Compare commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
  jcwalker3andClaude Opus 4.8
|
479e434f92 |
@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
|
||||
# Web console authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model (#633)
|
||||
|
||||
**Phase 1. Read-only. This document defines the model that future console
|
||||
writes must pass through; it enables none of them.**
|
||||
|
||||
The MVP deployment boundary ([`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md), #435)
|
||||
documents internal-only serving and states plainly that MVP authentication is
|
||||
*none* — protection comes from network placement. That is adequate while every
|
||||
route is a GET, and inadequate the moment a gated write ships. This document
|
||||
and the three modules it describes land **before** any write exists, so no
|
||||
Phase 2 action can be added without an authority to check it against.
|
||||
|
||||
| Concern | Module |
|
||||
|---------|--------|
|
||||
| Identity, roles, authorization decision | `webui/console_authz.py` |
|
||||
| Secret redaction for every surface | `webui/console_redaction.py` |
|
||||
| Audit event schema, retention, sink | `webui/console_audit.py` |
|
||||
| Machine-readable publication | `GET /api/console/security-model` |
|
||||
|
||||
Two invariants hold everywhere and are non-negotiable for every child of #631:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **No secrets reach the browser.** Credentials are resolved server-side and
|
||||
redacted before any payload, page, log line, or audit record leaves.
|
||||
2. **No ungated mutations.** Authorization is necessary but never sufficient;
|
||||
execution stays disabled until the Phase 2 framework ships.
|
||||
|
||||
## Identity sources
|
||||
|
||||
The console performs *authorization*. Authentication is delegated, because a
|
||||
console that mints its own sessions is a credential store, and this one must
|
||||
not be.
|
||||
|
||||
| Source | Mode value | Authenticated | Shared host | Phase |
|
||||
|--------|-----------|---------------|-------------|-------|
|
||||
| None | `none` (default) | No — anonymous, capped at `viewer` | No | 1 |
|
||||
| Local dev | `local-dev` / `local_dev` | Yes, **asserted not verified** | No | 1 |
|
||||
| Access proxy | `access-proxy` / `access_proxy` | Yes, asserted by trusted proxy | Yes | 2 |
|
||||
|
||||
Selected by `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE`. An unrecognised value falls back to `none`
|
||||
rather than erroring open.
|
||||
|
||||
**Access-proxy mode** reads the subject from the
|
||||
`Cf-Access-Authenticated-User-Email` header, set by Cloudflare Access, WARP, or
|
||||
an equivalent org portal that terminates authentication in front of the
|
||||
console. If the header is absent the request did not traverse the proxy, so the
|
||||
principal degrades to anonymous — it is never trusted by default.
|
||||
|
||||
The **role is always server-side configuration**, never a client assertion. It
|
||||
comes from `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`, a JSON object of subject → role:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{"[email protected]": "operator", "[email protected]": "controller"}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
An unmapped subject gets `viewer`. Malformed JSON yields an empty map, so
|
||||
everyone gets `viewer` — a parse failure loses authority rather than granting
|
||||
it.
|
||||
|
||||
Full SSO is explicitly a non-goal of this issue.
|
||||
|
||||
## Role matrix
|
||||
|
||||
Four roles, ordered least to most authority. Each role inherits every lower
|
||||
role's actions; the table states the *minimum* rank required.
|
||||
|
||||
| Role | Authority |
|
||||
|------|-----------|
|
||||
| `viewer` | Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase. |
|
||||
| `operator` | Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR. |
|
||||
| `controller` | Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR. |
|
||||
| `admin` | Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions. |
|
||||
|
||||
`viewer` holds the empty write set by construction, and a test asserts it stays
|
||||
empty.
|
||||
|
||||
## Privileged actions
|
||||
|
||||
Every console action maps to a `task_key` in `task_capability_map.py`, the same
|
||||
single source of truth `gitea_resolve_task_capability` and the MCP tool gates
|
||||
use. The console therefore cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not
|
||||
already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
|
||||
|
||||
| Action | Minimum role | Class | MCP permission | Confirm | Dual control | Break-glass | Phase |
|
||||
|--------|--------------|-------|----------------|---------|--------------|-------------|-------|
|
||||
| `claim_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
|
||||
| `comment_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
|
||||
| `create_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
|
||||
| `comment_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
|
||||
| `create_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
|
||||
| `review_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.review` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
|
||||
| `close_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
|
||||
| `merge_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.merge` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
|
||||
| `delete_branch` | admin | destructive | `gitea.branch.delete` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
|
||||
|
||||
**Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
|
||||
second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is
|
||||
expected to be unavailable in normal operation and its use is retained for two
|
||||
years. Both are declared here and enforced by the Phase 2 framework; Phase 1
|
||||
records the requirement on every decision so the framework cannot ship without
|
||||
honouring it.
|
||||
|
||||
`delete_branch` is admin-only rather than controller because it is the one
|
||||
irreversible action in the set.
|
||||
|
||||
### Authorization decision
|
||||
|
||||
`authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=False)` returns a decision
|
||||
record and **denies by default**. The deny reasons are closed and enumerated:
|
||||
|
||||
| Reason code | Meaning |
|
||||
|-------------|---------|
|
||||
| `unknown_action` | No such console action is registered. |
|
||||
| `unauthenticated` | The principal is anonymous. |
|
||||
| `unknown_role` | The role is not in the matrix. |
|
||||
| `insufficient_role` | The role ranks below the action's minimum. |
|
||||
| `phase_not_active` | Execution requested for an action whose phase is not open. |
|
||||
| `allowed_preview_only` | Authorized — preview only, execution still disabled. |
|
||||
|
||||
There is no implicit allow branch. Even the allow result reports
|
||||
`execution_enabled: false` while the console is in Phase 1, so no caller can
|
||||
read an allow as permission to mutate.
|
||||
|
||||
## Secret redaction
|
||||
|
||||
One pass applies to **API payloads, rendered HTML, server logs, and audit
|
||||
records** — the four surfaces where a credential could escape.
|
||||
|
||||
Redaction reuses `gitea_audit.redact` rather than forking it: that remains the
|
||||
authority for secret-looking dict keys, `Authorization` material, and raw URLs.
|
||||
The console layer then applies its own patterns:
|
||||
|
||||
Each rule below matches an *assignment form*: the named key, followed by `=` or
|
||||
`:`, followed by the value. The keys are listed bare rather than spelled out as
|
||||
complete assignments, because this document is itself scanned by
|
||||
`scan_for_secrets` — writing the examples in full assignment form would make the
|
||||
documentation trip the very detectors it documents.
|
||||
|
||||
| Rule | Catches (as an assignment) |
|
||||
|------|----------------------------|
|
||||
| `credential_assignment` | `token`, `password`, `passwd`, `secret`, `api_key`, `access_key`, `client_secret`, `private_key` |
|
||||
| `credential_env_assignment` | `GITEA_TOKEN`, `GITEA_PASS`, `GITEA_PASSWORD` and suffixed variants |
|
||||
| `keychain_reference` | `keychain:` entry references |
|
||||
| `keychain_command` | macOS `security` keychain lookups (`find-generic-password`, `find-internet-password`) |
|
||||
| `private_key_block` | PEM `BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY` blocks |
|
||||
| `json_web_token` | Three-segment `eyJ...` JWTs |
|
||||
| `bearer_credential` | `Bearer` / `Basic` credentials |
|
||||
|
||||
Assignments keep the key and replace only the value, so an operator can still
|
||||
see *what* was removed. Two behaviours are deliberate:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Fail closed.** A value that cannot be redacted becomes `[REDACTED]`
|
||||
outright rather than being emitted raw. Redaction never raises.
|
||||
- **Redact before persist.** `console_audit.build_event` redacts before
|
||||
serialization, and `write_event` re-scans and **drops** any record that still
|
||||
trips a detector. An unredacted record is never durable.
|
||||
|
||||
`scan_for_secrets` is the assertion helper: it returns the detector names still
|
||||
matching a payload, and already-redacted hits are not findings. Tests use it to
|
||||
prove the published policy, the security-model endpoint, and this document
|
||||
itself carry no secret material.
|
||||
|
||||
## Audit event schema
|
||||
|
||||
`gitea_audit` records MCP-side *mutations* — which profile and Gitea user
|
||||
performed which tool call. It has no console actor, no identity source, no
|
||||
correlation identifier, and no retention class, and an authorization **denial**
|
||||
is not a mutation, so it would never appear there at all. The console record is
|
||||
additive, not a replacement: a Phase 2 action emits both, joined on
|
||||
`correlation.request_id`.
|
||||
|
||||
Required fields, all asserted by tests so an edit cannot quietly drop one:
|
||||
|
||||
| Field | Content |
|
||||
|-------|---------|
|
||||
| `schema_version` | Currently `1`. |
|
||||
| `event_id` | Unique per record. |
|
||||
| `timestamp` | Timezone-aware ISO-8601, UTC. |
|
||||
| `actor` | `subject`, `role`, `identity_source`, `authenticated`. |
|
||||
| `action` | Console action id. |
|
||||
| `action_class` | `gated_write`, `privileged`, `destructive`, or `unknown`. |
|
||||
| `target` | `{kind, ref}`, e.g. `{"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"}`. |
|
||||
| `result` | `allowed`, `denied`, `previewed`, `failed`, `succeeded`. |
|
||||
| `reason_code` | The authorization reason code above. |
|
||||
| `correlation` | `request_id`, `session_id`, `mcp_task`, `mcp_permission`. |
|
||||
| `retention` | `class`, `days`, `expires_at`. |
|
||||
| `redacted` | Always `true`; records are redacted at build time. |
|
||||
|
||||
An unrecognised `result` degrades to `failed` rather than being stored
|
||||
verbatim.
|
||||
|
||||
The sink is an append-only JSON Lines file named by
|
||||
`WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`. It is **off by default**: with the variable unset,
|
||||
events are still built — so callers and tests exercise the schema — but nothing
|
||||
is written. Auditing never raises; a failed write returns `False` rather than
|
||||
breaking the request it describes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Retention
|
||||
|
||||
| Class | Applies to | Default |
|
||||
|-------|-----------|---------|
|
||||
| `standard` | Routine gated writes | 90 days |
|
||||
| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
|
||||
| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch` | 730 days |
|
||||
|
||||
Each record carries its own class, day count, and computed `expires_at`, so
|
||||
retention is auditable per record rather than inferred from file age. An
|
||||
**unknown action is retained as privileged, not standard** — for a safety
|
||||
control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
|
||||
|
||||
Nothing in this module updates or deletes. Expiry is enforced by an
|
||||
operator-run policy against `expires_at`, never by the console silently
|
||||
rewriting its own history.
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 2 integration
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 2 opens gated writes. It must reuse this model rather than introduce a
|
||||
second one. The integration points are already wired and observable:
|
||||
|
||||
- **`GET /api/actions/{action_id}/preview`** attaches an `authorization` block
|
||||
to the existing preview payload and records a `previewed` audit event.
|
||||
- **`POST /api/actions/{action_id}/attempt`** attaches the same block and
|
||||
records a `denied` event. The terminal outcome is unchanged — the MVP
|
||||
registry in `webui/gated_actions.py` still fails closed for every action — so
|
||||
Phase 1 cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision
|
||||
instead of adding a parallel check.
|
||||
- **`GET /api/console/security-model`** publishes the RBAC matrix, redaction
|
||||
policy, and audit policy as JSON for operators and tests.
|
||||
|
||||
To open Phase 2, a child issue must: raise `ACTIVE_PHASE`, implement the
|
||||
confirmation and dual-control flow the matrix already declares, emit a
|
||||
`succeeded` or `failed` record alongside the `gitea_audit` mutation record, and
|
||||
keep `viewer` unable to reach any of it. Turning on execution without the
|
||||
confirmation flow contradicts a declared requirement and is a review failure,
|
||||
not a shortcut.
|
||||
|
||||
## Local-dev mode
|
||||
|
||||
`WEBUI_AUTH_MODE=local-dev` reads the principal straight from the environment:
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Purpose |
|
||||
|----------|---------|
|
||||
| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | Subject string; absent ⇒ anonymous |
|
||||
| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | One of `viewer`, `operator`, `controller`, `admin`; unrecognised ⇒ `viewer` |
|
||||
|
||||
**INSECURE — this mode is for loopback development only.** The subject and role
|
||||
are *asserted by the developer running the process and verified by nothing*.
|
||||
Anyone able to set an environment variable on the host is an `admin`, and
|
||||
anyone able to reach the port inherits that principal. It provides no
|
||||
authentication whatsoever; it exists so Phase 2 authorization paths can be
|
||||
exercised without standing up a proxy.
|
||||
|
||||
Never enable local-dev mode on a non-loopback bind. Combining it with
|
||||
`WEBUI_ALLOW_PUBLIC_BIND=1` or `WEBUI_ALLOW_REMOTE_BIND=1` publishes an
|
||||
unauthenticated admin console.
|
||||
|
||||
For anything beyond a laptop use `access-proxy` mode behind Cloudflare Access,
|
||||
WARP, or a VPN, as [`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) requires.
|
||||
|
||||
### Probe authentication
|
||||
|
||||
`WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH=1` declares that non-public probes should require an
|
||||
authenticated principal. It is **opt-in**: the default is off so the MVP
|
||||
`/health` contract is unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
**This flag is declarative in Phase 1 and enforces nothing today.**
|
||||
`console_authz.probe_auth_required()` reports the operator's intent, and no
|
||||
route consults it — setting the variable does not currently change the
|
||||
behaviour of `/health` or any other endpoint. It is published here so the Phase
|
||||
2 action framework has a declared policy to honour rather than inventing a
|
||||
second one, exactly as `ACTIVE_PHASE` gates execution while the matrix is
|
||||
already declared. A regression test pins this "declared, not enforced" status,
|
||||
so wiring it later is a deliberate change rather than a silent one.
|
||||
|
||||
Until Phase 2 wires it, probe protection rests on network placement alone, as
|
||||
[`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) (#435) states.
|
||||
|
||||
## Environment variables
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Default | Purpose |
|
||||
|----------|---------|---------|
|
||||
| `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE` | `none` | Identity source selection |
|
||||
| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | unset | Local-dev subject (insecure) |
|
||||
| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | `viewer` | Local-dev role (insecure) |
|
||||
| `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP` | unset | JSON subject → role map |
|
||||
| `WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH` | unset | Require auth for non-public probes |
|
||||
| `WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG` | unset | Append-only audit sink path |
|
||||
|
||||
All are read server-side only. None is ever rendered into a page or returned by
|
||||
an API.
|
||||
|
||||
## Non-goals
|
||||
|
||||
- No full SSO product; authentication stays delegated to the proxy.
|
||||
- No browser-initiated merges or approvals in any phase covered here.
|
||||
- No tokens in the frontend, in browser storage, or in committed config.
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ only.
|
||||
## MVP deployment model
|
||||
|
||||
- **Default bind:** `127.0.0.1:8765` (`WEBUI_HOST` / `WEBUI_PORT`)
|
||||
- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement
|
||||
- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement.
|
||||
The authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model that future gated writes
|
||||
must pass through is defined in
|
||||
[`webui-authz-audit.md`](webui-authz-audit.md) (#633).
|
||||
- **Mutations:** read-only routes; gated write actions remain disabled (#434)
|
||||
- **Secrets:** resolved server-side via `gitea_auth` / `GITEA_MCP_CONFIG`; never
|
||||
embedded in HTML, JavaScript, or browser storage
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-81
@@ -48,8 +48,7 @@ that govern when a write path may open (#632, epic #631).
|
||||
| Path | Description |
|
||||
|------|-------------|
|
||||
| `/` | Home / operator overview |
|
||||
| `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`, `uptime_seconds`) |
|
||||
| `/api/v1/system/health` | Structured read-only system health (#634) |
|
||||
| `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`) |
|
||||
| `/queue` | Live PR and issue queue dashboard (#429) |
|
||||
| `/api/queue` | JSON queue export with pagination metadata |
|
||||
| `/projects` | Project registry list (#427) |
|
||||
@@ -73,85 +72,6 @@ Most routes are GET-only. POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE return `405` with
|
||||
`read-only-mvp`, except `/audit` and `/api/audit` which accept POST for
|
||||
local validator preview only (no Gitea mutations, no server-side storage).
|
||||
|
||||
## System health API (#634)
|
||||
|
||||
`GET /api/v1/system/health` is the structured, read-only health surface for
|
||||
automated readiness checks. It is the first console API under the `/api/v1`
|
||||
prefix; the unversioned MVP exports remain as compatibility aliases.
|
||||
|
||||
`/health` is unchanged for existing consumers — every MVP key is still present
|
||||
— and now also carries `started_at`, `uptime_seconds`, and a
|
||||
`system_health_api` pointer. It stays deliberately cheap and runs no dependency
|
||||
probe, because answering readiness costs real work.
|
||||
|
||||
**Status codes.** `200` when ready, `503` when a required dependency failed or
|
||||
was never probed. Automation can branch on the code without parsing the body.
|
||||
|
||||
**Query flags.** The Gitea check is a network call, so it is opt-in:
|
||||
`GET /api/v1/system/health?deep=1` runs it and caches the result for
|
||||
`WEBUI_HEALTH_PROBE_TTL_SECONDS` (default 15s) so dashboard polling does not
|
||||
amplify into remote load. Without the flag that probe reports `skipped`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Dependencies.** `control_plane_db` and `repository` are required and drive
|
||||
readiness. `gitea` is optional: when it fails the overall `status` degrades but
|
||||
`readiness.ready` stays true, because local inventory is still serveable. Each
|
||||
entry carries `status`, `detail`, `required`, and `latency_ms`.
|
||||
|
||||
Two honesty rules are worth knowing before reading the payload:
|
||||
|
||||
* `stale_runtime.mutation_safe` is true only when the runtime, checkout, and
|
||||
remote-tracking commits are all known and equal. An unfetched remote is
|
||||
reported as indeterminate, never as safe.
|
||||
* `mcp_namespaces` entries are always `unproven`. A web process runs outside
|
||||
the IDE-managed MCP client and cannot invoke a namespace tool, so per #543
|
||||
only a `client_namespace` probe can prove that path.
|
||||
|
||||
Sample response (abridged, healthy):
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"status": "ok",
|
||||
"service": "mcp-control-plane-webui",
|
||||
"mode": "read-only",
|
||||
"api": "/api/v1/system/health",
|
||||
"timestamp": "2026-07-22T11:04:18.512034+00:00",
|
||||
"readiness": { "ready": true, "complete": true, "reasons": [] },
|
||||
"version": {
|
||||
"git_sha": "620ed6e9a9550b8da2ceb82d9ab8744e8920490f",
|
||||
"git_describe": "v1.1.0-898-g620ed6e",
|
||||
"control_plane_schema_version": 4,
|
||||
"python_version": "3.14.5",
|
||||
"known": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"process": { "started_at": "2026-07-22T10:58:02.114+00:00", "uptime_seconds": 376.4 },
|
||||
"deep_probes_requested": false,
|
||||
"dependencies": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
"kind": "sqlite",
|
||||
"status": "ok",
|
||||
"detail": "schema v4 readable",
|
||||
"required": true,
|
||||
"healthy": true,
|
||||
"latency_ms": 1.482,
|
||||
"metadata": { "schema_version": 4, "active_leases": 3 }
|
||||
},
|
||||
{ "name": "repository", "kind": "git", "status": "ok", "required": true, "healthy": true },
|
||||
{ "name": "gitea", "kind": "http", "status": "skipped", "required": false, "healthy": false }
|
||||
],
|
||||
"mcp_namespaces": [
|
||||
{ "namespace": "gitea-author", "required_tool": "gitea_whoami", "status": "unproven" }
|
||||
],
|
||||
"stale_runtime": { "stale": false, "determinable": true, "mutation_safe": true, "reasons": [] },
|
||||
"probe_errors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
No restart, reload, or process-kill control is exposed here: those are Phase 2
|
||||
at the earliest, and #630 forbids process-kill recovery outright. Every probe
|
||||
opens its subject read-only — the control-plane database is opened through a
|
||||
`mode=ro` URI so a health check can never create or migrate a schema.
|
||||
|
||||
## Report audit (#431)
|
||||
|
||||
Paste an LLM final report at `/audit` or POST JSON to `/api/audit`. The UI
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
|
||||
"""Console authorization, redaction, and audit model tests (#633).
|
||||
|
||||
Covers each acceptance criterion and each required test named in the issue:
|
||||
|
||||
* AC1 — RBAC matrix and privileged-action list.
|
||||
* AC2 — redaction rules, unit-tested against sample payloads.
|
||||
* AC3 — audit event schema with required fields and retention defaults.
|
||||
* AC4 — Phase 2 integration points.
|
||||
* AC5 — local-dev mode with explicit insecurity warnings.
|
||||
|
||||
Required tests: redaction units (token, keychain, password patterns),
|
||||
default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs, and audit record creation for a
|
||||
simulated privileged preview.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import datetime
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import pathlib
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
|
||||
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
|
||||
|
||||
from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP # noqa: E402
|
||||
from webui import console_audit, console_authz # noqa: E402
|
||||
from webui.app import create_app # noqa: E402
|
||||
from webui.console_redaction import ( # noqa: E402
|
||||
REDACTED,
|
||||
redact_payload,
|
||||
redact_text,
|
||||
redaction_policy,
|
||||
scan_for_secrets,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
DOCS = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "docs"
|
||||
AUTHZ_DOC = DOCS / "webui-authz-audit.md"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _principal(role: str) -> console_authz.Principal:
|
||||
return console_authz.Principal(
|
||||
subject=f"{role}@example.com",
|
||||
role=role,
|
||||
identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
|
||||
authenticated=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestRoleMatrix(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC1 — the written RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_roles_are_ordered_least_to_most_authority(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
console_authz.ROLE_ORDER,
|
||||
("viewer", "operator", "controller", "admin"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_every_role_has_a_description(self):
|
||||
for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
|
||||
with self.subTest(role=role):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(console_authz.ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role].strip())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_higher_roles_inherit_lower_role_actions(self):
|
||||
matrix = {
|
||||
entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
|
||||
for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
for lower, higher in zip(
|
||||
console_authz.ROLE_ORDER, console_authz.ROLE_ORDER[1:]
|
||||
):
|
||||
with self.subTest(lower=lower, higher=higher):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(matrix[lower].issubset(matrix[higher]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_viewer_holds_no_write_action(self):
|
||||
matrix = {
|
||||
entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
|
||||
for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.assertEqual(matrix["viewer"], set())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_privileged_action_list_is_non_empty_and_classified(self):
|
||||
privileged = console_authz.privileged_actions()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(privileged)
|
||||
ids = {action.action_id for action in privileged}
|
||||
# Merge and branch deletion are the canonical privileged pair.
|
||||
self.assertIn("merge_pr", ids)
|
||||
self.assertIn("delete_branch", ids)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_merge_and_delete_require_dual_control_and_break_glass(self):
|
||||
for action_id in ("merge_pr", "delete_branch"):
|
||||
with self.subTest(action=action_id):
|
||||
action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(action.dual_control)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(action.break_glass)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_every_write_action_requires_confirmation(self):
|
||||
for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
|
||||
with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_delete_branch_is_admin_only(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
console_authz.get_action("delete_branch").minimum_role,
|
||||
console_authz.ADMIN,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_actions_map_to_real_mcp_capability_vocabulary(self):
|
||||
"""The console must not invent an authority the MCP layer lacks."""
|
||||
for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
|
||||
with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
|
||||
self.assertIn(action.task_key, TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
action.mcp_permission,
|
||||
TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["permission"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
action.mcp_role,
|
||||
TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["role"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_matrix_declares_deny_by_default_and_execution_disabled(self):
|
||||
matrix = console_authz.rbac_matrix()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(matrix["default_decision"], "deny")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(matrix["execution_enabled"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestAuthorizeDefaultDeny(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Fail-closed behaviour of the authorization decision."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_anonymous_is_denied_every_action(self):
|
||||
for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
|
||||
with self.subTest(action=action_id):
|
||||
decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unknown_action_is_denied(self):
|
||||
decision = console_authz.authorize(
|
||||
"not_a_real_action", _principal("admin")
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unknown_role_is_denied(self):
|
||||
rogue = console_authz.Principal(
|
||||
subject="[email protected]",
|
||||
role="superuser",
|
||||
identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
|
||||
authenticated=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
decision = console_authz.authorize("comment_issue", rogue)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_insufficient_role_is_denied(self):
|
||||
decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("operator"))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_sufficient_role_allows_preview_only(self):
|
||||
decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("controller"))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(decision.allowed)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_execution_is_refused_while_phase_is_not_active(self):
|
||||
decision = console_authz.authorize(
|
||||
"merge_pr", _principal("controller"), for_execution=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_allowed_decision_never_reports_execution_enabled(self):
|
||||
for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
|
||||
with self.subTest(action=action_id):
|
||||
decision = console_authz.authorize(
|
||||
action_id, _principal("admin")
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIdentityResolution(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC5 — identity sources, including the insecure local-dev mode."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_auth_mode_yields_anonymous_viewer(self):
|
||||
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(env={})
|
||||
self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(principal.identity_source, console_authz.IDENTITY_NONE)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_local_dev_mode_warns_that_identity_is_unverified(self):
|
||||
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||
env={
|
||||
console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev",
|
||||
console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
|
||||
console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "admin",
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(principal.authenticated)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(principal.role, "admin")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(principal.warnings)
|
||||
self.assertIn("asserted", " ".join(principal.warnings).lower())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_local_dev_without_subject_falls_back_to_anonymous(self):
|
||||
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||
env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_local_dev_unknown_role_degrades_to_viewer(self):
|
||||
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||
env={
|
||||
console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local_dev",
|
||||
console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
|
||||
console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "root",
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_access_proxy_without_header_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
"""A proxy-mode request that did not traverse the proxy is anonymous."""
|
||||
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||
headers={},
|
||||
env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_access_proxy_role_comes_from_server_config_not_client(self):
|
||||
env = {
|
||||
console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
|
||||
console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: json.dumps(
|
||||
{"[email protected]": "controller"}
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||
headers={
|
||||
console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]",
|
||||
"x-role": "admin", # client-supplied role must be ignored
|
||||
},
|
||||
env=env,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(principal.role, "controller")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_access_proxy_unmapped_subject_defaults_to_viewer(self):
|
||||
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||
headers={
|
||||
console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"
|
||||
},
|
||||
env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_malformed_role_map_does_not_raise_and_denies(self):
|
||||
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||
headers={console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"},
|
||||
env={
|
||||
console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
|
||||
console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: "{not json",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_probe_auth_is_opt_in(self):
|
||||
self.assertFalse(console_authz.probe_auth_required(env={}))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
console_authz.probe_auth_required(
|
||||
env={console_authz.REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV: "1"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_probe_auth_is_declared_but_not_yet_enforced(self):
|
||||
"""Phase 1 declares the probe-auth policy; no route enforces it yet.
|
||||
|
||||
The flag exists so the Phase 2 action framework has a declared policy
|
||||
to honour instead of inventing a second one. Pinning the current
|
||||
not-enforced status here means wiring it later is a deliberate change
|
||||
that updates this test and the documentation together, rather than a
|
||||
silent behaviour shift. The documentation must say so plainly, because
|
||||
an operator who sets the variable believing it protects a probe is
|
||||
worse off than one who knows it does not.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import inspect
|
||||
|
||||
from webui import app as webui_app
|
||||
|
||||
source = inspect.getsource(webui_app)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(
|
||||
"probe_auth_required",
|
||||
source,
|
||||
msg=(
|
||||
"webui.app now consults probe_auth_required, so probe auth is "
|
||||
"no longer merely declared. Update the 'Probe authentication' "
|
||||
"section of docs/webui-authz-audit.md, which states it "
|
||||
"enforces nothing, and replace this test with real "
|
||||
"enforcement coverage."
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
"enforces nothing today",
|
||||
AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC2 — required redaction units: token, keychain, password patterns."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_token_assignment_is_redacted(self):
|
||||
out = redact_text("GITEA_TOKEN=abcd1234efgh5678ijkl")
|
||||
self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("abcd1234efgh5678ijkl", out)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_password_assignment_is_redacted(self):
|
||||
out = redact_text("password: hunter2supersecret")
|
||||
self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", out)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_keychain_reference_is_redacted(self):
|
||||
out = redact_text("keychain:gitea-prgs-token")
|
||||
self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("gitea-prgs-token", out)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_keychain_command_is_redacted(self):
|
||||
out = redact_text("security find-generic-password -s gitea -w")
|
||||
self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("find-generic-password -s gitea", out)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_bearer_credential_is_redacted(self):
|
||||
out = redact_text("Authorization: Bearer abcdef1234567890abcdef")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890abcdef", out)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_jwt_is_redacted(self):
|
||||
token = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0.abcdefghijklmnop"
|
||||
out = redact_text(f"session={token}")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(token, out)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_private_key_block_is_redacted(self):
|
||||
pem = (
|
||||
"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
|
||||
"MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial\n"
|
||||
"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
|
||||
)
|
||||
out = redact_text(pem)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial", out)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_api_key_assignment_is_redacted(self):
|
||||
out = redact_text('api_key = "sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210"')
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210", out)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_nested_payload_is_redacted_recursively(self):
|
||||
payload = {
|
||||
"token": "abc123456789",
|
||||
"nested": {"note": "password=letmein12345"},
|
||||
"list": ["keychain:some-entry"],
|
||||
"safe": "plain text",
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = redact_payload(payload)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(out["token"], REDACTED)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("letmein12345", json.dumps(out))
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("some-entry", json.dumps(out))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(out["safe"], "plain text")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_scan_reports_findings_before_and_none_after(self):
|
||||
dirty = "password: hunter2supersecret"
|
||||
self.assertTrue(scan_for_secrets(dirty))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redact_text(dirty)), [])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_non_strings_pass_through_untouched(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(redact_text(42), 42)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
redact_payload({"n": 1, "b": True}), {"n": 1, "b": True}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_policy_is_documented_and_declares_redact_before_persist(self):
|
||||
policy = redaction_policy()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("audit_records", policy["applies_to"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(policy["console_rules"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_policy_statement_contains_no_secret_material(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redaction_policy()), [])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestAuditSchema(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC3 — audit event schema, required fields, and retention defaults."""
|
||||
|
||||
def _event(self, action_id="merge_pr", **kwargs):
|
||||
return console_audit.build_event(
|
||||
action_id=action_id,
|
||||
result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
|
||||
decision=console_authz.authorize(action_id, _principal("operator")),
|
||||
target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
|
||||
request_id="req-test",
|
||||
**kwargs,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_every_required_field_is_present(self):
|
||||
event = self._event()
|
||||
for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_FIELDS:
|
||||
with self.subTest(field=field):
|
||||
self.assertIn(field, event)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_actor_carries_who_and_how_they_were_identified(self):
|
||||
event = self._event()
|
||||
for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS:
|
||||
with self.subTest(field=field):
|
||||
self.assertIn(field, event["actor"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_correlation_ids_are_present(self):
|
||||
event = self._event()
|
||||
for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS:
|
||||
with self.subTest(field=field):
|
||||
self.assertIn(field, event["correlation"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["request_id"], "req-test")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["mcp_task"], "merge_pr")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_timestamp_is_timezone_aware_utc_iso8601(self):
|
||||
now = datetime.datetime(
|
||||
2026, 7, 22, 10, 16, 42, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc
|
||||
)
|
||||
event = self._event(now=now)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(event["timestamp"], "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00")
|
||||
parsed = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(event["timestamp"])
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(parsed.tzinfo)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_retention_defaults_by_class(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD], 90
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED],
|
||||
365,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS],
|
||||
730,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_break_glass_action_retains_longest(self):
|
||||
event = self._event("merge_pr")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_routine_write_uses_standard_retention(self):
|
||||
event = self._event("comment_issue")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unknown_action_retains_as_privileged_not_standard(self):
|
||||
"""Conservative direction: keep an unclassifiable record longer."""
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
console_audit.retention_class_for(None),
|
||||
console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_retention_expiry_matches_declared_days(self):
|
||||
now = datetime.datetime(2026, 7, 22, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
|
||||
event = self._event("comment_issue", now=now)
|
||||
expires = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(
|
||||
event["retention"]["expires_at"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual((expires - now).days, 90)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_invalid_result_degrades_to_failed(self):
|
||||
event = console_audit.build_event(action_id="merge_pr", result="banana")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(event["result"], console_audit.RESULT_FAILED)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_denied_result_is_representable(self):
|
||||
"""An authorization denial has no MCP-side mutation record."""
|
||||
self.assertIn(console_audit.RESULT_DENIED, console_audit.RESULTS)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_event_is_redacted_before_it_is_returned(self):
|
||||
event = console_audit.build_event(
|
||||
action_id="merge_pr",
|
||||
result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
|
||||
detail="failed with token=abcdef1234567890",
|
||||
metadata={"password": "hunter2supersecret"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
serialized = json.dumps(event)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890", serialized)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", serialized)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(event["redacted"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_audit_policy_reports_schema_and_retention(self):
|
||||
policy = console_audit.audit_policy()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(policy["append_only"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
policy["retention_defaults_days"], console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestAuditSink(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Append-only persistence behaviour."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_write_is_a_noop_when_sink_is_unconfigured(self):
|
||||
saved = os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
self.assertFalse(console_audit.audit_enabled())
|
||||
self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event({"schema_version": 1}))
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
if saved is not None:
|
||||
os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = saved
|
||||
|
||||
def test_records_append_one_json_line_each(self):
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||
sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
|
||||
for _ in range(3):
|
||||
event = console_audit.build_event(
|
||||
action_id="merge_pr", result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(console_audit.write_event(event, path=sink))
|
||||
with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
|
||||
lines = [json.loads(line) for line in handle if line.strip()]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(lines), 3)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len({line["event_id"] for line in lines}), 3)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_a_record_that_still_carries_a_secret_is_not_persisted(self):
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||
sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
|
||||
leaky = {
|
||||
"schema_version": 1,
|
||||
"detail": "password: hunter2supersecret",
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event(leaky, path=sink))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(sink))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_write_never_raises_on_a_bad_path(self):
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
console_audit.write_event(
|
||||
{"schema_version": 1}, path="/nonexistent-dir/audit.jsonl"
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_simulated_privileged_preview_creates_an_audit_record(self):
|
||||
"""Required test: audit record creation for a privileged preview."""
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||
sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
|
||||
os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = sink
|
||||
try:
|
||||
decision = console_authz.authorize(
|
||||
"merge_pr", _principal("controller")
|
||||
)
|
||||
outcome = console_audit.record_event(
|
||||
action_id="merge_pr",
|
||||
result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
|
||||
decision=decision,
|
||||
target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
|
||||
request_id="req-preview",
|
||||
)
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(outcome["written"])
|
||||
with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
|
||||
record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
|
||||
self.assertEqual(record["action"], "merge_pr")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(record["action_class"], "privileged")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(record["decision"]["allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(record["decision"]["execution_enabled"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["role"], "controller")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_decision_block_survives_redaction(self):
|
||||
"""Regression: naming it 'authorization' collided with a secret hint.
|
||||
|
||||
``gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS`` contains "authorization" (for the
|
||||
HTTP header), so a block under that key was replaced wholesale by the
|
||||
placeholder and the record lost its decision entirely.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
event = console_audit.build_event(
|
||||
action_id="merge_pr",
|
||||
result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
|
||||
decision=console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("admin")),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsInstance(event["decision"], dict)
|
||||
self.assertIn("allowed", event["decision"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestConsoleRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC4 — the wired Phase 2 integration points, still fail-closed."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self.client = TestClient(create_app(bind_host="127.0.0.1"))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unauthenticated_write_stub_is_denied(self):
|
||||
"""Required test: default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs."""
|
||||
response = self.client.post(
|
||||
"/api/actions/merge_pr/attempt", json={"pr_number": 99}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
|
||||
body = response.json()
|
||||
self.assertFalse(body["success"])
|
||||
authorization = body["authorization"]
|
||||
self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
authorization["reason_code"], console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(authorization["execution_enabled"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_preview_reports_an_authorization_decision(self):
|
||||
response = self.client.get("/api/actions/merge_pr/preview?pr_number=7")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
|
||||
authorization = response.json()["authorization"]
|
||||
self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(authorization["dual_control"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(authorization["required_role"], "controller")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unknown_action_preview_still_404s(self):
|
||||
response = self.client.get("/api/actions/no_such_action/preview")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_security_model_endpoint_publishes_all_three_policies(self):
|
||||
response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
|
||||
body = response.json()
|
||||
self.assertIn("rbac", body)
|
||||
self.assertIn("redaction", body)
|
||||
self.assertIn("audit", body)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(body["rbac"]["default_decision"], "deny")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_security_model_endpoint_leaks_no_secrets(self):
|
||||
response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(response.json()), [])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_security_model_rejects_writes(self):
|
||||
response = self.client.post("/api/console/security-model", json={})
|
||||
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_existing_read_routes_are_unaffected(self):
|
||||
for path in ("/", "/health", "/actions", "/api/actions"):
|
||||
with self.subTest(path=path):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(self.client.get(path).status_code, 200)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestAuthzAuditDoc(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""The model must be written down, not only coded."""
|
||||
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def setUpClass(cls):
|
||||
cls.text = (
|
||||
AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8") if AUTHZ_DOC.exists() else ""
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_doc_exists(self):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(AUTHZ_DOC.exists(), f"missing {AUTHZ_DOC}")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_doc_covers_each_required_section(self):
|
||||
for heading in (
|
||||
"Identity sources",
|
||||
"Role matrix",
|
||||
"Privileged actions",
|
||||
"Secret redaction",
|
||||
"Audit event schema",
|
||||
"Retention",
|
||||
"Phase 2 integration",
|
||||
"Local-dev mode",
|
||||
):
|
||||
with self.subTest(heading=heading):
|
||||
self.assertIn(heading, self.text)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_doc_names_every_role(self):
|
||||
for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
|
||||
with self.subTest(role=role):
|
||||
self.assertIn(role, self.text)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_doc_names_every_console_action(self):
|
||||
for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
|
||||
with self.subTest(action=action_id):
|
||||
self.assertIn(action_id, self.text)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_doc_states_retention_defaults(self):
|
||||
for days in console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS.values():
|
||||
with self.subTest(days=days):
|
||||
self.assertIn(str(days), self.text)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_doc_warns_local_dev_is_insecure(self):
|
||||
self.assertIn("INSECURE", self.text.upper())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_doc_states_default_deny(self):
|
||||
self.assertIn("deny", self.text.lower())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_doc_contains_no_secret_material(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(self.text), [])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_deployment_doc_links_to_the_model(self):
|
||||
deployment = (DOCS / "webui-deployment.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
self.assertIn("webui-authz-audit", deployment)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__": # pragma: no cover
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,499 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Tests for the read-only system-health API (#634).
|
||||
|
||||
Covers the acceptance criteria directly: a structured payload with readiness
|
||||
and a dependency list (AC1), version and uptime when knowable (AC2), stale
|
||||
runtime reported without a false mutation-safe claim (AC3), and the healthy /
|
||||
degraded-dependency / redaction cases (AC4).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from unittest import mock
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
|
||||
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
|
||||
|
||||
import control_plane_db
|
||||
from webui.app import create_app
|
||||
from webui.deployment_boundary import scan_text_for_client_secrets
|
||||
from webui.system_health import (
|
||||
API_PATH,
|
||||
STATUS_DEGRADED,
|
||||
STATUS_DOWN,
|
||||
STATUS_OK,
|
||||
STATUS_SKIPPED,
|
||||
DependencyProbe,
|
||||
StaleRuntime,
|
||||
assess_stale_runtime,
|
||||
clear_probe_cache,
|
||||
load_system_health,
|
||||
namespace_summaries,
|
||||
probe_control_plane_db,
|
||||
probe_gitea,
|
||||
process_uptime,
|
||||
redact,
|
||||
redact_url,
|
||||
snapshot_to_dict,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _probe(name, status, *, required=True, detail="detail", kind="test"):
|
||||
return DependencyProbe(
|
||||
name=name,
|
||||
kind=kind,
|
||||
status=status,
|
||||
detail=detail,
|
||||
required=required,
|
||||
latency_ms=1.5,
|
||||
metadata={},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_ALL_HEALTHY = (
|
||||
_probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
|
||||
_probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
|
||||
_probe("gitea", STATUS_OK, required=False, kind="http"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
_CLEAN_PARITY = StaleRuntime(
|
||||
daemon_head="abc123",
|
||||
checkout_head="abc123",
|
||||
remote_head="abc123",
|
||||
stale=False,
|
||||
determinable=True,
|
||||
mutation_safe=True,
|
||||
reasons=(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class CleanParityMixin:
|
||||
"""Pin parity for tests about aggregation rather than staleness.
|
||||
|
||||
Without this the assertions depend on the real checkout: a worktree whose
|
||||
branch is ahead of its upstream is genuinely stale, which would degrade the
|
||||
overall status and make these cases fail for an unrelated reason.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
super().setUp()
|
||||
patcher = mock.patch(
|
||||
"webui.system_health.assess_stale_runtime",
|
||||
return_value=_CLEAN_PARITY,
|
||||
)
|
||||
patcher.start()
|
||||
self.addCleanup(patcher.stop)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestDependencyAggregation(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC1 — readiness and dependency list derived from probe results."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_all_healthy_is_ok_and_ready(self):
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_OK)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(snapshot.readiness_complete)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(snapshot.readiness_reasons, ())
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(snapshot.dependencies), 3)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_required_dependency_down_blocks_readiness(self):
|
||||
probes = (
|
||||
_probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_DOWN, detail="file missing", kind="sqlite"),
|
||||
_probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
|
||||
_probe("gitea", STATUS_OK, required=False, kind="http"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DOWN)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(snapshot.ready)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("control_plane_db" in reason for reason in snapshot.readiness_reasons)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_optional_dependency_down_degrades_but_stays_ready(self):
|
||||
"""A failing optional probe must not claim the process itself is unready."""
|
||||
probes = (
|
||||
_probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
|
||||
_probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
|
||||
_probe("gitea", STATUS_DOWN, required=False, detail="timeout", kind="http"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("gitea" in reason for reason in snapshot.readiness_reasons))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unrun_required_probe_leaves_readiness_incomplete(self):
|
||||
"""Not probed is not the same as passing."""
|
||||
probes = (
|
||||
_probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
|
||||
_probe("repository", STATUS_SKIPPED, detail="offline", kind="git"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(snapshot.ready)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(snapshot.readiness_complete)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_skipped_optional_probe_does_not_block_readiness(self):
|
||||
probes = (
|
||||
_probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
|
||||
_probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
|
||||
_probe("gitea", STATUS_SKIPPED, required=False, kind="http"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(snapshot.readiness_complete)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestVersionAndUptime(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC2 — version and uptime present when knowable."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_uptime_and_start_time_present(self):
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
|
||||
self.assertGreaterEqual(snapshot.uptime_seconds, 0.0)
|
||||
self.assertIn("T", snapshot.started_at)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_process_uptime_helper_matches_shape(self):
|
||||
started_at, uptime = process_uptime()
|
||||
self.assertIn("T", started_at)
|
||||
self.assertGreaterEqual(uptime, 0.0)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_version_reports_python_and_schema_version(self):
|
||||
probes = (
|
||||
DependencyProbe(
|
||||
name="control_plane_db",
|
||||
kind="sqlite",
|
||||
status=STATUS_OK,
|
||||
detail="ok",
|
||||
required=True,
|
||||
latency_ms=1.0,
|
||||
metadata={"schema_version": control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION},
|
||||
),
|
||||
_probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
snapshot.version.control_plane_schema_version,
|
||||
control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(snapshot.version.python_version)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_version_known_flag_false_when_sha_unavailable(self):
|
||||
with mock.patch("webui.system_health._git", return_value=None):
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(snapshot.version.git_sha)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(snapshot.version.known)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestStaleRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC3 — stale runtime reflected without a false mutation-safe claim."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_matching_commits_are_mutation_safe(self):
|
||||
assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
|
||||
Path("/tmp"),
|
||||
daemon_head="aaa",
|
||||
git_reader=lambda *args: "aaa",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(assessment.stale)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(assessment.determinable)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(assessment.mutation_safe)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_diverged_commits_are_stale_and_not_mutation_safe(self):
|
||||
reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": "bbb"}
|
||||
assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
|
||||
Path("/tmp"),
|
||||
daemon_head="aaa",
|
||||
git_reader=lambda *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(assessment.stale)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(assessment.mutation_safe)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(assessment.reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unknown_remote_is_not_mutation_safe(self):
|
||||
"""Indeterminate must never read as safe."""
|
||||
reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": None}
|
||||
assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
|
||||
Path("/tmp"),
|
||||
daemon_head="aaa",
|
||||
git_reader=lambda *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(assessment.determinable)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(assessment.mutation_safe)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(assessment.stale)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("indeterminate" in reason for reason in assessment.reasons)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unobservable_daemon_head_is_disclosed(self):
|
||||
assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
|
||||
Path("/tmp"),
|
||||
git_reader=lambda *args: "aaa",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("not observable" in reason for reason in assessment.reasons)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_stale_runtime_degrades_overall_status(self):
|
||||
reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": "bbb"}
|
||||
# Pinned rather than inherited: this path uses the default git reader,
|
||||
# so the assertion must hold whether or not the suite runs offline.
|
||||
with mock.patch.dict(os.environ, {"WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE": ""}), mock.patch(
|
||||
"webui.system_health._git",
|
||||
side_effect=lambda repo, *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
|
||||
):
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="aaa")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(snapshot.stale_runtime.stale)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(snapshot.stale_runtime.mutation_safe)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestControlPlaneDbProbe(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""The required local dependency, probed read-only."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self.tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.addCleanup(self.tmp.cleanup)
|
||||
self.db_path = str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "control-plane.db")
|
||||
|
||||
def _build_db(self, schema_version):
|
||||
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
|
||||
conn.execute("CREATE TABLE schema_meta (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT)")
|
||||
conn.execute("CREATE TABLE leases (lease_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, status TEXT)")
|
||||
conn.execute(
|
||||
"INSERT INTO schema_meta(key, value) VALUES ('schema_version', ?)",
|
||||
(str(schema_version),),
|
||||
)
|
||||
conn.execute("INSERT INTO leases(lease_id, status) VALUES ('l1', 'active')")
|
||||
conn.commit()
|
||||
conn.close()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_missing_database_is_down(self):
|
||||
probe = probe_control_plane_db(str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "absent.db"))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(probe.required)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(probe.latency_ms)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_matching_schema_is_ok(self):
|
||||
self._build_db(control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION)
|
||||
probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_OK)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
probe.metadata["schema_version"], control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(probe.metadata["active_leases"], 1)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mismatched_schema_is_degraded(self):
|
||||
self._build_db(control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION + 99)
|
||||
probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_probe_does_not_create_a_database(self):
|
||||
"""A health check must never initialise the substrate it inspects."""
|
||||
absent = str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "never-created.db")
|
||||
probe_control_plane_db(absent)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(Path(absent).exists())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unreadable_database_is_down_not_raised(self):
|
||||
Path(self.db_path).write_text("this is not a sqlite database")
|
||||
probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC4 — redaction. No credential-shaped text crosses the boundary."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_redacts_token_assignment(self):
|
||||
cleaned = redact("failed with token=ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ012345")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ012345", cleaned)
|
||||
self.assertIn("[redacted]", cleaned)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_redacts_authorization_header_text(self):
|
||||
cleaned = redact("Authorization: Bearer abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456", cleaned)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_redacts_long_opaque_strings(self):
|
||||
cleaned = redact("value 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef here")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", cleaned)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_url_userinfo_and_query_are_stripped(self):
|
||||
cleaned = redact_url("https://user:[email protected]/api/v1?token=xyz")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("secretpass", cleaned)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("token=xyz", cleaned)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cleaned, "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_url_inside_free_text_is_redacted(self):
|
||||
cleaned = redact("GET https://u:[email protected]/x?token=abc failed")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("u:p@", cleaned)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("token=abc", cleaned)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_gitea_probe_failure_detail_is_redacted(self):
|
||||
boom = RuntimeError(
|
||||
"connection refused for https://user:[email protected]/api/v1/version"
|
||||
)
|
||||
with mock.patch("webui.system_health.get_auth_header", return_value="token x"), \
|
||||
mock.patch("webui.system_health.api_request", side_effect=boom):
|
||||
probe = probe_gitea("gitea.example.com")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("hunter2", probe.detail)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(scan_text_for_client_secrets(probe.detail), [])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_credential_guard_refusal_is_a_status_not_a_crash(self):
|
||||
with mock.patch(
|
||||
"webui.system_health.get_auth_header",
|
||||
side_effect=RuntimeError("daemon guard refused"),
|
||||
):
|
||||
probe = probe_gitea("gitea.example.com")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(probe.required)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestNamespaceSummaries(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""A web process cannot prove IDE namespace health, and must not claim to."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_every_namespace_reports_unproven(self):
|
||||
rows = namespace_summaries()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(rows)
|
||||
for row in rows:
|
||||
with self.subTest(namespace=row["namespace"]):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(row["status"], "unproven")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(row["ide_namespace_proven"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("client_namespace", row["reason"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestSystemHealthRoutes(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""The HTTP surface: versioned path, status codes, read-only guard."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
super().setUp()
|
||||
clear_probe_cache()
|
||||
self.addCleanup(clear_probe_cache)
|
||||
self.client = TestClient(create_app())
|
||||
|
||||
def _patch_snapshot(self, probes, daemon_head="abc123"):
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head=daemon_head)
|
||||
patcher = mock.patch(
|
||||
"webui.app.load_system_health",
|
||||
return_value=snapshot,
|
||||
)
|
||||
patcher.start()
|
||||
self.addCleanup(patcher.stop)
|
||||
return snapshot
|
||||
|
||||
def test_versioned_route_is_registered(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(API_PATH, "/api/v1/system/health")
|
||||
self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
|
||||
response = self.client.get(API_PATH)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_healthy_payload_shape(self):
|
||||
self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
|
||||
data = self.client.get(API_PATH).json()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(data["status"], STATUS_OK)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["ready"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["complete"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(data["api"], API_PATH)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(data["dependencies"]), 3)
|
||||
for key in ("version", "process", "stale_runtime", "mcp_namespaces"):
|
||||
self.assertIn(key, data)
|
||||
self.assertIn("uptime_seconds", data["process"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("mutation_safe", data["stale_runtime"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_degraded_dependency_returns_503(self):
|
||||
probes = (
|
||||
_probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_DOWN, detail="missing", kind="sqlite"),
|
||||
_probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._patch_snapshot(probes)
|
||||
response = self.client.get(API_PATH)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 503)
|
||||
data = response.json()
|
||||
self.assertFalse(data["readiness"]["ready"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dependency_entries_expose_status_and_latency(self):
|
||||
self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
|
||||
data = self.client.get(API_PATH).json()
|
||||
names = {entry["name"] for entry in data["dependencies"]}
|
||||
self.assertEqual(names, {"control_plane_db", "repository", "gitea"})
|
||||
for entry in data["dependencies"]:
|
||||
with self.subTest(dependency=entry["name"]):
|
||||
self.assertIn("status", entry)
|
||||
self.assertIn("required", entry)
|
||||
self.assertIn("latency_ms", entry)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_response_body_carries_no_client_secrets(self):
|
||||
self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
|
||||
body = self.client.get(API_PATH).text
|
||||
self.assertEqual(scan_text_for_client_secrets(body), [])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_deep_flag_is_forwarded(self):
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
|
||||
with mock.patch(
|
||||
"webui.app.load_system_health", return_value=snapshot
|
||||
) as loader:
|
||||
self.client.get(f"{API_PATH}?deep=1")
|
||||
loader.assert_called_once_with(deep=True)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_shallow_is_the_default(self):
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
|
||||
with mock.patch(
|
||||
"webui.app.load_system_health", return_value=snapshot
|
||||
) as loader:
|
||||
self.client.get(API_PATH)
|
||||
loader.assert_called_once_with(deep=False)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_route_rejects_mutation_methods(self):
|
||||
for method in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"):
|
||||
with self.subTest(method=method):
|
||||
response = self.client.request(method, API_PATH)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "read-only-mvp")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_default_shallow_call_skips_the_network_probe(self):
|
||||
"""The expensive probe must not run unless it was asked for."""
|
||||
with mock.patch("webui.system_health.probe_gitea") as probe:
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(deep=False)
|
||||
probe.assert_not_called()
|
||||
gitea = next(p for p in snapshot.dependencies if p.name == "gitea")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(gitea.status, STATUS_SKIPPED)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestHealthRouteBackwardCompatibility(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""`/health` is expanded additively; MVP consumers must keep working."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self.client = TestClient(create_app())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mvp_keys_are_unchanged(self):
|
||||
data = self.client.get("/health").json()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(data["status"], "ok")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(data["service"], "mcp-control-plane-webui")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(data["mode"], "read-only-mvp")
|
||||
self.assertIn("timestamp", data)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(data["deployment"]["mode"], "internal-operator-console")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_health_points_at_the_versioned_api(self):
|
||||
data = self.client.get("/health").json()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(data["system_health_api"], API_PATH)
|
||||
self.assertIn("uptime_seconds", data)
|
||||
self.assertIn("started_at", data)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_health_runs_no_dependency_probe(self):
|
||||
"""Liveness must stay cheap: no probe, no snapshot assembly."""
|
||||
with mock.patch("webui.app.load_system_health") as loader:
|
||||
response = self.client.get("/health")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
|
||||
loader.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestSnapshotSerialisation(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_snapshot_dict_is_json_serialisable(self):
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
|
||||
encoded = json.dumps(snapshot_to_dict(snapshot))
|
||||
self.assertIn("readiness", encoded)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
+80
-34
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
||||
|
||||
from starlette.applications import Starlette
|
||||
@@ -19,6 +20,9 @@ from final_report_validator import FINAL_REPORT_TASK_KINDS
|
||||
|
||||
from webui.gated_actions import attempt_action, load_action_registry, preview_action
|
||||
from webui.gated_action_views import render_actions_page
|
||||
from webui import console_audit
|
||||
from webui.console_authz import authorize, rbac_matrix, resolve_principal
|
||||
from webui.console_redaction import redaction_policy
|
||||
from webui.audit_validator import audit_report, audit_to_dict
|
||||
from webui.audit_views import render_audit_page
|
||||
from webui.lease_loader import load_lease_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as lease_snapshot_to_dict
|
||||
@@ -29,12 +33,6 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo
|
||||
from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
|
||||
from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
|
||||
from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
|
||||
from webui.system_health import (
|
||||
API_PATH as SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
|
||||
load_system_health,
|
||||
process_uptime,
|
||||
snapshot_to_dict as system_health_to_dict,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
_READ_ONLY_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
|
||||
_AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS = frozenset({"/audit", "/api/audit"})
|
||||
@@ -68,43 +66,16 @@ async def home(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def health(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
||||
"""Liveness only — deliberately cheap, runs no dependency probe (#634).
|
||||
|
||||
Every MVP key is retained so existing pollers keep working; the additions
|
||||
are a pointer to the structured API and the in-memory process uptime.
|
||||
Readiness lives at that API because answering it costs real probes.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
bind_host = _request.app.state.webui_bind_host
|
||||
started_at, uptime_seconds = process_uptime()
|
||||
return JSONResponse({
|
||||
"status": "ok",
|
||||
"service": "mcp-control-plane-webui",
|
||||
"mode": "read-only-mvp",
|
||||
"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
|
||||
"deployment": deployment_snapshot(bind_host=bind_host),
|
||||
"started_at": started_at,
|
||||
"uptime_seconds": uptime_seconds,
|
||||
"system_health_api": SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _truthy_flag(value: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
return (value or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def api_system_health(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
||||
"""Structured read-only system health (#634).
|
||||
|
||||
`?deep=1` opts into the expensive network probe. The response status code
|
||||
reflects readiness so automated checks can branch on it without parsing the
|
||||
body: 200 when ready, 503 when a required dependency failed or never ran.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
deep = _truthy_flag(request.query_params.get("deep"))
|
||||
snapshot = load_system_health(deep=deep)
|
||||
payload = system_health_to_dict(snapshot)
|
||||
return JSONResponse(payload, status_code=200 if snapshot.ready else 503)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def queue(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
|
||||
snapshot = load_queue_snapshot()
|
||||
return HTMLResponse(render_page(title="Queue", body_html=render_queue_page(snapshot)))
|
||||
@@ -248,6 +219,49 @@ async def api_actions(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
||||
return JSONResponse(load_action_registry().to_dict())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _request_id() -> str:
|
||||
return f"req-{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _audit_target(action_id: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
|
||||
"""Describe the action target for the audit record (never secrets)."""
|
||||
if "pr_number" in params:
|
||||
return {"kind": "pr", "ref": f"#{params['pr_number']}"}
|
||||
if "issue_number" in params:
|
||||
return {"kind": "issue", "ref": f"#{params['issue_number']}"}
|
||||
if "branch_name" in params:
|
||||
return {"kind": "branch", "ref": str(params["branch_name"])}
|
||||
return {"kind": "unspecified", "ref": action_id}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _authorize_request(
|
||||
request: Request,
|
||||
action_id: str,
|
||||
params: dict[str, object],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
for_execution: bool,
|
||||
result: str,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, object]:
|
||||
"""Resolve principal, decide, and audit. Returns the decision payload.
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 1 records the decision rather than enforcing it as the terminal
|
||||
outcome: ``webui.gated_actions`` already fails closed for every action, so
|
||||
this layer cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
principal = resolve_principal(headers=dict(request.headers))
|
||||
decision = authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=for_execution)
|
||||
console_audit.record_event(
|
||||
action_id=action_id,
|
||||
result=result,
|
||||
decision=decision,
|
||||
principal=principal,
|
||||
target=_audit_target(action_id, params),
|
||||
request_id=_request_id(),
|
||||
detail=decision.detail,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return decision.to_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
||||
action_id = request.path_params["action_id"]
|
||||
params = dict(request.query_params)
|
||||
@@ -257,6 +271,13 @@ async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
||||
result = preview_action(action_id, **params)
|
||||
if "error" in result:
|
||||
return JSONResponse(result, status_code=404)
|
||||
result["authorization"] = _authorize_request(
|
||||
request,
|
||||
action_id,
|
||||
params,
|
||||
for_execution=False,
|
||||
result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return JSONResponse(result)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -270,10 +291,31 @@ async def api_action_attempt(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
||||
if not isinstance(body, dict):
|
||||
body = {}
|
||||
result = attempt_action(action_id, **body)
|
||||
authorization = _authorize_request(
|
||||
request,
|
||||
action_id,
|
||||
body,
|
||||
for_execution=True,
|
||||
result=(
|
||||
console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
|
||||
if not result.get("success")
|
||||
else console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["authorization"] = authorization
|
||||
status = 403 if not result.get("success") else 200
|
||||
return JSONResponse(result, status_code=status)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
||||
"""Read-only publication of the #633 authorization/redaction/audit model."""
|
||||
return JSONResponse({
|
||||
"rbac": rbac_matrix(),
|
||||
"redaction": redaction_policy(),
|
||||
"audit": console_audit.audit_policy(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response:
|
||||
path = request.url.path
|
||||
if path in _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS and request.method == "POST":
|
||||
@@ -296,7 +338,6 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
|
||||
routes=[
|
||||
Route("/", home, methods=["GET"]),
|
||||
Route("/health", health, methods=["GET"]),
|
||||
Route(SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH, api_system_health, methods=["GET"]),
|
||||
Route("/queue", queue, methods=["GET"]),
|
||||
Route("/api/queue", api_queue, methods=["GET"]),
|
||||
Route("/projects", projects, methods=["GET"]),
|
||||
@@ -325,6 +366,11 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
|
||||
methods=["POST"],
|
||||
),
|
||||
Route("/api/leases", api_leases, methods=["GET"]),
|
||||
Route(
|
||||
"/api/console/security-model",
|
||||
api_console_security_model,
|
||||
methods=["GET"],
|
||||
),
|
||||
],
|
||||
exception_handlers={405: method_not_allowed},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
|
||||
"""Console audit event schema, retention, and append-only sink (#633).
|
||||
|
||||
``gitea_audit`` records MCP-side *mutations*: which profile and Gitea user
|
||||
performed which tool call. It carries no console actor, no identity source, no
|
||||
correlation identifier, and no retention class, so it cannot answer the
|
||||
question #633 exists to answer — *who sat at the console, what did they
|
||||
attempt, and was it authorized?* An authorization denial is not a mutation and
|
||||
would never appear there at all.
|
||||
|
||||
This module adds the console-side record. It does not replace ``gitea_audit``:
|
||||
when a Phase 2 action eventually reaches MCP, both fire, correlated by
|
||||
``correlation.request_id``.
|
||||
|
||||
Design constraints:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Redact before persist.** Every record passes through
|
||||
``webui.console_redaction.redact_payload`` before serialization, so an
|
||||
unredacted field is never durable.
|
||||
- **Append-only.** Records are appended as JSON lines. Nothing here updates or
|
||||
deletes; retention is metadata on each record, enforced by an operator-run
|
||||
policy, never by silent rewriting.
|
||||
- **Never raises.** Auditing must not break the request it describes. A failed
|
||||
write returns ``False``.
|
||||
- **Off by default.** With ``WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`` unset, events are still
|
||||
*built* (so callers and tests see the schema) but nothing is written.
|
||||
|
||||
A record looks like this (synthetic values):
|
||||
|
||||
{"schema_version": 1, "event_id": "evt-0001",
|
||||
"timestamp": "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00",
|
||||
"actor": {"subject": "[email protected]", "role": "operator",
|
||||
"identity_source": "access_proxy", "authenticated": true},
|
||||
"action": "merge_pr", "action_class": "privileged",
|
||||
"target": {"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
|
||||
"result": "denied", "reason_code": "insufficient_role",
|
||||
"correlation": {"request_id": "req-abc", "session_id": null,
|
||||
"mcp_task": "merge_pr", "mcp_permission": "gitea.pr.merge"},
|
||||
"retention": {"class": "privileged", "days": 365,
|
||||
"expires_at": "2027-07-22T10:16:42+00:00"},
|
||||
"redacted": true}
|
||||
|
||||
Timestamps are timezone-aware ISO-8601 in UTC.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import datetime
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
from webui import console_authz
|
||||
from webui.console_redaction import redact_payload, scan_for_secrets
|
||||
|
||||
SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
|
||||
|
||||
AUDIT_LOG_ENV = "WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG"
|
||||
|
||||
# Result vocabulary. ``denied`` is the one ``gitea_audit`` has no equivalent
|
||||
# for: an authorization refusal never reaches the MCP layer.
|
||||
RESULT_ALLOWED = "allowed"
|
||||
RESULT_DENIED = "denied"
|
||||
RESULT_PREVIEWED = "previewed"
|
||||
RESULT_FAILED = "failed"
|
||||
RESULT_SUCCEEDED = "succeeded"
|
||||
|
||||
RESULTS = frozenset(
|
||||
{
|
||||
RESULT_ALLOWED,
|
||||
RESULT_DENIED,
|
||||
RESULT_PREVIEWED,
|
||||
RESULT_FAILED,
|
||||
RESULT_SUCCEEDED,
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Retention classes and default lifetimes in days. Privileged and break-glass
|
||||
# records outlive routine ones because they are what an incident review needs.
|
||||
RETENTION_STANDARD = "standard"
|
||||
RETENTION_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
|
||||
RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS = "break_glass"
|
||||
|
||||
RETENTION_DAYS: dict[str, int] = {
|
||||
RETENTION_STANDARD: 90,
|
||||
RETENTION_PRIVILEGED: 365,
|
||||
RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS: 730,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Fields every record must carry. Asserted by the test suite so a future edit
|
||||
# cannot quietly drop one.
|
||||
REQUIRED_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
||||
"schema_version",
|
||||
"event_id",
|
||||
"timestamp",
|
||||
"actor",
|
||||
"action",
|
||||
"action_class",
|
||||
"target",
|
||||
"result",
|
||||
"reason_code",
|
||||
"correlation",
|
||||
"retention",
|
||||
"redacted",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
||||
"subject",
|
||||
"role",
|
||||
"identity_source",
|
||||
"authenticated",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
||||
"request_id",
|
||||
"session_id",
|
||||
"mcp_task",
|
||||
"mcp_permission",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def audit_log_path() -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Configured sink path, or ``None`` when console auditing is off."""
|
||||
return (os.environ.get(AUDIT_LOG_ENV) or "").strip() or None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def audit_enabled() -> bool:
|
||||
return audit_log_path() is not None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def retention_class_for(action: console_authz.ConsoleAction | None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Classify retention from the action, defaulting to the longest-lived.
|
||||
|
||||
An unknown action is treated as privileged rather than standard: for a
|
||||
safety control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if action is None:
|
||||
return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
|
||||
if action.break_glass:
|
||||
return RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
|
||||
if action.privileged:
|
||||
return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
|
||||
return RETENTION_STANDARD
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _retention_block(
|
||||
retention_class: str, now: datetime.datetime
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
days = RETENTION_DAYS.get(
|
||||
retention_class, RETENTION_DAYS[RETENTION_PRIVILEGED]
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"class": retention_class,
|
||||
"days": days,
|
||||
"expires_at": (now + datetime.timedelta(days=days)).isoformat(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_event(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
action_id: str,
|
||||
result: str,
|
||||
decision: console_authz.AuthorizationDecision | None = None,
|
||||
principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
|
||||
target: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
reason_code: str | None = None,
|
||||
request_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
session_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
detail: str | None = None,
|
||||
metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
now: datetime.datetime | None = None,
|
||||
event_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Build one redacted, JSON-able console audit record.
|
||||
|
||||
Redaction runs here rather than at write time so an in-memory record handed
|
||||
to a template or an API response is already clean.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
ts = now or datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
|
||||
action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
|
||||
who = principal or (
|
||||
decision.principal if decision else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
|
||||
)
|
||||
resolved_result = result if result in RESULTS else RESULT_FAILED
|
||||
resolved_reason = reason_code or (
|
||||
decision.reason_code if decision else "unspecified"
|
||||
)
|
||||
retention_class = retention_class_for(action)
|
||||
|
||||
event: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
|
||||
"event_id": event_id or f"evt-{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
|
||||
"timestamp": ts.isoformat(),
|
||||
"actor": who.to_dict(),
|
||||
"action": action_id,
|
||||
"action_class": action.action_class if action else "unknown",
|
||||
"target": dict(target or {}),
|
||||
"result": resolved_result,
|
||||
"reason_code": resolved_reason,
|
||||
"correlation": {
|
||||
"request_id": request_id,
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"mcp_task": action.task_key if action else None,
|
||||
"mcp_permission": action.mcp_permission if action else None,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"retention": _retention_block(retention_class, ts),
|
||||
"redacted": True,
|
||||
"detail": detail,
|
||||
"metadata": dict(metadata or {}),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if decision is not None:
|
||||
# Deliberately *not* named "authorization": ``gitea_audit`` treats that
|
||||
# substring as a secret key hint (it matches the HTTP Authorization
|
||||
# header) and would replace this whole block with the placeholder.
|
||||
event["decision"] = {
|
||||
"allowed": decision.allowed,
|
||||
"required_role": decision.required_role,
|
||||
"requires_confirmation": decision.requires_confirmation,
|
||||
"dual_control": decision.dual_control,
|
||||
"break_glass": decision.break_glass,
|
||||
"execution_enabled": decision.execution_enabled,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
redacted = redact_payload(event)
|
||||
if not isinstance(redacted, dict): # pragma: no cover - defensive
|
||||
return {"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION, "redacted": True}
|
||||
return redacted
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def write_event(event: dict[str, Any], path: str | None = None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Append *event* as one JSON line. Never raises.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns ``True`` when a line was written, ``False`` when auditing is off or
|
||||
the write failed. A record that still trips a secret detector is dropped
|
||||
rather than persisted.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
sink = path or audit_log_path()
|
||||
if not sink:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if scan_for_secrets(event):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
line = json.dumps(event, default=str, sort_keys=True)
|
||||
with open(sink, "a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
|
||||
handle.write(line + "\n")
|
||||
return True
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def record_event(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Build and persist one record; return the record either way.
|
||||
|
||||
Callers get the record back so it can be surfaced in a response or a test
|
||||
regardless of whether a sink is configured.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
event = build_event(**kwargs)
|
||||
written = write_event(event)
|
||||
return {"event": event, "written": written}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def audit_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Machine-readable audit schema and retention defaults (never secrets)."""
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
|
||||
"required_fields": list(REQUIRED_FIELDS),
|
||||
"required_actor_fields": list(REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS),
|
||||
"required_correlation_fields": list(REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS),
|
||||
"results": sorted(RESULTS),
|
||||
"retention_defaults_days": dict(RETENTION_DAYS),
|
||||
"sink_env": AUDIT_LOG_ENV,
|
||||
"enabled": audit_enabled(),
|
||||
"append_only": True,
|
||||
"redact_before_persist": True,
|
||||
"timestamp_format": "ISO-8601, timezone-aware, UTC",
|
||||
"relationship_to_mcp_audit": (
|
||||
"webui.console_audit records console intent and authorization "
|
||||
"outcomes; gitea_audit records MCP mutations. A Phase 2 action "
|
||||
"emits both, correlated by correlation.request_id."
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
|
||||
"""Console authorization and RBAC model (#633, Phase 1).
|
||||
|
||||
The read-only MVP (#426–#436) ships with no authentication: protection comes
|
||||
from network placement alone (#435). That is adequate while every route is a
|
||||
GET, and inadequate the moment Phase 2 wires a gated write. This module is the
|
||||
authorization model those writes must go through, landed *before* any of them
|
||||
exists so no write can be added without an authority to check against.
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 1 scope is the model itself: identity resolution, the role matrix, the
|
||||
privileged-action list, and a fail-closed :func:`authorize`. It deliberately
|
||||
does **not** enable any write. ``webui.gated_actions`` stays globally disabled,
|
||||
so an allow decision here is necessary but never sufficient.
|
||||
|
||||
Two invariants hold for every caller:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Default deny.** An unrecognised action, an unknown role, or an absent
|
||||
principal denies. There is no implicit allow branch and no "unless" clause.
|
||||
- **Authorization is not execution.** :func:`authorize` returns a decision
|
||||
record. It never calls MCP, never mutates, and never consults credentials.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
from task_capability_map import required_permission, required_role
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Roles ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Ordered least to most authority. Higher ranks inherit every lower rank's
|
||||
# permitted actions; the matrix below is expressed as a minimum required rank.
|
||||
VIEWER = "viewer"
|
||||
OPERATOR = "operator"
|
||||
CONTROLLER = "controller"
|
||||
ADMIN = "admin"
|
||||
|
||||
ROLE_ORDER: tuple[str, ...] = (VIEWER, OPERATOR, CONTROLLER, ADMIN)
|
||||
_ROLE_RANK: dict[str, int] = {role: idx for idx, role in enumerate(ROLE_ORDER)}
|
||||
|
||||
ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
VIEWER: "Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase.",
|
||||
OPERATOR: "Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR.",
|
||||
CONTROLLER: "Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR.",
|
||||
ADMIN: "Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions.",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Identity sources -------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
IDENTITY_NONE = "none"
|
||||
IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV = "local_dev"
|
||||
IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY = "access_proxy"
|
||||
|
||||
IDENTITY_SOURCES: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {
|
||||
IDENTITY_NONE: {
|
||||
"description": (
|
||||
"No authentication configured. Every request is anonymous and "
|
||||
"capped at viewer. This is the MVP default and the only mode "
|
||||
"whose safety rests entirely on network placement (#435)."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"authenticated": False,
|
||||
"safe_for_shared_host": False,
|
||||
"phase_available": 1,
|
||||
},
|
||||
IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV: {
|
||||
"description": (
|
||||
"Developer-supplied principal read from the environment. INSECURE: "
|
||||
"the subject and role are asserted, never verified. Loopback only."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"authenticated": True,
|
||||
"safe_for_shared_host": False,
|
||||
"phase_available": 1,
|
||||
},
|
||||
IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY: {
|
||||
"description": (
|
||||
"Subject asserted by a trusted access proxy (Cloudflare Access, "
|
||||
"WARP, or an org VPN portal) via a verified request header. The "
|
||||
"proxy performs authentication; the console performs authorization."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"authenticated": True,
|
||||
"safe_for_shared_host": True,
|
||||
"phase_available": 2,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Environment configuration. All are read server-side and never rendered.
|
||||
AUTH_MODE_ENV = "WEBUI_AUTH_MODE"
|
||||
DEV_SUBJECT_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT"
|
||||
DEV_ROLE_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_ROLE"
|
||||
ROLE_MAP_ENV = "WEBUI_ROLE_MAP"
|
||||
REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV = "WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH"
|
||||
ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER = "cf-access-authenticated-user-email"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Action classes ---------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
CLASS_READ = "read"
|
||||
CLASS_WRITE = "gated_write"
|
||||
CLASS_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
|
||||
CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE = "destructive"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Privileged action list -------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# ``task_key`` ties each console action back to ``task_capability_map``, so the
|
||||
# console cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not already define.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||
class ConsoleAction:
|
||||
"""One console action and the authority required to invoke it."""
|
||||
|
||||
action_id: str
|
||||
task_key: str
|
||||
action_class: str
|
||||
minimum_role: str
|
||||
requires_confirmation: bool
|
||||
dual_control: bool
|
||||
break_glass: bool
|
||||
phase: int
|
||||
summary: str
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def mcp_permission(self) -> str:
|
||||
return required_permission(self.task_key)
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def mcp_role(self) -> str:
|
||||
return required_role(self.task_key)
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def privileged(self) -> bool:
|
||||
return self.action_class in {CLASS_PRIVILEGED, CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE}
|
||||
|
||||
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
data = asdict(self)
|
||||
data["mcp_permission"] = self.mcp_permission
|
||||
data["mcp_role"] = self.mcp_role
|
||||
data["privileged"] = self.privileged
|
||||
return data
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
|
||||
ConsoleAction(
|
||||
action_id="claim_issue",
|
||||
task_key="claim_issue",
|
||||
action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
|
||||
minimum_role=OPERATOR,
|
||||
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||
dual_control=False,
|
||||
break_glass=False,
|
||||
phase=2,
|
||||
summary="Apply status:in-progress to an issue.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
ConsoleAction(
|
||||
action_id="comment_issue",
|
||||
task_key="comment_issue",
|
||||
action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
|
||||
minimum_role=OPERATOR,
|
||||
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||
dual_control=False,
|
||||
break_glass=False,
|
||||
phase=2,
|
||||
summary="Post an issue comment.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
ConsoleAction(
|
||||
action_id="create_issue",
|
||||
task_key="create_issue",
|
||||
action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
|
||||
minimum_role=OPERATOR,
|
||||
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||
dual_control=False,
|
||||
break_glass=False,
|
||||
phase=2,
|
||||
summary="Open a new tracking issue.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
ConsoleAction(
|
||||
action_id="comment_pr",
|
||||
task_key="comment_pr",
|
||||
action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
|
||||
minimum_role=OPERATOR,
|
||||
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||
dual_control=False,
|
||||
break_glass=False,
|
||||
phase=2,
|
||||
summary="Post a PR thread comment.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
ConsoleAction(
|
||||
action_id="create_pr",
|
||||
task_key="create_pr",
|
||||
action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
|
||||
minimum_role=OPERATOR,
|
||||
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||
dual_control=False,
|
||||
break_glass=False,
|
||||
phase=2,
|
||||
summary="Open a PR from a locked feature branch.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
ConsoleAction(
|
||||
action_id="review_pr",
|
||||
task_key="review_pr",
|
||||
action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
|
||||
minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
|
||||
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||
dual_control=False,
|
||||
break_glass=False,
|
||||
phase=3,
|
||||
summary="Submit an approve / request-changes verdict.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
ConsoleAction(
|
||||
action_id="close_pr",
|
||||
task_key="close_pr",
|
||||
action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
|
||||
minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
|
||||
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||
dual_control=False,
|
||||
break_glass=False,
|
||||
phase=3,
|
||||
summary="Close a pull request without merging.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
ConsoleAction(
|
||||
action_id="merge_pr",
|
||||
task_key="merge_pr",
|
||||
action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
|
||||
minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
|
||||
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||
dual_control=True,
|
||||
break_glass=True,
|
||||
phase=3,
|
||||
summary="Merge an approved pull request.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
ConsoleAction(
|
||||
action_id="delete_branch",
|
||||
task_key="delete_branch",
|
||||
action_class=CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE,
|
||||
minimum_role=ADMIN,
|
||||
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||
dual_control=True,
|
||||
break_glass=True,
|
||||
phase=3,
|
||||
summary="Remove a remote feature branch.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def privileged_actions() -> tuple[ConsoleAction, ...]:
|
||||
"""Actions requiring dual control, break-glass, or controller+ authority."""
|
||||
return tuple(a for a in _ACTION_SPECS if a.privileged)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_action(action_id: str) -> ConsoleAction | None:
|
||||
return ACTIONS.get(action_id)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Principals -------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||
class Principal:
|
||||
"""Who is making a request, and how strongly that is known."""
|
||||
|
||||
subject: str
|
||||
role: str
|
||||
identity_source: str
|
||||
authenticated: bool
|
||||
warnings: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def rank(self) -> int:
|
||||
return _ROLE_RANK.get(self.role, -1)
|
||||
|
||||
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"subject": self.subject,
|
||||
"role": self.role,
|
||||
"identity_source": self.identity_source,
|
||||
"authenticated": self.authenticated,
|
||||
"warnings": list(self.warnings),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
ANONYMOUS = Principal(
|
||||
subject="anonymous",
|
||||
role=VIEWER,
|
||||
identity_source=IDENTITY_NONE,
|
||||
authenticated=False,
|
||||
warnings=("No authentication configured; capped at viewer.",),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def auth_mode(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Resolve the configured identity source, defaulting to ``none``."""
|
||||
source = env if env is not None else os.environ
|
||||
raw = (source.get(AUTH_MODE_ENV) or "").strip().lower().replace("-", "_")
|
||||
if raw in IDENTITY_SOURCES:
|
||||
return raw
|
||||
return IDENTITY_NONE
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _role_map(env: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
|
||||
"""Parse ``WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`` (JSON subject→role). Invalid config yields {}."""
|
||||
raw = (env.get(ROLE_MAP_ENV) or "").strip()
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
return {}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parsed = json.loads(raw)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return {}
|
||||
if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
|
||||
return {}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
str(k): str(v).strip().lower()
|
||||
for k, v in parsed.items()
|
||||
if str(v).strip().lower() in _ROLE_RANK
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def resolve_principal(
|
||||
headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
|
||||
env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> Principal:
|
||||
"""Resolve the requesting principal. Unknown or unconfigured → anonymous.
|
||||
|
||||
Never raises and never trusts a client-supplied role: the role always comes
|
||||
from server-side configuration keyed by the resolved subject.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
source_env = dict(env) if env is not None else dict(os.environ)
|
||||
lowered = {str(k).lower(): str(v) for k, v in (headers or {}).items()}
|
||||
mode = auth_mode(source_env)
|
||||
|
||||
if mode == IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV:
|
||||
subject = (source_env.get(DEV_SUBJECT_ENV) or "").strip()
|
||||
if not subject:
|
||||
return ANONYMOUS
|
||||
role = (source_env.get(DEV_ROLE_ENV) or VIEWER).strip().lower()
|
||||
if role not in _ROLE_RANK:
|
||||
role = VIEWER
|
||||
return Principal(
|
||||
subject=subject,
|
||||
role=role,
|
||||
identity_source=IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV,
|
||||
authenticated=True,
|
||||
warnings=(
|
||||
"local-dev identity is asserted, not verified; never use "
|
||||
"outside loopback.",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if mode == IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY:
|
||||
subject = (lowered.get(ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER) or "").strip()
|
||||
if not subject:
|
||||
# Proxy mode with no proxy header means the request did not
|
||||
# traverse the proxy. Fail closed rather than trust it.
|
||||
return ANONYMOUS
|
||||
role = _role_map(source_env).get(subject, VIEWER)
|
||||
return Principal(
|
||||
subject=subject,
|
||||
role=role,
|
||||
identity_source=IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
|
||||
authenticated=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return ANONYMOUS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def probe_auth_required(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Whether non-public probes must be authenticated. Default False.
|
||||
|
||||
#633 requires the console to *fail closed on missing auth for non-public
|
||||
health probes if configured*. The default stays off so the MVP ``/health``
|
||||
contract is unchanged; an operator opts in explicitly.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
source = env if env is not None else os.environ
|
||||
return (source.get(REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {
|
||||
"1",
|
||||
"true",
|
||||
"yes",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Authorization ----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION = "unknown_action"
|
||||
DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED = "unauthenticated"
|
||||
DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE = "insufficient_role"
|
||||
DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE = "unknown_role"
|
||||
DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE = "phase_not_active"
|
||||
ALLOW_PREVIEW = "allowed_preview_only"
|
||||
|
||||
# Phase 1 is the only active console phase. Phase 2 opens gated writes and is
|
||||
# gated on this model landing; nothing here enables it.
|
||||
ACTIVE_PHASE = 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||
class AuthorizationDecision:
|
||||
"""Result of an authorization check. Never an execution grant."""
|
||||
|
||||
allowed: bool
|
||||
reason_code: str
|
||||
detail: str
|
||||
action_id: str
|
||||
principal: Principal
|
||||
required_role: str | None = None
|
||||
action_class: str | None = None
|
||||
requires_confirmation: bool = False
|
||||
dual_control: bool = False
|
||||
break_glass: bool = False
|
||||
execution_enabled: bool = False
|
||||
|
||||
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"allowed": self.allowed,
|
||||
"reason_code": self.reason_code,
|
||||
"detail": self.detail,
|
||||
"action_id": self.action_id,
|
||||
"principal": self.principal.to_dict(),
|
||||
"required_role": self.required_role,
|
||||
"action_class": self.action_class,
|
||||
"requires_confirmation": self.requires_confirmation,
|
||||
"dual_control": self.dual_control,
|
||||
"break_glass": self.break_glass,
|
||||
"execution_enabled": self.execution_enabled,
|
||||
"active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def authorize(
|
||||
action_id: str,
|
||||
principal: Principal | None = None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
for_execution: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> AuthorizationDecision:
|
||||
"""Decide whether *principal* may invoke *action_id*. Deny by default.
|
||||
|
||||
``for_execution`` distinguishes a read-only preview from a real invocation.
|
||||
Even an allowed decision reports ``execution_enabled=False`` while the
|
||||
console is in Phase 1, so no caller can read an allow as permission to
|
||||
mutate.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
who = principal if principal is not None else ANONYMOUS
|
||||
action = get_action(action_id)
|
||||
|
||||
if action is None:
|
||||
return AuthorizationDecision(
|
||||
allowed=False,
|
||||
reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION,
|
||||
detail=f"No console action registered as {action_id!r}.",
|
||||
action_id=action_id,
|
||||
principal=who,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
base: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"action_id": action_id,
|
||||
"principal": who,
|
||||
"required_role": action.minimum_role,
|
||||
"action_class": action.action_class,
|
||||
"requires_confirmation": action.requires_confirmation,
|
||||
"dual_control": action.dual_control,
|
||||
"break_glass": action.break_glass,
|
||||
"execution_enabled": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if not who.authenticated:
|
||||
return AuthorizationDecision(
|
||||
allowed=False,
|
||||
reason_code=DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED,
|
||||
detail=(
|
||||
"Write actions require an authenticated principal; this "
|
||||
"request is anonymous."
|
||||
),
|
||||
**base,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if who.rank < 0:
|
||||
return AuthorizationDecision(
|
||||
allowed=False,
|
||||
reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE,
|
||||
detail=f"Role {who.role!r} is not in the console role matrix.",
|
||||
**base,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if who.rank < _ROLE_RANK[action.minimum_role]:
|
||||
return AuthorizationDecision(
|
||||
allowed=False,
|
||||
reason_code=DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE,
|
||||
detail=(
|
||||
f"Action {action_id!r} requires {action.minimum_role!r}; "
|
||||
f"principal holds {who.role!r}."
|
||||
),
|
||||
**base,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if for_execution and action.phase > ACTIVE_PHASE:
|
||||
return AuthorizationDecision(
|
||||
allowed=False,
|
||||
reason_code=DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE,
|
||||
detail=(
|
||||
f"Action {action_id!r} belongs to phase {action.phase}; the "
|
||||
f"console is in phase {ACTIVE_PHASE}. Execution is not wired."
|
||||
),
|
||||
**base,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return AuthorizationDecision(
|
||||
allowed=True,
|
||||
reason_code=ALLOW_PREVIEW,
|
||||
detail=(
|
||||
"Principal holds the required role. Preview only — execution "
|
||||
"remains disabled until the Phase 2 action framework ships."
|
||||
),
|
||||
**base,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def rbac_matrix() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Machine-readable RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"model_version": 1,
|
||||
"active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
|
||||
"roles": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"role": role,
|
||||
"rank": _ROLE_RANK[role],
|
||||
"description": ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role],
|
||||
"permitted_actions": sorted(
|
||||
a.action_id
|
||||
for a in _ACTION_SPECS
|
||||
if _ROLE_RANK[role] >= _ROLE_RANK[a.minimum_role]
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
for role in ROLE_ORDER
|
||||
],
|
||||
"identity_sources": IDENTITY_SOURCES,
|
||||
"actions": [a.to_dict() for a in _ACTION_SPECS],
|
||||
"privileged_actions": [a.action_id for a in privileged_actions()],
|
||||
"default_decision": "deny",
|
||||
"execution_enabled": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
|
||||
"""Secret redaction policy for every console surface (#633).
|
||||
|
||||
The MVP already redacts MCP-side mutation records through ``gitea_audit``.
|
||||
This module is the console-facing policy: one redaction pass applied to API
|
||||
payloads, rendered HTML, log lines, and audit records *before* they leave the
|
||||
server or reach persistent storage.
|
||||
|
||||
Design constraints:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Reuse, never fork.** ``gitea_audit.redact`` remains the authority for
|
||||
secret-looking dict keys, ``Authorization`` material, and raw URLs. This
|
||||
module runs that pass first and then applies console-specific patterns for
|
||||
keychain references, key/value assignments, private-key blocks, and JWTs.
|
||||
- **Never raises.** Redaction is a safety control; a malformed payload must
|
||||
degrade to a redacted placeholder rather than propagate an exception.
|
||||
- **Redact before persist.** ``webui.console_audit`` calls this module before
|
||||
writing, so an unredacted record is never durable.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
import gitea_audit
|
||||
|
||||
REDACTED = gitea_audit.REDACTED
|
||||
|
||||
# Console-specific patterns applied after the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass.
|
||||
# Each keeps the identifying key so an operator can still tell *what* was
|
||||
# removed, and replaces only the secret run itself.
|
||||
_KEYCHAIN_REF = re.compile(r"(?i)\bkeychain:[\w.\-/@]+")
|
||||
_KEYCHAIN_CMD = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?i)\bsecurity\s+find-(?:generic|internet)-password\b[^\n]*"
|
||||
)
|
||||
_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?i)\b(token|password|passwd|secret|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|"
|
||||
r"client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key)\b(\s*[:=]\s*)"
|
||||
r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
_ENV_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?i)\b(GITEA_(?:TOKEN|PASS|PASSWORD)[A-Z0-9_]*)(\s*=\s*)"
|
||||
r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK = re.compile(
|
||||
r"-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----",
|
||||
re.S,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_JWT = re.compile(
|
||||
r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\b"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Shapes that mean a payload still carries a secret. ``scan_for_secrets`` uses
|
||||
# these to assert a surface is clean.
|
||||
_DETECTORS: tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...] = (
|
||||
("keychain_reference", _KEYCHAIN_REF),
|
||||
("keychain_command", _KEYCHAIN_CMD),
|
||||
("credential_assignment", _ASSIGNMENT),
|
||||
("credential_env_assignment", _ENV_ASSIGNMENT),
|
||||
("private_key_block", _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK),
|
||||
("json_web_token", _JWT),
|
||||
("bearer_credential", re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:bearer|basic)\s+\S{8,}")),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _mask_assignment(match: re.Match[str]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Keep the key and separator, replace the value."""
|
||||
return f"{match.group(1)}{match.group(2)}{REDACTED}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def redact_text(text: Any) -> Any:
|
||||
"""Redact secret material from a single string.
|
||||
|
||||
Non-strings are returned unchanged so this is safe to map over mixed
|
||||
payloads. Runs the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass first, then the
|
||||
console-specific patterns.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
|
||||
return text
|
||||
try:
|
||||
out = gitea_audit.redact(text)
|
||||
if not isinstance(out, str): # defensive; redact() returns str for str
|
||||
return REDACTED
|
||||
out = _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK.sub(f"{REDACTED}_PRIVATE_KEY", out)
|
||||
out = _ENV_ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
|
||||
out = _ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
|
||||
out = _KEYCHAIN_CMD.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_COMMAND", out)
|
||||
out = _KEYCHAIN_REF.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_REF", out)
|
||||
out = _JWT.sub(f"{REDACTED}_JWT", out)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Fail closed: an unredactable string is dropped rather than emitted raw.
|
||||
return REDACTED
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def redact_payload(value: Any) -> Any:
|
||||
"""Recursively redact a JSON-able payload for any console surface.
|
||||
|
||||
Secret-looking dict keys are replaced wholesale by the shared
|
||||
``gitea_audit`` policy; every remaining string is run through
|
||||
:func:`redact_text`.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
shared = gitea_audit.redact(value)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return REDACTED
|
||||
return _walk(shared)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _walk(value: Any) -> Any:
|
||||
if isinstance(value, dict):
|
||||
return {k: _walk(v) for k, v in value.items()}
|
||||
if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
|
||||
return [_walk(v) for v in value]
|
||||
if isinstance(value, str):
|
||||
return redact_text(value)
|
||||
return value
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def scan_for_secrets(value: Any) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Return detector names that still match *value* after serialization.
|
||||
|
||||
Used to assert an outbound payload or rendered page is clean. An empty
|
||||
list means no known secret shape was found. Already-redacted hits are not
|
||||
findings.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if isinstance(value, str):
|
||||
text = value
|
||||
else:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
text = json.dumps(value, default=str)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
text = str(value)
|
||||
findings: list[str] = []
|
||||
for name, pattern in _DETECTORS:
|
||||
for match in pattern.finditer(text):
|
||||
if REDACTED in match.group(0):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
findings.append(name)
|
||||
break
|
||||
return findings
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def redaction_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Machine-readable statement of the redaction rules (never secrets)."""
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"policy_version": 1,
|
||||
"applies_to": [
|
||||
"json_api_responses",
|
||||
"rendered_html",
|
||||
"server_logs",
|
||||
"audit_records",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"ordering": "shared gitea_audit pass, then console patterns",
|
||||
"redact_before_persist": True,
|
||||
"shared_rules": {
|
||||
"source": "gitea_audit.redact",
|
||||
"secret_key_hints": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS),
|
||||
"secret_value_prefixes": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES),
|
||||
"urls": "credentials, secret query parameters, and real hosts redacted",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"console_rules": [
|
||||
{"name": name, "pattern": pattern.pattern}
|
||||
for name, pattern in _DETECTORS
|
||||
],
|
||||
"placeholder": REDACTED,
|
||||
"failure_mode": "fail closed — unredactable values become the placeholder",
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,682 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Read-only system-health model for the operator console API (#634).
|
||||
|
||||
`/health` answers liveness only. Operators automating readiness checks need a
|
||||
structured view of *why* the control plane is or is not usable: which
|
||||
dependencies answered, how long they took, what version of the code is running,
|
||||
and whether the runtime is stale relative to its remote.
|
||||
|
||||
Three rules shape this module.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Read-only.** Every probe opens its subject read-only. The control-plane
|
||||
database is opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI so a health check can never
|
||||
create or migrate a schema, and no probe writes, restarts, or reloads
|
||||
anything — restart controls are Phase 2, and #630 forbids process-kill
|
||||
recovery outright.
|
||||
* **Fail-soft.** A dependency that is unreachable is a *status*, not an
|
||||
exception. Probes catch their own failures and report them as a degraded or
|
||||
down entry carrying a reason.
|
||||
* **Never claim more than was proven.** Readiness is derived only from probes
|
||||
that actually ran, ``mutation_safe`` stays false unless the parity commits are
|
||||
known and equal, and an MCP namespace is reported unproven because a web
|
||||
process cannot exercise the IDE-managed client path (#543).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import time
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from typing import Any, Callable
|
||||
from urllib.parse import urlsplit, urlunsplit
|
||||
|
||||
import control_plane_db
|
||||
import mcp_namespace_health
|
||||
from gitea_auth import api_request, get_auth_header, gitea_url
|
||||
|
||||
from webui.project_registry import load_registry
|
||||
|
||||
SERVICE_NAME = "mcp-control-plane-webui"
|
||||
API_PATH = "/api/v1/system/health"
|
||||
|
||||
STATUS_OK = "ok"
|
||||
STATUS_DEGRADED = "degraded"
|
||||
STATUS_DOWN = "down"
|
||||
STATUS_SKIPPED = "skipped"
|
||||
STATUS_UNPROVEN = "unproven"
|
||||
|
||||
# Statuses that count as a healthy answer from a probe.
|
||||
_HEALTHY_STATUSES = frozenset({STATUS_OK})
|
||||
# Statuses meaning "this probe did not run", as opposed to "it ran and failed".
|
||||
_NOT_RUN_STATUSES = frozenset({STATUS_SKIPPED})
|
||||
|
||||
_DEEP_PROBE_TTL_ENV = "WEBUI_HEALTH_PROBE_TTL_SECONDS"
|
||||
_DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL = 15.0
|
||||
_GITEA_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
|
||||
|
||||
_OFFLINE_ENV = "WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE"
|
||||
|
||||
# Credential-shaped material that must never reach the browser, mirroring the
|
||||
# forbidden client patterns in webui/deployment_boundary.py.
|
||||
_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?i)\b(token|password|passwd|secret|authorization|bearer)\b\s*[:=]?\s*\S+"
|
||||
)
|
||||
_LONG_OPAQUE_RE = re.compile(r"\b[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{32,}\b")
|
||||
|
||||
# Captured once at import so uptime measures this process, not the request.
|
||||
_STARTED_AT = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
_STARTED_MONOTONIC = time.monotonic()
|
||||
|
||||
# TTL cache for the expensive (network) probe only.
|
||||
_deep_cache: dict[str, tuple[float, "DependencyProbe"]] = {}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||
class DependencyProbe:
|
||||
"""One dependency check, fail-soft, with its own latency."""
|
||||
|
||||
name: str
|
||||
kind: str
|
||||
status: str
|
||||
detail: str
|
||||
required: bool
|
||||
latency_ms: float | None = None
|
||||
metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def healthy(self) -> bool:
|
||||
return self.status in _HEALTHY_STATUSES
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def ran(self) -> bool:
|
||||
return self.status not in _NOT_RUN_STATUSES
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||
class VersionInfo:
|
||||
git_sha: str | None
|
||||
git_describe: str | None
|
||||
control_plane_schema_version: int | None
|
||||
python_version: str
|
||||
known: bool
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||
class StaleRuntime:
|
||||
"""Parity between the running code, the checkout, and the remote.
|
||||
|
||||
``mutation_safe`` is deliberately conservative: unknown is not safe.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
daemon_head: str | None
|
||||
checkout_head: str | None
|
||||
remote_head: str | None
|
||||
stale: bool
|
||||
determinable: bool
|
||||
mutation_safe: bool
|
||||
reasons: tuple[str, ...]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||
class SystemHealthSnapshot:
|
||||
status: str
|
||||
ready: bool
|
||||
readiness_complete: bool
|
||||
readiness_reasons: tuple[str, ...]
|
||||
service: str
|
||||
mode: str
|
||||
version: VersionInfo
|
||||
started_at: str
|
||||
uptime_seconds: float
|
||||
timestamp: str
|
||||
deep_probes_requested: bool
|
||||
dependencies: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...]
|
||||
mcp_namespaces: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]
|
||||
stale_runtime: StaleRuntime
|
||||
probe_errors: tuple[str, ...] = ()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def process_uptime() -> tuple[str, float]:
|
||||
"""Process start timestamp and uptime — in-memory, safe for `/health`."""
|
||||
return _STARTED_AT.isoformat(), round(time.monotonic() - _STARTED_MONOTONIC, 3)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _offline() -> bool:
|
||||
return (os.environ.get(_OFFLINE_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _repo_root() -> Path:
|
||||
override = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_REPO_ROOT") or "").strip()
|
||||
if override:
|
||||
return Path(override).resolve()
|
||||
return Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _deep_probe_ttl() -> float:
|
||||
raw = (os.environ.get(_DEEP_PROBE_TTL_ENV) or "").strip()
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
return _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
|
||||
try:
|
||||
value = float(raw)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
return _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
|
||||
return value if value >= 0 else _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def redact(text: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Strip credential-shaped material from operator-visible probe text.
|
||||
|
||||
Probe details carry exception strings, and an exception raised by an HTTP
|
||||
client can quote the request that failed. Redaction happens here, at the
|
||||
boundary where those strings become part of a browser-bound payload.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
cleaned = _redact_urls(text)
|
||||
cleaned = _SECRET_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}=[redacted]", cleaned)
|
||||
return _LONG_OPAQUE_RE.sub("[redacted]", cleaned)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _redact_urls(text: str) -> str:
|
||||
return re.sub(r"https?://\S+", lambda m: redact_url(m.group(0)), text)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def redact_url(url: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Reduce a URL to scheme://host/path — no userinfo, no query, no fragment."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parts = urlsplit(url)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
return "[redacted-url]"
|
||||
if not parts.scheme or not parts.hostname:
|
||||
return "[redacted-url]"
|
||||
netloc = parts.hostname
|
||||
if parts.port:
|
||||
netloc = f"{netloc}:{parts.port}"
|
||||
return urlunsplit((parts.scheme, netloc, parts.path, "", ""))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _git(repo: Path, *args: str) -> str | None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
completed = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", str(repo), *args],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
timeout=10,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if completed.returncode != 0:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return (completed.stdout or "").strip() or None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _load_version(repo: Path, *, schema_version: int | None) -> VersionInfo:
|
||||
import platform
|
||||
|
||||
git_sha = None if _offline() else _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
|
||||
describe = None if _offline() else _git(repo, "describe", "--tags", "--always")
|
||||
return VersionInfo(
|
||||
git_sha=git_sha,
|
||||
git_describe=describe,
|
||||
control_plane_schema_version=schema_version,
|
||||
python_version=platform.python_version(),
|
||||
known=bool(git_sha),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Dependency probes
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _elapsed_ms(started: float) -> float:
|
||||
return round((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000, 3)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def probe_control_plane_db(db_path: str | None = None) -> DependencyProbe:
|
||||
"""Read-only reachability check for the control-plane SQLite substrate.
|
||||
|
||||
Opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI on purpose: ``ControlPlaneDB.__init__``
|
||||
creates directories and runs schema migrations, which a health check must
|
||||
never do.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path()).strip()
|
||||
started = time.monotonic()
|
||||
metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"path": path}
|
||||
|
||||
def _result(status: str, detail: str) -> DependencyProbe:
|
||||
return DependencyProbe(
|
||||
name="control_plane_db",
|
||||
kind="sqlite",
|
||||
status=status,
|
||||
detail=detail,
|
||||
required=True,
|
||||
latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
|
||||
metadata=metadata,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if not path or not os.path.exists(path):
|
||||
return _result(STATUS_DOWN, "control-plane database file does not exist yet")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=5)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
row = conn.execute(
|
||||
"SELECT value FROM schema_meta WHERE key = 'schema_version'"
|
||||
).fetchone()
|
||||
leases = conn.execute(
|
||||
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM leases WHERE status = 'active'"
|
||||
).fetchone()
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
conn.close()
|
||||
except sqlite3.Error as exc:
|
||||
return _result(STATUS_DOWN, redact(f"control-plane database unreadable: {exc}"))
|
||||
|
||||
schema_version = int(row[0]) if row and str(row[0]).isdigit() else None
|
||||
metadata["schema_version"] = schema_version
|
||||
metadata["active_leases"] = int(leases[0]) if leases else None
|
||||
if schema_version is None:
|
||||
return _result(
|
||||
STATUS_DEGRADED, "control-plane database has no recorded schema version"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if schema_version != control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION:
|
||||
return _result(
|
||||
STATUS_DEGRADED,
|
||||
f"control-plane schema version {schema_version} does not match the "
|
||||
f"version this code expects ({control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION})",
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _result(STATUS_OK, f"schema v{schema_version} readable")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def probe_repository(repo: Path) -> DependencyProbe:
|
||||
"""Local checkout reachability — required, cheap, no network."""
|
||||
started = time.monotonic()
|
||||
metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"repo_root": str(repo)}
|
||||
if _offline():
|
||||
return DependencyProbe(
|
||||
name="repository",
|
||||
kind="git",
|
||||
status=STATUS_SKIPPED,
|
||||
detail=f"{_OFFLINE_ENV} is set; git probe skipped",
|
||||
required=True,
|
||||
latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
|
||||
metadata=metadata,
|
||||
)
|
||||
head = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
|
||||
if not head:
|
||||
return DependencyProbe(
|
||||
name="repository",
|
||||
kind="git",
|
||||
status=STATUS_DOWN,
|
||||
detail=f"HEAD could not be read at {repo}",
|
||||
required=True,
|
||||
latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
|
||||
metadata=metadata,
|
||||
)
|
||||
branch = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD")
|
||||
metadata["head"] = head
|
||||
metadata["branch"] = branch
|
||||
return DependencyProbe(
|
||||
name="repository",
|
||||
kind="git",
|
||||
status=STATUS_OK,
|
||||
detail=f"checkout readable at {branch or 'detached HEAD'}",
|
||||
required=True,
|
||||
latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
|
||||
metadata=metadata,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def probe_gitea(host: str) -> DependencyProbe:
|
||||
"""Live Gitea reachability. Expensive (network), so opt-in via ``deep``.
|
||||
|
||||
Optional by design: the console stays useful for local inventory when the
|
||||
remote is unreachable, so a failure here degrades status without claiming
|
||||
the process itself is unready.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
started = time.monotonic()
|
||||
metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"host": host}
|
||||
|
||||
def _failure(status: str, detail: str) -> DependencyProbe:
|
||||
return DependencyProbe(
|
||||
name="gitea",
|
||||
kind="http",
|
||||
status=status,
|
||||
detail=detail,
|
||||
required=False,
|
||||
latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
|
||||
metadata=metadata,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if not host:
|
||||
return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, "no Gitea host is configured in the registry")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
auth = get_auth_header(host)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — credential guards are a status here
|
||||
return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, redact(f"credential lookup refused: {exc}"))
|
||||
if not auth:
|
||||
return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, f"no credentials available for {host}")
|
||||
|
||||
url = gitea_url(host, "/api/v1/version")
|
||||
metadata["endpoint"] = redact_url(url)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
data = api_request("GET", url, auth, timeout=_GITEA_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — a down dependency is a status
|
||||
return _failure(STATUS_DOWN, redact(f"Gitea probe failed: {exc}"))
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("version"):
|
||||
metadata["gitea_version"] = str(data["version"])
|
||||
return DependencyProbe(
|
||||
name="gitea",
|
||||
kind="http",
|
||||
status=STATUS_OK,
|
||||
detail=f"{host} reachable",
|
||||
required=False,
|
||||
latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
|
||||
metadata=metadata,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _skipped_gitea(host: str) -> DependencyProbe:
|
||||
return DependencyProbe(
|
||||
name="gitea",
|
||||
kind="http",
|
||||
status=STATUS_SKIPPED,
|
||||
detail="network probe not requested; call with ?deep=1 to run it",
|
||||
required=False,
|
||||
latency_ms=None,
|
||||
metadata={"host": host},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def namespace_summaries() -> tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]:
|
||||
"""Declared MCP namespaces, each honestly reported as unproven.
|
||||
|
||||
The web process runs outside the IDE-managed MCP client, so it cannot
|
||||
invoke a namespace tool. Per #543 only a ``client_namespace`` probe proves
|
||||
that path, and inventing a healthy verdict here is exactly the false claim
|
||||
the mutation gates exist to prevent.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
rows: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
for namespace, required_tool in sorted(
|
||||
mcp_namespace_health.REQUIRED_NAMESPACE_TOOLS.items()
|
||||
):
|
||||
classification = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
|
||||
namespace,
|
||||
required_tool=required_tool,
|
||||
probe_result=None,
|
||||
probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_UNKNOWN,
|
||||
)
|
||||
rows.append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"namespace": namespace,
|
||||
"required_tool": required_tool,
|
||||
"status": STATUS_UNPROVEN,
|
||||
"ide_namespace_proven": bool(classification.get("ide_namespace_proven")),
|
||||
"reason": (
|
||||
"the web console cannot invoke the IDE-managed MCP client; "
|
||||
"namespace health must be proven with a client_namespace "
|
||||
"probe (#543)"
|
||||
),
|
||||
"error_type": classification.get("error_type"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
return tuple(rows)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_stale_runtime(
|
||||
repo: Path,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
daemon_head: str | None = None,
|
||||
git_reader: Callable[..., str | None] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> StaleRuntime:
|
||||
"""Three-way parity view: running code, local checkout, remote-tracking ref.
|
||||
|
||||
``mutation_safe`` requires all three to be known and equal. Anything less —
|
||||
including "the remote ref was never fetched" — is reported as not safe with
|
||||
a reason, so an operator never reads an unproven green.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reader = git_reader or (lambda *args: _git(repo, *args))
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
# The offline switch suppresses real subprocess calls; an explicitly
|
||||
# injected reader is already a substitute for them and is always used.
|
||||
offline = _offline() and git_reader is None
|
||||
|
||||
checkout_head = None if offline else reader("rev-parse", "HEAD")
|
||||
remote_head = None if offline else reader("rev-parse", "@{upstream}")
|
||||
if offline:
|
||||
reasons.append(f"{_OFFLINE_ENV} is set; parity commits were not read")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
if checkout_head is None:
|
||||
reasons.append("local checkout HEAD could not be read")
|
||||
if remote_head is None:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"no remote-tracking commit is known for the current branch; "
|
||||
"remote staleness is indeterminate (no fetch is performed here)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
effective_daemon = daemon_head if daemon_head is not None else checkout_head
|
||||
if daemon_head is None:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"the running MCP daemon's startup commit is not observable from the "
|
||||
"web process; the checkout commit is reported in its place"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
determinable = bool(checkout_head and remote_head and effective_daemon)
|
||||
stale = bool(
|
||||
determinable and len({checkout_head, remote_head, effective_daemon}) > 1
|
||||
)
|
||||
if stale:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"runtime, checkout, and remote commits disagree; restart the MCP "
|
||||
"server after updating the checkout before trusting capability gates"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return StaleRuntime(
|
||||
daemon_head=effective_daemon,
|
||||
checkout_head=checkout_head,
|
||||
remote_head=remote_head,
|
||||
stale=stale,
|
||||
determinable=determinable,
|
||||
mutation_safe=bool(determinable and not stale),
|
||||
reasons=tuple(reasons),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Snapshot assembly
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _default_host() -> str:
|
||||
registry = load_registry()
|
||||
if not registry.projects:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
raw = registry.projects[0].remote_host
|
||||
parts = urlsplit(raw.strip())
|
||||
return parts.netloc or raw.strip().rstrip("/")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _aggregate(
|
||||
probes: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...],
|
||||
) -> tuple[str, bool, bool, tuple[str, ...]]:
|
||||
"""Fold probe results into overall status and readiness.
|
||||
|
||||
Required probes drive readiness; optional probes can only degrade status.
|
||||
A probe that did not run leaves readiness incomplete rather than passing.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
required = [probe for probe in probes if probe.required]
|
||||
unrun_required = [probe for probe in required if not probe.ran]
|
||||
failed_required = [probe for probe in required if probe.ran and not probe.healthy]
|
||||
failed_optional = [
|
||||
probe
|
||||
for probe in probes
|
||||
if not probe.required and probe.ran and not probe.healthy
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
for probe in unrun_required:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"required dependency '{probe.name}' was not probed: {probe.detail}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
for probe in failed_required:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"required dependency '{probe.name}' is {probe.status}: {probe.detail}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
for probe in failed_optional:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"optional dependency '{probe.name}' is {probe.status}: {probe.detail}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
readiness_complete = not unrun_required
|
||||
ready = readiness_complete and not failed_required
|
||||
|
||||
if any(probe.status == STATUS_DOWN for probe in failed_required):
|
||||
status = STATUS_DOWN
|
||||
elif failed_required or failed_optional or unrun_required:
|
||||
status = STATUS_DEGRADED
|
||||
else:
|
||||
status = STATUS_OK
|
||||
return status, ready, readiness_complete, tuple(reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def load_system_health(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
deep: bool = False,
|
||||
host: str | None = None,
|
||||
probes: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...] | None = None,
|
||||
daemon_head: str | None = None,
|
||||
use_cache: bool = True,
|
||||
) -> SystemHealthSnapshot:
|
||||
"""Assemble the read-only system-health snapshot.
|
||||
|
||||
``deep=True`` adds the network probe against Gitea; its result is cached for
|
||||
a short TTL so repeated dashboard polls do not amplify into remote load.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
repo = _repo_root()
|
||||
probe_errors: list[str] = []
|
||||
|
||||
if probes is None:
|
||||
collected: list[DependencyProbe] = []
|
||||
for probe_fn in (
|
||||
lambda: probe_control_plane_db(),
|
||||
lambda: probe_repository(repo),
|
||||
):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
collected.append(probe_fn())
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — a probe must not 500 the API
|
||||
probe_errors.append(redact(f"probe raised: {exc}"))
|
||||
resolved_host = host if host is not None else _default_host()
|
||||
if deep and not _offline():
|
||||
collected.append(_cached_gitea_probe(resolved_host, use_cache=use_cache))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
collected.append(_skipped_gitea(resolved_host))
|
||||
probes = tuple(collected)
|
||||
|
||||
status, ready, readiness_complete, reasons = _aggregate(probes)
|
||||
stale = assess_stale_runtime(repo, daemon_head=daemon_head)
|
||||
if stale.stale:
|
||||
if status == STATUS_OK:
|
||||
status = STATUS_DEGRADED
|
||||
reasons = reasons + (
|
||||
"runtime is stale relative to its remote-tracking commit",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
db_probe = next((p for p in probes if p.name == "control_plane_db"), None)
|
||||
schema_version = None
|
||||
if db_probe and db_probe.metadata:
|
||||
schema_version = db_probe.metadata.get("schema_version")
|
||||
|
||||
return SystemHealthSnapshot(
|
||||
status=status,
|
||||
ready=ready,
|
||||
readiness_complete=readiness_complete,
|
||||
readiness_reasons=reasons,
|
||||
service=SERVICE_NAME,
|
||||
mode="read-only",
|
||||
version=_load_version(repo, schema_version=schema_version),
|
||||
started_at=_STARTED_AT.isoformat(),
|
||||
uptime_seconds=round(time.monotonic() - _STARTED_MONOTONIC, 3),
|
||||
timestamp=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
|
||||
deep_probes_requested=deep,
|
||||
dependencies=probes,
|
||||
mcp_namespaces=namespace_summaries(),
|
||||
stale_runtime=stale,
|
||||
probe_errors=tuple(probe_errors),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _cached_gitea_probe(host: str, *, use_cache: bool = True) -> DependencyProbe:
|
||||
ttl = _deep_probe_ttl()
|
||||
now = time.monotonic()
|
||||
if use_cache and ttl > 0:
|
||||
cached = _deep_cache.get(host)
|
||||
if cached and (now - cached[0]) < ttl:
|
||||
return cached[1]
|
||||
probe = probe_gitea(host)
|
||||
if use_cache and ttl > 0:
|
||||
_deep_cache[host] = (now, probe)
|
||||
return probe
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def clear_probe_cache() -> None:
|
||||
"""Drop cached deep-probe results (tests and operator-forced refresh)."""
|
||||
_deep_cache.clear()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def probe_to_dict(probe: DependencyProbe) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"name": probe.name,
|
||||
"kind": probe.kind,
|
||||
"status": probe.status,
|
||||
"detail": probe.detail,
|
||||
"required": probe.required,
|
||||
"healthy": probe.healthy,
|
||||
"latency_ms": probe.latency_ms,
|
||||
"metadata": dict(probe.metadata or {}),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": snapshot.status,
|
||||
"service": snapshot.service,
|
||||
"mode": snapshot.mode,
|
||||
"api": API_PATH,
|
||||
"timestamp": snapshot.timestamp,
|
||||
"readiness": {
|
||||
"ready": snapshot.ready,
|
||||
"complete": snapshot.readiness_complete,
|
||||
"reasons": list(snapshot.readiness_reasons),
|
||||
},
|
||||
"version": {
|
||||
"git_sha": snapshot.version.git_sha,
|
||||
"git_describe": snapshot.version.git_describe,
|
||||
"control_plane_schema_version": (
|
||||
snapshot.version.control_plane_schema_version
|
||||
),
|
||||
"python_version": snapshot.version.python_version,
|
||||
"known": snapshot.version.known,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"process": {
|
||||
"started_at": snapshot.started_at,
|
||||
"uptime_seconds": snapshot.uptime_seconds,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"deep_probes_requested": snapshot.deep_probes_requested,
|
||||
"dependencies": [probe_to_dict(probe) for probe in snapshot.dependencies],
|
||||
"mcp_namespaces": [dict(row) for row in snapshot.mcp_namespaces],
|
||||
"stale_runtime": {
|
||||
"daemon_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.daemon_head,
|
||||
"checkout_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.checkout_head,
|
||||
"remote_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.remote_head,
|
||||
"stale": snapshot.stale_runtime.stale,
|
||||
"determinable": snapshot.stale_runtime.determinable,
|
||||
"mutation_safe": snapshot.stale_runtime.mutation_safe,
|
||||
"reasons": list(snapshot.stale_runtime.reasons),
|
||||
},
|
||||
"probe_errors": list(snapshot.probe_errors),
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user