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Author SHA1 Message Date
sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8 b2f6e9a6dc feat(webui): versioned project registry API (Closes #635)
Evolve the MVP project registry (#427) into a versioned, fail-closed
project registry API for the console (Phase 1, read-only).

- Add schema version 2 with project `status`, per-step onboarding
  `state`/`required`, optional redacted `last_seen_health`, and
  `remote_name`. Version 1 files stay loadable and are normalized with
  explicit defaults.
- Serve `/api/v1/projects` and `/api/v1/projects/{project_id}` with API
  provenance (`api_version`, `schema_version`, `source`). `/api/projects`
  is retained as an unversioned Phase 1 alias.
- Replace bare `ValueError` with `RegistryError`, carrying an operator
  `remediation` and `field_path`; invalid registries fail closed as a
  500 JSON payload or a dedicated HTML error page instead of a traceback.
- Reject credential-shaped keys before any DTO is built, reusing
  `registry_safety.is_forbidden_key` as the single source of truth
  shared with the worker registry (#798).
- Render HTML views from `project_to_dict`, so the console and the JSON
  API cannot disagree about status or onboarding progress.
- Document the contract in docs/webui-project-registry-api.md.

Tests: registry load/validate (valid, missing project, schema
validation, credential rejection) and API route coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 16:12:07 -04:00
sysadmin 9eb0f29cef Merge pull request 'feat(webui): worker registry and configuration schema (Closes #798)' (#810) from feat/issue-798-worker-registry-schema into master 2026-07-22 06:48:29 -05:00
sysadmin 0b29404031 Merge pull request 'docs(webui): MCP Control Plane Web Console architecture ADR (Closes #632)' (#796) from docs/issue-632-web-console-architecture into master 2026-07-22 06:22:11 -05:00
jcwalker3andClaude Opus 4.8 5463f58933 feat(webui): worker registry and configuration schema (Closes #798)
Add the declarative worker registry that epic #797 makes the source of
truth for the scheduled multi-LLM worker fleet.

Providers and configured workers are modelled as separate entities so a
provider can be listed with no worker configured, and so provider facts
are not copied into every worker record. A worker records provider,
model, project, role, namespace, profile, workflow, schedule, timeout,
enabled state, and scheduler metadata.

Validation fails closed: unknown fields are refused rather than ignored,
so a typo cannot silently disable a timeout; a worker naming an
undeclared provider is rejected; worker ids, provider ids, and
LaunchAgent labels must be unique.

Persistence is atomic (temp file in the same directory, fsync, replace).
Every superseded document is retained as a numbered revision, and
rollback republishes a chosen revision as a new head, so history stays
append-only and a rollback is itself reversible.

The credential-rejection guard is extracted to webui/registry_safety.py
so both registries share one implementation instead of two copies of a
security check; project_registry.py keeps identical behaviour.

Scope: data model, validation, persistence only. No routes, scheduler,
process control, or provider probing - those are #799/#800/#804/#805.
The workers array ships empty because populating it is #808.

Tests: tests/test_webui_worker_registry.py, 44 cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 06:10:34 -05:00
sysadmin 5032965e3a Merge pull request 'feat: make master-parity live-remote aware so a stale daemon fails closed (Closes #610)' (#788) from feat/issue-610-live-remote-parity into master 2026-07-22 05:51:56 -05:00
jcwalker3andGrok 4.5 57a52b1a99 fix(parity): hermetic live-remote master reads under pytest (Closes #610)
Remediate PR #788 review F1/F2: suite-wide hermetic mode prevents
git ls-remote from running in tests so feature worktrees no longer flip
legacy runtime-context assertions to live_stale, and unit tests stay offline.
Module flag survives patch.dict(clear=True); env override still wins.

Co-Authored-By: Grok 4.5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 05:40:15 -05:00
jcwalker3andClaude Opus 4.8 e33b8d3712 docs(webui): add MCP Control Plane Web Console architecture ADR (Closes #632)
Adds the durable architecture record epic #631 lacked: layer contract,
authority boundaries, the redaction boundary, /api/v1 versioning with a
compatibility rule for the existing unversioned MVP exports, a target page
map, per-child component ownership for all twenty children (#632-#651),
phase gates, and explicit forbidden paths.

Documentation only. No UI, API, or deployment change.

- docs/architecture/webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md (new)
- docs/webui-local-dev.md: cross-link to the ADR
- tests/test_webui_architecture_docs.py: doc gate for the acceptance
  criteria and the cross-link (12 cases)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 04:52:21 -05:00
jcwalker3 344dc41ce2 Merge branch 'master' into feat/issue-610-live-remote-parity 2026-07-22 04:30:44 -05:00
sysadmin 620ed6e9a9 Merge pull request 'fix(lock): allow exact-owner renewal of expired author issue locks (Closes #760)' (#791) from fix/issue-760-exact-owner-renewal into master 2026-07-22 01:02:39 -05:00
sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8 a30a3ce4c3 fix(lock): make the exact-owner renewal waiver survive downstream gates (#760)
Addresses review #499 on PR #791.

F1 — the renewal sanction was computed and then discarded twice.

`assess_issue_lock_worktree` waived base-equivalence only for
`recovery_sanctioned`, and `gitea_lock_issue` never passed the renewal waiver
into it. A branch being renewed always carries committed work, so it is never
base-equivalent, and #753 recovery refuses when the recorded PID is alive —
which is the defining condition of a renewal. Every real renewal was therefore
granted by the assessor and then rejected one gate later.

Thread `renewal_sanctioned` into `assess_issue_lock_worktree` alongside
`recovery_sanctioned`, waiving base-equivalence on the same grounds and nothing
else. Cleanliness is evaluated before the waiver and is never relaxed; the
assessment now reports which of the two waivers applied.

The MCP-level regression then exposed a second discard point: the duplicate-work
gate rejected the renewal with "open PR already covers issue" — the very PR the
lock being renewed already owns. Add `owning_pr_renewal_evidence`, the mirror of
`issue_lock_recovery.owning_pr_recovery_evidence` (#755), and carry it into the
gate only when renewal was granted. It re-checks that the PR, local, and remote
heads agree, so truncated or hand-built evidence cannot authorize an exemption.

Neither waiver is caller-supplied and `gitea_lock_issue` still gains no
parameter. Absolute wall-clock expiry is unchanged. No #790 heartbeat, sliding
expiry, fencing-token, or shared-lifecycle behavior is introduced, and #753
recovery behavior is untouched.

F2 — add tests/test_issue_760_mcp_renewal_path.py, 10 cases driving the native
`gitea_lock_issue` path against a real git repository and a real durable lock:
expired lease, live recorded PID, committed non-base-equivalent branch. Proves
the renewal completes, records prior and replacement lease evidence, advances
the generation exactly once, produces a live lock that satisfies
`verify_lock_for_mutation`, and does not claim dead-session recovery. Negative
companions prove a foreign claimant, foreign profile, unpublished branch, or
mismatched PR head cannot use the waiver, that a dirty worktree still fails
closed, and that base-equivalence still applies with no waiver at all.

Tests: new MCP suite 10 passed; combined #760 suites 50 passed; lock/lease
regression set 200 passed with 2 subtests; full suite 4240 passed, 11 failed,
6 skipped, 493 subtests passed — the same 11 pre-existing failures as the
master baseline at 3d0c13fa, no new failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ti8deB36iWcjHmE9cuxour
2026-07-22 01:10:48 -04:00
sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8 1a97ced133 feat(lock): allow exact-owner renewal of expired author issue locks (Closes #760)
An expired author issue lease could not be renewed by the exact session that
already owned it. `assess_same_issue_lease_conflict` computed same-owner
evidence and then returned on the expired branch before consulting it, and
`assess_expired_lock_reclaim` only permits takeover on a dead PID or a missing
worktree. Because the recorded PID is the long-lived MCP daemon rather than the
authoring task, a lease that expires under a live daemon is the ordinary case
for any author task outliving the TTL — and in that case the owner's own lock
became permanently unmodifiable through sanctioned tools.

Add `issue_lock_renewal`, a pure evidence assessor for that one case, and
evaluate its disposition before the expired foreign-takeover return.

Renewal requires an exact match of remote, org, repo, issue number, operation
type, branch, realpath-normalized worktree, claimant username, and claimant
profile; a registered worktree that exists, sits on the locked branch, and is
clean; local and remote heads that agree; and, when an owning PR exists, a PR
head that agrees too. No competing live lock, competing branch claim, or other
owning PR may exist. Any missing or contradictory evidence fails closed.

PID liveness is never authorization: it is recorded as evidence and is neither
necessary nor sufficient (AC16). Only an expired lease is ever a candidate, so
a live foreign lease stays non-recoverable (AC12) and dead-PID takeover keeps
its existing #601 conditions (AC11). Renewal is never caller-declarable — the
waiver is server-computed and `gitea_lock_issue` gains no parameter (AC14).

A sanctioned renewal records prior PID, prior expiry, replacement PID, new
expiry, claimant, and its supporting proof under `lease_renewal`, and reuses
the #772 compare-and-swap so two sessions observing the same expired lease
cannot both win.

Absolute wall-clock expiry is preserved. Sliding heartbeat renewal, fencing
tokens, and the shared cross-role lifecycle remain #790's scope and are
deliberately not implemented here; #790 stays sequenced behind this change.

Tests: 40 new cases covering the positive path, every near-match and
foreign-owner refusal, the non-candidate cases, the gate-ordering regression,
the renewal record, downstream mutation ownership, and AC14/AC17. Two #772 test
doubles now forward the new keyword.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ti8deB36iWcjHmE9cuxour
2026-07-22 00:39:51 -04:00
sysadmin 3d0c13fa5a Merge pull request 'fix(guard): quote-aware shell segmentation so only real daemon kills classify (Closes #787)' (#789) from fix/issue-787-kill-segment-separators into master 2026-07-21 21:40:02 -05:00
jcwalker3 0f19773076 Merge branch 'master' into feat/issue-610-live-remote-parity 2026-07-21 20:48:54 -05:00
sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8 324b4b3e93 feat: make master-parity live-remote aware so a stale daemon fails closed (Closes #610)
Master-parity previously compared only the daemon's startup commit against the
local on-disk HEAD. When the checkout was not pulled, parity reported green even
though the live remote master had advanced, so a stale daemon could claim a
mutation-safe result while running outdated capability gates (observed during
PR #592 recovery, where the resolver correctly required restart but parity said
in_parity=true).

Changes:
- master_parity_gate.assess_master_parity() gains an optional live_remote_head
  and reports the three commits distinctly (daemon_start_head, local_head,
  live_remote_head) plus live_known / live_stale / mutation_safe. A result is
  mutation_safe only when daemon, local checkout, and live remote all agree.
- parity_block_reasons() now blocks mutations on live-staleness too; read-only
  operations remain unblocked (non-goal: never block diagnostics offline).
- New parity_resolver_disagreement(): typed fail-closed blocker naming the
  capability resolver as authoritative when it requires restart but parity
  looks locally green.
- New read_remote_master_head(): best-effort `git ls-remote` for the live
  target, cached with a 60s TTL (bounded offline latency, no network probe per
  gate call); env override GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD keeps tests hermetic.
- Server: _current_master_parity() reads the live remote head;
  gitea_assess_master_parity and runtime_context surface the distinguished
  SHAs, mutation_safe, and resolver-authoritative guidance.

Tests: 13 new cases (live-remote parity, live-stale blocking + typed blocker,
remote-head reader + TTL cache, server wiring). Full suite: 2423 passed; the 8
remaining failures (test_config TestAuthIntegration, test_credentials
TestGetCredentials) are baseline-proven keychain/env failures identical on the
unmodified base.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-09 18:52:59 -04:00
23 changed files with 4874 additions and 166 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
# ADR: MCP Control Plane Web Console architecture and information architecture
- **Status:** Proposed (documentation only; blocks no code, gates every #631 child)
- **Date:** 2026-07-22
- **Tracking issue:** [#632](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/632) — architecture and information architecture (Phase 1)
- **Parent epic:** [#631](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/631) — MCP Control Plane Web Console
- **Foundation (closed, extend — do not recreate):** #425 tracker and children #426 skeleton, #427 projects, #428 prompts, #429 queue, #430 runtime, #431 audit paste, #432 worktrees, #433 leases, #434 gated actions, #435 auth/deployment boundary, #436 tests/CI
- **Related:** `mcp-allocator-control-plane-observability-adr.md`, `mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md`, `control-plane-db-substrate.md`, `../safety-model.md`, `../tool-boundaries.md`, `../credential-isolation.md`, `../webui-local-dev.md`, `../webui-deployment.md`
## 1. Context
The MVP web UI shipped under `webui/` as a read-only Starlette application with ten operator routes and a JSON export beside most of them. It is a working foundation, not the console product described by epic #631, and it carries no durable architecture record: no layer contract, no authority boundary, no API versioning rule, no page map, and no statement of which phase may open a write path.
Twenty children (#632#651) hang off #631. Without one architecture document each implementer re-derives boundaries, and the most likely failure is not a bad view — it is a privileged action wired into the browser before the authorization and audit model of #633 exists.
This ADR is the single retrievable design source for the console. It decides structure only. It implements no UI, no API, and no change to deployment topology.
## 2. Decision summary (core)
| Layer | Owns | Must not |
|-------|------|----------|
| **Browser UI** | Rendering, navigation, operator affordances | Hold tokens, call Gitea/providers directly, or execute an action the server did not gate |
| **HTTP route layer** (`webui/app.py`) | Versioned routing, authentication, authorization, redaction boundary, audit emission | Contain domain logic or reach past a loader to a raw credential |
| **Domain loaders** (`webui/*_loader.py`, `*_scanner.py`, `runtime_health.py`, `project_registry.py`) | Assembling read models from authoritative sources | Mutate anything, or emit unredacted secrets across the boundary |
| **Gitea** | Durable work record: issues, PRs, comments, reviews, labels, merges | Be the concurrency lock under multi-session load |
| **Control-plane DB** | Sessions, assignment, leases, heartbeats, events | Replace Gitea history |
| **MCP tools / capability gates** | Mutation authorization | Be re-implemented, mirrored, or bypassed by console code |
| **External providers** (Sentry/GlitchTip, AI providers) | Incident and usage data | Assign work or mutate Gitea outside the #612 bridge |
**One-liner:** **Gitea records. The DB coordinates. MCP tools authorize. The console projects state and executes only capability-checked, audited actions. Providers observe.**
## 3. Console surface today versus target
`webui/app.py` currently registers these routes (see `../webui-local-dev.md` for the operator-facing table): `/`, `/health`, `/queue`, `/projects`, `/projects/{id}`, `/prompts`, `/runtime`, `/audit`, `/worktrees`, `/leases`, `/actions`, and the unversioned exports `/api/queue`, `/api/projects`, `/api/prompts`, `/api/runtime`, `/api/audit`, `/api/worktrees`, `/api/leases`, `/api/actions`, `/api/actions/{id}/preview`, `/api/actions/{id}/attempt`.
Every one of these is **retained and evolved**. No child issue may recreate a route from scratch; each states in its PR which MVP surface it extends and what it changes.
## 4. Authority boundaries
### 4.1 Gitea (durable record)
Authoritative for issue and PR identity and state, comments, reviews and verdicts, labels, merges, and branch refs. When the console and Gitea disagree about durable state, Gitea wins and the console view is refreshed — never the reverse.
### 4.2 Control-plane DB (coordination)
Authoritative for live coordination: which session holds which assignment or lease, heartbeat freshness, expiry, and the allocation event log. The console reads it; only allocator and lease tools write it.
### 4.3 MCP capability gates (authorization)
`task_capability_map.py` and `gitea_resolve_task_capability` remain the only authority that decides whether a mutation may run. The console asks; it never answers. A console action that cannot name the MCP tool it delegates to is not an action — it is a defect.
### 4.4 Filesystem and git (local state)
Issue lock files, `branches/` worktrees, and registered git worktrees are read through existing scanners. The console never deletes, rebinds, or force-clears local state outside a Phase 2 gated action.
### 4.5 Providers (observe only)
Sentry/GlitchTip and AI providers are read surfaces. The #612 incident bridge is the only path that turns an observation into Gitea work.
## 5. Request flow and the redaction boundary
```text
browser ──HTTP──> route layer ──> domain loader ──> Gitea REST
│ ├──> control-plane DB
│ ├──> filesystem / git
│ └──> providers
[redaction boundary]
audit event
```
| Stage | May hold credentials | Emits |
|-------|----------------------|-------|
| Loader → route layer | yes (server-side, via `gitea_auth`) | domain objects |
| Route layer → browser | **no** | redacted DTOs, HTML |
Two invariants govern the boundary and are non-negotiable for every child:
1. **No secrets to the browser.** Tokens, keychain identifiers, Authorization headers, raw provider endpoints, and credential-bearing URLs are redacted by default, consistent with `../safety-model.md` §3 and `../credential-isolation.md`. Serializers redact; templates do not sanitize after the fact.
2. **No ungated mutations.** A write reaches an authoritative system only by delegating to an MCP tool that passed its own capability gate. HTML forms and JSON endpoints are transport, never authority.
## 6. API naming and versioning
**Decision:** all console APIs added from Phase 1 onward are served under `/api/v1/...`.
- Nouns are plural and hierarchical: `/api/v1/inventory/leases`, `/api/v1/system/health`.
- Read endpoints are `GET` and side-effect free.
- Phase 2 action endpoints are `POST /api/v1/actions/{action_id}/preview` and `POST /api/v1/actions/{action_id}/execute`; `preview` stays side-effect free and returns a mutation ledger.
- The existing unversioned MVP exports remain as **compatibility aliases** for the whole of Phase 1 so the current operator flow never breaks. They may be retired no earlier than Phase 2, and only after the replacing `v1` route ships and `../webui-local-dev.md` records the swap.
- A breaking change to a `v1` payload requires `/api/v2/...`, not an in-place edit.
- Every JSON payload carries enough provenance for an auditor to tell where the data came from — at minimum the source system and whether the inventory was complete, matching the pagination-proof habit the MVP queue export already established.
## 7. Page map
| Page | Purpose | Owning child | Evolves |
|------|---------|--------------|---------|
| `/` | Console shell, navigation, next-safe-action summary | #638 | MVP `/` (#426) |
| `/system` | System-health dashboard | #639 | new, backed by #634 |
| `/traffic` | Workflow traffic control, queues, blockers | #640 | MVP `/queue` (#429) |
| `/runtime` | Runtime and session view | #641 | MVP `/runtime` (#430) |
| `/projects`, `/projects/{id}` | Project registry and onboarding | #635 | MVP `/projects` (#427) |
| `/inventory` | Sessions, leases, locks, worktrees in one surface | #636 | MVP `/leases` (#433) + `/worktrees` (#432) |
| `/timeline` | Workflow events and conversation timeline | #637 | new |
| `/actions` | Gated action registry, preview, execution | #642, #643, #644 | MVP `/actions` (#434) |
| `/gitea` | Issue and PR linkage console | #645 | new |
| `/policy` | Guardrail visibility, then versioned editing | #646, #647 | new |
| `/notifications` | Human-attention routing | #648 | new |
| `/observability` | Sentry/GlitchTip correlation and durable issue creation | #649 | new |
| `/providers` | AI-provider connections and insights | #650 | new |
| `/analytics` | Usage, token cost, latency, workflow performance | #651 | new |
| `/audit` | Final-report validator preview and audit log | #431 foundation, extended by #633 | MVP `/audit` (#431) |
| `/prompts`, `/prompts/{id}` | Canonical prompt library | #638 | MVP `/prompts` (#428) |
| `/health` | Liveness and deployment metadata | #634 | MVP `/health` (#435) |
## 8. Component ownership for every epic child
Each #631 child maps to at least one architectural component defined above.
| Child | Capability area | Primary component | Phase |
|-------|-----------------|-------------------|-------|
| #632 | Architecture and information architecture | this ADR | 1 |
| #633 | Authorization, RBAC, secret redaction, audit and retention | route layer + redaction boundary (§5) | 1 |
| #634 | Read-only system-health API | `/api/v1/system/health` + health loader | 1 |
| #635 | Project registry API evolution | `/api/v1/projects` + `project_registry.py` | 1 |
| #636 | Session, lease, lock, worktree inventory API | `/api/v1/inventory/*` + `lease_loader.py`, `worktree_scanner.py` | 1 |
| #637 | Workflow-event and conversation timeline model | `/api/v1/events` + control-plane DB event log | 1 |
| #638 | Application shell evolution | browser UI layer + `layout.py` | 1 |
| #639 | System-health dashboard | `/system` page over #634 | 1 |
| #640 | Workflow traffic-control view | `/traffic` page over the queue loader | 1 |
| #641 | Runtime and session view | `/runtime` page over `runtime_health.py` | 1 |
| #642 | Sanctioned restart and graceful reload controls | gated action framework, restart class | 2 |
| #643 | Requests, intent preview, authorization, workflow initiation | `/api/v1/actions/*` execute path | 2 |
| #644 | Stale-runtime recovery, worktree rebinding, reconciliation controls | gated actions over filesystem/git authority | 2 |
| #645 | Gitea issue and PR linkage console | `/gitea` page over Gitea authority | 3 |
| #646 | Workflow policy and guardrail visibility | `/policy` read view over the capability map | 3 |
| #647 | Versioned policy editing, validation, simulation, approval, rollback | `/policy` write path, gated | 3 |
| #648 | Notifications and human-attention routing | notification component over the event model | 3 |
| #649 | Sentry/GlitchTip connections, correlation, durable issue creation | provider layer + #612 incident bridge | 4 |
| #650 | AI-provider connections and operational insights | provider layer | 4 |
| #651 | Model usage, token cost, latency, workflow analytics | analytics component over the event model | 4 |
Related but **outside** this epic: #667 (restart status, impact preview, and approval controls) belongs to the #655 restart-governance umbrella and must reuse the #642 action class rather than adding a second restart surface.
## 9. Phase gates
| Phase | May ship | Entry condition |
|-------|----------|-----------------|
| **1 — read-only visibility** | `GET` pages and `GET /api/v1/...` | this ADR accepted |
| **2 — controlled actions** | gated `POST` action execution | #633 authorization, RBAC, and audit model landed |
| **3 — orchestration and policy** | linkage, policy visibility, versioned policy editing | Phase 1 inventory plus the Phase 2 action framework |
| **4 — insights** | provider correlation, analytics | evidence-backed sources from Phases 13 |
Phase 1 must not open a mutation endpoint, and the read-only guard that returns `405 read-only-mvp` stays in force until the Phase 2 entry condition is met. A phase is not entered by exception; if a control is urgent, the entry condition is what gets prioritized.
## 10. Security and workflow safety
- **Fail closed** on unknown authentication, missing RBAC mapping, or ambiguous lease ownership. An unknown state renders as blocked, never as permitted.
- **Redact by default**, per §5.
- **Every privileged action** requires a resolved capability, an explicit operator confirmation, and a durable audit event naming actor, action, target, and outcome.
- **Contamination surfaces.** Session contamination — including a manually killed MCP daemon (#630) — must be shown and must block clean claims rather than being silently repaired.
- **Deployment boundary unchanged.** Loopback by default, with the existing refusal of public binds (#435). This ADR documents that target; it does not widen it.
## 11. Forbidden paths
These are rejected designs, not preferences:
1. **Raw provider incidents as work.** The allocator never receives an unclassified Sentry/GlitchTip incident; only the #612 bridge turns an observation into a Gitea issue.
2. **Browser-held tokens.** No credential, keychain identifier, or Authorization header is ever sent to the browser or embedded in a client bundle.
3. **Process-kill recovery.** The console must not expose `pkill`, process-identifier termination, or any host process kill as a recovery affordance (#630). Restart is the sanctioned, operator-owned path of #642 and the #655 umbrella.
4. **Ungated browser mutations.** No review, approval, merge, close, or comment may originate from the browser without passing an MCP capability gate.
5. **Policy invented in the console.** The console projects policy from the capability map and canonical workflows; it never encodes a second copy.
6. **Recreating MVP scope.** Re-implementing a #426#436 surface without an explicit evolve-or-extend statement is out of bounds.
## 12. Approval checklist (readable without chat history)
A controller can accept or reject this ADR against these six points alone:
1. Layers and their owners are defined (§2) and each authority is named (§4).
2. The redaction boundary and the two invariants are stated (§5).
3. API versioning is decided, including what happens to the existing unversioned routes (§6).
4. A page map exists and names an owning child for every page (§7).
5. Every #631 child maps to at least one component and one phase (§8).
6. Phase gates and forbidden paths are explicit (§9, §11).
## 13. Open questions and follow-ups
Unresolved choices are recorded here rather than settled by implication. Each needs its own durable issue before the phase that depends on it:
- **Authentication mechanism.** Whether the console authenticates via an access proxy (Cloudflare Access or equivalent) or an application-level session is deferred to #633. This ADR requires only that it fail closed.
- **Event model substrate.** Whether the #637 timeline reads the control-plane event log directly or through a projection is deferred to #637.
- **CI path filter coverage.** `webui/ci_paths.py` triggers the web UI suite on `webui/`, `tests/test_webui_*`, and `docs/webui*`. This ADR lives under `docs/architecture/`, so editing it alone does not trigger that gate; the accompanying `tests/test_webui_architecture_docs.py` does run in the full suite. Widening the filter is a small follow-up, deliberately not bundled into a documentation-only change.
- **Retention.** Audit-event retention duration is owned by #633.
## 14. Acceptance
Accepting this ADR means:
- Phase 1 children may proceed against the layers, page map, and API rules above.
- Phase 2 children may not open a write path until #633 lands.
- Any deviation is recorded as an amendment to this file with its own issue reference, not as an undocumented divergence in code.
+14 -2
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@ Optional environment variables:
See [webui-deployment.md](webui-deployment.md) for internal-only serving,
Cloudflare Access/WARP/VPN guidance, and unsafe bind overrides (#435).
See
[architecture/webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md](architecture/webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md)
for the console architecture: layer and authority boundaries, the redaction
boundary, `/api/v1/...` versioning, the target page map, and the phase gates
that govern when a write path may open (#632, epic #631).
See [webui-project-registry-api.md](webui-project-registry-api.md) for the
versioned project registry contract: registry schema versions 1 and 2, project
status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
## Routes (MVP)
| Path | Description |
@@ -45,9 +55,11 @@ Cloudflare Access/WARP/VPN guidance, and unsafe bind overrides (#435).
| `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`) |
| `/queue` | Live PR and issue queue dashboard (#429) |
| `/api/queue` | JSON queue export with pagination metadata |
| `/projects` | Project registry list (#427) |
| `/projects` | Project registry list with status and onboarding progress (#427, #635) |
| `/projects/{id}` | Project detail + onboarding checklist |
| `/api/projects` | JSON registry export |
| `/api/v1/projects` | Versioned JSON registry export (#635) |
| `/api/v1/projects/{id}` | Versioned JSON project detail (#635) |
| `/api/projects` | JSON registry export — unversioned Phase 1 alias of `/api/v1/projects` |
| `/prompts` | Prompt library with per-prompt copy buttons (#428) |
| `/api/prompts` | JSON prompt export with workflow hashes |
| `/runtime` | MCP runtime health and stale detection (#430) |
+213
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
# Project registry API (#635)
Phase 1 of the [console architecture ADR](architecture/webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md)
gives the project registry a versioned, read-only API. This document is the
field-by-field contract for that API and for the registry file behind it.
Everything here is **read-only**. The console never writes the registry; an
operator edits the JSON file, and an invalid file fails closed rather than
rendering a partial inventory.
## Routes
| Route | Method | Description |
|-------|--------|-------------|
| `/api/v1/projects` | GET | Versioned registry export: all projects, with provenance |
| `/api/v1/projects/{project_id}` | GET | Single project; `404` with `project_not_found` when unknown |
| `/api/projects` | GET | Unversioned MVP alias (#427), retained for all of Phase 1 |
| `/projects` | GET | HTML list — status and onboarding progress per project |
| `/projects/{project_id}` | GET | HTML detail — identity, profiles, paths, checklist |
Per ADR section 6 the unversioned alias may be retired no earlier than Phase 2,
and only after this document and `webui-local-dev.md` record the swap. The alias
returns the same payload as `/api/v1/projects`, including the legacy `version`
and `source_path` keys #427 consumers already read.
The HTML views render from the same DTO the JSON routes serialize
(`project_to_dict`), so the console and the API cannot disagree about a
project's status or onboarding progress.
## Registry file
Default location: `webui/data/projects.registry.json`. Override with the
`WEBUI_PROJECT_REGISTRY` environment variable.
Schema versions: **1** and **2** are accepted; **2** is current. A version 1
file loads unchanged and is normalized with the documented defaults, so an
existing operator registry keeps working without edits.
### Root
| Field | Type | Required | Notes |
|-------|------|----------|-------|
| `version` | int | yes | `1` or `2`. Anything else fails closed |
| `projects` | array | yes | Must be non-empty |
### Project
| Field | Type | Required | Default | Notes |
|-------|------|----------|---------|-------|
| `id` | string | yes | — | Stable registry id used in URLs |
| `repo_name` | string | yes | — | Gitea repository name |
| `gitea_owner` | string | yes | — | Owning org or user |
| `remote_host` | string | yes | — | Instance base URL, no credentials |
| `remote_name` | string | no | `null` | Logical remote label, e.g. `prgs` (v2) |
| `default_branch` | string | yes | — | Stable branch name |
| `local_checkout_path` | string | yes | — | Control checkout path |
| `status` | string | no | `active` | `active`, `onboarding`, `paused`, `archived` (v2) |
| `profiles` | object | yes | — | Must map `author`, `reviewer`, `reconciler` |
| `workflow_paths` | object | yes | — | Non-empty; label to repo-relative path |
| `schema_paths` | object | no | `{}` | Label to repo-relative path |
| `onboarding_checklist` | array | no | `[]` | See below |
| `last_seen_health` | object | no | `null` | Redacted health only (v2) |
### Onboarding step
| Field | Type | Required | Default | Notes |
|-------|------|----------|---------|-------|
| `id` | string | yes | — | Stable step id |
| `title` | string | yes | — | Short operator-facing label |
| `description` | string | yes | — | Self-contained; assumes no chat history |
| `state` | string | no | `pending` | `complete`, `pending`, `blocked`, `not_applicable` (v2) |
| `required` | bool | no | `true` | Optional steps never block readiness (v2) |
### Last-seen health
| Field | Type | Required | Notes |
|-------|------|----------|-------|
| `status` | string | no (default `unknown`) | `healthy`, `degraded`, `unreachable`, `unknown` |
| `checked_at` | string | no | ISO-8601 UTC timestamp, e.g. `2026-01-01T00:00:00Z` |
| `detail` | string | no | Short redacted note |
Health is recorded metadata, not a live probe: Phase 1 performs no outbound
health checks. Endpoints, tokens, and keychain identifiers must never appear
here.
## Response shape
`GET /api/v1/projects`:
```json
{
"api_version": "v1",
"schema_version": 2,
"version": 2,
"source_path": "/path/to/webui/data/projects.registry.json",
"source": {
"kind": "file",
"path": "/path/to/webui/data/projects.registry.json",
"inventory_complete": true
},
"project_count": 1,
"projects": [
{
"id": "example",
"repo_name": "Example",
"gitea_owner": "Org",
"repo_full_name": "Org/Example",
"remote_host": "https://gitea.example.invalid",
"remote_name": "example-remote",
"default_branch": "main",
"local_checkout_path": ".",
"status": "active",
"profiles": {"author": "...", "reviewer": "...", "reconciler": "..."},
"workflow_paths": {"skill": "skills/..."},
"schema_paths": {},
"onboarding_checklist": [
{
"id": "profiles",
"title": "Configure execution profiles",
"description": "...",
"state": "complete",
"required": true
}
],
"onboarding_summary": {
"total": 1,
"complete": 1,
"pending": 0,
"blocked": 0,
"not_applicable": 0,
"required_outstanding": 0,
"onboarding_complete": true
},
"last_seen_health": null
}
]
}
```
`GET /api/v1/projects/{project_id}` returns `api_version`, `schema_version`,
`source`, and a single `project` object with the same fields.
The `source` block satisfies the ADR section 6 provenance rule: every payload
states where the data came from and whether the inventory is complete. A
file-backed registry is always complete — there is no pagination to truncate it.
`onboarding_summary` is derived, never stored. `required_outstanding` counts
steps that are `required` **and** in state `pending` or `blocked`;
`onboarding_complete` is true when that count is zero.
## Fail-closed errors
Validation failures raise `RegistryError`, which routes render instead of a
traceback.
`404` — unknown project id on `/api/v1/projects/{project_id}`:
```json
{
"error": "project_not_found",
"project_id": "not-registered",
"known_project_ids": ["example"],
"remediation": "Request one of the known project ids, or add the project ...",
"source": {"kind": "file", "path": "...", "inventory_complete": true}
}
```
`500` — invalid registry, on both the versioned route and the alias:
```json
{
"error": "registry_invalid",
"detail": "unsupported registry version: 42",
"remediation": "Set 'version' to one of 1, 2 (current schema is 2) ...",
"field_path": "version",
"source_path": "/path/to/registry.json"
}
```
`field_path` points at the offending location (`projects[0].profiles.reconciler`,
`projects[0].onboarding_checklist[2].state`, and so on). The HTML routes render
the same detail, field, source, and remediation on a "Project registry
unavailable" page.
Conditions that fail closed:
* file missing or unreadable;
* invalid JSON (the remediation names line and column);
* root not an object, or `projects` missing/empty;
* unsupported `version`;
* a credential-shaped key anywhere in the file (`token`, `*_secret`, `auth_*`, and similar);
* a project missing a required field, or missing an `author`/`reviewer`/`reconciler` profile;
* an unknown `status`, onboarding `state`, or health `status`.
## Credential rule
The registry stores redacted metadata only. Credential-shaped keys are
rejected at load time, before any DTO is built, consistent with
[safety-model.md](safety-model.md) and
[credential-isolation.md](credential-isolation.md). Tokens live in the keychain
and are resolved server-side by `gitea_auth`.
## Migrating a version 1 registry
1. Set `"version": 2`.
2. Optionally add `"status"` per project (omitted means `active`).
3. Optionally add `"remote_name"` per project.
4. Optionally add `"state"` and `"required"` to each onboarding step (omitted
means `pending` and `true`).
5. Optionally add `"last_seen_health"`.
No step is mandatory: a version 1 file keeps loading. Bumping the version only
declares that the file may use the v2 fields.
+247 -22
View File
@@ -2017,6 +2017,7 @@ import issue_lock_provenance # noqa: E402
import issue_lock_store # noqa: E402
import issue_lock_adoption # noqa: E402
import issue_lock_recovery # noqa: E402
import issue_lock_renewal # noqa: E402
import stacked_pr_support # noqa: E402
import merge_approval_gate # noqa: E402
import review_quarantine # noqa: E402 # #695 contaminated formal-review quarantine
@@ -2316,7 +2317,12 @@ def _resolve_issue_lock_for_pr(
return lock_data
def _save_issue_lock(data: dict, *, expected_generation: int | None = None) -> str:
def _save_issue_lock(
data: dict,
*,
expected_generation: int | None = None,
renewal_sanctioned: bool = False,
) -> str:
existing = issue_lock_store.load_issue_lock(
remote=str(data.get("remote") or ""),
org=str(data.get("org") or ""),
@@ -2328,7 +2334,9 @@ def _save_issue_lock(data: dict, *, expected_generation: int | None = None) -> s
raise RuntimeError(overwrite_block)
try:
return issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock(
data, expected_generation=expected_generation
data,
expected_generation=expected_generation,
renewal_sanctioned=renewal_sanctioned,
)
except Exception as e:
raise RuntimeError(f"Could not write issue lock file: {e}") from e
@@ -2448,6 +2456,79 @@ def _evaluate_issue_lock_recovery(
)
def _evaluate_issue_lock_renewal(
existing_lock: dict,
*,
issue_number: int,
branch_name: str,
worktree_path: str,
remote: str,
h: str | None,
o: str,
r: str,
git_state: dict,
) -> dict:
"""Gather evidence and decide exact-owner renewal of an expired lease (#760).
Mirrors ``_evaluate_issue_lock_recovery``: every input is durable lock state
or a live server-side observation (Gitea branch/PR inventory, git in the
declared worktree, the local lock store). Nothing is reachable from an MCP
caller's parameters, so no caller can assert its way into a renewal
(#760 AC14).
"""
renewal_auth = _auth(h)
try:
renewal_branches = api_get_all(
f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/branches", renewal_auth
)
except Exception as exc:
raise RuntimeError(
f"Could not list branches to verify exact-owner lease renewal: {exc}"
)
remote_head: str | None = None
candidates: list[str] = []
for entry in renewal_branches:
entry_name = _branch_entry_name(entry)
if entry_name == branch_name:
remote_head = _branch_entry_commit_sha(entry)
if issue_lock_adoption.branch_carries_issue_marker(entry_name, issue_number):
candidates.append(entry_name)
pr_head: str | None = None
pr_number: int | None = None
for pull in _list_open_pulls(h, o, r, renewal_auth):
pull_head = pull.get("head") or {}
if str(pull_head.get("ref") or "") == branch_name:
pr_head = pull_head.get("sha")
pr_number = pull.get("number")
break
claimant = _work_lease_claimant(h)
return issue_lock_renewal.assess_exact_owner_lease_renewal(
existing_lock,
issue_number=issue_number,
branch_name=branch_name,
worktree_path=worktree_path,
remote=remote,
org=o,
repo=r,
identity=claimant.get("username"),
profile=claimant.get("profile"),
operation_type=AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE,
current_branch=git_state.get("current_branch"),
porcelain_status=git_state.get("porcelain_status") or "",
worktree_exists=os.path.isdir(os.path.realpath(worktree_path)),
head_sha=git_state.get("head_sha"),
remote_head_sha=remote_head,
pr_head_sha=pr_head,
pr_number=pr_number,
competing_live_locks=issue_lock_store.list_live_locks(),
candidate_branches=candidates,
current_pid=os.getpid(),
)
def _work_lease_claimant(host: str | None) -> dict:
profile = get_profile()
username = _IDENTITY_CACHE.get(host) if host else None
@@ -3893,15 +3974,12 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
existing_issue_lock = _load_existing_issue_lock(
remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, issue_number=issue_number
)
active_lease_block = issue_lock_store.assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
existing_issue_lock,
issue_number=issue_number,
branch_name=branch_name,
worktree_path=resolved_worktree,
operation_type=AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE,
)
if active_lease_block:
raise RuntimeError(active_lease_block)
# #760: the competing-lease disposition is decided below, once the worktree
# and Gitea evidence an exact-owner renewal depends on has actually been
# observed. Deciding it here — before any of that exists — is what made the
# same-owner allowance unreachable for an expired lease. The authoritative
# check still runs inside bind_session_lock under the per-issue flock, so
# moving this one later cannot widen the window for a competing writer.
# ── Stacked-PR base declaration (opt-in, #484) ──
# Normal work leaves stacked_base_branch None → master-equivalent path.
@@ -3967,6 +4045,53 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
recovery_sanctioned = bool(
recovery_assessment and recovery_assessment.get("recovery_sanctioned")
)
# ── Exact-owner renewal of an expired lease (#760) ──
# The opposite trigger from #753 above: there the lease is unexpired and the
# PID is dead; here the lease has expired while the recording daemon — which
# is the long-lived MCP server, not the authoring task — may well still be
# up. Only an expired lease is assessed, so a live foreign lease is never a
# candidate (AC12) and dead-PID takeover keeps its existing conditions
# (AC11). A refusal never raises: it withholds the waiver and leaves the
# conflict check below to fail closed exactly as before.
renewal_assessment: dict | None = None
if (
existing_issue_lock
and existing_issue_lock.get("issue_number") == issue_number
and issue_lock_store.is_lease_expired(existing_issue_lock)
):
renewal_assessment = _evaluate_issue_lock_renewal(
existing_issue_lock,
issue_number=issue_number,
branch_name=branch_name,
worktree_path=resolved_worktree,
remote=remote,
h=h,
o=o,
r=r,
git_state=git_state,
)
renewal_sanctioned = bool(
renewal_assessment and renewal_assessment.get("renewal_sanctioned")
)
active_lease_block = issue_lock_store.assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
existing_issue_lock,
issue_number=issue_number,
branch_name=branch_name,
worktree_path=resolved_worktree,
operation_type=AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE,
renewal_sanctioned=renewal_sanctioned,
)
if active_lease_block:
reasons = [active_lease_block]
# Name the exact missing evidence when this looked like a renewal, so a
# blocked owner sees why rather than only the generic takeover text.
if renewal_assessment and renewal_assessment.get("is_candidate"):
reasons.append(
issue_lock_renewal.format_renewal_refusal(renewal_assessment)
)
raise RuntimeError("; ".join(reasons))
# #755: a sanctioned dead-session recovery always has an owning open PR —
# that is what makes it a recovery rather than a fresh claim. Carry the
# server-derived owning-PR evidence into the duplicate-work gate below so
@@ -3978,6 +4103,14 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
if recovery_sanctioned
else None
)
# #760: a sanctioned renewal owns its open PR for the same reason, so it
# needs the same exemption. Without it the duplicate-work gate rejects every
# renewal with "open PR already covers issue", which is the PR the lock
# being renewed already owns. Withheld unless renewal was granted.
if recovered_owning_pr is None and renewal_sanctioned:
recovered_owning_pr = issue_lock_renewal.owning_pr_renewal_evidence(
renewal_assessment
)
lock_assessment = issue_lock_worktree.assess_issue_lock_worktree(
worktree_path=resolved_worktree,
current_branch=git_state.get("current_branch"),
@@ -3986,6 +4119,10 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
inspected_git_root=git_state.get("inspected_git_root"),
base_branch=git_state.get("base_branch"),
recovery_sanctioned=recovery_sanctioned,
# #760: without this the renewal waiver was computed and then discarded
# here — the exact-owner branch always carries commits, so it can never
# be base-equivalent, and every real renewal failed at this gate.
renewal_sanctioned=renewal_sanctioned,
)
if lock_assessment["block"]:
reasons = list(lock_assessment.get("reasons") or [])
@@ -3995,6 +4132,12 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
reasons.append(
issue_lock_recovery.format_recovery_refusal(recovery_assessment)
)
# #760: same courtesy for a refused renewal, so an exact owner blocked
# at this gate sees which piece of ownership evidence was missing.
if renewal_assessment and renewal_assessment.get("is_candidate"):
reasons.append(
issue_lock_renewal.format_renewal_refusal(renewal_assessment)
)
raise RuntimeError(
issue_lock_worktree.format_issue_lock_worktree_error(
{**lock_assessment, "reasons": reasons}
@@ -4070,18 +4213,35 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
recovery_assessment,
recovered_at=_work_lease_timestamp(_work_lease_now()),
)
if renewal_sanctioned and renewal_assessment:
# #760 AC9: record both sides of the transition — prior PID and expiry,
# replacement PID and new expiry — so a renewed lock is auditable and
# never reads as an original claim.
data["lease_renewal"] = issue_lock_renewal.build_renewal_record(
renewal_assessment,
renewed_at=_work_lease_timestamp(_work_lease_now()),
new_expires_at=str(work_lease.get("expires_at") or ""),
)
# #772 AC5: a recovery replaces a claim another session already owned, so
# its write is a compare-and-swap against the generation the assessment was
# made on. Two replacement sessions that both observed the same dead owner
# cannot both succeed — the second finds a moved generation and fails
# closed. Ordinary first-time claims keep the unconditional write.
# #760 uses the same compare-and-swap: a renewal also replaces a claim that
# already existed on disk, so two sessions that both observed the same
# expired lease cannot both win — the second finds a moved generation and
# fails closed.
expected_generation = (
issue_lock_store.lock_generation(existing_issue_lock)
if recovery_sanctioned
if (recovery_sanctioned or renewal_sanctioned)
else None
)
lock_file_path = _save_issue_lock(data, expected_generation=expected_generation)
lock_file_path = _save_issue_lock(
data,
expected_generation=expected_generation,
renewal_sanctioned=renewal_sanctioned,
)
lock_record = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(lock_file_path) or data
freshness = issue_lock_store.assess_lock_freshness(lock_record)
competing = [
@@ -4150,6 +4310,16 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
issue_number=issue_number,
branch_name=branch_name,
)
if renewal_sanctioned:
# #760 AC13: the renewal is visible in the native tool result, so an
# owner never has to inspect the lock file to confirm what happened.
result["lease_renewal"] = lock_record.get("lease_renewal")
result["message"] = (
f"Renewed the expired {AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE} lease on issue "
f"#{issue_number} for its exact recorded owner, on branch "
f"'{branch_name}' from worktree '{resolved_worktree}' "
"(fail-closed check complete)."
)
if agent_artifacts:
result["warnings"] = [
"Agent temp artifacts at repo root (delete before implementation): "
@@ -12366,10 +12536,39 @@ def _try_auto_switch_for_operation(op: str, host: str | None = None) -> bool:
return False
def _git_default_remote_name(root: str) -> str:
"""First configured git remote name for *root*, defaulting to 'origin'.
Used to resolve the live remote master target for parity (#610). Best
effort: any failure falls back to 'origin' so callers never raise.
"""
try:
res = subprocess.run(
["git", "-C", root, "remote"],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
except Exception:
return "origin"
if res.returncode != 0:
return "origin"
names = [n.strip() for n in (res.stdout or "").splitlines() if n.strip()]
return names[0] if names else "origin"
def _current_master_parity() -> dict:
"""Assess this process's code against the on-disk master HEAD (#420)."""
"""Assess this process's code against local and live remote master (#420/#610).
Compares the daemon's startup commit, the on-disk checkout HEAD, and the
live remote master target. A stale daemon relative to live master fails
closed for mutations even when the local checkout HEAD still matches the
startup commit. The live-remote read is best effort: an unresolved live
head leaves read-only diagnostics unblocked but is never mutation-safe.
"""
current_head = master_parity_gate.read_git_head(PROJECT_ROOT)
return master_parity_gate.assess_master_parity(_STARTUP_PARITY, current_head)
live_head = master_parity_gate.read_remote_master_head(
PROJECT_ROOT, remote=_git_default_remote_name(PROJECT_ROOT))
return master_parity_gate.assess_master_parity(
_STARTUP_PARITY, current_head, live_remote_head=live_head)
def _current_runtime_mode_report(refresh: bool = False) -> dict:
@@ -16310,15 +16509,34 @@ def gitea_get_runtime_context(
"restart_required": parity["restart_required"],
"startup_head": parity["startup_head"],
"current_head": parity["current_head"],
# #610 distinguished mutation-safety signals:
"daemon_start_head": parity["daemon_start_head"],
"local_head": parity["local_head"],
"live_remote_head": parity["live_remote_head"],
"live_known": parity["live_known"],
"live_stale": parity["live_stale"],
"mutation_safe": parity["mutation_safe"],
"summary": master_parity_gate.format_parity(parity),
"mutation_gate_enforced": not master_parity_gate.gate_disabled(),
# #610: the capability resolver is authoritative for mutation safety;
# local parity alone must never authorize a mutation.
"resolver_authoritative_for_mutation_safety": True,
}
if parity["stale"] and not master_parity_gate.gate_disabled():
safe_next_action = (
"Server code is stale relative to master; restart the Gitea MCP "
"server to load current capability gates before mutating. "
f"({master_parity_gate.format_parity(parity)})"
)
if parity["restart_required"] and not master_parity_gate.gate_disabled():
if parity["live_stale"]:
safe_next_action = (
"Daemon is stale relative to LIVE remote master "
f"(started {parity['startup_head'][:12] if parity['startup_head'] else 'unknown'}, "
f"live master {parity['live_remote_head'][:12] if parity['live_remote_head'] else 'unknown'}); "
"restart/reconnect the Gitea MCP server before mutating. The "
"capability resolver is authoritative for mutation safety."
)
else:
safe_next_action = (
"Server code is stale relative to master; restart the Gitea MCP "
"server to load current capability gates before mutating. "
f"({master_parity_gate.format_parity(parity)})"
)
result["safe_next_action"] = safe_next_action
if reveal and h:
@@ -16367,6 +16585,13 @@ def gitea_assess_master_parity(
"determinable": parity["determinable"],
"startup_head": parity["startup_head"],
"current_head": parity["current_head"],
# #610 distinguished mutation-safety signals:
"daemon_start_head": parity["daemon_start_head"],
"local_head": parity["local_head"],
"live_remote_head": parity["live_remote_head"],
"live_known": parity["live_known"],
"live_stale": parity["live_stale"],
"mutation_safe": parity["mutation_safe"],
"mutation_gate_enforced": enforced,
"summary": master_parity_gate.format_parity(parity),
"reasons": parity["reasons"],
@@ -16383,7 +16608,7 @@ def gitea_assess_master_parity(
source=canonical_source,
),
}
if parity["stale"] and enforced:
if parity["restart_required"] and enforced:
out["report"] = master_parity_gate.parity_report(parity)
return out
+481
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
"""Exact-owner renewal of an expired author issue lease (#760).
An author issue lease carries an absolute wall-clock expiry stamped once at
lock time. The PID recorded alongside it is the long-lived MCP daemon, not the
authoring task, so a lease that expires while its daemon is still up is the
ordinary case for any author task that outlives the TTL — not an anomaly.
Before this module, that case was unreachable.
``issue_lock_store.assess_same_issue_lease_conflict`` computed same-owner
evidence and then returned on the expired branch before consulting it, and
``assess_expired_lock_reclaim`` only permits takeover on a dead PID or a
missing worktree. An exact owner whose daemon is alive and whose worktree is
present satisfied neither, so its own lock became permanently unmodifiable
through sanctioned tools.
This module is the pure evidence assessor for that one narrow case. It answers
a single question: may *this* session renew a lease it can prove it already
owns? It performs no mutation and no network I/O, and it never trusts a caller
assertion — every field is compared against durable lock state or a live
observation supplied by the caller and gathered server-side.
Deliberate boundaries:
* **Renewal is not takeover.** A refusal here never widens what
``assess_expired_lock_reclaim`` already allows; foreign expired locks keep
requiring a dead PID or missing worktree (#760 AC11), and a *live* foreign
lease stays non-recoverable by construction because only an expired lease is
ever a candidate (AC12).
* **PID liveness is never authorization.** A live recorded PID proves the
daemon is up, nothing more. It is recorded as evidence and is neither
necessary nor sufficient for renewal (AC16).
* **Absolute expiry is preserved.** Renewal issues a new absolute expiry from
the moment of the write. It does not introduce sliding heartbeat renewal,
lease generations as fencing tokens, or a shared cross-role lifecycle — that
is #790's scope and is deliberately not implemented here.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
from issue_lock_store import AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE, is_lease_expired, is_process_alive
from reviewer_worktree import parse_dirty_tracked_files
# Outcome values.
RENEWAL_SANCTIONED = "RENEWAL_SANCTIONED"
NO_CANDIDATE = "NO_CANDIDATE"
REFUSED = "REFUSED"
# Durable fields a lock must carry before it can be considered at all.
REQUIRED_LOCK_FIELDS = ("issue_number", "branch_name", "worktree_path")
def _text(value: Any) -> str:
return str(value or "").strip()
def _same_realpath(left: str | None, right: str | None) -> bool:
if not left or not right:
return False
try:
return os.path.realpath(left) == os.path.realpath(right)
except OSError:
return left == right
def _lock_claimant(lock: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
claimant = lock.get("claimant")
if not isinstance(claimant, Mapping):
lease = lock.get("work_lease")
claimant = lease.get("claimant") if isinstance(lease, Mapping) else None
return dict(claimant) if isinstance(claimant, Mapping) else {}
def _lock_lease(lock: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
lease = lock.get("work_lease")
return dict(lease) if isinstance(lease, Mapping) else {}
def _lock_operation_type(lock: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
lease = _lock_lease(lock)
return _text(lease.get("operation_type")) or AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE
def _recorded_pid(lock: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any:
pid = lock.get("session_pid")
if pid is None:
pid = lock.get("pid")
return pid
def _malformed_reasons(lock: Mapping[str, Any]) -> list[str]:
"""Names of durable fields that are missing or unusable."""
missing: list[str] = []
for field in REQUIRED_LOCK_FIELDS:
if not _text(lock.get(field)):
missing.append(field)
pid = _recorded_pid(lock)
if pid is None or _text(pid) == "":
missing.append("session_pid/pid")
else:
try:
if int(pid) <= 0:
missing.append("session_pid/pid")
except (TypeError, ValueError):
missing.append("session_pid/pid")
return missing
def _competing_lock_reasons(
competing_live_locks: Iterable[Mapping[str, Any]] | None,
*,
issue_number: int,
branch_name: str,
worktree_path: str,
) -> list[str]:
"""Live locks that would contend with this renewal (#760 AC7).
A live lock on the *same* issue cannot coexist with this expired lease, so
any live entry naming this issue, branch, or worktree belongs to somebody
else and refuses the renewal.
"""
reasons: list[str] = []
for entry in competing_live_locks or ():
if not isinstance(entry, Mapping):
continue
entry_issue = entry.get("issue_number")
entry_branch = _text(entry.get("branch_name"))
entry_worktree = _text(entry.get("worktree_path"))
if entry_issue == issue_number:
reasons.append(
f"a live lock already exists for issue #{issue_number} "
f"(pid {entry.get('pid')}); renewal would contend with it"
)
continue
if entry_branch and entry_branch == _text(branch_name):
reasons.append(
f"live lock for issue #{entry_issue} already holds branch "
f"'{branch_name}'"
)
if entry_worktree and _same_realpath(entry_worktree, worktree_path):
reasons.append(
f"live lock for issue #{entry_issue} already holds worktree "
f"'{worktree_path}'"
)
return reasons
def assess_exact_owner_lease_renewal(
existing_lock: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
*,
issue_number: int,
branch_name: str,
worktree_path: str,
remote: str,
org: str,
repo: str,
identity: str | None,
profile: str | None,
operation_type: str = AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE,
current_branch: str | None = None,
porcelain_status: str = "",
worktree_exists: bool = False,
head_sha: str | None = None,
remote_head_sha: str | None = None,
pr_head_sha: str | None = None,
pr_number: int | None = None,
competing_live_locks: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]] | None = None,
candidate_branches: Sequence[str] | None = None,
current_pid: int | None = None,
now: Any = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Decide whether an expired lease may be renewed by its exact owner.
Returns a disposition dict; it never raises and never mutates. A refusal
withholds permission, leaving every pre-existing guard to fail closed
exactly as before — this assessment can only ever *add* permission.
``NO_CANDIDATE`` means the situation is not an exact-owner renewal at all
(no lock, different issue, different operation, or an unexpired lease) and
the caller should carry on with its normal path. ``REFUSED`` means it looked
like one but the evidence did not hold, and ``reasons`` names exactly what
was missing.
"""
evidence: dict[str, Any] = {
"issue_number": issue_number,
"branch_name": branch_name,
"worktree_path": worktree_path,
"remote": remote,
"org": org,
"repo": repo,
"operation_type": operation_type,
"identity": identity,
"profile": profile,
}
def _result(outcome: str, reasons: list[str], **extra: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"outcome": outcome,
"renewal_sanctioned": outcome == RENEWAL_SANCTIONED,
"is_candidate": outcome in (RENEWAL_SANCTIONED, REFUSED),
"reasons": reasons,
"evidence": {**evidence, **extra},
}
if not isinstance(existing_lock, Mapping) or not existing_lock:
return _result(NO_CANDIDATE, ["no existing lock to renew"])
if existing_lock.get("issue_number") != issue_number:
return _result(
NO_CANDIDATE,
[
f"existing lock is for issue #{existing_lock.get('issue_number')}, "
f"not #{issue_number}"
],
)
existing_operation = _lock_operation_type(existing_lock)
if existing_operation != operation_type:
return _result(
NO_CANDIDATE,
[
f"existing lease operation '{existing_operation}' is not "
f"'{operation_type}'"
],
)
# Only an *expired* lease is ever a renewal candidate. An unexpired lease —
# live, or stale by dead PID — is somebody else's problem: the first needs no
# renewal, and the second is #753's dead-session recovery. This is also what
# makes a live foreign lease non-recoverable here (#760 AC12).
if not is_lease_expired(existing_lock, now=now):
return _result(
NO_CANDIDATE,
["lease has not expired; renewal does not apply"],
)
malformed = _malformed_reasons(existing_lock)
if malformed:
return _result(
REFUSED,
["durable lock is missing or has unusable fields: " + ", ".join(malformed)],
)
lease = _lock_lease(existing_lock)
claimant = _lock_claimant(existing_lock)
recorded_pid = _recorded_pid(existing_lock)
prior_expires_at = _text(lease.get("expires_at"))
# #760 AC16: recorded purely as evidence. A live daemon PID is neither
# necessary nor sufficient for renewal, and nothing below branches on it.
recorded_pid_alive = is_process_alive(recorded_pid)
extra: dict[str, Any] = {
"prior_pid": recorded_pid,
"prior_pid_alive": recorded_pid_alive,
"prior_expires_at": prior_expires_at,
"replacement_pid": current_pid,
"recorded_claimant": claimant,
"head_sha": head_sha,
"remote_head_sha": remote_head_sha,
"pr_head_sha": pr_head_sha,
"pr_number": pr_number,
}
reasons: list[str] = []
# ── AC3: exact ownership identity ──
if _text(existing_lock.get("remote")) != _text(remote):
reasons.append(
f"recorded remote '{existing_lock.get('remote')}' does not match "
f"'{remote}'"
)
if _text(existing_lock.get("org")) != _text(org):
reasons.append(
f"recorded org '{existing_lock.get('org')}' does not match '{org}'"
)
if _text(existing_lock.get("repo")) != _text(repo):
reasons.append(
f"recorded repo '{existing_lock.get('repo')}' does not match '{repo}'"
)
if _text(existing_lock.get("branch_name")) != _text(branch_name):
reasons.append(
f"recorded branch '{existing_lock.get('branch_name')}' does not match "
f"'{branch_name}'"
)
if not _same_realpath(_text(existing_lock.get("worktree_path")), worktree_path):
reasons.append(
f"recorded worktree '{existing_lock.get('worktree_path')}' does not "
f"match '{worktree_path}'"
)
recorded_identity = _text(claimant.get("username"))
recorded_profile = _text(claimant.get("profile"))
if not recorded_identity or not recorded_profile:
reasons.append(
"durable lock does not record both a claimant username and profile"
)
if recorded_identity and recorded_identity != _text(identity):
reasons.append(
f"recorded claimant '{recorded_identity}' does not match active "
f"identity '{_text(identity) or 'unknown'}'"
)
if recorded_profile and recorded_profile != _text(profile):
reasons.append(
f"recorded profile '{recorded_profile}' does not match active profile "
f"'{_text(profile) or 'unknown'}'"
)
# ── AC4: the registered worktree still exists, is on the branch, and is clean ──
if not worktree_exists:
reasons.append(f"declared worktree '{worktree_path}' does not exist")
if _text(current_branch) != _text(branch_name):
reasons.append(
f"worktree is on branch '{_text(current_branch) or 'unknown'}', not "
f"'{branch_name}'"
)
dirty = parse_dirty_tracked_files(porcelain_status or "")
if dirty:
reasons.append(
"worktree has uncommitted tracked changes: " + ", ".join(sorted(dirty))
)
# ── AC5/AC6: published heads must agree ──
if not _text(head_sha):
reasons.append("local head could not be observed")
if not _text(remote_head_sha):
reasons.append(
"remote branch head could not be observed; an unpublished branch "
"cannot prove exact-owner renewal"
)
if _text(head_sha) and _text(remote_head_sha) and head_sha != remote_head_sha:
reasons.append(
f"local head {head_sha} does not equal remote head {remote_head_sha}"
)
if pr_number is not None:
if not _text(pr_head_sha):
reasons.append(f"owning PR #{pr_number} head could not be observed")
elif _text(head_sha) and pr_head_sha != head_sha:
reasons.append(
f"owning PR #{pr_number} head {pr_head_sha} does not equal local "
f"head {head_sha}"
)
# ── AC7: nothing else claims this work ──
reasons.extend(
_competing_lock_reasons(
competing_live_locks,
issue_number=issue_number,
branch_name=branch_name,
worktree_path=worktree_path,
)
)
other_branches = [
name
for name in (candidate_branches or ())
if _text(name) and _text(name) != _text(branch_name)
]
if other_branches:
reasons.append(
"other branches already carry this issue marker: "
+ ", ".join(sorted(other_branches))
)
if reasons:
return _result(REFUSED, reasons, **extra)
return _result(
RENEWAL_SANCTIONED,
[
f"exact owner '{recorded_identity}' ({recorded_profile}) proved "
f"ownership of issue #{issue_number} on branch '{branch_name}' from "
f"worktree '{worktree_path}'; local, remote"
+ (f", and PR #{pr_number}" if pr_number is not None else "")
+ f" heads all equal {head_sha}; lease expired at "
f"{prior_expires_at or 'unknown'}"
],
**extra,
)
def owning_pr_renewal_evidence(
assessment: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Server-derived proof of the open PR a sanctioned renewal already owns.
The mirror of ``issue_lock_recovery.owning_pr_recovery_evidence`` (#755) for
the renewal disposition. An exact-owner renewal of a published branch is, by
construction, renewal of work that already has an open PR — so the
duplicate-work gate's linked-open-PR blocker would otherwise discard every
sanctioned renewal, exactly as it once discarded every sanctioned recovery.
Returns ``None`` unless renewal was actually granted and the evidence names
one owning PR whose head agrees with both the local and remote heads the
assessor accepted. Nothing is caller-supplied: every field is copied from
evidence built out of durable lock state plus live git/Gitea observation.
Renewal has no descendant case — it requires the local, remote, and PR heads
to be equal — so there is only one head to report.
"""
if not isinstance(assessment, Mapping):
return None
if assessment.get("outcome") != RENEWAL_SANCTIONED:
return None
if not assessment.get("renewal_sanctioned"):
return None
evidence = assessment.get("evidence") or {}
branch_name = _text(evidence.get("branch_name"))
pr_head = _text(evidence.get("pr_head_sha"))
local_head = _text(evidence.get("head_sha"))
remote_head = _text(evidence.get("remote_head_sha"))
raw_pr_number = evidence.get("pr_number")
if raw_pr_number is None or not branch_name or not pr_head:
return None
# The assessor already required these to agree. Re-check, so a truncated or
# hand-built evidence map can never authorize an exemption.
if pr_head != local_head or pr_head != remote_head:
return None
try:
pr_number = int(raw_pr_number)
issue_number = int(evidence.get("issue_number"))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
return {
"issue_number": issue_number,
"pr_number": pr_number,
"branch_name": branch_name,
"head_sha": pr_head,
"recorded_head": pr_head,
"accepted_head": pr_head,
"head_relation": "equal",
}
def build_renewal_record(
assessment: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
*,
renewed_at: str,
new_expires_at: str,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Durable audit record for a sanctioned renewal (#760 AC9).
Records both sides of the transition — prior PID and expiry, replacement PID
and new expiry — so a renewed lock is never mistakable for an original
claim, and so the evidence the waiver was granted on stays inspectable.
"""
data = dict(assessment or {})
evidence = dict(data.get("evidence") or {})
recorded_claimant = dict(evidence.get("recorded_claimant") or {})
return {
"renewed": bool(data.get("renewal_sanctioned")),
"renewed_at": renewed_at,
"prior_pid": evidence.get("prior_pid"),
"prior_pid_alive": evidence.get("prior_pid_alive"),
"prior_expires_at": evidence.get("prior_expires_at"),
"replacement_pid": evidence.get("replacement_pid"),
"new_expires_at": new_expires_at,
"identity": recorded_claimant.get("username"),
"profile": recorded_claimant.get("profile"),
"branch_name": evidence.get("branch_name"),
"worktree_path": evidence.get("worktree_path"),
"head_sha": evidence.get("head_sha"),
"remote_head_sha": evidence.get("remote_head_sha"),
"pr_head_sha": evidence.get("pr_head_sha"),
"pr_number": evidence.get("pr_number"),
"reason": "expired lease renewed by its exact recorded owner",
"proof": list(data.get("reasons") or []),
}
def format_renewal_refusal(assessment: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> str:
"""One-line refusal summary for a blocked caller."""
data = dict(assessment or {})
reasons = list(data.get("reasons") or [])
if not reasons:
return "exact-owner lease renewal was not available (no evidence recorded)"
return "exact-owner lease renewal refused: " + "; ".join(reasons)
+23 -1
View File
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ def bind_session_lock(
lock_dir: str | None = None,
*,
expected_generation: int | None = None,
renewal_sanctioned: bool = False,
) -> str:
"""Persist a keyed lock and bind it to the current process session.
@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ def bind_session_lock(
issue_number=issue_number,
branch_name=str(record.get("branch_name") or ""),
worktree_path=str(record.get("worktree_path") or ""),
renewal_sanctioned=renewal_sanctioned,
)
if lease_block:
raise RuntimeError(lease_block)
@@ -483,9 +485,19 @@ def assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
branch_name: str,
worktree_path: str,
operation_type: str = AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE,
renewal_sanctioned: bool = False,
now: datetime | None = None,
) -> str | None:
"""Return a fail-closed error when a competing live lease blocks acquisition."""
"""Return a fail-closed error when a competing live lease blocks acquisition.
``renewal_sanctioned`` is set only when
``issue_lock_renewal.assess_exact_owner_lease_renewal`` has already proven,
from the durable lock plus live server-side observation, that this session
is the exact recorded owner of an *expired* lease (#760). It is never a
caller-supplied parameter of any MCP tool (#760 AC14): the server computes
it and passes it down. Left False, every pre-existing disposition is
unchanged.
"""
if not existing_lock:
return None
@@ -506,6 +518,16 @@ def assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
and _same_realpath(str(existing_worktree or ""), worktree_path)
)
if is_lease_expired(existing_lock, now=now):
# #760 AC1/AC2: exact-owner renewal is a different disposition from
# foreign takeover and is evaluated first. Before this, both branches
# below returned unconditionally, so the same_owner allowance further
# down was unreachable for every expired lease — an owner could never
# renew its own lock once the wall clock passed, no matter how complete
# its ownership evidence. Requires BOTH the locally recomputed
# same_owner match and the server-proven renewal waiver; either alone is
# insufficient.
if same_owner and renewal_sanctioned:
return None
reclaim = assess_expired_lock_reclaim(existing_lock, now=now)
if reclaim.get("reclaim_allowed"):
# #601: expired + dead pid / missing worktree may be reclaimed
+25 -3
View File
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ def assess_issue_lock_worktree(
base_branch: str | None = None,
base_branches: frozenset[str] | None = None,
recovery_sanctioned: bool = False,
renewal_sanctioned: bool = False,
) -> dict:
"""Fail closed when lock preconditions are not met on the declared worktree.
@@ -296,6 +297,19 @@ def assess_issue_lock_worktree(
by construction and could never satisfy it. Every other precondition —
notably worktree cleanliness — still applies unchanged, and brand-new issue
claims keep the full base-equivalence requirement.
``renewal_sanctioned`` waives base-equivalence on exactly the same grounds
for the other proven-ownership case (#760): ``issue_lock_renewal`` has shown
that an *expired* lease is being renewed by its exact recorded owner — same
remote, org, repo, issue, operation, branch, realpath-normalized worktree,
claimant username and profile — with the local head matching the remote head
and any owning PR head. Such a branch carries committed work for the same
reason a recovered one does, so it can never be base-equivalent either.
Both waivers relax this one requirement and nothing else. Neither is
caller-supplied: each is computed server-side from durable lock state plus
live observation. With both False every precondition applies exactly as
before.
"""
bases = base_branches or BASE_BRANCHES
reasons: list[str] = []
@@ -314,9 +328,12 @@ def assess_issue_lock_worktree(
f"(dirty files: {', '.join(dirty_files)})"
)
if recovery_sanctioned:
if recovery_sanctioned or renewal_sanctioned:
# Base-equivalence intentionally not evaluated: ownership was proven
# against the durable lock record instead (#753).
# against the durable lock record instead — by dead-session recovery
# (#753) or by exact-owner renewal of an expired lease (#760). Every
# other precondition above and below still applies; cleanliness in
# particular is checked before this branch and is never waived.
pass
elif base_equivalent is False:
reasons.append(
@@ -347,6 +364,7 @@ def assess_issue_lock_worktree(
base_branch=base_branch,
base_equivalent=base_equivalent,
recovery_sanctioned=recovery_sanctioned,
renewal_sanctioned=renewal_sanctioned,
)
@@ -406,6 +424,7 @@ def _assessment(
base_branch: str | None = None,
base_equivalent: bool | None = None,
recovery_sanctioned: bool = False,
renewal_sanctioned: bool = False,
) -> dict:
return {
"proven": proven,
@@ -418,7 +437,10 @@ def _assessment(
"base_branch": base_branch,
"base_equivalent": base_equivalent,
"recovery_sanctioned": recovery_sanctioned,
"base_equivalence_waived": bool(recovery_sanctioned),
"renewal_sanctioned": renewal_sanctioned,
# Either proven-ownership waiver relaxes base-equivalence; the two are
# reported separately so an audit can tell which one applied.
"base_equivalence_waived": bool(recovery_sanctioned or renewal_sanctioned),
}
+213 -17
View File
@@ -24,12 +24,50 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import os
import subprocess
import time
# Live-remote head cache: the parity gate runs on every mutation and every
# runtime-context read, so the ``git ls-remote`` result is cached briefly to
# avoid a network round-trip per call (#610). Keyed by (root, remote, branch).
_REMOTE_HEAD_CACHE: dict[tuple[str, str, str], tuple[float, str | None]] = {}
_REMOTE_HEAD_TTL = 60.0
# When True, ``read_remote_master_head`` never performs ``git ls-remote`` unless
# ``GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD`` is set. Conftest enables this suite-wide so
# feature worktrees (whose HEAD differs from live master) cannot flip legacy
# runtime-context assertions to live_stale, and so unit tests never depend on
# a live network (PR #788 F1/F2 / issue #610). Module-level (not env-only) so
# ``patch.dict(os.environ, …, clear=True)`` cannot re-enable the probe.
_HERMETIC_TEST_MODE: bool = False
def _clear_remote_head_cache() -> None:
"""Reset the live-remote head cache (test isolation / forced refresh)."""
_REMOTE_HEAD_CACHE.clear()
def set_hermetic_test_mode(enabled: bool) -> None:
"""Enable or disable suite-wide hermetic live-remote reads (tests only)."""
global _HERMETIC_TEST_MODE
_HERMETIC_TEST_MODE = bool(enabled)
_clear_remote_head_cache()
def hermetic_test_mode() -> bool:
"""Return whether hermetic live-remote reads are active."""
return bool(_HERMETIC_TEST_MODE)
# Environment escape hatches (ops + tests):
# GITEA_MCP_DISABLE_PARITY_GATE -> disable enforcement entirely (fail open).
# GITEA_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD -> force the "current" HEAD read, for tests.
ENV_DISABLE = "GITEA_MCP_DISABLE_PARITY_GATE"
ENV_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD = "GITEA_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD"
# GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD -> force the live remote master read, for tests.
ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD = "GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD"
# GITEA_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE -> opt a single test into a real ls-remote
# even when hermetic mode is on (rare; prefer ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD).
ENV_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE = "GITEA_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE"
def read_git_head(root: str) -> str | None:
@@ -58,6 +96,75 @@ def read_git_head(root: str) -> str | None:
return (res.stdout or "").strip() or None
def read_remote_master_head(
root: str,
remote: str = "origin",
branch: str = "master",
ttl: float = _REMOTE_HEAD_TTL,
) -> str | None:
"""Return the live remote ``branch`` commit SHA, or ``None`` (#610).
Resolves the *live* target commit via ``git ls-remote`` so parity can tell
a daemon that is behind the live remote master apart from one whose local
checkout simply hasn't been pulled. ``None`` means the live head could not
be resolved (offline, no such remote, git unavailable, error) -- callers
must treat unknown live state as *not mutation-safe* while never blocking
read-only diagnostics. A ``GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD`` override takes
precedence so the wiring can be exercised deterministically and offline.
The result is cached for *ttl* seconds per (root, remote, branch) so the
gate does not run a network probe on every mutation/read (``ttl=0`` forces
a live probe). Both hits and ``None`` misses are cached to bound offline
latency; the env override bypasses the cache and the subprocess entirely.
Under suite hermetic mode (``set_hermetic_test_mode(True)``, set by
conftest) a missing override returns ``None`` without network I/O so
feature-worktree test runs cannot observe live_stale against real master
(PR #788 F1) and unit tests stay offline (F2). Opt out with an explicit
``GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD`` pin or ``GITEA_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE``.
"""
forced = os.environ.get(ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD)
if forced is not None:
return forced.strip() or None
if _HERMETIC_TEST_MODE and not (
os.environ.get(ENV_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE) or ""
).strip():
# Hermetic default: live head unknown. live_stale stays False;
# mutation_safe is False when live is unknown (documented #610 note).
return None
# Defense in depth: even without the module flag, never probe while pytest
# is running unless the test opted into a real probe or set an override.
if (os.environ.get("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST") or "").strip() and not (
os.environ.get(ENV_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE) or ""
).strip():
return None
if not root:
return None
key = (root, remote, branch)
now = time.monotonic()
if ttl > 0:
cached = _REMOTE_HEAD_CACHE.get(key)
if cached is not None and (now - cached[0]) < ttl:
return cached[1]
sha: str | None = None
try:
res = subprocess.run(
["git", "-C", root, "ls-remote", remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
check=False,
timeout=5,
)
if res.returncode == 0:
lines = (res.stdout or "").strip().splitlines()
if lines:
sha = lines[0].split("\t", 1)[0].split()[0].strip() or None
except Exception:
sha = None
_REMOTE_HEAD_CACHE[key] = (now, sha)
return sha
def capture_startup_parity(root: str, head: str | None = None) -> dict:
"""Capture the process source-tree baseline once at server startup.
@@ -72,18 +179,38 @@ def _short(sha: str | None) -> str:
return sha[:12] if sha else "unknown"
def assess_master_parity(startup: dict | None, current_head: str | None) -> dict:
def assess_master_parity(
startup: dict | None,
current_head: str | None,
live_remote_head: str | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Compare the startup baseline against the current on-disk ``HEAD``.
Pure: both HEADs are supplied by the caller. Returns a structured result:
Pure: all HEADs are supplied by the caller. Returns a structured result:
- ``in_parity`` -- server code matches the on-disk master (or parity
could not be determined, which is not treated as stale).
- ``stale`` -- the on-disk master has definitively advanced past the
running process.
- ``restart_required`` -- alias of ``stale``; the recovery action.
- ``determinable`` -- whether both HEADs were known well enough to compare.
- ``restart_required`` -- ``stale`` or ``live_stale``; the recovery action.
- ``determinable`` -- whether both local HEADs were known well enough to
compare.
- ``startup_head`` / ``current_head`` / ``reasons``.
#610 adds live-remote awareness so a daemon that is stale relative to the
*live* remote master cannot report a mutation-safe result even when the
local checkout HEAD still matches the daemon's startup commit:
- ``daemon_start_head`` -- the commit the running process started at
(alias of ``startup_head``, named for clarity in reports).
- ``local_head`` -- the on-disk checkout HEAD (alias of ``current_head``).
- ``live_remote_head`` -- the live remote target commit, or ``None`` when it
could not be fetched.
- ``live_known`` -- whether the live remote target was resolved.
- ``live_stale`` -- the live remote master has advanced past the running
process (daemon is behind live master) even if local parity is green.
- ``mutation_safe`` -- the daemon code, local checkout, and live remote
target all agree; the only state in which a mutation may rely on parity.
"""
startup_head = (startup or {}).get("startup_head")
reasons: list[str] = []
@@ -91,32 +218,56 @@ def assess_master_parity(startup: dict | None, current_head: str | None) -> dict
if startup_head is None:
reasons.append(
"startup commit was not captured; code parity cannot be enforced")
return _result(True, False, False, startup_head, current_head, reasons)
return _result(True, False, False, startup_head, current_head,
live_remote_head, False, reasons)
if current_head is None:
reasons.append(
"current workspace HEAD could not be read; code parity cannot be "
"enforced")
return _result(True, False, False, startup_head, current_head, reasons)
return _result(True, False, False, startup_head, current_head,
live_remote_head, False, reasons)
if startup_head == current_head:
return _result(True, False, True, startup_head, current_head, reasons)
local_in_parity = startup_head == current_head
local_stale = not local_in_parity
if local_stale:
reasons.append(
f"MCP server started at commit {_short(startup_head)} but the "
f"workspace master is now {_short(current_head)}; restart the "
f"server to load the current capability gates")
reasons.append(
f"MCP server started at commit {_short(startup_head)} but the workspace "
f"master is now {_short(current_head)}; restart the server to load the "
f"current capability gates")
return _result(False, True, True, startup_head, current_head, reasons)
live_known = live_remote_head is not None
live_stale = live_known and live_remote_head != startup_head
if live_stale:
reasons.append(
f"live remote master is {_short(live_remote_head)} but the MCP "
f"server started at {_short(startup_head)}; the daemon is stale "
f"relative to live master -- restart/reconnect before mutating")
return _result(
local_in_parity, local_stale, True, startup_head, current_head,
live_remote_head, live_stale, reasons)
def _result(in_parity, stale, determinable, startup_head, current_head, reasons):
def _result(in_parity, stale, determinable, startup_head, current_head,
live_remote_head, live_stale, reasons):
live_known = live_remote_head is not None
mutation_safe = (
determinable and in_parity and live_known and not live_stale)
return {
"in_parity": in_parity,
"stale": stale,
"restart_required": stale,
"restart_required": stale or live_stale,
"determinable": determinable,
"startup_head": startup_head,
"current_head": current_head,
# #610 distinguished signals:
"daemon_start_head": startup_head,
"local_head": current_head,
"live_remote_head": live_remote_head,
"live_known": live_known,
"live_stale": live_stale,
"mutation_safe": mutation_safe,
"reasons": list(reasons),
}
@@ -130,11 +281,13 @@ def parity_block_reasons(assessment: dict) -> list[str]:
"""Block reasons for a mutation gate (empty when the mutation may proceed).
A disabled gate or an in-parity / non-determinable assessment yields no
reasons; only a definitively stale server blocks.
reasons. A definitively stale server blocks, and (#610) a daemon that is
stale relative to the *live* remote master blocks even when the local
checkout HEAD still matches the daemon's startup commit.
"""
if gate_disabled():
return []
if assessment.get("stale"):
if assessment.get("stale") or assessment.get("live_stale"):
return list(assessment.get("reasons") or
["server code is stale relative to master (fail closed)"])
return []
@@ -147,6 +300,10 @@ def parity_report(assessment: dict) -> dict:
"restart_required": True,
"startup_head": assessment.get("startup_head"),
"current_head": assessment.get("current_head"),
# #610: name the live remote target so the report distinguishes a
# local-code stale from a daemon-behind-live-master stale.
"live_remote_head": assessment.get("live_remote_head"),
"live_stale": bool(assessment.get("live_stale")),
"reasons": list(assessment.get("reasons") or []),
"recovery": [
"The running MCP server is executing code older than the current "
@@ -157,6 +314,45 @@ def parity_report(assessment: dict) -> dict:
}
def parity_resolver_disagreement(
assessment: dict,
resolver_restart_required: bool,
) -> dict | None:
"""Typed blocker when the resolver requires restart but parity looks green.
The capability resolver (``gitea_resolve_task_capability``) detects stale
runtime authoritatively for mutation safety (#610). When it requires a
restart, local-only parity must never override it: this returns a typed,
fail-closed blocker that names the resolver as authoritative. Returns
``None`` when the resolver does not require a restart.
"""
if not resolver_restart_required:
return None
parity_optimistic = bool(assessment.get("in_parity")) and not (
assessment.get("stale") or assessment.get("live_stale"))
return {
"kind": "parity_resolver_disagreement",
"restart_required": True,
"resolver_authoritative": True,
"parity_optimistic": parity_optimistic,
"daemon_start_head": assessment.get("daemon_start_head"),
"local_head": assessment.get("local_head"),
"live_remote_head": assessment.get("live_remote_head"),
"reasons": [
"The capability resolver requires a restart/reconnect (stale "
"runtime) but master-parity reported local code as in-parity. "
"The resolver is authoritative for mutation safety; do not mutate "
"on local parity alone. Restart/reconnect the Gitea MCP server "
"and re-verify before mutating.",
],
"recovery": [
"Trust the resolver: treat this session as stale.",
"Restart or /mcp reconnect the Gitea MCP namespace so it reloads "
"current master and live target state, then re-run preflight.",
],
}
def format_parity(assessment: dict) -> str:
"""One-line human summary for logs / runtime context."""
if assessment.get("stale"):
+29
View File
@@ -167,6 +167,35 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
import pytest
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _hermetic_live_remote_master_head():
"""#610 / PR #788 F1/F2: keep live-remote parity reads offline in tests.
``read_remote_master_head`` would otherwise ``git ls-remote`` whenever
``GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD`` is unset. Feature worktrees under
``branches/`` always differ from live master, so legacy suites that assert
runtime-context ``safe_next_action`` flip to live_stale. Module-level
hermetic mode survives ``patch.dict(os.environ, …, clear=True)``.
Tests that exercise the real probe path call
``master_parity_gate.set_hermetic_test_mode(False)`` and/or set
``GITEA_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE``.
"""
try:
import master_parity_gate as _mpg
_mpg.set_hermetic_test_mode(True)
except Exception:
_mpg = None
try:
yield
finally:
if _mpg is not None:
try:
_mpg.set_hermetic_test_mode(False)
except Exception:
pass
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _deterministic_workspace_remotes():
try:
@@ -0,0 +1,447 @@
"""Exact-owner renewal of an expired author issue lease (#760).
Covers the renewal disposition that lets the exact recorded owner re-acquire
its own lock after the wall-clock lease expires — including while the recording
MCP daemon PID is still alive — plus every rejection condition that must keep
failing closed, and the pre-existing dead-PID and live-foreign dispositions
that must remain untouched.
"""
import inspect
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
import issue_lock_renewal # noqa: E402
import issue_lock_store # noqa: E402
ISSUE = 5150
BRANCH = f"fix/issue-{ISSUE}-demo"
WORKTREE = "/scratch/wt-5150"
HEAD = "c" * 40
OTHER_SHA = "d" * 40
IDENTITY = "example-user"
PROFILE = "example-author"
REMOTE = "prgs"
ORG = "ExampleOrg"
REPO = "ExampleRepo"
def dead_pid() -> int:
"""A PID that has certainly exited (spawned, then reaped)."""
proc = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-c", "pass"])
proc.wait()
return proc.pid
def past_ts(hours: int = 1) -> str:
return (
(datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=hours))
.isoformat()
.replace("+00:00", "Z")
)
def future_ts(hours: int = 4) -> str:
return (
(datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=hours))
.isoformat()
.replace("+00:00", "Z")
)
def make_lock(*, expires_at: str | None = None, pid: int | None = None, **overrides):
"""An expired lock owned by a still-alive daemon PID — the #760 condition."""
lock = {
"issue_number": ISSUE,
"branch_name": BRANCH,
"worktree_path": WORKTREE,
"remote": REMOTE,
"org": ORG,
"repo": REPO,
# os.getpid() is unambiguously alive: the whole point of #760 is that
# daemon liveness is not evidence of an active author task.
"session_pid": os.getpid() if pid is None else pid,
"lock_generation": 3,
"work_lease": {
"operation_type": issue_lock_store.AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE,
"issue_number": ISSUE,
"branch": BRANCH,
"worktree_path": WORKTREE,
"claimant": {"username": IDENTITY, "profile": PROFILE},
"created_at": past_ts(5),
"expires_at": expires_at or past_ts(),
},
}
lease_overrides = overrides.pop("work_lease", None)
if lease_overrides:
lock["work_lease"].update(lease_overrides)
lock.update(overrides)
return lock
def assess(lock=None, **overrides):
"""Run the assessor with all-passing evidence unless overridden."""
kwargs = {
"issue_number": ISSUE,
"branch_name": BRANCH,
"worktree_path": WORKTREE,
"remote": REMOTE,
"org": ORG,
"repo": REPO,
"identity": IDENTITY,
"profile": PROFILE,
"current_branch": BRANCH,
"porcelain_status": "",
"worktree_exists": True,
"head_sha": HEAD,
"remote_head_sha": HEAD,
"pr_head_sha": None,
"pr_number": None,
"competing_live_locks": [],
"candidate_branches": [BRANCH],
"current_pid": 4242,
}
kwargs.update(overrides)
return issue_lock_renewal.assess_exact_owner_lease_renewal(
make_lock() if lock is None else lock, **kwargs
)
class ExactOwnerRenewalGranted(unittest.TestCase):
"""AC1/AC3-AC7: the positive path."""
def test_expired_lease_alive_pid_exact_owner_is_renewable(self):
result = assess()
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], issue_lock_renewal.RENEWAL_SANCTIONED)
self.assertTrue(result["renewal_sanctioned"])
self.assertTrue(result["is_candidate"])
def test_renewal_holds_when_owning_pr_head_matches(self):
result = assess(pr_number=999, pr_head_sha=HEAD)
self.assertTrue(result["renewal_sanctioned"])
def test_evidence_records_both_sides_of_the_transition(self):
result = assess()
evidence = result["evidence"]
self.assertEqual(evidence["prior_pid"], os.getpid())
self.assertTrue(evidence["prior_pid_alive"])
self.assertEqual(evidence["replacement_pid"], 4242)
self.assertTrue(evidence["prior_expires_at"])
class ExactOwnerRenewalRefused(unittest.TestCase):
"""AC3-AC8: every near-match must fail closed, one reason at a time."""
def _refused(self, **overrides):
result = assess(**overrides)
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], issue_lock_renewal.REFUSED)
self.assertFalse(result["renewal_sanctioned"])
self.assertTrue(result["reasons"])
return result
def test_different_branch_refused(self):
result = self._refused(branch_name=f"fix/issue-{ISSUE}-other")
self.assertTrue(any("branch" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
def test_different_worktree_refused(self):
result = self._refused(worktree_path="/scratch/somewhere-else")
self.assertTrue(any("worktree" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
def test_different_claimant_refused(self):
result = self._refused(identity="someone-else")
self.assertTrue(any("claimant" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
def test_different_profile_refused(self):
result = self._refused(profile="other-author")
self.assertTrue(any("profile" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
def test_different_remote_org_or_repo_refused(self):
self._refused(remote="dadeschools")
self._refused(org="OtherOrg")
self._refused(repo="OtherRepo")
def test_dirty_worktree_refused(self):
result = self._refused(porcelain_status=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n")
self.assertTrue(any("uncommitted" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
def test_missing_worktree_refused(self):
result = self._refused(worktree_exists=False)
self.assertTrue(any("does not exist" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
def test_worktree_on_wrong_branch_refused(self):
self._refused(current_branch="master")
def test_local_and_remote_head_mismatch_refused(self):
result = self._refused(remote_head_sha=OTHER_SHA)
self.assertTrue(
any("does not equal remote head" in r for r in result["reasons"])
)
def test_unpublished_branch_refused(self):
result = self._refused(remote_head_sha=None)
self.assertTrue(any("remote branch head" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
def test_pr_head_mismatch_refused(self):
result = self._refused(pr_number=999, pr_head_sha=OTHER_SHA)
self.assertTrue(any("does not equal local" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
def test_unobservable_pr_head_refused(self):
self._refused(pr_number=999, pr_head_sha=None)
def test_competing_live_lock_on_same_issue_refused(self):
result = self._refused(
competing_live_locks=[
{"issue_number": ISSUE, "branch_name": BRANCH, "pid": 777}
]
)
self.assertTrue(any("live lock" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
def test_competing_live_lock_holding_the_branch_refused(self):
self._refused(
competing_live_locks=[
{"issue_number": 111, "branch_name": BRANCH, "worktree_path": ""}
]
)
def test_competing_branch_claim_refused(self):
result = self._refused(candidate_branches=[BRANCH, f"feat/issue-{ISSUE}-rival"])
self.assertTrue(any("issue marker" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
def test_malformed_durable_lock_refused(self):
lock = make_lock()
lock["worktree_path"] = ""
result = assess(lock)
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], issue_lock_renewal.REFUSED)
def test_lock_without_recorded_claimant_refused(self):
lock = make_lock()
lock["work_lease"]["claimant"] = {}
result = assess(lock)
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], issue_lock_renewal.REFUSED)
class NotARenewalCandidate(unittest.TestCase):
"""AC12 and scope: situations renewal must decline to judge at all."""
def test_live_foreign_lease_is_never_a_candidate(self):
lock = make_lock(expires_at=future_ts())
result = assess(lock, identity="someone-else")
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], issue_lock_renewal.NO_CANDIDATE)
self.assertFalse(result["renewal_sanctioned"])
def test_unexpired_lease_is_never_a_candidate(self):
lock = make_lock(expires_at=future_ts())
result = assess(lock)
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], issue_lock_renewal.NO_CANDIDATE)
def test_dead_pid_under_unexpired_lease_stays_with_753(self):
"""The opposite trigger; #760 must not re-own it."""
lock = make_lock(expires_at=future_ts(), pid=dead_pid())
result = assess(lock)
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], issue_lock_renewal.NO_CANDIDATE)
def test_absent_lock_is_not_a_candidate(self):
result = assess({})
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], issue_lock_renewal.NO_CANDIDATE)
def test_different_issue_is_not_a_candidate(self):
lock = make_lock()
lock["issue_number"] = ISSUE + 1
result = assess(lock)
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], issue_lock_renewal.NO_CANDIDATE)
def test_different_operation_type_is_not_a_candidate(self):
lock = make_lock()
lock["work_lease"]["operation_type"] = "review_pr_work"
result = assess(lock)
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], issue_lock_renewal.NO_CANDIDATE)
class DaemonPidIsNotTaskLiveness(unittest.TestCase):
"""AC16: a live recorded PID is never, by itself, authorization."""
def test_alive_pid_alone_does_not_authorize_renewal(self):
# Every ownership fact except the live PID is wrong.
result = assess(identity="someone-else", branch_name="fix/issue-1-nope")
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], issue_lock_renewal.REFUSED)
self.assertTrue(result["evidence"]["prior_pid_alive"])
def test_renewal_does_not_require_a_dead_pid(self):
result = assess()
self.assertTrue(result["evidence"]["prior_pid_alive"])
self.assertTrue(result["renewal_sanctioned"])
def test_dead_pid_does_not_block_an_otherwise_exact_owner(self):
lock = make_lock(pid=dead_pid())
result = assess(lock)
self.assertTrue(result["renewal_sanctioned"])
class ConflictGateOrdering(unittest.TestCase):
"""AC2: the same-owner allowance is reachable on an expired lease.
These cases need a worktree that genuinely exists on disk. The #601 reclaim
affordance already permits takeover when the recorded worktree is missing,
so a fictional path would satisfy the gate for the wrong reason and never
exercise the ordering defect this issue is about.
"""
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls):
cls._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
cls.worktree = cls._tmp.name
@classmethod
def tearDownClass(cls):
cls._tmp.cleanup()
def present_lock(self, **overrides):
return make_lock(worktree_path=self.worktree, **overrides)
def test_expired_same_owner_is_allowed_when_renewal_is_sanctioned(self):
block = issue_lock_store.assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
self.present_lock(),
issue_number=ISSUE,
branch_name=BRANCH,
worktree_path=self.worktree,
renewal_sanctioned=True,
)
self.assertIsNone(block)
def test_expired_same_owner_still_blocks_without_the_waiver(self):
"""Regression for the ordering defect: no waiver, no change in behavior.
Live PID and a present worktree, so the #601 reclaim affordance refuses;
before #760 this was the permanent dead end for an exact owner.
"""
lock = self.present_lock()
self.assertFalse(
issue_lock_store.assess_expired_lock_reclaim(lock)["reclaim_allowed"]
)
block = issue_lock_store.assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
lock,
issue_number=ISSUE,
branch_name=BRANCH,
worktree_path=self.worktree,
)
self.assertIsNotNone(block)
self.assertIn("Recovery review is required", block)
def test_waiver_does_not_unlock_a_different_owner(self):
"""AC11: the waiver is scoped by same_owner, not merely by its own flag."""
block = issue_lock_store.assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
self.present_lock(),
issue_number=ISSUE,
branch_name=f"fix/issue-{ISSUE}-someone-else",
worktree_path=self.worktree,
renewal_sanctioned=True,
)
self.assertIsNotNone(block)
self.assertIn("Recovery review is required", block)
def test_live_lease_disposition_is_unchanged(self):
"""AC12: a live foreign lease still blocks, waiver or not."""
block = issue_lock_store.assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
self.present_lock(expires_at=future_ts()),
issue_number=ISSUE,
branch_name=f"fix/issue-{ISSUE}-someone-else",
worktree_path="/scratch/other",
renewal_sanctioned=True,
)
self.assertIsNotNone(block)
self.assertIn("already has an active", block)
def test_dead_pid_reclaim_path_is_unchanged(self):
"""AC11: expired + dead PID still reclaims through the #601 affordance."""
lock = self.present_lock(pid=dead_pid())
reclaim = issue_lock_store.assess_expired_lock_reclaim(lock)
self.assertTrue(reclaim["reclaim_allowed"])
block = issue_lock_store.assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
lock,
issue_number=ISSUE,
branch_name=BRANCH,
worktree_path=self.worktree,
)
self.assertIsNone(block)
class RenewalRecordAndDownstream(unittest.TestCase):
"""AC9/AC10: durable audit trail, and a renewed lock that actually works."""
def test_record_captures_prior_and_replacement_state(self):
assessment = assess()
record = issue_lock_renewal.build_renewal_record(
assessment,
renewed_at="2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
new_expires_at="2026-01-01T04:00:00Z",
)
self.assertTrue(record["renewed"])
self.assertEqual(record["prior_pid"], os.getpid())
self.assertEqual(record["new_expires_at"], "2026-01-01T04:00:00Z")
self.assertEqual(record["renewed_at"], "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z")
self.assertEqual(record["identity"], IDENTITY)
self.assertEqual(record["profile"], PROFILE)
self.assertTrue(record["prior_expires_at"])
self.assertTrue(record["proof"])
def test_renewed_lock_satisfies_verify_lock_for_mutation(self):
renewed = make_lock(expires_at=future_ts())
renewed["session_pid"] = os.getpid()
renewed["lease_renewal"] = {"renewed": True}
verdict = issue_lock_store.verify_lock_for_mutation(
renewed,
issue_number=ISSUE,
branch_name=BRANCH,
)
self.assertTrue(verdict["proven"])
self.assertFalse(verdict["block"])
def test_refusal_message_names_the_missing_evidence(self):
assessment = assess(porcelain_status=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n")
message = issue_lock_renewal.format_renewal_refusal(assessment)
self.assertIn("refused", message)
self.assertIn("uncommitted", message)
class NoCallerControlledRenewalFlag(unittest.TestCase):
"""AC14: renewal eligibility is never declarable by a caller."""
def test_lock_issue_tool_exposes_no_renewal_parameter(self):
import gitea_mcp_server
target = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_lock_issue
target = getattr(target, "fn", getattr(target, "__wrapped__", target))
params = set(inspect.signature(target).parameters)
for forbidden in ("renewal_sanctioned", "renew", "allow_renewal", "is_owner"):
self.assertNotIn(forbidden, params)
def test_store_defaults_to_no_waiver(self):
params = inspect.signature(
issue_lock_store.assess_same_issue_lease_conflict
).parameters
self.assertIs(params["renewal_sanctioned"].default, False)
bind_params = inspect.signature(issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock).parameters
self.assertIs(bind_params["renewal_sanctioned"].default, False)
class NoIssueNumberSpecialCasing(unittest.TestCase):
"""AC17: no repository issue or PR number is special-cased."""
def test_module_contains_no_hardcoded_issue_special_cases(self):
source = inspect.getsource(issue_lock_renewal)
code = "\n".join(
line for line in source.splitlines() if not line.strip().startswith("#")
)
for literal in ("757", "759", "760"):
self.assertNotIn(f"== {literal}", code)
self.assertNotIn(f"issue_number == {literal}", code)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+342
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,342 @@
"""MCP-level exact-owner lease renewal through ``gitea_lock_issue`` (#760).
The unit suite in ``test_issue_760_exact_owner_lease_renewal`` proves the
renewal *disposition*. It cannot prove the disposition survives the rest of the
tool, and it did not: the waiver was computed and then discarded before
``assess_issue_lock_worktree``, so every real renewal still failed on
base-equivalence. A branch being renewed always carries committed work, so it is
never base-equivalent by construction — exactly the argument #753 already makes
for recovery.
These tests drive the public tool end to end against a real git repository and a
real durable lock file, composing every gate in the production order.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from unittest.mock import patch
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env # noqa: E402
import issue_lock_provenance # noqa: E402
import issue_lock_store # noqa: E402
import mcp_server # noqa: E402
ISSUE = 9760
BRANCH = f"fix/issue-{ISSUE}-renewal-mcp"
IDENTITY = "example-user"
PROFILE = "test-author-prgs"
ORG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
REPO = "Gitea-Tools"
def _past_ts(hours: int = 1) -> str:
return (
(datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=hours))
.isoformat()
.replace("+00:00", "Z")
)
class _RenewalMcpBase(unittest.TestCase):
"""Real git repo + durable expired lock owned by a live PID.
The recorded PID is ``os.getpid()`` — unambiguously alive. That is the whole
point of #760: the PID belongs to the long-lived MCP daemon, so its liveness
says nothing about whether the authoring task still holds the work.
"""
def setUp(self):
self.lock_dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.addCleanup(self.lock_dir.cleanup)
self.repo = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="issue760-mcp-")
self.addCleanup(lambda: subprocess.run(["rm", "-rf", self.repo], check=False))
self._init_worktree()
self.remotes = patch.dict(
mcp_server.REMOTES,
{"prgs": {"host": "gitea.prgs.cc", "org": ORG, "repo": REPO}},
)
self.remotes.start()
self.addCleanup(patch.stopall)
mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
def _git(self, *args):
return subprocess.run(
["git", "-C", self.repo, *args],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
check=True,
)
def _init_worktree(self):
self._git("init", "-q", "-b", "master")
self._git("config", "user.email", "[email protected]")
self._git("config", "user.name", "Test")
with open(os.path.join(self.repo, "seed.txt"), "w") as fh:
fh.write("seed\n")
self._git("add", "seed.txt")
self._git("commit", "-q", "-m", "seed")
self.base_sha = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD").stdout.strip()
# The branch carries committed work, so it is NOT base-equivalent.
self._git("checkout", "-q", "-b", BRANCH)
with open(os.path.join(self.repo, "work.txt"), "w") as fh:
fh.write("author work\n")
self._git("add", "work.txt")
self._git("commit", "-q", "-m", "author work")
self.head_sha = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD").stdout.strip()
self.worktree = os.path.realpath(self.repo)
def write_expired_lock(self, **overrides):
path = issue_lock_store.lock_file_path(
remote="prgs",
org=ORG,
repo=REPO,
issue_number=ISSUE,
lock_dir=self.lock_dir.name,
)
claimant = {"username": IDENTITY, "profile": PROFILE}
pid = overrides.pop("session_pid", os.getpid())
overrides.pop("pid", None)
lease_overrides = overrides.pop("work_lease", {})
data = {
"issue_number": ISSUE,
"branch_name": BRANCH,
"remote": "prgs",
"org": ORG,
"repo": REPO,
"worktree_path": self.worktree,
"session_pid": pid,
"pid": pid,
"lock_generation": 3,
"work_lease": {
"operation_type": issue_lock_store.AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE,
"issue_number": ISSUE,
"pr_number": None,
"branch": BRANCH,
"worktree_path": self.worktree,
"claimant": claimant,
"created_at": _past_ts(5),
"last_heartbeat_at": _past_ts(5),
"expires_at": _past_ts(), # already expired
},
"lock_provenance": issue_lock_provenance.build_sanctioned_lock_provenance(
tool="gitea_lock_issue",
claimant=claimant,
),
}
data["work_lease"].update(lease_overrides)
data.update(overrides)
data["session_pid"] = pid
data["pid"] = pid
data["lock_file_path"] = path
issue_lock_store.save_lock_file(path, data)
return path
def _tool_env(self):
env = shared_mutation_env(
PROFILE,
include_example_repo=True,
GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR=self.lock_dir.name,
)
env["GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR"] = self.lock_dir.name
return env
def _git_state(self, *, porcelain="", branch=BRANCH, head=None):
return {
"current_branch": branch,
"porcelain_status": porcelain,
# The decisive fact: a branch carrying work is never base-equivalent.
"base_equivalent": False,
"head_sha": head or self.head_sha,
"inspected_git_root": self.worktree,
"base_branch": "master",
}
def run_lock_issue(
self,
*,
branch_entries=None,
open_prs=None,
git_state=None,
identity=IDENTITY,
profile=PROFILE,
):
"""Drive the public tool for the published exact-owner renewal shape."""
if branch_entries is None:
branch_entries = [{"name": BRANCH, "commit": {"id": self.head_sha}}]
if open_prs is None:
open_prs = [{"number": 4242, "head": {"ref": BRANCH, "sha": self.head_sha}}]
if git_state is None:
git_state = self._git_state()
env = self._tool_env()
with patch(
"mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=list(branch_entries)
), patch(
"mcp_server._list_open_pulls", return_value=list(open_prs)
), patch(
"mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token x"
), patch(
"mcp_server._work_lease_claimant",
return_value={"username": identity, "profile": profile},
), patch(
"mcp_server.issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state",
return_value=git_state,
), patch(
"mcp_server.issue_duplicate_context_fetcher",
side_effect=lambda h, o, r, auth, issue_number: (
list(open_prs),
[b.get("name") for b in branch_entries if isinstance(b, dict)],
{"status": "not_claimed"},
),
), patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
os.environ["GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR"] = self.lock_dir.name
return mcp_server.gitea_lock_issue(
issue_number=ISSUE,
branch_name=BRANCH,
remote="prgs",
worktree_path=self.worktree,
)
class TestRenewalReachableThroughTool(_RenewalMcpBase):
"""F1: the sanctioned renewal must survive every downstream gate."""
def test_expired_lease_live_pid_exact_owner_renews_through_the_tool(self):
prior = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(self.write_expired_lock())
self.assertTrue(issue_lock_store.is_lease_expired(prior))
self.assertTrue(issue_lock_store.is_process_alive(prior["session_pid"]))
result = self.run_lock_issue()
self.assertTrue(result["success"], result)
self.assertEqual(result["issue_number"], ISSUE)
self.assertEqual(result["branch_name"], BRANCH)
# The renewal is reported natively, so no lock-file inspection is needed.
self.assertIn("lease_renewal", result)
self.assertTrue(result["lease_renewal"]["renewed"])
self.assertIn("Renewed the expired", result["message"])
def test_renewed_lock_records_prior_and_replacement_evidence(self):
prior = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(self.write_expired_lock())
prior_expiry = prior["work_lease"]["expires_at"]
prior_generation = issue_lock_store.lock_generation(prior)
result = self.run_lock_issue()
written = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(result["lock_file_path"])
renewal = written["lease_renewal"]
self.assertTrue(renewal["renewed"])
self.assertEqual(renewal["prior_pid"], prior["session_pid"])
self.assertTrue(renewal["prior_pid_alive"])
self.assertEqual(renewal["prior_expires_at"], prior_expiry)
self.assertEqual(renewal["identity"], IDENTITY)
self.assertEqual(renewal["profile"], PROFILE)
self.assertEqual(renewal["head_sha"], self.head_sha)
self.assertTrue(renewal["proof"])
# New expiry is a fresh absolute stamp, later than the one it replaced.
self.assertEqual(renewal["new_expires_at"], written["work_lease"]["expires_at"])
self.assertGreater(renewal["new_expires_at"], prior_expiry)
# Compare-and-swap advanced the generation exactly once.
self.assertEqual(
issue_lock_store.lock_generation(written), prior_generation + 1
)
def test_renewed_lock_is_live_and_satisfies_mutation_ownership(self):
self.write_expired_lock()
result = self.run_lock_issue()
written = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(result["lock_file_path"])
self.assertTrue(issue_lock_store.assess_lock_freshness(written)["live"])
verdict = issue_lock_store.verify_lock_for_mutation(
written,
issue_number=ISSUE,
branch_name=BRANCH,
worktree_path=self.worktree,
)
self.assertTrue(verdict["proven"], verdict)
self.assertFalse(verdict["block"])
def test_recovery_record_is_not_written_for_a_live_owner_renewal(self):
"""#753 recovery must not be claimed when the recorded PID is alive."""
self.write_expired_lock()
result = self.run_lock_issue()
written = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(result["lock_file_path"])
self.assertNotIn("dead_session_recovery", written)
class TestRenewalWaiverIsNarrow(_RenewalMcpBase):
"""The waiver relaxes base-equivalence and nothing else."""
def test_dirty_worktree_still_blocks_a_would_be_renewal(self):
"""Cleanliness is never waived; the renewal assessor refuses first.
A dirty worktree makes the renewal refuse, so no waiver is issued and
the lease-conflict gate fails closed ahead of the worktree gate. The
refusal names the uncommitted files, so the owner still learns why.
"""
self.write_expired_lock()
with self.assertRaises(Exception) as ctx:
self.run_lock_issue(
git_state=self._git_state(porcelain=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n")
)
message = str(ctx.exception)
self.assertIn("Recovery review is required before takeover", message)
self.assertIn("worktree has uncommitted tracked changes", message)
self.assertIn("gitea_mcp_server.py", message)
def test_foreign_claimant_cannot_use_the_waiver(self):
"""A near-match owner gets no renewal and no base-equivalence waiver."""
self.write_expired_lock()
with self.assertRaises(Exception) as ctx:
self.run_lock_issue(identity="someone-else")
message = str(ctx.exception)
self.assertIn("Recovery review is required before takeover", message)
# The refusal names the missing ownership evidence (#760 diagnostics).
self.assertIn("does not match active identity", message)
def test_foreign_profile_cannot_use_the_waiver(self):
self.write_expired_lock()
with self.assertRaises(Exception) as ctx:
self.run_lock_issue(profile="other-author")
self.assertIn(
"Recovery review is required before takeover", str(ctx.exception)
)
def test_unpublished_branch_cannot_use_the_waiver(self):
"""No remote head to agree with, so exact-owner renewal is refused."""
self.write_expired_lock()
with self.assertRaises(Exception) as ctx:
self.run_lock_issue(branch_entries=[], open_prs=[])
self.assertIn(
"Recovery review is required before takeover", str(ctx.exception)
)
def test_pr_head_mismatch_cannot_use_the_waiver(self):
self.write_expired_lock()
other = "9" * 40
with self.assertRaises(Exception) as ctx:
self.run_lock_issue(
open_prs=[{"number": 4242, "head": {"ref": BRANCH, "sha": other}}]
)
self.assertIn(
"Recovery review is required before takeover", str(ctx.exception)
)
def test_non_base_equivalent_branch_still_blocks_without_any_waiver(self):
"""No durable lock at all: the ordinary base-equivalence rule applies."""
with self.assertRaises(Exception) as ctx:
self.run_lock_issue()
self.assertIn("must be base-equivalent", str(ctx.exception))
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -871,9 +871,13 @@ class TestAc6McpUnpublishedClaimRecovery(_UnpublishedMcpBase):
save_calls: list[dict] = []
real_save = mcp_server._save_issue_lock
def tracking_save(data, *, expected_generation=None):
def tracking_save(data, *, expected_generation=None, renewal_sanctioned=False):
save_calls.append({"expected_generation": expected_generation, "data": dict(data)})
return real_save(data, expected_generation=expected_generation)
return real_save(
data,
expected_generation=expected_generation,
renewal_sanctioned=renewal_sanctioned,
)
with patch("mcp_server._save_issue_lock", side_effect=tracking_save):
result = self.run_lock_issue()
@@ -926,18 +930,33 @@ class TestAc6McpUnpublishedClaimRecovery(_UnpublishedMcpBase):
real_bind = issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock
bind_calls: list[int | None] = []
def racing_bind(data, lock_dir=None, expected_generation=None):
# #760 added the renewal waiver keyword; the double forwards it verbatim
# so this race still exercises the real compare-and-swap.
def racing_bind(
data, lock_dir=None, expected_generation=None, renewal_sanctioned=False
):
bind_calls.append(expected_generation)
if expected_generation is None:
return real_bind(data, lock_dir=lock_dir, expected_generation=None)
return real_bind(
data,
lock_dir=lock_dir,
expected_generation=None,
renewal_sanctioned=renewal_sanctioned,
)
# First concurrent writer wins.
if len([c for c in bind_calls if c is not None]) == 1:
return real_bind(
data, lock_dir=lock_dir, expected_generation=expected_generation
data,
lock_dir=lock_dir,
expected_generation=expected_generation,
renewal_sanctioned=renewal_sanctioned,
)
# Second concurrent writer still holds the pre-race generation.
return real_bind(
data, lock_dir=lock_dir, expected_generation=expected_generation
data,
lock_dir=lock_dir,
expected_generation=expected_generation,
renewal_sanctioned=renewal_sanctioned,
)
# First recovery succeeds and advances generation.
+269
View File
@@ -78,6 +78,95 @@ class TestBlockReasonsAndReport(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertTrue(report["recovery"])
class TestLiveRemoteParity(unittest.TestCase):
"""#610: parity must account for the live remote master, not just local.
The daemon can be stale relative to the live remote target while the local
checkout HEAD still matches the daemon's startup commit, so local parity
reports green even though a mutation would run against outdated code.
"""
SHA_C = "c" * 40
def test_distinguishes_three_shas(self):
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=SHA_B)
self.assertEqual(res["daemon_start_head"], SHA_A)
self.assertEqual(res["local_head"], SHA_A)
self.assertEqual(res["live_remote_head"], SHA_B)
def test_mutation_safe_only_when_all_three_match(self):
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=SHA_A)
self.assertTrue(res["mutation_safe"])
self.assertTrue(res["live_known"])
self.assertFalse(res["live_stale"])
def test_live_stale_when_remote_advanced_past_daemon(self):
# Local checkout still matches the daemon start (local parity green),
# but the live remote master has advanced -> daemon is live-stale.
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=SHA_B)
self.assertTrue(res["in_parity"]) # local parity still green
self.assertTrue(res["live_stale"])
self.assertFalse(res["mutation_safe"])
self.assertTrue(any("live" in r.lower() for r in res["reasons"]))
def test_live_unknown_is_not_mutation_safe_but_not_stale(self):
# Non-goal: unfetchable live remote must not be treated as stale for
# read-only, but a mutation-safe claim fails closed.
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=None)
self.assertFalse(res["live_known"])
self.assertFalse(res["mutation_safe"])
self.assertFalse(res["live_stale"])
self.assertTrue(res["in_parity"])
def test_default_live_remote_preserves_legacy_shape(self):
# Callers that do not supply a live head keep the pre-#610 behavior:
# in-parity, not live-stale, no live-derived block.
res = mp.assess_master_parity({"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A)
self.assertFalse(res["live_stale"])
self.assertEqual(mp.parity_block_reasons(res), [])
class TestLiveStaleBlockAndReport(unittest.TestCase):
"""#610: live-staleness must block mutations and surface a typed blocker."""
def test_live_stale_produces_block_reasons(self):
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=SHA_B)
self.assertTrue(mp.parity_block_reasons(res))
def test_disable_env_suppresses_live_stale_block(self):
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=SHA_B)
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_DISABLE: "1"}):
self.assertEqual(mp.parity_block_reasons(res), [])
def test_resolver_disagreement_returns_typed_blocker(self):
# Parity says local-green, resolver says restart required -> disagreement
# is a typed, fail-closed blocker naming the resolver as authoritative.
res = mp.assess_master_parity({"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A)
blocker = mp.parity_resolver_disagreement(res, resolver_restart_required=True)
self.assertIsNotNone(blocker)
self.assertEqual(blocker["kind"], "parity_resolver_disagreement")
self.assertTrue(blocker["restart_required"])
self.assertTrue(blocker["resolver_authoritative"])
def test_no_disagreement_when_resolver_agrees(self):
res = mp.assess_master_parity({"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A)
self.assertIsNone(
mp.parity_resolver_disagreement(res, resolver_restart_required=False))
def test_live_stale_report_names_live_remote(self):
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=SHA_B)
report = mp.parity_report(res)
self.assertEqual(report["live_remote_head"], SHA_B)
self.assertTrue(report["restart_required"])
class TestReadGitHead(unittest.TestCase):
def test_test_override_takes_precedence(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD: SHA_B}):
@@ -95,6 +184,149 @@ class TestReadGitHead(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIsNone(mp.read_git_head(""))
class TestReadRemoteMasterHead(unittest.TestCase):
"""#610: live remote master head reader (env-overridable, fails to None)."""
def test_test_override_takes_precedence(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_B}):
self.assertEqual(mp.read_remote_master_head("/nonexistent"), SHA_B)
def test_blank_override_is_none(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: " "}):
self.assertIsNone(mp.read_remote_master_head("/nonexistent"))
def test_unfetchable_remote_is_none(self):
# No override; a bogus root/remote must fail closed to None, never raise.
env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items()
if k != mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD}
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
self.assertIsNone(
mp.read_remote_master_head("/nonexistent", remote="nope"))
class TestRemoteHeadCache(unittest.TestCase):
"""#610: live remote reads are cached with a TTL to stay off the network.
The parity gate runs on every mutation and every runtime-context read, so an
unbounded ``git ls-remote`` per call would be a latency/flakiness regression.
"""
def setUp(self):
# These cases intentionally exercise the subprocess/cache path, so they
# opt out of suite-wide hermetic mode (PR #788 F1).
self._saved_hermetic = mp.hermetic_test_mode()
mp.set_hermetic_test_mode(False)
mp._clear_remote_head_cache()
env = {
k: v for k, v in os.environ.items()
if k not in (mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD,
mp.ENV_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE,
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST")
}
# Allow the probe path under hermetic defenses while still mocking
# subprocess so no real network call runs.
env[mp.ENV_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE] = "1"
self._env = patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True)
self._env.start()
self.addCleanup(self._env.stop)
self.addCleanup(mp._clear_remote_head_cache)
self.addCleanup(
lambda: mp.set_hermetic_test_mode(self._saved_hermetic)
)
def _fake_run(self, sha):
class _R:
returncode = 0
stdout = f"{sha}\trefs/heads/master\n"
calls = {"n": 0}
def run(*args, **kwargs):
calls["n"] += 1
return _R()
return run, calls
def test_second_call_within_ttl_uses_cache(self):
run, calls = self._fake_run(SHA_B)
with patch.object(mp.subprocess, "run", run):
a = mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo", remote="prgs", ttl=100)
b = mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo", remote="prgs", ttl=100)
self.assertEqual(a, SHA_B)
self.assertEqual(b, SHA_B)
self.assertEqual(calls["n"], 1)
def test_zero_ttl_bypasses_cache(self):
run, calls = self._fake_run(SHA_B)
with patch.object(mp.subprocess, "run", run):
mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo", remote="prgs", ttl=0)
mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo", remote="prgs", ttl=0)
self.assertEqual(calls["n"], 2)
def test_env_override_never_touches_subprocess(self):
run, calls = self._fake_run(SHA_B)
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_A}):
with patch.object(mp.subprocess, "run", run):
self.assertEqual(
mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo", remote="prgs"), SHA_A)
self.assertEqual(calls["n"], 0)
class TestHermeticLiveRemoteReads(unittest.TestCase):
"""#610 / PR #788 F1/F2: suite hermetic mode never hits the network."""
def setUp(self):
self._saved = mp.hermetic_test_mode()
mp.set_hermetic_test_mode(True)
mp._clear_remote_head_cache()
self.addCleanup(lambda: mp.set_hermetic_test_mode(self._saved))
self.addCleanup(mp._clear_remote_head_cache)
def test_hermetic_mode_returns_none_without_subprocess(self):
run_calls = {"n": 0}
def boom(*args, **kwargs):
run_calls["n"] += 1
raise AssertionError("ls-remote must not run under hermetic mode")
env = {
k: v for k, v in os.environ.items()
if k not in (mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD,
mp.ENV_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE)
}
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
with patch.object(mp.subprocess, "run", boom):
self.assertIsNone(
mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo", remote="prgs")
)
self.assertEqual(run_calls["n"], 0)
def test_hermetic_mode_survives_clear_true_env(self):
"""Module flag, not env pin: clear=True cannot re-enable the probe."""
run_calls = {"n": 0}
def boom(*args, **kwargs):
run_calls["n"] += 1
raise AssertionError("ls-remote must not run after clear=True")
with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
with patch.object(mp.subprocess, "run", boom):
self.assertIsNone(mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo"))
self.assertEqual(run_calls["n"], 0)
def test_explicit_override_still_wins_under_hermetic(self):
run_calls = {"n": 0}
def boom(*args, **kwargs):
run_calls["n"] += 1
raise AssertionError("override must bypass subprocess")
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_B}):
with patch.object(mp.subprocess, "run", boom):
self.assertEqual(
mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo"), SHA_B
)
self.assertEqual(run_calls["n"], 0)
class TestServerWiring(unittest.TestCase):
"""Integration with the gate choke point in the server namespace."""
@@ -105,6 +337,13 @@ class TestServerWiring(unittest.TestCase):
self._saved = self.srv._STARTUP_PARITY
self.srv._STARTUP_PARITY = {"root": self.srv.PROJECT_ROOT,
"startup_head": SHA_A}
# Keep the live-remote read hermetic (no real ls-remote network call):
# default the live master to the daemon start so parity is fully green
# unless a test overrides the live head explicitly (#610).
self._live_patch = patch.dict(
os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_A})
self._live_patch.start()
self.addCleanup(self._live_patch.stop)
def tearDown(self):
self.srv._STARTUP_PARITY = self._saved
@@ -147,6 +386,36 @@ class TestServerWiring(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertTrue(out["in_parity"])
self.assertNotIn("report", out)
# --- #610: live-remote wiring -------------------------------------------
def test_live_stale_blocks_mutation_though_local_green(self):
# Local checkout matches the daemon start (local parity green) but the
# live remote master has advanced -> mutations must fail closed.
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD: SHA_A,
mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_B}):
self.assertEqual(self.srv._master_parity_block("gitea.read"), [])
self.assertTrue(
self.srv._master_parity_block("gitea.pr.create"))
def test_assess_tool_exposes_three_distinct_shas(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD: SHA_A,
mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_B}):
out = self.srv.gitea_assess_master_parity(remote="prgs")
self.assertEqual(out["daemon_start_head"], SHA_A)
self.assertEqual(out["local_head"], SHA_A)
self.assertEqual(out["live_remote_head"], SHA_B)
self.assertTrue(out["live_stale"])
self.assertFalse(out["mutation_safe"])
self.assertIn("report", out)
def test_assess_tool_mutation_safe_when_all_three_match(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD: SHA_A,
mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_A}):
out = self.srv.gitea_assess_master_parity(remote="prgs")
self.assertTrue(out["mutation_safe"])
self.assertFalse(out["live_stale"])
self.assertNotIn("report", out)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+149
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
"""Documentation acceptance for the web console architecture ADR (#632 / epic #631).
Enforces the acceptance criteria of issue #632:
* AC1 — the ADR exists and covers layers, authority, phases, API versioning,
and a page map.
* AC2 — every #631 child (#632#651) maps to at least one architectural
component.
* AC3 — the closed MVP (#425#436) is stated as foundation, not recreated.
* AC4 — forbidden paths are explicit: raw provider incidents as work,
browser-held tokens, process-kill recovery.
* AC5 — a controller can approve the document without reading chat history.
Plus the linkage requirement: ``docs/webui-local-dev.md`` cross-links the ADR.
"""
from pathlib import Path
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
ADR = (
REPO_ROOT
/ "docs"
/ "architecture"
/ "webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md"
)
ADR_BASENAME = "webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md"
LOCAL_DEV = REPO_ROOT / "docs" / "webui-local-dev.md"
# Epic #631 children, phases 1-4 (twenty capability areas).
EPIC_CHILDREN = tuple(f"#{number}" for number in range(632, 652))
def _read(path: Path) -> str:
assert path.is_file(), f"missing {path.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)}"
return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
def test_ac1_adr_exists_with_required_sections():
text = _read(ADR)
lower = text.lower()
assert text.lstrip().startswith("#"), "ADR lacks a title"
assert "#631" in text and "#632" in text
for heading in (
"## 2. Decision summary",
"## 4. Authority boundaries",
"## 5. Request flow and the redaction boundary",
"## 6. API naming and versioning",
"## 7. Page map",
"## 8. Component ownership",
"## 9. Phase gates",
"## 11. Forbidden paths",
):
assert heading in text, f"ADR must contain section {heading!r}"
assert "browser ui" in lower and "domain loader" in lower
assert "control-plane db" in lower and "capability gate" in lower
def test_ac1_api_versioning_is_decided_including_legacy_routes():
text = _read(ADR)
assert "/api/v1/" in text, "ADR must decide the versioned API prefix"
assert "/api/v2/" in text, "ADR must state how breaking changes are handled"
lower = text.lower()
assert "compatibility alias" in lower, (
"ADR must say what happens to the existing unversioned MVP exports"
)
def test_ac1_page_map_covers_mvp_routes():
text = _read(ADR)
for route in ("`/`", "`/health`", "`/projects`", "`/prompts`", "`/runtime`",
"`/audit`", "`/actions`"):
assert route in text, f"page map must account for MVP route {route}"
def test_ac2_every_epic_child_maps_to_a_component():
text = _read(ADR)
ownership = text.split("## 8. Component ownership", 1)[-1].split("## 9.", 1)[0]
missing = [child for child in EPIC_CHILDREN if child not in ownership]
assert not missing, (
f"epic #631 children without an architectural component: {missing}"
)
def test_ac2_every_child_row_declares_a_phase():
text = _read(ADR)
ownership = text.split("## 8. Component ownership", 1)[-1].split("## 9.", 1)[0]
for child in EPIC_CHILDREN:
row = next(
(line for line in ownership.splitlines() if line.startswith(f"| {child} ")),
None,
)
assert row is not None, f"no ownership row for {child}"
assert row.rstrip().endswith(("| 1 |", "| 2 |", "| 3 |", "| 4 |")), (
f"ownership row for {child} must end with its phase: {row!r}"
)
def test_ac3_mvp_is_foundation_not_recreated():
text = _read(ADR)
assert "#425" in text and "#436" in text
lower = text.lower()
assert "do not recreate" in lower or "recreating mvp scope" in lower
assert "retained and evolved" in lower
def test_ac4_forbidden_paths_are_explicit():
text = _read(ADR)
forbidden = text.split("## 11. Forbidden paths", 1)[-1].split("## 12.", 1)[0]
lower = forbidden.lower()
assert "raw provider incidents" in lower and "#612" in forbidden
assert "browser-held tokens" in lower
assert "process-kill recovery" in lower and "#630" in forbidden
assert "ungated browser mutations" in lower
def test_ac5_approval_checklist_is_self_contained():
text = _read(ADR)
assert "## 12. Approval checklist" in text
checklist = text.split("## 12. Approval checklist", 1)[-1].split("## 13.", 1)[0]
for marker in ("1.", "2.", "3.", "4.", "5.", "6."):
assert marker in checklist, f"approval checklist missing item {marker}"
def test_adr_states_the_two_boundary_invariants():
text = _read(ADR)
lower = text.lower()
assert "no secrets to the browser" in lower
assert "no ungated mutations" in lower
def test_open_questions_are_recorded_not_implied():
text = _read(ADR)
assert "## 13. Open questions and follow-ups" in text
section = text.split("## 13. Open questions and follow-ups", 1)[-1]
assert "#633" in section, "deferred authorization work must name its issue"
def test_local_dev_doc_cross_links_the_adr():
text = _read(LOCAL_DEV)
assert ADR_BASENAME in text, (
"docs/webui-local-dev.md must cross-link the console architecture ADR "
"(issue #632 scope)"
)
def test_docs_do_not_embed_secrets():
for path in (ADR, LOCAL_DEV):
text = _read(path)
for marker in ("ghp_", "BEGIN PRIVATE KEY", "Authorization: Bearer"):
assert marker not in text, f"{path.name} contains {marker!r}"
+336 -31
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
"""Tests for web UI project registry (#427)."""
"""Tests for web UI project registry (#427) and its API evolution (#635)."""
import json
import sys
import tempfile
@@ -11,57 +11,246 @@ from starlette.testclient import TestClient
from webui.app import create_app
from webui.project_registry import (
CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION,
REGISTRY_API_VERSION,
SUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSIONS,
RegistryError,
default_registry_path,
load_registry,
onboarding_summary,
project_to_dict,
)
from webui.registry_safety import is_forbidden_key
_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
_API_DOC = _REPO_ROOT / "docs" / "webui-project-registry-api.md"
class TestProjectRegistryLoader(unittest.TestCase):
def _valid_project(**overrides):
project = {
"id": "example",
"repo_name": "Example",
"gitea_owner": "Org",
"remote_host": "https://gitea.example.invalid",
"default_branch": "main",
"local_checkout_path": ".",
"profiles": {"author": "a", "reviewer": "r", "reconciler": "c"},
"workflow_paths": {"skill": "skills/x.md"},
}
project.update(overrides)
return project
def _write_registry(payload) -> Path:
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", suffix=".json", delete=False) as handle:
json.dump(payload, handle)
return Path(handle.name)
class RegistryFileCase(unittest.TestCase):
"""Base class that cleans up temporary registry files."""
def setUp(self):
self._temp_paths: list[Path] = []
def tearDown(self):
for path in self._temp_paths:
path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
def write_registry(self, payload) -> Path:
path = _write_registry(payload)
self._temp_paths.append(path)
return path
class TestProjectRegistryLoader(RegistryFileCase):
def test_default_registry_loads_gitea_tools(self):
registry = load_registry()
self.assertEqual(registry.version, 1)
self.assertEqual(registry.version, CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION)
self.assertEqual(registry.schema_version, CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION)
self.assertEqual(registry.api_version, REGISTRY_API_VERSION)
self.assertEqual(len(registry.projects), 1)
project = registry.projects[0]
self.assertEqual(project.id, "gitea-tools")
self.assertEqual(project.repo_name, "Gitea-Tools")
self.assertEqual(project.gitea_owner, "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
self.assertEqual(project.repo_full_name, "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools")
self.assertEqual(project.remote_host, "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
self.assertEqual(project.remote_name, "prgs")
self.assertEqual(project.status, "active")
self.assertEqual(project.profiles["author"], "prgs-author")
self.assertEqual(project.profiles["reviewer"], "prgs-reviewer")
self.assertEqual(project.profiles["reconciler"], "prgs-reconciler")
self.assertIn("skill", project.workflow_paths)
self.assertGreaterEqual(len(project.onboarding_checklist), 4)
def test_registry_rejects_credential_keys(self):
payload = {
def test_default_registry_onboarding_summary_is_complete(self):
summary = onboarding_summary(load_registry().projects[0])
self.assertEqual(summary.total, summary.complete)
self.assertEqual(summary.required_outstanding, 0)
self.assertTrue(summary.onboarding_complete)
def test_version_1_registry_still_loads_with_defaults(self):
path = self.write_registry({
"version": 1,
"projects": [
{
"id": "bad",
"repo_name": "Bad",
"gitea_owner": "Org",
"remote_host": "https://gitea.example.invalid",
"default_branch": "main",
"local_checkout_path": ".",
"profiles": {
"author": "a",
"reviewer": "r",
"reconciler": "c",
},
"workflow_paths": {"skill": "skills/x.md"},
"api_token": "secret",
}
_valid_project(
onboarding_checklist=[
{"id": "step", "title": "Step", "description": "Do it"}
]
)
],
}
})
registry = load_registry(path)
self.assertEqual(registry.schema_version, 1)
self.assertIn(1, SUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSIONS)
project = registry.projects[0]
self.assertEqual(project.status, "active")
self.assertIsNone(project.remote_name)
self.assertIsNone(project.last_seen_health)
step = project.onboarding_checklist[0]
self.assertEqual(step.state, "pending")
self.assertTrue(step.required)
self.assertFalse(onboarding_summary(project).onboarding_complete)
def test_onboarding_summary_counts_states(self):
path = self.write_registry({
"version": 2,
"projects": [
_valid_project(
onboarding_checklist=[
{"id": "a", "title": "A", "description": "d", "state": "complete"},
{"id": "b", "title": "B", "description": "d", "state": "blocked"},
{
"id": "c",
"title": "C",
"description": "d",
"state": "pending",
"required": False,
},
{
"id": "d",
"title": "D",
"description": "d",
"state": "not_applicable",
},
]
)
],
})
summary = onboarding_summary(load_registry(path).projects[0])
self.assertEqual(summary.total, 4)
self.assertEqual(summary.complete, 1)
self.assertEqual(summary.blocked, 1)
self.assertEqual(summary.pending, 1)
self.assertEqual(summary.not_applicable, 1)
# Only the blocked step is both required and outstanding.
self.assertEqual(summary.required_outstanding, 1)
self.assertFalse(summary.onboarding_complete)
def test_last_seen_health_is_parsed_when_present(self):
path = self.write_registry({
"version": 2,
"projects": [
_valid_project(
last_seen_health={
"status": "degraded",
"checked_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"detail": "daemon restart pending",
}
)
],
})
health = load_registry(path).projects[0].last_seen_health
self.assertIsNotNone(health)
self.assertEqual(health.status, "degraded")
self.assertEqual(health.checked_at, "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z")
def test_registry_rejects_credential_keys(self):
path = self.write_registry({
"version": 1,
"projects": [_valid_project(id="bad", api_token="redacted-placeholder")],
})
with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
load_registry(path)
self.assertIn("credential", ctx.exception.remediation.lower())
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.field_path, "projects[0].api_token")
def test_unsupported_version_fails_closed_with_remediation(self):
path = self.write_registry({"version": 99, "projects": [_valid_project()]})
with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
load_registry(path)
self.assertIn("unsupported registry version", ctx.exception.message)
self.assertIn(str(CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION), ctx.exception.remediation)
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.field_path, "version")
def test_missing_required_field_fails_closed(self):
broken = _valid_project()
del broken["default_branch"]
path = self.write_registry({"version": 2, "projects": [broken]})
with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
load_registry(path)
self.assertIn("default_branch", ctx.exception.message)
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.field_path, "projects[0]")
def test_unknown_status_fails_closed(self):
path = self.write_registry({
"version": 2,
"projects": [_valid_project(status="mystery")],
})
with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
load_registry(path)
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.field_path, "projects[0].status")
self.assertIn("active", ctx.exception.remediation)
def test_unknown_onboarding_state_fails_closed(self):
path = self.write_registry({
"version": 2,
"projects": [
_valid_project(
onboarding_checklist=[
{"id": "a", "title": "A", "description": "d", "state": "almost"}
]
)
],
})
with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
load_registry(path)
self.assertEqual(
ctx.exception.field_path,
"projects[0].onboarding_checklist[0].state",
)
def test_missing_profile_role_fails_closed(self):
path = self.write_registry({
"version": 2,
"projects": [_valid_project(profiles={"author": "a", "reviewer": "r"})],
})
with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
load_registry(path)
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.field_path, "projects[0].profiles.reconciler")
def test_empty_projects_fails_closed(self):
path = self.write_registry({"version": 2, "projects": []})
with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
load_registry(path)
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.field_path, "projects")
def test_invalid_json_fails_closed_with_location(self):
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", suffix=".json", delete=False) as handle:
json.dump(payload, handle)
handle.write("{not json")
path = Path(handle.name)
try:
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
load_registry(path)
finally:
path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
self._temp_paths.append(path)
with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
load_registry(path)
self.assertIn("not valid JSON", ctx.exception.message)
self.assertIn("line", ctx.exception.remediation)
def test_missing_file_fails_closed(self):
missing = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "webui-registry-does-not-exist.json"
with self.assertRaises(RegistryError) as ctx:
load_registry(missing)
self.assertIn("could not be read", ctx.exception.message)
def test_default_registry_path_points_at_packaged_data(self):
path = default_registry_path()
@@ -81,31 +270,147 @@ class TestProjectRegistryRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn("prgs-author", response.text)
self.assertNotIn("child issue", response.text.lower())
def test_projects_page_shows_status_and_progress(self):
response = self.client.get("/projects")
self.assertIn("Status", response.text)
self.assertIn("Onboarding", response.text)
self.assertIn("4/4 complete", response.text)
def test_project_detail_renders_checklist(self):
response = self.client.get("/projects/gitea-tools")
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
self.assertIn("Onboarding checklist", response.text)
self.assertIn("Configure execution profiles", response.text)
self.assertIn("branches/", response.text)
self.assertIn("Complete", response.text)
self.assertIn("required outstanding 0", response.text)
def test_project_detail_404(self):
response = self.client.get("/projects/unknown-repo")
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)
def test_api_projects_json(self):
def test_api_projects_alias_stays_compatible(self):
response = self.client.get("/api/projects")
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
data = response.json()
self.assertEqual(data["version"], 1)
# #427 consumers keep these keys.
self.assertEqual(data["version"], CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION)
self.assertIn("source_path", data)
self.assertEqual(len(data["projects"]), 1)
self.assertEqual(data["projects"][0]["id"], "gitea-tools")
self.assertIn("onboarding_checklist", data["projects"][0])
def test_api_v1_projects_payload(self):
response = self.client.get("/api/v1/projects")
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
data = response.json()
self.assertEqual(data["api_version"], REGISTRY_API_VERSION)
self.assertEqual(data["schema_version"], CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION)
self.assertEqual(data["project_count"], 1)
self.assertEqual(data["source"]["kind"], "file")
self.assertTrue(data["source"]["inventory_complete"])
project = data["projects"][0]
self.assertEqual(project["status"], "active")
self.assertEqual(project["remote_name"], "prgs")
self.assertEqual(
project["repo_full_name"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
)
self.assertTrue(project["onboarding_summary"]["onboarding_complete"])
self.assertEqual(project["onboarding_checklist"][0]["state"], "complete")
self.assertIsNone(project["last_seen_health"])
def test_api_v1_project_detail(self):
response = self.client.get("/api/v1/projects/gitea-tools")
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
data = response.json()
self.assertEqual(data["api_version"], REGISTRY_API_VERSION)
self.assertEqual(data["project"]["id"], "gitea-tools")
self.assertEqual(data["source"]["kind"], "file")
def test_api_v1_project_detail_missing_fails_closed(self):
response = self.client.get("/api/v1/projects/not-registered")
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)
data = response.json()
self.assertEqual(data["error"], "project_not_found")
self.assertEqual(data["project_id"], "not-registered")
self.assertIn("gitea-tools", data["known_project_ids"])
self.assertIn("remediation", data)
def test_api_v1_projects_is_read_only(self):
response = self.client.post("/api/v1/projects", json={})
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "read-only-mvp")
def test_project_to_dict_is_json_safe(self):
registry = load_registry()
encoded = json.dumps(project_to_dict(registry.projects[0]))
dto = project_to_dict(registry.projects[0])
encoded = json.dumps(dto)
self.assertIn("gitea-tools", encoded)
# Prose may mention tokens; no serialized *key* may look like a secret.
for key in dto:
with self.subTest(key=key):
self.assertFalse(is_forbidden_key(key))
class TestInvalidRegistryFailsClosedOverHttp(RegistryFileCase):
def setUp(self):
super().setUp()
self.path = self.write_registry({"version": 42, "projects": []})
self.client = TestClient(create_app())
def _with_bad_registry(self, url: str):
import os
from unittest import mock
with mock.patch.dict(
os.environ, {"WEBUI_PROJECT_REGISTRY": str(self.path)}, clear=False
):
return self.client.get(url)
def test_api_v1_reports_actionable_error(self):
response = self._with_bad_registry("/api/v1/projects")
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 500)
data = response.json()
self.assertEqual(data["error"], "registry_invalid")
self.assertIn("unsupported registry version", data["detail"])
self.assertTrue(data["remediation"])
self.assertEqual(data["field_path"], "version")
def test_unversioned_alias_reports_actionable_error(self):
response = self._with_bad_registry("/api/projects")
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 500)
self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "registry_invalid")
def test_html_page_reports_actionable_error(self):
response = self._with_bad_registry("/projects")
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 500)
self.assertIn("Project registry unavailable", response.text)
self.assertIn("Remediation", response.text)
class TestProjectRegistryApiDocs(unittest.TestCase):
def test_api_contract_is_documented(self):
self.assertTrue(_API_DOC.is_file(), f"missing {_API_DOC}")
text = _API_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
for token in (
"/api/v1/projects",
"/api/v1/projects/{project_id}",
"/api/projects",
"onboarding_summary",
"last_seen_health",
"registry_invalid",
"#635",
):
with self.subTest(token=token):
self.assertIn(token, text)
def test_route_table_lists_versioned_routes(self):
local_dev = (_REPO_ROOT / "docs" / "webui-local-dev.md").read_text(
encoding="utf-8"
)
self.assertIn("/api/v1/projects", local_dev)
self.assertIn("webui-project-registry-api.md", local_dev)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
unittest.main()
+458
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,458 @@
"""Tests for the worker registry and configuration schema (#798, epic #797)."""
import json
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
from webui.worker_registry import (
ALLOWED_ROLES,
SCHEMA_VERSION,
RegistryValidationError,
WorkerRegistry,
default_registry_path,
find_provider,
find_worker,
history_dir,
list_revisions,
load_registry,
registry_to_dict,
registry_to_document,
rollback_to_revision,
save_registry,
validate_payload,
worker_to_dict,
workers_for_provider,
)
_EXPECTED_PROVIDER_IDS = ("claude", "grok", "codex", "agy", "kimi-k")
def _provider(provider_id: str = "claude", **overrides) -> dict:
payload = {
"id": provider_id,
"display_name": "Claude",
"vendor": "Anthropic",
"executable": "claude",
"available": True,
"models": ["claude-opus-4-8"],
"notes": "",
}
payload.update(overrides)
return payload
def _worker(worker_id: str = "claude-author", **overrides) -> dict:
payload = {
"id": worker_id,
"display_name": "Claude author",
"provider": "claude",
"model": "claude-opus-4-8",
"project": "gitea-tools",
"role": "author",
"namespace": "gitea-author",
"profile": "prgs-author",
"workflow": "skills/llm-project-workflow/workflows/work-issue.md",
"schedule": {"kind": "cron", "expression": "0 * * * *"},
"timeout_seconds": 3600,
"enabled": True,
"scheduler": {"kind": "launchd", "label": "cc.prgs.claude.author"},
"notes": "",
}
payload.update(overrides)
return payload
def _document(providers=None, workers=None, **overrides) -> dict:
payload = {
"version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
"revision": 1,
"updated_at": "2026-07-22T00:00:00Z",
"providers": providers if providers is not None else [_provider()],
"workers": workers if workers is not None else [_worker()],
}
payload.update(overrides)
return payload
class _TempRegistryCase(unittest.TestCase):
"""Base case giving each test an isolated registry file."""
def setUp(self):
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
self.path = Path(self._tmp.name) / "workers.registry.json"
def write(self, document: dict) -> Path:
self.path.write_text(json.dumps(document, indent=2) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
return self.path
def parse(self, document: dict) -> WorkerRegistry:
return validate_payload(document, source_path=self.path)
class TestPackagedRegistry(unittest.TestCase):
"""AC: the declarative registry is the source of truth and ships with the app."""
def test_default_path_points_at_packaged_data(self):
path = default_registry_path()
self.assertEqual(path.name, "workers.registry.json")
self.assertEqual(path.parent.name, "data")
def test_packaged_registry_loads_and_validates(self):
registry = load_registry()
self.assertEqual(registry.version, SCHEMA_VERSION)
self.assertGreaterEqual(registry.revision, 1)
def test_packaged_registry_declares_all_five_providers(self):
registry = load_registry()
self.assertEqual(
tuple(provider.id for provider in registry.providers),
_EXPECTED_PROVIDER_IDS,
)
def test_packaged_registry_carries_no_credentials(self):
raw = default_registry_path().read_text(encoding="utf-8").lower()
for marker in ("token", "password", "secret", "api_key", "credential"):
self.assertNotIn(marker, raw)
class TestSeparateEntities(_TempRegistryCase):
"""AC: providers and configured workers are separate entities."""
def test_provider_may_exist_with_no_workers(self):
registry = self.parse(
_document(providers=[_provider("grok", display_name="Grok")], workers=[])
)
self.assertEqual(len(registry.providers), 1)
self.assertEqual(registry.workers, ())
self.assertEqual(workers_for_provider(registry, "grok"), ())
def test_many_workers_may_share_one_provider(self):
registry = self.parse(
_document(
workers=[
_worker("claude-author"),
_worker(
"claude-reviewer",
role="reviewer",
namespace="gitea-reviewer",
profile="prgs-reviewer",
scheduler={"kind": "launchd", "label": "cc.prgs.claude.reviewer"},
),
]
)
)
self.assertEqual(len(workers_for_provider(registry, "claude")), 2)
self.assertEqual(len(registry.providers), 1)
def test_worker_referencing_unknown_provider_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(provider="mystery")]))
self.assertIn("unknown provider", str(ctx.exception))
def test_lookup_helpers(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
self.assertIsNotNone(find_worker(registry, "claude-author"))
self.assertIsNone(find_worker(registry, "absent"))
self.assertIsNotNone(find_provider(registry, "claude"))
self.assertIsNone(find_provider(registry, "absent"))
class TestRecordedFields(_TempRegistryCase):
"""AC: records provider, model, project, role, namespace/profile, workflow,
schedule, timeout, enabled state, and scheduler metadata."""
def test_every_required_field_is_recorded(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
worker = registry.workers[0]
self.assertEqual(worker.provider, "claude")
self.assertEqual(worker.model, "claude-opus-4-8")
self.assertEqual(worker.project, "gitea-tools")
self.assertEqual(worker.role, "author")
self.assertEqual(worker.namespace, "gitea-author")
self.assertEqual(worker.profile, "prgs-author")
self.assertEqual(worker.workflow, "skills/llm-project-workflow/workflows/work-issue.md")
self.assertEqual(worker.schedule.kind, "cron")
self.assertEqual(worker.schedule.expression, "0 * * * *")
self.assertEqual(worker.timeout_seconds, 3600)
self.assertTrue(worker.enabled)
self.assertEqual(worker.scheduler.kind, "launchd")
self.assertEqual(worker.scheduler.label, "cc.prgs.claude.author")
def test_each_required_field_is_individually_required(self):
for field in (
"provider", "model", "project", "role", "namespace",
"profile", "workflow", "schedule", "timeout_seconds",
"enabled", "scheduler", "id", "display_name",
):
with self.subTest(field=field):
worker = _worker()
worker.pop(field)
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[worker]))
def test_all_sanctioned_roles_are_accepted(self):
for role in ALLOWED_ROLES:
with self.subTest(role=role):
registry = self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(role=role)]))
self.assertEqual(registry.workers[0].role, role)
def test_unsanctioned_role_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(role="admin")]))
self.assertIn("role must be one of", str(ctx.exception))
def test_worker_dict_round_trips_every_field(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
encoded = worker_to_dict(registry.workers[0])
self.assertEqual(encoded, _worker())
json.dumps(encoded) # must stay JSON-safe for the #799 API
class TestSchemaValidation(_TempRegistryCase):
"""AC: supports schema validation — and fails closed."""
def test_unsupported_version_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(version=2))
def test_root_must_be_an_object(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
validate_payload([], source_path=self.path)
def test_providers_must_be_non_empty(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(providers=[]))
def test_unknown_top_level_field_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(fleet=[]))
self.assertIn("unknown fields", str(ctx.exception))
def test_unknown_worker_field_is_refused_not_ignored(self):
# A typo'd field must not be silently dropped: "timeout_second" would
# otherwise read as "no timeout declared".
worker = _worker()
worker["timeout_second"] = 30
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=[worker]))
self.assertIn("timeout_second", str(ctx.exception))
def test_credentials_are_refused_anywhere_in_the_document(self):
for label, mutate in (
("provider.api_token", lambda doc: doc["providers"][0].__setitem__("api_token", "x")),
("worker.password", lambda doc: doc["workers"][0].__setitem__("password", "x")),
("root.secret", lambda doc: doc.__setitem__("secret", "x")),
):
with self.subTest(field=label):
document = _document()
mutate(document)
with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as ctx:
self.parse(document)
self.assertIn("credential", str(ctx.exception).lower())
def test_duplicate_worker_id_is_refused(self):
workers = [_worker("dup"), _worker("dup", scheduler={"kind": "manual"})]
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=workers))
self.assertIn("duplicate worker id", str(ctx.exception))
def test_duplicate_provider_id_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(providers=[_provider("claude"), _provider("claude")], workers=[]))
self.assertIn("duplicate provider id", str(ctx.exception))
def test_duplicate_launchagent_label_is_refused(self):
# Two workers sharing a label would silently overwrite each other's agent.
workers = [
_worker("a", scheduler={"kind": "launchd", "label": "cc.prgs.same"}),
_worker("b", scheduler={"kind": "launchd", "label": "cc.prgs.same"}),
]
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=workers))
self.assertIn("duplicate scheduler label", str(ctx.exception))
def test_manual_scheduler_needs_no_label_and_many_may_coexist(self):
workers = [
_worker("a", scheduler={"kind": "manual"}),
_worker("b", scheduler={"kind": "manual"}),
]
registry = self.parse(_document(workers=workers))
self.assertEqual([w.scheduler.label for w in registry.workers], [None, None])
def test_launchd_scheduler_requires_a_label(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(scheduler={"kind": "launchd"})]))
self.assertIn("label is required", str(ctx.exception))
def test_unknown_scheduler_kind_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(scheduler={"kind": "systemd", "label": "x"})]))
def test_timeout_must_be_a_positive_bounded_integer(self):
for bad in (0, -1, "3600", 1.5, True, 86_401):
with self.subTest(timeout=bad):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(timeout_seconds=bad)]))
def test_enabled_must_be_a_real_boolean(self):
for bad in ("true", 1, None):
with self.subTest(enabled=bad):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(enabled=bad)]))
def test_identifier_shape_is_enforced(self):
for bad in ("Claude Author", "-leading", "UPPER", ""):
with self.subTest(worker_id=bad):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(bad)]))
class TestScheduleValidation(_TempRegistryCase):
"""Schedules are declarations; next-run computation belongs to #803."""
def test_interval_schedule_requires_positive_seconds(self):
registry = self.parse(
_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "interval", "seconds": 900})])
)
self.assertEqual(registry.workers[0].schedule.seconds, 900)
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "interval"})]))
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "interval", "seconds": 0})]))
def test_cron_schedule_requires_five_fields(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "cron", "expression": "0 *"})]))
self.assertIn("five crontab fields", str(ctx.exception))
def test_manual_schedule_needs_no_timing(self):
registry = self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "manual"})]))
schedule = registry.workers[0].schedule
self.assertEqual(schedule.kind, "manual")
self.assertIsNone(schedule.seconds)
self.assertIsNone(schedule.expression)
def test_fields_from_the_wrong_kind_are_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "manual", "seconds": 60})]))
self.assertIn("not valid for kind", str(ctx.exception))
def test_unknown_schedule_kind_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "hourly"})]))
class TestAtomicPersistence(_TempRegistryCase):
"""AC: atomic persistence."""
def test_save_then_load_round_trips(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
save_registry(registry, self.path)
reloaded = load_registry(self.path)
self.assertEqual(
[worker_to_dict(w) for w in reloaded.workers],
[worker_to_dict(w) for w in registry.workers],
)
def test_save_leaves_no_temp_files_behind(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
save_registry(registry, self.path)
save_registry(registry, self.path)
leftovers = [p.name for p in self.path.parent.iterdir() if p.name.startswith(".")]
self.assertEqual(leftovers, [])
def test_save_refuses_to_persist_an_invalid_document(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
broken = WorkerRegistry(
version=registry.version,
revision=registry.revision,
updated_at=registry.updated_at,
providers=registry.providers,
# A worker whose provider is not declared in the registry.
workers=tuple(
type(worker)(**{**worker.__dict__, "provider": "vanished"})
for worker in registry.workers
),
source_path=self.path,
)
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
save_registry(broken, self.path)
self.assertFalse(self.path.exists(), "invalid save must not create the file")
def test_document_shape_excludes_local_paths_but_api_shape_includes_it(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
self.assertNotIn("source_path", registry_to_document(registry))
self.assertEqual(registry_to_dict(registry)["source_path"], str(self.path))
class TestVersioningAndRollback(_TempRegistryCase):
"""AC: versioning and rollback."""
def _seed(self) -> WorkerRegistry:
self.write(_document())
return load_registry(self.path)
def test_revision_increments_on_each_save(self):
registry = self._seed()
self.assertEqual(registry.revision, 1)
second = save_registry(registry, self.path)
self.assertEqual(second.revision, 2)
third = save_registry(second, self.path)
self.assertEqual(third.revision, 3)
def test_updated_at_is_refreshed_and_utc(self):
registry = self._seed()
saved = save_registry(registry, self.path)
self.assertRegex(saved.updated_at, r"^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}Z$")
def test_superseded_revisions_are_retained(self):
registry = self._seed()
second = save_registry(registry, self.path)
save_registry(second, self.path)
self.assertEqual(list_revisions(self.path), (1, 2))
self.assertTrue(history_dir(self.path).is_dir())
def test_rollback_restores_prior_content_as_a_new_revision(self):
self.write(_document(workers=[_worker("original")]))
registry = load_registry(self.path)
changed = WorkerRegistry(
version=registry.version,
revision=registry.revision,
updated_at=registry.updated_at,
providers=registry.providers,
workers=(), # operator deletes every worker
source_path=self.path,
)
save_registry(changed, self.path)
self.assertEqual(load_registry(self.path).workers, ())
restored = rollback_to_revision(1, self.path)
self.assertEqual([w.id for w in restored.workers], ["original"])
# Append-only: the rollback publishes a new head rather than rewinding.
self.assertGreater(restored.revision, 2)
self.assertEqual([w.id for w in load_registry(self.path).workers], ["original"])
def test_rollback_to_unknown_revision_fails_closed(self):
self._seed()
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
rollback_to_revision(99, self.path)
self.assertIn("not retained", str(ctx.exception))
def test_revision_must_be_a_positive_integer(self):
for bad in (0, -1, "1", None):
with self.subTest(revision=bad):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(revision=bad))
def test_history_is_empty_before_any_save(self):
self.write(_document())
self.assertEqual(list_revisions(self.path), ())
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+72 -5
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,20 @@ from starlette.routing import Route
from webui.deployment_boundary import deployment_snapshot
from webui.layout import render_page
from webui.project_registry import find_project, load_registry, registry_to_dict
from webui.project_views import render_project_detail, render_projects_list
from webui.project_registry import (
ProjectRegistry,
RegistryError,
find_project,
known_project_ids,
load_registry,
project_detail_to_dict,
registry_to_dict,
)
from webui.project_views import (
render_project_detail,
render_projects_list,
render_registry_error,
)
from webui.prompt_library import find_prompt, library_to_dict
from webui.prompt_views import render_prompt_detail, render_prompts_page
from final_report_validator import FINAL_REPORT_TASK_KINDS
@@ -81,14 +93,26 @@ async def api_queue(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
return JSONResponse(queue_snapshot_to_dict(load_queue_snapshot()))
def _load_project_registry() -> tuple[ProjectRegistry | None, RegistryError | None]:
"""Load the registry, converting validation failure into a fail-closed pair."""
try:
return load_registry(), None
except RegistryError as exc:
return None, exc
async def projects(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
registry = load_registry()
registry, error = _load_project_registry()
if error is not None:
return HTMLResponse(render_registry_error(error), status_code=500)
return HTMLResponse(render_projects_list(registry))
async def project_detail(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
project_id = request.path_params["project_id"]
registry = load_registry()
registry, error = _load_project_registry()
if error is not None:
return HTMLResponse(render_registry_error(error), status_code=500)
project = find_project(registry, project_id)
if project is None:
return HTMLResponse(
@@ -106,10 +130,47 @@ async def project_detail(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
async def api_projects(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
registry = load_registry()
"""Unversioned MVP alias, retained through Phase 1 (#632 section 6)."""
registry, error = _load_project_registry()
if error is not None:
return JSONResponse(error.to_dict(), status_code=500)
return JSONResponse(registry_to_dict(registry))
async def api_v1_projects(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
registry, error = _load_project_registry()
if error is not None:
return JSONResponse(error.to_dict(), status_code=500)
return JSONResponse(registry_to_dict(registry))
async def api_v1_project_detail(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
project_id = request.path_params["project_id"]
registry, error = _load_project_registry()
if error is not None:
return JSONResponse(error.to_dict(), status_code=500)
project = find_project(registry, project_id)
if project is None:
return JSONResponse(
{
"error": "project_not_found",
"project_id": project_id,
"known_project_ids": known_project_ids(registry),
"remediation": (
"Request one of the known project ids, or add the project to the "
"registry file named in 'source'."
),
"source": {
"kind": "file",
"path": str(registry.source_path),
"inventory_complete": True,
},
},
status_code=404,
)
return JSONResponse(project_detail_to_dict(registry, project))
async def prompts(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
return HTMLResponse(render_prompts_page())
@@ -268,6 +329,12 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
Route("/projects", projects, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/projects/{project_id}", project_detail, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/projects", api_projects, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/v1/projects", api_v1_projects, methods=["GET"]),
Route(
"/api/v1/projects/{project_id}",
api_v1_project_detail,
methods=["GET"],
),
Route("/prompts", prompts, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/prompts/{prompt_id}", prompt_detail, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/prompts", api_prompts, methods=["GET"]),
+16 -6
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
{
"version": 1,
"version": 2,
"projects": [
{
"id": "gitea-tools",
"repo_name": "Gitea-Tools",
"gitea_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
"remote_name": "prgs",
"remote_host": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
"default_branch": "master",
"local_checkout_path": ".",
"status": "active",
"profiles": {
"author": "prgs-author",
"reviewer": "prgs-reviewer",
@@ -26,24 +28,32 @@
{
"id": "profiles",
"title": "Configure execution profiles",
"description": "Install author, reviewer, and reconciler MCP profiles (prgs-author, prgs-reviewer, prgs-reconciler) in separate namespaces. Tokens stay in keychain — never in this registry."
"description": "Install author, reviewer, and reconciler MCP profiles (prgs-author, prgs-reviewer, prgs-reconciler) in separate namespaces. Tokens stay in keychain — never in this registry.",
"state": "complete",
"required": true
},
{
"id": "mcp_config",
"title": "Wire MCP v2 contexts",
"description": "Copy and customize gitea-mcp.v2-contexts.example.json for your machine. Map this repo path under projects with default_owner Scaled-Tech-Consulting and default_repo Gitea-Tools."
"description": "Copy and customize gitea-mcp.v2-contexts.example.json for your machine. Map this repo path under projects with default_owner Scaled-Tech-Consulting and default_repo Gitea-Tools.",
"state": "complete",
"required": true
},
{
"id": "wiki_gate",
"title": "Wiki publication readiness",
"description": "For wiki-tracked work, satisfy the live Gitea Wiki proof gate (#224) before closing issues. See docs/wiki/Safety-and-Gates.md."
"description": "For wiki-tracked work, satisfy the live Gitea Wiki proof gate (#224) before closing issues. See docs/wiki/Safety-and-Gates.md.",
"state": "complete",
"required": true
},
{
"id": "branches_layout",
"title": "Isolate work under branches/",
"description": "All LLM task edits happen in worktrees under branches/. Main checkout stays clean; use skills/llm-project-workflow templates for start-issue and review flows."
"description": "All LLM task edits happen in worktrees under branches/. Main checkout stays clean; use skills/llm-project-workflow templates for start-issue and review flows.",
"state": "complete",
"required": true
}
]
}
]
}
}
+57
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
{
"version": 1,
"revision": 1,
"updated_at": "2026-07-22T00:00:00Z",
"providers": [
{
"id": "claude",
"display_name": "Claude",
"vendor": "Anthropic",
"executable": "claude",
"available": true,
"models": [
"claude-opus-4-8",
"claude-sonnet-5",
"claude-haiku-4-5-20251001"
],
"notes": "Model list is a declaration. Live enumeration and version inspection belong to the provider adapter framework (#800)."
},
{
"id": "grok",
"display_name": "Grok",
"vendor": "xAI",
"executable": "grok",
"available": true,
"models": [],
"notes": "Models enumerated by the provider adapter (#800); not declared here."
},
{
"id": "codex",
"display_name": "Codex",
"vendor": "OpenAI",
"executable": "codex",
"available": true,
"models": [],
"notes": "Models enumerated by the provider adapter (#800); not declared here."
},
{
"id": "agy",
"display_name": "AGY",
"vendor": "Antigravity",
"executable": "agy",
"available": true,
"models": [],
"notes": "MCP allowlist gating applies to this provider; confirm server-side allowlist before configuring a worker."
},
{
"id": "kimi-k",
"display_name": "Kimi K",
"vendor": "Moonshot AI",
"executable": "kimi",
"available": true,
"models": [],
"notes": "Provider id is kimi-k; the executable on PATH is kimi. Models enumerated by the provider adapter (#800)."
}
],
"workers": []
}
+451 -48
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,16 @@
"""Load and validate the web UI project registry (#427)."""
"""Load and validate the web UI project registry (#427, evolved for #635).
Phase 1 of the console architecture ADR keeps this loader read-only. It owns
the versioned project registry contract served at ``/api/v1/projects``:
* the on-disk file carries a ``version`` (schema version 1 or 2);
* version 1 files stay loadable and are normalized with explicit defaults, so
an operator registry written for #427 keeps working;
* every validation failure raises :class:`RegistryError`, which carries an
actionable ``remediation`` string instead of leaking a traceback;
* serialization never emits credentials credential-shaped keys are rejected
at load time, before any DTO is built.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -8,27 +20,59 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
_FORBIDDEN_EXACT_KEYS = frozenset({
"token",
"password",
"secret",
"credential",
"auth",
"api_key",
"api-key",
})
_FORBIDDEN_KEY_PREFIXES = ("auth_", "api_key_", "api-key_")
_FORBIDDEN_KEY_SUFFIXES = ("_token", "_secret", "_password", "_credential", "_auth")
from webui.registry_safety import is_forbidden_key
#: Version of the JSON contract served under ``/api/v1/...``.
REGISTRY_API_VERSION = "v1"
#: Schema version written by this repository's packaged registry.
CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION = 2
#: Schema versions this loader accepts. Version 1 is normalized on load.
SUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSIONS = (1, 2)
#: Lifecycle state of a registered project.
PROJECT_STATUSES = ("active", "onboarding", "paused", "archived")
_DEFAULT_PROJECT_STATUS = "active"
#: Completion state of a single onboarding step.
ONBOARDING_STATES = ("complete", "pending", "blocked", "not_applicable")
_DEFAULT_ONBOARDING_STATE = "pending"
#: Redacted, last-seen health of a project's control plane.
HEALTH_STATUSES = ("healthy", "degraded", "unreachable", "unknown")
class RegistryError(ValueError):
"""A registry file could not be loaded or failed validation.
Carries an operator-facing ``remediation`` so routes can fail closed with
an actionable message rather than a stack trace.
"""
def __init__(
self,
message: str,
*,
remediation: str,
source_path: Path | None = None,
field_path: str | None = None,
) -> None:
super().__init__(message)
self.message = message
self.remediation = remediation
self.source_path = source_path
self.field_path = field_path
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Serialize for a fail-closed JSON error response."""
return {
"error": "registry_invalid",
"detail": self.message,
"remediation": self.remediation,
"field_path": self.field_path,
"source_path": str(self.source_path) if self.source_path else None,
}
def _is_forbidden_key(key: str) -> bool:
lowered = key.lower()
if lowered in _FORBIDDEN_EXACT_KEYS:
return True
return (
lowered.startswith(_FORBIDDEN_KEY_PREFIXES)
or lowered.endswith(_FORBIDDEN_KEY_SUFFIXES)
)
_REQUIRED_PROJECT_FIELDS = (
"id",
@@ -49,6 +93,30 @@ class OnboardingStep:
id: str
title: str
description: str
state: str = _DEFAULT_ONBOARDING_STATE
required: bool = True
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class OnboardingSummary:
"""Aggregate onboarding progress for a single project."""
total: int
complete: int
pending: int
blocked: int
not_applicable: int
required_outstanding: int
onboarding_complete: bool
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ProjectHealth:
"""Redacted last-seen health. Never carries endpoints or credentials."""
status: str
checked_at: str | None
detail: str | None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -63,6 +131,13 @@ class ProjectRecord:
workflow_paths: dict[str, str]
schema_paths: dict[str, str]
onboarding_checklist: tuple[OnboardingStep, ...]
status: str = _DEFAULT_PROJECT_STATUS
remote_name: str | None = None
last_seen_health: ProjectHealth | None = None
@property
def repo_full_name(self) -> str:
return f"{self.gitea_owner}/{self.repo_name}"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -71,6 +146,15 @@ class ProjectRegistry:
projects: tuple[ProjectRecord, ...]
source_path: Path
@property
def schema_version(self) -> int:
"""Alias of :attr:`version` — the schema version read from disk."""
return self.version
@property
def api_version(self) -> str:
return REGISTRY_API_VERSION
def default_registry_path() -> Path:
override = os.environ.get("WEBUI_PROJECT_REGISTRY", "").strip()
@@ -79,52 +163,221 @@ def default_registry_path() -> Path:
return (Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "data" / "projects.registry.json").resolve()
def _reject_credential_keys(obj: Any, *, path: str = "") -> None:
def _reject_credential_keys(obj: Any, *, path: str = "", source: Path | None = None) -> None:
"""Recursive credential-key guard that reports an actionable ``field_path``.
Key *shape* is decided by :func:`webui.registry_safety.is_forbidden_key`, the
single source of truth shared with the worker registry (#798).
"""
if isinstance(obj, dict):
for key, value in obj.items():
key_path = f"{path}.{key}" if path else key
if _is_forbidden_key(key):
raise ValueError(f"registry must not store credentials ({key_path})")
_reject_credential_keys(value, path=key_path)
if is_forbidden_key(key):
raise RegistryError(
f"registry must not store credentials ({key_path})",
remediation=(
f"Remove the credential-shaped key '{key_path}' from the registry. "
"Tokens live in the keychain and are resolved server-side by "
"gitea_auth; the registry is redacted metadata only."
),
source_path=source,
field_path=key_path,
)
_reject_credential_keys(value, path=key_path, source=source)
elif isinstance(obj, list):
for index, item in enumerate(obj):
_reject_credential_keys(item, path=f"{path}[{index}]")
_reject_credential_keys(item, path=f"{path}[{index}]", source=source)
def _parse_onboarding(raw: list[dict[str, Any]] | None) -> tuple[OnboardingStep, ...]:
if not raw:
def _require_enum(
value: Any,
*,
allowed: tuple[str, ...],
field_path: str,
source: Path | None,
) -> str:
text = str(value)
if text not in allowed:
raise RegistryError(
f"{field_path} must be one of {', '.join(allowed)} (got {text!r})",
remediation=(
f"Set {field_path} to one of: {', '.join(allowed)}. "
"Unknown values fail closed so the console never renders an "
"unverified state."
),
source_path=source,
field_path=field_path,
)
return text
def _parse_onboarding(
raw: Any,
*,
project_path: str,
source: Path | None,
) -> tuple[OnboardingStep, ...]:
if raw is None:
return ()
if not isinstance(raw, list):
raise RegistryError(
f"{project_path}.onboarding_checklist must be an array",
remediation=(
f"Rewrite {project_path}.onboarding_checklist as a JSON array of "
"steps with id, title, description, and optional state."
),
source_path=source,
field_path=f"{project_path}.onboarding_checklist",
)
steps: list[OnboardingStep] = []
for item in raw:
for index, item in enumerate(raw):
step_path = f"{project_path}.onboarding_checklist[{index}]"
if not isinstance(item, dict):
raise RegistryError(
f"{step_path} must be an object",
remediation=f"Rewrite {step_path} as an object with id, title, description.",
source_path=source,
field_path=step_path,
)
missing = [field for field in ("id", "title", "description") if field not in item]
if missing:
raise RegistryError(
f"{step_path} missing required fields: {', '.join(missing)}",
remediation=(
f"Add {', '.join(missing)} to {step_path}. Every onboarding step "
"must be self-describing for an operator who has no chat history."
),
source_path=source,
field_path=step_path,
)
state = _require_enum(
item.get("state", _DEFAULT_ONBOARDING_STATE),
allowed=ONBOARDING_STATES,
field_path=f"{step_path}.state",
source=source,
)
steps.append(
OnboardingStep(
id=str(item["id"]),
title=str(item["title"]),
description=str(item["description"]),
state=state,
required=bool(item.get("required", True)),
)
)
return tuple(steps)
def _parse_project(raw: dict[str, Any]) -> ProjectRecord:
def _parse_health(
raw: Any,
*,
project_path: str,
source: Path | None,
) -> ProjectHealth | None:
if raw is None:
return None
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise RegistryError(
f"{project_path}.last_seen_health must be an object when present",
remediation=(
f"Rewrite {project_path}.last_seen_health as an object with status "
f"(one of {', '.join(HEALTH_STATUSES)}), optional checked_at and detail, "
"or remove it. Never store endpoints or credentials here."
),
source_path=source,
field_path=f"{project_path}.last_seen_health",
)
status = _require_enum(
raw.get("status", "unknown"),
allowed=HEALTH_STATUSES,
field_path=f"{project_path}.last_seen_health.status",
source=source,
)
checked_at = raw.get("checked_at")
detail = raw.get("detail")
return ProjectHealth(
status=status,
checked_at=str(checked_at) if checked_at is not None else None,
detail=str(detail) if detail is not None else None,
)
def _parse_project(raw: Any, *, index: int, source: Path | None) -> ProjectRecord:
project_path = f"projects[{index}]"
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise RegistryError(
f"{project_path} must be an object",
remediation=f"Rewrite {project_path} as a JSON object describing one project.",
source_path=source,
field_path=project_path,
)
missing = [field for field in _REQUIRED_PROJECT_FIELDS if field not in raw]
if missing:
raise ValueError(f"project missing required fields: {', '.join(missing)}")
raise RegistryError(
f"{project_path} missing required fields: {', '.join(missing)}",
remediation=(
f"Add {', '.join(missing)} to {project_path}. See "
"docs/webui-project-registry-api.md for the field-by-field contract."
),
source_path=source,
field_path=project_path,
)
profiles = raw["profiles"]
if not isinstance(profiles, dict):
raise ValueError("profiles must be an object")
raise RegistryError(
f"{project_path}.profiles must be an object",
remediation=(
f"Rewrite {project_path}.profiles as an object mapping "
f"{', '.join(_REQUIRED_PROFILE_ROLES)} to MCP profile names."
),
source_path=source,
field_path=f"{project_path}.profiles",
)
for role in _REQUIRED_PROFILE_ROLES:
if role not in profiles or not profiles[role]:
raise ValueError(f"profiles.{role} is required")
raise RegistryError(
f"{project_path}.profiles.{role} is required",
remediation=(
f"Set {project_path}.profiles.{role} to the configured MCP profile "
"name for that role. Role separation is a workflow-safety invariant."
),
source_path=source,
field_path=f"{project_path}.profiles.{role}",
)
workflow_paths = raw["workflow_paths"]
if not isinstance(workflow_paths, dict) or not workflow_paths:
raise ValueError("workflow_paths must be a non-empty object")
raise RegistryError(
f"{project_path}.workflow_paths must be a non-empty object",
remediation=(
f"Add at least a 'skill' entry to {project_path}.workflow_paths pointing "
"at the project's canonical workflow skill."
),
source_path=source,
field_path=f"{project_path}.workflow_paths",
)
schema_paths = raw.get("schema_paths") or {}
if not isinstance(schema_paths, dict):
raise ValueError("schema_paths must be an object when present")
raise RegistryError(
f"{project_path}.schema_paths must be an object when present",
remediation=(
f"Rewrite {project_path}.schema_paths as an object of label to repo path, "
"or remove it."
),
source_path=source,
field_path=f"{project_path}.schema_paths",
)
status = _require_enum(
raw.get("status", _DEFAULT_PROJECT_STATUS),
allowed=PROJECT_STATUSES,
field_path=f"{project_path}.status",
source=source,
)
remote_name = raw.get("remote_name")
return ProjectRecord(
id=str(raw["id"]),
@@ -136,61 +389,211 @@ def _parse_project(raw: dict[str, Any]) -> ProjectRecord:
profiles={role: str(profiles[role]) for role in _REQUIRED_PROFILE_ROLES},
workflow_paths={key: str(value) for key, value in workflow_paths.items()},
schema_paths={key: str(value) for key, value in schema_paths.items()},
onboarding_checklist=_parse_onboarding(raw.get("onboarding_checklist")),
onboarding_checklist=_parse_onboarding(
raw.get("onboarding_checklist"),
project_path=project_path,
source=source,
),
status=status,
remote_name=str(remote_name) if remote_name else None,
last_seen_health=_parse_health(
raw.get("last_seen_health"),
project_path=project_path,
source=source,
),
)
def load_registry(path: Path | None = None) -> ProjectRegistry:
"""Load the versioned project registry from disk."""
"""Load the versioned project registry from disk.
Raises:
RegistryError: whenever the file is unreadable, is not valid JSON, or
fails schema validation. The error carries an operator remediation.
"""
source = (path or default_registry_path()).resolve()
raw_text = source.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
payload = json.loads(raw_text)
try:
raw_text = source.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
except OSError as exc:
raise RegistryError(
f"registry file could not be read: {exc.strerror or exc}",
remediation=(
f"Create a readable registry at {source}, or point "
"WEBUI_PROJECT_REGISTRY at an existing file."
),
source_path=source,
) from exc
try:
payload = json.loads(raw_text)
except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
raise RegistryError(
f"registry is not valid JSON: {exc.msg} (line {exc.lineno}, column {exc.colno})",
remediation=(
f"Fix the JSON syntax in {source} at line {exc.lineno}, column {exc.colno}."
),
source_path=source,
) from exc
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise ValueError("registry root must be an object")
raise RegistryError(
"registry root must be an object",
remediation=(
"Wrap the registry in a JSON object with 'version' and 'projects' keys."
),
source_path=source,
)
version = payload.get("version")
if version != 1:
raise ValueError(f"unsupported registry version: {version!r}")
if version not in SUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSIONS:
supported = ", ".join(str(item) for item in SUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSIONS)
raise RegistryError(
f"unsupported registry version: {version!r}",
remediation=(
f"Set 'version' to one of {supported} (current schema is "
f"{CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION}). Migration notes live in "
"docs/webui-project-registry-api.md."
),
source_path=source,
field_path="version",
)
_reject_credential_keys(payload)
_reject_credential_keys(payload, source=source)
projects_raw = payload.get("projects")
if not isinstance(projects_raw, list) or not projects_raw:
raise ValueError("projects must be a non-empty array")
raise RegistryError(
"projects must be a non-empty array",
remediation=(
"Add at least one project object to 'projects'. An empty console "
"registry fails closed rather than rendering a blank inventory."
),
source_path=source,
field_path="projects",
)
projects = tuple(_parse_project(item) for item in projects_raw)
return ProjectRegistry(version=version, projects=projects, source_path=source)
projects = tuple(
_parse_project(item, index=index, source=source)
for index, item in enumerate(projects_raw)
)
return ProjectRegistry(version=int(version), projects=projects, source_path=source)
def onboarding_summary(project: ProjectRecord) -> OnboardingSummary:
"""Aggregate a project's onboarding checklist state."""
steps = project.onboarding_checklist
counts = {state: 0 for state in ONBOARDING_STATES}
for step in steps:
counts[step.state] += 1
required_outstanding = sum(
1
for step in steps
if step.required and step.state in ("pending", "blocked")
)
return OnboardingSummary(
total=len(steps),
complete=counts["complete"],
pending=counts["pending"],
blocked=counts["blocked"],
not_applicable=counts["not_applicable"],
required_outstanding=required_outstanding,
onboarding_complete=required_outstanding == 0,
)
def project_to_dict(project: ProjectRecord) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Serialize a project for JSON API responses."""
"""Serialize a project for JSON API responses and HTML views.
The HTML views render from this same DTO, so the console and the API can
never disagree about a project's status or onboarding progress.
"""
summary = onboarding_summary(project)
health = project.last_seen_health
return {
"id": project.id,
"repo_name": project.repo_name,
"gitea_owner": project.gitea_owner,
"repo_full_name": project.repo_full_name,
"remote_host": project.remote_host,
"remote_name": project.remote_name,
"default_branch": project.default_branch,
"local_checkout_path": project.local_checkout_path,
"status": project.status,
"profiles": dict(project.profiles),
"workflow_paths": dict(project.workflow_paths),
"schema_paths": dict(project.schema_paths),
"onboarding_checklist": [
{"id": step.id, "title": step.title, "description": step.description}
{
"id": step.id,
"title": step.title,
"description": step.description,
"state": step.state,
"required": step.required,
}
for step in project.onboarding_checklist
],
"onboarding_summary": {
"total": summary.total,
"complete": summary.complete,
"pending": summary.pending,
"blocked": summary.blocked,
"not_applicable": summary.not_applicable,
"required_outstanding": summary.required_outstanding,
"onboarding_complete": summary.onboarding_complete,
},
"last_seen_health": (
None
if health is None
else {
"status": health.status,
"checked_at": health.checked_at,
"detail": health.detail,
}
),
}
def registry_to_dict(registry: ProjectRegistry) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Serialize the whole registry, including API provenance (#632 section 6)."""
return {
"api_version": registry.api_version,
"schema_version": registry.schema_version,
# Retained for the unversioned MVP alias consumers (#427).
"version": registry.version,
"source_path": str(registry.source_path),
"source": {
"kind": "file",
"path": str(registry.source_path),
"inventory_complete": True,
},
"project_count": len(registry.projects),
"projects": [project_to_dict(project) for project in registry.projects],
}
def project_detail_to_dict(
registry: ProjectRegistry,
project: ProjectRecord,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Serialize a single project for ``/api/v1/projects/{project_id}``."""
return {
"api_version": registry.api_version,
"schema_version": registry.schema_version,
"source": {
"kind": "file",
"path": str(registry.source_path),
"inventory_complete": True,
},
"project": project_to_dict(project),
}
def find_project(registry: ProjectRegistry, project_id: str) -> ProjectRecord | None:
for project in registry.projects:
if project.id == project_id:
return project
return None
return None
def known_project_ids(registry: ProjectRegistry) -> list[str]:
return [project.id for project in registry.projects]
+107 -25
View File
@@ -1,34 +1,65 @@
"""HTML views for project registry pages (#427)."""
"""HTML views for project registry pages (#427, evolved for #635).
Every view renders from :func:`webui.project_registry.project_to_dict`, the
same DTO the ``/api/v1/projects`` JSON responses use, so the HTML console and
the API can never disagree about status or onboarding progress.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import html
from typing import Any
from webui.layout import render_page
from webui.project_registry import ProjectRecord, ProjectRegistry
from webui.project_registry import (
ProjectRecord,
ProjectRegistry,
RegistryError,
project_to_dict,
)
_STATE_LABELS = {
"complete": "Complete",
"pending": "Pending",
"blocked": "Blocked",
"not_applicable": "Not applicable",
}
def _escape(text: str) -> str:
return html.escape(text, quote=True)
def _progress_label(summary: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
total = summary["total"]
if not total:
return "no steps"
label = f"{summary['complete']}/{total} complete"
if summary["blocked"]:
label += f", {summary['blocked']} blocked"
return label
def render_projects_list(registry: ProjectRegistry) -> str:
rows = []
for project in registry.projects:
dto = project_to_dict(project)
rows.append(
"<tr>"
f"<td><a href=\"/projects/{_escape(project.id)}\">{_escape(project.repo_name)}</a></td>"
f"<td>{_escape(project.gitea_owner)}</td>"
f"<td>{_escape(project.remote_host)}</td>"
f"<td>{_escape(project.default_branch)}</td>"
f"<td><code>{_escape(project.profiles['author'])}</code></td>"
f"<td><a href=\"/projects/{_escape(dto['id'])}\">{_escape(dto['repo_name'])}</a></td>"
f"<td>{_escape(dto['gitea_owner'])}</td>"
f"<td>{_escape(dto['remote_host'])}</td>"
f"<td>{_escape(dto['default_branch'])}</td>"
f"<td><code>{_escape(dto['status'])}</code></td>"
f"<td>{_escape(_progress_label(dto['onboarding_summary']))}</td>"
f"<td><code>{_escape(dto['profiles']['author'])}</code></td>"
"</tr>"
)
table = (
"<table class=\"registry\">"
"<thead><tr>"
"<th>Repository</th><th>Owner</th><th>Remote</th>"
"<th>Branch</th><th>Author profile</th>"
"<th>Branch</th><th>Status</th><th>Onboarding</th><th>Author profile</th>"
"</tr></thead>"
f"<tbody>{''.join(rows)}</tbody></table>"
)
@@ -36,32 +67,39 @@ def render_projects_list(registry: ProjectRegistry) -> str:
"<h2>Projects</h2>"
"<p>Configured repositories managed by the MCP Control Plane.</p>"
f"<p class=\"meta\">Registry: <code>{_escape(str(registry.source_path))}</code> "
f"(version {registry.version})</p>"
f"(schema version {registry.schema_version}, "
f"API {_escape(registry.api_version)})</p>"
f"{table}"
"<p><a href=\"/api/projects\">JSON API</a></p>"
"<p><a href=\"/api/v1/projects\">JSON API</a> "
"(<a href=\"/api/projects\">unversioned alias</a>)</p>"
)
return render_page(title="Projects", body_html=body)
def render_project_detail(project: ProjectRecord) -> str:
dto = project_to_dict(project)
profile_rows = "".join(
f"<tr><th>{_escape(role)}</th><td><code>{_escape(name)}</code></td></tr>"
for role, name in project.profiles.items()
for role, name in dto["profiles"].items()
)
workflow_rows = "".join(
f"<tr><th>{_escape(key)}</th><td><code>{_escape(path)}</code></td></tr>"
for key, path in project.workflow_paths.items()
for key, path in dto["workflow_paths"].items()
)
schema_rows = "".join(
f"<tr><th>{_escape(key)}</th><td><code>{_escape(path)}</code></td></tr>"
for key, path in project.schema_paths.items()
for key, path in dto["schema_paths"].items()
)
checklist_items = []
for index, step in enumerate(project.onboarding_checklist, start=1):
for index, step in enumerate(dto["onboarding_checklist"], start=1):
state_label = _STATE_LABELS.get(step["state"], step["state"])
requirement = "required" if step["required"] else "optional"
checklist_items.append(
"<li>"
f"<strong>{index}. {_escape(step.title)}</strong>"
f"<p>{_escape(step.description)}</p>"
f"<li class=\"step-{_escape(step['state'])}\">"
f"<strong>{index}. {_escape(step['title'])}</strong>"
f" <span class=\"badge\">{_escape(state_label)}</span>"
f" <span class=\"meta\">({_escape(requirement)})</span>"
f"<p>{_escape(step['description'])}</p>"
"</li>"
)
checklist_html = (
@@ -69,16 +107,38 @@ def render_project_detail(project: ProjectRecord) -> str:
if checklist_items
else "<p>No onboarding steps defined.</p>"
)
summary = dto["onboarding_summary"]
summary_html = (
"<p class=\"meta\">Onboarding: "
f"{_escape(_progress_label(summary))}; required outstanding "
f"{summary['required_outstanding']}.</p>"
)
health = dto["last_seen_health"]
health_html = (
"<p class=\"meta\">No health probe recorded (Phase 1 is read-only).</p>"
if health is None
else (
"<table class=\"detail\">"
f"<tr><th>Status</th><td><code>{_escape(health['status'])}</code></td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Checked at</th><td>{_escape(str(health['checked_at'] or 'unknown'))}</td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Detail</th><td>{_escape(str(health['detail'] or ''))}</td></tr>"
"</table>"
)
)
remote_name = dto["remote_name"] or "unset"
body = (
f"<h2>{_escape(project.repo_name)}</h2>"
f"<h2>{_escape(dto['repo_name'])}</h2>"
"<p><a href=\"/projects\">← All projects</a></p>"
"<h3>Identity</h3>"
"<table class=\"detail\">"
f"<tr><th>Registry id</th><td><code>{_escape(project.id)}</code></td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Gitea owner</th><td>{_escape(project.gitea_owner)}</td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Remote host</th><td>{_escape(project.remote_host)}</td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Default branch</th><td><code>{_escape(project.default_branch)}</code></td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Local checkout</th><td><code>{_escape(project.local_checkout_path)}</code></td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Registry id</th><td><code>{_escape(dto['id'])}</code></td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Status</th><td><code>{_escape(dto['status'])}</code></td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Gitea owner</th><td>{_escape(dto['gitea_owner'])}</td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Repository</th><td><code>{_escape(dto['repo_full_name'])}</code></td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Remote name</th><td><code>{_escape(remote_name)}</code></td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Remote host</th><td>{_escape(dto['remote_host'])}</td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Default branch</th><td><code>{_escape(dto['default_branch'])}</code></td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Local checkout</th><td><code>{_escape(dto['local_checkout_path'])}</code></td></tr>"
"</table>"
"<h3>Profiles</h3>"
f"<table class=\"detail\">{profile_rows}</table>"
@@ -86,8 +146,30 @@ def render_project_detail(project: ProjectRecord) -> str:
f"<table class=\"detail\">{workflow_rows}</table>"
"<h3>Schema paths</h3>"
f"<table class=\"detail\">{schema_rows}</table>"
"<h3>Last seen health</h3>"
f"{health_html}"
"<h3>Onboarding checklist</h3>"
"<p class=\"meta\">Read-only MVP — complete these steps outside the UI.</p>"
"<p class=\"meta\">Read-only — complete these steps outside the UI.</p>"
f"{summary_html}"
f"{checklist_html}"
f"<p><a href=\"/api/v1/projects/{_escape(dto['id'])}\">JSON detail</a></p>"
)
return render_page(title=project.repo_name, body_html=body)
return render_page(title=dto["repo_name"], body_html=body)
def render_registry_error(error: RegistryError) -> str:
"""Render a fail-closed page for an invalid registry."""
source = str(error.source_path) if error.source_path else "unknown"
field = error.field_path or "n/a"
body = (
"<h2>Project registry unavailable</h2>"
"<p>The registry failed validation, so the console refuses to render a "
"partial inventory.</p>"
"<table class=\"detail\">"
f"<tr><th>Detail</th><td>{_escape(error.message)}</td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Field</th><td><code>{_escape(field)}</code></td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Source</th><td><code>{_escape(source)}</code></td></tr>"
f"<tr><th>Remediation</th><td>{_escape(error.remediation)}</td></tr>"
"</table>"
)
return render_page(title="Project registry unavailable", body_html=body)
+52
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
"""Shared credential-rejection guard for web UI registries (#427, #798).
Registries are operator-editable declarative files that the web UI loads and,
for the worker registry, writes back. None of them may ever carry a secret:
credentials belong in the keychain and reach worker processes through
environment injection, never through a file the browser layer can read.
The check is structural rather than value-based on purpose. A value scanner has
to guess what a secret looks like; a key scanner refuses the *shape* of a
credential field, so an operator cannot introduce one by accident and a later
loader cannot silently pass one through.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import Any
_FORBIDDEN_EXACT_KEYS = frozenset({
"token",
"password",
"secret",
"credential",
"auth",
"api_key",
"api-key",
})
_FORBIDDEN_KEY_PREFIXES = ("auth_", "api_key_", "api-key_")
_FORBIDDEN_KEY_SUFFIXES = ("_token", "_secret", "_password", "_credential", "_auth")
def is_forbidden_key(key: str) -> bool:
"""Return True when *key* names a credential field."""
lowered = key.lower()
if lowered in _FORBIDDEN_EXACT_KEYS:
return True
return (
lowered.startswith(_FORBIDDEN_KEY_PREFIXES)
or lowered.endswith(_FORBIDDEN_KEY_SUFFIXES)
)
def reject_credential_keys(obj: Any, *, path: str = "", subject: str = "registry") -> None:
"""Raise ValueError when *obj* carries a credential-shaped key at any depth."""
if isinstance(obj, dict):
for key, value in obj.items():
key_path = f"{path}.{key}" if path else key
if is_forbidden_key(key):
raise ValueError(f"{subject} must not store credentials ({key_path})")
reject_credential_keys(value, path=key_path, subject=subject)
elif isinstance(obj, list):
for index, item in enumerate(obj):
reject_credential_keys(item, path=f"{path}[{index}]", subject=subject)
+647
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,647 @@
"""Declarative worker registry and configuration schema (#798, epic #797).
The registry is the single source of truth for the scheduled multi-LLM worker
fleet. It is a versioned JSON document holding two *separate* entity kinds:
* **Providers** the LLM runtimes a worker can be built on (Claude, Grok,
Codex, AGY, Kimi K). A provider describes the runtime itself: vendor,
executable name, models it can serve, and whether it is available on this
machine. Providers exist whether or not any worker uses them.
* **Workers** a configured *instance*: one provider, one model, one project,
one role, one MCP namespace/profile, one workflow, one schedule. Several
workers may share a provider; a worker naming an undeclared provider is
refused.
Keeping them separate is what lets #799 list all five providers even when a
provider currently has no configured worker, and it stops provider facts from
being copied into (and drifting across) every worker record.
Scope boundary. This module owns the data model, its validation, and its
persistence. It does **not** schedule anything, launch anything, probe provider
executables, or serve HTTP. Loading a registry never touches a process; the
live fields a dashboard wants (PID, elapsed time, next run) are derived
elsewhere (#799, #801, #803, #804) from these declarations.
Safety invariants:
* No credential may be stored (:mod:`webui.registry_safety`), so the registry
stays safe to render and to hand to a browser layer.
* Validation fails closed. Unknown fields are refused rather than ignored, so a
typo cannot silently disable a timeout or a role binding.
* Writes are atomic and every superseded document is retained as a numbered
revision, so a bad edit is recoverable by rollback rather than hand-repair.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import re
import tempfile
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
from webui.registry_safety import reject_credential_keys
SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
#: Roles a worker may hold. These mirror the sanctioned MCP role kinds; a
#: worker may not invent one, because the role selects the namespace/profile
#: whose capability gates constrain it.
ALLOWED_ROLES = ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "cleanup")
#: Scheduler backends the registry can describe. ``manual`` means the worker is
#: only ever started on request and has no recurring trigger.
ALLOWED_SCHEDULER_KINDS = ("launchd", "manual")
#: Schedule kinds. Next-run computation belongs to #803; this module only
#: guarantees the declaration is well formed.
ALLOWED_SCHEDULE_KINDS = ("interval", "cron", "manual")
_REQUIRED_PROVIDER_FIELDS = ("id", "display_name", "vendor", "executable", "available")
_OPTIONAL_PROVIDER_FIELDS = ("models", "notes")
_REQUIRED_WORKER_FIELDS = (
"id",
"display_name",
"provider",
"model",
"project",
"role",
"namespace",
"profile",
"workflow",
"schedule",
"timeout_seconds",
"enabled",
"scheduler",
)
_OPTIONAL_WORKER_FIELDS = ("notes",)
_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*$")
#: Guards against an operator writing a timeout that would let a worker hold a
#: lease effectively forever. 24h is far above any sanctioned cycle.
_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 86_400
#: How many superseded revisions to retain beside the live file.
_HISTORY_LIMIT = 20
_TOP_LEVEL_FIELDS = frozenset({"version", "revision", "updated_at", "providers", "workers"})
class RegistryValidationError(ValueError):
"""Raised when a registry document violates the schema."""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ProviderRecord:
id: str
display_name: str
vendor: str
executable: str
available: bool
models: tuple[str, ...]
notes: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ScheduleSpec:
kind: str
#: Set for ``interval`` schedules.
seconds: int | None
#: Set for ``cron`` schedules — a five-field crontab expression.
expression: str | None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SchedulerSpec:
kind: str
#: LaunchAgent label; required for ``launchd``, absent for ``manual``.
label: str | None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class WorkerRecord:
id: str
display_name: str
provider: str
model: str
project: str
role: str
namespace: str
profile: str
workflow: str
schedule: ScheduleSpec
timeout_seconds: int
enabled: bool
scheduler: SchedulerSpec
notes: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class WorkerRegistry:
version: int
revision: int
updated_at: str
providers: tuple[ProviderRecord, ...]
workers: tuple[WorkerRecord, ...]
source_path: Path
# ── paths ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def default_registry_path() -> Path:
"""Location of the packaged worker registry, overridable for tests/deploys."""
override = os.environ.get("WEBUI_WORKER_REGISTRY", "").strip()
if override:
return Path(override).expanduser().resolve()
return (Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "data" / "workers.registry.json").resolve()
def history_dir(path: Path | None = None) -> Path:
"""Directory holding superseded revisions of *path*."""
source = (path or default_registry_path()).resolve()
return source.parent / f"{source.name}.history"
# ── field helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _require_exact_fields(
raw: Any,
*,
required: tuple[str, ...],
optional: tuple[str, ...],
subject: str,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be an object")
missing = [field for field in required if field not in raw]
if missing:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject} missing required fields: {', '.join(sorted(missing))}"
)
unknown = sorted(set(raw) - set(required) - set(optional))
if unknown:
# Fail closed: silently dropping an unrecognized key is how a typo'd
# "timeout_second" ends up meaning "no timeout".
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} has unknown fields: {', '.join(unknown)}")
return raw
def _require_identifier(value: Any, *, subject: str) -> str:
text = str(value).strip()
if not _ID_RE.match(text):
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject} must be lowercase alphanumeric with '.', '_', or '-' (got {value!r})"
)
return text
def _require_text(value: Any, *, subject: str) -> str:
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be a string (got {value!r})")
text = value.strip()
if not text:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be a non-empty string")
return text
def _require_bool(value: Any, *, subject: str) -> bool:
if not isinstance(value, bool):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be a boolean (got {value!r})")
return value
def _require_positive_int(value: Any, *, subject: str, maximum: int | None = None) -> int:
if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be an integer (got {value!r})")
if value <= 0:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be greater than zero (got {value})")
if maximum is not None and value > maximum:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must not exceed {maximum} (got {value})")
return value
# ── parsing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _parse_provider(raw: Any) -> ProviderRecord:
data = _require_exact_fields(
raw,
required=_REQUIRED_PROVIDER_FIELDS,
optional=_OPTIONAL_PROVIDER_FIELDS,
subject="provider",
)
provider_id = _require_identifier(data["id"], subject="provider.id")
models_raw = data.get("models") or []
if not isinstance(models_raw, list):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"provider[{provider_id}].models must be an array")
models = tuple(
_require_text(item, subject=f"provider[{provider_id}].models[]") for item in models_raw
)
return ProviderRecord(
id=provider_id,
display_name=_require_text(
data["display_name"], subject=f"provider[{provider_id}].display_name"
),
vendor=_require_text(data["vendor"], subject=f"provider[{provider_id}].vendor"),
executable=_require_text(data["executable"], subject=f"provider[{provider_id}].executable"),
available=_require_bool(data["available"], subject=f"provider[{provider_id}].available"),
models=models,
notes=str(data.get("notes") or "").strip(),
)
def _parse_schedule(raw: Any, *, subject: str) -> ScheduleSpec:
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be an object")
kind = _require_text(raw.get("kind"), subject=f"{subject}.kind")
if kind not in ALLOWED_SCHEDULE_KINDS:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject}.kind must be one of {', '.join(ALLOWED_SCHEDULE_KINDS)} (got {kind!r})"
)
seconds: int | None = None
expression: str | None = None
if kind == "interval":
if "seconds" not in raw:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject}.seconds is required for interval schedules")
seconds = _require_positive_int(raw["seconds"], subject=f"{subject}.seconds")
elif kind == "cron":
if "expression" not in raw:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject}.expression is required for cron schedules")
expression = _require_text(raw["expression"], subject=f"{subject}.expression")
if len(expression.split()) != 5:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject}.expression must have five crontab fields (got {expression!r})"
)
allowed = {"kind"}
if kind == "interval":
allowed.add("seconds")
elif kind == "cron":
allowed.add("expression")
unknown = sorted(set(raw) - allowed)
if unknown:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject} has fields not valid for kind {kind!r}: {', '.join(unknown)}"
)
return ScheduleSpec(kind=kind, seconds=seconds, expression=expression)
def _parse_scheduler(raw: Any, *, subject: str) -> SchedulerSpec:
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be an object")
kind = _require_text(raw.get("kind"), subject=f"{subject}.kind")
if kind not in ALLOWED_SCHEDULER_KINDS:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject}.kind must be one of {', '.join(ALLOWED_SCHEDULER_KINDS)} (got {kind!r})"
)
label: str | None = None
if kind == "launchd":
if "label" not in raw:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject}.label is required for launchd schedulers")
label = _require_text(raw["label"], subject=f"{subject}.label")
allowed = {"kind"}
if kind == "launchd":
allowed.add("label")
unknown = sorted(set(raw) - allowed)
if unknown:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject} has fields not valid for kind {kind!r}: {', '.join(unknown)}"
)
return SchedulerSpec(kind=kind, label=label)
def _parse_worker(raw: Any) -> WorkerRecord:
data = _require_exact_fields(
raw,
required=_REQUIRED_WORKER_FIELDS,
optional=_OPTIONAL_WORKER_FIELDS,
subject="worker",
)
worker_id = _require_identifier(data["id"], subject="worker.id")
role = _require_text(data["role"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].role")
if role not in ALLOWED_ROLES:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"worker[{worker_id}].role must be one of {', '.join(ALLOWED_ROLES)} (got {role!r})"
)
return WorkerRecord(
id=worker_id,
display_name=_require_text(
data["display_name"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].display_name"
),
provider=_require_identifier(data["provider"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].provider"),
model=_require_text(data["model"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].model"),
project=_require_text(data["project"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].project"),
role=role,
namespace=_require_text(data["namespace"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].namespace"),
profile=_require_text(data["profile"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].profile"),
workflow=_require_text(data["workflow"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].workflow"),
schedule=_parse_schedule(data["schedule"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].schedule"),
timeout_seconds=_require_positive_int(
data["timeout_seconds"],
subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].timeout_seconds",
maximum=_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
),
enabled=_require_bool(data["enabled"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].enabled"),
scheduler=_parse_scheduler(data["scheduler"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].scheduler"),
notes=str(data.get("notes") or "").strip(),
)
def _require_unique(values: list[str], *, subject: str) -> None:
seen: set[str] = set()
for value in values:
if value in seen:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"duplicate {subject}: {value}")
seen.add(value)
def validate_payload(payload: Any, *, source_path: Path) -> WorkerRegistry:
"""Validate a decoded registry document and return the typed registry.
Raises :class:`RegistryValidationError` on any violation; never partially
accepts a document.
"""
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise RegistryValidationError("registry root must be an object")
version = payload.get("version")
if version != SCHEMA_VERSION:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"unsupported registry version: {version!r}")
reject_credential_keys(payload, subject="worker registry")
unknown = sorted(set(payload) - _TOP_LEVEL_FIELDS)
if unknown:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"registry has unknown fields: {', '.join(unknown)}")
revision = _require_positive_int(payload.get("revision"), subject="revision")
updated_at = _require_text(payload.get("updated_at"), subject="updated_at")
providers_raw = payload.get("providers")
if not isinstance(providers_raw, list) or not providers_raw:
raise RegistryValidationError("providers must be a non-empty array")
providers = tuple(_parse_provider(item) for item in providers_raw)
_require_unique([provider.id for provider in providers], subject="provider id")
workers_raw = payload.get("workers")
if not isinstance(workers_raw, list):
raise RegistryValidationError("workers must be an array")
workers = tuple(_parse_worker(item) for item in workers_raw)
_require_unique([worker.id for worker in workers], subject="worker id")
# Referential integrity: a worker naming an undeclared provider would look
# configured while being unrunnable, which is exactly the ambiguous
# ownership the epic requires to fail closed.
known_providers = {provider.id for provider in providers}
for worker in workers:
if worker.provider not in known_providers:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"worker[{worker.id}].provider references unknown provider {worker.provider!r}"
)
# A LaunchAgent label identifies a job to launchd; two workers sharing one
# would silently overwrite each other's agent.
_require_unique(
[worker.scheduler.label for worker in workers if worker.scheduler.label],
subject="scheduler label",
)
return WorkerRegistry(
version=version,
revision=revision,
updated_at=updated_at,
providers=providers,
workers=workers,
source_path=source_path,
)
def load_registry(path: Path | None = None) -> WorkerRegistry:
"""Load and validate the worker registry from disk."""
source = (path or default_registry_path()).resolve()
payload = json.loads(source.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
return validate_payload(payload, source_path=source)
# ── serialization ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def provider_to_dict(provider: ProviderRecord) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": provider.id,
"display_name": provider.display_name,
"vendor": provider.vendor,
"executable": provider.executable,
"available": provider.available,
"models": list(provider.models),
"notes": provider.notes,
}
def _schedule_to_dict(schedule: ScheduleSpec) -> dict[str, Any]:
payload: dict[str, Any] = {"kind": schedule.kind}
if schedule.kind == "interval":
payload["seconds"] = schedule.seconds
elif schedule.kind == "cron":
payload["expression"] = schedule.expression
return payload
def _scheduler_to_dict(scheduler: SchedulerSpec) -> dict[str, Any]:
payload: dict[str, Any] = {"kind": scheduler.kind}
if scheduler.kind == "launchd":
payload["label"] = scheduler.label
return payload
def worker_to_dict(worker: WorkerRecord) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": worker.id,
"display_name": worker.display_name,
"provider": worker.provider,
"model": worker.model,
"project": worker.project,
"role": worker.role,
"namespace": worker.namespace,
"profile": worker.profile,
"workflow": worker.workflow,
"schedule": _schedule_to_dict(worker.schedule),
"timeout_seconds": worker.timeout_seconds,
"enabled": worker.enabled,
"scheduler": _scheduler_to_dict(worker.scheduler),
"notes": worker.notes,
}
def registry_to_document(registry: WorkerRegistry) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Serialize to the on-disk document shape (no local paths embedded)."""
return {
"version": registry.version,
"revision": registry.revision,
"updated_at": registry.updated_at,
"providers": [provider_to_dict(provider) for provider in registry.providers],
"workers": [worker_to_dict(worker) for worker in registry.workers],
}
def registry_to_dict(registry: WorkerRegistry) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Serialize for JSON API responses (adds the resolved source path)."""
document = registry_to_document(registry)
document["source_path"] = str(registry.source_path)
return document
def find_worker(registry: WorkerRegistry, worker_id: str) -> WorkerRecord | None:
for worker in registry.workers:
if worker.id == worker_id:
return worker
return None
def find_provider(registry: WorkerRegistry, provider_id: str) -> ProviderRecord | None:
for provider in registry.providers:
if provider.id == provider_id:
return provider
return None
def workers_for_provider(registry: WorkerRegistry, provider_id: str) -> tuple[WorkerRecord, ...]:
return tuple(worker for worker in registry.workers if worker.provider == provider_id)
# ── persistence ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _utc_now() -> str:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
def _atomic_write(path: Path, payload: str) -> None:
"""Write *payload* to *path* atomically: temp file in the same dir, fsync, replace."""
parent = path.parent
parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
fd, temp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}-", suffix=".tmp", dir=parent)
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
handle.write(payload)
handle.flush()
os.fsync(handle.fileno())
os.replace(temp_path, path)
finally:
if os.path.exists(temp_path):
try:
os.remove(temp_path)
except OSError:
pass
def _revision_path(directory: Path, revision: int) -> Path:
return directory / f"rev-{revision:06d}.json"
def _prune_history(path: Path) -> None:
directory = history_dir(path)
revisions = list_revisions(path)
excess = len(revisions) - _HISTORY_LIMIT
for revision in revisions[: max(0, excess)]:
_revision_path(directory, revision).unlink(missing_ok=True)
def _archive_current(path: Path) -> int | None:
"""Copy the live document into the history dir under its own revision number."""
if not path.exists():
return None
try:
existing = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
revision = int(existing.get("revision", 0))
except (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError, ValueError, AttributeError):
# An unreadable live file has no trustworthy revision number to file it
# under, so it cannot join the history chain.
return None
if revision <= 0:
return None
_atomic_write(
_revision_path(history_dir(path), revision),
json.dumps(existing, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n",
)
_prune_history(path)
return revision
def list_revisions(path: Path | None = None) -> tuple[int, ...]:
"""Revision numbers retained in history for *path*, oldest first."""
directory = history_dir(path)
if not directory.is_dir():
return ()
revisions: list[int] = []
for entry in directory.glob("rev-*.json"):
try:
revisions.append(int(entry.stem.split("-", 1)[1]))
except (IndexError, ValueError):
continue
return tuple(sorted(revisions))
def save_registry(
registry: WorkerRegistry,
path: Path | None = None,
*,
updated_at: str | None = None,
) -> WorkerRegistry:
"""Validate, archive the superseded revision, then atomically persist a new one.
The stored revision is always the previous revision plus one, so a reader
can tell two documents apart even when their content is otherwise equal.
Returns the registry exactly as persisted.
"""
target = (path or registry.source_path or default_registry_path()).resolve()
document = registry_to_document(registry)
# Re-validate before writing: a registry assembled in memory has not
# necessarily been through the loader.
validate_payload(document, source_path=target)
archived = _archive_current(target)
document["revision"] = (archived + 1) if archived is not None else registry.revision
document["updated_at"] = updated_at or _utc_now()
persisted = validate_payload(document, source_path=target)
_atomic_write(target, json.dumps(document, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
return persisted
def rollback_to_revision(revision: int, path: Path | None = None) -> WorkerRegistry:
"""Restore a retained *revision* as a new head revision.
History is append-only: rolling back does not delete the revisions in
between, it republishes the chosen one under the next revision number, so a
rollback is itself reversible.
"""
target = (path or default_registry_path()).resolve()
snapshot_path = _revision_path(history_dir(target), revision)
if not snapshot_path.exists():
available = ", ".join(str(item) for item in list_revisions(target)) or "(none)"
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"revision {revision} is not retained for {target.name}; available: {available}"
)
payload = json.loads(snapshot_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
restored = validate_payload(payload, source_path=target)
return save_registry(restored, target)