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Gitea-Tools/mcp_application_launcher.py
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sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8 0dbff6dcd5 fix(controller): production client_instance_id launch path and instance-aware mutation gate
Remediate review 655 blockers on PR #979 (issue #978):

B1 — Production launcher (mcp_application_launcher) mints one trusted
client_instance_id per application launch and propagates it to all five
namespace workers via GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_INSTANCE. launcher_entry and
multi_namespace_launcher_entries use that path. Workers never invent a
trusted ID; missing/malformed/user-supplied values fail closed.

B2 — _check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics is instance-aware: two legitimate
instances sharing a profile are allowed when each has a distinct trusted
client_instance_id; duplicate workers for the same (instance, profile)
still fail closed. Worker identity/generation exported for peer scans.

Tests cover shared ID across five namespaces, distinct launches, multi-
instance same profile, same-instance duplicates, untrusted attribution,
and the production launcher path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-30 10:12:16 -04:00

394 lines
14 KiB
Python

"""Production application launcher for multi-namespace MCP fleets (#978 B1).
One real LLM application launch mints exactly one trusted
``client_instance_id`` and propagates it to every Gitea MCP namespace worker
started for that launch. Workers never invent a trusted instance identity from
PID proximity, timestamps, or ordinary untrusted environment values.
This module is the production serve-path authority for instance identity.
Tests and fixtures may call the same functions, but production registration
receives the identity from the env this launcher builds — not from a hand-set
test-only helper that bypasses it.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import secrets
from typing import Any, Mapping
import mcp_fleet_snapshot as fleet
import mcp_worker_identity as mwi
#: Canonical MCP server names for the five role namespaces.
NAMESPACE_SERVER_NAMES: tuple[str, ...] = (
"gitea-author",
"gitea-reviewer",
"gitea-merger",
"gitea-controller",
"gitea-reconciler",
)
#: Map MCP server name → role/namespace kind.
SERVER_TO_NAMESPACE: dict[str, str] = {
"gitea-author": "author",
"gitea-reviewer": "reviewer",
"gitea-merger": "merger",
"gitea-controller": "controller",
"gitea-reconciler": "reconciler",
}
SANCTIONED_NAMESPACES: tuple[str, ...] = (
"author",
"reviewer",
"merger",
"controller",
"reconciler",
)
# Env the launcher may set on every worker of one application launch.
CLIENT_NAME_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_CLIENT"
CLIENT_INSTANCE_ENV = fleet.CLIENT_INSTANCE_ENV
FLEET_RUN_ENV = fleet.FLEET_RUN_ENV
CLIENT_SESSION_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_SESSION"
CLIENT_MANAGED_ENV = "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED"
PROFILE_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE"
CONFIG_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG"
INSTANCE_PROVENANCE_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_INSTANCE_PROVENANCE"
WORKER_IDENTITY_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_WORKER_IDENTITY"
GENERATION_ID_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_GENERATION_ID"
# Marker the trusted launcher alone writes; ordinary user env without this
# marker is never classified as launcher-trusted provenance.
LAUNCHER_PROVENANCE_VALUE = fleet.INSTANCE_ID_PROVENANCE_TRUSTED
def mint_application_launch(
client_type: str | None,
*,
launch_nonce: str | None = None,
fleet_run_id: str | None = None,
session_id: str | None = None,
now=None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Mint one trusted application-instance identity for a production launch.
Called exactly once per real application launch. The returned
``client_instance_id`` is injected into every namespace worker environment
for that launch. A second call (separate launch) yields a different ID.
"""
client = mwi.normalize_client_name(client_type)
instance_id = fleet.generate_client_instance_id(
client, launch_nonce=launch_nonce, now=now
)
assessment = fleet.assess_instance_identity(instance_id)
if not assessment["trusted"]:
# generate_client_instance_id always produces a trusted format; fail
# closed if that invariant ever breaks rather than shipping untrusted.
raise RuntimeError(
f"launcher produced untrusted client_instance_id {instance_id!r}: "
f"{assessment.get('reasons')}"
)
session = (session_id or "").strip() or f"launch-{secrets.token_hex(12)}"
return {
"client_type": client,
"client_instance_id": instance_id,
"instance_id_provenance": LAUNCHER_PROVENANCE_VALUE,
"instance_identity_trusted": True,
"fleet_run_id": (fleet_run_id or "").strip() or None,
"session_id": session,
"namespaces": list(SANCTIONED_NAMESPACES),
"namespace_server_names": list(NAMESPACE_SERVER_NAMES),
}
def namespace_worker_env(
*,
profile_name: str,
client_type: str | None,
client_instance_id: str,
config_path: str | None = None,
fleet_run_id: str | None = None,
session_id: str | None = None,
extra_env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Build the environment for one namespace worker of a trusted launch.
Never invents a client_instance_id. The caller must supply the launch-minted
identity so all five workers receive the same value.
"""
assessment = fleet.assess_instance_identity(client_instance_id)
if not assessment["trusted"]:
raise ValueError(
"namespace_worker_env refuses untrusted client_instance_id "
f"{client_instance_id!r}: {assessment.get('reasons')}"
)
client = mwi.normalize_client_name(client_type)
env: dict[str, str] = {
PROFILE_ENV: str(profile_name),
CLIENT_MANAGED_ENV: "1",
"GITEA_MCP_CLIENT": client,
CLIENT_INSTANCE_ENV: assessment["client_instance_id"],
INSTANCE_PROVENANCE_ENV: LAUNCHER_PROVENANCE_VALUE,
}
if config_path:
env[CONFIG_ENV] = str(config_path)
if fleet_run_id:
env[FLEET_RUN_ENV] = str(fleet_run_id)
if session_id:
env[CLIENT_SESSION_ENV] = str(session_id)
if extra_env:
# Never let untrusted callers override the trusted instance keys.
protected = {
CLIENT_INSTANCE_ENV,
INSTANCE_PROVENANCE_ENV,
"GITEA_MCP_CLIENT",
CLIENT_MANAGED_ENV,
}
for key, value in extra_env.items():
if key in protected:
continue
env[str(key)] = str(value)
return env
def build_application_mcp_servers(
profile_by_namespace: Mapping[str, str],
*,
client_type: str | None,
config_path: str | None = None,
client_instance_id: str | None = None,
fleet_run_id: str | None = None,
session_id: str | None = None,
launch_nonce: str | None = None,
command: str | None = None,
args: list[str] | None = None,
now=None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Build a production ``mcpServers`` map for one application launch.
Mints one ``client_instance_id`` when *client_instance_id* is omitted (fresh
launch). When the caller supplies a previously minted trusted ID (resume of
the same launch / config rewrite), that ID is reused so reconnect keeps
attribution. A full new application restart omits the ID and receives a
fresh mint.
Every namespace server entry receives the **same** instance ID. Separate
calls with no supplied ID receive distinct IDs.
"""
missing = [
ns for ns in SANCTIONED_NAMESPACES if not profile_by_namespace.get(ns)
]
if missing:
raise ValueError(
"build_application_mcp_servers requires a profile for every "
f"sanctioned namespace; missing: {missing}"
)
if client_instance_id is None:
launch = mint_application_launch(
client_type,
launch_nonce=launch_nonce,
fleet_run_id=fleet_run_id,
session_id=session_id,
now=now,
)
else:
assessment = fleet.assess_instance_identity(client_instance_id)
if not assessment["trusted"]:
raise ValueError(
"refusing to propagate untrusted client_instance_id "
f"{client_instance_id!r} into production launch envs: "
f"{assessment.get('reasons')}"
)
launch = {
"client_type": mwi.normalize_client_name(client_type),
"client_instance_id": assessment["client_instance_id"],
"instance_id_provenance": LAUNCHER_PROVENANCE_VALUE,
"instance_identity_trusted": True,
"fleet_run_id": (fleet_run_id or "").strip() or None,
"session_id": (session_id or "").strip()
or f"launch-{secrets.token_hex(12)}",
"namespaces": list(SANCTIONED_NAMESPACES),
"namespace_server_names": list(NAMESPACE_SERVER_NAMES),
}
# Resolve command/args from the production server entry when not provided.
if command is None or args is None:
import gitea_config
cmd, cmd_args = gitea_config.server_command()
command = command or cmd
args = args if args is not None else list(cmd_args)
servers: dict[str, Any] = {}
shared_id = launch["client_instance_id"]
for namespace in SANCTIONED_NAMESPACES:
server_name = f"gitea-{namespace}"
profile = profile_by_namespace[namespace]
env = namespace_worker_env(
profile_name=profile,
client_type=launch["client_type"],
client_instance_id=shared_id,
config_path=config_path,
fleet_run_id=launch.get("fleet_run_id"),
session_id=launch.get("session_id"),
)
servers[server_name] = {
"command": command,
"args": list(args),
"env": env,
}
return {
"mcpServers": servers,
"launch": launch,
"client_instance_id": shared_id,
"client_type": launch["client_type"],
"namespaces": list(SANCTIONED_NAMESPACES),
"shared_instance_id_across_namespaces": True,
"namespace_count": len(SANCTIONED_NAMESPACES),
}
def launcher_entry_for_profile(
profile_name: str,
*,
client_type: str | None = None,
config_path: str | None = None,
client_instance_id: str | None = None,
fleet_run_id: str | None = None,
session_id: str | None = None,
server_key: str = "gitea-tools",
launch_nonce: str | None = None,
now=None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Thin single-server production launcher entry with trusted instance ID.
Used when only one namespace is being configured. Still mints (or reuses)
a trusted ``client_instance_id`` so production never relies on the legacy
placeholder identity for normal launches.
"""
import gitea_config
if client_instance_id is None:
launch = mint_application_launch(
client_type or "unknown",
launch_nonce=launch_nonce,
fleet_run_id=fleet_run_id,
session_id=session_id,
now=now,
)
client_instance_id = launch["client_instance_id"]
client = launch["client_type"]
fleet_run = launch.get("fleet_run_id")
session = launch.get("session_id")
else:
assessment = fleet.assess_instance_identity(client_instance_id)
if not assessment["trusted"]:
raise ValueError(
f"untrusted client_instance_id {client_instance_id!r}"
)
client = mwi.normalize_client_name(client_type)
fleet_run = (fleet_run_id or "").strip() or None
session = (session_id or "").strip() or None
client_instance_id = assessment["client_instance_id"]
command, args = gitea_config.server_command()
env = namespace_worker_env(
profile_name=profile_name,
client_type=client,
client_instance_id=client_instance_id,
config_path=config_path or gitea_config.DEFAULT_CONFIG_PATH,
fleet_run_id=fleet_run,
session_id=session,
)
return {
server_key: {
"command": command,
"args": args,
"env": env,
},
"client_instance_id": client_instance_id,
"client_type": client,
}
def collect_instance_ids_from_mcp_servers(
mcp_servers: Mapping[str, Any],
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Inspect a production mcpServers map for shared instance attribution.
Returns the unique set of client_instance_id values across gitea-* servers
and whether all five namespaces share exactly one trusted ID.
"""
ids: list[str] = []
by_server: dict[str, str | None] = {}
for name in NAMESPACE_SERVER_NAMES:
entry = mcp_servers.get(name) or {}
env = entry.get("env") or {}
raw = (env.get(CLIENT_INSTANCE_ENV) or "").strip() or None
by_server[name] = raw
if raw:
ids.append(raw)
unique = sorted(set(ids))
trusted = [
i
for i in unique
if fleet.assess_instance_identity(i)["trusted"]
]
return {
"server_instance_ids": by_server,
"unique_instance_ids": unique,
"trusted_instance_ids": trusted,
"shared_single_trusted_id": (
len(unique) == 1
and len(trusted) == 1
and all(by_server.get(n) == unique[0] for n in NAMESPACE_SERVER_NAMES)
),
"namespace_server_count": sum(
1 for n in NAMESPACE_SERVER_NAMES if n in mcp_servers
),
}
def inherit_or_refuse_client_instance(
env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Resolve instance identity for a worker process at serve time.
Production workers inherit the launcher-issued ID. They never mint a
trusted ID themselves. Missing / legacy / malformed values fail soft into
an untrusted assessment so registration can still record a diagnostic row
without authorizing multi-instance fleet mutation.
"""
source = dict(env if env is not None else os.environ)
raw = (source.get(CLIENT_INSTANCE_ENV) or "").strip() or None
provenance_marker = (source.get(INSTANCE_PROVENANCE_ENV) or "").strip()
assessment = fleet.assess_instance_identity(raw)
# Ordinary user-supplied values without launcher provenance marker are
# still format-checked by assess_instance_identity. When the format is
# trusted but the launcher marker is absent, keep the ID but note that
# provenance is not launcher-sealed (operator hand-set or legacy config).
if assessment["trusted"] and provenance_marker != LAUNCHER_PROVENANCE_VALUE:
assessment = dict(assessment)
assessment["launcher_sealed"] = False
assessment["reasons"] = list(assessment.get("reasons") or []) + [
f"{INSTANCE_PROVENANCE_ENV} is not {LAUNCHER_PROVENANCE_VALUE!r}; "
"identity format is valid but not sealed by the production launcher"
]
else:
assessment = dict(assessment)
assessment["launcher_sealed"] = bool(
assessment["trusted"]
and provenance_marker == LAUNCHER_PROVENANCE_VALUE
)
assessment["fleet_run_id"] = (source.get(FLEET_RUN_ENV) or "").strip() or None
assessment["session_id"] = (
(source.get(CLIENT_SESSION_ENV) or "").strip() or None
)
assessment["client_type"] = mwi.normalize_client_name(
(source.get("GITEA_MCP_CLIENT") or "").strip() or None
)
return assessment