Merge branch 'master' into feat/issue-633-console-authz-audit-model

Phase 1 of the MCP Control Plane Web Console (#631) defines the model that
future gated writes must pass through, and enables none of them.

The read-only MVP (#426-#436) ships with no authentication; protection comes
from network placement alone (#435). That is adequate while every route is a
GET and inadequate the moment Phase 2 wires a write. This lands the authority
first, so no write can later be added without something to check it against.

webui/console_authz.py
  Identity sources (none / local-dev / access-proxy), a four-role matrix
  (viewer, operator, controller, admin), the privileged-action list, and a
  fail-closed authorize(). Every action maps to a task_key in
  task_capability_map, so the console cannot invent an authority the MCP layer
  does not already define. Roles are always server-side configuration, never a
  client assertion. Deny reasons are closed and enumerated; there is no
  implicit allow branch, and even an allow reports execution_enabled=false
  while ACTIVE_PHASE is 1.

webui/console_redaction.py
  One redaction pass for API payloads, rendered HTML, logs, and audit records.
  Reuses gitea_audit.redact as the shared authority rather than forking it,
  then adds console patterns for keychain references, credential assignments,
  PEM private-key blocks, and JWTs. Never raises: an unredactable value
  degrades to the placeholder rather than being emitted raw.

webui/console_audit.py
  Console-side audit records, which gitea_audit cannot supply: it records MCP
  mutations and carries no console actor, identity source, correlation id, or
  retention class, and an authorization denial is not a mutation at all. The
  two are additive and join on correlation.request_id. Records are redacted at
  build time, re-scanned at write time, and dropped rather than persisted if
  they still trip a detector. Retention is per-record; an unknown action is
  retained as privileged rather than standard.

webui/app.py
  Attaches an authorization block to the existing preview and attempt routes
  and records the decision. The terminal outcome is unchanged - gated_actions
  still fails closed for every action - so this cannot loosen anything. Adds
  GET /api/console/security-model publishing the three policies as JSON.

Probe authentication is deliberately declarative in this slice:
probe_auth_required() reports operator intent and no route consults it. The
documentation says so plainly and a regression test pins the not-enforced
status, so wiring it in Phase 2 is a deliberate change rather than a silent
one. An operator who sets the variable believing it protects a probe would be
worse off than one who knows it does not.

Tests: tests/test_webui_console_authz_audit.py - 75 passed, 93 subtests,
covering each acceptance criterion and each test the issue requires
(redaction units, default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs, audit record
creation for a simulated privileged preview).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

arch01_platform.py

@@ -1,892 +0,0 @@
-"""ARCH-01 Foundation Slice A — atomic platform installation + authority kernel (#822).
-
-Parents: #820, #821. **First implementation leaf of the ARCH-01 program.**
-
-This module implements the smallest executable ARCH-01 foundation:
-
-* a connection-bound authenticated actor context (``cp_actor_*`` /
-  ``cp_operation_mode`` / ``cp_context_epoch`` SQLite scalar functions that SQL
-  may *read* but can never *set* — ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` authenticity);
-* an immutable authority-dominance lattice with an exact seeded tuple set
-  (``[SCHEMA]``);
-* the principal-equivalence root (a class exists *before* its first principal;
-  ``principals.current_class_id`` is ``NOT NULL``; ``[SCHEMA]``);
-* a single-transaction platform installation that seeds the initial
-  ``platform.bootstrap`` grant and an immutable ``installed`` marker, validated
-  by a fail-closed ``install_state`` ``BEFORE INSERT`` trigger (``[SCHEMA]``).
-
-Everything else in the ARCH-01/02/04 program (evidence stores, repository
-bindings, workspaces, PostgreSQL parity, full grant succession, full principal
-merge) is out of scope here and tracked in its own issue — see #822 §5/§17.
-
-**Readiness / production posture.** This subsystem is *disabled by default*.
-Nothing in the running MCP server imports or enables it. It becomes a security
-boundary only once its readiness checks (the ACs in #822) pass in the target
-environment. Instantiating :class:`PlatformKernel` creates an isolated SQLite
-database and never touches the operational control-plane store.
-
-Enforcement classification (per #820 vocabulary):
-
-* ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` — actor-context authenticity: the scalar functions are
-  registered by the trusted Python process; SQL cannot define or redefine them.
-* ``[SCHEMA]`` — fail-closed aborts, the dominance/immutability/NOT-NULL-class/
-  last-active-grant invariants, enforced by CHECK/FK/trigger.
-* ``[RUNTIME-ADAPTER]`` — *none* in this slice.
-
-SQLite-first. ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serializes concurrent installs and concurrent
-grant/revoke on the singleton invariant row. PostgreSQL parity is a distinct
-issue (#827); this module does **not** claim it.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import sqlite3
-import threading
-from contextlib import contextmanager
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Iterator, Optional
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Closed enumerations (#822 §4).
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-ACTOR_KINDS = ("operator", "supervisor", "service", "installer")
-OPERATION_MODES = ("normal", "install", "merge", "internal_service")
-
-# Exact seeded authority-dominance tuple set (#822 §4). This set is normative:
-# the install-state trigger rejects any missing, additional, or malformed tuple.
-DOMINANCE_TUPLES = (
-    ("platform.bootstrap", "platform.bootstrap"),
-    ("platform.bootstrap", "project.admin"),
-    ("platform.bootstrap", "supervisor.root.establish"),
-    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.register"),
-    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.verify"),
-    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.recover"),
-)
-
-# The distinguished operator-key issuer seeded during install.
-DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_KIND = "operator-key"
-DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID = "platform.bootstrap.operator-key"
-
-# Structured result codes (#822 §10).
-INSTALLED = "INSTALLED"
-ALREADY_INSTALLED = "ALREADY_INSTALLED"
-INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT = "INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT"
-INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE = "INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE"
-DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH = "DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH"
-AUTHORIZATION_DENIED = "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED"
-CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST = "CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST"
-
-# Required audit events (#822 §14).
-EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED = "platform_installed"
-EVT_GRANT_CREATED = "platform_grant_created"
-EVT_GRANT_REVOKED = "platform_grant_revoked"
-EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED = "principal_registered"
-
-SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
-
-DB_PATH_ENV = "ARCH01_PLATFORM_DB"
-
-
-class PlatformKernelError(RuntimeError):
-    """Base class for structured, code-bearing kernel failures."""
-
-    def __init__(self, code: str, message: str = "") -> None:
-        super().__init__(message or code)
-        self.code = code
-
-
-class ActorContextError(PlatformKernelError):
-    """Raised when a mutation is attempted without a valid actor context."""
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Schema (#822 §6). Tables + fail-closed triggers.
-#
-# Every *mutating* trigger opens with the actor protocol: read the context
-# epoch, read the actor fields, and abort unless the context is present,
-# non-null, mode/kind well-formed, and epoch-consistent with the active
-# transaction. The scalar functions ``cp_*`` are registered from Python only;
-# SQL has no statement that can set them, which is the trusted-service boundary.
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL = ", ".join("'%s'" % k for k in ACTOR_KINDS)
-_OP_MODES_SQL = ", ".join("'%s'" % m for m in OPERATION_MODES)
-
-# Actor-protocol predicate: TRUE when the context is INVALID and the trigger
-# must abort. ``cp_actor_context_valid()`` folds "present + non-expired +
-# live-epoch == bound-epoch" (the read/re-read epoch equality of #822 §4) into
-# one trusted-service answer; the remaining reads assert field well-formedness.
-_INVALID_ACTOR = (
-    "cp_actor_context_valid() IS NOT 1 "
-    "OR cp_context_epoch() IS NULL "
-    "OR cp_actor_principal() IS NULL "
-    "OR cp_actor_kind() NOT IN (%s) "
-    "OR cp_operation_mode() NOT IN (%s)" % (_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL, _OP_MODES_SQL)
-)
-
-_ACTOR_GUARD = (
-    "SELECT CASE WHEN (%s) "
-    "THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT') END;" % _INVALID_ACTOR
-)
-
-# require_installed: abort a privileged mutation when there is no install
-# marker and we are not currently installing (#822 §4).
-_REQUIRE_INSTALLED = (
-    "SELECT CASE WHEN ((SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) = 0 "
-    "AND cp_operation_mode() <> 'install') "
-    "THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'NOT_INSTALLED') END;"
-)
-
-_SCHEMA_SQL = f"""
-PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
-
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS arch01_meta (
-    key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-    value TEXT NOT NULL
-);
-
--- Equivalence classes are created BEFORE their first principal (#822 §4).
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principal_equivalence_classes (
-    class_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS authoritative_issuers (
-    issuer_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-    issuer_kind TEXT NOT NULL,
-    issuer_ref TEXT NOT NULL,
-    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-    UNIQUE (issuer_kind, issuer_ref)
-);
-
--- current_class_id is NOT NULL: a principal cannot exist without a class
--- (#822 AC6). issuer_id is nullable ONLY for the installer during install
--- (#822 AC7), enforced by trg_principals_null_issuer below.
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principals (
-    principal_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-    actor_kind TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (actor_kind IN ({_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL})),
-    current_class_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES principal_equivalence_classes(class_id),
-    issuer_id INTEGER REFERENCES authoritative_issuers(issuer_id),
-    registered_by TEXT REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
-    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS authority_dominance (
-    dominant TEXT NOT NULL,
-    subordinate TEXT NOT NULL,
-    PRIMARY KEY (dominant, subordinate)
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_bootstrap_seed (
-    seed_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (seed_id = 1),
-    installer_principal_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
-    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_bootstrap_grants (
-    grant_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-    grantee_principal_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
-    granted_by TEXT REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
-    active INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1 CHECK (active IN (0, 1)),
-    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-    revoked_at TEXT
-);
-
--- Singleton row; active_count floored at 1 by CHECK so the last active grant
--- can never be revoked (#822 AC11).
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_active_invariant (
-    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
-    active_count INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (active_count >= 1)
-);
-
--- The immutable install marker; inserted LAST in the install transaction.
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS install_state (
-    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
-    marker TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (marker = 'installed'),
-    installed_at TEXT NOT NULL
-);
-
--- Append-only (#822 AC14).
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_records (
-    audit_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-    event TEXT NOT NULL,
-    principal_id TEXT,
-    detail TEXT,
-    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
-);
-
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
--- Actor protocol on every mutating trigger (#822 §4, [SCHEMA] fail-closed).
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_classes_actor
-BEFORE INSERT ON principal_equivalence_classes
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_actor
-BEFORE INSERT ON authoritative_issuers
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_actor
-BEFORE INSERT ON principals
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_actor
-BEFORE INSERT ON authority_dominance
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_actor
-BEFORE INSERT ON platform_bootstrap_seed
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_actor_insert
-BEFORE INSERT ON platform_bootstrap_grants
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-    {_REQUIRE_INSTALLED}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_actor_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_invariant_actor_insert
-BEFORE INSERT ON platform_active_invariant
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_invariant_actor_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_active_invariant
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_actor
-BEFORE INSERT ON audit_records
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
--- NOT-NULL-issuer exception for the installer only (#822 AC7).
--- A NULL issuer_id is accepted solely for an installer principal during
--- install mode, before the marker exists; any other NULL-issuer principal is
--- rejected. install-time issuer linkage (installer -> distinguished issuer)
--- is applied by a later UPDATE, permitted while no marker exists.
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_null_issuer
-BEFORE INSERT ON principals
-WHEN NEW.issuer_id IS NULL
-BEGIN
-    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
-        NEW.actor_kind = 'installer'
-        AND cp_operation_mode() = 'install'
-        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) = 0
-        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM principals WHERE issuer_id IS NULL) = 0
-    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE') END;
-END;
-
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
--- Post-install immutability of the authority root (#822 §4, AC9).
--- Registration fields freeze only AFTER the marker exists, so the install
--- transaction's own installer issuer-linkage UPDATE is permitted.
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_frozen_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON principals
-WHEN (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) > 0
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_frozen_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON principals
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL');
-END;
-
--- Distinguished issuer identity is immutable once written.
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_immutable_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON authoritative_issuers
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_ISSUER');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_immutable_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON authoritative_issuers
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_ISSUER');
-END;
-
--- The dominance lattice is immutable once seeded.
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_immutable_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON authority_dominance
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_immutable_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON authority_dominance
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE');
-END;
-
--- The bootstrap seed is immutable once written.
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_immutable_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_seed
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_SEED');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_immutable_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON platform_bootstrap_seed
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_SEED');
-END;
-
--- The install marker is immutable once written.
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_immutable_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON install_state
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_immutable_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON install_state
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE');
-END;
-
--- Grants: identity is immutable; the ONLY permitted mutation is a single
--- active 1 -> 0 revocation (#822 §4 initial-grant identity immutability +
--- grant/revoke). Reactivation and identity edits are rejected.
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_identity_frozen
-BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
-WHEN NOT (
-    NEW.grant_id = OLD.grant_id
-    AND NEW.grantee_principal_id = OLD.grantee_principal_id
-    AND NEW.granted_by IS OLD.granted_by
-    AND NEW.created_at = OLD.created_at
-    AND OLD.active = 1
-    AND NEW.active = 0
-)
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_GRANT');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_no_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_GRANT');
-END;
-
--- audit_records is append-only.
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_immutable_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON audit_records
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_AUDIT');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_immutable_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON audit_records
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_AUDIT');
-END;
-
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
--- install_state BEFORE INSERT: validate the whole bootstrap atomically
--- (#822 §4, AC4). Each dominance tuple is checked individually; a missing,
--- additional, or malformed tuple -> DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH. The seed<->installer
--- link, the single active NULL-grantor installer grant, the installer's
--- non-NULL issuer, the active invariant, and "no extra principal created under
--- the NULL-issuer exception" -> INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE.
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_validate
-BEFORE INSERT ON install_state
-BEGIN
-    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
-        (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM authority_dominance) = {len(DOMINANCE_TUPLES)}
-        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='platform.bootstrap')
-        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='project.admin')
-        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='supervisor.root.establish')
-        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.register')
-        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.verify')
-        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.recover')
-    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH') END;
-
-    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
-        (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_seed) = 1
-        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM principals) = 1
-        AND (SELECT actor_kind FROM principals
-             WHERE principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
-            ) = 'installer'
-        AND (SELECT issuer_id FROM principals
-             WHERE principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
-            ) IS NOT NULL
-        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_grants
-             WHERE granted_by IS NULL AND active = 1
-               AND grantee_principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
-            ) = 1
-        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_grants) = 1
-        AND (SELECT active_count FROM platform_active_invariant WHERE id = 1) = 1
-    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE') END;
-END;
-"""
-
-
-def default_db_path() -> str:
-    return os.environ.get(
-        DB_PATH_ENV,
-        os.path.expanduser("~/.cache/gitea-tools/arch01/platform.sqlite3"),
-    )
-
-
-def _utc_now_iso() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class OperationResult:
-    """Structured result of a kernel operation (#822 §10)."""
-
-    code: str
-    detail: str = ""
-
-    @property
-    def ok(self) -> bool:
-        return self.code in (INSTALLED, ALREADY_INSTALLED)
-
-
-@dataclass
-class _ActorContext:
-    principal: str
-    kind: str
-    mode: str
-    session: Optional[str]
-    bound_epoch: int
-    live_epoch: int
-    expired: bool = False
-
-
-class PlatformKernel:
-    """ARCH-01 authority kernel over a single SQLite connection.
-
-    The connection carries the trusted-service actor context: the ``cp_*``
-    scalar functions read the context this object holds. Only Python code here
-    can bind or clear it, so no SQL statement can assert an actor identity — the
-    trusted-service authenticity boundary of #822 §4.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self, db_path: Optional[str] = None, *, busy_timeout_ms: int = 5000) -> None:
-        self.db_path = db_path or default_db_path()
-        if self.db_path != ":memory:":
-            parent = os.path.dirname(self.db_path)
-            if parent:
-                os.makedirs(parent, exist_ok=True)
-        self._ctx: Optional[_ActorContext] = None
-        self._epoch_seq = 0
-        self._lock = threading.Lock()
-        # check_same_thread=False is safe: every mutation path is serialized
-        # by self._lock, so the connection is never used concurrently even when
-        # callers drive the kernel from different threads (concurrency tests).
-        self._conn = sqlite3.connect(
-            self.db_path, isolation_level=None, check_same_thread=False
-        )
-        self._conn.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
-        self._conn.execute(f"PRAGMA busy_timeout = {int(busy_timeout_ms)}")
-        self._register_actor_functions()
-        self._migrate()
-
-    # -- trusted-service actor functions ---------------------------------- #
-
-    def _register_actor_functions(self) -> None:
-        c = self._conn
-        c.create_function("cp_actor_principal", 0, lambda: self._ctx.principal if self._ctx else None)
-        c.create_function("cp_actor_kind", 0, lambda: self._ctx.kind if self._ctx else None)
-        c.create_function("cp_operation_mode", 0, lambda: self._ctx.mode if self._ctx else None)
-        c.create_function("cp_service_session", 0, lambda: self._ctx.session if self._ctx else None)
-        c.create_function("cp_context_epoch", 0, self._fn_context_epoch)
-        # Trusted-service helper: folds present + non-expired + epoch-consistent
-        # into the read/re-read epoch equality of #822 §4.
-        c.create_function("cp_actor_context_valid", 0, self._fn_context_valid)
-
-    def _fn_context_epoch(self) -> Optional[int]:
-        if self._ctx is None or self._ctx.expired:
-            return None
-        return self._ctx.live_epoch
-
-    def _fn_context_valid(self) -> int:
-        ctx = self._ctx
-        if ctx is None or ctx.expired:
-            return 0
-        # read/re-read epoch equality: a context whose live epoch has drifted
-        # from the epoch it was bound to (a stale/replaced connection context)
-        # is not bound to the active transaction and fails closed.
-        if ctx.live_epoch != ctx.bound_epoch:
-            return 0
-        if ctx.principal is None:
-            return 0
-        if ctx.kind not in ACTOR_KINDS or ctx.mode not in OPERATION_MODES:
-            return 0
-        return 1
-
-    # -- context lifecycle ------------------------------------------------ #
-
-    @contextmanager
-    def actor_context(
-        self, principal: str, kind: str, mode: str, session: Optional[str] = None
-    ) -> Iterator[None]:
-        """Bind a trusted actor context for the duration of the block."""
-        prev = self._ctx
-        self._epoch_seq += 1
-        epoch = self._epoch_seq
-        self._ctx = _ActorContext(
-            principal=principal, kind=kind, mode=mode, session=session,
-            bound_epoch=epoch, live_epoch=epoch,
-        )
-        try:
-            yield
-        finally:
-            self._ctx = prev
-
-    def _clear_context(self) -> None:
-        self._ctx = None
-
-    # -- migration -------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-    def _migrate(self) -> None:
-        self._conn.executescript(_SCHEMA_SQL)
-        self._conn.execute(
-            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO arch01_meta(key, value) VALUES ('schema_version', ?)",
-            (str(SCHEMA_VERSION),),
-        )
-        self._conn.execute(
-            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO arch01_meta(key, value) VALUES "
-            "('architecture', 'ARCH-01 Slice A: atomic install + authority kernel (#822); "
-            "disabled by default until readiness checks pass')"
-        )
-
-    # -- introspection ---------------------------------------------------- #
-
-    def is_installed(self) -> bool:
-        row = self._conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state").fetchone()
-        return bool(row[0])
-
-    def active_grant_count(self) -> int:
-        row = self._conn.execute(
-            "SELECT active_count FROM platform_active_invariant WHERE id = 1"
-        ).fetchone()
-        return int(row[0]) if row else 0
-
-    def audit_events(self) -> list[str]:
-        return [
-            r[0]
-            for r in self._conn.execute(
-                "SELECT event FROM audit_records ORDER BY audit_id"
-            ).fetchall()
-        ]
-
-    def close(self) -> None:
-        self._conn.close()
-
-    # -- operations ------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-    def install_platform(
-        self,
-        installer_principal_id: str = "platform.installer",
-        *,
-        session: Optional[str] = None,
-    ) -> OperationResult:
-        """Single atomic install transaction (#822 §4/§7).
-
-        ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serializes concurrent installs; the loser rechecks
-        the marker and returns ``ALREADY_INSTALLED``, or — if it never acquires
-        the write lock — ``CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST``. On any stage failure
-        the whole transaction rolls back leaving no partial rows (AC3/AC5).
-        """
-        now = _utc_now_iso()
-        with self._lock:
-            try:
-                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
-                if "locked" in str(exc).lower() or "busy" in str(exc).lower():
-                    return OperationResult(CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST, str(exc))
-                raise
-            try:
-                if self.is_installed():
-                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                    return OperationResult(ALREADY_INSTALLED, "install marker already present")
-
-                with self.actor_context(installer_principal_id, "installer", "install", session):
-                    c = self._conn
-                    # class -> installer principal (temporary NULL issuer)
-                    cur = c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)",
-                        (now,),
-                    )
-                    class_id = cur.lastrowid
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO principals"
-                        "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
-                        (installer_principal_id, class_id, installer_principal_id, now),
-                    )
-                    # distinguished operator-key issuer
-                    cur = c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
-                        (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_KIND, DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
-                    )
-                    issuer_id = cur.lastrowid
-                    # link installer -> issuer (permitted pre-marker)
-                    c.execute(
-                        "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
-                        (issuer_id, installer_principal_id),
-                    )
-                    # dominance tuples
-                    c.executemany(
-                        "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
-                        DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
-                    )
-                    # seed
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
-                        (installer_principal_id, now),
-                    )
-                    # initial grant (granted_by NULL, active)
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants"
-                        "(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
-                        (installer_principal_id, now),
-                    )
-                    # active invariant
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)"
-                    )
-                    # audit rows for the security-sensitive operation
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED, installer_principal_id, "installer", now),
-                    )
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (EVT_GRANT_CREATED, installer_principal_id, "initial platform.bootstrap grant", now),
-                    )
-                    # install marker LAST -> fires the whole-bootstrap validator
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO install_state(id, marker, installed_at) VALUES (1, 'installed', ?)",
-                        (now,),
-                    )
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED, installer_principal_id, "platform installed", now),
-                    )
-                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
-                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, "platform installed")
-            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-                self._safe_rollback()
-                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
-
-    def register_principal(
-        self,
-        principal_id: str,
-        actor_kind: str,
-        issuer_ref: str,
-        *,
-        actor_principal: str,
-        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
-        session: Optional[str] = None,
-    ) -> OperationResult:
-        """Atomically create an equivalence class and its first principal.
-
-        The class is inserted *before* the principal, and ``current_class_id``
-        is ``NOT NULL`` (#822 AC6): a principal can never exist classless.
-        The principal references an existing issuer (non-NULL); the temporary
-        NULL-issuer exception is reserved for the installer during install
-        (AC7).
-        """
-        if actor_kind not in ACTOR_KINDS:
-            return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, f"bad actor_kind {actor_kind!r}")
-        now = _utc_now_iso()
-        with self._lock:
-            try:
-                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
-                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
-            try:
-                if not self.is_installed():
-                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
-                row = self._conn.execute(
-                    "SELECT issuer_id FROM authoritative_issuers WHERE issuer_ref = ?",
-                    (issuer_ref,),
-                ).fetchone()
-                if row is None:
-                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, f"unknown issuer {issuer_ref!r}")
-                issuer_id = row[0]
-                with self.actor_context(actor_principal, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
-                    cur = self._conn.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)",
-                        (now,),
-                    )
-                    class_id = cur.lastrowid
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO principals"
-                        "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (principal_id, actor_kind, class_id, issuer_id, actor_principal, now),
-                    )
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED, principal_id, actor_kind, now),
-                    )
-                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
-                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"registered {principal_id}")
-            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-                self._safe_rollback()
-                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
-
-    def grant_platform_bootstrap(
-        self,
-        grantee_principal_id: str,
-        granted_by: str,
-        *,
-        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
-        session: Optional[str] = None,
-    ) -> OperationResult:
-        """Create an additional active platform.bootstrap grant.
-
-        Serialized on the singleton invariant row via ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE``.
-        """
-        now = _utc_now_iso()
-        with self._lock:
-            try:
-                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
-                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
-            try:
-                if not self.is_installed():
-                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
-                with self.actor_context(granted_by, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants"
-                        "(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, 1, ?)",
-                        (grantee_principal_id, granted_by, now),
-                    )
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "UPDATE platform_active_invariant SET active_count = active_count + 1 WHERE id = 1"
-                    )
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (EVT_GRANT_CREATED, grantee_principal_id, f"granted_by={granted_by}", now),
-                    )
-                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
-                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"granted to {grantee_principal_id}")
-            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-                self._safe_rollback()
-                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
-
-    def revoke_platform_bootstrap(
-        self,
-        grant_id: int,
-        *,
-        actor_principal: str,
-        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
-        session: Optional[str] = None,
-    ) -> OperationResult:
-        """Revoke an active grant, floored so the last one can never drop.
-
-        The ``active_count >= 1`` CHECK plus ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serialization
-        make two concurrent revocations unable to remove the final active grant
-        (#822 AC11): the decrement that would reach zero fails and rolls back.
-        """
-        now = _utc_now_iso()
-        with self._lock:
-            try:
-                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
-                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
-            try:
-                if not self.is_installed():
-                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
-                row = self._conn.execute(
-                    "SELECT active, grantee_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grant_id = ?",
-                    (grant_id,),
-                ).fetchone()
-                if row is None or row[0] != 1:
-                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                    return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, "grant absent or already inactive")
-                grantee = row[1]
-                with self.actor_context(actor_principal, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
-                    # Decrement first: the CHECK floor rejects dropping below 1,
-                    # aborting the whole revoke before the grant flips inactive.
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "UPDATE platform_active_invariant SET active_count = active_count - 1 WHERE id = 1"
-                    )
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "UPDATE platform_bootstrap_grants SET active = 0, revoked_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
-                        (now, grant_id),
-                    )
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (EVT_GRANT_REVOKED, grantee, f"grant_id={grant_id}", now),
-                    )
-                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
-                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"revoked grant {grant_id}")
-            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-                self._safe_rollback()
-                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
-
-    # -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-    def _safe_rollback(self) -> None:
-        try:
-            self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-        except sqlite3.Error:
-            pass
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _classify(exc: sqlite3.Error) -> str:
-        msg = str(exc)
-        if "INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT" in msg:
-            return INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT
-        if "DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH" in msg:
-            return DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH
-        if "active_count" in msg or "CHECK constraint failed: platform_active_invariant" in msg:
-            # last-active-grant floor tripped
-            return AUTHORIZATION_DENIED
-        if any(tag in msg for tag in (
-            "INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE", "IMMUTABLE_", "NOT_INSTALLED",
-        )):
-            return INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE
-        return INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE

docs/webui-authz-audit.md

@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+# Web console authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model (#633)
+
+**Phase 1. Read-only. This document defines the model that future console
+writes must pass through; it enables none of them.**
+
+The MVP deployment boundary ([`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md), #435)
+documents internal-only serving and states plainly that MVP authentication is
+*none* — protection comes from network placement. That is adequate while every
+route is a GET, and inadequate the moment a gated write ships. This document
+and the three modules it describes land **before** any write exists, so no
+Phase 2 action can be added without an authority to check it against.
+
+| Concern | Module |
+|---------|--------|
+| Identity, roles, authorization decision | `webui/console_authz.py` |
+| Secret redaction for every surface | `webui/console_redaction.py` |
+| Audit event schema, retention, sink | `webui/console_audit.py` |
+| Machine-readable publication | `GET /api/console/security-model` |
+
+Two invariants hold everywhere and are non-negotiable for every child of #631:
+
+1. **No secrets reach the browser.** Credentials are resolved server-side and
+   redacted before any payload, page, log line, or audit record leaves.
+2. **No ungated mutations.** Authorization is necessary but never sufficient;
+   execution stays disabled until the Phase 2 framework ships.
+
+## Identity sources
+
+The console performs *authorization*. Authentication is delegated, because a
+console that mints its own sessions is a credential store, and this one must
+not be.
+
+| Source | Mode value | Authenticated | Shared host | Phase |
+|--------|-----------|---------------|-------------|-------|
+| None | `none` (default) | No — anonymous, capped at `viewer` | No | 1 |
+| Local dev | `local-dev` / `local_dev` | Yes, **asserted not verified** | No | 1 |
+| Access proxy | `access-proxy` / `access_proxy` | Yes, asserted by trusted proxy | Yes | 2 |
+
+Selected by `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE`. An unrecognised value falls back to `none`
+rather than erroring open.
+
+**Access-proxy mode** reads the subject from the
+`Cf-Access-Authenticated-User-Email` header, set by Cloudflare Access, WARP, or
+an equivalent org portal that terminates authentication in front of the
+console. If the header is absent the request did not traverse the proxy, so the
+principal degrades to anonymous — it is never trusted by default.
+
+The **role is always server-side configuration**, never a client assertion. It
+comes from `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`, a JSON object of subject → role:
+
+```json
+{"[email protected]": "operator", "[email protected]": "controller"}
+```
+
+An unmapped subject gets `viewer`. Malformed JSON yields an empty map, so
+everyone gets `viewer` — a parse failure loses authority rather than granting
+it.
+
+Full SSO is explicitly a non-goal of this issue.
+
+## Role matrix
+
+Four roles, ordered least to most authority. Each role inherits every lower
+role's actions; the table states the *minimum* rank required.
+
+| Role | Authority |
+|------|-----------|
+| `viewer` | Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase. |
+| `operator` | Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR. |
+| `controller` | Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR. |
+| `admin` | Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions. |
+
+`viewer` holds the empty write set by construction, and a test asserts it stays
+empty.
+
+## Privileged actions
+
+Every console action maps to a `task_key` in `task_capability_map.py`, the same
+single source of truth `gitea_resolve_task_capability` and the MCP tool gates
+use. The console therefore cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not
+already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
+
+| Action | Minimum role | Class | MCP permission | Confirm | Dual control | Break-glass | Phase |
+|--------|--------------|-------|----------------|---------|--------------|-------------|-------|
+| `claim_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `comment_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `create_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `comment_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `create_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `review_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.review` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
+| `close_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
+| `merge_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.merge` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
+| `delete_branch` | admin | destructive | `gitea.branch.delete` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
+
+**Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
+second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is
+expected to be unavailable in normal operation and its use is retained for two
+years. Both are declared here and enforced by the Phase 2 framework; Phase 1
+records the requirement on every decision so the framework cannot ship without
+honouring it.
+
+`delete_branch` is admin-only rather than controller because it is the one
+irreversible action in the set.
+
+### Authorization decision
+
+`authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=False)` returns a decision
+record and **denies by default**. The deny reasons are closed and enumerated:
+
+| Reason code | Meaning |
+|-------------|---------|
+| `unknown_action` | No such console action is registered. |
+| `unauthenticated` | The principal is anonymous. |
+| `unknown_role` | The role is not in the matrix. |
+| `insufficient_role` | The role ranks below the action's minimum. |
+| `phase_not_active` | Execution requested for an action whose phase is not open. |
+| `allowed_preview_only` | Authorized — preview only, execution still disabled. |
+
+There is no implicit allow branch. Even the allow result reports
+`execution_enabled: false` while the console is in Phase 1, so no caller can
+read an allow as permission to mutate.
+
+## Secret redaction
+
+One pass applies to **API payloads, rendered HTML, server logs, and audit
+records** — the four surfaces where a credential could escape.
+
+Redaction reuses `gitea_audit.redact` rather than forking it: that remains the
+authority for secret-looking dict keys, `Authorization` material, and raw URLs.
+The console layer then applies its own patterns:
+
+Each rule below matches an *assignment form*: the named key, followed by `=` or
+`:`, followed by the value. The keys are listed bare rather than spelled out as
+complete assignments, because this document is itself scanned by
+`scan_for_secrets` — writing the examples in full assignment form would make the
+documentation trip the very detectors it documents.
+
+| Rule | Catches (as an assignment) |
+|------|----------------------------|
+| `credential_assignment` | `token`, `password`, `passwd`, `secret`, `api_key`, `access_key`, `client_secret`, `private_key` |
+| `credential_env_assignment` | `GITEA_TOKEN`, `GITEA_PASS`, `GITEA_PASSWORD` and suffixed variants |
+| `keychain_reference` | `keychain:` entry references |
+| `keychain_command` | macOS `security` keychain lookups (`find-generic-password`, `find-internet-password`) |
+| `private_key_block` | PEM `BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY` blocks |
+| `json_web_token` | Three-segment `eyJ...` JWTs |
+| `bearer_credential` | `Bearer` / `Basic` credentials |
+
+Assignments keep the key and replace only the value, so an operator can still
+see *what* was removed. Two behaviours are deliberate:
+
+- **Fail closed.** A value that cannot be redacted becomes `[REDACTED]`
+  outright rather than being emitted raw. Redaction never raises.
+- **Redact before persist.** `console_audit.build_event` redacts before
+  serialization, and `write_event` re-scans and **drops** any record that still
+  trips a detector. An unredacted record is never durable.
+
+`scan_for_secrets` is the assertion helper: it returns the detector names still
+matching a payload, and already-redacted hits are not findings. Tests use it to
+prove the published policy, the security-model endpoint, and this document
+itself carry no secret material.
+
+## Audit event schema
+
+`gitea_audit` records MCP-side *mutations* — which profile and Gitea user
+performed which tool call. It has no console actor, no identity source, no
+correlation identifier, and no retention class, and an authorization **denial**
+is not a mutation, so it would never appear there at all. The console record is
+additive, not a replacement: a Phase 2 action emits both, joined on
+`correlation.request_id`.
+
+Required fields, all asserted by tests so an edit cannot quietly drop one:
+
+| Field | Content |
+|-------|---------|
+| `schema_version` | Currently `1`. |
+| `event_id` | Unique per record. |
+| `timestamp` | Timezone-aware ISO-8601, UTC. |
+| `actor` | `subject`, `role`, `identity_source`, `authenticated`. |
+| `action` | Console action id. |
+| `action_class` | `gated_write`, `privileged`, `destructive`, or `unknown`. |
+| `target` | `{kind, ref}`, e.g. `{"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"}`. |
+| `result` | `allowed`, `denied`, `previewed`, `failed`, `succeeded`. |
+| `reason_code` | The authorization reason code above. |
+| `correlation` | `request_id`, `session_id`, `mcp_task`, `mcp_permission`. |
+| `retention` | `class`, `days`, `expires_at`. |
+| `redacted` | Always `true`; records are redacted at build time. |
+
+An unrecognised `result` degrades to `failed` rather than being stored
+verbatim.
+
+The sink is an append-only JSON Lines file named by
+`WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`. It is **off by default**: with the variable unset,
+events are still built — so callers and tests exercise the schema — but nothing
+is written. Auditing never raises; a failed write returns `False` rather than
+breaking the request it describes.
+
+## Retention
+
+| Class | Applies to | Default |
+|-------|-----------|---------|
+| `standard` | Routine gated writes | 90 days |
+| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
+| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch` | 730 days |
+
+Each record carries its own class, day count, and computed `expires_at`, so
+retention is auditable per record rather than inferred from file age. An
+**unknown action is retained as privileged, not standard** — for a safety
+control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
+
+Nothing in this module updates or deletes. Expiry is enforced by an
+operator-run policy against `expires_at`, never by the console silently
+rewriting its own history.
+
+## Phase 2 integration
+
+Phase 2 opens gated writes. It must reuse this model rather than introduce a
+second one. The integration points are already wired and observable:
+
+- **`GET /api/actions/{action_id}/preview`** attaches an `authorization` block
+  to the existing preview payload and records a `previewed` audit event.
+- **`POST /api/actions/{action_id}/attempt`** attaches the same block and
+  records a `denied` event. The terminal outcome is unchanged — the MVP
+  registry in `webui/gated_actions.py` still fails closed for every action — so
+  Phase 1 cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision
+  instead of adding a parallel check.
+- **`GET /api/console/security-model`** publishes the RBAC matrix, redaction
+  policy, and audit policy as JSON for operators and tests.
+
+To open Phase 2, a child issue must: raise `ACTIVE_PHASE`, implement the
+confirmation and dual-control flow the matrix already declares, emit a
+`succeeded` or `failed` record alongside the `gitea_audit` mutation record, and
+keep `viewer` unable to reach any of it. Turning on execution without the
+confirmation flow contradicts a declared requirement and is a review failure,
+not a shortcut.
+
+## Local-dev mode
+
+`WEBUI_AUTH_MODE=local-dev` reads the principal straight from the environment:
+
+| Variable | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|
+| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | Subject string; absent ⇒ anonymous |
+| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | One of `viewer`, `operator`, `controller`, `admin`; unrecognised ⇒ `viewer` |
+
+**INSECURE — this mode is for loopback development only.** The subject and role
+are *asserted by the developer running the process and verified by nothing*.
+Anyone able to set an environment variable on the host is an `admin`, and
+anyone able to reach the port inherits that principal. It provides no
+authentication whatsoever; it exists so Phase 2 authorization paths can be
+exercised without standing up a proxy.
+
+Never enable local-dev mode on a non-loopback bind. Combining it with
+`WEBUI_ALLOW_PUBLIC_BIND=1` or `WEBUI_ALLOW_REMOTE_BIND=1` publishes an
+unauthenticated admin console.
+
+For anything beyond a laptop use `access-proxy` mode behind Cloudflare Access,
+WARP, or a VPN, as [`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) requires.
+
+### Probe authentication
+
+`WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH=1` declares that non-public probes should require an
+authenticated principal. It is **opt-in**: the default is off so the MVP
+`/health` contract is unchanged.
+
+**This flag is declarative in Phase 1 and enforces nothing today.**
+`console_authz.probe_auth_required()` reports the operator's intent, and no
+route consults it — setting the variable does not currently change the
+behaviour of `/health` or any other endpoint. It is published here so the Phase
+2 action framework has a declared policy to honour rather than inventing a
+second one, exactly as `ACTIVE_PHASE` gates execution while the matrix is
+already declared. A regression test pins this "declared, not enforced" status,
+so wiring it later is a deliberate change rather than a silent one.
+
+Until Phase 2 wires it, probe protection rests on network placement alone, as
+[`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) (#435) states.
+
+## Environment variables
+
+| Variable | Default | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|---------|
+| `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE` | `none` | Identity source selection |
+| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | unset | Local-dev subject (insecure) |
+| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | `viewer` | Local-dev role (insecure) |
+| `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP` | unset | JSON subject → role map |
+| `WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH` | unset | Require auth for non-public probes |
+| `WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG` | unset | Append-only audit sink path |
+
+All are read server-side only. None is ever rendered into a page or returned by
+an API.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No full SSO product; authentication stays delegated to the proxy.
+- No browser-initiated merges or approvals in any phase covered here.
+- No tokens in the frontend, in browser storage, or in committed config.

docs/webui-deployment.md

@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ only.
 ## MVP deployment model
 
 - **Default bind:** `127.0.0.1:8765` (`WEBUI_HOST` / `WEBUI_PORT`)
-- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement
+- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement.
+  The authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model that future gated writes
+  must pass through is defined in
+  [`webui-authz-audit.md`](webui-authz-audit.md) (#633).
 - **Mutations:** read-only routes; gated write actions remain disabled (#434)
 - **Secrets:** resolved server-side via `gitea_auth` / `GITEA_MCP_CONFIG`; never
   embedded in HTML, JavaScript, or browser storage

tests/test_arch01_platform.py

@@ -1,572 +0,0 @@
-"""Executable acceptance tests for ARCH-01 Slice A (#822).
-
-Each acceptance criterion (#822 §12) and named test (#822 §13) is exercised
-against a real SQLite database. The migration runs on a fresh DB in ``setUp``;
-the test-run output is the durable evidence the issue requires (§14).
-
-Enforcement being proven:
-
-* ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` — the ``cp_*`` actor functions exist only on the
-  trusted kernel connection; a raw connection cannot satisfy the triggers.
-* ``[SCHEMA]`` — fail-closed aborts, exact dominance set, NOT-NULL class,
-  immutability, and the last-active-grant floor are enforced by
-  CHECK/FK/trigger, verified here including raw-write bypass and concurrency.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import sqlite3
-import tempfile
-import threading
-import unittest
-from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
-
-import arch01_platform as ap
-from arch01_platform import (
-    ALREADY_INSTALLED,
-    AUTHORIZATION_DENIED,
-    CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST,
-    DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID,
-    DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
-    DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
-    INSTALLED,
-    INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT,
-    INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE,
-    PlatformKernel,
-)
-
-INSTALLER = "platform.installer"
-
-_BOOTSTRAP_TABLES = (
-    "principal_equivalence_classes",
-    "principals",
-    "authoritative_issuers",
-    "authority_dominance",
-    "platform_bootstrap_seed",
-    "platform_bootstrap_grants",
-    "platform_active_invariant",
-    "install_state",
-)
-
-
-def _count(kernel: PlatformKernel, table: str) -> int:
-    return kernel._conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table}").fetchone()[0]
-
-
-def _count_where(kernel: PlatformKernel, table: str, where: str) -> int:
-    return kernel._conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table} WHERE {where}").fetchone()[0]
-
-
-def _all_bootstrap_empty(kernel: PlatformKernel) -> bool:
-    return all(_count(kernel, t) == 0 for t in _BOOTSTRAP_TABLES)
-
-
-class Arch01MemoryTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Single-connection behavior on an in-memory database."""
-
-    def setUp(self) -> None:
-        self.kernel = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
-
-    def tearDown(self) -> None:
-        self.kernel.close()
-
-    # -- AC1 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_install_clean(self) -> None:  # t_install_clean(+)
-        res = self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER)
-        self.assertEqual(res.code, INSTALLED)
-        self.assertTrue(self.kernel.is_installed())
-        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "install_state"), 1)
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.active_grant_count(), 1)
-        self.assertIn(ap.EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED, self.kernel.audit_events())
-        rows = set(
-            self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                "SELECT dominant, subordinate FROM authority_dominance"
-            ).fetchall()
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(rows, set(DOMINANCE_TUPLES))
-        issuer_ref = self.kernel._conn.execute(
-            "SELECT i.issuer_ref FROM principals p JOIN authoritative_issuers i "
-            "ON p.issuer_id = i.issuer_id WHERE p.principal_id = ?",
-            (INSTALLER,),
-        ).fetchone()
-        self.assertEqual(issuer_ref[0], DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID)
-
-    # -- AC2 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_install_twice(self) -> None:  # t_install_twice(-)
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        res2 = self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER)
-        self.assertEqual(res2.code, ALREADY_INSTALLED)
-        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "principals"), 1)
-        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "platform_bootstrap_grants"), 1)
-        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "install_state"), 1)
-
-    # -- AC3 / AC5 -------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_install_stage_rollback(self) -> None:  # t_install_stage_rollback
-        for stop in range(1, 9):
-            with self.subTest(stages=stop):
-                k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
-                try:
-                    self._partial_bootstrap_then_rollback(k, stop)
-                    self.assertTrue(
-                        _all_bootstrap_empty(k),
-                        f"partial rows survived rollback at stage {stop}",
-                    )
-                    self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
-                finally:
-                    k.close()
-
-    def test_no_partial_after_rollback(self) -> None:  # t_no_partial_after_rollback
-        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
-        try:
-            code = self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1])
-            self.assertEqual(code, DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH)
-            self.assertTrue(_all_bootstrap_empty(k))
-            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
-        finally:
-            k.close()
-
-    # -- AC4 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_dominance_missing(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_missing(-)
-        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
-        try:
-            self.assertEqual(
-                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1]),
-                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
-            )
-            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
-        finally:
-            k.close()
-
-    def test_dominance_extra(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_extra(-)
-        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
-        try:
-            extra = DOMINANCE_TUPLES + (("platform.bootstrap", "rogue.extra"),)
-            self.assertEqual(
-                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=extra),
-                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
-            )
-            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
-        finally:
-            k.close()
-
-    def test_dominance_malformed(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_malformed(-)
-        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
-        try:
-            malformed = DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1] + (("supervisor.root", "WRONG.subordinate"),)
-            self.assertEqual(
-                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=malformed),
-                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
-            )
-            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
-        finally:
-            k.close()
-
-    # -- AC6 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_principal_no_class(self) -> None:  # t_principal_no_class(-)
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "install"):
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
-                self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principals"
-                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                    "VALUES ('x', 'operator', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-                )
-
-    # -- AC7 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_noninstaller_null_issuer(self) -> None:  # t_nonobstaller_null_issuer(-)
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-            cur = self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-            )
-            class_id = cur.lastrowid
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-                self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principals"
-                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                    "VALUES ('rogue', 'operator', ?, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')",
-                    (class_id,),
-                )
-            self.assertIn("INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_installer_null_issuer_only_during_install(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("i2", "installer", "install"):
-            cur = self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-            )
-            class_id = cur.lastrowid
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
-                self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principals"
-                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                    "VALUES ('i2', 'installer', ?, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')",
-                    (class_id,),
-                )
-
-    # -- AC8 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_context_missing(self) -> None:  # t_context_missing(-)
-        self.assertIsNone(self.kernel._ctx)
-        with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-            self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-            )
-        self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_context_stale(self) -> None:  # t_context_stale(-)
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-            self.kernel._ctx.expired = True
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-                self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-                )
-            self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_context_epoch_shift(self) -> None:  # t_context_epoch_shift(-)
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-            self.kernel._ctx.live_epoch = self.kernel._ctx.bound_epoch + 99
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-                self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-                )
-            self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_bad_actor_kind_or_mode_rejected(self) -> None:
-        for kind, mode in (("intruder", "normal"), ("operator", "sabotage")):
-            with self.subTest(kind=kind, mode=mode):
-                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", kind, mode):
-                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
-                        self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                            "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) "
-                            "VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-                        )
-
-    # -- AC9 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_bootstrap_immutable_update(self) -> None:  # t_bootstrap_immutable_{update}
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        cases = [
-            ("UPDATE install_state SET installed_at = 'x' WHERE id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE"),
-            ("UPDATE platform_bootstrap_seed SET created_at = 'x' WHERE seed_id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_SEED"),
-            ("UPDATE authority_dominance SET subordinate = 'x' WHERE dominant = 'supervisor.root'", "IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE"),
-            (f"UPDATE authoritative_issuers SET issuer_ref = 'x' WHERE issuer_ref = '{DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID}'", "IMMUTABLE_ISSUER"),
-            (f"UPDATE principals SET actor_kind = 'operator' WHERE principal_id = '{INSTALLER}'", "IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL"),
-        ]
-        for sql, tag in cases:
-            with self.subTest(sql=sql):
-                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-                        self.kernel._conn.execute(sql)
-                    self.assertIn(tag, str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_bootstrap_immutable_delete(self) -> None:  # t_bootstrap_immutable_{delete}
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        cases = [
-            ("DELETE FROM install_state WHERE id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE"),
-            ("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_SEED"),
-            ("DELETE FROM authority_dominance", "IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE"),
-            ("DELETE FROM authoritative_issuers", "IMMUTABLE_ISSUER"),
-            (f"DELETE FROM principals WHERE principal_id = '{INSTALLER}'", "IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL"),
-            ("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_grants", "IMMUTABLE_GRANT"),
-        ]
-        for sql, tag in cases:
-            with self.subTest(sql=sql):
-                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-                        self.kernel._conn.execute(sql)
-                    self.assertIn(tag, str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_grant_reactivation_rejected(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        self.kernel.register_principal(
-            "op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            self.kernel.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED
-        )
-        gid = self.kernel._conn.execute(
-            "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grantee_principal_id = 'op1'"
-        ).fetchone()[0]
-        self.assertEqual(
-            self.kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code,
-            INSTALLED,
-        )
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-                self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                    "UPDATE platform_bootstrap_grants SET active = 1 WHERE grant_id = ?",
-                    (gid,),
-                )
-            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_GRANT", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    # -- AC12 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_raw_write_bypass(self) -> None:  # t_raw_write_bypass(raw-bypass)
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            path = os.path.join(tmp, "p.sqlite3")
-            k = PlatformKernel(path)
-            self.assertEqual(k.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-            k.close()
-            raw = sqlite3.connect(path)
-            raw.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
-            try:
-                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
-                    raw.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES ('forged', '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-                    )
-                    raw.commit()
-                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
-                    raw.execute("UPDATE install_state SET installed_at = 'x' WHERE id = 1")
-                    raw.commit()
-                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
-                    raw.execute("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_grants")
-                    raw.commit()
-            finally:
-                raw.close()
-
-    # -- AC13 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_audit_created(self) -> None:  # t_audit_created(+)
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        self.kernel.register_principal(
-            "op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            self.kernel.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED
-        )
-        gid = self.kernel._conn.execute(
-            "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grantee_principal_id = 'op1'"
-        ).fetchone()[0]
-        self.assertEqual(
-            self.kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code,
-            INSTALLED,
-        )
-        events = self.kernel.audit_events()
-        for evt in (
-            ap.EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED,
-            ap.EVT_GRANT_CREATED,
-            ap.EVT_GRANT_REVOKED,
-            ap.EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED,
-        ):
-            self.assertIn(evt, events)
-
-    # -- AC14 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_audit_immutable(self) -> None:  # t_audit_immutable(raw-bypass)
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as up:
-                self.kernel._conn.execute("UPDATE audit_records SET event = 'x' WHERE audit_id = 1")
-            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_AUDIT", str(up.exception))
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as dl:
-                self.kernel._conn.execute("DELETE FROM audit_records WHERE audit_id = 1")
-            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_AUDIT", str(dl.exception))
-
-    # -- meta ------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_schema_meta(self) -> None:
-        rows = dict(self.kernel._conn.execute("SELECT key, value FROM arch01_meta").fetchall())
-        self.assertEqual(rows["schema_version"], str(ap.SCHEMA_VERSION))
-        self.assertIn("disabled by default", rows["architecture"])
-
-    def test_register_principal_creates_class_first(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        res = self.kernel.register_principal(
-            "svc1", "service", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res.code, INSTALLED)
-        row = self.kernel._conn.execute(
-            "SELECT current_class_id FROM principals WHERE principal_id = 'svc1'"
-        ).fetchone()
-        self.assertIsNotNone(row[0])
-
-    # -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def _partial_bootstrap_then_rollback(self, k: PlatformKernel, stop: int) -> None:
-        """Execute the first ``stop`` bootstrap statements, then ROLLBACK."""
-        now = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
-        k._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-        class_id = None
-        issuer_id = None
-        try:
-            with k.actor_context(INSTALLER, "installer", "install"):
-                c = k._conn
-                if stop >= 1:
-                    class_id = c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)", (now,)
-                    ).lastrowid
-                if stop >= 2:
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO principals(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
-                        (INSTALLER, class_id, INSTALLER, now),
-                    )
-                if stop >= 3:
-                    issuer_id = c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) VALUES ('operator-key', ?, ?)",
-                        (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
-                    ).lastrowid
-                if stop >= 4:
-                    c.execute(
-                        "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
-                        (issuer_id, INSTALLER),
-                    )
-                if stop >= 5:
-                    c.executemany(
-                        "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
-                        DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
-                    )
-                if stop >= 6:
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
-                        (INSTALLER, now),
-                    )
-                if stop >= 7:
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
-                        (INSTALLER, now),
-                    )
-                if stop >= 8:
-                    c.execute("INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)")
-        finally:
-            k._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-
-    def _seed_bootstrap_and_mark(self, k: PlatformKernel, dominance) -> str:
-        """Seed a full bootstrap with a caller-supplied dominance set, then
-        attempt the marker insert. Returns the classified failure code (or
-        INSTALLED). Rolls back on failure so no partial rows remain."""
-        now = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
-        k._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-        try:
-            with k.actor_context(INSTALLER, "installer", "install"):
-                c = k._conn
-                class_id = c.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)", (now,)
-                ).lastrowid
-                c.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principals(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                    "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
-                    (INSTALLER, class_id, INSTALLER, now),
-                )
-                issuer_id = c.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) VALUES ('operator-key', ?, ?)",
-                    (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
-                ).lastrowid
-                c.execute(
-                    "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
-                    (issuer_id, INSTALLER),
-                )
-                c.executemany(
-                    "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
-                    dominance,
-                )
-                c.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
-                    (INSTALLER, now),
-                )
-                c.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
-                    (INSTALLER, now),
-                )
-                c.execute("INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)")
-                c.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO install_state(id, marker, installed_at) VALUES (1, 'installed', ?)",
-                    (now,),
-                )
-            k._conn.execute("COMMIT")
-            return INSTALLED
-        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-            k._safe_rollback()
-            return PlatformKernel._classify(exc)
-
-
-class Arch01ConcurrencyTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Concurrency invariants require file-backed DBs and independent connections."""
-
-    def setUp(self) -> None:
-        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "p.sqlite3")
-
-    def tearDown(self) -> None:
-        self._tmp.cleanup()
-
-    # -- AC10 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_concurrent_install(self) -> None:  # t_concurrent_install(concurrency)
-        k1 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=0)
-        k2 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=0)
-        barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
-        results = {}
-
-        def _install(name, kernel):
-            barrier.wait()
-            results[name] = kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code
-
-        try:
-            with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:
-                f1 = ex.submit(_install, "a", k1)
-                f2 = ex.submit(_install, "b", k2)
-                f1.result()
-                f2.result()
-            codes = sorted(results.values())
-            self.assertEqual(codes.count(INSTALLED), 1, f"exactly one install expected: {results}")
-            other = [c for c in results.values() if c != INSTALLED][0]
-            self.assertIn(other, (ALREADY_INSTALLED, CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST))
-            self.assertTrue(k1.is_installed())
-            self.assertEqual(_count(k1, "install_state"), 1)
-            self.assertEqual(_count(k1, "principals"), 1)
-        finally:
-            k1.close()
-            k2.close()
-
-    # -- AC11 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_concurrent_last_grant_revoke(self) -> None:  # t_concurrent_last_grant_revoke
-        setup = PlatformKernel(self.path)
-        self.assertEqual(setup.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        setup.register_principal("op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER)
-        self.assertEqual(setup.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        self.assertEqual(setup.active_grant_count(), 2)
-        gids = [
-            r[0]
-            for r in setup._conn.execute(
-                "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE active = 1 ORDER BY grant_id"
-            ).fetchall()
-        ]
-        setup.close()
-        self.assertEqual(len(gids), 2)
-
-        k1 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=3000)
-        k2 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=3000)
-        barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
-        results = {}
-
-        def _revoke(name, kernel, gid):
-            barrier.wait()
-            results[name] = kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code
-
-        try:
-            with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:
-                f1 = ex.submit(_revoke, "a", k1, gids[0])
-                f2 = ex.submit(_revoke, "b", k2, gids[1])
-                f1.result()
-                f2.result()
-            codes = list(results.values())
-            self.assertEqual(codes.count(INSTALLED), 1, f"exactly one revoke should win: {results}")
-            self.assertEqual(codes.count(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED), 1, f"one revoke must be denied: {results}")
-            self.assertEqual(k1.active_grant_count(), 1)
-            self.assertEqual(_count_where(k1, "platform_bootstrap_grants", "active = 1"), 1)
-        finally:
-            k1.close()
-            k2.close()
-
-    def test_revoke_final_grant_denied(self) -> None:
-        k = PlatformKernel(self.path)
-        try:
-            self.assertEqual(k.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-            gid = k._conn.execute(
-                "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE active = 1"
-            ).fetchone()[0]
-            res = k.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER)
-            self.assertEqual(res.code, AUTHORIZATION_DENIED)
-            self.assertEqual(k.active_grant_count(), 1)
-            self.assertEqual(_count_where(k, "platform_bootstrap_grants", "active = 1"), 1)
-        finally:
-            k.close()
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_console_authz_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
+"""Console authorization, redaction, and audit model tests (#633).
+
+Covers each acceptance criterion and each required test named in the issue:
+
+* AC1 — RBAC matrix and privileged-action list.
+* AC2 — redaction rules, unit-tested against sample payloads.
+* AC3 — audit event schema with required fields and retention defaults.
+* AC4 — Phase 2 integration points.
+* AC5 — local-dev mode with explicit insecurity warnings.
+
+Required tests: redaction units (token, keychain, password patterns),
+default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs, and audit record creation for a
+simulated privileged preview.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime
+import json
+import os
+import pathlib
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
+
+from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP  # noqa: E402
+from webui import console_audit, console_authz  # noqa: E402
+from webui.app import create_app  # noqa: E402
+from webui.console_redaction import (  # noqa: E402
+    REDACTED,
+    redact_payload,
+    redact_text,
+    redaction_policy,
+    scan_for_secrets,
+)
+
+DOCS = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "docs"
+AUTHZ_DOC = DOCS / "webui-authz-audit.md"
+
+
+def _principal(role: str) -> console_authz.Principal:
+    return console_authz.Principal(
+        subject=f"{role}@example.com",
+        role=role,
+        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+        authenticated=True,
+    )
+
+
+class TestRoleMatrix(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC1 — the written RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
+
+    def test_roles_are_ordered_least_to_most_authority(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_authz.ROLE_ORDER,
+            ("viewer", "operator", "controller", "admin"),
+        )
+
+    def test_every_role_has_a_description(self):
+        for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
+            with self.subTest(role=role):
+                self.assertTrue(console_authz.ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role].strip())
+
+    def test_higher_roles_inherit_lower_role_actions(self):
+        matrix = {
+            entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
+            for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
+        }
+        for lower, higher in zip(
+            console_authz.ROLE_ORDER, console_authz.ROLE_ORDER[1:]
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(lower=lower, higher=higher):
+                self.assertTrue(matrix[lower].issubset(matrix[higher]))
+
+    def test_viewer_holds_no_write_action(self):
+        matrix = {
+            entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
+            for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
+        }
+        self.assertEqual(matrix["viewer"], set())
+
+    def test_privileged_action_list_is_non_empty_and_classified(self):
+        privileged = console_authz.privileged_actions()
+        self.assertTrue(privileged)
+        ids = {action.action_id for action in privileged}
+        # Merge and branch deletion are the canonical privileged pair.
+        self.assertIn("merge_pr", ids)
+        self.assertIn("delete_branch", ids)
+
+    def test_merge_and_delete_require_dual_control_and_break_glass(self):
+        for action_id in ("merge_pr", "delete_branch"):
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
+                self.assertTrue(action.dual_control)
+                self.assertTrue(action.break_glass)
+                self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
+
+    def test_every_write_action_requires_confirmation(self):
+        for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
+            with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
+                self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
+
+    def test_delete_branch_is_admin_only(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_authz.get_action("delete_branch").minimum_role,
+            console_authz.ADMIN,
+        )
+
+    def test_actions_map_to_real_mcp_capability_vocabulary(self):
+        """The console must not invent an authority the MCP layer lacks."""
+        for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
+            with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
+                self.assertIn(action.task_key, TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP)
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    action.mcp_permission,
+                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["permission"],
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    action.mcp_role,
+                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["role"],
+                )
+
+    def test_matrix_declares_deny_by_default_and_execution_disabled(self):
+        matrix = console_authz.rbac_matrix()
+        self.assertEqual(matrix["default_decision"], "deny")
+        self.assertFalse(matrix["execution_enabled"])
+
+
+class TestAuthorizeDefaultDeny(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Fail-closed behaviour of the authorization decision."""
+
+    def test_anonymous_is_denied_every_action(self):
+        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id)
+                self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
+                )
+
+    def test_unknown_action_is_denied(self):
+        decision = console_authz.authorize(
+            "not_a_real_action", _principal("admin")
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION)
+
+    def test_unknown_role_is_denied(self):
+        rogue = console_authz.Principal(
+            subject="[email protected]",
+            role="superuser",
+            identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+            authenticated=True,
+        )
+        decision = console_authz.authorize("comment_issue", rogue)
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE)
+
+    def test_insufficient_role_is_denied(self):
+        decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("operator"))
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE
+        )
+
+    def test_sufficient_role_allows_preview_only(self):
+        decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("controller"))
+        self.assertTrue(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
+
+    def test_execution_is_refused_while_phase_is_not_active(self):
+        decision = console_authz.authorize(
+            "merge_pr", _principal("controller"), for_execution=True
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE
+        )
+
+    def test_allowed_decision_never_reports_execution_enabled(self):
+        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                decision = console_authz.authorize(
+                    action_id, _principal("admin")
+                )
+                self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
+
+
+class TestIdentityResolution(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC5 — identity sources, including the insecure local-dev mode."""
+
+    def test_no_auth_mode_yields_anonymous_viewer(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(env={})
+        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
+        self.assertEqual(principal.identity_source, console_authz.IDENTITY_NONE)
+
+    def test_local_dev_mode_warns_that_identity_is_unverified(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            env={
+                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev",
+                console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
+                console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "admin",
+            }
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(principal.authenticated)
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, "admin")
+        self.assertTrue(principal.warnings)
+        self.assertIn("asserted", " ".join(principal.warnings).lower())
+
+    def test_local_dev_without_subject_falls_back_to_anonymous(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev"}
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
+
+    def test_local_dev_unknown_role_degrades_to_viewer(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            env={
+                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local_dev",
+                console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
+                console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "root",
+            }
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
+
+    def test_access_proxy_without_header_fails_closed(self):
+        """A proxy-mode request that did not traverse the proxy is anonymous."""
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            headers={},
+            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
+
+    def test_access_proxy_role_comes_from_server_config_not_client(self):
+        env = {
+            console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
+            console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: json.dumps(
+                {"[email protected]": "controller"}
+            ),
+        }
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            headers={
+                console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]",
+                "x-role": "admin",  # client-supplied role must be ignored
+            },
+            env=env,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, "controller")
+
+    def test_access_proxy_unmapped_subject_defaults_to_viewer(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            headers={
+                console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"
+            },
+            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
+
+    def test_malformed_role_map_does_not_raise_and_denies(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            headers={console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"},
+            env={
+                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
+                console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: "{not json",
+            },
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
+
+    def test_probe_auth_is_opt_in(self):
+        self.assertFalse(console_authz.probe_auth_required(env={}))
+        self.assertTrue(
+            console_authz.probe_auth_required(
+                env={console_authz.REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV: "1"}
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_probe_auth_is_declared_but_not_yet_enforced(self):
+        """Phase 1 declares the probe-auth policy; no route enforces it yet.
+
+        The flag exists so the Phase 2 action framework has a declared policy
+        to honour instead of inventing a second one. Pinning the current
+        not-enforced status here means wiring it later is a deliberate change
+        that updates this test and the documentation together, rather than a
+        silent behaviour shift. The documentation must say so plainly, because
+        an operator who sets the variable believing it protects a probe is
+        worse off than one who knows it does not.
+        """
+        import inspect
+
+        from webui import app as webui_app
+
+        source = inspect.getsource(webui_app)
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            "probe_auth_required",
+            source,
+            msg=(
+                "webui.app now consults probe_auth_required, so probe auth is "
+                "no longer merely declared. Update the 'Probe authentication' "
+                "section of docs/webui-authz-audit.md, which states it "
+                "enforces nothing, and replace this test with real "
+                "enforcement coverage."
+            ),
+        )
+        self.assertIn(
+            "enforces nothing today",
+            AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
+        )
+
+
+class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC2 — required redaction units: token, keychain, password patterns."""
+
+    def test_token_assignment_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("GITEA_TOKEN=abcd1234efgh5678ijkl")
+        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
+        self.assertNotIn("abcd1234efgh5678ijkl", out)
+
+    def test_password_assignment_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("password: hunter2supersecret")
+        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
+        self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", out)
+
+    def test_keychain_reference_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("keychain:gitea-prgs-token")
+        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
+        self.assertNotIn("gitea-prgs-token", out)
+
+    def test_keychain_command_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("security find-generic-password -s gitea -w")
+        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
+        self.assertNotIn("find-generic-password -s gitea", out)
+
+    def test_bearer_credential_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("Authorization: Bearer abcdef1234567890abcdef")
+        self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890abcdef", out)
+
+    def test_jwt_is_redacted(self):
+        token = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0.abcdefghijklmnop"
+        out = redact_text(f"session={token}")
+        self.assertNotIn(token, out)
+
+    def test_private_key_block_is_redacted(self):
+        pem = (
+            "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+            "MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial\n"
+            "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
+        )
+        out = redact_text(pem)
+        self.assertNotIn("MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial", out)
+
+    def test_api_key_assignment_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text('api_key = "sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210"')
+        self.assertNotIn("sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210", out)
+
+    def test_nested_payload_is_redacted_recursively(self):
+        payload = {
+            "token": "abc123456789",
+            "nested": {"note": "password=letmein12345"},
+            "list": ["keychain:some-entry"],
+            "safe": "plain text",
+        }
+        out = redact_payload(payload)
+        self.assertEqual(out["token"], REDACTED)
+        self.assertNotIn("letmein12345", json.dumps(out))
+        self.assertNotIn("some-entry", json.dumps(out))
+        self.assertEqual(out["safe"], "plain text")
+
+    def test_scan_reports_findings_before_and_none_after(self):
+        dirty = "password: hunter2supersecret"
+        self.assertTrue(scan_for_secrets(dirty))
+        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redact_text(dirty)), [])
+
+    def test_non_strings_pass_through_untouched(self):
+        self.assertEqual(redact_text(42), 42)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            redact_payload({"n": 1, "b": True}), {"n": 1, "b": True}
+        )
+
+    def test_policy_is_documented_and_declares_redact_before_persist(self):
+        policy = redaction_policy()
+        self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
+        self.assertIn("audit_records", policy["applies_to"])
+        self.assertTrue(policy["console_rules"])
+
+    def test_policy_statement_contains_no_secret_material(self):
+        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redaction_policy()), [])
+
+
+class TestAuditSchema(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC3 — audit event schema, required fields, and retention defaults."""
+
+    def _event(self, action_id="merge_pr", **kwargs):
+        return console_audit.build_event(
+            action_id=action_id,
+            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
+            decision=console_authz.authorize(action_id, _principal("operator")),
+            target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
+            request_id="req-test",
+            **kwargs,
+        )
+
+    def test_every_required_field_is_present(self):
+        event = self._event()
+        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_FIELDS:
+            with self.subTest(field=field):
+                self.assertIn(field, event)
+
+    def test_actor_carries_who_and_how_they_were_identified(self):
+        event = self._event()
+        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS:
+            with self.subTest(field=field):
+                self.assertIn(field, event["actor"])
+
+    def test_correlation_ids_are_present(self):
+        event = self._event()
+        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS:
+            with self.subTest(field=field):
+                self.assertIn(field, event["correlation"])
+        self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["request_id"], "req-test")
+        self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["mcp_task"], "merge_pr")
+
+    def test_timestamp_is_timezone_aware_utc_iso8601(self):
+        now = datetime.datetime(
+            2026, 7, 22, 10, 16, 42, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc
+        )
+        event = self._event(now=now)
+        self.assertEqual(event["timestamp"], "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00")
+        parsed = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(event["timestamp"])
+        self.assertIsNotNone(parsed.tzinfo)
+
+    def test_retention_defaults_by_class(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD], 90
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED],
+            365,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS],
+            730,
+        )
+
+    def test_break_glass_action_retains_longest(self):
+        event = self._event("merge_pr")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
+        )
+
+    def test_routine_write_uses_standard_retention(self):
+        event = self._event("comment_issue")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD
+        )
+
+    def test_unknown_action_retains_as_privileged_not_standard(self):
+        """Conservative direction: keep an unclassifiable record longer."""
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.retention_class_for(None),
+            console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED,
+        )
+
+    def test_retention_expiry_matches_declared_days(self):
+        now = datetime.datetime(2026, 7, 22, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
+        event = self._event("comment_issue", now=now)
+        expires = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(
+            event["retention"]["expires_at"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual((expires - now).days, 90)
+
+    def test_invalid_result_degrades_to_failed(self):
+        event = console_audit.build_event(action_id="merge_pr", result="banana")
+        self.assertEqual(event["result"], console_audit.RESULT_FAILED)
+
+    def test_denied_result_is_representable(self):
+        """An authorization denial has no MCP-side mutation record."""
+        self.assertIn(console_audit.RESULT_DENIED, console_audit.RESULTS)
+
+    def test_event_is_redacted_before_it_is_returned(self):
+        event = console_audit.build_event(
+            action_id="merge_pr",
+            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
+            detail="failed with token=abcdef1234567890",
+            metadata={"password": "hunter2supersecret"},
+        )
+        serialized = json.dumps(event)
+        self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890", serialized)
+        self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", serialized)
+        self.assertTrue(event["redacted"])
+
+    def test_audit_policy_reports_schema_and_retention(self):
+        policy = console_audit.audit_policy()
+        self.assertTrue(policy["append_only"])
+        self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            policy["retention_defaults_days"], console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS
+        )
+
+
+class TestAuditSink(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Append-only persistence behaviour."""
+
+    def test_write_is_a_noop_when_sink_is_unconfigured(self):
+        saved = os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
+        try:
+            self.assertFalse(console_audit.audit_enabled())
+            self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event({"schema_version": 1}))
+        finally:
+            if saved is not None:
+                os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = saved
+
+    def test_records_append_one_json_line_each(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
+            for _ in range(3):
+                event = console_audit.build_event(
+                    action_id="merge_pr", result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
+                )
+                self.assertTrue(console_audit.write_event(event, path=sink))
+            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                lines = [json.loads(line) for line in handle if line.strip()]
+            self.assertEqual(len(lines), 3)
+            self.assertEqual(len({line["event_id"] for line in lines}), 3)
+
+    def test_a_record_that_still_carries_a_secret_is_not_persisted(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
+            leaky = {
+                "schema_version": 1,
+                "detail": "password: hunter2supersecret",
+            }
+            self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event(leaky, path=sink))
+            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(sink))
+
+    def test_write_never_raises_on_a_bad_path(self):
+        self.assertFalse(
+            console_audit.write_event(
+                {"schema_version": 1}, path="/nonexistent-dir/audit.jsonl"
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_simulated_privileged_preview_creates_an_audit_record(self):
+        """Required test: audit record creation for a privileged preview."""
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
+            os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = sink
+            try:
+                decision = console_authz.authorize(
+                    "merge_pr", _principal("controller")
+                )
+                outcome = console_audit.record_event(
+                    action_id="merge_pr",
+                    result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
+                    decision=decision,
+                    target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
+                    request_id="req-preview",
+                )
+            finally:
+                os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
+            self.assertTrue(outcome["written"])
+            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
+            self.assertEqual(record["action"], "merge_pr")
+            self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED)
+            self.assertEqual(record["action_class"], "privileged")
+            self.assertTrue(record["decision"]["allowed"])
+            self.assertFalse(record["decision"]["execution_enabled"])
+            self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["role"], "controller")
+
+    def test_decision_block_survives_redaction(self):
+        """Regression: naming it 'authorization' collided with a secret hint.
+
+        ``gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS`` contains "authorization" (for the
+        HTTP header), so a block under that key was replaced wholesale by the
+        placeholder and the record lost its decision entirely.
+        """
+        event = console_audit.build_event(
+            action_id="merge_pr",
+            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
+            decision=console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("admin")),
+        )
+        self.assertIsInstance(event["decision"], dict)
+        self.assertIn("allowed", event["decision"])
+
+
+class TestConsoleRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC4 — the wired Phase 2 integration points, still fail-closed."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app(bind_host="127.0.0.1"))
+
+    def test_unauthenticated_write_stub_is_denied(self):
+        """Required test: default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs."""
+        response = self.client.post(
+            "/api/actions/merge_pr/attempt", json={"pr_number": 99}
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
+        body = response.json()
+        self.assertFalse(body["success"])
+        authorization = body["authorization"]
+        self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            authorization["reason_code"], console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(authorization["execution_enabled"])
+
+    def test_preview_reports_an_authorization_decision(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/actions/merge_pr/preview?pr_number=7")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        authorization = response.json()["authorization"]
+        self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(authorization["dual_control"])
+        self.assertEqual(authorization["required_role"], "controller")
+
+    def test_unknown_action_preview_still_404s(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/actions/no_such_action/preview")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)
+
+    def test_security_model_endpoint_publishes_all_three_policies(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        body = response.json()
+        self.assertIn("rbac", body)
+        self.assertIn("redaction", body)
+        self.assertIn("audit", body)
+        self.assertEqual(body["rbac"]["default_decision"], "deny")
+
+    def test_security_model_endpoint_leaks_no_secrets(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
+        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(response.json()), [])
+
+    def test_security_model_rejects_writes(self):
+        response = self.client.post("/api/console/security-model", json={})
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
+
+    def test_existing_read_routes_are_unaffected(self):
+        for path in ("/", "/health", "/actions", "/api/actions"):
+            with self.subTest(path=path):
+                self.assertEqual(self.client.get(path).status_code, 200)
+
+
+class TestAuthzAuditDoc(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The model must be written down, not only coded."""
+
+    @classmethod
+    def setUpClass(cls):
+        cls.text = (
+            AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8") if AUTHZ_DOC.exists() else ""
+        )
+
+    def test_doc_exists(self):
+        self.assertTrue(AUTHZ_DOC.exists(), f"missing {AUTHZ_DOC}")
+
+    def test_doc_covers_each_required_section(self):
+        for heading in (
+            "Identity sources",
+            "Role matrix",
+            "Privileged actions",
+            "Secret redaction",
+            "Audit event schema",
+            "Retention",
+            "Phase 2 integration",
+            "Local-dev mode",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(heading=heading):
+                self.assertIn(heading, self.text)
+
+    def test_doc_names_every_role(self):
+        for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
+            with self.subTest(role=role):
+                self.assertIn(role, self.text)
+
+    def test_doc_names_every_console_action(self):
+        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                self.assertIn(action_id, self.text)
+
+    def test_doc_states_retention_defaults(self):
+        for days in console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS.values():
+            with self.subTest(days=days):
+                self.assertIn(str(days), self.text)
+
+    def test_doc_warns_local_dev_is_insecure(self):
+        self.assertIn("INSECURE", self.text.upper())
+
+    def test_doc_states_default_deny(self):
+        self.assertIn("deny", self.text.lower())
+
+    def test_doc_contains_no_secret_material(self):
+        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(self.text), [])
+
+    def test_deployment_doc_links_to_the_model(self):
+        deployment = (DOCS / "webui-deployment.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        self.assertIn("webui-authz-audit", deployment)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover
+    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import uuid
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
 from starlette.applications import Starlette
@@ -31,6 +32,9 @@ from final_report_validator import FINAL_REPORT_TASK_KINDS
 
 from webui.gated_actions import attempt_action, load_action_registry, preview_action
 from webui.gated_action_views import render_actions_page
+from webui import console_audit
+from webui.console_authz import authorize, rbac_matrix, resolve_principal
+from webui.console_redaction import redaction_policy
 from webui.audit_validator import audit_report, audit_to_dict
 from webui.audit_views import render_audit_page
 from webui.lease_loader import load_lease_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as lease_snapshot_to_dict
@@ -276,6 +280,49 @@ async def api_actions(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(load_action_registry().to_dict())
 
 
+def _request_id() -> str:
+    return f"req-{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
+
+
+def _audit_target(action_id: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Describe the action target for the audit record (never secrets)."""
+    if "pr_number" in params:
+        return {"kind": "pr", "ref": f"#{params['pr_number']}"}
+    if "issue_number" in params:
+        return {"kind": "issue", "ref": f"#{params['issue_number']}"}
+    if "branch_name" in params:
+        return {"kind": "branch", "ref": str(params["branch_name"])}
+    return {"kind": "unspecified", "ref": action_id}
+
+
+def _authorize_request(
+    request: Request,
+    action_id: str,
+    params: dict[str, object],
+    *,
+    for_execution: bool,
+    result: str,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Resolve principal, decide, and audit. Returns the decision payload.
+
+    Phase 1 records the decision rather than enforcing it as the terminal
+    outcome: ``webui.gated_actions`` already fails closed for every action, so
+    this layer cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision.
+    """
+    principal = resolve_principal(headers=dict(request.headers))
+    decision = authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=for_execution)
+    console_audit.record_event(
+        action_id=action_id,
+        result=result,
+        decision=decision,
+        principal=principal,
+        target=_audit_target(action_id, params),
+        request_id=_request_id(),
+        detail=decision.detail,
+    )
+    return decision.to_dict()
+
+
 async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     action_id = request.path_params["action_id"]
     params = dict(request.query_params)
@@ -285,6 +332,13 @@ async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     result = preview_action(action_id, **params)
     if "error" in result:
         return JSONResponse(result, status_code=404)
+    result["authorization"] = _authorize_request(
+        request,
+        action_id,
+        params,
+        for_execution=False,
+        result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
+    )
     return JSONResponse(result)
 
 
@@ -298,10 +352,31 @@ async def api_action_attempt(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     if not isinstance(body, dict):
         body = {}
     result = attempt_action(action_id, **body)
+    authorization = _authorize_request(
+        request,
+        action_id,
+        body,
+        for_execution=True,
+        result=(
+            console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
+            if not result.get("success")
+            else console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED
+        ),
+    )
+    result["authorization"] = authorization
     status = 403 if not result.get("success") else 200
     return JSONResponse(result, status_code=status)
 
 
+async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    """Read-only publication of the #633 authorization/redaction/audit model."""
+    return JSONResponse({
+        "rbac": rbac_matrix(),
+        "redaction": redaction_policy(),
+        "audit": console_audit.audit_policy(),
+    })
+
+
 async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response:
     path = request.url.path
     if path in _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS and request.method == "POST":
@@ -358,6 +433,11 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
                 methods=["POST"],
             ),
             Route("/api/leases", api_leases, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route(
+                "/api/console/security-model",
+                api_console_security_model,
+                methods=["GET"],
+            ),
         ],
         exception_handlers={405: method_not_allowed},
     )

webui/console_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+"""Console audit event schema, retention, and append-only sink (#633).
+
+``gitea_audit`` records MCP-side *mutations*: which profile and Gitea user
+performed which tool call. It carries no console actor, no identity source, no
+correlation identifier, and no retention class, so it cannot answer the
+question #633 exists to answer — *who sat at the console, what did they
+attempt, and was it authorized?* An authorization denial is not a mutation and
+would never appear there at all.
+
+This module adds the console-side record. It does not replace ``gitea_audit``:
+when a Phase 2 action eventually reaches MCP, both fire, correlated by
+``correlation.request_id``.
+
+Design constraints:
+
+- **Redact before persist.** Every record passes through
+  ``webui.console_redaction.redact_payload`` before serialization, so an
+  unredacted field is never durable.
+- **Append-only.** Records are appended as JSON lines. Nothing here updates or
+  deletes; retention is metadata on each record, enforced by an operator-run
+  policy, never by silent rewriting.
+- **Never raises.** Auditing must not break the request it describes. A failed
+  write returns ``False``.
+- **Off by default.** With ``WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`` unset, events are still
+  *built* (so callers and tests see the schema) but nothing is written.
+
+A record looks like this (synthetic values):
+
+    {"schema_version": 1, "event_id": "evt-0001",
+     "timestamp": "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00",
+     "actor": {"subject": "[email protected]", "role": "operator",
+               "identity_source": "access_proxy", "authenticated": true},
+     "action": "merge_pr", "action_class": "privileged",
+     "target": {"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
+     "result": "denied", "reason_code": "insufficient_role",
+     "correlation": {"request_id": "req-abc", "session_id": null,
+                     "mcp_task": "merge_pr", "mcp_permission": "gitea.pr.merge"},
+     "retention": {"class": "privileged", "days": 365,
+                   "expires_at": "2027-07-22T10:16:42+00:00"},
+     "redacted": true}
+
+Timestamps are timezone-aware ISO-8601 in UTC.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime
+import json
+import os
+import uuid
+from typing import Any
+
+from webui import console_authz
+from webui.console_redaction import redact_payload, scan_for_secrets
+
+SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+AUDIT_LOG_ENV = "WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG"
+
+# Result vocabulary. ``denied`` is the one ``gitea_audit`` has no equivalent
+# for: an authorization refusal never reaches the MCP layer.
+RESULT_ALLOWED = "allowed"
+RESULT_DENIED = "denied"
+RESULT_PREVIEWED = "previewed"
+RESULT_FAILED = "failed"
+RESULT_SUCCEEDED = "succeeded"
+
+RESULTS = frozenset(
+    {
+        RESULT_ALLOWED,
+        RESULT_DENIED,
+        RESULT_PREVIEWED,
+        RESULT_FAILED,
+        RESULT_SUCCEEDED,
+    }
+)
+
+# Retention classes and default lifetimes in days. Privileged and break-glass
+# records outlive routine ones because they are what an incident review needs.
+RETENTION_STANDARD = "standard"
+RETENTION_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
+RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS = "break_glass"
+
+RETENTION_DAYS: dict[str, int] = {
+    RETENTION_STANDARD: 90,
+    RETENTION_PRIVILEGED: 365,
+    RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS: 730,
+}
+
+# Fields every record must carry. Asserted by the test suite so a future edit
+# cannot quietly drop one.
+REQUIRED_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "schema_version",
+    "event_id",
+    "timestamp",
+    "actor",
+    "action",
+    "action_class",
+    "target",
+    "result",
+    "reason_code",
+    "correlation",
+    "retention",
+    "redacted",
+)
+
+REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "subject",
+    "role",
+    "identity_source",
+    "authenticated",
+)
+
+REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "request_id",
+    "session_id",
+    "mcp_task",
+    "mcp_permission",
+)
+
+
+def audit_log_path() -> str | None:
+    """Configured sink path, or ``None`` when console auditing is off."""
+    return (os.environ.get(AUDIT_LOG_ENV) or "").strip() or None
+
+
+def audit_enabled() -> bool:
+    return audit_log_path() is not None
+
+
+def retention_class_for(action: console_authz.ConsoleAction | None) -> str:
+    """Classify retention from the action, defaulting to the longest-lived.
+
+    An unknown action is treated as privileged rather than standard: for a
+    safety control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
+    """
+    if action is None:
+        return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
+    if action.break_glass:
+        return RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
+    if action.privileged:
+        return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
+    return RETENTION_STANDARD
+
+
+def _retention_block(
+    retention_class: str, now: datetime.datetime
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    days = RETENTION_DAYS.get(
+        retention_class, RETENTION_DAYS[RETENTION_PRIVILEGED]
+    )
+    return {
+        "class": retention_class,
+        "days": days,
+        "expires_at": (now + datetime.timedelta(days=days)).isoformat(),
+    }
+
+
+def build_event(
+    *,
+    action_id: str,
+    result: str,
+    decision: console_authz.AuthorizationDecision | None = None,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    target: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    reason_code: str | None = None,
+    request_id: str | None = None,
+    session_id: str | None = None,
+    detail: str | None = None,
+    metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    now: datetime.datetime | None = None,
+    event_id: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build one redacted, JSON-able console audit record.
+
+    Redaction runs here rather than at write time so an in-memory record handed
+    to a template or an API response is already clean.
+    """
+    ts = now or datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
+    action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
+    who = principal or (
+        decision.principal if decision else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
+    )
+    resolved_result = result if result in RESULTS else RESULT_FAILED
+    resolved_reason = reason_code or (
+        decision.reason_code if decision else "unspecified"
+    )
+    retention_class = retention_class_for(action)
+
+    event: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        "event_id": event_id or f"evt-{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+        "timestamp": ts.isoformat(),
+        "actor": who.to_dict(),
+        "action": action_id,
+        "action_class": action.action_class if action else "unknown",
+        "target": dict(target or {}),
+        "result": resolved_result,
+        "reason_code": resolved_reason,
+        "correlation": {
+            "request_id": request_id,
+            "session_id": session_id,
+            "mcp_task": action.task_key if action else None,
+            "mcp_permission": action.mcp_permission if action else None,
+        },
+        "retention": _retention_block(retention_class, ts),
+        "redacted": True,
+        "detail": detail,
+        "metadata": dict(metadata or {}),
+    }
+    if decision is not None:
+        # Deliberately *not* named "authorization": ``gitea_audit`` treats that
+        # substring as a secret key hint (it matches the HTTP Authorization
+        # header) and would replace this whole block with the placeholder.
+        event["decision"] = {
+            "allowed": decision.allowed,
+            "required_role": decision.required_role,
+            "requires_confirmation": decision.requires_confirmation,
+            "dual_control": decision.dual_control,
+            "break_glass": decision.break_glass,
+            "execution_enabled": decision.execution_enabled,
+        }
+
+    redacted = redact_payload(event)
+    if not isinstance(redacted, dict):  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+        return {"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION, "redacted": True}
+    return redacted
+
+
+def write_event(event: dict[str, Any], path: str | None = None) -> bool:
+    """Append *event* as one JSON line. Never raises.
+
+    Returns ``True`` when a line was written, ``False`` when auditing is off or
+    the write failed. A record that still trips a secret detector is dropped
+    rather than persisted.
+    """
+    sink = path or audit_log_path()
+    if not sink:
+        return False
+    try:
+        if scan_for_secrets(event):
+            return False
+        line = json.dumps(event, default=str, sort_keys=True)
+        with open(sink, "a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            handle.write(line + "\n")
+        return True
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+
+
+def record_event(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build and persist one record; return the record either way.
+
+    Callers get the record back so it can be surfaced in a response or a test
+    regardless of whether a sink is configured.
+    """
+    event = build_event(**kwargs)
+    written = write_event(event)
+    return {"event": event, "written": written}
+
+
+def audit_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Machine-readable audit schema and retention defaults (never secrets)."""
+    return {
+        "schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        "required_fields": list(REQUIRED_FIELDS),
+        "required_actor_fields": list(REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS),
+        "required_correlation_fields": list(REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS),
+        "results": sorted(RESULTS),
+        "retention_defaults_days": dict(RETENTION_DAYS),
+        "sink_env": AUDIT_LOG_ENV,
+        "enabled": audit_enabled(),
+        "append_only": True,
+        "redact_before_persist": True,
+        "timestamp_format": "ISO-8601, timezone-aware, UTC",
+        "relationship_to_mcp_audit": (
+            "webui.console_audit records console intent and authorization "
+            "outcomes; gitea_audit records MCP mutations. A Phase 2 action "
+            "emits both, correlated by correlation.request_id."
+        ),
+    }

webui/console_authz.py

@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
+"""Console authorization and RBAC model (#633, Phase 1).
+
+The read-only MVP (#426–#436) ships with no authentication: protection comes
+from network placement alone (#435). That is adequate while every route is a
+GET, and inadequate the moment Phase 2 wires a gated write. This module is the
+authorization model those writes must go through, landed *before* any of them
+exists so no write can be added without an authority to check against.
+
+Phase 1 scope is the model itself: identity resolution, the role matrix, the
+privileged-action list, and a fail-closed :func:`authorize`. It deliberately
+does **not** enable any write. ``webui.gated_actions`` stays globally disabled,
+so an allow decision here is necessary but never sufficient.
+
+Two invariants hold for every caller:
+
+- **Default deny.** An unrecognised action, an unknown role, or an absent
+  principal denies. There is no implicit allow branch and no "unless" clause.
+- **Authorization is not execution.** :func:`authorize` returns a decision
+  record. It never calls MCP, never mutates, and never consults credentials.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from typing import Any
+
+from task_capability_map import required_permission, required_role
+
+# --- Roles ------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Ordered least to most authority. Higher ranks inherit every lower rank's
+# permitted actions; the matrix below is expressed as a minimum required rank.
+VIEWER = "viewer"
+OPERATOR = "operator"
+CONTROLLER = "controller"
+ADMIN = "admin"
+
+ROLE_ORDER: tuple[str, ...] = (VIEWER, OPERATOR, CONTROLLER, ADMIN)
+_ROLE_RANK: dict[str, int] = {role: idx for idx, role in enumerate(ROLE_ORDER)}
+
+ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
+    VIEWER: "Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase.",
+    OPERATOR: "Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR.",
+    CONTROLLER: "Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR.",
+    ADMIN: "Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions.",
+}
+
+# --- Identity sources -------------------------------------------------------
+IDENTITY_NONE = "none"
+IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV = "local_dev"
+IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY = "access_proxy"
+
+IDENTITY_SOURCES: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {
+    IDENTITY_NONE: {
+        "description": (
+            "No authentication configured. Every request is anonymous and "
+            "capped at viewer. This is the MVP default and the only mode "
+            "whose safety rests entirely on network placement (#435)."
+        ),
+        "authenticated": False,
+        "safe_for_shared_host": False,
+        "phase_available": 1,
+    },
+    IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV: {
+        "description": (
+            "Developer-supplied principal read from the environment. INSECURE: "
+            "the subject and role are asserted, never verified. Loopback only."
+        ),
+        "authenticated": True,
+        "safe_for_shared_host": False,
+        "phase_available": 1,
+    },
+    IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY: {
+        "description": (
+            "Subject asserted by a trusted access proxy (Cloudflare Access, "
+            "WARP, or an org VPN portal) via a verified request header. The "
+            "proxy performs authentication; the console performs authorization."
+        ),
+        "authenticated": True,
+        "safe_for_shared_host": True,
+        "phase_available": 2,
+    },
+}
+
+# Environment configuration. All are read server-side and never rendered.
+AUTH_MODE_ENV = "WEBUI_AUTH_MODE"
+DEV_SUBJECT_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT"
+DEV_ROLE_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_ROLE"
+ROLE_MAP_ENV = "WEBUI_ROLE_MAP"
+REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV = "WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH"
+ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER = "cf-access-authenticated-user-email"
+
+# --- Action classes ---------------------------------------------------------
+CLASS_READ = "read"
+CLASS_WRITE = "gated_write"
+CLASS_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
+CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE = "destructive"
+
+# --- Privileged action list -------------------------------------------------
+# ``task_key`` ties each console action back to ``task_capability_map``, so the
+# console cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not already define.
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ConsoleAction:
+    """One console action and the authority required to invoke it."""
+
+    action_id: str
+    task_key: str
+    action_class: str
+    minimum_role: str
+    requires_confirmation: bool
+    dual_control: bool
+    break_glass: bool
+    phase: int
+    summary: str
+
+    @property
+    def mcp_permission(self) -> str:
+        return required_permission(self.task_key)
+
+    @property
+    def mcp_role(self) -> str:
+        return required_role(self.task_key)
+
+    @property
+    def privileged(self) -> bool:
+        return self.action_class in {CLASS_PRIVILEGED, CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE}
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        data = asdict(self)
+        data["mcp_permission"] = self.mcp_permission
+        data["mcp_role"] = self.mcp_role
+        data["privileged"] = self.privileged
+        return data
+
+
+_ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="claim_issue",
+        task_key="claim_issue",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Apply status:in-progress to an issue.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="comment_issue",
+        task_key="comment_issue",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Post an issue comment.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="create_issue",
+        task_key="create_issue",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Open a new tracking issue.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="comment_pr",
+        task_key="comment_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Post a PR thread comment.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="create_pr",
+        task_key="create_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Open a PR from a locked feature branch.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="review_pr",
+        task_key="review_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
+        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=3,
+        summary="Submit an approve / request-changes verdict.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="close_pr",
+        task_key="close_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
+        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=3,
+        summary="Close a pull request without merging.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="merge_pr",
+        task_key="merge_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
+        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=True,
+        break_glass=True,
+        phase=3,
+        summary="Merge an approved pull request.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="delete_branch",
+        task_key="delete_branch",
+        action_class=CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE,
+        minimum_role=ADMIN,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=True,
+        break_glass=True,
+        phase=3,
+        summary="Remove a remote feature branch.",
+    ),
+)
+
+ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}
+
+
+def privileged_actions() -> tuple[ConsoleAction, ...]:
+    """Actions requiring dual control, break-glass, or controller+ authority."""
+    return tuple(a for a in _ACTION_SPECS if a.privileged)
+
+
+def get_action(action_id: str) -> ConsoleAction | None:
+    return ACTIONS.get(action_id)
+
+
+# --- Principals -------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Principal:
+    """Who is making a request, and how strongly that is known."""
+
+    subject: str
+    role: str
+    identity_source: str
+    authenticated: bool
+    warnings: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
+
+    @property
+    def rank(self) -> int:
+        return _ROLE_RANK.get(self.role, -1)
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "subject": self.subject,
+            "role": self.role,
+            "identity_source": self.identity_source,
+            "authenticated": self.authenticated,
+            "warnings": list(self.warnings),
+        }
+
+
+ANONYMOUS = Principal(
+    subject="anonymous",
+    role=VIEWER,
+    identity_source=IDENTITY_NONE,
+    authenticated=False,
+    warnings=("No authentication configured; capped at viewer.",),
+)
+
+
+def auth_mode(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
+    """Resolve the configured identity source, defaulting to ``none``."""
+    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
+    raw = (source.get(AUTH_MODE_ENV) or "").strip().lower().replace("-", "_")
+    if raw in IDENTITY_SOURCES:
+        return raw
+    return IDENTITY_NONE
+
+
+def _role_map(env: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Parse ``WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`` (JSON subject→role). Invalid config yields {}."""
+    raw = (env.get(ROLE_MAP_ENV) or "").strip()
+    if not raw:
+        return {}
+    try:
+        parsed = json.loads(raw)
+    except Exception:
+        return {}
+    if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
+        return {}
+    return {
+        str(k): str(v).strip().lower()
+        for k, v in parsed.items()
+        if str(v).strip().lower() in _ROLE_RANK
+    }
+
+
+def resolve_principal(
+    headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> Principal:
+    """Resolve the requesting principal. Unknown or unconfigured → anonymous.
+
+    Never raises and never trusts a client-supplied role: the role always comes
+    from server-side configuration keyed by the resolved subject.
+    """
+    source_env = dict(env) if env is not None else dict(os.environ)
+    lowered = {str(k).lower(): str(v) for k, v in (headers or {}).items()}
+    mode = auth_mode(source_env)
+
+    if mode == IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV:
+        subject = (source_env.get(DEV_SUBJECT_ENV) or "").strip()
+        if not subject:
+            return ANONYMOUS
+        role = (source_env.get(DEV_ROLE_ENV) or VIEWER).strip().lower()
+        if role not in _ROLE_RANK:
+            role = VIEWER
+        return Principal(
+            subject=subject,
+            role=role,
+            identity_source=IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV,
+            authenticated=True,
+            warnings=(
+                "local-dev identity is asserted, not verified; never use "
+                "outside loopback.",
+            ),
+        )
+
+    if mode == IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY:
+        subject = (lowered.get(ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER) or "").strip()
+        if not subject:
+            # Proxy mode with no proxy header means the request did not
+            # traverse the proxy. Fail closed rather than trust it.
+            return ANONYMOUS
+        role = _role_map(source_env).get(subject, VIEWER)
+        return Principal(
+            subject=subject,
+            role=role,
+            identity_source=IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+            authenticated=True,
+        )
+
+    return ANONYMOUS
+
+
+def probe_auth_required(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> bool:
+    """Whether non-public probes must be authenticated. Default False.
+
+    #633 requires the console to *fail closed on missing auth for non-public
+    health probes if configured*. The default stays off so the MVP ``/health``
+    contract is unchanged; an operator opts in explicitly.
+    """
+    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
+    return (source.get(REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {
+        "1",
+        "true",
+        "yes",
+    }
+
+
+# --- Authorization ----------------------------------------------------------
+
+DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION = "unknown_action"
+DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED = "unauthenticated"
+DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE = "insufficient_role"
+DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE = "unknown_role"
+DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE = "phase_not_active"
+ALLOW_PREVIEW = "allowed_preview_only"
+
+# Phase 1 is the only active console phase. Phase 2 opens gated writes and is
+# gated on this model landing; nothing here enables it.
+ACTIVE_PHASE = 1
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AuthorizationDecision:
+    """Result of an authorization check. Never an execution grant."""
+
+    allowed: bool
+    reason_code: str
+    detail: str
+    action_id: str
+    principal: Principal
+    required_role: str | None = None
+    action_class: str | None = None
+    requires_confirmation: bool = False
+    dual_control: bool = False
+    break_glass: bool = False
+    execution_enabled: bool = False
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "allowed": self.allowed,
+            "reason_code": self.reason_code,
+            "detail": self.detail,
+            "action_id": self.action_id,
+            "principal": self.principal.to_dict(),
+            "required_role": self.required_role,
+            "action_class": self.action_class,
+            "requires_confirmation": self.requires_confirmation,
+            "dual_control": self.dual_control,
+            "break_glass": self.break_glass,
+            "execution_enabled": self.execution_enabled,
+            "active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
+        }
+
+
+def authorize(
+    action_id: str,
+    principal: Principal | None = None,
+    *,
+    for_execution: bool = False,
+) -> AuthorizationDecision:
+    """Decide whether *principal* may invoke *action_id*. Deny by default.
+
+    ``for_execution`` distinguishes a read-only preview from a real invocation.
+    Even an allowed decision reports ``execution_enabled=False`` while the
+    console is in Phase 1, so no caller can read an allow as permission to
+    mutate.
+    """
+    who = principal if principal is not None else ANONYMOUS
+    action = get_action(action_id)
+
+    if action is None:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION,
+            detail=f"No console action registered as {action_id!r}.",
+            action_id=action_id,
+            principal=who,
+        )
+
+    base: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "action_id": action_id,
+        "principal": who,
+        "required_role": action.minimum_role,
+        "action_class": action.action_class,
+        "requires_confirmation": action.requires_confirmation,
+        "dual_control": action.dual_control,
+        "break_glass": action.break_glass,
+        "execution_enabled": False,
+    }
+
+    if not who.authenticated:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED,
+            detail=(
+                "Write actions require an authenticated principal; this "
+                "request is anonymous."
+            ),
+            **base,
+        )
+
+    if who.rank < 0:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE,
+            detail=f"Role {who.role!r} is not in the console role matrix.",
+            **base,
+        )
+
+    if who.rank < _ROLE_RANK[action.minimum_role]:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE,
+            detail=(
+                f"Action {action_id!r} requires {action.minimum_role!r}; "
+                f"principal holds {who.role!r}."
+            ),
+            **base,
+        )
+
+    if for_execution and action.phase > ACTIVE_PHASE:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE,
+            detail=(
+                f"Action {action_id!r} belongs to phase {action.phase}; the "
+                f"console is in phase {ACTIVE_PHASE}. Execution is not wired."
+            ),
+            **base,
+        )
+
+    return AuthorizationDecision(
+        allowed=True,
+        reason_code=ALLOW_PREVIEW,
+        detail=(
+            "Principal holds the required role. Preview only — execution "
+            "remains disabled until the Phase 2 action framework ships."
+        ),
+        **base,
+    )
+
+
+def rbac_matrix() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Machine-readable RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
+    return {
+        "model_version": 1,
+        "active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
+        "roles": [
+            {
+                "role": role,
+                "rank": _ROLE_RANK[role],
+                "description": ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role],
+                "permitted_actions": sorted(
+                    a.action_id
+                    for a in _ACTION_SPECS
+                    if _ROLE_RANK[role] >= _ROLE_RANK[a.minimum_role]
+                ),
+            }
+            for role in ROLE_ORDER
+        ],
+        "identity_sources": IDENTITY_SOURCES,
+        "actions": [a.to_dict() for a in _ACTION_SPECS],
+        "privileged_actions": [a.action_id for a in privileged_actions()],
+        "default_decision": "deny",
+        "execution_enabled": False,
+    }

webui/console_redaction.py

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+"""Secret redaction policy for every console surface (#633).
+
+The MVP already redacts MCP-side mutation records through ``gitea_audit``.
+This module is the console-facing policy: one redaction pass applied to API
+payloads, rendered HTML, log lines, and audit records *before* they leave the
+server or reach persistent storage.
+
+Design constraints:
+
+- **Reuse, never fork.** ``gitea_audit.redact`` remains the authority for
+  secret-looking dict keys, ``Authorization`` material, and raw URLs. This
+  module runs that pass first and then applies console-specific patterns for
+  keychain references, key/value assignments, private-key blocks, and JWTs.
+- **Never raises.** Redaction is a safety control; a malformed payload must
+  degrade to a redacted placeholder rather than propagate an exception.
+- **Redact before persist.** ``webui.console_audit`` calls this module before
+  writing, so an unredacted record is never durable.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import re
+from typing import Any
+
+import gitea_audit
+
+REDACTED = gitea_audit.REDACTED
+
+# Console-specific patterns applied after the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass.
+# Each keeps the identifying key so an operator can still tell *what* was
+# removed, and replaces only the secret run itself.
+_KEYCHAIN_REF = re.compile(r"(?i)\bkeychain:[\w.\-/@]+")
+_KEYCHAIN_CMD = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)\bsecurity\s+find-(?:generic|internet)-password\b[^\n]*"
+)
+_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)\b(token|password|passwd|secret|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|"
+    r"client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key)\b(\s*[:=]\s*)"
+    r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
+)
+_ENV_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)\b(GITEA_(?:TOKEN|PASS|PASSWORD)[A-Z0-9_]*)(\s*=\s*)"
+    r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
+)
+_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK = re.compile(
+    r"-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----",
+    re.S,
+)
+_JWT = re.compile(
+    r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\b"
+)
+
+# Shapes that mean a payload still carries a secret. ``scan_for_secrets`` uses
+# these to assert a surface is clean.
+_DETECTORS: tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...] = (
+    ("keychain_reference", _KEYCHAIN_REF),
+    ("keychain_command", _KEYCHAIN_CMD),
+    ("credential_assignment", _ASSIGNMENT),
+    ("credential_env_assignment", _ENV_ASSIGNMENT),
+    ("private_key_block", _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK),
+    ("json_web_token", _JWT),
+    ("bearer_credential", re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:bearer|basic)\s+\S{8,}")),
+)
+
+
+def _mask_assignment(match: re.Match[str]) -> str:
+    """Keep the key and separator, replace the value."""
+    return f"{match.group(1)}{match.group(2)}{REDACTED}"
+
+
+def redact_text(text: Any) -> Any:
+    """Redact secret material from a single string.
+
+    Non-strings are returned unchanged so this is safe to map over mixed
+    payloads. Runs the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass first, then the
+    console-specific patterns.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
+        return text
+    try:
+        out = gitea_audit.redact(text)
+        if not isinstance(out, str):  # defensive; redact() returns str for str
+            return REDACTED
+        out = _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK.sub(f"{REDACTED}_PRIVATE_KEY", out)
+        out = _ENV_ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
+        out = _ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
+        out = _KEYCHAIN_CMD.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_COMMAND", out)
+        out = _KEYCHAIN_REF.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_REF", out)
+        out = _JWT.sub(f"{REDACTED}_JWT", out)
+        return out
+    except Exception:
+        # Fail closed: an unredactable string is dropped rather than emitted raw.
+        return REDACTED
+
+
+def redact_payload(value: Any) -> Any:
+    """Recursively redact a JSON-able payload for any console surface.
+
+    Secret-looking dict keys are replaced wholesale by the shared
+    ``gitea_audit`` policy; every remaining string is run through
+    :func:`redact_text`.
+    """
+    try:
+        shared = gitea_audit.redact(value)
+    except Exception:
+        return REDACTED
+    return _walk(shared)
+
+
+def _walk(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {k: _walk(v) for k, v in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
+        return [_walk(v) for v in value]
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return redact_text(value)
+    return value
+
+
+def scan_for_secrets(value: Any) -> list[str]:
+    """Return detector names that still match *value* after serialization.
+
+    Used to assert an outbound payload or rendered page is clean. An empty
+    list means no known secret shape was found. Already-redacted hits are not
+    findings.
+    """
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        text = value
+    else:
+        try:
+            text = json.dumps(value, default=str)
+        except Exception:
+            text = str(value)
+    findings: list[str] = []
+    for name, pattern in _DETECTORS:
+        for match in pattern.finditer(text):
+            if REDACTED in match.group(0):
+                continue
+            findings.append(name)
+            break
+    return findings
+
+
+def redaction_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Machine-readable statement of the redaction rules (never secrets)."""
+    return {
+        "policy_version": 1,
+        "applies_to": [
+            "json_api_responses",
+            "rendered_html",
+            "server_logs",
+            "audit_records",
+        ],
+        "ordering": "shared gitea_audit pass, then console patterns",
+        "redact_before_persist": True,
+        "shared_rules": {
+            "source": "gitea_audit.redact",
+            "secret_key_hints": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS),
+            "secret_value_prefixes": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES),
+            "urls": "credentials, secret query parameters, and real hosts redacted",
+        },
+        "console_rules": [
+            {"name": name, "pattern": pattern.pattern}
+            for name, pattern in _DETECTORS
+        ],
+        "placeholder": REDACTED,
+        "failure_mode": "fail closed — unredactable values become the placeholder",
+    }