aliases", {})),
+    }
+
+
+def migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data):
+    """Convert version 1 profiles.json format to version 2 environments format."""
+    environments = {}
+    aliases = {}
+
+    profiles = v1_data.get("profiles", {})
+    if not isinstance(profiles, dict):
+        raise ValueError("Malformed input: 'profiles' field must be a JSON object")
+
+    for name, prof in profiles.items():
+        if not isinstance(prof, dict):
+            raise ValueError(f"Malformed input: profile '{name}' must be a JSON object")
+
+        # Infer environment and identity name
+        if "-" in name:
+            parts = name.split("-", 1)
+            env_name = parts[0]
+            ident_name = parts[1]
+        else:
+            env_name = name
+            ident_name = "author"
+
+        # Determine role and identity based on name / execution_profile.
+        # Ambiguous profiles may still migrate only when they carry explicit
+        # permissions; otherwise role-based defaults could widen permissions.
+        exec_prof = prof.get("execution_profile") or ""
+        role = infer_role(name, exec_prof)
+        if role == "reviewer":
+            ident_name = "reviewer"
+        elif role == "author":
+            ident_name = "author"
+        else:
+            role = prof.get("role")
+            if role not in (None, "author", "reviewer"):
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"Profile '{name}' has unsupported role {role!r}"
+                )
+
+        # Construct identity block
+        identity_data = {
+            "username": prof.get("username"),
+            "auth": prof.get("auth"),
+        }
+        if role:
+            identity_data["role"] = role
+        if prof.get("execution_profile"):
+            identity_data["execution_profile"] = prof["execution_profile"]
+
+        # Set audit label (default to old name to preserve context)
+        identity_data["audit_label"] = prof.get("audit_label") or name
+
+        has_allowed = "allowed_operations" in prof
+        has_forbidden = "forbidden_operations" in prof
+        if has_allowed != has_forbidden:
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"Profile '{name}' must define both allowed_operations and "
+                "forbidden_operations, or neither (fail closed)"
+            )
+        if has_allowed:
+            allowed = prof.get("allowed_operations")
+            forbidden = prof.get("forbidden_operations")
+            if not isinstance(allowed, list) or not isinstance(forbidden, list):
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"Profile '{name}' operation fields must be lists"
+                )
+            identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(allowed)
+            identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(forbidden)
+        elif role == "author":
+            identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
+            identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
+        elif role == "reviewer":
+            identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
+            identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
+        else:
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"Profile '{name}' has no explicit operation lists and no "
+                "unambiguous author/reviewer role marker (fail closed)"
+            )
+
+        # Nest inside environments/services structure
+        env = environments.setdefault(env_name, {})
+        services = env.setdefault("services", {})
+        gitea_svc = services.setdefault("gitea", {})
+
+        # Copy service-level attributes
+        if prof.get("base_url"):
+            gitea_svc["base_url"] = prof["base_url"]
+        if prof.get("default_owner"):
+            gitea_svc["default_owner"] = prof["default_owner"]
+        if prof.get("default_repo"):
+            gitea_svc["default_repo"] = prof["default_repo"]
+
+        identities = gitea_svc.setdefault("identities", {})
+        identities[ident_name] = identity_data
+
+        # Alias resolution targets
+        alias_target = f"{env_name}.gitea.{ident_name}"
+        if name != alias_target:
+            aliases[name] = alias_target
+
+        # Extra convenience alias for standard old-profile compatibility (e.g. prgs-author)
+        convenience_alias = f"{env_name}-{ident_name}"
+        if convenience_alias != alias_target and convenience_alias not in aliases:
+            aliases[convenience_alias] = alias_target
+
+    v2_data = {
+        "version": 2,
+        "environments": environments,
+        "aliases": aliases
+    }
+    return v2_data
+
+
+def validate_v2_data(v2_data):
+    """Validate generated v2 structure using gitea_config parser."""
+    fd, temp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".json")
+    os.close(fd)
+    try:
+        with open(temp_path, "w") as f:
+            json.dump(v2_data, f)
+        # Attempt to load using load_config to run all validation rules
+        gitea_config.load_config(temp_path)
+        return True
+    except Exception as e:
+        raise ValueError(f"Generated v2 config failed validation: {e}")
+    finally:
+        try:
+            os.remove(temp_path)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+
+
+def main():
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description="Migrate profiles.json from version 1 to version 2 environments shape."
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "-i", "--input",
+        default=gitea_config.DEFAULT_CONFIG_PATH,
+        help="Path to the version 1 profiles.json file (default: ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json)"
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "-o", "--output",
+        help="Path to write the migrated version 2 profiles.json file (default: overwrite input)"
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "-w", "--write",
+        action="store_true",
+        help="Actually write the migrated config and create a backup (default is dry-run)"
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--backup",
+        help="Path to write the backup file (default: <input_path>.bak)"
+    )
+
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    input_path = os.path.abspath(args.input)
+    output_path = os.path.abspath(args.output or input_path)
+    backup_path = args.backup or f"{input_path}.bak"
+
+    if not os.path.isfile(input_path):
+        print(f"Error: Input file not found: {input_path}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    try:
+        with open(input_path, "r") as f:
+            v1_data = json.load(f)
+    except json.JSONDecodeError as e:
+        print(f"Error: Input file is not valid JSON: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+    except Exception as e:
+        print(f"Error reading input file: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    # Validate version
+    version = v1_data.get("version")
+    if version is not None and version != 1:
+        print(f"Error: Unsupported profiles.json version: {version}. Expected version 1.", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    try:
+        v2_data = migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+        validate_v2_data(v2_data)
+    except Exception as e:
+        print(f"Error: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    if not args.write:
+        print("=== DRY-RUN MODE (No files modified) ===")
+        print("Generated v2 config validated successfully.")
+        print("Only aggregate counts are shown.")
+        summary = migration_summary(v2_data)
+        print("Summary:")
+        print(f"  version: {summary['version']}")
+        print(f"  environments: {summary['environments']}")
+        print(f"  services: {summary['services']}")
+        print(f"  identities: {summary['identities']}")
+        print(f"  aliases: {summary['aliases']}")
+        sys.exit(0)
+
+    # Write Mode: Create Backup first
+    try:
+        print(f"Creating backup: {backup_path}")
+        shutil.copy2(input_path, backup_path)
+    except Exception as e:
+        print(f"Error creating backup: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    # Write migrated config
+    try:
+        print(f"Writing migrated version 2 config: {output_path}")
+        # Ensure target directory exists
+        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(output_path), exist_ok=True)
+        with open(output_path, "w") as f:
+            json.dump(v2_data, f, indent=2)
+            f.write("\n")
+        print("Migration completed successfully!")
+    except Exception as e:
+        print(f"Error writing output file: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

tests/test_mcp_server.py

@@ -995,6 +995,65 @@ class TestRuntimeProfile(unittest.TestCase):
         for secret in ("super-secret-token", "token", "authorization", "basic "):
             self.assertNotIn(secret, blob)
 
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    def test_whoami_v2_metadata(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {"id": 7, "login": "rev"}
+        env = {
+            "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
+            "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve",
+            "GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS": "merge",
+            "GITEA_AUDIT_LABEL": "reviewer-runtime",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE": "keychain:prgs-reviewer-token",
+        }
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            result = gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+        profile = result["profile"]
+        self.assertEqual(profile["environment"], None)
+        self.assertEqual(profile["service"], None)
+        self.assertEqual(profile["identity"], None)
+        self.assertEqual(profile["role"], None)
+        self.assertEqual(profile["profile_address"], None)
+        self.assertEqual(profile["execution_profile"], None)
+        self.assertEqual(profile["audit_label"], "reviewer-runtime")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["auth_source_type"], "keychain")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["forbidden_operations"], ["merge"])
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_profile")
+    def test_whoami_v2_resolved_metadata(self, mock_get_profile, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {"id": 7, "login": "rev"}
+        mock_get_profile.return_value = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs.gitea.reviewer",
+            "allowed_operations": ["read", "review"],
+            "forbidden_operations": ["merge"],
+            "audit_label": "rev-audit",
+            "token_source_name": "keychain:prgs-reviewer-token",
+            "auth_source_type": "keychain",
+            "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+            "username": "sysadmin",
+            "default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            "profile_path": "prgs.gitea.reviewer",
+            "environment": "prgs",
+            "service": "gitea",
+            "identity": "reviewer",
+            "role": "reviewer",
+            "execution_profile": "reviewer-profile",
+        }
+        result = gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+        profile = result["profile"]
+        self.assertEqual(profile["environment"], "prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["service"], "gitea")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["identity"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["role"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["profile_address"], "prgs.gitea.reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["execution_profile"], "reviewer-profile")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["audit_label"], "rev-audit")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["auth_source_type"], "keychain")
+        self.assertEqual(profile["forbidden_operations"], ["merge"])
+
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Profile discovery (read-only) — issue #13
@@ -1082,6 +1141,39 @@ class TestProfileDiscovery(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIsNone(result["remote"])
         self.assertIn("remote_error", result)
 
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_profile")
+    def test_get_profile_v2_resolved_metadata(self, mock_get_profile, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {"id": 7, "login": "rev"}
+        mock_get_profile.return_value = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs.gitea.reviewer",
+            "allowed_operations": ["read", "review"],
+            "forbidden_operations": ["merge"],
+            "audit_label": "rev-audit",
+            "token_source_name": "keychain:prgs-reviewer-token",
+            "auth_source_type": "keychain",
+            "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
+            "username": "sysadmin",
+            "default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            "profile_path": "prgs.gitea.reviewer",
+            "environment": "prgs",
+            "service": "gitea",
+            "identity": "reviewer",
+            "role": "reviewer",
+            "execution_profile": "reviewer-profile",
+        }
+        result = gitea_get_profile(remote="prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(result["environment"], "prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(result["service"], "gitea")
+        self.assertEqual(result["identity"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(result["role"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(result["profile_address"], "prgs.gitea.reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(result["execution_profile"], "reviewer-profile")
+        self.assertEqual(result["auth_source_type"], "keychain")
+        self.assertEqual(result["forbidden_operations"], ["merge"])
+
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # PR eligibility checks (read-only) — issue #14

tests/test_migrate_profiles.py

@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+"""Unit tests for migrate_profiles.py migration helper."""
+
+import os
+import sys
+import json
+import unittest
+import tempfile
+import shutil
+from unittest.mock import patch
+from io import StringIO
+
+# Add project root to sys.path
+PROJECT_ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+if PROJECT_ROOT not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, PROJECT_ROOT)
+
+import migrate_profiles
+
+
+class TestMigrateProfiles(unittest.TestCase):
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.temp_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp()
+        self.v1_content = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "jcwalker3",
+                    "auth": {
+                        "type": "keychain",
+                        "id": "redacted-author-ref"
+                    },
+                    "default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                    "execution_profile": "personal-prgs",
+                    "allowed_operations": ["read", "comment"],
+                    "forbidden_operations": ["approve", "merge"]
+                },
+                "mdcps": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-mdcps-service",
+                    "username": "913443",
+                    "auth": {
+                        "type": "keychain",
+                        "id": "redacted-mdcps-ref"
+                    },
+                    "default_owner": "Contractor",
+                    "execution_profile": "mdcps",
+                    "allowed_operations": ["read"],
+                    "forbidden_operations": ["merge"]
+                },
+                "prgs-reviewer": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "sysadmin",
+                    "auth": {
+                        "type": "keychain",
+                        "id": "redacted-reviewer-ref"
+                    },
+                    "default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                    "execution_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
+                    "allowed_operations": [
+                        "read", "review", "comment", "approve",
+                        "request_changes", "merge"
+                    ],
+                    "forbidden_operations": ["branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr"]
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        self.input_file = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "profiles.json")
+        with open(self.input_file, "w") as f:
+            json.dump(self.v1_content, f)
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        shutil.rmtree(self.temp_dir)
+
+    def test_migration_logic(self):
+        """Test the structural transformation and capability mapping."""
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(self.v1_content)
+        self.assertEqual(v2_data["version"], 2)
+
+        # Check environment structure
+        envs = v2_data["environments"]
+        self.assertIn("prgs", envs)
+        self.assertIn("mdcps", envs)
+
+        # Check service and identity structure
+        prgs_gitea = envs["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]
+        self.assertEqual(prgs_gitea["base_url"], "redacted-prgs-service")
+        self.assertEqual(prgs_gitea["default_owner"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
+
+        author = prgs_gitea["identities"]["author"]
+        self.assertEqual(author["username"], "jcwalker3")
+        self.assertEqual(author["auth"]["id"], "redacted-author-ref")
+        self.assertEqual(author["allowed_operations"], ["read", "comment"])
+        self.assertEqual(author["forbidden_operations"], ["approve", "merge"])
+
+        reviewer = prgs_gitea["identities"]["reviewer"]
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["role"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["username"], "sysadmin")
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["auth"]["id"], "redacted-reviewer-ref")
+        self.assertIn("merge", reviewer["allowed_operations"])
+
+    def test_alias_generation(self):
+        """Test that aliases are correctly generated to support old profile names."""
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(self.v1_content)
+        aliases = v2_data["aliases"]
+
+        self.assertEqual(aliases["prgs"], "prgs.gitea.author")
+        self.assertEqual(aliases["prgs-author"], "prgs.gitea.author")
+        self.assertEqual(aliases["prgs-reviewer"], "prgs.gitea.reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(aliases["mdcps"], "mdcps.gitea.author")
+
+    def test_no_secret_behavior(self):
+        """Ensure secrets are never extracted, printed, or processed."""
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(self.v1_content)
+        # Check that auth structures only contain keychain references, not credentials
+        for env in v2_data["environments"].values():
+            for svc in env["services"].values():
+                for ident in svc["identities"].values():
+                    auth = ident["auth"]
+                    self.assertEqual(auth["type"], "keychain")
+                    self.assertIn("id", auth)
+                    self.assertNotIn("token", auth)
+                    self.assertNotIn("password", auth)
+
+    def test_validation(self):
+        """Test that the generated v2 configuration validates against Gitea-Tools v2 loader."""
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(self.v1_content)
+        self.assertTrue(migrate_profiles.validate_v2_data(v2_data))
+
+    @patch("sys.stdout", new_callable=StringIO)
+    def test_dry_run_default(self, mock_stdout):
+        """Verify that running without -w prints generated config without modifying files."""
+        output_file = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "migrated_dry.json")
+        test_args = [
+            "migrate_profiles.py",
+            "-i", self.input_file,
+            "-o", output_file
+        ]
+        with patch.object(sys, "argv", test_args):
+            with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as cm:
+                migrate_profiles.main()
+            self.assertEqual(cm.exception.code, 0)
+
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(output_file))
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(f"{self.input_file}.bak"))
+
+        stdout_output = mock_stdout.getvalue()
+        self.assertIn("DRY-RUN MODE", stdout_output)
+        self.assertIn("version", stdout_output)
+        self.assertIn("identities", stdout_output)
+        self.assertIn("aliases", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("redacted-prgs-service", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("redacted-mdcps-service", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("redacted-author-ref", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("redacted-mdcps-ref", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("redacted-reviewer-ref", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("keychain", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("auth", stdout_output)
+
+    def test_dry_run_hides_token_like_values(self):
+        """Verify dry-run summary does not expose token-like auth metadata."""
+        sensitive = json.loads(json.dumps(self.v1_content))
+        sensitive["profiles"]["prgs"]["auth"]["id"] = "super-secret-token-value"
+        with open(self.input_file, "w") as f:
+            json.dump(sensitive, f)
+
+        test_args = ["migrate_profiles.py", "-i", self.input_file]
+        with patch("sys.stdout", new_callable=StringIO) as mock_stdout:
+            with patch.object(sys, "argv", test_args):
+                with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as cm:
+                    migrate_profiles.main()
+                self.assertEqual(cm.exception.code, 0)
+
+        stdout_output = mock_stdout.getvalue()
+        self.assertNotIn("super-secret-token-value", stdout_output)
+        self.assertNotIn("token", stdout_output.lower())
+
+    def test_explicit_operations_are_preserved(self):
+        """Explicit v1 permissions must not be replaced by role defaults."""
+        v1_data = json.loads(json.dumps(self.v1_content))
+        v1_data["profiles"]["prgs-reviewer"]["allowed_operations"] = ["read"]
+        v1_data["profiles"]["prgs-reviewer"]["forbidden_operations"] = ["merge"]
+
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+        reviewer = (
+            v2_data["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]
+            ["identities"]["reviewer"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["allowed_operations"], ["read"])
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["forbidden_operations"], ["merge"])
+
+    def test_inferred_role_defaults_only_when_unambiguous(self):
+        """Role defaults are allowed only for clear author/reviewer profiles."""
+        v1_data = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-author": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "jcwalker3",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "hidden-author-ref"},
+                    "execution_profile": "prgs-author",
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+        author = (
+            v2_data["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]
+            ["identities"]["author"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            author["allowed_operations"],
+            migrate_profiles.AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            author["forbidden_operations"],
+            migrate_profiles.AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN,
+        )
+
+    def test_ambiguous_permission_source_fails_closed(self):
+        """A profile without explicit permissions or clear role must not widen."""
+        v1_data = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "jcwalker3",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "hidden-author-ref"},
+                    "execution_profile": "personal-prgs",
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "fail closed"):
+            migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+
+    def test_partial_permission_source_fails_closed(self):
+        """Allowed without forbidden, or vice versa, is ambiguous."""
+        v1_data = json.loads(json.dumps(self.v1_content))
+        del v1_data["profiles"]["prgs"]["forbidden_operations"]
+
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "fail closed"):
+            migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+
+    def test_write_mode_and_backup(self):
+        """Verify that write mode creates a backup and correctly saves the validated config."""
+        output_file = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "migrated.json")
+        backup_file = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "profiles_backup.json.bak")
+
+        test_args = [
+            "migrate_profiles.py",
+            "-i", self.input_file,
+            "-o", output_file,
+            "--backup", backup_file,
+            "-w"
+        ]
+        with patch.object(sys, "argv", test_args):
+            migrate_profiles.main()
+
+        # Verify backup exists and matches original v1 config
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(backup_file))
+        with open(backup_file, "r") as f:
+            backup_data = json.load(f)
+        self.assertEqual(backup_data["version"], 1)
+        self.assertIn("prgs", backup_data["profiles"])
+
+        # Verify migrated v2 config exists and validates
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(output_file))
+        with open(output_file, "r") as f:
+            v2_data = json.load(f)
+        self.assertEqual(v2_data["version"], 2)
+        self.assertIn("environments", v2_data)
+        self.assertEqual(v2_data["aliases"]["prgs"], "prgs.gitea.author")
+
+    def test_malformed_input_fails_safely(self):
+        """Test that malformed JSON or invalid version numbers cause a clean exit with code 1."""
+        bad_json_file = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "bad.json")
+        with open(bad_json_file, "w") as f:
+            f.write("{invalid-json}")
+
+        test_args = ["migrate_profiles.py", "-i", bad_json_file]
+        with patch.object(sys, "argv", test_args):
+            with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as cm:
+                migrate_profiles.main()
+            self.assertEqual(cm.exception.code, 1)
+
+        bad_version_file = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "bad_version.json")
+        with open(bad_version_file, "w") as f:
+            json.dump({"version": 3, "profiles": {}}, f)
+
+        test_args = ["migrate_profiles.py", "-i", bad_version_file]
+        with patch.object(sys, "argv", test_args):
+            with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as cm:
+                migrate_profiles.main()
+            self.assertEqual(cm.exception.code, 1)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_op_normalization.py

@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+"""Operation-name normalization table and enforcement tests — issue #106.
+
+Covers the required matrix from #106:
+
+- fully qualified allowed / forbidden operations
+- legacy unqualified allowed / forbidden operations
+- unknown operations (fail closed)
+- ambiguous operations (fail closed)
+- service mismatch (cross-service names never accepted by the wrong service)
+- forbidden-overrides-allowed
+- empty / missing allowed list
+- duplicate operations after normalization
+- no silent permission widening
+- eligibility enforcement normalizes before checking
+"""
+
+import os
+import sys
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
+from gitea_config import (  # noqa: E402
+    ConfigError,
+    check_operation,
+    normalize_operation,
+)
+from mcp_server import gitea_check_pr_eligibility  # noqa: E402
+
+FAKE_AUTH = "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# normalize_operation — canonical table
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestNormalizeOperation(unittest.TestCase):
+
+    def test_fully_qualified_gitea_op_unchanged(self):
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("gitea.pr.merge"), "gitea.pr.merge")
+
+    def test_legacy_aliases_map_to_canonical_names(self):
+        expected = {
+            "merge": "gitea.pr.merge",
+            "approve": "gitea.pr.approve",
+            "request_changes": "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+            "review": "gitea.pr.review",
+            "comment": "gitea.pr.comment",
+            "read": "gitea.read",
+        }
+        for legacy, canonical in expected.items():
+            self.assertEqual(normalize_operation(legacy), canonical)
+
+    def test_contexts_shape_author_verbs(self):
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("branch"), "gitea.branch.create")
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("commit"), "gitea.repo.commit")
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("push"), "gitea.branch.push")
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("open_pr"), "gitea.pr.create")
+
+    def test_unknown_unqualified_op_fails_closed(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ConfigError):
+            normalize_operation("frobnicate")
+
+    def test_ambiguous_dotted_op_fails_closed(self):
+        # Dotted but neither gitea-prefixed nor an explicit alias: refuse to
+        # guess which namespace was meant.
+        with self.assertRaises(ConfigError):
+            normalize_operation("build.read")
+
+    def test_cross_service_name_rejected_by_wrong_service(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ConfigError):
+            normalize_operation("jenkins.read", service="gitea")
+        with self.assertRaises(ConfigError):
+            normalize_operation("gitea.read", service="jenkins")
+
+    def test_non_gitea_single_word_namespaced_to_service(self):
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("read", service="jenkins"),
+                         "jenkins.read")
+
+    def test_non_gitea_qualified_own_prefix_unchanged(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            normalize_operation("jenkins.build.read", service="jenkins"),
+            "jenkins.build.read",
+        )
+
+    def test_empty_and_non_string_fail_closed(self):
+        for bad in ("", None, 3, ["merge"]):
+            with self.assertRaises(ConfigError):
+                normalize_operation(bad)
+
+    def test_gitea_alias_not_applied_to_other_services(self):
+        # "merge" on jenkins must not resolve to the *gitea* merge permission.
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_operation("merge", service="jenkins"),
+                         "jenkins.merge")
+
+    def test_table_is_documented_and_matches_normalization(self):
+        table = gitea_config.GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES
+        self.assertIsInstance(table, dict)
+        self.assertTrue(table)
+        for legacy, canonical in table.items():
+            self.assertEqual(normalize_operation(legacy), canonical)
+            self.assertTrue(canonical.startswith("gitea."))
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# check_operation — enforcement semantics (normalize BEFORE checking)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestCheckOperation(unittest.TestCase):
+
+    def test_fully_qualified_allowed(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("gitea.pr.merge", ["gitea.pr.merge"])
+        self.assertTrue(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "allowed")
+
+    def test_fully_qualified_forbidden(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation(
+            "gitea.pr.merge", ["gitea.pr.merge"], ["gitea.pr.merge"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "forbidden")
+
+    def test_legacy_unqualified_allowed(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("merge", ["gitea.pr.merge"])
+        self.assertTrue(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "allowed")
+
+    def test_legacy_unqualified_forbidden(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("merge", ["gitea.pr.merge"], ["merge"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "forbidden")
+
+    def test_unknown_operation_fails_closed(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("frobnicate", ["gitea.read"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "invalid-operation")
+
+    def test_ambiguous_operation_fails_closed(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("build.read", ["gitea.read"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "invalid-operation")
+
+    def test_service_mismatch_rejected(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("jenkins.read", ["gitea.read"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "invalid-operation")
+
+    def test_forbidden_overrides_allowed_across_spellings(self):
+        # Allowed via legacy spelling, forbidden via canonical spelling: the
+        # forbidden entry must win after both normalize to the same op.
+        ok, reason = check_operation("merge", ["merge"], ["gitea.pr.merge"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "forbidden")
+
+    def test_empty_allowed_list_denies(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("gitea.read", [])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "no-allowed-operations")
+
+    def test_missing_allowed_list_denies(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation("gitea.read", None)
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "no-allowed-operations")
+
+    def test_duplicates_after_normalization_are_harmless(self):
+        ok, reason = check_operation(
+            "merge", ["merge", "gitea.pr.merge", "merge"])
+        self.assertTrue(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "allowed")
+
+    def test_unnormalizable_allowed_entry_grants_nothing(self):
+        # A junk allowed entry must not widen permissions to anything.
+        ok, reason = check_operation("gitea.read", ["frobnicate"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "not-allowed")
+
+    def test_unnormalizable_forbidden_entry_fails_closed(self):
+        # If a forbidden entry cannot be understood, deny rather than risk
+        # silently narrowing the forbidden set (which would widen permissions).
+        ok, reason = check_operation(
+            "gitea.read", ["gitea.read"], ["frobnicate"])
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "invalid-forbidden-entry")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Eligibility enforcement — normalization happens before checking (#106)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestEligibilityNormalizesOperations(unittest.TestCase):
+
+    def _pr(self, author, state="open", sha="abc123", mergeable=True):
+        return {
+            "user": {"login": author},
+            "state": state,
+            "head": {"sha": sha},
+            "mergeable": mergeable,
+        }
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    def test_namespaced_profile_ops_allow_legacy_action(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        # JSON-config profiles carry canonical namespaced ops; the raw action
+        # "merge" must still match them after normalization.
+        mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "merger-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot")]
+        env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
+               "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.read,gitea.pr.merge"}
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=9, action="merge",
+                                           remote="prgs")
+        self.assertTrue(r["eligible"])
+        self.assertNotIn("profile is not allowed to merge", r["reasons"])
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    def test_namespaced_forbidden_op_blocks_legacy_action(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "merger-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot")]
+        env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
+               "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.read,gitea.pr.merge",
+               "GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS": "gitea.pr.merge"}
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=9, action="merge",
+                                           remote="prgs")
+        self.assertFalse(r["eligible"])
+        self.assertIn("profile forbids 'merge'", r["reasons"])
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    def test_legacy_env_ops_still_work(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        # v1/env behaviour stays compatible: unqualified env ops keep working.
+        mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "reviewer-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot")]
+        env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
+               "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve"}
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=5, action="review",
+                                           remote="prgs")
+        self.assertTrue(r["eligible"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()