fix: bind cross-role handoff consume role to authenticated profile (Closes #843)

Review #515 F1: gitea_adopt_workflow_lease trusted a caller-supplied role
((role or active_role)), so any namespace holding gitea.read could consume
an author-only cross-role handoff by passing role="author".

- Derive the adopter role authoritatively from the active profile; reject
  any supplied role that does not exactly match (no silent accept).
- Pass the profile-derived role and authoritative profile/namespace context
  to lease_lifecycle.adopt_lease; validate handoff provenance
  required_profile/required_namespace against it (fail closed).
- Fail closed when the profile role cannot be derived (no author default).
- Add MCP-boundary regression tests: reviewer/merger profiles cannot
  consume an author handoff via role="author"; the legitimate author
  profile still consumes; foreign required_profile rejected.

allocator_service.py

@@ -78,6 +78,33 @@ VALID_ROLES = frozenset(
     {ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER, ROLE_RECONCILER, ROLE_CONTROLLER}
 )
 
+# Allocation modes (#840).
+# role_scoped: only candidates whose expected role matches the caller role.
+# cross_role:  controller-owned generic queue selection — inspect full queue,
+# rank/eligibility canonically, return one selection naming the required
+# downstream role/profile. Controller routes; it does not perform mutations.
+ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED = "role_scoped"
+ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE = "cross_role"
+VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES = frozenset(
+    {ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED, ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE}
+)
+
+# Default execution-profile / MCP-namespace names for each role.
+DEFAULT_ROLE_PROFILES: dict[str, str] = {
+    ROLE_AUTHOR: "prgs-author",
+    ROLE_REVIEWER: "prgs-reviewer",
+    ROLE_MERGER: "prgs-merger",
+    ROLE_RECONCILER: "prgs-reconciler",
+    ROLE_CONTROLLER: "prgs-controller",
+}
+DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES: dict[str, str] = {
+    ROLE_AUTHOR: "gitea-author",
+    ROLE_REVIEWER: "gitea-reviewer",
+    ROLE_MERGER: "gitea-merger",
+    ROLE_RECONCILER: "gitea-reconciler",
+    ROLE_CONTROLLER: "gitea-controller",
+}
+
 # Default action matrices by role (mutation gate will re-check).
 ROLE_ACTIONS: dict[str, tuple[tuple[str, ...], tuple[str, ...]]] = {
     ROLE_AUTHOR: (
@@ -259,6 +286,126 @@ def normalize_role(role: str | None, *, profile_name: str | None = None) -> str:
     )
 
 
+def resolve_allocation_mode(
+    role: str,
+    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    """Resolve allocation mode; controller defaults to cross_role (#840)."""
+    raw = (allocation_mode or "").strip().lower()
+    if raw:
+        if raw not in VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES:
+            raise ControlPlaneError(
+                f"unknown allocation_mode {allocation_mode!r}; expected one of "
+                f"{sorted(VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES)}"
+            )
+        return raw
+    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        return ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE
+    return ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED
+
+
+def required_profile_for_role(
+    role: str,
+    *,
+    profile_name: str | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    """Map a required role to the canonical execution profile name."""
+    role_norm = (role or "").strip().lower()
+    # Preserve remote/env prefix from the active profile when present
+    # (e.g. dadeschools-author → dadeschools-reviewer).
+    active = (profile_name or "").strip()
+    if active:
+        lower = active.lower()
+        for token in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"):
+            if lower.endswith(f"-{token}") or lower == token:
+                prefix = active[: -len(token)].rstrip("-")
+                if prefix:
+                    return f"{prefix}-{role_norm}"
+                return role_norm
+    return DEFAULT_ROLE_PROFILES.get(role_norm, f"prgs-{role_norm}")
+
+
+def required_namespace_for_role(
+    role: str,
+    *,
+    profile_name: str | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    """Map a required role to the canonical MCP namespace name."""
+    role_norm = (role or "").strip().lower()
+    profile = required_profile_for_role(role_norm, profile_name=profile_name)
+    # Namespace is typically gitea-<role>; keep stable mapping when profile is
+    # non-prgs (still gitea-<role> for isolation).
+    return DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES.get(role_norm, f"gitea-{role_norm}")
+
+
+def selected_action_for_candidate(c: WorkCandidate, required_role: str) -> str:
+    """Canonical next action for the selected work under *required_role*."""
+    role = (required_role or "").strip().lower()
+    if role == ROLE_AUTHOR:
+        if c.kind == "pr" and c.request_changes_current_head:
+            return "address_pr_change_requests"
+        if c.kind == "pr":
+            return "update_pr"
+        return "implement"
+    if role == ROLE_REVIEWER:
+        if c.approval_stale:
+            return "re_review"
+        return "review"
+    if role == ROLE_MERGER:
+        return "merge"
+    if role == ROLE_RECONCILER:
+        if c.approval_contaminated:
+            return "reconcile_contaminated_approval"
+        return "reconcile"
+    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        return "diagnose"
+    return "process"
+
+
+def build_selection_dict(
+    selected: WorkCandidate,
+    *,
+    active_role: str,
+    required_role: str,
+    profile_name: str | None = None,
+    allocation_mode: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Authoritative single selection payload for allocator results (#840)."""
+    action = selected_action_for_candidate(selected, required_role)
+    req_profile = required_profile_for_role(
+        required_role, profile_name=profile_name
+    )
+    req_ns = required_namespace_for_role(
+        required_role, profile_name=profile_name
+    )
+    return {
+        "kind": selected.kind,
+        "number": selected.number,
+        "title": selected.title,
+        "labels": list(selected.labels),
+        "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
+        "priority": selected.priority,
+        "expected_role_next": required_role,
+        "required_role": required_role,
+        "selected_action": action,
+        "action": action,
+        "required_profile": req_profile,
+        "required_namespace": req_ns,
+        "pinned": {
+            "kind": selected.kind,
+            "number": selected.number,
+            "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
+            "issue_number": selected.number if selected.kind == "issue" else None,
+            "pr_number": selected.number if selected.kind == "pr" else None,
+        },
+        "reason_selected": (
+            f"highest-priority eligible candidate under allocation_mode="
+            f"'{allocation_mode}' (active_role={active_role}, "
+            f"required_role={required_role}, action={action})"
+        ),
+    }
+
+
 def expected_role_for_candidate(c: WorkCandidate) -> str:
     """ADR §5.3 routing: which role should take this work next."""
     if c.kind == "pr":
@@ -289,6 +436,7 @@ def classify_skip(
     role: str,
     terminal_pr: int | None,
     claim_ownership: str | None = None,
+    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
 ) -> str | None:
     """Return skip reason, or None if candidate is selectable for *role*.
 
@@ -297,7 +445,12 @@ def classify_skip(
     and unknown claims are excluded so one session's in-progress task can never
     blockade the queue for a different controller; ``own`` stays selectable so
     a controller can resume its own work.
+
+    *allocation_mode* (#840): ``cross_role`` (controller default) ranks the full
+    queue and selects the highest-priority eligible item for any downstream
+    role. ``role_scoped`` retains prior role-match filtering.
     """
+    mode = resolve_allocation_mode(role, allocation_mode)
     if c.state in ("merged", "closed"):
         return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} is {c.state}; never assign"
     if c.blocked or "status:blocked" in c.labels:
@@ -322,34 +475,58 @@ def classify_skip(
     if c.kind == "pr" and not (c.head_sha or "").strip():
         return f"pr#{c.number} missing head_sha pin"
 
+    expected = expected_role_for_candidate(c)
+
     # Terminal path first: when an active terminal PR exists, only that PR
-    # (or controller diagnosis) is assignable for review-path roles.
+    # is assignable for review-path roles (or for work whose expected role is
+    # review/merge under cross_role selection).
     if terminal_pr is not None and c.kind == "pr" and c.number != terminal_pr:
-        if role in (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER):
+        terminal_roles = (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER)
+        if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE:
+            if expected in terminal_roles:
+                return (
+                    f"pr#{c.number} skipped: active terminal-review lock on "
+                    f"PR #{terminal_pr} must be resolved first"
+                )
+        elif role in terminal_roles:
             return (
                 f"pr#{c.number} skipped: active terminal-review lock on "
                 f"PR #{terminal_pr} must be resolved first"
             )
 
-    expected = expected_role_for_candidate(c)
-    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
-        # Controller may inspect anything but only assigns diagnosis targets
-        # when contaminated / blocked.
+    if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE:
+        # Cross-role controller selection: eligibility only — no active-role
+        # match filter. The selection payload names required_role.
+        pass
+    elif role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        # Legacy diagnosis-only controller path (role_scoped): only reconciler-
+        # needed targets. Prefer cross_role for generic queue allocation.
         if expected == ROLE_RECONCILER or c.blocked:
             return None
-        return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} does not require controller (expected {expected})"
-
-    if role != expected:
+        return (
+            f"{c.kind}#{c.number} does not require controller "
+            f"(expected {expected})"
+        )
+    elif role != expected:
         return (
             f"{c.kind}#{c.number} expects role '{expected}', active role is '{role}'"
         )
 
     # Ready-gate for issues: prefer status:ready when labels present.
+    # Applies for author-bound work in both modes (cross_role only gates
+    # author-expected issues so reconciler/reviewer PRs stay selectable).
     if c.kind == "issue" and c.labels:
-        if "status:ready" not in c.labels and "status:in-progress" not in c.labels:
-            # Allow unlabeled open issues; only skip explicit non-ready states.
-            if any(l.startswith("status:") for l in c.labels):
-                return f"issue#{c.number} not status:ready ({','.join(c.labels)})"
+        gate_role = expected if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE else role
+        if gate_role in (ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_CONTROLLER):
+            if (
+                "status:ready" not in c.labels
+                and "status:in-progress" not in c.labels
+            ):
+                if any(l.startswith("status:") for l in c.labels):
+                    return (
+                        f"issue#{c.number} not status:ready "
+                        f"({','.join(c.labels)})"
+                    )
     return None
 
 
@@ -501,12 +678,19 @@ def allocate_next_work(
     claims: Mapping[tuple[str, int], dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
     exclude_issue_numbers: Sequence[int] | None = None,
     expected_candidate_set_fingerprint: str | None = None,
+    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Select and optionally reserve the next work unit via control-plane DB.
 
     *apply=False* (default): dry-run selection only — no lease/assignment.
     *apply=True*: atomic ``assign_and_lease`` for the selected candidate.
 
+    *allocation_mode* (#840): ``cross_role`` (default for controller) inspects
+    the complete queue and returns one authoritative selection naming the
+    required downstream role/profile/action. ``role_scoped`` keeps prior
+    per-role filtering. Controller routes only — never grants author/reviewer/
+    merger/reconciler mutation rights to the controller session.
+
     *exclude_issue_numbers* (#776): numbers removed before ranking. Omitted /
     empty preserves prior behavior.
 
@@ -541,6 +725,19 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
         }
 
+    try:
+        mode = resolve_allocation_mode(role_norm, allocation_mode)
+    except ControlPlaneError as exc:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "outcome": OUTCOME_ROLE_INELIGIBLE,
+            "reasons": [str(exc)],
+            "skipped": [],
+            "assignment": None,
+            "substrate": "control_plane_db",
+            "allocation_mode": (allocation_mode or "").strip() or None,
+        }
+
     session_id = (session_id or "").strip() or f"alloc-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}"
     try:
         db.upsert_session(
@@ -748,6 +945,7 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             role=role_norm,
             terminal_pr=terminal_pr,
             claim_ownership=ownership,
+            allocation_mode=mode,
         )
         if reason:
             is_claim_skip = SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION in reason
@@ -828,6 +1026,10 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "outcome": outcome,
             "apply": bool(apply),
             "role": role_norm,
+            "allocation_mode": mode,
+            "routing_role": role_norm,
+            "required_role": None,
+            "selected_action": None,
             "profile_name": profile_name,
             "username": username,
             "session_id": session_id,
@@ -840,6 +1042,12 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
             "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
             "assignment": None,
+            "allocation_evidence": {
+                "mode": "empty",
+                "allocation_mode": mode,
+                "lease_created": False,
+                "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
+            },
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
             "file_lock_only": False,
             "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -852,25 +1060,37 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "owner_session_id": owner_session_id,
             "downstream_note": (
                 "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
+                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+                "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
             ),
         }
 
     expected_role = expected_role_for_candidate(selected)
-    allowed, forbidden = role_actions(role_norm)
-    selection = {
-        "kind": selected.kind,
-        "number": selected.number,
-        "title": selected.title,
-        "labels": list(selected.labels),
-        "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
-        "priority": selected.priority,
-        "expected_role_next": expected_role,
-        "reason_selected": (
-            f"highest-priority candidate for role '{role_norm}' "
-            f"(expected_role={expected_role})"
-        ),
-    }
+    # Cross-role: lease/action matrix follows the required downstream role so
+    # evidence names the worker that must act. Controller session still owns
+    # the routing decision; mutation isolation is enforced by role gates on
+    # mutation tools (controller profile lacks author/review/merge ops).
+    lease_role = (
+        expected_role if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE else role_norm
+    )
+    allowed, forbidden = role_actions(lease_role)
+    # Controller must never receive mutation-class rights via cross-role apply.
+    if role_norm == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        ctrl_allowed, ctrl_forbidden = role_actions(ROLE_CONTROLLER)
+        # Keep controller session capability evidence separate from lease_role.
+        controller_allowed_actions = ctrl_allowed
+        controller_forbidden_actions = ctrl_forbidden
+    else:
+        controller_allowed_actions = allowed
+        controller_forbidden_actions = forbidden
+
+    selection = build_selection_dict(
+        selected,
+        active_role=role_norm,
+        required_role=expected_role,
+        profile_name=profile_name,
+        allocation_mode=mode,
+    )
 
     if not apply:
         return {
@@ -878,6 +1098,12 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "outcome": OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
             "apply": False,
             "role": role_norm,
+            "allocation_mode": mode,
+            "routing_role": role_norm,
+            "required_role": expected_role,
+            "selected_action": selection["selected_action"],
+            "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
+            "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
             "profile_name": profile_name,
             "username": username,
             "session_id": session_id,
@@ -889,10 +1115,22 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "reasons": [
                 "dry-run only (apply=false); no assignment/lease created — "
                 "call again with apply=true to reserve via control-plane DB"
+                + (
+                    "; after apply, the required-role worker consumes via "
+                    "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease (#843)"
+                    if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE and expected_role != role_norm
+                    else ""
+                )
             ],
             "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
             "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
             "assignment": None,
+            "allocation_evidence": {
+                "mode": "preview",
+                "allocation_mode": mode,
+                "lease_created": False,
+                "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
+            },
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
             "file_lock_only": False,
             "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -902,18 +1140,24 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
             "exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
             "candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
+            "controller_allowed_actions": list(controller_allowed_actions),
+            "controller_forbidden_actions": list(controller_forbidden_actions),
             "downstream_note": (
                 "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
+                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+                "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
             ),
         }
 
     # Atomic reserve via #613 substrate.
     ttl = lease_ttl_seconds if lease_ttl_seconds is not None else None
     try:
+        cross_role_handoff = (
+            mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE and lease_role != role_norm
+        )
         kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
             "session_id": session_id,
-            "role": role_norm,
+            "role": lease_role,
             "remote": remote,
             "org": org,
             "repo": repo,
@@ -922,7 +1166,8 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "expected_head_sha": selected.head_sha,
             "allowed_actions": allowed,
             "forbidden_actions": forbidden,
-            "phase": "allocated",
+            # #843: mark cross-role allocations as awaiting independent consume
+            "phase": "awaiting_handoff" if cross_role_handoff else "allocated",
         }
         if ttl is not None:
             kwargs["lease_ttl_seconds"] = int(ttl)
@@ -992,11 +1237,72 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         }
 
     # assigned
-    return {
+    lease_proof = {
+        "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
+        "lease_id": result.lease_id,
+        "expires_at": result.expires_at,
+        "expected_head_sha": result.expected_head_sha,
+        "allowed_actions": list(result.allowed_actions),
+        "forbidden_actions": list(result.forbidden_actions),
+        "lease_role": lease_role,
+        "source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
+    }
+    consume_allocation = None
+    if cross_role_handoff and result.lease_id:
+        # Durable handoff marker so independent required-role workers can
+        # consume without sharing the controller session (#843).
+        handoff_prov = {
+            "cross_role_handoff": True,
+            "handoff_status": "pending",
+            "allocating_session_id": session_id,
+            "allocating_role": role_norm,
+            "required_role": expected_role,
+            "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
+            "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
+            "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
+            "lease_id": result.lease_id,
+            "allocation_mode": mode,
+            "adopted_by_session_id": None,
+        }
+        try:
+            db.attach_lease_provenance(result.lease_id, handoff_prov)
+        except ControlPlaneError:
+            # Still return assignment evidence; consume path may be unavailable
+            handoff_prov["attach_failed"] = True
+        consume_allocation = {
+            "tool": "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease",
+            "lease_id": result.lease_id,
+            "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
+            "required_role": expected_role,
+            "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
+            "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
+            "handoff_status": "pending",
+            "controller_session_required": False,
+            "instructions": (
+                f"From an independent {expected_role} session "
+                f"({selection['required_namespace']} / "
+                f"{selection['required_profile']}), call "
+                f"gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(lease_id={result.lease_id!r}) "
+                "to consume this controller allocation. The allocating "
+                "controller process does not need to remain alive. Wrong-role "
+                "and second-adoption attempts fail closed."
+            ),
+        }
+        lease_proof["cross_role_handoff"] = True
+        lease_proof["handoff_status"] = "pending"
+        lease_proof["consume_tool"] = "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease"
+
+    out = {
         "success": True,
         "outcome": OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
         "apply": True,
         "role": role_norm,
+        "allocation_mode": mode,
+        "routing_role": role_norm,
+        "required_role": expected_role,
+        "selected_action": selection["selected_action"],
+        "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
+        "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
         "profile_name": profile_name,
         "username": username,
         "session_id": session_id,
@@ -1012,16 +1318,25 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
         "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
         "assignment": result.as_dict(),
-        "lease_proof": {
-            "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
-            "lease_id": result.lease_id,
-            "expires_at": result.expires_at,
-            "expected_head_sha": result.expected_head_sha,
-            "allowed_actions": list(result.allowed_actions),
-            "forbidden_actions": list(result.forbidden_actions),
-            "source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
+        "lease_proof": lease_proof,
+        "allocation_evidence": {
+            "mode": "assigned",
+            "allocation_mode": mode,
+            "lease_created": True,
+            "lease_role": lease_role,
+            "lease_proof": lease_proof,
+            "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
+            "cross_role_handoff": bool(cross_role_handoff),
         },
-        "next_valid_command": _next_command(role_norm, selected),
+        "next_valid_command": (
+            (
+                f"consume lease {result.lease_id} via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease "
+                f"as {expected_role}, then "
+            )
+            + _next_command(lease_role, selected)
+            if cross_role_handoff
+            else _next_command(lease_role, selected)
+        ),
         "substrate": "control_plane_db",
         "file_lock_only": False,
         "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -1031,11 +1346,19 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
         "exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
         "candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
+        "controller_allowed_actions": list(controller_allowed_actions),
+        "controller_forbidden_actions": list(controller_forbidden_actions),
         "downstream_note": (
             "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-            "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
+            "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+            "controller routes only under cross_role (#840); "
+            "cross-role assignments are consumable by independent "
+            "required-role workers via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease (#843)"
         ),
     }
+    if consume_allocation is not None:
+        out["consume_allocation"] = consume_allocation
+    return out
 
 
 def _next_command(role: str, c: WorkCandidate) -> str:

arch01_platform.py

@@ -0,0 +1,892 @@
+"""ARCH-01 Foundation Slice A — atomic platform installation + authority kernel (#822).
+
+Parents: #820, #821. **First implementation leaf of the ARCH-01 program.**
+
+This module implements the smallest executable ARCH-01 foundation:
+
+* a connection-bound authenticated actor context (``cp_actor_*`` /
+  ``cp_operation_mode`` / ``cp_context_epoch`` SQLite scalar functions that SQL
+  may *read* but can never *set* — ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` authenticity);
+* an immutable authority-dominance lattice with an exact seeded tuple set
+  (``[SCHEMA]``);
+* the principal-equivalence root (a class exists *before* its first principal;
+  ``principals.current_class_id`` is ``NOT NULL``; ``[SCHEMA]``);
+* a single-transaction platform installation that seeds the initial
+  ``platform.bootstrap`` grant and an immutable ``installed`` marker, validated
+  by a fail-closed ``install_state`` ``BEFORE INSERT`` trigger (``[SCHEMA]``).
+
+Everything else in the ARCH-01/02/04 program (evidence stores, repository
+bindings, workspaces, PostgreSQL parity, full grant succession, full principal
+merge) is out of scope here and tracked in its own issue — see #822 §5/§17.
+
+**Readiness / production posture.** This subsystem is *disabled by default*.
+Nothing in the running MCP server imports or enables it. It becomes a security
+boundary only once its readiness checks (the ACs in #822) pass in the target
+environment. Instantiating :class:`PlatformKernel` creates an isolated SQLite
+database and never touches the operational control-plane store.
+
+Enforcement classification (per #820 vocabulary):
+
+* ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` — actor-context authenticity: the scalar functions are
+  registered by the trusted Python process; SQL cannot define or redefine them.
+* ``[SCHEMA]`` — fail-closed aborts, the dominance/immutability/NOT-NULL-class/
+  last-active-grant invariants, enforced by CHECK/FK/trigger.
+* ``[RUNTIME-ADAPTER]`` — *none* in this slice.
+
+SQLite-first. ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serializes concurrent installs and concurrent
+grant/revoke on the singleton invariant row. PostgreSQL parity is a distinct
+issue (#827); this module does **not** claim it.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Iterator, Optional
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Closed enumerations (#822 §4).
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+ACTOR_KINDS = ("operator", "supervisor", "service", "installer")
+OPERATION_MODES = ("normal", "install", "merge", "internal_service")
+
+# Exact seeded authority-dominance tuple set (#822 §4). This set is normative:
+# the install-state trigger rejects any missing, additional, or malformed tuple.
+DOMINANCE_TUPLES = (
+    ("platform.bootstrap", "platform.bootstrap"),
+    ("platform.bootstrap", "project.admin"),
+    ("platform.bootstrap", "supervisor.root.establish"),
+    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.register"),
+    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.verify"),
+    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.recover"),
+)
+
+# The distinguished operator-key issuer seeded during install.
+DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_KIND = "operator-key"
+DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID = "platform.bootstrap.operator-key"
+
+# Structured result codes (#822 §10).
+INSTALLED = "INSTALLED"
+ALREADY_INSTALLED = "ALREADY_INSTALLED"
+INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT = "INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT"
+INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE = "INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE"
+DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH = "DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH"
+AUTHORIZATION_DENIED = "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED"
+CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST = "CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST"
+
+# Required audit events (#822 §14).
+EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED = "platform_installed"
+EVT_GRANT_CREATED = "platform_grant_created"
+EVT_GRANT_REVOKED = "platform_grant_revoked"
+EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED = "principal_registered"
+
+SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+DB_PATH_ENV = "ARCH01_PLATFORM_DB"
+
+
+class PlatformKernelError(RuntimeError):
+    """Base class for structured, code-bearing kernel failures."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str, message: str = "") -> None:
+        super().__init__(message or code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+class ActorContextError(PlatformKernelError):
+    """Raised when a mutation is attempted without a valid actor context."""
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Schema (#822 §6). Tables + fail-closed triggers.
+#
+# Every *mutating* trigger opens with the actor protocol: read the context
+# epoch, read the actor fields, and abort unless the context is present,
+# non-null, mode/kind well-formed, and epoch-consistent with the active
+# transaction. The scalar functions ``cp_*`` are registered from Python only;
+# SQL has no statement that can set them, which is the trusted-service boundary.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL = ", ".join("'%s'" % k for k in ACTOR_KINDS)
+_OP_MODES_SQL = ", ".join("'%s'" % m for m in OPERATION_MODES)
+
+# Actor-protocol predicate: TRUE when the context is INVALID and the trigger
+# must abort. ``cp_actor_context_valid()`` folds "present + non-expired +
+# live-epoch == bound-epoch" (the read/re-read epoch equality of #822 §4) into
+# one trusted-service answer; the remaining reads assert field well-formedness.
+_INVALID_ACTOR = (
+    "cp_actor_context_valid() IS NOT 1 "
+    "OR cp_context_epoch() IS NULL "
+    "OR cp_actor_principal() IS NULL "
+    "OR cp_actor_kind() NOT IN (%s) "
+    "OR cp_operation_mode() NOT IN (%s)" % (_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL, _OP_MODES_SQL)
+)
+
+_ACTOR_GUARD = (
+    "SELECT CASE WHEN (%s) "
+    "THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT') END;" % _INVALID_ACTOR
+)
+
+# require_installed: abort a privileged mutation when there is no install
+# marker and we are not currently installing (#822 §4).
+_REQUIRE_INSTALLED = (
+    "SELECT CASE WHEN ((SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) = 0 "
+    "AND cp_operation_mode() <> 'install') "
+    "THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'NOT_INSTALLED') END;"
+)
+
+_SCHEMA_SQL = f"""
+PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS arch01_meta (
+    key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    value TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+-- Equivalence classes are created BEFORE their first principal (#822 §4).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principal_equivalence_classes (
+    class_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS authoritative_issuers (
+    issuer_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    issuer_kind TEXT NOT NULL,
+    issuer_ref TEXT NOT NULL,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+    UNIQUE (issuer_kind, issuer_ref)
+);
+
+-- current_class_id is NOT NULL: a principal cannot exist without a class
+-- (#822 AC6). issuer_id is nullable ONLY for the installer during install
+-- (#822 AC7), enforced by trg_principals_null_issuer below.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principals (
+    principal_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    actor_kind TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (actor_kind IN ({_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL})),
+    current_class_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES principal_equivalence_classes(class_id),
+    issuer_id INTEGER REFERENCES authoritative_issuers(issuer_id),
+    registered_by TEXT REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS authority_dominance (
+    dominant TEXT NOT NULL,
+    subordinate TEXT NOT NULL,
+    PRIMARY KEY (dominant, subordinate)
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_bootstrap_seed (
+    seed_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (seed_id = 1),
+    installer_principal_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_bootstrap_grants (
+    grant_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    grantee_principal_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    granted_by TEXT REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    active INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1 CHECK (active IN (0, 1)),
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+    revoked_at TEXT
+);
+
+-- Singleton row; active_count floored at 1 by CHECK so the last active grant
+-- can never be revoked (#822 AC11).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_active_invariant (
+    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
+    active_count INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (active_count >= 1)
+);
+
+-- The immutable install marker; inserted LAST in the install transaction.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS install_state (
+    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
+    marker TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (marker = 'installed'),
+    installed_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+-- Append-only (#822 AC14).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_records (
+    audit_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    event TEXT NOT NULL,
+    principal_id TEXT,
+    detail TEXT,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- Actor protocol on every mutating trigger (#822 §4, [SCHEMA] fail-closed).
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_classes_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON principal_equivalence_classes
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON authoritative_issuers
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON principals
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON authority_dominance
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON platform_bootstrap_seed
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_actor_insert
+BEFORE INSERT ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+    {_REQUIRE_INSTALLED}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_actor_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_invariant_actor_insert
+BEFORE INSERT ON platform_active_invariant
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_invariant_actor_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_active_invariant
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON audit_records
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- NOT-NULL-issuer exception for the installer only (#822 AC7).
+-- A NULL issuer_id is accepted solely for an installer principal during
+-- install mode, before the marker exists; any other NULL-issuer principal is
+-- rejected. install-time issuer linkage (installer -> distinguished issuer)
+-- is applied by a later UPDATE, permitted while no marker exists.
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_null_issuer
+BEFORE INSERT ON principals
+WHEN NEW.issuer_id IS NULL
+BEGIN
+    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
+        NEW.actor_kind = 'installer'
+        AND cp_operation_mode() = 'install'
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) = 0
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM principals WHERE issuer_id IS NULL) = 0
+    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE') END;
+END;
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- Post-install immutability of the authority root (#822 §4, AC9).
+-- Registration fields freeze only AFTER the marker exists, so the install
+-- transaction's own installer issuer-linkage UPDATE is permitted.
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_frozen_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON principals
+WHEN (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) > 0
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_frozen_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON principals
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL');
+END;
+
+-- Distinguished issuer identity is immutable once written.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON authoritative_issuers
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_ISSUER');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON authoritative_issuers
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_ISSUER');
+END;
+
+-- The dominance lattice is immutable once seeded.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON authority_dominance
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON authority_dominance
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE');
+END;
+
+-- The bootstrap seed is immutable once written.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_seed
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_SEED');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON platform_bootstrap_seed
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_SEED');
+END;
+
+-- The install marker is immutable once written.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON install_state
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON install_state
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE');
+END;
+
+-- Grants: identity is immutable; the ONLY permitted mutation is a single
+-- active 1 -> 0 revocation (#822 §4 initial-grant identity immutability +
+-- grant/revoke). Reactivation and identity edits are rejected.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_identity_frozen
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+WHEN NOT (
+    NEW.grant_id = OLD.grant_id
+    AND NEW.grantee_principal_id = OLD.grantee_principal_id
+    AND NEW.granted_by IS OLD.granted_by
+    AND NEW.created_at = OLD.created_at
+    AND OLD.active = 1
+    AND NEW.active = 0
+)
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_GRANT');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_no_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_GRANT');
+END;
+
+-- audit_records is append-only.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON audit_records
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_AUDIT');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON audit_records
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_AUDIT');
+END;
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- install_state BEFORE INSERT: validate the whole bootstrap atomically
+-- (#822 §4, AC4). Each dominance tuple is checked individually; a missing,
+-- additional, or malformed tuple -> DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH. The seed<->installer
+-- link, the single active NULL-grantor installer grant, the installer's
+-- non-NULL issuer, the active invariant, and "no extra principal created under
+-- the NULL-issuer exception" -> INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE.
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_validate
+BEFORE INSERT ON install_state
+BEGIN
+    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
+        (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM authority_dominance) = {len(DOMINANCE_TUPLES)}
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='platform.bootstrap')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='project.admin')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='supervisor.root.establish')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.register')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.verify')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.recover')
+    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH') END;
+
+    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
+        (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_seed) = 1
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM principals) = 1
+        AND (SELECT actor_kind FROM principals
+             WHERE principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
+            ) = 'installer'
+        AND (SELECT issuer_id FROM principals
+             WHERE principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
+            ) IS NOT NULL
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_grants
+             WHERE granted_by IS NULL AND active = 1
+               AND grantee_principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
+            ) = 1
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_grants) = 1
+        AND (SELECT active_count FROM platform_active_invariant WHERE id = 1) = 1
+    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE') END;
+END;
+"""
+
+
+def default_db_path() -> str:
+    return os.environ.get(
+        DB_PATH_ENV,
+        os.path.expanduser("~/.cache/gitea-tools/arch01/platform.sqlite3"),
+    )
+
+
+def _utc_now_iso() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OperationResult:
+    """Structured result of a kernel operation (#822 §10)."""
+
+    code: str
+    detail: str = ""
+
+    @property
+    def ok(self) -> bool:
+        return self.code in (INSTALLED, ALREADY_INSTALLED)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class _ActorContext:
+    principal: str
+    kind: str
+    mode: str
+    session: Optional[str]
+    bound_epoch: int
+    live_epoch: int
+    expired: bool = False
+
+
+class PlatformKernel:
+    """ARCH-01 authority kernel over a single SQLite connection.
+
+    The connection carries the trusted-service actor context: the ``cp_*``
+    scalar functions read the context this object holds. Only Python code here
+    can bind or clear it, so no SQL statement can assert an actor identity — the
+    trusted-service authenticity boundary of #822 §4.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path: Optional[str] = None, *, busy_timeout_ms: int = 5000) -> None:
+        self.db_path = db_path or default_db_path()
+        if self.db_path != ":memory:":
+            parent = os.path.dirname(self.db_path)
+            if parent:
+                os.makedirs(parent, exist_ok=True)
+        self._ctx: Optional[_ActorContext] = None
+        self._epoch_seq = 0
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        # check_same_thread=False is safe: every mutation path is serialized
+        # by self._lock, so the connection is never used concurrently even when
+        # callers drive the kernel from different threads (concurrency tests).
+        self._conn = sqlite3.connect(
+            self.db_path, isolation_level=None, check_same_thread=False
+        )
+        self._conn.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
+        self._conn.execute(f"PRAGMA busy_timeout = {int(busy_timeout_ms)}")
+        self._register_actor_functions()
+        self._migrate()
+
+    # -- trusted-service actor functions ---------------------------------- #
+
+    def _register_actor_functions(self) -> None:
+        c = self._conn
+        c.create_function("cp_actor_principal", 0, lambda: self._ctx.principal if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_actor_kind", 0, lambda: self._ctx.kind if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_operation_mode", 0, lambda: self._ctx.mode if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_service_session", 0, lambda: self._ctx.session if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_context_epoch", 0, self._fn_context_epoch)
+        # Trusted-service helper: folds present + non-expired + epoch-consistent
+        # into the read/re-read epoch equality of #822 §4.
+        c.create_function("cp_actor_context_valid", 0, self._fn_context_valid)
+
+    def _fn_context_epoch(self) -> Optional[int]:
+        if self._ctx is None or self._ctx.expired:
+            return None
+        return self._ctx.live_epoch
+
+    def _fn_context_valid(self) -> int:
+        ctx = self._ctx
+        if ctx is None or ctx.expired:
+            return 0
+        # read/re-read epoch equality: a context whose live epoch has drifted
+        # from the epoch it was bound to (a stale/replaced connection context)
+        # is not bound to the active transaction and fails closed.
+        if ctx.live_epoch != ctx.bound_epoch:
+            return 0
+        if ctx.principal is None:
+            return 0
+        if ctx.kind not in ACTOR_KINDS or ctx.mode not in OPERATION_MODES:
+            return 0
+        return 1
+
+    # -- context lifecycle ------------------------------------------------ #
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def actor_context(
+        self, principal: str, kind: str, mode: str, session: Optional[str] = None
+    ) -> Iterator[None]:
+        """Bind a trusted actor context for the duration of the block."""
+        prev = self._ctx
+        self._epoch_seq += 1
+        epoch = self._epoch_seq
+        self._ctx = _ActorContext(
+            principal=principal, kind=kind, mode=mode, session=session,
+            bound_epoch=epoch, live_epoch=epoch,
+        )
+        try:
+            yield
+        finally:
+            self._ctx = prev
+
+    def _clear_context(self) -> None:
+        self._ctx = None
+
+    # -- migration -------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def _migrate(self) -> None:
+        self._conn.executescript(_SCHEMA_SQL)
+        self._conn.execute(
+            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO arch01_meta(key, value) VALUES ('schema_version', ?)",
+            (str(SCHEMA_VERSION),),
+        )
+        self._conn.execute(
+            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO arch01_meta(key, value) VALUES "
+            "('architecture', 'ARCH-01 Slice A: atomic install + authority kernel (#822); "
+            "disabled by default until readiness checks pass')"
+        )
+
+    # -- introspection ---------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def is_installed(self) -> bool:
+        row = self._conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state").fetchone()
+        return bool(row[0])
+
+    def active_grant_count(self) -> int:
+        row = self._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT active_count FROM platform_active_invariant WHERE id = 1"
+        ).fetchone()
+        return int(row[0]) if row else 0
+
+    def audit_events(self) -> list[str]:
+        return [
+            r[0]
+            for r in self._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT event FROM audit_records ORDER BY audit_id"
+            ).fetchall()
+        ]
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        self._conn.close()
+
+    # -- operations ------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def install_platform(
+        self,
+        installer_principal_id: str = "platform.installer",
+        *,
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Single atomic install transaction (#822 §4/§7).
+
+        ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serializes concurrent installs; the loser rechecks
+        the marker and returns ``ALREADY_INSTALLED``, or — if it never acquires
+        the write lock — ``CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST``. On any stage failure
+        the whole transaction rolls back leaving no partial rows (AC3/AC5).
+        """
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                if "locked" in str(exc).lower() or "busy" in str(exc).lower():
+                    return OperationResult(CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST, str(exc))
+                raise
+            try:
+                if self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(ALREADY_INSTALLED, "install marker already present")
+
+                with self.actor_context(installer_principal_id, "installer", "install", session):
+                    c = self._conn
+                    # class -> installer principal (temporary NULL issuer)
+                    cur = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)",
+                        (now,),
+                    )
+                    class_id = cur.lastrowid
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principals"
+                        "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
+                        (installer_principal_id, class_id, installer_principal_id, now),
+                    )
+                    # distinguished operator-key issuer
+                    cur = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
+                        (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_KIND, DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
+                    )
+                    issuer_id = cur.lastrowid
+                    # link installer -> issuer (permitted pre-marker)
+                    c.execute(
+                        "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
+                        (issuer_id, installer_principal_id),
+                    )
+                    # dominance tuples
+                    c.executemany(
+                        "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
+                        DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
+                    )
+                    # seed
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
+                        (installer_principal_id, now),
+                    )
+                    # initial grant (granted_by NULL, active)
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants"
+                        "(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
+                        (installer_principal_id, now),
+                    )
+                    # active invariant
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)"
+                    )
+                    # audit rows for the security-sensitive operation
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED, installer_principal_id, "installer", now),
+                    )
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_GRANT_CREATED, installer_principal_id, "initial platform.bootstrap grant", now),
+                    )
+                    # install marker LAST -> fires the whole-bootstrap validator
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO install_state(id, marker, installed_at) VALUES (1, 'installed', ?)",
+                        (now,),
+                    )
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED, installer_principal_id, "platform installed", now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, "platform installed")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    def register_principal(
+        self,
+        principal_id: str,
+        actor_kind: str,
+        issuer_ref: str,
+        *,
+        actor_principal: str,
+        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Atomically create an equivalence class and its first principal.
+
+        The class is inserted *before* the principal, and ``current_class_id``
+        is ``NOT NULL`` (#822 AC6): a principal can never exist classless.
+        The principal references an existing issuer (non-NULL); the temporary
+        NULL-issuer exception is reserved for the installer during install
+        (AC7).
+        """
+        if actor_kind not in ACTOR_KINDS:
+            return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, f"bad actor_kind {actor_kind!r}")
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
+            try:
+                if not self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
+                row = self._conn.execute(
+                    "SELECT issuer_id FROM authoritative_issuers WHERE issuer_ref = ?",
+                    (issuer_ref,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is None:
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, f"unknown issuer {issuer_ref!r}")
+                issuer_id = row[0]
+                with self.actor_context(actor_principal, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
+                    cur = self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)",
+                        (now,),
+                    )
+                    class_id = cur.lastrowid
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principals"
+                        "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (principal_id, actor_kind, class_id, issuer_id, actor_principal, now),
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED, principal_id, actor_kind, now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"registered {principal_id}")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    def grant_platform_bootstrap(
+        self,
+        grantee_principal_id: str,
+        granted_by: str,
+        *,
+        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Create an additional active platform.bootstrap grant.
+
+        Serialized on the singleton invariant row via ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE``.
+        """
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
+            try:
+                if not self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
+                with self.actor_context(granted_by, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants"
+                        "(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, 1, ?)",
+                        (grantee_principal_id, granted_by, now),
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE platform_active_invariant SET active_count = active_count + 1 WHERE id = 1"
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_GRANT_CREATED, grantee_principal_id, f"granted_by={granted_by}", now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"granted to {grantee_principal_id}")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    def revoke_platform_bootstrap(
+        self,
+        grant_id: int,
+        *,
+        actor_principal: str,
+        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Revoke an active grant, floored so the last one can never drop.
+
+        The ``active_count >= 1`` CHECK plus ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serialization
+        make two concurrent revocations unable to remove the final active grant
+        (#822 AC11): the decrement that would reach zero fails and rolls back.
+        """
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
+            try:
+                if not self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
+                row = self._conn.execute(
+                    "SELECT active, grantee_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                    (grant_id,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is None or row[0] != 1:
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, "grant absent or already inactive")
+                grantee = row[1]
+                with self.actor_context(actor_principal, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
+                    # Decrement first: the CHECK floor rejects dropping below 1,
+                    # aborting the whole revoke before the grant flips inactive.
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE platform_active_invariant SET active_count = active_count - 1 WHERE id = 1"
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE platform_bootstrap_grants SET active = 0, revoked_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                        (now, grant_id),
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_GRANT_REVOKED, grantee, f"grant_id={grant_id}", now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"revoked grant {grant_id}")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    # -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def _safe_rollback(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+        except sqlite3.Error:
+            pass
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _classify(exc: sqlite3.Error) -> str:
+        msg = str(exc)
+        if "INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT" in msg:
+            return INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT
+        if "DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH" in msg:
+            return DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH
+        if "active_count" in msg or "CHECK constraint failed: platform_active_invariant" in msg:
+            # last-active-grant floor tripped
+            return AUTHORIZATION_DENIED
+        if any(tag in msg for tag in (
+            "INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE", "IMMUTABLE_", "NOT_INSTALLED",
+        )):
+            return INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE
+        return INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE

control_plane_db.py

@@ -1637,11 +1637,13 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
         provenance: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
         lease_ttl_seconds: int = DEFAULT_LEASE_TTL_SECONDS,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        """Transfer or refresh a lease with provenance (#601).
+        """Transfer or refresh a lease with provenance (#601 / #843).
 
         * Same owner + active → refresh (owner-resume).
+        * Cross-role handoff pending + matching required role → atomic consume
+          (even while the allocating controller session still "owns" the lease).
         * Expired/abandoned/released → create new assignment+lease with provenance.
-        * Active foreign → raise ForeignLeaseError (never silent steal).
+        * Active foreign (non-handoff) → raise ForeignLeaseError (never silent steal).
         """
         now = _utc_now()
         now_s = _ts(now)
@@ -1677,7 +1679,35 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
                 status = "expired"
 
             owner = lease["session_id"]
-            if status == "active" and owner != adopter_session_id:
+            # Parse durable provenance for cross-role handoff consume (#843).
+            lease_prov: dict[str, Any] = {}
+            if "provenance_json" in lease.keys() and lease["provenance_json"]:
+                try:
+                    loaded = json.loads(lease["provenance_json"])
+                    if isinstance(loaded, dict):
+                        lease_prov = loaded
+                except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+                    lease_prov = {}
+            handoff_pending = bool(lease_prov.get("cross_role_handoff")) and (
+                str(lease_prov.get("handoff_status") or "pending").strip().lower()
+                == "pending"
+            )
+            already_adopted = bool(
+                (lease["adopted_by_session_id"] if "adopted_by_session_id" in lease.keys() else None)
+                or lease_prov.get("adopted_by_session_id")
+            )
+            required_role = str(
+                lease_prov.get("required_role") or lease["role"] or ""
+            ).strip().lower()
+            adopter_role = (role or "").strip().lower()
+            cross_role_consume = (
+                handoff_pending
+                and not already_adopted
+                and status == "active"
+                and owner != adopter_session_id
+            )
+
+            if status == "active" and owner != adopter_session_id and not cross_role_consume:
                 raise ForeignLeaseError(
                     f"cannot adopt active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by {owner}"
                 )
@@ -1761,6 +1791,142 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
                     "reasons": ["owner-resume: refreshed lease with provenance"],
                 }
 
+            # #843: controller→required-role handoff consume (atomic, same lease_id)
+            if cross_role_consume:
+                if not required_role:
+                    raise ControlPlaneError(
+                        f"cross-role handoff lease {lease_id} missing required_role"
+                    )
+                if adopter_role != required_role:
+                    raise ForeignLeaseError(
+                        f"wrong role for cross-role handoff consume: "
+                        f"required={required_role} adopter={adopter_role or 'none'} "
+                        f"(fail closed)"
+                    )
+                # CAS: only transfer if still owned by allocating session and unadopted
+                cols = self._lease_columns(conn)
+                adopted_col_null = (
+                    "(adopted_by_session_id IS NULL OR adopted_by_session_id = '')"
+                    if "adopted_by_session_id" in cols
+                    else "1=1"
+                )
+                cas = conn.execute(
+                    f"""
+                    UPDATE leases
+                    SET session_id = ?,
+                        heartbeat_at = ?,
+                        expires_at = ?,
+                        phase = ?,
+                        role = ?
+                    WHERE lease_id = ?
+                      AND status = 'active'
+                      AND session_id = ?
+                      AND {adopted_col_null}
+                    """,
+                    (
+                        adopter_session_id,
+                        now_s,
+                        expires,
+                        "adopted",
+                        required_role,
+                        lease_id,
+                        owner,
+                    ),
+                )
+                if cas.rowcount != 1:
+                    raise ForeignLeaseError(
+                        f"cross-role handoff consume lost race for lease {lease_id} "
+                        "(already adopted or no longer pending; fail closed)"
+                    )
+                if "adopted_from_session_id" in cols:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        """
+                        UPDATE leases
+                        SET adopted_from_session_id = ?, adopted_by_session_id = ?
+                        WHERE lease_id = ?
+                        """,
+                        (owner, adopter_session_id, lease_id),
+                    )
+                if "worktree_path" in cols and worktree_path:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE leases SET worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                        (worktree_path, lease_id),
+                    )
+                if "owner_pid" in cols and owner_pid is not None:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                        (owner_pid, lease_id),
+                    )
+                if "expected_head_sha" in cols and expected_head_sha:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE leases SET expected_head_sha = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                        (expected_head_sha, lease_id),
+                    )
+                # Merge handoff provenance + caller provenance
+                merged = dict(lease_prov)
+                merged.update(provenance or {})
+                merged["cross_role_handoff"] = True
+                merged["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
+                merged["adopted_from_session_id"] = owner
+                merged["adopted_by_session_id"] = adopter_session_id
+                merged["required_role"] = required_role
+                if "provenance_json" in cols:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE leases SET provenance_json = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                        (json.dumps(merged), lease_id),
+                    )
+                # Transfer active assignment ownership atomically
+                asn_cas = conn.execute(
+                    """
+                    UPDATE assignments
+                    SET session_id = ?, role = ?
+                    WHERE lease_id = ? AND status = 'active' AND session_id = ?
+                    """,
+                    (adopter_session_id, required_role, lease_id, owner),
+                )
+                if asn_cas.rowcount < 1:
+                    # Fail closed: assignment must move with the lease
+                    raise ControlPlaneError(
+                        f"cross-role handoff: no active assignment for lease {lease_id} "
+                        f"owned by {owner}"
+                    )
+                lease2 = conn.execute(
+                    "SELECT * FROM leases WHERE lease_id = ?", (lease_id,)
+                ).fetchone()
+                asn = conn.execute(
+                    """
+                    SELECT * FROM assignments
+                    WHERE lease_id = ? AND status = 'active'
+                    ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1
+                    """,
+                    (lease_id,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                conn.execute(
+                    """
+                    INSERT INTO events(work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)
+                    VALUES (?, 'lease_adopted', ?, ?)
+                    """,
+                    (
+                        lease["work_item_id"],
+                        f"cross-role handoff: {adopter_session_id} consumed "
+                        f"{lease_id} from {owner} as {required_role}",
+                        now_s,
+                    ),
+                )
+                return {
+                    "outcome": "adopted_cross_role_handoff",
+                    "lease": dict(lease2) if lease2 else dict(lease),
+                    "assignment": dict(asn) if asn else None,
+                    "reasons": [
+                        "cross-role handoff: independent required-role worker consumed "
+                        "controller allocation without abandonment"
+                    ],
+                    "adopted_by_session_id": adopter_session_id,
+                    "adopted_from_session_id": owner,
+                    "required_role": required_role,
+                    "handoff_status": "adopted",
+                }
+
             # Non-active: create new lease + assignment (transfer)
             new_lease_id = f"lease-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]}"
             new_asn_id = f"asn-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]}"

docs/webui-authz-audit.md

@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+# Web console authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model (#633)
+
+**Phase 1. Read-only. This document defines the model that future console
+writes must pass through; it enables none of them.**
+
+The MVP deployment boundary ([`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md), #435)
+documents internal-only serving and states plainly that MVP authentication is
+*none* — protection comes from network placement. That is adequate while every
+route is a GET, and inadequate the moment a gated write ships. This document
+and the three modules it describes land **before** any write exists, so no
+Phase 2 action can be added without an authority to check it against.
+
+| Concern | Module |
+|---------|--------|
+| Identity, roles, authorization decision | `webui/console_authz.py` |
+| Secret redaction for every surface | `webui/console_redaction.py` |
+| Audit event schema, retention, sink | `webui/console_audit.py` |
+| Machine-readable publication | `GET /api/console/security-model` |
+
+Two invariants hold everywhere and are non-negotiable for every child of #631:
+
+1. **No secrets reach the browser.** Credentials are resolved server-side and
+   redacted before any payload, page, log line, or audit record leaves.
+2. **No ungated mutations.** Authorization is necessary but never sufficient;
+   execution stays disabled until the Phase 2 framework ships.
+
+## Identity sources
+
+The console performs *authorization*. Authentication is delegated, because a
+console that mints its own sessions is a credential store, and this one must
+not be.
+
+| Source | Mode value | Authenticated | Shared host | Phase |
+|--------|-----------|---------------|-------------|-------|
+| None | `none` (default) | No — anonymous, capped at `viewer` | No | 1 |
+| Local dev | `local-dev` / `local_dev` | Yes, **asserted not verified** | No | 1 |
+| Access proxy | `access-proxy` / `access_proxy` | Yes, asserted by trusted proxy | Yes | 2 |
+
+Selected by `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE`. An unrecognised value falls back to `none`
+rather than erroring open.
+
+**Access-proxy mode** reads the subject from the
+`Cf-Access-Authenticated-User-Email` header, set by Cloudflare Access, WARP, or
+an equivalent org portal that terminates authentication in front of the
+console. If the header is absent the request did not traverse the proxy, so the
+principal degrades to anonymous — it is never trusted by default.
+
+The **role is always server-side configuration**, never a client assertion. It
+comes from `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`, a JSON object of subject → role:
+
+```json
+{"[email protected]": "operator", "[email protected]": "controller"}
+```
+
+An unmapped subject gets `viewer`. Malformed JSON yields an empty map, so
+everyone gets `viewer` — a parse failure loses authority rather than granting
+it.
+
+Full SSO is explicitly a non-goal of this issue.
+
+## Role matrix
+
+Four roles, ordered least to most authority. Each role inherits every lower
+role's actions; the table states the *minimum* rank required.
+
+| Role | Authority |
+|------|-----------|
+| `viewer` | Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase. |
+| `operator` | Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR. |
+| `controller` | Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR. |
+| `admin` | Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions. |
+
+`viewer` holds the empty write set by construction, and a test asserts it stays
+empty.
+
+## Privileged actions
+
+Every console action maps to a `task_key` in `task_capability_map.py`, the same
+single source of truth `gitea_resolve_task_capability` and the MCP tool gates
+use. The console therefore cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not
+already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
+
+| Action | Minimum role | Class | MCP permission | Confirm | Dual control | Break-glass | Phase |
+|--------|--------------|-------|----------------|---------|--------------|-------------|-------|
+| `claim_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `comment_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `create_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `comment_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `create_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `review_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.review` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
+| `close_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
+| `merge_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.merge` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
+| `delete_branch` | admin | destructive | `gitea.branch.delete` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
+
+**Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
+second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is
+expected to be unavailable in normal operation and its use is retained for two
+years. Both are declared here and enforced by the Phase 2 framework; Phase 1
+records the requirement on every decision so the framework cannot ship without
+honouring it.
+
+`delete_branch` is admin-only rather than controller because it is the one
+irreversible action in the set.
+
+### Authorization decision
+
+`authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=False)` returns a decision
+record and **denies by default**. The deny reasons are closed and enumerated:
+
+| Reason code | Meaning |
+|-------------|---------|
+| `unknown_action` | No such console action is registered. |
+| `unauthenticated` | The principal is anonymous. |
+| `unknown_role` | The role is not in the matrix. |
+| `insufficient_role` | The role ranks below the action's minimum. |
+| `phase_not_active` | Execution requested for an action whose phase is not open. |
+| `allowed_preview_only` | Authorized — preview only, execution still disabled. |
+
+There is no implicit allow branch. Even the allow result reports
+`execution_enabled: false` while the console is in Phase 1, so no caller can
+read an allow as permission to mutate.
+
+## Secret redaction
+
+One pass applies to **API payloads, rendered HTML, server logs, and audit
+records** — the four surfaces where a credential could escape.
+
+Redaction reuses `gitea_audit.redact` rather than forking it: that remains the
+authority for secret-looking dict keys, `Authorization` material, and raw URLs.
+The console layer then applies its own patterns:
+
+Each rule below matches an *assignment form*: the named key, followed by `=` or
+`:`, followed by the value. The keys are listed bare rather than spelled out as
+complete assignments, because this document is itself scanned by
+`scan_for_secrets` — writing the examples in full assignment form would make the
+documentation trip the very detectors it documents.
+
+| Rule | Catches (as an assignment) |
+|------|----------------------------|
+| `credential_assignment` | `token`, `password`, `passwd`, `secret`, `api_key`, `access_key`, `client_secret`, `private_key` |
+| `credential_env_assignment` | `GITEA_TOKEN`, `GITEA_PASS`, `GITEA_PASSWORD` and suffixed variants |
+| `keychain_reference` | `keychain:` entry references |
+| `keychain_command` | macOS `security` keychain lookups (`find-generic-password`, `find-internet-password`) |
+| `private_key_block` | PEM `BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY` blocks |
+| `json_web_token` | Three-segment `eyJ...` JWTs |
+| `bearer_credential` | `Bearer` / `Basic` credentials |
+
+Assignments keep the key and replace only the value, so an operator can still
+see *what* was removed. Two behaviours are deliberate:
+
+- **Fail closed.** A value that cannot be redacted becomes `[REDACTED]`
+  outright rather than being emitted raw. Redaction never raises.
+- **Redact before persist.** `console_audit.build_event` redacts before
+  serialization, and `write_event` re-scans and **drops** any record that still
+  trips a detector. An unredacted record is never durable.
+
+`scan_for_secrets` is the assertion helper: it returns the detector names still
+matching a payload, and already-redacted hits are not findings. Tests use it to
+prove the published policy, the security-model endpoint, and this document
+itself carry no secret material.
+
+## Audit event schema
+
+`gitea_audit` records MCP-side *mutations* — which profile and Gitea user
+performed which tool call. It has no console actor, no identity source, no
+correlation identifier, and no retention class, and an authorization **denial**
+is not a mutation, so it would never appear there at all. The console record is
+additive, not a replacement: a Phase 2 action emits both, joined on
+`correlation.request_id`.
+
+Required fields, all asserted by tests so an edit cannot quietly drop one:
+
+| Field | Content |
+|-------|---------|
+| `schema_version` | Currently `1`. |
+| `event_id` | Unique per record. |
+| `timestamp` | Timezone-aware ISO-8601, UTC. |
+| `actor` | `subject`, `role`, `identity_source`, `authenticated`. |
+| `action` | Console action id. |
+| `action_class` | `gated_write`, `privileged`, `destructive`, or `unknown`. |
+| `target` | `{kind, ref}`, e.g. `{"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"}`. |
+| `result` | `allowed`, `denied`, `previewed`, `failed`, `succeeded`. |
+| `reason_code` | The authorization reason code above. |
+| `correlation` | `request_id`, `session_id`, `mcp_task`, `mcp_permission`. |
+| `retention` | `class`, `days`, `expires_at`. |
+| `redacted` | Always `true`; records are redacted at build time. |
+
+An unrecognised `result` degrades to `failed` rather than being stored
+verbatim.
+
+The sink is an append-only JSON Lines file named by
+`WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`. It is **off by default**: with the variable unset,
+events are still built — so callers and tests exercise the schema — but nothing
+is written. Auditing never raises; a failed write returns `False` rather than
+breaking the request it describes.
+
+## Retention
+
+| Class | Applies to | Default |
+|-------|-----------|---------|
+| `standard` | Routine gated writes | 90 days |
+| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
+| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch` | 730 days |
+
+Each record carries its own class, day count, and computed `expires_at`, so
+retention is auditable per record rather than inferred from file age. An
+**unknown action is retained as privileged, not standard** — for a safety
+control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
+
+Nothing in this module updates or deletes. Expiry is enforced by an
+operator-run policy against `expires_at`, never by the console silently
+rewriting its own history.
+
+## Phase 2 integration
+
+Phase 2 opens gated writes. It must reuse this model rather than introduce a
+second one. The integration points are already wired and observable:
+
+- **`GET /api/actions/{action_id}/preview`** attaches an `authorization` block
+  to the existing preview payload and records a `previewed` audit event.
+- **`POST /api/actions/{action_id}/attempt`** attaches the same block and
+  records a `denied` event. The terminal outcome is unchanged — the MVP
+  registry in `webui/gated_actions.py` still fails closed for every action — so
+  Phase 1 cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision
+  instead of adding a parallel check.
+- **`GET /api/console/security-model`** publishes the RBAC matrix, redaction
+  policy, and audit policy as JSON for operators and tests.
+
+To open Phase 2, a child issue must: raise `ACTIVE_PHASE`, implement the
+confirmation and dual-control flow the matrix already declares, emit a
+`succeeded` or `failed` record alongside the `gitea_audit` mutation record, and
+keep `viewer` unable to reach any of it. Turning on execution without the
+confirmation flow contradicts a declared requirement and is a review failure,
+not a shortcut.
+
+## Local-dev mode
+
+`WEBUI_AUTH_MODE=local-dev` reads the principal straight from the environment:
+
+| Variable | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|
+| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | Subject string; absent ⇒ anonymous |
+| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | One of `viewer`, `operator`, `controller`, `admin`; unrecognised ⇒ `viewer` |
+
+**INSECURE — this mode is for loopback development only.** The subject and role
+are *asserted by the developer running the process and verified by nothing*.
+Anyone able to set an environment variable on the host is an `admin`, and
+anyone able to reach the port inherits that principal. It provides no
+authentication whatsoever; it exists so Phase 2 authorization paths can be
+exercised without standing up a proxy.
+
+Never enable local-dev mode on a non-loopback bind. Combining it with
+`WEBUI_ALLOW_PUBLIC_BIND=1` or `WEBUI_ALLOW_REMOTE_BIND=1` publishes an
+unauthenticated admin console.
+
+For anything beyond a laptop use `access-proxy` mode behind Cloudflare Access,
+WARP, or a VPN, as [`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) requires.
+
+### Probe authentication
+
+`WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH=1` declares that non-public probes should require an
+authenticated principal. It is **opt-in**: the default is off so the MVP
+`/health` contract is unchanged.
+
+**This flag is declarative in Phase 1 and enforces nothing today.**
+`console_authz.probe_auth_required()` reports the operator's intent, and no
+route consults it — setting the variable does not currently change the
+behaviour of `/health` or any other endpoint. It is published here so the Phase
+2 action framework has a declared policy to honour rather than inventing a
+second one, exactly as `ACTIVE_PHASE` gates execution while the matrix is
+already declared. A regression test pins this "declared, not enforced" status,
+so wiring it later is a deliberate change rather than a silent one.
+
+Until Phase 2 wires it, probe protection rests on network placement alone, as
+[`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) (#435) states.
+
+## Environment variables
+
+| Variable | Default | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|---------|
+| `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE` | `none` | Identity source selection |
+| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | unset | Local-dev subject (insecure) |
+| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | `viewer` | Local-dev role (insecure) |
+| `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP` | unset | JSON subject → role map |
+| `WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH` | unset | Require auth for non-public probes |
+| `WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG` | unset | Append-only audit sink path |
+
+All are read server-side only. None is ever rendered into a page or returned by
+an API.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No full SSO product; authentication stays delegated to the proxy.
+- No browser-initiated merges or approvals in any phase covered here.
+- No tokens in the frontend, in browser storage, or in committed config.

docs/webui-deployment.md

@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ only.
 ## MVP deployment model
 
 - **Default bind:** `127.0.0.1:8765` (`WEBUI_HOST` / `WEBUI_PORT`)
-- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement
+- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement.
+  The authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model that future gated writes
+  must pass through is defined in
+  [`webui-authz-audit.md`](webui-authz-audit.md) (#633).
 - **Mutations:** read-only routes; gated write actions remain disabled (#434)
 - **Secrets:** resolved server-side via `gitea_auth` / `GITEA_MCP_CONFIG`; never
   embedded in HTML, JavaScript, or browser storage

docs/webui-local-dev.md

@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ for the console architecture: layer and authority boundaries, the redaction
 boundary, `/api/v1/...` versioning, the target page map, and the phase gates
 that govern when a write path may open (#632, epic #631).
 
+See [webui-project-registry-api.md](webui-project-registry-api.md) for the
+versioned project registry contract: registry schema versions 1 and 2, project
+status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
+
 ## Routes (MVP)
 
 | Path | Description |
@@ -51,9 +55,11 @@ that govern when a write path may open (#632, epic #631).
 | `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`) |
 | `/queue` | Live PR and issue queue dashboard (#429) |
 | `/api/queue` | JSON queue export with pagination metadata |
-| `/projects` | Project registry list (#427) |
+| `/projects` | Project registry list with status and onboarding progress (#427, #635) |
 | `/projects/{id}` | Project detail + onboarding checklist |
-| `/api/projects` | JSON registry export |
+| `/api/v1/projects` | Versioned JSON registry export (#635) |
+| `/api/v1/projects/{id}` | Versioned JSON project detail (#635) |
+| `/api/projects` | JSON registry export — unversioned Phase 1 alias of `/api/v1/projects` |
 | `/prompts` | Prompt library with per-prompt copy buttons (#428) |
 | `/api/prompts` | JSON prompt export with workflow hashes |
 | `/runtime` | MCP runtime health and stale detection (#430) |

docs/webui-project-registry-api.md

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+# Project registry API (#635)
+
+Phase 1 of the [console architecture ADR](architecture/webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md)
+gives the project registry a versioned, read-only API. This document is the
+field-by-field contract for that API and for the registry file behind it.
+
+Everything here is **read-only**. The console never writes the registry; an
+operator edits the JSON file, and an invalid file fails closed rather than
+rendering a partial inventory.
+
+## Routes
+
+| Route | Method | Description |
+|-------|--------|-------------|
+| `/api/v1/projects` | GET | Versioned registry export: all projects, with provenance |
+| `/api/v1/projects/{project_id}` | GET | Single project; `404` with `project_not_found` when unknown |
+| `/api/projects` | GET | Unversioned MVP alias (#427), retained for all of Phase 1 |
+| `/projects` | GET | HTML list — status and onboarding progress per project |
+| `/projects/{project_id}` | GET | HTML detail — identity, profiles, paths, checklist |
+
+Per ADR section 6 the unversioned alias may be retired no earlier than Phase 2,
+and only after this document and `webui-local-dev.md` record the swap. The alias
+returns the same payload as `/api/v1/projects`, including the legacy `version`
+and `source_path` keys #427 consumers already read.
+
+The HTML views render from the same DTO the JSON routes serialize
+(`project_to_dict`), so the console and the API cannot disagree about a
+project's status or onboarding progress.
+
+## Registry file
+
+Default location: `webui/data/projects.registry.json`. Override with the
+`WEBUI_PROJECT_REGISTRY` environment variable.
+
+Schema versions: **1** and **2** are accepted; **2** is current. A version 1
+file loads unchanged and is normalized with the documented defaults, so an
+existing operator registry keeps working without edits.
+
+### Root
+
+| Field | Type | Required | Notes |
+|-------|------|----------|-------|
+| `version` | int | yes | `1` or `2`. Anything else fails closed |
+| `projects` | array | yes | Must be non-empty |
+
+### Project
+
+| Field | Type | Required | Default | Notes |
+|-------|------|----------|---------|-------|
+| `id` | string | yes | — | Stable registry id used in URLs |
+| `repo_name` | string | yes | — | Gitea repository name |
+| `gitea_owner` | string | yes | — | Owning org or user |
+| `remote_host` | string | yes | — | Instance base URL, no credentials |
+| `remote_name` | string | no | `null` | Logical remote label, e.g. `prgs` (v2) |
+| `default_branch` | string | yes | — | Stable branch name |
+| `local_checkout_path` | string | yes | — | Control checkout path |
+| `status` | string | no | `active` | `active`, `onboarding`, `paused`, `archived` (v2) |
+| `profiles` | object | yes | — | Must map `author`, `reviewer`, `reconciler` |
+| `workflow_paths` | object | yes | — | Non-empty; label to repo-relative path |
+| `schema_paths` | object | no | `{}` | Label to repo-relative path |
+| `onboarding_checklist` | array | no | `[]` | See below |
+| `last_seen_health` | object | no | `null` | Redacted health only (v2) |
+
+### Onboarding step
+
+| Field | Type | Required | Default | Notes |
+|-------|------|----------|---------|-------|
+| `id` | string | yes | — | Stable step id |
+| `title` | string | yes | — | Short operator-facing label |
+| `description` | string | yes | — | Self-contained; assumes no chat history |
+| `state` | string | no | `pending` | `complete`, `pending`, `blocked`, `not_applicable` (v2) |
+| `required` | bool | no | `true` | Optional steps never block readiness (v2) |
+
+### Last-seen health
+
+| Field | Type | Required | Notes |
+|-------|------|----------|-------|
+| `status` | string | no (default `unknown`) | `healthy`, `degraded`, `unreachable`, `unknown` |
+| `checked_at` | string | no | ISO-8601 UTC timestamp, e.g. `2026-01-01T00:00:00Z` |
+| `detail` | string | no | Short redacted note |
+
+Health is recorded metadata, not a live probe: Phase 1 performs no outbound
+health checks. Endpoints, tokens, and keychain identifiers must never appear
+here.
+
+## Response shape
+
+`GET /api/v1/projects`:
+
+```json
+{
+  "api_version": "v1",
+  "schema_version": 2,
+  "version": 2,
+  "source_path": "/path/to/webui/data/projects.registry.json",
+  "source": {
+    "kind": "file",
+    "path": "/path/to/webui/data/projects.registry.json",
+    "inventory_complete": true
+  },
+  "project_count": 1,
+  "projects": [
+    {
+      "id": "example",
+      "repo_name": "Example",
+      "gitea_owner": "Org",
+      "repo_full_name": "Org/Example",
+      "remote_host": "https://gitea.example.invalid",
+      "remote_name": "example-remote",
+      "default_branch": "main",
+      "local_checkout_path": ".",
+      "status": "active",
+      "profiles": {"author": "...", "reviewer": "...", "reconciler": "..."},
+      "workflow_paths": {"skill": "skills/..."},
+      "schema_paths": {},
+      "onboarding_checklist": [
+        {
+          "id": "profiles",
+          "title": "Configure execution profiles",
+          "description": "...",
+          "state": "complete",
+          "required": true
+        }
+      ],
+      "onboarding_summary": {
+        "total": 1,
+        "complete": 1,
+        "pending": 0,
+        "blocked": 0,
+        "not_applicable": 0,
+        "required_outstanding": 0,
+        "onboarding_complete": true
+      },
+      "last_seen_health": null
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+`GET /api/v1/projects/{project_id}` returns `api_version`, `schema_version`,
+`source`, and a single `project` object with the same fields.
+
+The `source` block satisfies the ADR section 6 provenance rule: every payload
+states where the data came from and whether the inventory is complete. A
+file-backed registry is always complete — there is no pagination to truncate it.
+
+`onboarding_summary` is derived, never stored. `required_outstanding` counts
+steps that are `required` **and** in state `pending` or `blocked`;
+`onboarding_complete` is true when that count is zero.
+
+## Fail-closed errors
+
+Validation failures raise `RegistryError`, which routes render instead of a
+traceback.
+
+`404` — unknown project id on `/api/v1/projects/{project_id}`:
+
+```json
+{
+  "error": "project_not_found",
+  "project_id": "not-registered",
+  "known_project_ids": ["example"],
+  "remediation": "Request one of the known project ids, or add the project ...",
+  "source": {"kind": "file", "path": "...", "inventory_complete": true}
+}
+```
+
+`500` — invalid registry, on both the versioned route and the alias:
+
+```json
+{
+  "error": "registry_invalid",
+  "detail": "unsupported registry version: 42",
+  "remediation": "Set 'version' to one of 1, 2 (current schema is 2) ...",
+  "field_path": "version",
+  "source_path": "/path/to/registry.json"
+}
+```
+
+`field_path` points at the offending location (`projects[0].profiles.reconciler`,
+`projects[0].onboarding_checklist[2].state`, and so on). The HTML routes render
+the same detail, field, source, and remediation on a "Project registry
+unavailable" page.
+
+Conditions that fail closed:
+
+* file missing or unreadable;
+* invalid JSON (the remediation names line and column);
+* root not an object, or `projects` missing/empty;
+* unsupported `version`;
+* a credential-shaped key anywhere in the file (`token`, `*_secret`, `auth_*`, and similar);
+* a project missing a required field, or missing an `author`/`reviewer`/`reconciler` profile;
+* an unknown `status`, onboarding `state`, or health `status`.
+
+## Credential rule
+
+The registry stores redacted metadata only. Credential-shaped keys are
+rejected at load time, before any DTO is built, consistent with
+[safety-model.md](safety-model.md) and
+[credential-isolation.md](credential-isolation.md). Tokens live in the keychain
+and are resolved server-side by `gitea_auth`.
+
+## Migrating a version 1 registry
+
+1. Set `"version": 2`.
+2. Optionally add `"status"` per project (omitted means `active`).
+3. Optionally add `"remote_name"` per project.
+4. Optionally add `"state"` and `"required"` to each onboarding step (omitted
+   means `pending` and `true`).
+5. Optionally add `"last_seen_health"`.
+
+No step is mandatory: a version 1 file keeps loading. Bumping the version only
+declares that the file may use the v2 fields.

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -234,12 +234,25 @@ def _effective_workspace_role() -> str:
 
 
 def _profile_role_kind(profile: dict) -> str:
-    """Resolve a profile's declared role before inferring from permissions."""
-    role = (profile.get("role") or profile.get("role_kind") or "").strip()
+    """Resolve a profile's declared role before inferring from permissions.
+
+    Declared ``role`` / ``role_kind`` always wins so a controller profile is
+    never reclassified as reconciler from permission inference (#840).
+    """
+    role = (profile.get("role") or profile.get("role_kind") or "").strip().lower()
     if role:
+        # Normalize aliases / case.
+        if "control" in role:
+            return "controller"
         return role
     profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip().lower()
-    for candidate in ("reconciler", "merger", "reviewer", "author"):
+    for candidate in (
+        "controller",
+        "reconciler",
+        "merger",
+        "reviewer",
+        "author",
+    ):
         if candidate in profile_name:
             return candidate
     return _role_kind(
@@ -15538,7 +15551,8 @@ def mcp_get_control_plane_guide(
     profile = get_profile()
     allowed = profile["allowed_operations"]
     forbidden = profile["forbidden_operations"]
-    role = _role_kind(allowed, forbidden)
+    # Prefer declared profile role so controller is not mislabeled reconciler (#840).
+    role = _profile_role_kind(profile)
     username = _authenticated_username(h)
 
     identity = {
@@ -15597,6 +15611,16 @@ def mcp_get_control_plane_guide(
             "user, and merging requires explicit operator authorization plus the "
             "'MERGE PR <n>' confirmation. "
             "Review and merge are separate workflow roles. A reviewer approval is not merge authorization.")
+    elif role == "controller":
+        guidance.append(
+            "Controller profile: route work via "
+            "gitea_route_task_session(task_type='process_work_queue') then "
+            "gitea_allocate_next_work (allocation_mode=cross_role by default). "
+            "The allocator returns exactly one authoritative selection with "
+            "required_role / required_profile / selected_action. Do not "
+            "implement, review, approve, or merge in this session — schedule "
+            "the matching role namespace instead. Dashboard output is "
+            "explanatory only and never replaces allocator selection.")
     elif role == "mixed":
         guidance.append(
             "WARNING: this profile allows both authoring and "
@@ -15806,7 +15830,8 @@ def gitea_whoami(
             "environment": profile.get("environment"),
             "service": profile.get("service"),
             "identity": profile.get("identity"),
-            "role": profile.get("role"),
+            "role": profile.get("role") or _profile_role_kind(profile),
+            "role_kind": _profile_role_kind(profile),
             "profile_address": profile.get("profile_path"),
             "execution_profile": profile.get("execution_profile"),
             "audit_label": profile.get("audit_label"),
@@ -20590,9 +20615,10 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
     candidates_json: Any = None,
     exclude_issue_numbers: list[int] | None = None,
     expected_candidate_set_fingerprint: str | None = None,
+    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
     limit: int = 50,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Controller-owned next-work allocator using the #613 control-plane DB (#600).
+    """Controller-owned next-work allocator using the #613 control-plane DB (#600/#840).
 
     Workers must not self-select exclusive work under the standard multi-LLM
     workflow. Call this tool instead.
@@ -20602,6 +20628,14 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
     ``ControlPlaneDB.assign_and_lease`` (never file locks or comment-only
     leases as the coordination source).
 
+    *allocation_mode* (#840): when the active role is controller (or mode is
+    ``cross_role``), inspect the complete queue and return exactly one
+    authoritative selection with selected item, action, required_role,
+    required_profile/namespace, pins, and allocation/lease evidence.
+    Role-scoped workers pass ``role=author|reviewer|merger|reconciler`` (or
+    omit for profile role) for single-role filtering. Controller routes only
+    and does not perform downstream mutations.
+
     Outcomes include: ``assigned_work``, ``preview``, ``wait``,
     ``blocked_by_terminal_path``, ``no_safe_work``, ``role_ineligible``,
     ``blocked_by_excluded_own_lease``, ``candidate_set_drift``.
@@ -20736,6 +20770,7 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
             controller_instance_id=allocator_service.resolve_controller_instance_id(),
             exclude_issue_numbers=exclude_issue_numbers,
             expected_candidate_set_fingerprint=expected_candidate_set_fingerprint,
+            allocation_mode=allocation_mode,
         )
     except ValueError as exc:
         return {
@@ -21113,10 +21148,21 @@ def gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
     remote: str = "dadeschools",
     host: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Adopt a control-plane lease through the sanctioned path (#601).
+    """Adopt a control-plane lease through the sanctioned path (#601 / #843).
 
-    Same-owner resume refreshes provenance. Foreign active leases are refused.
-    Expired leases may be reclaimed; provenance records adopted_from/by.
+    Same-owner resume refreshes provenance. Foreign active leases are refused
+    unless the lease is a pending controller cross-role handoff and the caller
+    holds the required role (independent consume without sharing the
+    controller session). Expired leases may be reclaimed; provenance records
+    adopted_from/by. Terminal (abandoned/released) leases cannot be adopted.
+
+    #843 F1: the adopter role is derived authoritatively from the active
+    authenticated profile — never from caller input. A supplied ``role`` that
+    does not exactly match the profile-derived role is rejected (no silent
+    accept or reinterpretation), and handoff provenance ``required_profile`` /
+    ``required_namespace`` restrictions are validated against the same
+    authoritative caller context. Caller-supplied role/profile/namespace can
+    never grant authority.
     """
     read_block = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.read")
     if read_block:
@@ -21125,25 +21171,64 @@ def gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
             "reasons": read_block,
             "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.read"),
         }
+    profile = get_profile()
+    profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip() or "session"
+    active_role = (_profile_role_kind(profile) or "").strip().lower()
+    if not active_role:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "outcome": "blocked",
+            "mutation_performed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                "active profile role could not be derived authoritatively; "
+                "refusing lease adoption (fail closed, #843)"
+            ],
+            "lease_id": lease_id,
+            "authoritative_source": "control_plane_db",
+            "file_lock_only": False,
+            "comment_lease_only": False,
+        }
+    if role is not None and str(role).strip():
+        supplied_role = str(role).strip().lower()
+        if supplied_role != active_role:
+            return {
+                "success": False,
+                "outcome": "blocked",
+                "mutation_performed": False,
+                "profile_role_kind": active_role,
+                "supplied_role": supplied_role,
+                "reasons": [
+                    f"caller-supplied role '{supplied_role}' does not match "
+                    f"the authenticated profile-derived role '{active_role}'; "
+                    "caller-supplied role/profile/namespace can never grant "
+                    "authority (fail closed, #843)"
+                ],
+                "lease_id": lease_id,
+                "authoritative_source": "control_plane_db",
+                "file_lock_only": False,
+                "comment_lease_only": False,
+            }
     db, errs = _control_plane_db_or_error()
     if db is None:
         return {"success": False, "reasons": errs}
-    profile = get_profile()
-    profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip() or "session"
-    active_role = _profile_role_kind(profile) or "author"
     sid = (session_id or "").strip() or (
         f"{profile_name}-{os.getpid()}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
     )
+    adopter_namespace = allocator_service.DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES.get(
+        active_role, f"gitea-{active_role}"
+    )
     try:
         return lease_lifecycle.adopt_lease(
             db,
             lease_id=lease_id,
             adopter_session_id=sid,
-            role=(role or active_role).strip() or "author",
+            role=active_role,
             worktree_path=worktree_path,
             expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha,
             owner_pid=os.getpid(),
             operator_authorized=bool(operator_authorized),
+            adopter_profile_name=profile_name,
+            adopter_namespace=adopter_namespace,
         )
     except (lease_lifecycle.LeaseLifecycleError, control_plane_db.ControlPlaneError) as exc:
         return {

lease_lifecycle.py

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SAFE_RELEASE_OWNED = "release_owned"
 SAFE_STALE_PROMPT = "stale_prompt_lease"
 SAFE_UNKNOWN = "inspect_only"
 SAFE_NO_AUTHORITY = "file_or_comment_not_authoritative"
+SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE = "consume_cross_role_handoff"
 
 LEASE_STATUS_ACTIVE = "active"
 LEASE_STATUS_RELEASED = "released"
@@ -250,6 +251,23 @@ def decide_safe_next_action(
                 "same_owner": True,
                 "also_allowed": [SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED, SAFE_RELEASE_OWNED],
             }
+        handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff({"lease": lease})
+        if handoff:
+            return {
+                "safe_next_action": SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE,
+                "reasons": [
+                    f"controller allocation pending handoff (freshness={status}); "
+                    "required-role worker may consume without abandon/reassign; "
+                    f"required_role={handoff['required_role']}"
+                ],
+                "block": False,
+                "same_owner": False,
+                "owner_session_id": owner,
+                "required_role": handoff["required_role"],
+                "cross_role_handoff": True,
+                "handoff_status": "pending",
+                "also_allowed": [SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED],
+            }
         return {
             "safe_next_action": SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED,
             "reasons": [
@@ -272,6 +290,24 @@ def decide_safe_next_action(
         }
 
     if not same_owner and status == "active":
+        # #843: pending cross-role handoff is consumable by required role
+        handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff({"lease": lease})
+        if handoff:
+            return {
+                "safe_next_action": SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE,
+                "reasons": [
+                    "controller cross-role allocation pending handoff; "
+                    f"required_role={handoff['required_role']}; "
+                    "consume via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease without "
+                    "abandonment or sharing the controller session"
+                ],
+                "block": False,
+                "same_owner": False,
+                "owner_session_id": owner,
+                "required_role": handoff["required_role"],
+                "cross_role_handoff": True,
+                "handoff_status": "pending",
+            }
         return {
             "safe_next_action": SAFE_WAIT_FOREIGN,
             "reasons": [
@@ -440,6 +476,84 @@ def list_active_leases(
     }
 
 
+
+def parse_lease_provenance(lease_or_state: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return durable lease provenance dict (empty when absent/unparseable)."""
+    if not lease_or_state:
+        return {}
+    if "provenance" in lease_or_state and isinstance(lease_or_state.get("provenance"), dict):
+        return dict(lease_or_state["provenance"])
+    raw = None
+    if "provenance_json" in lease_or_state:
+        raw = lease_or_state.get("provenance_json")
+    elif "lease" in lease_or_state and isinstance(lease_or_state.get("lease"), Mapping):
+        raw = lease_or_state["lease"].get("provenance_json")
+    if not raw:
+        return {}
+    if isinstance(raw, dict):
+        return dict(raw)
+    try:
+        loaded = json.loads(raw)
+    except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        return {}
+    return dict(loaded) if isinstance(loaded, dict) else {}
+
+
+def is_pending_cross_role_handoff(
+    state: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Return handoff evidence when a controller allocation awaits consume (#843).
+
+    A pending handoff is identified by durable provenance written at
+    cross-role apply time — not by title heuristics or session-id guessing.
+    """
+    if not state:
+        return None
+    lease = state.get("lease") if isinstance(state.get("lease"), Mapping) else state
+    if not isinstance(lease, Mapping):
+        return None
+    status = str(lease.get("status") or "").strip().lower()
+    if status in (LEASE_STATUS_ABANDONED, LEASE_STATUS_RELEASED, LEASE_STATUS_EXPIRED):
+        return None
+    prov = parse_lease_provenance(state)
+    if not prov and isinstance(lease, Mapping):
+        prov = parse_lease_provenance(lease)
+    if not prov.get("cross_role_handoff"):
+        return None
+    handoff_status = str(prov.get("handoff_status") or "pending").strip().lower()
+    if handoff_status != "pending":
+        return None
+    adopted_by = (
+        lease.get("adopted_by_session_id")
+        or prov.get("adopted_by_session_id")
+        or ""
+    )
+    if str(adopted_by).strip():
+        return None
+    required_role = str(
+        prov.get("required_role") or lease.get("role") or ""
+    ).strip().lower()
+    if not required_role:
+        return None
+    return {
+        "cross_role_handoff": True,
+        "handoff_status": "pending",
+        "required_role": required_role,
+        "allocating_session_id": str(
+            prov.get("allocating_session_id") or lease.get("session_id") or ""
+        ),
+        "allocating_role": str(prov.get("allocating_role") or "controller"),
+        "lease_id": str(lease.get("lease_id") or ""),
+        "assignment_id": (
+            str(state["assignment"]["assignment_id"])
+            if isinstance(state.get("assignment"), Mapping)
+            and state["assignment"].get("assignment_id")
+            else None
+        ),
+        "provenance": prov,
+    }
+
+
 def adopt_lease(
     db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB,
     *,
@@ -450,8 +564,17 @@ def adopt_lease(
     expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
     owner_pid: int | None = None,
     operator_authorized: bool = False,
+    adopter_profile_name: str | None = None,
+    adopter_namespace: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Sanctioned adopt path with provenance; never silent foreign steal."""
+    """Sanctioned adopt path with provenance; never silent foreign steal.
+
+    #843 F1: for a pending cross-role handoff, ``role`` must be the
+    authoritative profile-derived role supplied by the MCP boundary — never
+    caller-asserted authority. When the handoff provenance declares
+    ``required_profile`` / ``required_namespace`` and the caller context is
+    provided, both are validated exactly; a mismatch fails closed.
+    """
     state = db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
     if not state:
         raise LeaseLifecycleError(
@@ -463,11 +586,8 @@ def adopt_lease(
     owner = str(lease.get("session_id") or "")
     same_owner = owner == str(adopter_session_id)
 
-    if freshness["freshness"] == "active" and not same_owner:
-        raise LeaseLifecycleError(
-            f"refusing to steal active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by "
-            f"{owner} (fail closed)"
-        )
+    handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff(state)
+    adopter_role = (role or "").strip().lower()
 
     if freshness["freshness"] in ("abandoned", "released"):
         raise LeaseLifecycleError(
@@ -475,13 +595,64 @@ def adopt_lease(
             "(fail closed)"
         )
 
-    # Expired or stale: require abandon-style safety before ownership transfer
-    # when not same owner; same owner may reclaim.
-    if not same_owner and freshness["freshness"] in (
+    if handoff and not same_owner:
+        # Terminal statuses already rejected above. Freshness may be
+        # active OR stale_dead_process (controller exited) — both are
+        # consumable without abandonment when handoff is still pending.
+        if freshness["freshness"] not in (
+            "active",
+            "stale_dead_process",
+            "stale_missing_worktree",
+        ):
+            raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+                f"lease {lease_id} freshness={freshness['freshness']}; "
+                "terminal or non-active allocation cannot be handoff-consumed "
+                "(fail closed)"
+            )
+        required = handoff["required_role"]
+        if adopter_role != required:
+            raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+                f"wrong role for cross-role handoff consume of {lease_id}: "
+                f"required={required} adopter={adopter_role or 'none'} "
+                "(fail closed)"
+            )
+        # #843 F1: provenance profile/namespace restrictions are validated
+        # against the authoritative caller context when declared. Caller
+        # input can never widen authority; a mismatch fails closed.
+        handoff_prov = handoff.get("provenance") or {}
+        required_profile = str(
+            handoff_prov.get("required_profile") or ""
+        ).strip()
+        if required_profile and adopter_profile_name is not None:
+            if str(adopter_profile_name).strip() != required_profile:
+                raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+                    f"wrong profile for cross-role handoff consume of "
+                    f"{lease_id}: required_profile={required_profile} "
+                    f"adopter_profile={adopter_profile_name} (fail closed)"
+                )
+        required_namespace = str(
+            handoff_prov.get("required_namespace") or ""
+        ).strip()
+        if required_namespace and adopter_namespace is not None:
+            if str(adopter_namespace).strip() != required_namespace:
+                raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+                    f"wrong namespace for cross-role handoff consume of "
+                    f"{lease_id}: required_namespace={required_namespace} "
+                    f"adopter_namespace={adopter_namespace} (fail closed)"
+                )
+        reason = "cross-role-handoff-consume"
+    elif freshness["freshness"] == "active" and not same_owner:
+        raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+            f"refusing to steal active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by "
+            f"{owner} (fail closed)"
+        )
+    elif not same_owner and freshness["freshness"] in (
         "expired",
         "stale_dead_process",
         "stale_missing_worktree",
     ):
+        # Expired or stale (non-handoff): require abandon-style safety before
+        # ownership transfer when not same owner; same owner may reclaim.
         if not operator_authorized and freshness["freshness"] == "expired":
             # Deterministic reclaim of expired foreign lease is allowed
             # without operator flag (sanctioned expire reclaim).
@@ -492,6 +663,9 @@ def adopt_lease(
                 f"lease {lease_id} freshness={freshness['freshness']}; "
                 "use abandon with proof before foreign adopt (fail closed)"
             )
+        reason = "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
+    else:
+        reason = "owner-resume-adopt" if same_owner else "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
 
     provenance = build_adopt_provenance(
         adopted_from_session_id=owner,
@@ -504,10 +678,14 @@ def adopt_lease(
         worktree_path=worktree_path,
         expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha or lease.get("expected_head_sha"),
         prior_lease_id=lease_id,
-        reason=(
-            "owner-resume-adopt" if same_owner else "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
-        ),
+        reason=reason,
     )
+    if handoff and not same_owner:
+        provenance["cross_role_handoff"] = True
+        provenance["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
+        provenance["required_role"] = handoff["required_role"]
+        provenance["allocating_session_id"] = handoff["allocating_session_id"]
+        provenance["allocating_role"] = handoff["allocating_role"]
 
     result = db.adopt_lease(
         lease_id=lease_id,
@@ -518,7 +696,7 @@ def adopt_lease(
         owner_pid=owner_pid if owner_pid is not None else os.getpid(),
         provenance=provenance,
     )
-    return {
+    out = {
         "success": True,
         "outcome": result.get("outcome"),
         "same_owner": same_owner,
@@ -531,6 +709,24 @@ def adopt_lease(
         "comment_lease_only": False,
         "reasons": result.get("reasons") or [],
     }
+    if handoff and not same_owner:
+        out["cross_role_handoff"] = True
+        out["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
+        out["required_role"] = handoff["required_role"]
+        out["adopted_by_session_id"] = adopter_session_id
+        out["adopted_from_session_id"] = owner
+        lease_row = result.get("lease") or {}
+        if isinstance(lease_row, Mapping):
+            out["read_after_write"] = {
+                "lease_id": lease_row.get("lease_id"),
+                "session_id": lease_row.get("session_id"),
+                "role": lease_row.get("role"),
+                "status": lease_row.get("status"),
+                "adopted_by_session_id": lease_row.get("adopted_by_session_id"),
+                "adopted_from_session_id": lease_row.get("adopted_from_session_id"),
+                "phase": lease_row.get("phase"),
+            }
+    return out
 
 
 def release_lease(

namespace_workspace_binding.py

@@ -24,7 +24,12 @@ ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS: dict[str, str] = {
     "reconciler": RECONCILER_WORKTREE_ENV,
 }
 
-NON_AUTHOR_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler"})
+# Controller has no task worktree env — it routes only (#840).
+KNOWN_ROLE_KINDS = frozenset(
+    {"author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"}
+)
+
+NON_AUTHOR_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"})
 
 
 def normalize_role_kind(
@@ -37,8 +42,12 @@ def normalize_role_kind(
     profile = (profile_name or "").strip().lower()
     if role == "reviewer" and "merger" in profile:
         return "merger"
+    if "controller" in profile or role == "controller":
+        return "controller"
     if role in ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS:
         return role
+    if role in KNOWN_ROLE_KINDS:
+        return role
     return "author"
 
 
@@ -80,7 +89,7 @@ def resolve_namespace_workspace(
     """
     env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
     role = normalize_role_kind(role_kind, profile_name=profile_name)
-    role_env_key = ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS[role]
+    role_env_key = ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS.get(role)
 
     # #618: durable author resolution — no silent control/master fallback.
     if role == "author" and verify_paths:
@@ -108,13 +117,17 @@ def resolve_namespace_workspace(
             )
         return workspace, source
 
+    role_env_candidate = (
+        (_env_value(env_map, role_env_key), f"{role_env_key} environment variable", True)
+        if role_env_key
+        else (None, "no role worktree env", True)
+    )
     for candidate, source, env_sourced in (
         (worktree_path, "worktree_path argument", False),
         (worktree, "worktree argument", False),
         (_env_value(env_map, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV),
          f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV} environment variable", True),
-        (_env_value(env_map, role_env_key),
-         f"{role_env_key} environment variable", True),
+        role_env_candidate,
         (session_lease_worktree if role in {"reviewer", "merger"} else None,
          "reviewer PR lease worktree", False),
         # Author lock derivation is handled by the durable path above when
@@ -433,7 +446,8 @@ def assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
         reasons.append(
             f"{role} mutation blocked: workspace is the stable control checkout; "
             f"create or reconnect to a session-owned worktree under branches/ "
-            f"or set {ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS[role]} / {ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV}"
+            f"or set {ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS.get(role, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV)} / "
+            f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV}"
         )
     elif (
         role in {"reviewer", "merger"}

role_session_router.py

@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ AUTHOR_TASKS = frozenset({
     "reconcile_landed_pr",
 })
 
+CONTROLLER_TASKS = frozenset({
+    "process_work_queue",
+    "process-work-queue",
+    "cross_role_allocate",
+})
+
 RECONCILER_TASKS = frozenset({
     "cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
     # #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned (gitea.branch.delete is granted
@@ -132,6 +138,10 @@ TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE = {
     "reconcile_close_superseded_pr": "reconciler",
     "reconcile_close_satisfied_issue": "reconciler",
     "reconcile_create_followup_issue": "reconciler",
+    # #840: controller-owned generic queue allocation / routing.
+    "process_work_queue": "controller",
+    "process-work-queue": "controller",
+    "cross_role_allocate": "controller",
 }
 
 WRONG_ROLE_REVIEWER_MSG = (
@@ -147,6 +157,10 @@ WRONG_ROLE_MERGER_MSG = (
     "Wrong role/session for merger task. Launch merger MCP namespace."
 )
 
+WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG = (
+    "Wrong role/session for controller task. Launch controller MCP namespace."
+)
+
 _session_last_route: dict | None = None
 
 
@@ -281,6 +295,27 @@ def route_task_session(
         _record_route(result)
         return result
 
+    if required_role == "controller":
+        result = {
+            "task_type": task_type,
+            "required_role": required_role,
+            "active_role": active_role_kind,
+            "active_profile": active_profile,
+            "route_result": ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE,
+            "downstream_allowed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG,
+                "Controller tasks (process_work_queue / cross-role allocate) "
+                "cannot run in author, reviewer, merger, or reconciler "
+                "worker sessions.",
+            ],
+            "message": WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG,
+            "runtime_switching_supported": runtime_switching_supported,
+            "profile_switch_blocked": not runtime_switching_supported,
+        }
+        _record_route(result)
+        return result
+
     if required_role == "author":
         route = ROUTE_TO_AUTHOR
         message = (

task_capability_map.py

@@ -309,8 +309,10 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.create",
         "role": "author",
     },
-    # #600: controller-owned allocator — any authenticated profile may call;
-    # routing enforces role match to selected work. Uses control-plane DB (#613).
+    # #600: workers and controller may call with gitea.read; role-scoped workers
+    # pass role=author|reviewer|merger|reconciler. Cross-role routing is the
+    # controller default (#840). The canonical generic queue *task type* is
+    # process_work_queue (controller-only below).
     "allocate_next_work": {
         "permission": "gitea.read",
         "role": "author",
@@ -319,6 +321,19 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.read",
         "role": "author",
     },
+    # #840: documented generic queue task — controller routes only.
+    "process_work_queue": {
+        "permission": "gitea.read",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
+    "process-work-queue": {
+        "permission": "gitea.read",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
+    "cross_role_allocate": {
+        "permission": "gitea.read",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
 
     # #601 first-class lease lifecycle — inspect/list need read; mutations gate on
     # ownership in the control-plane DB (not a separate Gitea write permission).

tests/test_arch01_platform.py

@@ -0,0 +1,572 @@
+"""Executable acceptance tests for ARCH-01 Slice A (#822).
+
+Each acceptance criterion (#822 §12) and named test (#822 §13) is exercised
+against a real SQLite database. The migration runs on a fresh DB in ``setUp``;
+the test-run output is the durable evidence the issue requires (§14).
+
+Enforcement being proven:
+
+* ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` — the ``cp_*`` actor functions exist only on the
+  trusted kernel connection; a raw connection cannot satisfy the triggers.
+* ``[SCHEMA]`` — fail-closed aborts, exact dominance set, NOT-NULL class,
+  immutability, and the last-active-grant floor are enforced by
+  CHECK/FK/trigger, verified here including raw-write bypass and concurrency.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import unittest
+from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
+
+import arch01_platform as ap
+from arch01_platform import (
+    ALREADY_INSTALLED,
+    AUTHORIZATION_DENIED,
+    CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST,
+    DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID,
+    DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+    DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
+    INSTALLED,
+    INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT,
+    INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE,
+    PlatformKernel,
+)
+
+INSTALLER = "platform.installer"
+
+_BOOTSTRAP_TABLES = (
+    "principal_equivalence_classes",
+    "principals",
+    "authoritative_issuers",
+    "authority_dominance",
+    "platform_bootstrap_seed",
+    "platform_bootstrap_grants",
+    "platform_active_invariant",
+    "install_state",
+)
+
+
+def _count(kernel: PlatformKernel, table: str) -> int:
+    return kernel._conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table}").fetchone()[0]
+
+
+def _count_where(kernel: PlatformKernel, table: str, where: str) -> int:
+    return kernel._conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table} WHERE {where}").fetchone()[0]
+
+
+def _all_bootstrap_empty(kernel: PlatformKernel) -> bool:
+    return all(_count(kernel, t) == 0 for t in _BOOTSTRAP_TABLES)
+
+
+class Arch01MemoryTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Single-connection behavior on an in-memory database."""
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.kernel = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self.kernel.close()
+
+    # -- AC1 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_install_clean(self) -> None:  # t_install_clean(+)
+        res = self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res.code, INSTALLED)
+        self.assertTrue(self.kernel.is_installed())
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "install_state"), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.active_grant_count(), 1)
+        self.assertIn(ap.EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED, self.kernel.audit_events())
+        rows = set(
+            self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT dominant, subordinate FROM authority_dominance"
+            ).fetchall()
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(rows, set(DOMINANCE_TUPLES))
+        issuer_ref = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT i.issuer_ref FROM principals p JOIN authoritative_issuers i "
+            "ON p.issuer_id = i.issuer_id WHERE p.principal_id = ?",
+            (INSTALLER,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        self.assertEqual(issuer_ref[0], DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID)
+
+    # -- AC2 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_install_twice(self) -> None:  # t_install_twice(-)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        res2 = self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res2.code, ALREADY_INSTALLED)
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "principals"), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "platform_bootstrap_grants"), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "install_state"), 1)
+
+    # -- AC3 / AC5 -------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_install_stage_rollback(self) -> None:  # t_install_stage_rollback
+        for stop in range(1, 9):
+            with self.subTest(stages=stop):
+                k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+                try:
+                    self._partial_bootstrap_then_rollback(k, stop)
+                    self.assertTrue(
+                        _all_bootstrap_empty(k),
+                        f"partial rows survived rollback at stage {stop}",
+                    )
+                    self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+                finally:
+                    k.close()
+
+    def test_no_partial_after_rollback(self) -> None:  # t_no_partial_after_rollback
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            code = self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1])
+            self.assertEqual(code, DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH)
+            self.assertTrue(_all_bootstrap_empty(k))
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    # -- AC4 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_dominance_missing(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_missing(-)
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1]),
+                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    def test_dominance_extra(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_extra(-)
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            extra = DOMINANCE_TUPLES + (("platform.bootstrap", "rogue.extra"),)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=extra),
+                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    def test_dominance_malformed(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_malformed(-)
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            malformed = DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1] + (("supervisor.root", "WRONG.subordinate"),)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=malformed),
+                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    # -- AC6 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_principal_no_class(self) -> None:  # t_principal_no_class(-)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "install"):
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals"
+                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES ('x', 'operator', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                )
+
+    # -- AC7 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_noninstaller_null_issuer(self) -> None:  # t_nonobstaller_null_issuer(-)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            cur = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+            )
+            class_id = cur.lastrowid
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals"
+                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES ('rogue', 'operator', ?, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')",
+                    (class_id,),
+                )
+            self.assertIn("INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_installer_null_issuer_only_during_install(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("i2", "installer", "install"):
+            cur = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+            )
+            class_id = cur.lastrowid
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals"
+                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES ('i2', 'installer', ?, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')",
+                    (class_id,),
+                )
+
+    # -- AC8 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_context_missing(self) -> None:  # t_context_missing(-)
+        self.assertIsNone(self.kernel._ctx)
+        with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+            self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+            )
+        self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_context_stale(self) -> None:  # t_context_stale(-)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            self.kernel._ctx.expired = True
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                )
+            self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_context_epoch_shift(self) -> None:  # t_context_epoch_shift(-)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            self.kernel._ctx.live_epoch = self.kernel._ctx.bound_epoch + 99
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                )
+            self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_bad_actor_kind_or_mode_rejected(self) -> None:
+        for kind, mode in (("intruder", "normal"), ("operator", "sabotage")):
+            with self.subTest(kind=kind, mode=mode):
+                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", kind, mode):
+                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
+                        self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                            "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) "
+                            "VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                        )
+
+    # -- AC9 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_bootstrap_immutable_update(self) -> None:  # t_bootstrap_immutable_{update}
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        cases = [
+            ("UPDATE install_state SET installed_at = 'x' WHERE id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE"),
+            ("UPDATE platform_bootstrap_seed SET created_at = 'x' WHERE seed_id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_SEED"),
+            ("UPDATE authority_dominance SET subordinate = 'x' WHERE dominant = 'supervisor.root'", "IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE"),
+            (f"UPDATE authoritative_issuers SET issuer_ref = 'x' WHERE issuer_ref = '{DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID}'", "IMMUTABLE_ISSUER"),
+            (f"UPDATE principals SET actor_kind = 'operator' WHERE principal_id = '{INSTALLER}'", "IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL"),
+        ]
+        for sql, tag in cases:
+            with self.subTest(sql=sql):
+                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                        self.kernel._conn.execute(sql)
+                    self.assertIn(tag, str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_bootstrap_immutable_delete(self) -> None:  # t_bootstrap_immutable_{delete}
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        cases = [
+            ("DELETE FROM install_state WHERE id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE"),
+            ("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_SEED"),
+            ("DELETE FROM authority_dominance", "IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE"),
+            ("DELETE FROM authoritative_issuers", "IMMUTABLE_ISSUER"),
+            (f"DELETE FROM principals WHERE principal_id = '{INSTALLER}'", "IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL"),
+            ("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_grants", "IMMUTABLE_GRANT"),
+        ]
+        for sql, tag in cases:
+            with self.subTest(sql=sql):
+                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                        self.kernel._conn.execute(sql)
+                    self.assertIn(tag, str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_grant_reactivation_rejected(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        self.kernel.register_principal(
+            "op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED
+        )
+        gid = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grantee_principal_id = 'op1'"
+        ).fetchone()[0]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code,
+            INSTALLED,
+        )
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "UPDATE platform_bootstrap_grants SET active = 1 WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                    (gid,),
+                )
+            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_GRANT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    # -- AC12 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_raw_write_bypass(self) -> None:  # t_raw_write_bypass(raw-bypass)
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            path = os.path.join(tmp, "p.sqlite3")
+            k = PlatformKernel(path)
+            self.assertEqual(k.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+            k.close()
+            raw = sqlite3.connect(path)
+            raw.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
+            try:
+                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
+                    raw.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES ('forged', '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                    )
+                    raw.commit()
+                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
+                    raw.execute("UPDATE install_state SET installed_at = 'x' WHERE id = 1")
+                    raw.commit()
+                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
+                    raw.execute("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_grants")
+                    raw.commit()
+            finally:
+                raw.close()
+
+    # -- AC13 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_audit_created(self) -> None:  # t_audit_created(+)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        self.kernel.register_principal(
+            "op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED
+        )
+        gid = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grantee_principal_id = 'op1'"
+        ).fetchone()[0]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code,
+            INSTALLED,
+        )
+        events = self.kernel.audit_events()
+        for evt in (
+            ap.EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED,
+            ap.EVT_GRANT_CREATED,
+            ap.EVT_GRANT_REVOKED,
+            ap.EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED,
+        ):
+            self.assertIn(evt, events)
+
+    # -- AC14 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_audit_immutable(self) -> None:  # t_audit_immutable(raw-bypass)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as up:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute("UPDATE audit_records SET event = 'x' WHERE audit_id = 1")
+            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_AUDIT", str(up.exception))
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as dl:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute("DELETE FROM audit_records WHERE audit_id = 1")
+            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_AUDIT", str(dl.exception))
+
+    # -- meta ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_schema_meta(self) -> None:
+        rows = dict(self.kernel._conn.execute("SELECT key, value FROM arch01_meta").fetchall())
+        self.assertEqual(rows["schema_version"], str(ap.SCHEMA_VERSION))
+        self.assertIn("disabled by default", rows["architecture"])
+
+    def test_register_principal_creates_class_first(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        res = self.kernel.register_principal(
+            "svc1", "service", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res.code, INSTALLED)
+        row = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT current_class_id FROM principals WHERE principal_id = 'svc1'"
+        ).fetchone()
+        self.assertIsNotNone(row[0])
+
+    # -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def _partial_bootstrap_then_rollback(self, k: PlatformKernel, stop: int) -> None:
+        """Execute the first ``stop`` bootstrap statements, then ROLLBACK."""
+        now = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
+        k._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+        class_id = None
+        issuer_id = None
+        try:
+            with k.actor_context(INSTALLER, "installer", "install"):
+                c = k._conn
+                if stop >= 1:
+                    class_id = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)", (now,)
+                    ).lastrowid
+                if stop >= 2:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principals(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
+                        (INSTALLER, class_id, INSTALLER, now),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 3:
+                    issuer_id = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) VALUES ('operator-key', ?, ?)",
+                        (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
+                    ).lastrowid
+                if stop >= 4:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
+                        (issuer_id, INSTALLER),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 5:
+                    c.executemany(
+                        "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
+                        DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
+                    )
+                if stop >= 6:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
+                        (INSTALLER, now),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 7:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
+                        (INSTALLER, now),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 8:
+                    c.execute("INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)")
+        finally:
+            k._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+
+    def _seed_bootstrap_and_mark(self, k: PlatformKernel, dominance) -> str:
+        """Seed a full bootstrap with a caller-supplied dominance set, then
+        attempt the marker insert. Returns the classified failure code (or
+        INSTALLED). Rolls back on failure so no partial rows remain."""
+        now = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
+        k._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+        try:
+            with k.actor_context(INSTALLER, "installer", "install"):
+                c = k._conn
+                class_id = c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)", (now,)
+                ).lastrowid
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
+                    (INSTALLER, class_id, INSTALLER, now),
+                )
+                issuer_id = c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) VALUES ('operator-key', ?, ?)",
+                    (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
+                ).lastrowid
+                c.execute(
+                    "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
+                    (issuer_id, INSTALLER),
+                )
+                c.executemany(
+                    "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
+                    dominance,
+                )
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
+                    (INSTALLER, now),
+                )
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
+                    (INSTALLER, now),
+                )
+                c.execute("INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)")
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO install_state(id, marker, installed_at) VALUES (1, 'installed', ?)",
+                    (now,),
+                )
+            k._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+            return INSTALLED
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            k._safe_rollback()
+            return PlatformKernel._classify(exc)
+
+
+class Arch01ConcurrencyTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Concurrency invariants require file-backed DBs and independent connections."""
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "p.sqlite3")
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    # -- AC10 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_concurrent_install(self) -> None:  # t_concurrent_install(concurrency)
+        k1 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=0)
+        k2 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=0)
+        barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
+        results = {}
+
+        def _install(name, kernel):
+            barrier.wait()
+            results[name] = kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code
+
+        try:
+            with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:
+                f1 = ex.submit(_install, "a", k1)
+                f2 = ex.submit(_install, "b", k2)
+                f1.result()
+                f2.result()
+            codes = sorted(results.values())
+            self.assertEqual(codes.count(INSTALLED), 1, f"exactly one install expected: {results}")
+            other = [c for c in results.values() if c != INSTALLED][0]
+            self.assertIn(other, (ALREADY_INSTALLED, CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST))
+            self.assertTrue(k1.is_installed())
+            self.assertEqual(_count(k1, "install_state"), 1)
+            self.assertEqual(_count(k1, "principals"), 1)
+        finally:
+            k1.close()
+            k2.close()
+
+    # -- AC11 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_concurrent_last_grant_revoke(self) -> None:  # t_concurrent_last_grant_revoke
+        setup = PlatformKernel(self.path)
+        self.assertEqual(setup.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        setup.register_principal("op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER)
+        self.assertEqual(setup.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        self.assertEqual(setup.active_grant_count(), 2)
+        gids = [
+            r[0]
+            for r in setup._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE active = 1 ORDER BY grant_id"
+            ).fetchall()
+        ]
+        setup.close()
+        self.assertEqual(len(gids), 2)
+
+        k1 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=3000)
+        k2 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=3000)
+        barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
+        results = {}
+
+        def _revoke(name, kernel, gid):
+            barrier.wait()
+            results[name] = kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code
+
+        try:
+            with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:
+                f1 = ex.submit(_revoke, "a", k1, gids[0])
+                f2 = ex.submit(_revoke, "b", k2, gids[1])
+                f1.result()
+                f2.result()
+            codes = list(results.values())
+            self.assertEqual(codes.count(INSTALLED), 1, f"exactly one revoke should win: {results}")
+            self.assertEqual(codes.count(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED), 1, f"one revoke must be denied: {results}")
+            self.assertEqual(k1.active_grant_count(), 1)
+            self.assertEqual(_count_where(k1, "platform_bootstrap_grants", "active = 1"), 1)
+        finally:
+            k1.close()
+            k2.close()
+
+    def test_revoke_final_grant_denied(self) -> None:
+        k = PlatformKernel(self.path)
+        try:
+            self.assertEqual(k.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+            gid = k._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE active = 1"
+            ).fetchone()[0]
+            res = k.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER)
+            self.assertEqual(res.code, AUTHORIZATION_DENIED)
+            self.assertEqual(k.active_grant_count(), 1)
+            self.assertEqual(_count_where(k, "platform_bootstrap_grants", "active = 1"), 1)
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_cross_role_queue_allocation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,581 @@
+"""Authoritative controller cross-role generic queue allocation (#840)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from allocator_service import (
+    ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+    ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+    OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
+    OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
+    OUTCOME_WAIT,
+    ROLE_AUTHOR,
+    ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+    ROLE_MERGER,
+    ROLE_RECONCILER,
+    ROLE_REVIEWER,
+    WorkCandidate,
+    allocate_next_work,
+    build_selection_dict,
+    classify_skip,
+    required_namespace_for_role,
+    required_profile_for_role,
+    resolve_allocation_mode,
+    selected_action_for_candidate,
+)
+from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
+import role_session_router
+from role_session_router import (
+    ROUTE_ALLOWED,
+    ROUTE_AMBIGUOUS,
+    ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE,
+    route_task_session,
+)
+import namespace_workspace_binding as nwb
+import task_capability_map
+
+
+class CrossRoleAllocationModeTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_controller_defaults_to_cross_role(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_CONTROLLER),
+            ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+
+    def test_worker_defaults_to_role_scoped(self) -> None:
+        for role in (ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER, ROLE_RECONCILER):
+            self.assertEqual(
+                resolve_allocation_mode(role),
+                ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+            )
+
+    def test_explicit_modes(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_CONTROLLER, "role_scoped"),
+            ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_AUTHOR, "cross_role"),
+            ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+
+
+class CrossRoleSelectionPayloadTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_selection_contains_required_fields(self) -> None:
+        c = WorkCandidate(
+            kind="issue",
+            number=840,
+            labels=("status:ready",),
+            title="cross-role",
+            priority=20,
+        )
+        sel = build_selection_dict(
+            c,
+            active_role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            required_role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            profile_name="prgs-controller",
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(sel["number"], 840)
+        self.assertEqual(sel["kind"], "issue")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertEqual(sel["selected_action"], "implement")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["action"], "implement")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["pinned"]["number"], 840)
+        self.assertIsNone(sel["pinned"]["head_sha"])
+
+    def test_profile_prefix_preserved(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            required_profile_for_role(ROLE_REVIEWER, profile_name="dadeschools-controller"),
+            "dadeschools-reviewer",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            required_namespace_for_role(ROLE_MERGER),
+            "gitea-merger",
+        )
+
+    def test_selected_actions_per_role(self) -> None:
+        issue = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
+        pr_review = WorkCandidate(kind="pr", number=2, head_sha="a" * 40)
+        pr_rc = WorkCandidate(
+            kind="pr",
+            number=3,
+            head_sha="b" * 40,
+            request_changes_current_head=True,
+        )
+        pr_merge = WorkCandidate(
+            kind="pr",
+            number=4,
+            head_sha="c" * 40,
+            approval_on_current_head=True,
+            mergeable=True,
+        )
+        pr_recon = WorkCandidate(
+            kind="pr",
+            number=5,
+            head_sha="d" * 40,
+            approval_contaminated=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(selected_action_for_candidate(issue, ROLE_AUTHOR), "implement")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_rc, ROLE_AUTHOR),
+            "address_pr_change_requests",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_review, ROLE_REVIEWER), "review"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(selected_action_for_candidate(pr_merge, ROLE_MERGER), "merge")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_recon, ROLE_RECONCILER),
+            "reconcile_contaminated_approval",
+        )
+
+
+class CrossRoleAllocateServiceTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def _alloc(self, **kwargs):
+        defaults = dict(
+            db=self.db,
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="org",
+            repo="repo",
+            candidates=[],
+            apply=False,
+            profile_name="prgs-controller",
+            username="controller-bot",
+            controller_instance_id="ctrl-1",
+        )
+        defaults.update(kwargs)
+        return allocate_next_work(**defaults)
+
+    def test_eligible_author_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=100,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                title="author work",
+                priority=20,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_PREVIEW)
+        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(res["selected"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 100)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "implement")
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
+        self.assertIn("allocate", res["controller_allowed_actions"])
+        self.assertIn("merge", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_created"])
+
+    def test_eligible_reviewer_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=200,
+                head_sha="e" * 40,
+                title="needs review",
+                priority=30,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 200)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_REVIEWER)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "review")
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_profile"], "prgs-reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["pinned"]["head_sha"], "e" * 40)
+
+    def test_eligible_merger_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=300,
+                head_sha="f" * 40,
+                approval_on_current_head=True,
+                mergeable=True,
+                priority=40,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 300)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_MERGER)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "merge")
+
+    def test_eligible_reconciler_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=400,
+                head_sha="1" * 40,
+                approval_contaminated=True,
+                priority=50,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 400)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_RECONCILER)
+        self.assertIn("reconcile", res["selected_action"])
+
+    def test_no_eligible_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=10,
+                labels=("status:blocked",),
+                blocked=True,
+                priority=99,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=11,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                dependency_unmet=True,
+                dependency_reason="blocked by #10",
+                priority=98,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_NO_SAFE)
+        self.assertIsNone(res["selected"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE)
+
+    def test_leased_work_skipped(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=50,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=20,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=51,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=10,
+            ),
+        ]
+        # Seed a foreign lease on issue 50 via assign_and_lease under another session.
+        other = allocate_next_work(
+            self.db,
+            session_id="other-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="org",
+            repo="repo",
+            candidates=cands[:1],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            controller_instance_id="other-ctrl",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(other["outcome"], "assigned_work")
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(res["selected"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 51)
+        self.assertTrue(any(s["number"] == 50 for s in res["skipped"]))
+        self.assertTrue(res["claims_excluded"])
+
+    def test_dependencies_skipped(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=1,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=99,
+                dependency_unmet=True,
+                dependency_reason="needs #2",
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=2,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=1,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 2)
+        skipped = {s["number"]: s["reason"] for s in res["skipped"]}
+        self.assertIn(1, skipped)
+        self.assertIn("needs #2", skipped[1])
+
+    def test_pagination_limit_only_truncates_skip_report(self) -> None:
+        """Ranking uses full inventory; reporting limit is MCP-layer only.
+
+        Service ranks all candidates; prove higher-priority eligible item
+        wins even when many skipped precede it.
+        """
+        cands = []
+        for n in range(1, 30):
+            cands.append(
+                WorkCandidate(
+                    kind="issue",
+                    number=n,
+                    labels=("status:ready",),
+                    priority=100 - n,
+                    dependency_unmet=True,
+                    dependency_reason=f"dep {n}",
+                )
+            )
+        cands.append(
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=999,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=1,
+            )
+        )
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 999)
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(res["skipped"]), 29)
+
+    def test_role_scoped_controller_legacy_still_restricts(self) -> None:
+        """role_scoped controller only takes reconciler-needed items."""
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=1,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=50,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=2,
+                head_sha="a" * 40,
+                approval_contaminated=True,
+                priority=1,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(
+            candidates=cands,
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 2)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_RECONCILER)
+
+    def test_cross_role_prefers_highest_priority_across_roles(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=10,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=10,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=20,
+                head_sha="b" * 40,
+                priority=50,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=30,
+                head_sha="c" * 40,
+                approval_on_current_head=True,
+                mergeable=True,
+                priority=20,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        # PR #20 highest priority → reviewer
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 20)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_REVIEWER)
+
+    def test_apply_creates_lease_evidence_for_required_role(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=777,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=20,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands, apply=True)
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], "assigned_work")
+        self.assertTrue(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_created"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        proof = res["lease_proof"]
+        self.assertIsNotNone(proof["lease_id"])
+        self.assertEqual(proof["lease_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertIn("implement", proof["allowed_actions"])
+        # Controller isolation: controller still forbids merge/push/create_pr
+        self.assertIn("merge", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
+        self.assertIn("push", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
+
+    def test_metadata_consistency_role_is_controller(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=1,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["role"], ROLE_CONTROLLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res["routing_role"], ROLE_CONTROLLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+
+
+class ProcessWorkQueueRouterTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        role_session_router.clear_route_state()
+
+    def test_process_work_queue_allowed_for_controller(self) -> None:
+        res = route_task_session(
+            "process_work_queue",
+            active_profile="prgs-controller",
+            active_role_kind="controller",
+            allowed_in_current_session=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_ALLOWED)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], "controller")
+        self.assertTrue(res["downstream_allowed"])
+
+    def test_process_work_queue_hyphen_alias(self) -> None:
+        res = route_task_session(
+            "process-work-queue",
+            active_profile="prgs-controller",
+            active_role_kind="controller",
+            allowed_in_current_session=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_ALLOWED)
+
+    def test_process_work_queue_wrong_role_for_author(self) -> None:
+        res = route_task_session(
+            "process_work_queue",
+            active_profile="prgs-author",
+            active_role_kind="author",
+            allowed_in_current_session=False,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], "controller")
+        self.assertFalse(res["downstream_allowed"])
+
+    def test_unknown_still_ambiguous(self) -> None:
+        res = route_task_session(
+            "not_a_real_task",
+            active_profile="prgs-controller",
+            active_role_kind="controller",
+            allowed_in_current_session=False,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_AMBIGUOUS)
+
+    def test_capability_map_process_work_queue_is_controller(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            task_capability_map.required_role("process_work_queue"),
+            "controller",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            task_capability_map.required_permission("process_work_queue"),
+            "gitea.read",
+        )
+
+
+class ControllerRoleMetadataTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_normalize_role_kind_controller(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            nwb.normalize_role_kind("controller"),
+            "controller",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            nwb.normalize_role_kind("author", profile_name="prgs-controller"),
+            "controller",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            nwb.normalize_role_kind("reconciler", profile_name="prgs-controller"),
+            "controller",
+        )
+
+    def test_profile_role_kind_prefers_declared_controller(self) -> None:
+        # Import from worktree package path via sys.path already set by pytest.
+        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp
+
+        profile = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-controller",
+            "role": "controller",
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read",
+                "gitea.issue.comment",
+                "gitea.pr.close",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [
+                "gitea.pr.approve",
+                "gitea.pr.merge",
+                "gitea.pr.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+            ],
+        }
+        # Declared role wins even if permissions look reconciler-like.
+        self.assertEqual(mcp._profile_role_kind(profile), "controller")
+        # Name-based fallback.
+        profile_no_role = dict(profile)
+        profile_no_role["role"] = None
+        profile_no_role["role_kind"] = None
+        self.assertEqual(mcp._profile_role_kind(profile_no_role), "controller")
+
+    def test_permission_inference_without_controller_name_stays_reconciler(self) -> None:
+        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp
+
+        # Pure permission inference still may return reconciler when no controller
+        # declaration exists — that is intentional for reconciler profiles.
+        role = mcp._role_kind(
+            ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.close", "gitea.issue.comment"],
+            ["gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(role, "reconciler")
+
+
+class DashboardRemainsExplanatoryTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_dashboard_prompt_points_at_allocator_not_self_select(self) -> None:
+        import workflow_dashboard as wd
+
+        self.assertIn("gitea_allocate_next_work", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER)
+        self.assertIn("process_work_queue", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER)
+        self.assertIn("never replaces allocator", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER.lower())
+        self.assertNotIn("self-select", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER.lower())
+
+
+class ClassifySkipCrossRoleTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_controller_cross_role_accepts_author_issue(self) -> None:
+        c = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
+        self.assertIsNone(
+            classify_skip(
+                c,
+                role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+                terminal_pr=None,
+                allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_legacy_controller_skips_author_issue(self) -> None:
+        c = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
+        reason = classify_skip(
+            c,
+            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            terminal_pr=None,
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+        )
+        self.assertIsNotNone(reason)
+        self.assertIn("does not require controller", reason or "")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_843_cross_role_handoff.py

@@ -0,0 +1,682 @@
+"""Cross-role allocation handoff consumable by independent workers (#843).
+
+Regression coverage for the controller→required-role consume path:
+
+* controller allocates author work; independent author adopts successfully
+* author adoption succeeds after allocating controller process exits
+* author adoption without sharing controller session identity
+* wrong-role adoption rejected
+* concurrent/second adoption rejected without state corruption
+* terminal allocation adoption rejected
+* successful adoption produces authoritative ownership evidence
+* genuine abandoned-lease recovery remains valid
+* process_work_queue / allocate results include consume identifiers
+* same-role allocation behavior remains compatible
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from datetime import timedelta
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from allocator_service import (
+    ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+    ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+    OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
+    ROLE_AUTHOR,
+    ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+    ROLE_REVIEWER,
+    WorkCandidate,
+    allocate_next_work,
+)
+from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, ForeignLeaseError, _ts, _utc_now
+import lease_lifecycle as ll
+
+
+class CrossRoleHandoffTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
+        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role="controller",
+            profile="prgs-controller",
+            pid=99999999,  # dead-looking pid
+        )
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role="author",
+            profile="prgs-author",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="author-worker-2",
+            role="author",
+            profile="prgs-author",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="reviewer-worker",
+            role="reviewer",
+            profile="prgs-reviewer",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        self.wt = self._tmp.name
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def _ready_issue(self, number: int = 843, title: str = "handoff target") -> WorkCandidate:
+        return WorkCandidate(
+            kind="issue",
+            number=number,
+            labels=("status:ready", "type:bug"),
+            title=title,
+            priority=20,
+        )
+
+    def _controller_allocate(self, number: int = 843, **kwargs):
+        defaults = dict(
+            db=self.db,
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            candidates=[self._ready_issue(number)],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-controller",
+            username="controller-user",
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+        defaults.update(kwargs)
+        return allocate_next_work(**defaults)
+
+    def test_controller_allocates_author_independent_author_adopts(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate()
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertIn("consume_allocation", res)
+        consume = res["consume_allocation"]
+        self.assertEqual(consume["tool"], "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease")
+        self.assertEqual(consume["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertFalse(consume["controller_session_required"])
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        self.assertEqual(consume["lease_id"], lid)
+        self.assertIn(lid, res["next_valid_command"])
+
+        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(adopted["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        raw = adopted["read_after_write"]
+        self.assertEqual(raw["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["status"], "active")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["phase"], "adopted")
+
+        # Authoritative re-read
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "adopted")
+
+    def test_author_adoption_after_controller_process_exits(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=900)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        # Force owner_pid dead + freshness stale_dead_process
+        import sqlite3
+
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
+        try:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999 WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                (lid,),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        fr = ll.classify_lease_freshness(
+            state["lease"], pid_checker=lambda _p: False
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(fr["freshness"], "stale_dead_process")
+
+        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        # No abandon required
+        state2 = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state2["lease"]["status"], "active")
+        self.assertNotEqual(state2["lease"]["status"], "abandoned")
+
+    def test_adoption_without_sharing_controller_session_identity(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=901)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertNotEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        self.assertFalse(adopted["same_owner"])
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+
+    def test_wrong_role_adoption_rejected(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=902)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError) as ctx:
+            ll.adopt_lease(
+                self.db,
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="reviewer-worker",
+                role=ROLE_REVIEWER,
+            )
+        self.assertIn("wrong role", str(ctx.exception).lower())
+        # State unchanged
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        self.assertIsNone(state["lease"].get("adopted_by_session_id") or None)
+        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
+
+    def test_second_adoption_rejected_without_corruption(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=903)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        first = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError):
+            ll.adopt_lease(
+                self.db,
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
+                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+                worktree_path=self.wt,
+            )
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["status"], "active")
+
+    def test_terminal_allocation_adoption_rejected(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=904)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        # Abandon as terminal
+        proof = ll.AbandonProof(
+            dead_process=True,
+            missing_worktree=True,
+            no_open_pr=True,
+            no_live_mutation_risk=True,
+            owner_pid=99999999,
+            worktree_path="/nonexistent/for-843",
+        )
+        # Attach dead pid / missing wt for abandon eligibility
+        import sqlite3
+
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
+        try:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999, worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                ("/nonexistent/for-843", lid),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+        abandoned = ll.abandon_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            requester_session_id="author-worker",
+            proof=proof,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(abandoned["outcome"], "abandoned")
+        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError) as ctx:
+            ll.adopt_lease(
+                self.db,
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            )
+        self.assertIn("abandoned", str(ctx.exception).lower())
+
+    def test_successful_adoption_read_after_write_ownership(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=905)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        raw = adopted["read_after_write"]
+        self.assertEqual(raw["lease_id"], lid)
+        self.assertEqual(raw["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        # Re-fetch proves durable write
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], raw["session_id"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], raw["adopted_by_session_id"]
+        )
+
+    def test_genuine_abandoned_recovery_still_valid(self) -> None:
+        """Same-role author lease abandoned remains reclaimable via abandon path."""
+        same = allocate_next_work(
+            self.db,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            candidates=[self._ready_issue(906, "same-role")],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            username="author-user",
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(same["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
+        lid = same["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        import sqlite3
+
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
+        try:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999, worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                ("/nonexistent/same-role", lid),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+        proof = ll.AbandonProof(
+            dead_process=True,
+            missing_worktree=True,
+            no_open_pr=True,
+            no_live_mutation_risk=True,
+            owner_pid=99999999,
+            worktree_path="/nonexistent/same-role",
+        )
+        abandoned = ll.abandon_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            requester_session_id="author-worker-2",
+            proof=proof,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(abandoned["outcome"], "abandoned")
+        # Foreign author cannot handoff-consume an abandoned non-handoff lease
+        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError):
+            ll.adopt_lease(
+                self.db,
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
+                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            )
+        # Reclaim path still works for expired/abandoned after force-expire
+        reclaimed = ll.reclaim_expired_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="author-worker-2",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(reclaimed["outcome"], "reclaimed")
+        self.assertEqual(reclaimed["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker-2")
+
+    def test_allocate_payload_includes_consume_identifiers(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=907)
+        self.assertIn("consume_allocation", res)
+        c = res["consume_allocation"]
+        for key in (
+            "tool",
+            "lease_id",
+            "assignment_id",
+            "required_role",
+            "required_profile",
+            "required_namespace",
+            "instructions",
+            "handoff_status",
+        ):
+            self.assertIn(key, c)
+        self.assertEqual(c["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
+        self.assertEqual(c["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
+        self.assertIn("gitea_adopt_workflow_lease", c["instructions"])
+        self.assertTrue(res["lease_proof"]["cross_role_handoff"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["lease_proof"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
+
+    def test_same_role_allocation_remains_compatible(self) -> None:
+        res = allocate_next_work(
+            self.db,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            candidates=[self._ready_issue(908)],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            username="author-user",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
+        self.assertNotIn("consume_allocation", res)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        # No cross-role handoff provenance
+        prov = state.get("provenance") or {}
+        self.assertFalse(prov.get("cross_role_handoff"))
+        # Owner resume still works
+        resume = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(resume["same_owner"])
+        self.assertEqual(resume["outcome"], "adopted_owner_resume")
+
+    def test_inspect_points_required_role_at_consume(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=909)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        decision = ll.inspect_lease(
+            self.db, lid, caller_session_id="author-worker"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            decision["safe_next_action"], ll.SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(decision["block"])
+        self.assertEqual(decision["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+
+    def test_db_cas_rejects_concurrent_second_consume(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=910)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        # First consume via DB layer directly
+        first = self.db.adopt_lease(
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+            provenance={
+                "cross_role_handoff": True,
+                "handoff_status": "adopted",
+                "required_role": "author",
+            },
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        # Second CAS must fail
+        with self.assertRaises(ForeignLeaseError):
+            self.db.adopt_lease(
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
+                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+                worktree_path=self.wt,
+                provenance={
+                    "cross_role_handoff": True,
+                    "handoff_status": "pending",
+                    "required_role": "author",
+                },
+            )
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+
+
+class MCPBoundaryAdoptRoleBindingTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    """#843 F1: MCP-boundary role binding for ``gitea_adopt_workflow_lease``.
+
+    The library-level wrong-role test calls ``lease_lifecycle.adopt_lease``
+    directly. These tests prove the MCP entry point derives the adopter role
+    authoritatively from the active authenticated profile and rejects any
+    caller-supplied role that disagrees, so a reviewer/merger profile cannot
+    consume an author handoff by passing ``role="author"``.
+    """
+
+    AUTHOR_PROFILE = {
+        "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+        "role": "author",
+        "allowed_operations": [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.pr.create",
+            "gitea.branch.push",
+        ],
+        "forbidden_operations": [],
+    }
+    REVIEWER_PROFILE = {
+        "profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
+        "role": "reviewer",
+        "allowed_operations": [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.pr.review",
+            "gitea.pr.approve",
+            "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+        ],
+        "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
+    }
+    MERGER_PROFILE = {
+        "profile_name": "prgs-merger",
+        "role": "merger",
+        "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.merge"],
+        "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
+    }
+    FOREIGN_AUTHOR_PROFILE = {
+        "profile_name": "dadeschools-author",
+        "role": "author",
+        "allowed_operations": [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.pr.create",
+            "gitea.branch.push",
+        ],
+        "forbidden_operations": [],
+    }
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
+        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role="controller",
+            profile="prgs-controller",
+            pid=99999999,
+        )
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role="author",
+            profile="prgs-author",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        self.wt = self._tmp.name
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def _ready_issue(self, number: int) -> WorkCandidate:
+        return WorkCandidate(
+            kind="issue",
+            number=number,
+            labels=("status:ready", "type:bug"),
+            title="handoff target",
+            priority=20,
+        )
+
+    def _handoff_lease(self, number: int = 843) -> str:
+        res = allocate_next_work(
+            db=self.db,
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            candidates=[self._ready_issue(number)],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-controller",
+            username="controller-user",
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        return res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+
+    def _call_adopt_tool(self, profile: dict, **kwargs):
+        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp_server
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile),
+            patch.object(
+                mcp_server,
+                "_control_plane_db_or_error",
+                return_value=(self.db, []),
+            ),
+        ):
+            return mcp_server.gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
+                remote="prgs", **kwargs
+            )
+
+    def _assert_handoff_untouched(self, lease_id: str) -> None:
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        self.assertIsNone(state["lease"].get("adopted_by_session_id") or None)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["status"], "active")
+        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
+
+    def test_reviewer_profile_cannot_consume_author_handoff_via_role_author(
+        self,
+    ) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(920)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.REVIEWER_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="reviewer-worker",
+            role="author",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(result["supplied_role"], "author")
+        self.assertIn("does not match", result["reasons"][0])
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_merger_profile_cannot_consume_author_handoff_via_role_author(
+        self,
+    ) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(921)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.MERGER_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="merger-worker",
+            role="author",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "merger")
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_reviewer_profile_rejected_without_role_argument(self) -> None:
+        """Even without a spoofed role, the profile-derived role binds."""
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(922)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.REVIEWER_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="reviewer-worker",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertIn("wrong role", result["reasons"][0].lower())
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_author_profile_mismatching_supplied_role_rejected(self) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(923)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role="reviewer",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "author")
+        self.assertEqual(result["supplied_role"], "reviewer")
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_foreign_profile_name_rejected_for_author_handoff(self) -> None:
+        """Provenance required_profile binds even when the role matches."""
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(924)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.FOREIGN_AUTHOR_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="foreign-author-worker",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertIn("wrong profile", result["reasons"][0].lower())
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_author_profile_consumes_author_handoff(self) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(925)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role="author",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        self.assertEqual(result["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(result["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "adopted")
+
+    def test_author_profile_consumes_author_handoff_without_role_argument(
+        self,
+    ) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(926)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["role"], "author")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_console_authz_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
+"""Console authorization, redaction, and audit model tests (#633).
+
+Covers each acceptance criterion and each required test named in the issue:
+
+* AC1 — RBAC matrix and privileged-action list.
+* AC2 — redaction rules, unit-tested against sample payloads.
+* AC3 — audit event schema with required fields and retention defaults.
+* AC4 — Phase 2 integration points.
+* AC5 — local-dev mode with explicit insecurity warnings.
+
+Required tests: redaction units (token, keychain, password patterns),
+default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs, and audit record creation for a
+simulated privileged preview.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime
+import json
+import os
+import pathlib
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
+
+from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP  # noqa: E402
+from webui import console_audit, console_authz  # noqa: E402
+from webui.app import create_app  # noqa: E402
+from webui.console_redaction import (  # noqa: E402
+    REDACTED,
+    redact_payload,
+    redact_text,
+    redaction_policy,
+    scan_for_secrets,
+)
+
+DOCS = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "docs"
+AUTHZ_DOC = DOCS / "webui-authz-audit.md"
+
+
+def _principal(role: str) -> console_authz.Principal:
+    return console_authz.Principal(
+        subject=f"{role}@example.com",
+        role=role,
+        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+        authenticated=True,
+    )
+
+
+class TestRoleMatrix(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC1 — the written RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
+
+    def test_roles_are_ordered_least_to_most_authority(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_authz.ROLE_ORDER,
+            ("viewer", "operator", "controller", "admin"),
+        )
+
+    def test_every_role_has_a_description(self):
+        for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
+            with self.subTest(role=role):
+                self.assertTrue(console_authz.ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role].strip())
+
+    def test_higher_roles_inherit_lower_role_actions(self):
+        matrix = {
+            entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
+            for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
+        }
+        for lower, higher in zip(
+            console_authz.ROLE_ORDER, console_authz.ROLE_ORDER[1:]
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(lower=lower, higher=higher):
+                self.assertTrue(matrix[lower].issubset(matrix[higher]))
+
+    def test_viewer_holds_no_write_action(self):
+        matrix = {
+            entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
+            for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
+        }
+        self.assertEqual(matrix["viewer"], set())
+
+    def test_privileged_action_list_is_non_empty_and_classified(self):
+        privileged = console_authz.privileged_actions()
+        self.assertTrue(privileged)
+        ids = {action.action_id for action in privileged}
+        # Merge and branch deletion are the canonical privileged pair.
+        self.assertIn("merge_pr", ids)
+        self.assertIn("delete_branch", ids)
+
+    def test_merge_and_delete_require_dual_control_and_break_glass(self):
+        for action_id in ("merge_pr", "delete_branch"):
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
+                self.assertTrue(action.dual_control)
+                self.assertTrue(action.break_glass)
+                self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
+
+    def test_every_write_action_requires_confirmation(self):
+        for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
+            with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
+                self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
+
+    def test_delete_branch_is_admin_only(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_authz.get_action("delete_branch").minimum_role,
+            console_authz.ADMIN,
+        )
+
+    def test_actions_map_to_real_mcp_capability_vocabulary(self):
+        """The console must not invent an authority the MCP layer lacks."""
+        for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
+            with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
+                self.assertIn(action.task_key, TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP)
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    action.mcp_permission,
+                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["permission"],
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    action.mcp_role,
+                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["role"],
+                )
+
+    def test_matrix_declares_deny_by_default_and_execution_disabled(self):
+        matrix = console_authz.rbac_matrix()
+        self.assertEqual(matrix["default_decision"], "deny")
+        self.assertFalse(matrix["execution_enabled"])
+
+
+class TestAuthorizeDefaultDeny(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Fail-closed behaviour of the authorization decision."""
+
+    def test_anonymous_is_denied_every_action(self):
+        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id)
+                self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
+                )
+
+    def test_unknown_action_is_denied(self):
+        decision = console_authz.authorize(
+            "not_a_real_action", _principal("admin")
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION)
+
+    def test_unknown_role_is_denied(self):
+        rogue = console_authz.Principal(
+            subject="[email protected]",
+            role="superuser",
+            identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+            authenticated=True,
+        )
+        decision = console_authz.authorize("comment_issue", rogue)
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE)
+
+    def test_insufficient_role_is_denied(self):
+        decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("operator"))
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE
+        )
+
+    def test_sufficient_role_allows_preview_only(self):
+        decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("controller"))
+        self.assertTrue(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
+
+    def test_execution_is_refused_while_phase_is_not_active(self):
+        decision = console_authz.authorize(
+            "merge_pr", _principal("controller"), for_execution=True
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE
+        )
+
+    def test_allowed_decision_never_reports_execution_enabled(self):
+        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                decision = console_authz.authorize(
+                    action_id, _principal("admin")
+                )
+                self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
+
+
+class TestIdentityResolution(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC5 — identity sources, including the insecure local-dev mode."""
+
+    def test_no_auth_mode_yields_anonymous_viewer(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(env={})
+        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
+        self.assertEqual(principal.identity_source, console_authz.IDENTITY_NONE)
+
+    def test_local_dev_mode_warns_that_identity_is_unverified(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            env={
+                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev",
+                console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
+                console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "admin",
+            }
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(principal.authenticated)
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, "admin")
+        self.assertTrue(principal.warnings)
+        self.assertIn("asserted", " ".join(principal.warnings).lower())
+
+    def test_local_dev_without_subject_falls_back_to_anonymous(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev"}
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
+
+    def test_local_dev_unknown_role_degrades_to_viewer(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            env={
+                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local_dev",
+                console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
+                console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "root",
+            }
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
+
+    def test_access_proxy_without_header_fails_closed(self):
+        """A proxy-mode request that did not traverse the proxy is anonymous."""
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            headers={},
+            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
+
+    def test_access_proxy_role_comes_from_server_config_not_client(self):
+        env = {
+            console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
+            console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: json.dumps(
+                {"[email protected]": "controller"}
+            ),
+        }
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            headers={
+                console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]",
+                "x-role": "admin",  # client-supplied role must be ignored
+            },
+            env=env,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, "controller")
+
+    def test_access_proxy_unmapped_subject_defaults_to_viewer(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            headers={
+                console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"
+            },
+            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
+
+    def test_malformed_role_map_does_not_raise_and_denies(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            headers={console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"},
+            env={
+                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
+                console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: "{not json",
+            },
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
+
+    def test_probe_auth_is_opt_in(self):
+        self.assertFalse(console_authz.probe_auth_required(env={}))
+        self.assertTrue(
+            console_authz.probe_auth_required(
+                env={console_authz.REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV: "1"}
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_probe_auth_is_declared_but_not_yet_enforced(self):
+        """Phase 1 declares the probe-auth policy; no route enforces it yet.
+
+        The flag exists so the Phase 2 action framework has a declared policy
+        to honour instead of inventing a second one. Pinning the current
+        not-enforced status here means wiring it later is a deliberate change
+        that updates this test and the documentation together, rather than a
+        silent behaviour shift. The documentation must say so plainly, because
+        an operator who sets the variable believing it protects a probe is
+        worse off than one who knows it does not.
+        """
+        import inspect
+
+        from webui import app as webui_app
+
+        source = inspect.getsource(webui_app)
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            "probe_auth_required",
+            source,
+            msg=(
+                "webui.app now consults probe_auth_required, so probe auth is "
+                "no longer merely declared. Update the 'Probe authentication' "
+                "section of docs/webui-authz-audit.md, which states it "
+                "enforces nothing, and replace this test with real "
+                "enforcement coverage."
+            ),
+        )
+        self.assertIn(
+            "enforces nothing today",
+            AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
+        )
+
+
+class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC2 — required redaction units: token, keychain, password patterns."""
+
+    def test_token_assignment_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("GITEA_TOKEN=abcd1234efgh5678ijkl")
+        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
+        self.assertNotIn("abcd1234efgh5678ijkl", out)
+
+    def test_password_assignment_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("password: hunter2supersecret")
+        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
+        self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", out)
+
+    def test_keychain_reference_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("keychain:gitea-prgs-token")
+        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
+        self.assertNotIn("gitea-prgs-token", out)
+
+    def test_keychain_command_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("security find-generic-password -s gitea -w")
+        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
+        self.assertNotIn("find-generic-password -s gitea", out)
+
+    def test_bearer_credential_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("Authorization: Bearer abcdef1234567890abcdef")
+        self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890abcdef", out)
+
+    def test_jwt_is_redacted(self):
+        token = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0.abcdefghijklmnop"
+        out = redact_text(f"session={token}")
+        self.assertNotIn(token, out)
+
+    def test_private_key_block_is_redacted(self):
+        pem = (
+            "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+            "MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial\n"
+            "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
+        )
+        out = redact_text(pem)
+        self.assertNotIn("MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial", out)
+
+    def test_api_key_assignment_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text('api_key = "sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210"')
+        self.assertNotIn("sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210", out)
+
+    def test_nested_payload_is_redacted_recursively(self):
+        payload = {
+            "token": "abc123456789",
+            "nested": {"note": "password=letmein12345"},
+            "list": ["keychain:some-entry"],
+            "safe": "plain text",
+        }
+        out = redact_payload(payload)
+        self.assertEqual(out["token"], REDACTED)
+        self.assertNotIn("letmein12345", json.dumps(out))
+        self.assertNotIn("some-entry", json.dumps(out))
+        self.assertEqual(out["safe"], "plain text")
+
+    def test_scan_reports_findings_before_and_none_after(self):
+        dirty = "password: hunter2supersecret"
+        self.assertTrue(scan_for_secrets(dirty))
+        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redact_text(dirty)), [])
+
+    def test_non_strings_pass_through_untouched(self):
+        self.assertEqual(redact_text(42), 42)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            redact_payload({"n": 1, "b": True}), {"n": 1, "b": True}
+        )
+
+    def test_policy_is_documented_and_declares_redact_before_persist(self):
+        policy = redaction_policy()
+        self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
+        self.assertIn("audit_records", policy["applies_to"])
+        self.assertTrue(policy["console_rules"])
+
+    def test_policy_statement_contains_no_secret_material(self):
+        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redaction_policy()), [])
+
+
+class TestAuditSchema(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC3 — audit event schema, required fields, and retention defaults."""
+
+    def _event(self, action_id="merge_pr", **kwargs):
+        return console_audit.build_event(
+            action_id=action_id,
+            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
+            decision=console_authz.authorize(action_id, _principal("operator")),
+            target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
+            request_id="req-test",
+            **kwargs,
+        )
+
+    def test_every_required_field_is_present(self):
+        event = self._event()
+        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_FIELDS:
+            with self.subTest(field=field):
+                self.assertIn(field, event)
+
+    def test_actor_carries_who_and_how_they_were_identified(self):
+        event = self._event()
+        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS:
+            with self.subTest(field=field):
+                self.assertIn(field, event["actor"])
+
+    def test_correlation_ids_are_present(self):
+        event = self._event()
+        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS:
+            with self.subTest(field=field):
+                self.assertIn(field, event["correlation"])
+        self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["request_id"], "req-test")
+        self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["mcp_task"], "merge_pr")
+
+    def test_timestamp_is_timezone_aware_utc_iso8601(self):
+        now = datetime.datetime(
+            2026, 7, 22, 10, 16, 42, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc
+        )
+        event = self._event(now=now)
+        self.assertEqual(event["timestamp"], "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00")
+        parsed = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(event["timestamp"])
+        self.assertIsNotNone(parsed.tzinfo)
+
+    def test_retention_defaults_by_class(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD], 90
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED],
+            365,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS],
+            730,
+        )
+
+    def test_break_glass_action_retains_longest(self):
+        event = self._event("merge_pr")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
+        )
+
+    def test_routine_write_uses_standard_retention(self):
+        event = self._event("comment_issue")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD
+        )
+
+    def test_unknown_action_retains_as_privileged_not_standard(self):
+        """Conservative direction: keep an unclassifiable record longer."""
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.retention_class_for(None),
+            console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED,
+        )
+
+    def test_retention_expiry_matches_declared_days(self):
+        now = datetime.datetime(2026, 7, 22, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
+        event = self._event("comment_issue", now=now)
+        expires = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(
+            event["retention"]["expires_at"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual((expires - now).days, 90)
+
+    def test_invalid_result_degrades_to_failed(self):
+        event = console_audit.build_event(action_id="merge_pr", result="banana")
+        self.assertEqual(event["result"], console_audit.RESULT_FAILED)
+
+    def test_denied_result_is_representable(self):
+        """An authorization denial has no MCP-side mutation record."""
+        self.assertIn(console_audit.RESULT_DENIED, console_audit.RESULTS)
+
+    def test_event_is_redacted_before_it_is_returned(self):
+        event = console_audit.build_event(
+            action_id="merge_pr",
+            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
+            detail="failed with token=abcdef1234567890",
+            metadata={"password": "hunter2supersecret"},
+        )
+        serialized = json.dumps(event)
+        self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890", serialized)
+        self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", serialized)
+        self.assertTrue(event["redacted"])
+
+    def test_audit_policy_reports_schema_and_retention(self):
+        policy = console_audit.audit_policy()
+        self.assertTrue(policy["append_only"])
+        self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            policy["retention_defaults_days"], console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS
+        )
+
+
+class TestAuditSink(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Append-only persistence behaviour."""
+
+    def test_write_is_a_noop_when_sink_is_unconfigured(self):
+        saved = os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
+        try:
+            self.assertFalse(console_audit.audit_enabled())
+            self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event({"schema_version": 1}))
+        finally:
+            if saved is not None:
+                os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = saved
+
+    def test_records_append_one_json_line_each(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
+            for _ in range(3):
+                event = console_audit.build_event(
+                    action_id="merge_pr", result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
+                )
+                self.assertTrue(console_audit.write_event(event, path=sink))
+            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                lines = [json.loads(line) for line in handle if line.strip()]
+            self.assertEqual(len(lines), 3)
+            self.assertEqual(len({line["event_id"] for line in lines}), 3)
+
+    def test_a_record_that_still_carries_a_secret_is_not_persisted(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
+            leaky = {
+                "schema_version": 1,
+                "detail": "password: hunter2supersecret",
+            }
+            self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event(leaky, path=sink))
+            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(sink))
+
+    def test_write_never_raises_on_a_bad_path(self):
+        self.assertFalse(
+            console_audit.write_event(
+                {"schema_version": 1}, path="/nonexistent-dir/audit.jsonl"
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_simulated_privileged_preview_creates_an_audit_record(self):
+        """Required test: audit record creation for a privileged preview."""
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
+            os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = sink
+            try:
+                decision = console_authz.authorize(
+                    "merge_pr", _principal("controller")
+                )
+                outcome = console_audit.record_event(
+                    action_id="merge_pr",
+                    result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
+                    decision=decision,
+                    target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
+                    request_id="req-preview",
+                )
+            finally:
+                os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
+            self.assertTrue(outcome["written"])
+            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
+            self.assertEqual(record["action"], "merge_pr")
+            self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED)
+            self.assertEqual(record["action_class"], "privileged")
+            self.assertTrue(record["decision"]["allowed"])
+            self.assertFalse(record["decision"]["execution_enabled"])
+            self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["role"], "controller")
+
+    def test_decision_block_survives_redaction(self):
+        """Regression: naming it 'authorization' collided with a secret hint.
+
+        ``gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS`` contains "authorization" (for the
+        HTTP header), so a block under that key was replaced wholesale by the
+        placeholder and the record lost its decision entirely.
+        """
+        event = console_audit.build_event(
+            action_id="merge_pr",
+            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
+            decision=console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("admin")),
+        )
+        self.assertIsInstance(event["decision"], dict)
+        self.assertIn("allowed", event["decision"])
+
+
+class TestConsoleRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC4 — the wired Phase 2 integration points, still fail-closed."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app(bind_host="127.0.0.1"))
+
+    def test_unauthenticated_write_stub_is_denied(self):
+        """Required test: default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs."""
+        response = self.client.post(
+            "/api/actions/merge_pr/attempt", json={"pr_number": 99}
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
+        body = response.json()
+        self.assertFalse(body["success"])
+        authorization = body["authorization"]
+        self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            authorization["reason_code"], console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(authorization["execution_enabled"])
+
+    def test_preview_reports_an_authorization_decision(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/actions/merge_pr/preview?pr_number=7")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        authorization = response.json()["authorization"]
+        self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(authorization["dual_control"])
+        self.assertEqual(authorization["required_role"], "controller")
+
+    def test_unknown_action_preview_still_404s(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/actions/no_such_action/preview")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)
+
+    def test_security_model_endpoint_publishes_all_three_policies(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        body = response.json()
+        self.assertIn("rbac", body)
+        self.assertIn("redaction", body)
+        self.assertIn("audit", body)
+        self.assertEqual(body["rbac"]["default_decision"], "deny")
+
+    def test_security_model_endpoint_leaks_no_secrets(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
+        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(response.json()), [])
+
+    def test_security_model_rejects_writes(self):
+        response = self.client.post("/api/console/security-model", json={})
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
+
+    def test_existing_read_routes_are_unaffected(self):
+        for path in ("/", "/health", "/actions", "/api/actions"):
+            with self.subTest(path=path):
+                self.assertEqual(self.client.get(path).status_code, 200)
+
+
+class TestAuthzAuditDoc(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The model must be written down, not only coded."""
+
+    @classmethod
+    def setUpClass(cls):
+        cls.text = (
+            AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8") if AUTHZ_DOC.exists() else ""
+        )
+
+    def test_doc_exists(self):
+        self.assertTrue(AUTHZ_DOC.exists(), f"missing {AUTHZ_DOC}")
+
+    def test_doc_covers_each_required_section(self):
+        for heading in (
+            "Identity sources",
+            "Role matrix",
+            "Privileged actions",
+            "Secret redaction",
+            "Audit event schema",
+            "Retention",
+            "Phase 2 integration",
+            "Local-dev mode",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(heading=heading):
+                self.assertIn(heading, self.text)
+
+    def test_doc_names_every_role(self):
+        for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
+            with self.subTest(role=role):
+                self.assertIn(role, self.text)
+
+    def test_doc_names_every_console_action(self):
+        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                self.assertIn(action_id, self.text)
+
+    def test_doc_states_retention_defaults(self):
+        for days in console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS.values():
+            with self.subTest(days=days):
+                self.assertIn(str(days), self.text)
+
+    def test_doc_warns_local_dev_is_insecure(self):
+        self.assertIn("INSECURE", self.text.upper())
+
+    def test_doc_states_default_deny(self):
+        self.assertIn("deny", self.text.lower())
+
+    def test_doc_contains_no_secret_material(self):
+        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(self.text), [])
+
+    def test_deployment_doc_links_to_the_model(self):
+        deployment = (DOCS / "webui-deployment.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        self.assertIn("webui-authz-audit", deployment)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_project_registry.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"""Tests for web UI project registry (#427)."""
+"""Tests for web UI project registry (#427) and its API evolution (#635)."""
 import json
 import sys
 import tempfile
@@ -11,57 +11,246 @@ from starlette.testclient import TestClient
 
 from webui.app import create_app
 from webui.project_registry import (
+    CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+    REGISTRY_API_VERSION,
+    SUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSIONS,
+    RegistryError,
     default_registry_path,
     load_registry,
+    onboarding_summary,
     project_to_dict,
 )
+from webui.registry_safety import is_forbidden_key
+
+_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+_API_DOC = _REPO_ROOT / "docs" / "webui-project-registry-api.md"
 
 
-class TestProjectRegistryLoader(unittest.TestCase):
+def _valid_project(**overrides):
+    project = {
+        "id": "example",
+        "repo_name": "Example",
+        "gitea_owner": "Org",
+        "remote_host": "https://gitea.example.invalid",
+        "default_branch": "main",
+        "local_checkout_path": ".",
+        "profiles": {"author": "a", "reviewer": "r", "reconciler": "c"},
+        "workflow_paths": {"skill": "skills/x.md"},
+    }
+    project.update(overrides)
+    return project
+
+
+def _write_registry(payload) -> Path:
+    with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", suffix=".json", delete=False) as handle:
+        json.dump(payload, handle)
+        return Path(handle.name)
+
+
+class RegistryFileCase(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Base class that cleans up temporary registry files."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._temp_paths: list[Path] = []
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        for path in self._temp_paths:
+            path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+    def write_registry(self, payload) -> Path:
+        path = _write_registry(payload)
+        self._temp_paths.append(path)
+        return path
+
+
+class TestProjectRegistryLoader(RegistryFileCase):
     def test_default_registry_loads_gitea_tools(self):
         registry = load_registry()
-        self.assertEqual(registry.version, 1)
+        self.assertEqual(registry.version, CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION)
+        self.assertEqual(registry.schema_version, CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION)
+        self.assertEqual(registry.api_version, REGISTRY_API_VERSION)
         self.assertEqual(len(registry.projects), 1)
         project = registry.projects[0]
         self.assertEqual(project.id, "gitea-tools")
         self.assertEqual(project.repo_name, "Gitea-Tools")
         self.assertEqual(project.gitea_owner, "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
+        self.assertEqual(project.repo_full_name, "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools")
         self.assertEqual(project.remote_host, "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
+        self.assertEqual(project.remote_name, "prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(project.status, "active")
         self.assertEqual(project.profiles["author"], "prgs-author")
         self.assertEqual(project.profiles["reviewer"], "prgs-reviewer")
         self.assertEqual(project.profiles["reconciler"], "prgs-reconciler")
         self.assertIn("skill", project.workflow_paths)
         self.assertGreaterEqual(len(project.onboarding_checklist), 4)
 
-    def test_registry_rejects_credential_keys(self):
-        payload = {
+    def test_default_registry_onboarding_summary_is_complete(self):
+        summary = onboarding_summary(load_registry().projects[0])
+        self.assertEqual(summary.total, summary.complete)
+        self.assertEqual(summary.required_outstanding, 0)
+        self.assertTrue(summary.onboarding_complete)
+
+    def test_version_1_registry_still_loads_with_defaults(self):
+        path = self.write_registry({
             "version": 1,
             "projects": [
-                {
-                    "id": "bad",
-                    "repo_name": "Bad",
-                    "gitea_owner": "Org",
-                    "remote_host": "https://gitea.example.invalid",
-                    "default_branch": "main",
-                    "local_checkout_path": ".",
-                    "profiles": {
-                        "author": "a",
-                        "reviewer": "r",
-                        "reconciler": "c",
-                    },
-                    "workflow_paths": {"skill": "skills/x.md"},
-                    "api_token": "secret",
-                }
+                _valid_project(
+                    onboarding_checklist=[
+                        {"id": "step", "title": "Step", "description": "Do it"}
+                    ]
+                )
             ],
-        }
+        })
+        registry = load_registry(path)
+        self.assertEqual(registry.schema_version, 1)
+        self.assertIn(1, SUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSIONS)
+        project = registry.projects[0]
+        self.assertEqual(project.status, "active")
+        self.assertIsNone(project.remote_name)
+        self.assertIsNone(project.last_seen_health)
+        step = project.onboarding_checklist[0]
+        self.assertEqual(step.state, "pending")
+        self.assertTrue(step.required)
+        self.assertFalse(onboarding_summary(project).onboarding_complete)
+
+    def test_onboarding_summary_counts_states(self):
+        path = self.write_registry({
+            "version": 2,
+            "projects": [
+                _valid_project(
+                    onboarding_checklist=[
+                        {"id": "a", "title": "A", "description": "d", "state": "complete"},
+                        {"id": "b", "title": "B", "description": "d", "state": "blocked"},
+                        {
+                            "id": "c",
+                            "title": "C",
+                            "description": "d",
+                            "state": "pending",
+                            "required": False,
+                        },
+                        {
+                            "id": "d",
+                            "title": "D",
+                            "description": "d",
+                            "state": "not_applicable",
+                        },
+                    ]
+                )
+            ],
+        })
+        summary = onboarding_summary(load_registry(path).projects[0])
+        self.assertEqual(summary.total, 4)
+        self.assertEqual(summary.complete, 1)
+        self.assertEqual(summary.blocked, 1)
+        self.assertEqual(summary.pending, 1)
+        self.assertEqual(summary.not_applicable, 1)
+        # Only the blocked step is both required and outstanding.
+        self.assertEqual(summary.required_outstanding, 1)
+        self.assertFalse(summary.onboarding_complete)
+
+    def test_last_seen_health_is_parsed_when_present(self):
+        path = self.write_registry({
+            "version": 2,
+            "projects": [
+                _valid_project(
+                    last_seen_health={
+                        "status": "degraded",
+                        "checked_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+                        "detail": "daemon restart pending",
+                    }
+                )
+            ],
+        })
+        health = load_registry(path).projects[0].last_seen_health
+        self.assertIsNotNone(health)
+        self.assertEqual(health.status, "degraded")
+        self.assertEqual(health.checked_at, "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z")
+
+    def test_registry_rejects_credential_keys(self):
+        path = self.write_registry({
+            "version": 1,
+            "projects": [_valid_project(id="bad", api_token="redacted-placeholder")],
+        })
+        with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
+            load_registry(path)
+        self.assertIn("credential", ctx.exception.remediation.lower())
+        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.field_path, "projects[0].api_token")
+
+    def test_unsupported_version_fails_closed_with_remediation(self):
+        path = self.write_registry({"version": 99, "projects": [_valid_project()]})
+        with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
+            load_registry(path)
+        self.assertIn("unsupported registry version", ctx.exception.message)
+        self.assertIn(str(CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION), ctx.exception.remediation)
+        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.field_path, "version")
+
+    def test_missing_required_field_fails_closed(self):
+        broken = _valid_project()
+        del broken["default_branch"]
+        path = self.write_registry({"version": 2, "projects": [broken]})
+        with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
+            load_registry(path)
+        self.assertIn("default_branch", ctx.exception.message)
+        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.field_path, "projects[0]")
+
+    def test_unknown_status_fails_closed(self):
+        path = self.write_registry({
+            "version": 2,
+            "projects": [_valid_project(status="mystery")],
+        })
+        with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
+            load_registry(path)
+        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.field_path, "projects[0].status")
+        self.assertIn("active", ctx.exception.remediation)
+
+    def test_unknown_onboarding_state_fails_closed(self):
+        path = self.write_registry({
+            "version": 2,
+            "projects": [
+                _valid_project(
+                    onboarding_checklist=[
+                        {"id": "a", "title": "A", "description": "d", "state": "almost"}
+                    ]
+                )
+            ],
+        })
+        with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
+            load_registry(path)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            ctx.exception.field_path,
+            "projects[0].onboarding_checklist[0].state",
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_profile_role_fails_closed(self):
+        path = self.write_registry({
+            "version": 2,
+            "projects": [_valid_project(profiles={"author": "a", "reviewer": "r"})],
+        })
+        with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
+            load_registry(path)
+        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.field_path, "projects[0].profiles.reconciler")
+
+    def test_empty_projects_fails_closed(self):
+        path = self.write_registry({"version": 2, "projects": []})
+        with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
+            load_registry(path)
+        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.field_path, "projects")
+
+    def test_invalid_json_fails_closed_with_location(self):
         with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", suffix=".json", delete=False) as handle:
-            json.dump(payload, handle)
+            handle.write("{not json")
             path = Path(handle.name)
-        try:
-            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
-                load_registry(path)
-        finally:
-            path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        self._temp_paths.append(path)
+        with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
+            load_registry(path)
+        self.assertIn("not valid JSON", ctx.exception.message)
+        self.assertIn("line", ctx.exception.remediation)
+
+    def test_missing_file_fails_closed(self):
+        missing = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "webui-registry-does-not-exist.json"
+        with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
+            load_registry(missing)
+        self.assertIn("could not be read", ctx.exception.message)
 
     def test_default_registry_path_points_at_packaged_data(self):
         path = default_registry_path()
@@ -81,31 +270,147 @@ class TestProjectRegistryRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("prgs-author", response.text)
         self.assertNotIn("child issue", response.text.lower())
 
+    def test_projects_page_shows_status_and_progress(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/projects")
+        self.assertIn("Status", response.text)
+        self.assertIn("Onboarding", response.text)
+        self.assertIn("4/4 complete", response.text)
+
     def test_project_detail_renders_checklist(self):
         response = self.client.get("/projects/gitea-tools")
         self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
         self.assertIn("Onboarding checklist", response.text)
         self.assertIn("Configure execution profiles", response.text)
         self.assertIn("branches/", response.text)
+        self.assertIn("Complete", response.text)
+        self.assertIn("required outstanding 0", response.text)
 
     def test_project_detail_404(self):
         response = self.client.get("/projects/unknown-repo")
         self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)
 
-    def test_api_projects_json(self):
+    def test_api_projects_alias_stays_compatible(self):
         response = self.client.get("/api/projects")
         self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
         data = response.json()
-        self.assertEqual(data["version"], 1)
+        # #427 consumers keep these keys.
+        self.assertEqual(data["version"], CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION)
+        self.assertIn("source_path", data)
         self.assertEqual(len(data["projects"]), 1)
         self.assertEqual(data["projects"][0]["id"], "gitea-tools")
         self.assertIn("onboarding_checklist", data["projects"][0])
 
+    def test_api_v1_projects_payload(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/v1/projects")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        data = response.json()
+        self.assertEqual(data["api_version"], REGISTRY_API_VERSION)
+        self.assertEqual(data["schema_version"], CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION)
+        self.assertEqual(data["project_count"], 1)
+        self.assertEqual(data["source"]["kind"], "file")
+        self.assertTrue(data["source"]["inventory_complete"])
+        project = data["projects"][0]
+        self.assertEqual(project["status"], "active")
+        self.assertEqual(project["remote_name"], "prgs")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            project["repo_full_name"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(project["onboarding_summary"]["onboarding_complete"])
+        self.assertEqual(project["onboarding_checklist"][0]["state"], "complete")
+        self.assertIsNone(project["last_seen_health"])
+
+    def test_api_v1_project_detail(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/v1/projects/gitea-tools")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        data = response.json()
+        self.assertEqual(data["api_version"], REGISTRY_API_VERSION)
+        self.assertEqual(data["project"]["id"], "gitea-tools")
+        self.assertEqual(data["source"]["kind"], "file")
+
+    def test_api_v1_project_detail_missing_fails_closed(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/v1/projects/not-registered")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)
+        data = response.json()
+        self.assertEqual(data["error"], "project_not_found")
+        self.assertEqual(data["project_id"], "not-registered")
+        self.assertIn("gitea-tools", data["known_project_ids"])
+        self.assertIn("remediation", data)
+
+    def test_api_v1_projects_is_read_only(self):
+        response = self.client.post("/api/v1/projects", json={})
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
+        self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "read-only-mvp")
+
     def test_project_to_dict_is_json_safe(self):
         registry = load_registry()
-        encoded = json.dumps(project_to_dict(registry.projects[0]))
+        dto = project_to_dict(registry.projects[0])
+        encoded = json.dumps(dto)
         self.assertIn("gitea-tools", encoded)
+        # Prose may mention tokens; no serialized *key* may look like a secret.
+        for key in dto:
+            with self.subTest(key=key):
+                self.assertFalse(is_forbidden_key(key))
+
+
+class TestInvalidRegistryFailsClosedOverHttp(RegistryFileCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        super().setUp()
+        self.path = self.write_registry({"version": 42, "projects": []})
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+
+    def _with_bad_registry(self, url: str):
+        import os
+        from unittest import mock
+
+        with mock.patch.dict(
+            os.environ, {"WEBUI_PROJECT_REGISTRY": str(self.path)}, clear=False
+        ):
+            return self.client.get(url)
+
+    def test_api_v1_reports_actionable_error(self):
+        response = self._with_bad_registry("/api/v1/projects")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 500)
+        data = response.json()
+        self.assertEqual(data["error"], "registry_invalid")
+        self.assertIn("unsupported registry version", data["detail"])
+        self.assertTrue(data["remediation"])
+        self.assertEqual(data["field_path"], "version")
+
+    def test_unversioned_alias_reports_actionable_error(self):
+        response = self._with_bad_registry("/api/projects")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 500)
+        self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "registry_invalid")
+
+    def test_html_page_reports_actionable_error(self):
+        response = self._with_bad_registry("/projects")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 500)
+        self.assertIn("Project registry unavailable", response.text)
+        self.assertIn("Remediation", response.text)
+
+
+class TestProjectRegistryApiDocs(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_api_contract_is_documented(self):
+        self.assertTrue(_API_DOC.is_file(), f"missing {_API_DOC}")
+        text = _API_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        for token in (
+            "/api/v1/projects",
+            "/api/v1/projects/{project_id}",
+            "/api/projects",
+            "onboarding_summary",
+            "last_seen_health",
+            "registry_invalid",
+            "#635",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(token=token):
+                self.assertIn(token, text)
+
+    def test_route_table_lists_versioned_routes(self):
+        local_dev = (_REPO_ROOT / "docs" / "webui-local-dev.md").read_text(
+            encoding="utf-8"
+        )
+        self.assertIn("/api/v1/projects", local_dev)
+        self.assertIn("webui-project-registry-api.md", local_dev)
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()
+    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import uuid
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
 from starlette.applications import Starlette
@@ -11,14 +12,29 @@ from starlette.routing import Route
 
 from webui.deployment_boundary import deployment_snapshot
 from webui.layout import render_page
-from webui.project_registry import find_project, load_registry, registry_to_dict
-from webui.project_views import render_project_detail, render_projects_list
+from webui.project_registry import (
+    ProjectRegistry,
+    RegistryError,
+    find_project,
+    known_project_ids,
+    load_registry,
+    project_detail_to_dict,
+    registry_to_dict,
+)
+from webui.project_views import (
+    render_project_detail,
+    render_projects_list,
+    render_registry_error,
+)
 from webui.prompt_library import find_prompt, library_to_dict
 from webui.prompt_views import render_prompt_detail, render_prompts_page
 from final_report_validator import FINAL_REPORT_TASK_KINDS
 
 from webui.gated_actions import attempt_action, load_action_registry, preview_action
 from webui.gated_action_views import render_actions_page
+from webui import console_audit
+from webui.console_authz import authorize, rbac_matrix, resolve_principal
+from webui.console_redaction import redaction_policy
 from webui.audit_validator import audit_report, audit_to_dict
 from webui.audit_views import render_audit_page
 from webui.lease_loader import load_lease_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as lease_snapshot_to_dict
@@ -81,14 +97,26 @@ async def api_queue(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(queue_snapshot_to_dict(load_queue_snapshot()))
 
 
+def _load_project_registry() -> tuple[ProjectRegistry | None, RegistryError | None]:
+    """Load the registry, converting validation failure into a fail-closed pair."""
+    try:
+        return load_registry(), None
+    except RegistryError as exc:
+        return None, exc
+
+
 async def projects(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
-    registry = load_registry()
+    registry, error = _load_project_registry()
+    if error is not None:
+        return HTMLResponse(render_registry_error(error), status_code=500)
     return HTMLResponse(render_projects_list(registry))
 
 
 async def project_detail(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
     project_id = request.path_params["project_id"]
-    registry = load_registry()
+    registry, error = _load_project_registry()
+    if error is not None:
+        return HTMLResponse(render_registry_error(error), status_code=500)
     project = find_project(registry, project_id)
     if project is None:
         return HTMLResponse(
@@ -106,10 +134,47 @@ async def project_detail(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
 
 
 async def api_projects(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
-    registry = load_registry()
+    """Unversioned MVP alias, retained through Phase 1 (#632 section 6)."""
+    registry, error = _load_project_registry()
+    if error is not None:
+        return JSONResponse(error.to_dict(), status_code=500)
     return JSONResponse(registry_to_dict(registry))
 
 
+async def api_v1_projects(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    registry, error = _load_project_registry()
+    if error is not None:
+        return JSONResponse(error.to_dict(), status_code=500)
+    return JSONResponse(registry_to_dict(registry))
+
+
+async def api_v1_project_detail(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    project_id = request.path_params["project_id"]
+    registry, error = _load_project_registry()
+    if error is not None:
+        return JSONResponse(error.to_dict(), status_code=500)
+    project = find_project(registry, project_id)
+    if project is None:
+        return JSONResponse(
+            {
+                "error": "project_not_found",
+                "project_id": project_id,
+                "known_project_ids": known_project_ids(registry),
+                "remediation": (
+                    "Request one of the known project ids, or add the project to the "
+                    "registry file named in 'source'."
+                ),
+                "source": {
+                    "kind": "file",
+                    "path": str(registry.source_path),
+                    "inventory_complete": True,
+                },
+            },
+            status_code=404,
+        )
+    return JSONResponse(project_detail_to_dict(registry, project))
+
+
 async def prompts(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
     return HTMLResponse(render_prompts_page())
 
@@ -215,6 +280,49 @@ async def api_actions(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(load_action_registry().to_dict())
 
 
+def _request_id() -> str:
+    return f"req-{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
+
+
+def _audit_target(action_id: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Describe the action target for the audit record (never secrets)."""
+    if "pr_number" in params:
+        return {"kind": "pr", "ref": f"#{params['pr_number']}"}
+    if "issue_number" in params:
+        return {"kind": "issue", "ref": f"#{params['issue_number']}"}
+    if "branch_name" in params:
+        return {"kind": "branch", "ref": str(params["branch_name"])}
+    return {"kind": "unspecified", "ref": action_id}
+
+
+def _authorize_request(
+    request: Request,
+    action_id: str,
+    params: dict[str, object],
+    *,
+    for_execution: bool,
+    result: str,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Resolve principal, decide, and audit. Returns the decision payload.
+
+    Phase 1 records the decision rather than enforcing it as the terminal
+    outcome: ``webui.gated_actions`` already fails closed for every action, so
+    this layer cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision.
+    """
+    principal = resolve_principal(headers=dict(request.headers))
+    decision = authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=for_execution)
+    console_audit.record_event(
+        action_id=action_id,
+        result=result,
+        decision=decision,
+        principal=principal,
+        target=_audit_target(action_id, params),
+        request_id=_request_id(),
+        detail=decision.detail,
+    )
+    return decision.to_dict()
+
+
 async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     action_id = request.path_params["action_id"]
     params = dict(request.query_params)
@@ -224,6 +332,13 @@ async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     result = preview_action(action_id, **params)
     if "error" in result:
         return JSONResponse(result, status_code=404)
+    result["authorization"] = _authorize_request(
+        request,
+        action_id,
+        params,
+        for_execution=False,
+        result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
+    )
     return JSONResponse(result)
 
 
@@ -237,10 +352,31 @@ async def api_action_attempt(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     if not isinstance(body, dict):
         body = {}
     result = attempt_action(action_id, **body)
+    authorization = _authorize_request(
+        request,
+        action_id,
+        body,
+        for_execution=True,
+        result=(
+            console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
+            if not result.get("success")
+            else console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED
+        ),
+    )
+    result["authorization"] = authorization
     status = 403 if not result.get("success") else 200
     return JSONResponse(result, status_code=status)
 
 
+async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    """Read-only publication of the #633 authorization/redaction/audit model."""
+    return JSONResponse({
+        "rbac": rbac_matrix(),
+        "redaction": redaction_policy(),
+        "audit": console_audit.audit_policy(),
+    })
+
+
 async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response:
     path = request.url.path
     if path in _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS and request.method == "POST":
@@ -268,6 +404,12 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
             Route("/projects", projects, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/projects/{project_id}", project_detail, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/projects", api_projects, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route("/api/v1/projects", api_v1_projects, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route(
+                "/api/v1/projects/{project_id}",
+                api_v1_project_detail,
+                methods=["GET"],
+            ),
             Route("/prompts", prompts, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/prompts/{prompt_id}", prompt_detail, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/prompts", api_prompts, methods=["GET"]),
@@ -291,6 +433,11 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
                 methods=["POST"],
             ),
             Route("/api/leases", api_leases, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route(
+                "/api/console/security-model",
+                api_console_security_model,
+                methods=["GET"],
+            ),
         ],
         exception_handlers={405: method_not_allowed},
     )

webui/console_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+"""Console audit event schema, retention, and append-only sink (#633).
+
+``gitea_audit`` records MCP-side *mutations*: which profile and Gitea user
+performed which tool call. It carries no console actor, no identity source, no
+correlation identifier, and no retention class, so it cannot answer the
+question #633 exists to answer — *who sat at the console, what did they
+attempt, and was it authorized?* An authorization denial is not a mutation and
+would never appear there at all.
+
+This module adds the console-side record. It does not replace ``gitea_audit``:
+when a Phase 2 action eventually reaches MCP, both fire, correlated by
+``correlation.request_id``.
+
+Design constraints:
+
+- **Redact before persist.** Every record passes through
+  ``webui.console_redaction.redact_payload`` before serialization, so an
+  unredacted field is never durable.
+- **Append-only.** Records are appended as JSON lines. Nothing here updates or
+  deletes; retention is metadata on each record, enforced by an operator-run
+  policy, never by silent rewriting.
+- **Never raises.** Auditing must not break the request it describes. A failed
+  write returns ``False``.
+- **Off by default.** With ``WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`` unset, events are still
+  *built* (so callers and tests see the schema) but nothing is written.
+
+A record looks like this (synthetic values):
+
+    {"schema_version": 1, "event_id": "evt-0001",
+     "timestamp": "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00",
+     "actor": {"subject": "[email protected]", "role": "operator",
+               "identity_source": "access_proxy", "authenticated": true},
+     "action": "merge_pr", "action_class": "privileged",
+     "target": {"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
+     "result": "denied", "reason_code": "insufficient_role",
+     "correlation": {"request_id": "req-abc", "session_id": null,
+                     "mcp_task": "merge_pr", "mcp_permission": "gitea.pr.merge"},
+     "retention": {"class": "privileged", "days": 365,
+                   "expires_at": "2027-07-22T10:16:42+00:00"},
+     "redacted": true}
+
+Timestamps are timezone-aware ISO-8601 in UTC.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime
+import json
+import os
+import uuid
+from typing import Any
+
+from webui import console_authz
+from webui.console_redaction import redact_payload, scan_for_secrets
+
+SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+AUDIT_LOG_ENV = "WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG"
+
+# Result vocabulary. ``denied`` is the one ``gitea_audit`` has no equivalent
+# for: an authorization refusal never reaches the MCP layer.
+RESULT_ALLOWED = "allowed"
+RESULT_DENIED = "denied"
+RESULT_PREVIEWED = "previewed"
+RESULT_FAILED = "failed"
+RESULT_SUCCEEDED = "succeeded"
+
+RESULTS = frozenset(
+    {
+        RESULT_ALLOWED,
+        RESULT_DENIED,
+        RESULT_PREVIEWED,
+        RESULT_FAILED,
+        RESULT_SUCCEEDED,
+    }
+)
+
+# Retention classes and default lifetimes in days. Privileged and break-glass
+# records outlive routine ones because they are what an incident review needs.
+RETENTION_STANDARD = "standard"
+RETENTION_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
+RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS = "break_glass"
+
+RETENTION_DAYS: dict[str, int] = {
+    RETENTION_STANDARD: 90,
+    RETENTION_PRIVILEGED: 365,
+    RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS: 730,
+}
+
+# Fields every record must carry. Asserted by the test suite so a future edit
+# cannot quietly drop one.
+REQUIRED_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "schema_version",
+    "event_id",
+    "timestamp",
+    "actor",
+    "action",
+    "action_class",
+    "target",
+    "result",
+    "reason_code",
+    "correlation",
+    "retention",
+    "redacted",
+)
+
+REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "subject",
+    "role",
+    "identity_source",
+    "authenticated",
+)
+
+REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "request_id",
+    "session_id",
+    "mcp_task",
+    "mcp_permission",
+)
+
+
+def audit_log_path() -> str | None:
+    """Configured sink path, or ``None`` when console auditing is off."""
+    return (os.environ.get(AUDIT_LOG_ENV) or "").strip() or None
+
+
+def audit_enabled() -> bool:
+    return audit_log_path() is not None
+
+
+def retention_class_for(action: console_authz.ConsoleAction | None) -> str:
+    """Classify retention from the action, defaulting to the longest-lived.
+
+    An unknown action is treated as privileged rather than standard: for a
+    safety control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
+    """
+    if action is None:
+        return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
+    if action.break_glass:
+        return RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
+    if action.privileged:
+        return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
+    return RETENTION_STANDARD
+
+
+def _retention_block(
+    retention_class: str, now: datetime.datetime
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    days = RETENTION_DAYS.get(
+        retention_class, RETENTION_DAYS[RETENTION_PRIVILEGED]
+    )
+    return {
+        "class": retention_class,
+        "days": days,
+        "expires_at": (now + datetime.timedelta(days=days)).isoformat(),
+    }
+
+
+def build_event(
+    *,
+    action_id: str,
+    result: str,
+    decision: console_authz.AuthorizationDecision | None = None,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    target: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    reason_code: str | None = None,
+    request_id: str | None = None,
+    session_id: str | None = None,
+    detail: str | None = None,
+    metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    now: datetime.datetime | None = None,
+    event_id: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build one redacted, JSON-able console audit record.
+
+    Redaction runs here rather than at write time so an in-memory record handed
+    to a template or an API response is already clean.
+    """
+    ts = now or datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
+    action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
+    who = principal or (
+        decision.principal if decision else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
+    )
+    resolved_result = result if result in RESULTS else RESULT_FAILED
+    resolved_reason = reason_code or (
+        decision.reason_code if decision else "unspecified"
+    )
+    retention_class = retention_class_for(action)
+
+    event: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        "event_id": event_id or f"evt-{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+        "timestamp": ts.isoformat(),
+        "actor": who.to_dict(),
+        "action": action_id,
+        "action_class": action.action_class if action else "unknown",
+        "target": dict(target or {}),
+        "result": resolved_result,
+        "reason_code": resolved_reason,
+        "correlation": {
+            "request_id": request_id,
+            "session_id": session_id,
+            "mcp_task": action.task_key if action else None,
+            "mcp_permission": action.mcp_permission if action else None,
+        },
+        "retention": _retention_block(retention_class, ts),
+        "redacted": True,
+        "detail": detail,
+        "metadata": dict(metadata or {}),
+    }
+    if decision is not None:
+        # Deliberately *not* named "authorization": ``gitea_audit`` treats that
+        # substring as a secret key hint (it matches the HTTP Authorization
+        # header) and would replace this whole block with the placeholder.
+        event["decision"] = {
+            "allowed": decision.allowed,
+            "required_role": decision.required_role,
+            "requires_confirmation": decision.requires_confirmation,
+            "dual_control": decision.dual_control,
+            "break_glass": decision.break_glass,
+            "execution_enabled": decision.execution_enabled,
+        }
+
+    redacted = redact_payload(event)
+    if not isinstance(redacted, dict):  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+        return {"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION, "redacted": True}
+    return redacted
+
+
+def write_event(event: dict[str, Any], path: str | None = None) -> bool:
+    """Append *event* as one JSON line. Never raises.
+
+    Returns ``True`` when a line was written, ``False`` when auditing is off or
+    the write failed. A record that still trips a secret detector is dropped
+    rather than persisted.
+    """
+    sink = path or audit_log_path()
+    if not sink:
+        return False
+    try:
+        if scan_for_secrets(event):
+            return False
+        line = json.dumps(event, default=str, sort_keys=True)
+        with open(sink, "a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            handle.write(line + "\n")
+        return True
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+
+
+def record_event(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build and persist one record; return the record either way.
+
+    Callers get the record back so it can be surfaced in a response or a test
+    regardless of whether a sink is configured.
+    """
+    event = build_event(**kwargs)
+    written = write_event(event)
+    return {"event": event, "written": written}
+
+
+def audit_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Machine-readable audit schema and retention defaults (never secrets)."""
+    return {
+        "schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        "required_fields": list(REQUIRED_FIELDS),
+        "required_actor_fields": list(REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS),
+        "required_correlation_fields": list(REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS),
+        "results": sorted(RESULTS),
+        "retention_defaults_days": dict(RETENTION_DAYS),
+        "sink_env": AUDIT_LOG_ENV,
+        "enabled": audit_enabled(),
+        "append_only": True,
+        "redact_before_persist": True,
+        "timestamp_format": "ISO-8601, timezone-aware, UTC",
+        "relationship_to_mcp_audit": (
+            "webui.console_audit records console intent and authorization "
+            "outcomes; gitea_audit records MCP mutations. A Phase 2 action "
+            "emits both, correlated by correlation.request_id."
+        ),
+    }

webui/console_authz.py

@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
+"""Console authorization and RBAC model (#633, Phase 1).
+
+The read-only MVP (#426–#436) ships with no authentication: protection comes
+from network placement alone (#435). That is adequate while every route is a
+GET, and inadequate the moment Phase 2 wires a gated write. This module is the
+authorization model those writes must go through, landed *before* any of them
+exists so no write can be added without an authority to check against.
+
+Phase 1 scope is the model itself: identity resolution, the role matrix, the
+privileged-action list, and a fail-closed :func:`authorize`. It deliberately
+does **not** enable any write. ``webui.gated_actions`` stays globally disabled,
+so an allow decision here is necessary but never sufficient.
+
+Two invariants hold for every caller:
+
+- **Default deny.** An unrecognised action, an unknown role, or an absent
+  principal denies. There is no implicit allow branch and no "unless" clause.
+- **Authorization is not execution.** :func:`authorize` returns a decision
+  record. It never calls MCP, never mutates, and never consults credentials.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from typing import Any
+
+from task_capability_map import required_permission, required_role
+
+# --- Roles ------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Ordered least to most authority. Higher ranks inherit every lower rank's
+# permitted actions; the matrix below is expressed as a minimum required rank.
+VIEWER = "viewer"
+OPERATOR = "operator"
+CONTROLLER = "controller"
+ADMIN = "admin"
+
+ROLE_ORDER: tuple[str, ...] = (VIEWER, OPERATOR, CONTROLLER, ADMIN)
+_ROLE_RANK: dict[str, int] = {role: idx for idx, role in enumerate(ROLE_ORDER)}
+
+ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
+    VIEWER: "Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase.",
+    OPERATOR: "Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR.",
+    CONTROLLER: "Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR.",
+    ADMIN: "Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions.",
+}
+
+# --- Identity sources -------------------------------------------------------
+IDENTITY_NONE = "none"
+IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV = "local_dev"
+IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY = "access_proxy"
+
+IDENTITY_SOURCES: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {
+    IDENTITY_NONE: {
+        "description": (
+            "No authentication configured. Every request is anonymous and "
+            "capped at viewer. This is the MVP default and the only mode "
+            "whose safety rests entirely on network placement (#435)."
+        ),
+        "authenticated": False,
+        "safe_for_shared_host": False,
+        "phase_available": 1,
+    },
+    IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV: {
+        "description": (
+            "Developer-supplied principal read from the environment. INSECURE: "
+            "the subject and role are asserted, never verified. Loopback only."
+        ),
+        "authenticated": True,
+        "safe_for_shared_host": False,
+        "phase_available": 1,
+    },
+    IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY: {
+        "description": (
+            "Subject asserted by a trusted access proxy (Cloudflare Access, "
+            "WARP, or an org VPN portal) via a verified request header. The "
+            "proxy performs authentication; the console performs authorization."
+        ),
+        "authenticated": True,
+        "safe_for_shared_host": True,
+        "phase_available": 2,
+    },
+}
+
+# Environment configuration. All are read server-side and never rendered.
+AUTH_MODE_ENV = "WEBUI_AUTH_MODE"
+DEV_SUBJECT_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT"
+DEV_ROLE_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_ROLE"
+ROLE_MAP_ENV = "WEBUI_ROLE_MAP"
+REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV = "WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH"
+ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER = "cf-access-authenticated-user-email"
+
+# --- Action classes ---------------------------------------------------------
+CLASS_READ = "read"
+CLASS_WRITE = "gated_write"
+CLASS_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
+CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE = "destructive"
+
+# --- Privileged action list -------------------------------------------------
+# ``task_key`` ties each console action back to ``task_capability_map``, so the
+# console cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not already define.
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ConsoleAction:
+    """One console action and the authority required to invoke it."""
+
+    action_id: str
+    task_key: str
+    action_class: str
+    minimum_role: str
+    requires_confirmation: bool
+    dual_control: bool
+    break_glass: bool
+    phase: int
+    summary: str
+
+    @property
+    def mcp_permission(self) -> str:
+        return required_permission(self.task_key)
+
+    @property
+    def mcp_role(self) -> str:
+        return required_role(self.task_key)
+
+    @property
+    def privileged(self) -> bool:
+        return self.action_class in {CLASS_PRIVILEGED, CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE}
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        data = asdict(self)
+        data["mcp_permission"] = self.mcp_permission
+        data["mcp_role"] = self.mcp_role
+        data["privileged"] = self.privileged
+        return data
+
+
+_ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="claim_issue",
+        task_key="claim_issue",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Apply status:in-progress to an issue.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="comment_issue",
+        task_key="comment_issue",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Post an issue comment.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="create_issue",
+        task_key="create_issue",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Open a new tracking issue.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="comment_pr",
+        task_key="comment_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Post a PR thread comment.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="create_pr",
+        task_key="create_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Open a PR from a locked feature branch.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="review_pr",
+        task_key="review_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
+        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=3,
+        summary="Submit an approve / request-changes verdict.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="close_pr",
+        task_key="close_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
+        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=3,
+        summary="Close a pull request without merging.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="merge_pr",
+        task_key="merge_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
+        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=True,
+        break_glass=True,
+        phase=3,
+        summary="Merge an approved pull request.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="delete_branch",
+        task_key="delete_branch",
+        action_class=CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE,
+        minimum_role=ADMIN,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=True,
+        break_glass=True,
+        phase=3,
+        summary="Remove a remote feature branch.",
+    ),
+)
+
+ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}
+
+
+def privileged_actions() -> tuple[ConsoleAction, ...]:
+    """Actions requiring dual control, break-glass, or controller+ authority."""
+    return tuple(a for a in _ACTION_SPECS if a.privileged)
+
+
+def get_action(action_id: str) -> ConsoleAction | None:
+    return ACTIONS.get(action_id)
+
+
+# --- Principals -------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Principal:
+    """Who is making a request, and how strongly that is known."""
+
+    subject: str
+    role: str
+    identity_source: str
+    authenticated: bool
+    warnings: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
+
+    @property
+    def rank(self) -> int:
+        return _ROLE_RANK.get(self.role, -1)
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "subject": self.subject,
+            "role": self.role,
+            "identity_source": self.identity_source,
+            "authenticated": self.authenticated,
+            "warnings": list(self.warnings),
+        }
+
+
+ANONYMOUS = Principal(
+    subject="anonymous",
+    role=VIEWER,
+    identity_source=IDENTITY_NONE,
+    authenticated=False,
+    warnings=("No authentication configured; capped at viewer.",),
+)
+
+
+def auth_mode(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
+    """Resolve the configured identity source, defaulting to ``none``."""
+    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
+    raw = (source.get(AUTH_MODE_ENV) or "").strip().lower().replace("-", "_")
+    if raw in IDENTITY_SOURCES:
+        return raw
+    return IDENTITY_NONE
+
+
+def _role_map(env: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Parse ``WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`` (JSON subject→role). Invalid config yields {}."""
+    raw = (env.get(ROLE_MAP_ENV) or "").strip()
+    if not raw:
+        return {}
+    try:
+        parsed = json.loads(raw)
+    except Exception:
+        return {}
+    if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
+        return {}
+    return {
+        str(k): str(v).strip().lower()
+        for k, v in parsed.items()
+        if str(v).strip().lower() in _ROLE_RANK
+    }
+
+
+def resolve_principal(
+    headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> Principal:
+    """Resolve the requesting principal. Unknown or unconfigured → anonymous.
+
+    Never raises and never trusts a client-supplied role: the role always comes
+    from server-side configuration keyed by the resolved subject.
+    """
+    source_env = dict(env) if env is not None else dict(os.environ)
+    lowered = {str(k).lower(): str(v) for k, v in (headers or {}).items()}
+    mode = auth_mode(source_env)
+
+    if mode == IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV:
+        subject = (source_env.get(DEV_SUBJECT_ENV) or "").strip()
+        if not subject:
+            return ANONYMOUS
+        role = (source_env.get(DEV_ROLE_ENV) or VIEWER).strip().lower()
+        if role not in _ROLE_RANK:
+            role = VIEWER
+        return Principal(
+            subject=subject,
+            role=role,
+            identity_source=IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV,
+            authenticated=True,
+            warnings=(
+                "local-dev identity is asserted, not verified; never use "
+                "outside loopback.",
+            ),
+        )
+
+    if mode == IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY:
+        subject = (lowered.get(ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER) or "").strip()
+        if not subject:
+            # Proxy mode with no proxy header means the request did not
+            # traverse the proxy. Fail closed rather than trust it.
+            return ANONYMOUS
+        role = _role_map(source_env).get(subject, VIEWER)
+        return Principal(
+            subject=subject,
+            role=role,
+            identity_source=IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+            authenticated=True,
+        )
+
+    return ANONYMOUS
+
+
+def probe_auth_required(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> bool:
+    """Whether non-public probes must be authenticated. Default False.
+
+    #633 requires the console to *fail closed on missing auth for non-public
+    health probes if configured*. The default stays off so the MVP ``/health``
+    contract is unchanged; an operator opts in explicitly.
+    """
+    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
+    return (source.get(REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {
+        "1",
+        "true",
+        "yes",
+    }
+
+
+# --- Authorization ----------------------------------------------------------
+
+DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION = "unknown_action"
+DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED = "unauthenticated"
+DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE = "insufficient_role"
+DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE = "unknown_role"
+DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE = "phase_not_active"
+ALLOW_PREVIEW = "allowed_preview_only"
+
+# Phase 1 is the only active console phase. Phase 2 opens gated writes and is
+# gated on this model landing; nothing here enables it.
+ACTIVE_PHASE = 1
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AuthorizationDecision:
+    """Result of an authorization check. Never an execution grant."""
+
+    allowed: bool
+    reason_code: str
+    detail: str
+    action_id: str
+    principal: Principal
+    required_role: str | None = None
+    action_class: str | None = None
+    requires_confirmation: bool = False
+    dual_control: bool = False
+    break_glass: bool = False
+    execution_enabled: bool = False
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "allowed": self.allowed,
+            "reason_code": self.reason_code,
+            "detail": self.detail,
+            "action_id": self.action_id,
+            "principal": self.principal.to_dict(),
+            "required_role": self.required_role,
+            "action_class": self.action_class,
+            "requires_confirmation": self.requires_confirmation,
+            "dual_control": self.dual_control,
+            "break_glass": self.break_glass,
+            "execution_enabled": self.execution_enabled,
+            "active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
+        }
+
+
+def authorize(
+    action_id: str,
+    principal: Principal | None = None,
+    *,
+    for_execution: bool = False,
+) -> AuthorizationDecision:
+    """Decide whether *principal* may invoke *action_id*. Deny by default.
+
+    ``for_execution`` distinguishes a read-only preview from a real invocation.
+    Even an allowed decision reports ``execution_enabled=False`` while the
+    console is in Phase 1, so no caller can read an allow as permission to
+    mutate.
+    """
+    who = principal if principal is not None else ANONYMOUS
+    action = get_action(action_id)
+
+    if action is None:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION,
+            detail=f"No console action registered as {action_id!r}.",
+            action_id=action_id,
+            principal=who,
+        )
+
+    base: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "action_id": action_id,
+        "principal": who,
+        "required_role": action.minimum_role,
+        "action_class": action.action_class,
+        "requires_confirmation": action.requires_confirmation,
+        "dual_control": action.dual_control,
+        "break_glass": action.break_glass,
+        "execution_enabled": False,
+    }
+
+    if not who.authenticated:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED,
+            detail=(
+                "Write actions require an authenticated principal; this "
+                "request is anonymous."
+            ),
+            **base,
+        )
+
+    if who.rank < 0:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE,
+            detail=f"Role {who.role!r} is not in the console role matrix.",
+            **base,
+        )
+
+    if who.rank < _ROLE_RANK[action.minimum_role]:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE,
+            detail=(
+                f"Action {action_id!r} requires {action.minimum_role!r}; "
+                f"principal holds {who.role!r}."
+            ),
+            **base,
+        )
+
+    if for_execution and action.phase > ACTIVE_PHASE:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE,
+            detail=(
+                f"Action {action_id!r} belongs to phase {action.phase}; the "
+                f"console is in phase {ACTIVE_PHASE}. Execution is not wired."
+            ),
+            **base,
+        )
+
+    return AuthorizationDecision(
+        allowed=True,
+        reason_code=ALLOW_PREVIEW,
+        detail=(
+            "Principal holds the required role. Preview only — execution "
+            "remains disabled until the Phase 2 action framework ships."
+        ),
+        **base,
+    )
+
+
+def rbac_matrix() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Machine-readable RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
+    return {
+        "model_version": 1,
+        "active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
+        "roles": [
+            {
+                "role": role,
+                "rank": _ROLE_RANK[role],
+                "description": ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role],
+                "permitted_actions": sorted(
+                    a.action_id
+                    for a in _ACTION_SPECS
+                    if _ROLE_RANK[role] >= _ROLE_RANK[a.minimum_role]
+                ),
+            }
+            for role in ROLE_ORDER
+        ],
+        "identity_sources": IDENTITY_SOURCES,
+        "actions": [a.to_dict() for a in _ACTION_SPECS],
+        "privileged_actions": [a.action_id for a in privileged_actions()],
+        "default_decision": "deny",
+        "execution_enabled": False,
+    }

webui/console_redaction.py

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+"""Secret redaction policy for every console surface (#633).
+
+The MVP already redacts MCP-side mutation records through ``gitea_audit``.
+This module is the console-facing policy: one redaction pass applied to API
+payloads, rendered HTML, log lines, and audit records *before* they leave the
+server or reach persistent storage.
+
+Design constraints:
+
+- **Reuse, never fork.** ``gitea_audit.redact`` remains the authority for
+  secret-looking dict keys, ``Authorization`` material, and raw URLs. This
+  module runs that pass first and then applies console-specific patterns for
+  keychain references, key/value assignments, private-key blocks, and JWTs.
+- **Never raises.** Redaction is a safety control; a malformed payload must
+  degrade to a redacted placeholder rather than propagate an exception.
+- **Redact before persist.** ``webui.console_audit`` calls this module before
+  writing, so an unredacted record is never durable.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import re
+from typing import Any
+
+import gitea_audit
+
+REDACTED = gitea_audit.REDACTED
+
+# Console-specific patterns applied after the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass.
+# Each keeps the identifying key so an operator can still tell *what* was
+# removed, and replaces only the secret run itself.
+_KEYCHAIN_REF = re.compile(r"(?i)\bkeychain:[\w.\-/@]+")
+_KEYCHAIN_CMD = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)\bsecurity\s+find-(?:generic|internet)-password\b[^\n]*"
+)
+_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)\b(token|password|passwd|secret|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|"
+    r"client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key)\b(\s*[:=]\s*)"
+    r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
+)
+_ENV_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)\b(GITEA_(?:TOKEN|PASS|PASSWORD)[A-Z0-9_]*)(\s*=\s*)"
+    r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
+)
+_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK = re.compile(
+    r"-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----",
+    re.S,
+)
+_JWT = re.compile(
+    r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\b"
+)
+
+# Shapes that mean a payload still carries a secret. ``scan_for_secrets`` uses
+# these to assert a surface is clean.
+_DETECTORS: tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...] = (
+    ("keychain_reference", _KEYCHAIN_REF),
+    ("keychain_command", _KEYCHAIN_CMD),
+    ("credential_assignment", _ASSIGNMENT),
+    ("credential_env_assignment", _ENV_ASSIGNMENT),
+    ("private_key_block", _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK),
+    ("json_web_token", _JWT),
+    ("bearer_credential", re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:bearer|basic)\s+\S{8,}")),
+)
+
+
+def _mask_assignment(match: re.Match[str]) -> str:
+    """Keep the key and separator, replace the value."""
+    return f"{match.group(1)}{match.group(2)}{REDACTED}"
+
+
+def redact_text(text: Any) -> Any:
+    """Redact secret material from a single string.
+
+    Non-strings are returned unchanged so this is safe to map over mixed
+    payloads. Runs the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass first, then the
+    console-specific patterns.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
+        return text
+    try:
+        out = gitea_audit.redact(text)
+        if not isinstance(out, str):  # defensive; redact() returns str for str
+            return REDACTED
+        out = _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK.sub(f"{REDACTED}_PRIVATE_KEY", out)
+        out = _ENV_ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
+        out = _ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
+        out = _KEYCHAIN_CMD.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_COMMAND", out)
+        out = _KEYCHAIN_REF.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_REF", out)
+        out = _JWT.sub(f"{REDACTED}_JWT", out)
+        return out
+    except Exception:
+        # Fail closed: an unredactable string is dropped rather than emitted raw.
+        return REDACTED
+
+
+def redact_payload(value: Any) -> Any:
+    """Recursively redact a JSON-able payload for any console surface.
+
+    Secret-looking dict keys are replaced wholesale by the shared
+    ``gitea_audit`` policy; every remaining string is run through
+    :func:`redact_text`.
+    """
+    try:
+        shared = gitea_audit.redact(value)
+    except Exception:
+        return REDACTED
+    return _walk(shared)
+
+
+def _walk(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {k: _walk(v) for k, v in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
+        return [_walk(v) for v in value]
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return redact_text(value)
+    return value
+
+
+def scan_for_secrets(value: Any) -> list[str]:
+    """Return detector names that still match *value* after serialization.
+
+    Used to assert an outbound payload or rendered page is clean. An empty
+    list means no known secret shape was found. Already-redacted hits are not
+    findings.
+    """
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        text = value
+    else:
+        try:
+            text = json.dumps(value, default=str)
+        except Exception:
+            text = str(value)
+    findings: list[str] = []
+    for name, pattern in _DETECTORS:
+        for match in pattern.finditer(text):
+            if REDACTED in match.group(0):
+                continue
+            findings.append(name)
+            break
+    return findings
+
+
+def redaction_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Machine-readable statement of the redaction rules (never secrets)."""
+    return {
+        "policy_version": 1,
+        "applies_to": [
+            "json_api_responses",
+            "rendered_html",
+            "server_logs",
+            "audit_records",
+        ],
+        "ordering": "shared gitea_audit pass, then console patterns",
+        "redact_before_persist": True,
+        "shared_rules": {
+            "source": "gitea_audit.redact",
+            "secret_key_hints": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS),
+            "secret_value_prefixes": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES),
+            "urls": "credentials, secret query parameters, and real hosts redacted",
+        },
+        "console_rules": [
+            {"name": name, "pattern": pattern.pattern}
+            for name, pattern in _DETECTORS
+        ],
+        "placeholder": REDACTED,
+        "failure_mode": "fail closed — unredactable values become the placeholder",
+    }

webui/data/projects.registry.json

@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
 {
-  "version": 1,
+  "version": 2,
   "projects": [
     {
       "id": "gitea-tools",
       "repo_name": "Gitea-Tools",
       "gitea_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+      "remote_name": "prgs",
       "remote_host": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
       "default_branch": "master",
       "local_checkout_path": ".",
+      "status": "active",
       "profiles": {
         "author": "prgs-author",
         "reviewer": "prgs-reviewer",
@@ -26,24 +28,32 @@
         {
           "id": "profiles",
           "title": "Configure execution profiles",
-          "description": "Install author, reviewer, and reconciler MCP profiles (prgs-author, prgs-reviewer, prgs-reconciler) in separate namespaces. Tokens stay in keychain — never in this registry."
+          "description": "Install author, reviewer, and reconciler MCP profiles (prgs-author, prgs-reviewer, prgs-reconciler) in separate namespaces. Tokens stay in keychain — never in this registry.",
+          "state": "complete",
+          "required": true
         },
         {
           "id": "mcp_config",
           "title": "Wire MCP v2 contexts",
-          "description": "Copy and customize gitea-mcp.v2-contexts.example.json for your machine. Map this repo path under projects with default_owner Scaled-Tech-Consulting and default_repo Gitea-Tools."
+          "description": "Copy and customize gitea-mcp.v2-contexts.example.json for your machine. Map this repo path under projects with default_owner Scaled-Tech-Consulting and default_repo Gitea-Tools.",
+          "state": "complete",
+          "required": true
         },
         {
           "id": "wiki_gate",
           "title": "Wiki publication readiness",
-          "description": "For wiki-tracked work, satisfy the live Gitea Wiki proof gate (#224) before closing issues. See docs/wiki/Safety-and-Gates.md."
+          "description": "For wiki-tracked work, satisfy the live Gitea Wiki proof gate (#224) before closing issues. See docs/wiki/Safety-and-Gates.md.",
+          "state": "complete",
+          "required": true
         },
         {
           "id": "branches_layout",
           "title": "Isolate work under branches/",
-          "description": "All LLM task edits happen in worktrees under branches/. Main checkout stays clean; use skills/llm-project-workflow templates for start-issue and review flows."
+          "description": "All LLM task edits happen in worktrees under branches/. Main checkout stays clean; use skills/llm-project-workflow templates for start-issue and review flows.",
+          "state": "complete",
+          "required": true
         }
       ]
     }
   ]
-}
+}

webui/project_registry.py

@@ -1,4 +1,16 @@
-"""Load and validate the web UI project registry (#427)."""
+"""Load and validate the web UI project registry (#427, evolved for #635).
+
+Phase 1 of the console architecture ADR keeps this loader read-only. It owns
+the versioned project registry contract served at ``/api/v1/projects``:
+
+* the on-disk file carries a ``version`` (schema version 1 or 2);
+* version 1 files stay loadable and are normalized with explicit defaults, so
+  an operator registry written for #427 keeps working;
+* every validation failure raises :class:`RegistryError`, which carries an
+  actionable ``remediation`` string instead of leaking a traceback;
+* serialization never emits credentials — credential-shaped keys are rejected
+  at load time, before any DTO is built.
+"""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
@@ -8,7 +20,59 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
-from webui.registry_safety import reject_credential_keys as _reject_credential_keys
+from webui.registry_safety import is_forbidden_key
+
+#: Version of the JSON contract served under ``/api/v1/...``.
+REGISTRY_API_VERSION = "v1"
+
+#: Schema version written by this repository's packaged registry.
+CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION = 2
+
+#: Schema versions this loader accepts. Version 1 is normalized on load.
+SUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSIONS = (1, 2)
+
+#: Lifecycle state of a registered project.
+PROJECT_STATUSES = ("active", "onboarding", "paused", "archived")
+_DEFAULT_PROJECT_STATUS = "active"
+
+#: Completion state of a single onboarding step.
+ONBOARDING_STATES = ("complete", "pending", "blocked", "not_applicable")
+_DEFAULT_ONBOARDING_STATE = "pending"
+
+#: Redacted, last-seen health of a project's control plane.
+HEALTH_STATUSES = ("healthy", "degraded", "unreachable", "unknown")
+
+class RegistryError(ValueError):
+    """A registry file could not be loaded or failed validation.
+
+    Carries an operator-facing ``remediation`` so routes can fail closed with
+    an actionable message rather than a stack trace.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        message: str,
+        *,
+        remediation: str,
+        source_path: Path | None = None,
+        field_path: str | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(message)
+        self.message = message
+        self.remediation = remediation
+        self.source_path = source_path
+        self.field_path = field_path
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        """Serialize for a fail-closed JSON error response."""
+        return {
+            "error": "registry_invalid",
+            "detail": self.message,
+            "remediation": self.remediation,
+            "field_path": self.field_path,
+            "source_path": str(self.source_path) if self.source_path else None,
+        }
+
 
 _REQUIRED_PROJECT_FIELDS = (
     "id",
@@ -29,6 +93,30 @@ class OnboardingStep:
     id: str
     title: str
     description: str
+    state: str = _DEFAULT_ONBOARDING_STATE
+    required: bool = True
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OnboardingSummary:
+    """Aggregate onboarding progress for a single project."""
+
+    total: int
+    complete: int
+    pending: int
+    blocked: int
+    not_applicable: int
+    required_outstanding: int
+    onboarding_complete: bool
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ProjectHealth:
+    """Redacted last-seen health. Never carries endpoints or credentials."""
+
+    status: str
+    checked_at: str | None
+    detail: str | None
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -43,6 +131,13 @@ class ProjectRecord:
     workflow_paths: dict[str, str]
     schema_paths: dict[str, str]
     onboarding_checklist: tuple[OnboardingStep, ...]
+    status: str = _DEFAULT_PROJECT_STATUS
+    remote_name: str | None = None
+    last_seen_health: ProjectHealth | None = None
+
+    @property
+    def repo_full_name(self) -> str:
+        return f"{self.gitea_owner}/{self.repo_name}"
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -51,6 +146,15 @@ class ProjectRegistry:
     projects: tuple[ProjectRecord, ...]
     source_path: Path
 
+    @property
+    def schema_version(self) -> int:
+        """Alias of :attr:`version` — the schema version read from disk."""
+        return self.version
+
+    @property
+    def api_version(self) -> str:
+        return REGISTRY_API_VERSION
+
 
 def default_registry_path() -> Path:
     override = os.environ.get("WEBUI_PROJECT_REGISTRY", "").strip()
@@ -59,40 +163,221 @@ def default_registry_path() -> Path:
     return (Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "data" / "projects.registry.json").resolve()
 
 
-def _parse_onboarding(raw: list[dict[str, Any]] | None) -> tuple[OnboardingStep, ...]:
-    if not raw:
+def _reject_credential_keys(obj: Any, *, path: str = "", source: Path | None = None) -> None:
+    """Recursive credential-key guard that reports an actionable ``field_path``.
+
+    Key *shape* is decided by :func:`webui.registry_safety.is_forbidden_key`, the
+    single source of truth shared with the worker registry (#798).
+    """
+    if isinstance(obj, dict):
+        for key, value in obj.items():
+            key_path = f"{path}.{key}" if path else key
+            if is_forbidden_key(key):
+                raise RegistryError(
+                    f"registry must not store credentials ({key_path})",
+                    remediation=(
+                        f"Remove the credential-shaped key '{key_path}' from the registry. "
+                        "Tokens live in the keychain and are resolved server-side by "
+                        "gitea_auth; the registry is redacted metadata only."
+                    ),
+                    source_path=source,
+                    field_path=key_path,
+                )
+            _reject_credential_keys(value, path=key_path, source=source)
+    elif isinstance(obj, list):
+        for index, item in enumerate(obj):
+            _reject_credential_keys(item, path=f"{path}[{index}]", source=source)
+
+
+def _require_enum(
+    value: Any,
+    *,
+    allowed: tuple[str, ...],
+    field_path: str,
+    source: Path | None,
+) -> str:
+    text = str(value)
+    if text not in allowed:
+        raise RegistryError(
+            f"{field_path} must be one of {', '.join(allowed)} (got {text!r})",
+            remediation=(
+                f"Set {field_path} to one of: {', '.join(allowed)}. "
+                "Unknown values fail closed so the console never renders an "
+                "unverified state."
+            ),
+            source_path=source,
+            field_path=field_path,
+        )
+    return text
+
+
+def _parse_onboarding(
+    raw: Any,
+    *,
+    project_path: str,
+    source: Path | None,
+) -> tuple[OnboardingStep, ...]:
+    if raw is None:
         return ()
+    if not isinstance(raw, list):
+        raise RegistryError(
+            f"{project_path}.onboarding_checklist must be an array",
+            remediation=(
+                f"Rewrite {project_path}.onboarding_checklist as a JSON array of "
+                "steps with id, title, description, and optional state."
+            ),
+            source_path=source,
+            field_path=f"{project_path}.onboarding_checklist",
+        )
     steps: list[OnboardingStep] = []
-    for item in raw:
+    for index, item in enumerate(raw):
+        step_path = f"{project_path}.onboarding_checklist[{index}]"
+        if not isinstance(item, dict):
+            raise RegistryError(
+                f"{step_path} must be an object",
+                remediation=f"Rewrite {step_path} as an object with id, title, description.",
+                source_path=source,
+                field_path=step_path,
+            )
+        missing = [field for field in ("id", "title", "description") if field not in item]
+        if missing:
+            raise RegistryError(
+                f"{step_path} missing required fields: {', '.join(missing)}",
+                remediation=(
+                    f"Add {', '.join(missing)} to {step_path}. Every onboarding step "
+                    "must be self-describing for an operator who has no chat history."
+                ),
+                source_path=source,
+                field_path=step_path,
+            )
+        state = _require_enum(
+            item.get("state", _DEFAULT_ONBOARDING_STATE),
+            allowed=ONBOARDING_STATES,
+            field_path=f"{step_path}.state",
+            source=source,
+        )
         steps.append(
             OnboardingStep(
                 id=str(item["id"]),
                 title=str(item["title"]),
                 description=str(item["description"]),
+                state=state,
+                required=bool(item.get("required", True)),
             )
         )
     return tuple(steps)
 
 
-def _parse_project(raw: dict[str, Any]) -> ProjectRecord:
+def _parse_health(
+    raw: Any,
+    *,
+    project_path: str,
+    source: Path | None,
+) -> ProjectHealth | None:
+    if raw is None:
+        return None
+    if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+        raise RegistryError(
+            f"{project_path}.last_seen_health must be an object when present",
+            remediation=(
+                f"Rewrite {project_path}.last_seen_health as an object with status "
+                f"(one of {', '.join(HEALTH_STATUSES)}), optional checked_at and detail, "
+                "or remove it. Never store endpoints or credentials here."
+            ),
+            source_path=source,
+            field_path=f"{project_path}.last_seen_health",
+        )
+    status = _require_enum(
+        raw.get("status", "unknown"),
+        allowed=HEALTH_STATUSES,
+        field_path=f"{project_path}.last_seen_health.status",
+        source=source,
+    )
+    checked_at = raw.get("checked_at")
+    detail = raw.get("detail")
+    return ProjectHealth(
+        status=status,
+        checked_at=str(checked_at) if checked_at is not None else None,
+        detail=str(detail) if detail is not None else None,
+    )
+
+
+def _parse_project(raw: Any, *, index: int, source: Path | None) -> ProjectRecord:
+    project_path = f"projects[{index}]"
+    if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+        raise RegistryError(
+            f"{project_path} must be an object",
+            remediation=f"Rewrite {project_path} as a JSON object describing one project.",
+            source_path=source,
+            field_path=project_path,
+        )
+
     missing = [field for field in _REQUIRED_PROJECT_FIELDS if field not in raw]
     if missing:
-        raise ValueError(f"project missing required fields: {', '.join(missing)}")
+        raise RegistryError(
+            f"{project_path} missing required fields: {', '.join(missing)}",
+            remediation=(
+                f"Add {', '.join(missing)} to {project_path}. See "
+                "docs/webui-project-registry-api.md for the field-by-field contract."
+            ),
+            source_path=source,
+            field_path=project_path,
+        )
 
     profiles = raw["profiles"]
     if not isinstance(profiles, dict):
-        raise ValueError("profiles must be an object")
+        raise RegistryError(
+            f"{project_path}.profiles must be an object",
+            remediation=(
+                f"Rewrite {project_path}.profiles as an object mapping "
+                f"{', '.join(_REQUIRED_PROFILE_ROLES)} to MCP profile names."
+            ),
+            source_path=source,
+            field_path=f"{project_path}.profiles",
+        )
     for role in _REQUIRED_PROFILE_ROLES:
         if role not in profiles or not profiles[role]:
-            raise ValueError(f"profiles.{role} is required")
+            raise RegistryError(
+                f"{project_path}.profiles.{role} is required",
+                remediation=(
+                    f"Set {project_path}.profiles.{role} to the configured MCP profile "
+                    "name for that role. Role separation is a workflow-safety invariant."
+                ),
+                source_path=source,
+                field_path=f"{project_path}.profiles.{role}",
+            )
 
     workflow_paths = raw["workflow_paths"]
     if not isinstance(workflow_paths, dict) or not workflow_paths:
-        raise ValueError("workflow_paths must be a non-empty object")
+        raise RegistryError(
+            f"{project_path}.workflow_paths must be a non-empty object",
+            remediation=(
+                f"Add at least a 'skill' entry to {project_path}.workflow_paths pointing "
+                "at the project's canonical workflow skill."
+            ),
+            source_path=source,
+            field_path=f"{project_path}.workflow_paths",
+        )
 
     schema_paths = raw.get("schema_paths") or {}
     if not isinstance(schema_paths, dict):
-        raise ValueError("schema_paths must be an object when present")
+        raise RegistryError(
+            f"{project_path}.schema_paths must be an object when present",
+            remediation=(
+                f"Rewrite {project_path}.schema_paths as an object of label to repo path, "
+                "or remove it."
+            ),
+            source_path=source,
+            field_path=f"{project_path}.schema_paths",
+        )
+
+    status = _require_enum(
+        raw.get("status", _DEFAULT_PROJECT_STATUS),
+        allowed=PROJECT_STATUSES,
+        field_path=f"{project_path}.status",
+        source=source,
+    )
+    remote_name = raw.get("remote_name")
 
     return ProjectRecord(
         id=str(raw["id"]),
@@ -104,61 +389,211 @@ def _parse_project(raw: dict[str, Any]) -> ProjectRecord:
         profiles={role: str(profiles[role]) for role in _REQUIRED_PROFILE_ROLES},
         workflow_paths={key: str(value) for key, value in workflow_paths.items()},
         schema_paths={key: str(value) for key, value in schema_paths.items()},
-        onboarding_checklist=_parse_onboarding(raw.get("onboarding_checklist")),
+        onboarding_checklist=_parse_onboarding(
+            raw.get("onboarding_checklist"),
+            project_path=project_path,
+            source=source,
+        ),
+        status=status,
+        remote_name=str(remote_name) if remote_name else None,
+        last_seen_health=_parse_health(
+            raw.get("last_seen_health"),
+            project_path=project_path,
+            source=source,
+        ),
     )
 
 
 def load_registry(path: Path | None = None) -> ProjectRegistry:
-    """Load the versioned project registry from disk."""
+    """Load the versioned project registry from disk.
+
+    Raises:
+        RegistryError: whenever the file is unreadable, is not valid JSON, or
+            fails schema validation. The error carries an operator remediation.
+    """
     source = (path or default_registry_path()).resolve()
-    raw_text = source.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    payload = json.loads(raw_text)
+    try:
+        raw_text = source.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise RegistryError(
+            f"registry file could not be read: {exc.strerror or exc}",
+            remediation=(
+                f"Create a readable registry at {source}, or point "
+                "WEBUI_PROJECT_REGISTRY at an existing file."
+            ),
+            source_path=source,
+        ) from exc
+
+    try:
+        payload = json.loads(raw_text)
+    except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+        raise RegistryError(
+            f"registry is not valid JSON: {exc.msg} (line {exc.lineno}, column {exc.colno})",
+            remediation=(
+                f"Fix the JSON syntax in {source} at line {exc.lineno}, column {exc.colno}."
+            ),
+            source_path=source,
+        ) from exc
+
     if not isinstance(payload, dict):
-        raise ValueError("registry root must be an object")
+        raise RegistryError(
+            "registry root must be an object",
+            remediation=(
+                "Wrap the registry in a JSON object with 'version' and 'projects' keys."
+            ),
+            source_path=source,
+        )
 
     version = payload.get("version")
-    if version != 1:
-        raise ValueError(f"unsupported registry version: {version!r}")
+    if version not in SUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSIONS:
+        supported = ", ".join(str(item) for item in SUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSIONS)
+        raise RegistryError(
+            f"unsupported registry version: {version!r}",
+            remediation=(
+                f"Set 'version' to one of {supported} (current schema is "
+                f"{CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION}). Migration notes live in "
+                "docs/webui-project-registry-api.md."
+            ),
+            source_path=source,
+            field_path="version",
+        )
 
-    _reject_credential_keys(payload)
+    _reject_credential_keys(payload, source=source)
 
     projects_raw = payload.get("projects")
     if not isinstance(projects_raw, list) or not projects_raw:
-        raise ValueError("projects must be a non-empty array")
+        raise RegistryError(
+            "projects must be a non-empty array",
+            remediation=(
+                "Add at least one project object to 'projects'. An empty console "
+                "registry fails closed rather than rendering a blank inventory."
+            ),
+            source_path=source,
+            field_path="projects",
+        )
 
-    projects = tuple(_parse_project(item) for item in projects_raw)
-    return ProjectRegistry(version=version, projects=projects, source_path=source)
+    projects = tuple(
+        _parse_project(item, index=index, source=source)
+        for index, item in enumerate(projects_raw)
+    )
+    return ProjectRegistry(version=int(version), projects=projects, source_path=source)
+
+
+def onboarding_summary(project: ProjectRecord) -> OnboardingSummary:
+    """Aggregate a project's onboarding checklist state."""
+    steps = project.onboarding_checklist
+    counts = {state: 0 for state in ONBOARDING_STATES}
+    for step in steps:
+        counts[step.state] += 1
+    required_outstanding = sum(
+        1
+        for step in steps
+        if step.required and step.state in ("pending", "blocked")
+    )
+    return OnboardingSummary(
+        total=len(steps),
+        complete=counts["complete"],
+        pending=counts["pending"],
+        blocked=counts["blocked"],
+        not_applicable=counts["not_applicable"],
+        required_outstanding=required_outstanding,
+        onboarding_complete=required_outstanding == 0,
+    )
 
 
 def project_to_dict(project: ProjectRecord) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Serialize a project for JSON API responses."""
+    """Serialize a project for JSON API responses and HTML views.
+
+    The HTML views render from this same DTO, so the console and the API can
+    never disagree about a project's status or onboarding progress.
+    """
+    summary = onboarding_summary(project)
+    health = project.last_seen_health
     return {
         "id": project.id,
         "repo_name": project.repo_name,
         "gitea_owner": project.gitea_owner,
+        "repo_full_name": project.repo_full_name,
         "remote_host": project.remote_host,
+        "remote_name": project.remote_name,
         "default_branch": project.default_branch,
         "local_checkout_path": project.local_checkout_path,
+        "status": project.status,
         "profiles": dict(project.profiles),
         "workflow_paths": dict(project.workflow_paths),
         "schema_paths": dict(project.schema_paths),
         "onboarding_checklist": [
-            {"id": step.id, "title": step.title, "description": step.description}
+            {
+                "id": step.id,
+                "title": step.title,
+                "description": step.description,
+                "state": step.state,
+                "required": step.required,
+            }
             for step in project.onboarding_checklist
         ],
+        "onboarding_summary": {
+            "total": summary.total,
+            "complete": summary.complete,
+            "pending": summary.pending,
+            "blocked": summary.blocked,
+            "not_applicable": summary.not_applicable,
+            "required_outstanding": summary.required_outstanding,
+            "onboarding_complete": summary.onboarding_complete,
+        },
+        "last_seen_health": (
+            None
+            if health is None
+            else {
+                "status": health.status,
+                "checked_at": health.checked_at,
+                "detail": health.detail,
+            }
+        ),
     }
 
 
 def registry_to_dict(registry: ProjectRegistry) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Serialize the whole registry, including API provenance (#632 section 6)."""
     return {
+        "api_version": registry.api_version,
+        "schema_version": registry.schema_version,
+        # Retained for the unversioned MVP alias consumers (#427).
         "version": registry.version,
         "source_path": str(registry.source_path),
+        "source": {
+            "kind": "file",
+            "path": str(registry.source_path),
+            "inventory_complete": True,
+        },
+        "project_count": len(registry.projects),
         "projects": [project_to_dict(project) for project in registry.projects],
     }
 
 
+def project_detail_to_dict(
+    registry: ProjectRegistry,
+    project: ProjectRecord,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Serialize a single project for ``/api/v1/projects/{project_id}``."""
+    return {
+        "api_version": registry.api_version,
+        "schema_version": registry.schema_version,
+        "source": {
+            "kind": "file",
+            "path": str(registry.source_path),
+            "inventory_complete": True,
+        },
+        "project": project_to_dict(project),
+    }
+
+
 def find_project(registry: ProjectRegistry, project_id: str) -> ProjectRecord | None:
     for project in registry.projects:
         if project.id == project_id:
             return project
-    return None
+    return None
+
+
+def known_project_ids(registry: ProjectRegistry) -> list[str]:
+    return [project.id for project in registry.projects]

webui/project_views.py

@@ -1,34 +1,65 @@
-"""HTML views for project registry pages (#427)."""
+"""HTML views for project registry pages (#427, evolved for #635).
+
+Every view renders from :func:`webui.project_registry.project_to_dict`, the
+same DTO the ``/api/v1/projects`` JSON responses use, so the HTML console and
+the API can never disagree about status or onboarding progress.
+"""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import html
+from typing import Any
 
 from webui.layout import render_page
-from webui.project_registry import ProjectRecord, ProjectRegistry
+from webui.project_registry import (
+    ProjectRecord,
+    ProjectRegistry,
+    RegistryError,
+    project_to_dict,
+)
+
+_STATE_LABELS = {
+    "complete": "Complete",
+    "pending": "Pending",
+    "blocked": "Blocked",
+    "not_applicable": "Not applicable",
+}
 
 
 def _escape(text: str) -> str:
     return html.escape(text, quote=True)
 
 
+def _progress_label(summary: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    total = summary["total"]
+    if not total:
+        return "no steps"
+    label = f"{summary['complete']}/{total} complete"
+    if summary["blocked"]:
+        label += f", {summary['blocked']} blocked"
+    return label
+
+
 def render_projects_list(registry: ProjectRegistry) -> str:
     rows = []
     for project in registry.projects:
+        dto = project_to_dict(project)
         rows.append(
             "<tr>"
-            f"<td><a href=\"/projects/{_escape(project.id)}\">{_escape(project.repo_name)}</a></td>"
-            f"<td>{_escape(project.gitea_owner)}</td>"
-            f"<td>{_escape(project.remote_host)}</td>"
-            f"<td>{_escape(project.default_branch)}</td>"
-            f"<td><code>{_escape(project.profiles['author'])}</code></td>"
+            f"<td><a href=\"/projects/{_escape(dto['id'])}\">{_escape(dto['repo_name'])}</a></td>"
+            f"<td>{_escape(dto['gitea_owner'])}</td>"
+            f"<td>{_escape(dto['remote_host'])}</td>"
+            f"<td>{_escape(dto['default_branch'])}</td>"
+            f"<td><code>{_escape(dto['status'])}</code></td>"
+            f"<td>{_escape(_progress_label(dto['onboarding_summary']))}</td>"
+            f"<td><code>{_escape(dto['profiles']['author'])}</code></td>"
             "</tr>"
         )
     table = (
         "<table class=\"registry\">"
         "<thead><tr>"
         "<th>Repository</th><th>Owner</th><th>Remote</th>"
-        "<th>Branch</th><th>Author profile</th>"
+        "<th>Branch</th><th>Status</th><th>Onboarding</th><th>Author profile</th>"
         "</tr></thead>"
         f"<tbody>{''.join(rows)}</tbody></table>"
     )
@@ -36,32 +67,39 @@ def render_projects_list(registry: ProjectRegistry) -> str:
         "<h2>Projects</h2>"
         "<p>Configured repositories managed by the MCP Control Plane.</p>"
         f"<p class=\"meta\">Registry: <code>{_escape(str(registry.source_path))}</code> "
-        f"(version {registry.version})</p>"
+        f"(schema version {registry.schema_version}, "
+        f"API {_escape(registry.api_version)})</p>"
         f"{table}"
-        "<p><a href=\"/api/projects\">JSON API</a></p>"
+        "<p><a href=\"/api/v1/projects\">JSON API</a> "
+        "(<a href=\"/api/projects\">unversioned alias</a>)</p>"
     )
     return render_page(title="Projects", body_html=body)
 
 
 def render_project_detail(project: ProjectRecord) -> str:
+    dto = project_to_dict(project)
     profile_rows = "".join(
         f"<tr><th>{_escape(role)}</th><td><code>{_escape(name)}</code></td></tr>"
-        for role, name in project.profiles.items()
+        for role, name in dto["profiles"].items()
     )
     workflow_rows = "".join(
         f"<tr><th>{_escape(key)}</th><td><code>{_escape(path)}</code></td></tr>"
-        for key, path in project.workflow_paths.items()
+        for key, path in dto["workflow_paths"].items()
     )
     schema_rows = "".join(
         f"<tr><th>{_escape(key)}</th><td><code>{_escape(path)}</code></td></tr>"
-        for key, path in project.schema_paths.items()
+        for key, path in dto["schema_paths"].items()
     )
     checklist_items = []
-    for index, step in enumerate(project.onboarding_checklist, start=1):
+    for index, step in enumerate(dto["onboarding_checklist"], start=1):
+        state_label = _STATE_LABELS.get(step["state"], step["state"])
+        requirement = "required" if step["required"] else "optional"
         checklist_items.append(
-            "<li>"
-            f"<strong>{index}. {_escape(step.title)}</strong>"
-            f"<p>{_escape(step.description)}</p>"
+            f"<li class=\"step-{_escape(step['state'])}\">"
+            f"<strong>{index}. {_escape(step['title'])}</strong>"
+            f" <span class=\"badge\">{_escape(state_label)}</span>"
+            f" <span class=\"meta\">({_escape(requirement)})</span>"
+            f"<p>{_escape(step['description'])}</p>"
             "</li>"
         )
     checklist_html = (
@@ -69,16 +107,38 @@ def render_project_detail(project: ProjectRecord) -> str:
         if checklist_items
         else "<p>No onboarding steps defined.</p>"
     )
+    summary = dto["onboarding_summary"]
+    summary_html = (
+        "<p class=\"meta\">Onboarding: "
+        f"{_escape(_progress_label(summary))}; required outstanding "
+        f"{summary['required_outstanding']}.</p>"
+    )
+    health = dto["last_seen_health"]
+    health_html = (
+        "<p class=\"meta\">No health probe recorded (Phase 1 is read-only).</p>"
+        if health is None
+        else (
+            "<table class=\"detail\">"
+            f"<tr><th>Status</th><td><code>{_escape(health['status'])}</code></td></tr>"
+            f"<tr><th>Checked at</th><td>{_escape(str(health['checked_at'] or 'unknown'))}</td></tr>"
+            f"<tr><th>Detail</th><td>{_escape(str(health['detail'] or ''))}</td></tr>"
+            "</table>"
+        )
+    )
+    remote_name = dto["remote_name"] or "unset"
     body = (
-        f"<h2>{_escape(project.repo_name)}</h2>"
+        f"<h2>{_escape(dto['repo_name'])}</h2>"
         "<p><a href=\"/projects\">← All projects</a></p>"
         "<h3>Identity</h3>"
         "<table class=\"detail\">"
-        f"<tr><th>Registry id</th><td><code>{_escape(project.id)}</code></td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Gitea owner</th><td>{_escape(project.gitea_owner)}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Remote host</th><td>{_escape(project.remote_host)}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Default branch</th><td><code>{_escape(project.default_branch)}</code></td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Local checkout</th><td><code>{_escape(project.local_checkout_path)}</code></td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Registry id</th><td><code>{_escape(dto['id'])}</code></td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Status</th><td><code>{_escape(dto['status'])}</code></td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Gitea owner</th><td>{_escape(dto['gitea_owner'])}</td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Repository</th><td><code>{_escape(dto['repo_full_name'])}</code></td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Remote name</th><td><code>{_escape(remote_name)}</code></td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Remote host</th><td>{_escape(dto['remote_host'])}</td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Default branch</th><td><code>{_escape(dto['default_branch'])}</code></td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Local checkout</th><td><code>{_escape(dto['local_checkout_path'])}</code></td></tr>"
         "</table>"
         "<h3>Profiles</h3>"
         f"<table class=\"detail\">{profile_rows}</table>"
@@ -86,8 +146,30 @@ def render_project_detail(project: ProjectRecord) -> str:
         f"<table class=\"detail\">{workflow_rows}</table>"
         "<h3>Schema paths</h3>"
         f"<table class=\"detail\">{schema_rows}</table>"
+        "<h3>Last seen health</h3>"
+        f"{health_html}"
         "<h3>Onboarding checklist</h3>"
-        "<p class=\"meta\">Read-only MVP — complete these steps outside the UI.</p>"
+        "<p class=\"meta\">Read-only — complete these steps outside the UI.</p>"
+        f"{summary_html}"
         f"{checklist_html}"
+        f"<p><a href=\"/api/v1/projects/{_escape(dto['id'])}\">JSON detail</a></p>"
     )
-    return render_page(title=project.repo_name, body_html=body)
+    return render_page(title=dto["repo_name"], body_html=body)
+
+
+def render_registry_error(error: RegistryError) -> str:
+    """Render a fail-closed page for an invalid registry."""
+    source = str(error.source_path) if error.source_path else "unknown"
+    field = error.field_path or "n/a"
+    body = (
+        "<h2>Project registry unavailable</h2>"
+        "<p>The registry failed validation, so the console refuses to render a "
+        "partial inventory.</p>"
+        "<table class=\"detail\">"
+        f"<tr><th>Detail</th><td>{_escape(error.message)}</td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Field</th><td><code>{_escape(field)}</code></td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Source</th><td><code>{_escape(source)}</code></td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Remediation</th><td>{_escape(error.remediation)}</td></tr>"
+        "</table>"
+    )
+    return render_page(title="Project registry unavailable", body_html=body)

workflow_dashboard.py

@@ -65,9 +65,11 @@ PROMPT_RECONCILER = (
     "reconciliation (already-landed / post-merge cleanup). Do not approve or merge."
 )
 PROMPT_CONTROLLER = (
-    "CONTROLLER session: inspect gitea_workflow_dashboard + control-plane leases, "
-    "diagnose blocked/terminal-locked items for {remote}/{org}/{repo}, and schedule "
-    "exactly one fresh role-scoped cycle. Do not implement, review, or merge in-band."
+    "CONTROLLER session: call gitea_route_task_session(task_type='process_work_queue') "
+    "then gitea_allocate_next_work (cross_role default) for {remote}/{org}/{repo}; "
+    "use the returned required_role/profile/action to schedule exactly one downstream "
+    "role cycle. Dashboard is explanatory only and never replaces allocator selection. "
+    "Do not implement, review, approve, or merge in-band."
 )
 PROMPT_IDLE = (
     "IDLE: no safe assignable work for role '{role}' on {remote}/{org}/{repo}. "