fix: conflict-fix lease lifecycle chain termination and TTL handling (Closes #847, Refs #842)

Add controller-owned cross_role allocation mode that inspects the full
queue and returns one selection with required role/profile/action and
lease evidence. Document process_work_queue routing, normalize
controller role metadata, and keep the dashboard explanatory only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

allocator_service.py

@@ -78,6 +78,33 @@ VALID_ROLES = frozenset(
     {ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER, ROLE_RECONCILER, ROLE_CONTROLLER}
 )
 
+# Allocation modes (#840).
+# role_scoped: only candidates whose expected role matches the caller role.
+# cross_role:  controller-owned generic queue selection — inspect full queue,
+# rank/eligibility canonically, return one selection naming the required
+# downstream role/profile. Controller routes; it does not perform mutations.
+ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED = "role_scoped"
+ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE = "cross_role"
+VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES = frozenset(
+    {ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED, ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE}
+)
+
+# Default execution-profile / MCP-namespace names for each role.
+DEFAULT_ROLE_PROFILES: dict[str, str] = {
+    ROLE_AUTHOR: "prgs-author",
+    ROLE_REVIEWER: "prgs-reviewer",
+    ROLE_MERGER: "prgs-merger",
+    ROLE_RECONCILER: "prgs-reconciler",
+    ROLE_CONTROLLER: "prgs-controller",
+}
+DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES: dict[str, str] = {
+    ROLE_AUTHOR: "gitea-author",
+    ROLE_REVIEWER: "gitea-reviewer",
+    ROLE_MERGER: "gitea-merger",
+    ROLE_RECONCILER: "gitea-reconciler",
+    ROLE_CONTROLLER: "gitea-controller",
+}
+
 # Default action matrices by role (mutation gate will re-check).
 ROLE_ACTIONS: dict[str, tuple[tuple[str, ...], tuple[str, ...]]] = {
     ROLE_AUTHOR: (
@@ -259,6 +286,126 @@ def normalize_role(role: str | None, *, profile_name: str | None = None) -> str:
     )
 
 
+def resolve_allocation_mode(
+    role: str,
+    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    """Resolve allocation mode; controller defaults to cross_role (#840)."""
+    raw = (allocation_mode or "").strip().lower()
+    if raw:
+        if raw not in VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES:
+            raise ControlPlaneError(
+                f"unknown allocation_mode {allocation_mode!r}; expected one of "
+                f"{sorted(VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES)}"
+            )
+        return raw
+    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        return ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE
+    return ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED
+
+
+def required_profile_for_role(
+    role: str,
+    *,
+    profile_name: str | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    """Map a required role to the canonical execution profile name."""
+    role_norm = (role or "").strip().lower()
+    # Preserve remote/env prefix from the active profile when present
+    # (e.g. dadeschools-author → dadeschools-reviewer).
+    active = (profile_name or "").strip()
+    if active:
+        lower = active.lower()
+        for token in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"):
+            if lower.endswith(f"-{token}") or lower == token:
+                prefix = active[: -len(token)].rstrip("-")
+                if prefix:
+                    return f"{prefix}-{role_norm}"
+                return role_norm
+    return DEFAULT_ROLE_PROFILES.get(role_norm, f"prgs-{role_norm}")
+
+
+def required_namespace_for_role(
+    role: str,
+    *,
+    profile_name: str | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    """Map a required role to the canonical MCP namespace name."""
+    role_norm = (role or "").strip().lower()
+    profile = required_profile_for_role(role_norm, profile_name=profile_name)
+    # Namespace is typically gitea-<role>; keep stable mapping when profile is
+    # non-prgs (still gitea-<role> for isolation).
+    return DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES.get(role_norm, f"gitea-{role_norm}")
+
+
+def selected_action_for_candidate(c: WorkCandidate, required_role: str) -> str:
+    """Canonical next action for the selected work under *required_role*."""
+    role = (required_role or "").strip().lower()
+    if role == ROLE_AUTHOR:
+        if c.kind == "pr" and c.request_changes_current_head:
+            return "address_pr_change_requests"
+        if c.kind == "pr":
+            return "update_pr"
+        return "implement"
+    if role == ROLE_REVIEWER:
+        if c.approval_stale:
+            return "re_review"
+        return "review"
+    if role == ROLE_MERGER:
+        return "merge"
+    if role == ROLE_RECONCILER:
+        if c.approval_contaminated:
+            return "reconcile_contaminated_approval"
+        return "reconcile"
+    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        return "diagnose"
+    return "process"
+
+
+def build_selection_dict(
+    selected: WorkCandidate,
+    *,
+    active_role: str,
+    required_role: str,
+    profile_name: str | None = None,
+    allocation_mode: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Authoritative single selection payload for allocator results (#840)."""
+    action = selected_action_for_candidate(selected, required_role)
+    req_profile = required_profile_for_role(
+        required_role, profile_name=profile_name
+    )
+    req_ns = required_namespace_for_role(
+        required_role, profile_name=profile_name
+    )
+    return {
+        "kind": selected.kind,
+        "number": selected.number,
+        "title": selected.title,
+        "labels": list(selected.labels),
+        "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
+        "priority": selected.priority,
+        "expected_role_next": required_role,
+        "required_role": required_role,
+        "selected_action": action,
+        "action": action,
+        "required_profile": req_profile,
+        "required_namespace": req_ns,
+        "pinned": {
+            "kind": selected.kind,
+            "number": selected.number,
+            "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
+            "issue_number": selected.number if selected.kind == "issue" else None,
+            "pr_number": selected.number if selected.kind == "pr" else None,
+        },
+        "reason_selected": (
+            f"highest-priority eligible candidate under allocation_mode="
+            f"'{allocation_mode}' (active_role={active_role}, "
+            f"required_role={required_role}, action={action})"
+        ),
+    }
+
+
 def expected_role_for_candidate(c: WorkCandidate) -> str:
     """ADR §5.3 routing: which role should take this work next."""
     if c.kind == "pr":
@@ -289,6 +436,7 @@ def classify_skip(
     role: str,
     terminal_pr: int | None,
     claim_ownership: str | None = None,
+    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
 ) -> str | None:
     """Return skip reason, or None if candidate is selectable for *role*.
 
@@ -297,7 +445,12 @@ def classify_skip(
     and unknown claims are excluded so one session's in-progress task can never
     blockade the queue for a different controller; ``own`` stays selectable so
     a controller can resume its own work.
+
+    *allocation_mode* (#840): ``cross_role`` (controller default) ranks the full
+    queue and selects the highest-priority eligible item for any downstream
+    role. ``role_scoped`` retains prior role-match filtering.
     """
+    mode = resolve_allocation_mode(role, allocation_mode)
     if c.state in ("merged", "closed"):
         return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} is {c.state}; never assign"
     if c.blocked or "status:blocked" in c.labels:
@@ -322,34 +475,58 @@ def classify_skip(
     if c.kind == "pr" and not (c.head_sha or "").strip():
         return f"pr#{c.number} missing head_sha pin"
 
+    expected = expected_role_for_candidate(c)
+
     # Terminal path first: when an active terminal PR exists, only that PR
-    # (or controller diagnosis) is assignable for review-path roles.
+    # is assignable for review-path roles (or for work whose expected role is
+    # review/merge under cross_role selection).
     if terminal_pr is not None and c.kind == "pr" and c.number != terminal_pr:
-        if role in (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER):
+        terminal_roles = (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER)
+        if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE:
+            if expected in terminal_roles:
+                return (
+                    f"pr#{c.number} skipped: active terminal-review lock on "
+                    f"PR #{terminal_pr} must be resolved first"
+                )
+        elif role in terminal_roles:
             return (
                 f"pr#{c.number} skipped: active terminal-review lock on "
                 f"PR #{terminal_pr} must be resolved first"
             )
 
-    expected = expected_role_for_candidate(c)
-    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
-        # Controller may inspect anything but only assigns diagnosis targets
-        # when contaminated / blocked.
+    if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE:
+        # Cross-role controller selection: eligibility only — no active-role
+        # match filter. The selection payload names required_role.
+        pass
+    elif role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        # Legacy diagnosis-only controller path (role_scoped): only reconciler-
+        # needed targets. Prefer cross_role for generic queue allocation.
         if expected == ROLE_RECONCILER or c.blocked:
             return None
-        return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} does not require controller (expected {expected})"
-
-    if role != expected:
+        return (
+            f"{c.kind}#{c.number} does not require controller "
+            f"(expected {expected})"
+        )
+    elif role != expected:
         return (
             f"{c.kind}#{c.number} expects role '{expected}', active role is '{role}'"
         )
 
     # Ready-gate for issues: prefer status:ready when labels present.
+    # Applies for author-bound work in both modes (cross_role only gates
+    # author-expected issues so reconciler/reviewer PRs stay selectable).
     if c.kind == "issue" and c.labels:
-        if "status:ready" not in c.labels and "status:in-progress" not in c.labels:
-            # Allow unlabeled open issues; only skip explicit non-ready states.
-            if any(l.startswith("status:") for l in c.labels):
-                return f"issue#{c.number} not status:ready ({','.join(c.labels)})"
+        gate_role = expected if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE else role
+        if gate_role in (ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_CONTROLLER):
+            if (
+                "status:ready" not in c.labels
+                and "status:in-progress" not in c.labels
+            ):
+                if any(l.startswith("status:") for l in c.labels):
+                    return (
+                        f"issue#{c.number} not status:ready "
+                        f"({','.join(c.labels)})"
+                    )
     return None
 
 
@@ -501,12 +678,19 @@ def allocate_next_work(
     claims: Mapping[tuple[str, int], dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
     exclude_issue_numbers: Sequence[int] | None = None,
     expected_candidate_set_fingerprint: str | None = None,
+    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Select and optionally reserve the next work unit via control-plane DB.
 
     *apply=False* (default): dry-run selection only — no lease/assignment.
     *apply=True*: atomic ``assign_and_lease`` for the selected candidate.
 
+    *allocation_mode* (#840): ``cross_role`` (default for controller) inspects
+    the complete queue and returns one authoritative selection naming the
+    required downstream role/profile/action. ``role_scoped`` keeps prior
+    per-role filtering. Controller routes only — never grants author/reviewer/
+    merger/reconciler mutation rights to the controller session.
+
     *exclude_issue_numbers* (#776): numbers removed before ranking. Omitted /
     empty preserves prior behavior.
 
@@ -541,6 +725,19 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
         }
 
+    try:
+        mode = resolve_allocation_mode(role_norm, allocation_mode)
+    except ControlPlaneError as exc:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "outcome": OUTCOME_ROLE_INELIGIBLE,
+            "reasons": [str(exc)],
+            "skipped": [],
+            "assignment": None,
+            "substrate": "control_plane_db",
+            "allocation_mode": (allocation_mode or "").strip() or None,
+        }
+
     session_id = (session_id or "").strip() or f"alloc-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}"
     try:
         db.upsert_session(
@@ -748,6 +945,7 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             role=role_norm,
             terminal_pr=terminal_pr,
             claim_ownership=ownership,
+            allocation_mode=mode,
         )
         if reason:
             is_claim_skip = SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION in reason
@@ -828,6 +1026,10 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "outcome": outcome,
             "apply": bool(apply),
             "role": role_norm,
+            "allocation_mode": mode,
+            "routing_role": role_norm,
+            "required_role": None,
+            "selected_action": None,
             "profile_name": profile_name,
             "username": username,
             "session_id": session_id,
@@ -840,6 +1042,12 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
             "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
             "assignment": None,
+            "allocation_evidence": {
+                "mode": "empty",
+                "allocation_mode": mode,
+                "lease_created": False,
+                "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
+            },
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
             "file_lock_only": False,
             "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -852,25 +1060,37 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "owner_session_id": owner_session_id,
             "downstream_note": (
                 "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
+                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+                "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
             ),
         }
 
     expected_role = expected_role_for_candidate(selected)
-    allowed, forbidden = role_actions(role_norm)
-    selection = {
-        "kind": selected.kind,
-        "number": selected.number,
-        "title": selected.title,
-        "labels": list(selected.labels),
-        "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
-        "priority": selected.priority,
-        "expected_role_next": expected_role,
-        "reason_selected": (
-            f"highest-priority candidate for role '{role_norm}' "
-            f"(expected_role={expected_role})"
-        ),
-    }
+    # Cross-role: lease/action matrix follows the required downstream role so
+    # evidence names the worker that must act. Controller session still owns
+    # the routing decision; mutation isolation is enforced by role gates on
+    # mutation tools (controller profile lacks author/review/merge ops).
+    lease_role = (
+        expected_role if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE else role_norm
+    )
+    allowed, forbidden = role_actions(lease_role)
+    # Controller must never receive mutation-class rights via cross-role apply.
+    if role_norm == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        ctrl_allowed, ctrl_forbidden = role_actions(ROLE_CONTROLLER)
+        # Keep controller session capability evidence separate from lease_role.
+        controller_allowed_actions = ctrl_allowed
+        controller_forbidden_actions = ctrl_forbidden
+    else:
+        controller_allowed_actions = allowed
+        controller_forbidden_actions = forbidden
+
+    selection = build_selection_dict(
+        selected,
+        active_role=role_norm,
+        required_role=expected_role,
+        profile_name=profile_name,
+        allocation_mode=mode,
+    )
 
     if not apply:
         return {
@@ -878,6 +1098,12 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "outcome": OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
             "apply": False,
             "role": role_norm,
+            "allocation_mode": mode,
+            "routing_role": role_norm,
+            "required_role": expected_role,
+            "selected_action": selection["selected_action"],
+            "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
+            "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
             "profile_name": profile_name,
             "username": username,
             "session_id": session_id,
@@ -893,6 +1119,12 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
             "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
             "assignment": None,
+            "allocation_evidence": {
+                "mode": "preview",
+                "allocation_mode": mode,
+                "lease_created": False,
+                "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
+            },
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
             "file_lock_only": False,
             "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -902,9 +1134,12 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
             "exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
             "candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
+            "controller_allowed_actions": list(controller_allowed_actions),
+            "controller_forbidden_actions": list(controller_forbidden_actions),
             "downstream_note": (
                 "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
+                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+                "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
             ),
         }
 
@@ -913,7 +1148,7 @@ def allocate_next_work(
     try:
         kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
             "session_id": session_id,
-            "role": role_norm,
+            "role": lease_role,
             "remote": remote,
             "org": org,
             "repo": repo,
@@ -992,11 +1227,27 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         }
 
     # assigned
+    lease_proof = {
+        "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
+        "lease_id": result.lease_id,
+        "expires_at": result.expires_at,
+        "expected_head_sha": result.expected_head_sha,
+        "allowed_actions": list(result.allowed_actions),
+        "forbidden_actions": list(result.forbidden_actions),
+        "lease_role": lease_role,
+        "source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
+    }
     return {
         "success": True,
         "outcome": OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
         "apply": True,
         "role": role_norm,
+        "allocation_mode": mode,
+        "routing_role": role_norm,
+        "required_role": expected_role,
+        "selected_action": selection["selected_action"],
+        "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
+        "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
         "profile_name": profile_name,
         "username": username,
         "session_id": session_id,
@@ -1012,16 +1263,16 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
         "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
         "assignment": result.as_dict(),
-        "lease_proof": {
-            "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
-            "lease_id": result.lease_id,
-            "expires_at": result.expires_at,
-            "expected_head_sha": result.expected_head_sha,
-            "allowed_actions": list(result.allowed_actions),
-            "forbidden_actions": list(result.forbidden_actions),
-            "source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
+        "lease_proof": lease_proof,
+        "allocation_evidence": {
+            "mode": "assigned",
+            "allocation_mode": mode,
+            "lease_created": True,
+            "lease_role": lease_role,
+            "lease_proof": lease_proof,
+            "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
         },
-        "next_valid_command": _next_command(role_norm, selected),
+        "next_valid_command": _next_command(lease_role, selected),
         "substrate": "control_plane_db",
         "file_lock_only": False,
         "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -1031,9 +1282,12 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
         "exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
         "candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
+        "controller_allowed_actions": list(controller_allowed_actions),
+        "controller_forbidden_actions": list(controller_forbidden_actions),
         "downstream_note": (
             "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-            "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
+            "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+            "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
         ),
     }
 

anti_stomp_preflight.py

@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ MUTATION_TASKS = frozenset({
     "edit_pr",
     "commit_files",
     "gitea_commit_files",
+    "publish_unpublished_branch",
     "delete_branch",
     "cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
     "cleanup_stale_claims",

arch01_platform.py

@@ -0,0 +1,892 @@
+"""ARCH-01 Foundation Slice A — atomic platform installation + authority kernel (#822).
+
+Parents: #820, #821. **First implementation leaf of the ARCH-01 program.**
+
+This module implements the smallest executable ARCH-01 foundation:
+
+* a connection-bound authenticated actor context (``cp_actor_*`` /
+  ``cp_operation_mode`` / ``cp_context_epoch`` SQLite scalar functions that SQL
+  may *read* but can never *set* — ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` authenticity);
+* an immutable authority-dominance lattice with an exact seeded tuple set
+  (``[SCHEMA]``);
+* the principal-equivalence root (a class exists *before* its first principal;
+  ``principals.current_class_id`` is ``NOT NULL``; ``[SCHEMA]``);
+* a single-transaction platform installation that seeds the initial
+  ``platform.bootstrap`` grant and an immutable ``installed`` marker, validated
+  by a fail-closed ``install_state`` ``BEFORE INSERT`` trigger (``[SCHEMA]``).
+
+Everything else in the ARCH-01/02/04 program (evidence stores, repository
+bindings, workspaces, PostgreSQL parity, full grant succession, full principal
+merge) is out of scope here and tracked in its own issue — see #822 §5/§17.
+
+**Readiness / production posture.** This subsystem is *disabled by default*.
+Nothing in the running MCP server imports or enables it. It becomes a security
+boundary only once its readiness checks (the ACs in #822) pass in the target
+environment. Instantiating :class:`PlatformKernel` creates an isolated SQLite
+database and never touches the operational control-plane store.
+
+Enforcement classification (per #820 vocabulary):
+
+* ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` — actor-context authenticity: the scalar functions are
+  registered by the trusted Python process; SQL cannot define or redefine them.
+* ``[SCHEMA]`` — fail-closed aborts, the dominance/immutability/NOT-NULL-class/
+  last-active-grant invariants, enforced by CHECK/FK/trigger.
+* ``[RUNTIME-ADAPTER]`` — *none* in this slice.
+
+SQLite-first. ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serializes concurrent installs and concurrent
+grant/revoke on the singleton invariant row. PostgreSQL parity is a distinct
+issue (#827); this module does **not** claim it.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Iterator, Optional
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Closed enumerations (#822 §4).
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+ACTOR_KINDS = ("operator", "supervisor", "service", "installer")
+OPERATION_MODES = ("normal", "install", "merge", "internal_service")
+
+# Exact seeded authority-dominance tuple set (#822 §4). This set is normative:
+# the install-state trigger rejects any missing, additional, or malformed tuple.
+DOMINANCE_TUPLES = (
+    ("platform.bootstrap", "platform.bootstrap"),
+    ("platform.bootstrap", "project.admin"),
+    ("platform.bootstrap", "supervisor.root.establish"),
+    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.register"),
+    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.verify"),
+    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.recover"),
+)
+
+# The distinguished operator-key issuer seeded during install.
+DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_KIND = "operator-key"
+DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID = "platform.bootstrap.operator-key"
+
+# Structured result codes (#822 §10).
+INSTALLED = "INSTALLED"
+ALREADY_INSTALLED = "ALREADY_INSTALLED"
+INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT = "INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT"
+INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE = "INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE"
+DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH = "DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH"
+AUTHORIZATION_DENIED = "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED"
+CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST = "CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST"
+
+# Required audit events (#822 §14).
+EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED = "platform_installed"
+EVT_GRANT_CREATED = "platform_grant_created"
+EVT_GRANT_REVOKED = "platform_grant_revoked"
+EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED = "principal_registered"
+
+SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+DB_PATH_ENV = "ARCH01_PLATFORM_DB"
+
+
+class PlatformKernelError(RuntimeError):
+    """Base class for structured, code-bearing kernel failures."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str, message: str = "") -> None:
+        super().__init__(message or code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+class ActorContextError(PlatformKernelError):
+    """Raised when a mutation is attempted without a valid actor context."""
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Schema (#822 §6). Tables + fail-closed triggers.
+#
+# Every *mutating* trigger opens with the actor protocol: read the context
+# epoch, read the actor fields, and abort unless the context is present,
+# non-null, mode/kind well-formed, and epoch-consistent with the active
+# transaction. The scalar functions ``cp_*`` are registered from Python only;
+# SQL has no statement that can set them, which is the trusted-service boundary.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL = ", ".join("'%s'" % k for k in ACTOR_KINDS)
+_OP_MODES_SQL = ", ".join("'%s'" % m for m in OPERATION_MODES)
+
+# Actor-protocol predicate: TRUE when the context is INVALID and the trigger
+# must abort. ``cp_actor_context_valid()`` folds "present + non-expired +
+# live-epoch == bound-epoch" (the read/re-read epoch equality of #822 §4) into
+# one trusted-service answer; the remaining reads assert field well-formedness.
+_INVALID_ACTOR = (
+    "cp_actor_context_valid() IS NOT 1 "
+    "OR cp_context_epoch() IS NULL "
+    "OR cp_actor_principal() IS NULL "
+    "OR cp_actor_kind() NOT IN (%s) "
+    "OR cp_operation_mode() NOT IN (%s)" % (_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL, _OP_MODES_SQL)
+)
+
+_ACTOR_GUARD = (
+    "SELECT CASE WHEN (%s) "
+    "THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT') END;" % _INVALID_ACTOR
+)
+
+# require_installed: abort a privileged mutation when there is no install
+# marker and we are not currently installing (#822 §4).
+_REQUIRE_INSTALLED = (
+    "SELECT CASE WHEN ((SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) = 0 "
+    "AND cp_operation_mode() <> 'install') "
+    "THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'NOT_INSTALLED') END;"
+)
+
+_SCHEMA_SQL = f"""
+PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS arch01_meta (
+    key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    value TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+-- Equivalence classes are created BEFORE their first principal (#822 §4).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principal_equivalence_classes (
+    class_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS authoritative_issuers (
+    issuer_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    issuer_kind TEXT NOT NULL,
+    issuer_ref TEXT NOT NULL,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+    UNIQUE (issuer_kind, issuer_ref)
+);
+
+-- current_class_id is NOT NULL: a principal cannot exist without a class
+-- (#822 AC6). issuer_id is nullable ONLY for the installer during install
+-- (#822 AC7), enforced by trg_principals_null_issuer below.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principals (
+    principal_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    actor_kind TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (actor_kind IN ({_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL})),
+    current_class_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES principal_equivalence_classes(class_id),
+    issuer_id INTEGER REFERENCES authoritative_issuers(issuer_id),
+    registered_by TEXT REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS authority_dominance (
+    dominant TEXT NOT NULL,
+    subordinate TEXT NOT NULL,
+    PRIMARY KEY (dominant, subordinate)
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_bootstrap_seed (
+    seed_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (seed_id = 1),
+    installer_principal_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_bootstrap_grants (
+    grant_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    grantee_principal_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    granted_by TEXT REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    active INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1 CHECK (active IN (0, 1)),
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+    revoked_at TEXT
+);
+
+-- Singleton row; active_count floored at 1 by CHECK so the last active grant
+-- can never be revoked (#822 AC11).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_active_invariant (
+    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
+    active_count INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (active_count >= 1)
+);
+
+-- The immutable install marker; inserted LAST in the install transaction.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS install_state (
+    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
+    marker TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (marker = 'installed'),
+    installed_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+-- Append-only (#822 AC14).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_records (
+    audit_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    event TEXT NOT NULL,
+    principal_id TEXT,
+    detail TEXT,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- Actor protocol on every mutating trigger (#822 §4, [SCHEMA] fail-closed).
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_classes_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON principal_equivalence_classes
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON authoritative_issuers
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON principals
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON authority_dominance
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON platform_bootstrap_seed
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_actor_insert
+BEFORE INSERT ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+    {_REQUIRE_INSTALLED}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_actor_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_invariant_actor_insert
+BEFORE INSERT ON platform_active_invariant
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_invariant_actor_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_active_invariant
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON audit_records
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- NOT-NULL-issuer exception for the installer only (#822 AC7).
+-- A NULL issuer_id is accepted solely for an installer principal during
+-- install mode, before the marker exists; any other NULL-issuer principal is
+-- rejected. install-time issuer linkage (installer -> distinguished issuer)
+-- is applied by a later UPDATE, permitted while no marker exists.
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_null_issuer
+BEFORE INSERT ON principals
+WHEN NEW.issuer_id IS NULL
+BEGIN
+    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
+        NEW.actor_kind = 'installer'
+        AND cp_operation_mode() = 'install'
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) = 0
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM principals WHERE issuer_id IS NULL) = 0
+    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE') END;
+END;
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- Post-install immutability of the authority root (#822 §4, AC9).
+-- Registration fields freeze only AFTER the marker exists, so the install
+-- transaction's own installer issuer-linkage UPDATE is permitted.
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_frozen_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON principals
+WHEN (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) > 0
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_frozen_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON principals
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL');
+END;
+
+-- Distinguished issuer identity is immutable once written.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON authoritative_issuers
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_ISSUER');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON authoritative_issuers
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_ISSUER');
+END;
+
+-- The dominance lattice is immutable once seeded.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON authority_dominance
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON authority_dominance
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE');
+END;
+
+-- The bootstrap seed is immutable once written.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_seed
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_SEED');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON platform_bootstrap_seed
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_SEED');
+END;
+
+-- The install marker is immutable once written.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON install_state
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON install_state
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE');
+END;
+
+-- Grants: identity is immutable; the ONLY permitted mutation is a single
+-- active 1 -> 0 revocation (#822 §4 initial-grant identity immutability +
+-- grant/revoke). Reactivation and identity edits are rejected.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_identity_frozen
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+WHEN NOT (
+    NEW.grant_id = OLD.grant_id
+    AND NEW.grantee_principal_id = OLD.grantee_principal_id
+    AND NEW.granted_by IS OLD.granted_by
+    AND NEW.created_at = OLD.created_at
+    AND OLD.active = 1
+    AND NEW.active = 0
+)
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_GRANT');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_no_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_GRANT');
+END;
+
+-- audit_records is append-only.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON audit_records
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_AUDIT');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON audit_records
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_AUDIT');
+END;
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- install_state BEFORE INSERT: validate the whole bootstrap atomically
+-- (#822 §4, AC4). Each dominance tuple is checked individually; a missing,
+-- additional, or malformed tuple -> DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH. The seed<->installer
+-- link, the single active NULL-grantor installer grant, the installer's
+-- non-NULL issuer, the active invariant, and "no extra principal created under
+-- the NULL-issuer exception" -> INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE.
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_validate
+BEFORE INSERT ON install_state
+BEGIN
+    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
+        (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM authority_dominance) = {len(DOMINANCE_TUPLES)}
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='platform.bootstrap')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='project.admin')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='supervisor.root.establish')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.register')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.verify')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.recover')
+    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH') END;
+
+    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
+        (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_seed) = 1
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM principals) = 1
+        AND (SELECT actor_kind FROM principals
+             WHERE principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
+            ) = 'installer'
+        AND (SELECT issuer_id FROM principals
+             WHERE principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
+            ) IS NOT NULL
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_grants
+             WHERE granted_by IS NULL AND active = 1
+               AND grantee_principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
+            ) = 1
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_grants) = 1
+        AND (SELECT active_count FROM platform_active_invariant WHERE id = 1) = 1
+    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE') END;
+END;
+"""
+
+
+def default_db_path() -> str:
+    return os.environ.get(
+        DB_PATH_ENV,
+        os.path.expanduser("~/.cache/gitea-tools/arch01/platform.sqlite3"),
+    )
+
+
+def _utc_now_iso() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OperationResult:
+    """Structured result of a kernel operation (#822 §10)."""
+
+    code: str
+    detail: str = ""
+
+    @property
+    def ok(self) -> bool:
+        return self.code in (INSTALLED, ALREADY_INSTALLED)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class _ActorContext:
+    principal: str
+    kind: str
+    mode: str
+    session: Optional[str]
+    bound_epoch: int
+    live_epoch: int
+    expired: bool = False
+
+
+class PlatformKernel:
+    """ARCH-01 authority kernel over a single SQLite connection.
+
+    The connection carries the trusted-service actor context: the ``cp_*``
+    scalar functions read the context this object holds. Only Python code here
+    can bind or clear it, so no SQL statement can assert an actor identity — the
+    trusted-service authenticity boundary of #822 §4.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path: Optional[str] = None, *, busy_timeout_ms: int = 5000) -> None:
+        self.db_path = db_path or default_db_path()
+        if self.db_path != ":memory:":
+            parent = os.path.dirname(self.db_path)
+            if parent:
+                os.makedirs(parent, exist_ok=True)
+        self._ctx: Optional[_ActorContext] = None
+        self._epoch_seq = 0
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        # check_same_thread=False is safe: every mutation path is serialized
+        # by self._lock, so the connection is never used concurrently even when
+        # callers drive the kernel from different threads (concurrency tests).
+        self._conn = sqlite3.connect(
+            self.db_path, isolation_level=None, check_same_thread=False
+        )
+        self._conn.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
+        self._conn.execute(f"PRAGMA busy_timeout = {int(busy_timeout_ms)}")
+        self._register_actor_functions()
+        self._migrate()
+
+    # -- trusted-service actor functions ---------------------------------- #
+
+    def _register_actor_functions(self) -> None:
+        c = self._conn
+        c.create_function("cp_actor_principal", 0, lambda: self._ctx.principal if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_actor_kind", 0, lambda: self._ctx.kind if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_operation_mode", 0, lambda: self._ctx.mode if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_service_session", 0, lambda: self._ctx.session if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_context_epoch", 0, self._fn_context_epoch)
+        # Trusted-service helper: folds present + non-expired + epoch-consistent
+        # into the read/re-read epoch equality of #822 §4.
+        c.create_function("cp_actor_context_valid", 0, self._fn_context_valid)
+
+    def _fn_context_epoch(self) -> Optional[int]:
+        if self._ctx is None or self._ctx.expired:
+            return None
+        return self._ctx.live_epoch
+
+    def _fn_context_valid(self) -> int:
+        ctx = self._ctx
+        if ctx is None or ctx.expired:
+            return 0
+        # read/re-read epoch equality: a context whose live epoch has drifted
+        # from the epoch it was bound to (a stale/replaced connection context)
+        # is not bound to the active transaction and fails closed.
+        if ctx.live_epoch != ctx.bound_epoch:
+            return 0
+        if ctx.principal is None:
+            return 0
+        if ctx.kind not in ACTOR_KINDS or ctx.mode not in OPERATION_MODES:
+            return 0
+        return 1
+
+    # -- context lifecycle ------------------------------------------------ #
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def actor_context(
+        self, principal: str, kind: str, mode: str, session: Optional[str] = None
+    ) -> Iterator[None]:
+        """Bind a trusted actor context for the duration of the block."""
+        prev = self._ctx
+        self._epoch_seq += 1
+        epoch = self._epoch_seq
+        self._ctx = _ActorContext(
+            principal=principal, kind=kind, mode=mode, session=session,
+            bound_epoch=epoch, live_epoch=epoch,
+        )
+        try:
+            yield
+        finally:
+            self._ctx = prev
+
+    def _clear_context(self) -> None:
+        self._ctx = None
+
+    # -- migration -------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def _migrate(self) -> None:
+        self._conn.executescript(_SCHEMA_SQL)
+        self._conn.execute(
+            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO arch01_meta(key, value) VALUES ('schema_version', ?)",
+            (str(SCHEMA_VERSION),),
+        )
+        self._conn.execute(
+            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO arch01_meta(key, value) VALUES "
+            "('architecture', 'ARCH-01 Slice A: atomic install + authority kernel (#822); "
+            "disabled by default until readiness checks pass')"
+        )
+
+    # -- introspection ---------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def is_installed(self) -> bool:
+        row = self._conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state").fetchone()
+        return bool(row[0])
+
+    def active_grant_count(self) -> int:
+        row = self._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT active_count FROM platform_active_invariant WHERE id = 1"
+        ).fetchone()
+        return int(row[0]) if row else 0
+
+    def audit_events(self) -> list[str]:
+        return [
+            r[0]
+            for r in self._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT event FROM audit_records ORDER BY audit_id"
+            ).fetchall()
+        ]
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        self._conn.close()
+
+    # -- operations ------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def install_platform(
+        self,
+        installer_principal_id: str = "platform.installer",
+        *,
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Single atomic install transaction (#822 §4/§7).
+
+        ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serializes concurrent installs; the loser rechecks
+        the marker and returns ``ALREADY_INSTALLED``, or — if it never acquires
+        the write lock — ``CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST``. On any stage failure
+        the whole transaction rolls back leaving no partial rows (AC3/AC5).
+        """
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                if "locked" in str(exc).lower() or "busy" in str(exc).lower():
+                    return OperationResult(CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST, str(exc))
+                raise
+            try:
+                if self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(ALREADY_INSTALLED, "install marker already present")
+
+                with self.actor_context(installer_principal_id, "installer", "install", session):
+                    c = self._conn
+                    # class -> installer principal (temporary NULL issuer)
+                    cur = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)",
+                        (now,),
+                    )
+                    class_id = cur.lastrowid
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principals"
+                        "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
+                        (installer_principal_id, class_id, installer_principal_id, now),
+                    )
+                    # distinguished operator-key issuer
+                    cur = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
+                        (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_KIND, DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
+                    )
+                    issuer_id = cur.lastrowid
+                    # link installer -> issuer (permitted pre-marker)
+                    c.execute(
+                        "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
+                        (issuer_id, installer_principal_id),
+                    )
+                    # dominance tuples
+                    c.executemany(
+                        "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
+                        DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
+                    )
+                    # seed
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
+                        (installer_principal_id, now),
+                    )
+                    # initial grant (granted_by NULL, active)
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants"
+                        "(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
+                        (installer_principal_id, now),
+                    )
+                    # active invariant
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)"
+                    )
+                    # audit rows for the security-sensitive operation
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED, installer_principal_id, "installer", now),
+                    )
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_GRANT_CREATED, installer_principal_id, "initial platform.bootstrap grant", now),
+                    )
+                    # install marker LAST -> fires the whole-bootstrap validator
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO install_state(id, marker, installed_at) VALUES (1, 'installed', ?)",
+                        (now,),
+                    )
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED, installer_principal_id, "platform installed", now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, "platform installed")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    def register_principal(
+        self,
+        principal_id: str,
+        actor_kind: str,
+        issuer_ref: str,
+        *,
+        actor_principal: str,
+        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Atomically create an equivalence class and its first principal.
+
+        The class is inserted *before* the principal, and ``current_class_id``
+        is ``NOT NULL`` (#822 AC6): a principal can never exist classless.
+        The principal references an existing issuer (non-NULL); the temporary
+        NULL-issuer exception is reserved for the installer during install
+        (AC7).
+        """
+        if actor_kind not in ACTOR_KINDS:
+            return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, f"bad actor_kind {actor_kind!r}")
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
+            try:
+                if not self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
+                row = self._conn.execute(
+                    "SELECT issuer_id FROM authoritative_issuers WHERE issuer_ref = ?",
+                    (issuer_ref,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is None:
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, f"unknown issuer {issuer_ref!r}")
+                issuer_id = row[0]
+                with self.actor_context(actor_principal, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
+                    cur = self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)",
+                        (now,),
+                    )
+                    class_id = cur.lastrowid
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principals"
+                        "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (principal_id, actor_kind, class_id, issuer_id, actor_principal, now),
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED, principal_id, actor_kind, now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"registered {principal_id}")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    def grant_platform_bootstrap(
+        self,
+        grantee_principal_id: str,
+        granted_by: str,
+        *,
+        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Create an additional active platform.bootstrap grant.
+
+        Serialized on the singleton invariant row via ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE``.
+        """
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
+            try:
+                if not self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
+                with self.actor_context(granted_by, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants"
+                        "(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, 1, ?)",
+                        (grantee_principal_id, granted_by, now),
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE platform_active_invariant SET active_count = active_count + 1 WHERE id = 1"
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_GRANT_CREATED, grantee_principal_id, f"granted_by={granted_by}", now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"granted to {grantee_principal_id}")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    def revoke_platform_bootstrap(
+        self,
+        grant_id: int,
+        *,
+        actor_principal: str,
+        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Revoke an active grant, floored so the last one can never drop.
+
+        The ``active_count >= 1`` CHECK plus ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serialization
+        make two concurrent revocations unable to remove the final active grant
+        (#822 AC11): the decrement that would reach zero fails and rolls back.
+        """
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
+            try:
+                if not self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
+                row = self._conn.execute(
+                    "SELECT active, grantee_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                    (grant_id,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is None or row[0] != 1:
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, "grant absent or already inactive")
+                grantee = row[1]
+                with self.actor_context(actor_principal, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
+                    # Decrement first: the CHECK floor rejects dropping below 1,
+                    # aborting the whole revoke before the grant flips inactive.
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE platform_active_invariant SET active_count = active_count - 1 WHERE id = 1"
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE platform_bootstrap_grants SET active = 0, revoked_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                        (now, grant_id),
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_GRANT_REVOKED, grantee, f"grant_id={grant_id}", now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"revoked grant {grant_id}")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    # -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def _safe_rollback(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+        except sqlite3.Error:
+            pass
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _classify(exc: sqlite3.Error) -> str:
+        msg = str(exc)
+        if "INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT" in msg:
+            return INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT
+        if "DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH" in msg:
+            return DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH
+        if "active_count" in msg or "CHECK constraint failed: platform_active_invariant" in msg:
+            # last-active-grant floor tripped
+            return AUTHORIZATION_DENIED
+        if any(tag in msg for tag in (
+            "INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE", "IMMUTABLE_", "NOT_INSTALLED",
+        )):
+            return INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE
+        return INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE

branch_publish.py

@@ -0,0 +1,591 @@
+"""Publish an unpublished local commit on a registered issue worktree (#812 AC20).
+
+Entry point B of #812 is the state where an author's work has already advanced
+to a local commit: the worktree is registered, clean, on the issue branch, and
+carries the only copy of the implementation, but the branch has never been
+published. That state deadlocks, because two individually correct predicates
+close a cycle:
+
+* ``issue_lock_renewal.assess_exact_owner_lease_renewal`` refuses to renew an
+  expired lease without an observable remote head — an unpublished branch has
+  none.
+* Every publication path (``gitea_commit_files``, ``gitea_create_pr``) derives
+  its workspace from the author issue lock under #618, so nothing can create
+  that remote head without first holding the lock.
+
+This module supplies the missing operation: it publishes an *already committed*
+local head to the remote branch, so exact-owner renewal has the evidence it
+requires. It deliberately does **not** renew, reclaim, rebind, or clear any
+lock. Publication is the whole of its authority.
+
+Why this is not a lock bypass
+-----------------------------
+The operation can only publish a branch whose **durable issue-lock record
+already names the caller as claimant**. Ownership is read from the lock file on
+disk (``issue_lock_store``), never from a caller-supplied flag, so the tool
+cannot manufacture a claim it does not already hold. Nothing here weakens the
+#510/#618/#713 guards: a dirty tree, an unregistered worktree, a foreign
+claimant, a changed HEAD, or a divergent remote head each refuse, exactly as
+they do today. The only thing this adds is the ability to make an existing,
+owned, committed, clean branch observable on the remote.
+
+Separation of records (#812 AC23)
+---------------------------------
+The durable **issue-lock file** and the control-plane **workflow lease** are
+distinct records. This module reads the former as ownership evidence and writes
+neither. Publishing changes remote git state only; no lock is renewed,
+abandoned, reclaimed, or generation-bumped here.
+
+Process evidence (#812 AC24)
+----------------------------
+Liveness of the lock's recorded pid is **not consulted**. That is deliberate:
+the recorded pid routinely belongs to the long-running MCP daemon rather than to
+an active author client, and the existing reclaim predicate
+(``assess_expired_lock_reclaim``) can never be satisfied while that daemon runs.
+Publication does not require the recording process to be dead, so this module
+never asserts, infers, or depends on a process being dead. Ownership is proven
+by identity and profile match against the recorded claimant instead.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+
+from reviewer_worktree import parse_dirty_tracked_files
+from stable_branch_push_guard import is_stable_ref, redact_command
+
+# Assessment outcomes.
+PUBLISH_SANCTIONED = "publish_sanctioned"
+ALREADY_PUBLISHED = "already_published"
+REFUSED = "refused"
+
+#: Implementation branches must stay traceable to their issue (#713 lineage).
+ISSUE_BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"^(fix|feat|docs|chore)/issue-(\d+)-.+$")
+
+_SHA_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+
+
+def _text(value: object) -> str:
+    return value.strip() if isinstance(value, str) else ""
+
+
+def _realpath(value: str | None) -> str | None:
+    path = _text(value)
+    return os.path.realpath(path) if path else None
+
+
+def parse_untracked_files(porcelain_status: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Return untracked paths from ``git status --porcelain`` output.
+
+    ``reviewer_worktree.parse_dirty_tracked_files`` deliberately skips ``??``
+    entries. Publication needs both halves: an untracked file in the worktree is
+    unpublished content that the commit does not carry, so publishing would
+    silently leave it behind.
+    """
+    untracked: list[str] = []
+    for line in (porcelain_status or "").splitlines():
+        if not line.startswith("??"):
+            continue
+        path = line[2:].strip()
+        if path:
+            untracked.append(path)
+    return untracked
+
+
+def hash_worktree_files(worktree_path: str, paths) -> dict[str, str | None]:
+    """SHA-256 each path under *worktree_path*; ``None`` when unreadable."""
+    root = _text(worktree_path)
+    hashes: dict[str, str | None] = {}
+    for rel in paths or ():
+        rel_text = _text(rel)
+        if not rel_text:
+            continue
+        full = os.path.join(root, rel_text)
+        try:
+            with open(full, "rb") as handle:
+                digest = hashlib.sha256()
+                for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(65536), b""):
+                    digest.update(chunk)
+            hashes[rel_text] = digest.hexdigest()
+        except OSError:
+            hashes[rel_text] = None
+    return hashes
+
+
+def read_remote_branch_head(
+    worktree_path: str, remote_name: str, branch_name: str
+) -> dict:
+    """Observe the remote head for *branch_name*, read-only.
+
+    ``probe_ok`` False means git could not answer at all. That is kept distinct
+    from "the branch does not exist": an unobservable remote must fail closed
+    rather than be mistaken for an absent branch, because the two lead to
+    opposite dispositions.
+    """
+    path = _text(worktree_path)
+    remote = _text(remote_name)
+    branch = _text(branch_name)
+    result: dict = {
+        "probe_ok": False,
+        "remote_branch_exists": False,
+        "remote_head_sha": None,
+        "reasons": [],
+    }
+    if not (path and remote and branch):
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            "remote head probe requires a worktree path, remote name, and branch"
+        )
+        return result
+    try:
+        res = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", path, "ls-remote", remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+    except OSError as exc:  # git unavailable — fail closed, never assume absent
+        result["reasons"].append(f"remote head probe could not run: {exc}")
+        return result
+    if res.returncode != 0:
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            f"remote head probe failed for '{branch}' on remote '{remote}'"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    result["probe_ok"] = True
+    for line in (res.stdout or "").splitlines():
+        parts = line.split()
+        if len(parts) >= 2 and parts[1] == f"refs/heads/{branch}":
+            result["remote_branch_exists"] = True
+            result["remote_head_sha"] = parts[0].strip()
+            break
+    return result
+
+
+def read_is_ancestor(
+    worktree_path: str, ancestor_sha: str, descendant_sha: str
+) -> dict:
+    """Observe whether *ancestor_sha* is an ancestor of *descendant_sha*."""
+    path = _text(worktree_path)
+    ancestor = _text(ancestor_sha)
+    descendant = _text(descendant_sha)
+    result: dict = {"probe_ok": False, "is_ancestor": False, "reasons": []}
+    if not (path and ancestor and descendant):
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            "ancestry probe requires a worktree path and both commit SHAs"
+        )
+        return result
+    try:
+        present = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", path, "rev-parse", "--verify", "--quiet",
+             f"{ancestor}^{{commit}}"],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if present.returncode != 0:
+            result["reasons"].append(
+                f"remote head {ancestor} is not present locally, so it cannot be "
+                "proven an ancestor of the commit being published"
+            )
+            return result
+        res = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", path, "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", ancestor, descendant],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
+        )
+    except OSError as exc:
+        result["reasons"].append(f"ancestry probe could not run: {exc}")
+        return result
+    result["probe_ok"] = res.returncode in (0, 1)
+    result["is_ancestor"] = res.returncode == 0
+    return result
+
+
+def assess_unpublished_commit_publication(
+    existing_lock,
+    *,
+    issue_number: int,
+    branch_name: str,
+    worktree_path: str,
+    expected_head: str,
+    remote: str,
+    org: str,
+    repo: str,
+    identity: str | None,
+    profile: str | None,
+    worktree_state,
+    worktree_registered: bool | None = None,
+    remote_probe=None,
+    ancestry=None,
+    competing_open_prs=(),
+    expected_file_hashes=None,
+    observed_file_hashes=None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Decide whether an unpublished local commit may be published (#812 AC20).
+
+    Pure predicate. Every input is either a caller-declared expectation that
+    must be *matched* against observation, or a server-side observation. No
+    caller-supplied boolean is accepted as proof of ownership, liveness, or
+    eligibility: ``existing_lock`` comes from the durable lock file and the
+    git/PR state is observed by the server.
+
+    The single mutating disposition it can return is "publish this exact commit
+    to this exact branch". It never sanctions renewal, reclamation, force
+    updates, history rewriting, or publication of uncommitted content.
+    """
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    branch = _text(branch_name)
+    head = _text(expected_head).lower()
+    workspace = _realpath(worktree_path)
+    state = worktree_state if isinstance(worktree_state, dict) else {}
+    lock = existing_lock if isinstance(existing_lock, dict) else None
+
+    evidence: dict = {
+        "issue_number": issue_number,
+        "branch_name": branch or None,
+        "worktree_path": workspace,
+        "expected_head": head or None,
+        "remote": _text(remote) or None,
+        "org": _text(org) or None,
+        "repo": _text(repo) or None,
+        "identity": _text(identity) or None,
+        "profile": _text(profile) or None,
+        "lock_record_present": lock is not None,
+        "recorded_claimant": None,
+        "recorded_branch": None,
+        "recorded_worktree": None,
+        "lock_generation": None,
+        "local_head_sha": _text(state.get("head_sha")) or None,
+        "current_branch": _text(state.get("current_branch")) or None,
+        "dirty_tracked_files": [],
+        "untracked_files": [],
+        "worktree_registered": worktree_registered,
+        "remote_branch_exists": None,
+        "remote_head_sha": None,
+        "fast_forward_from_remote": None,
+        "competing_open_prs": [],
+        "file_hashes_verified": None,
+        "hash_mismatches": [],
+        # Recorded explicitly so no reader mistakes silence for a liveness
+        # claim, and so the audit shows which records were left alone (AC23/AC24).
+        "owner_pid_liveness_consulted": False,
+        "workflow_lease_touched": False,
+        "issue_lock_record_mutated": False,
+    }
+
+    # ── declared shape ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    if not branch:
+        reasons.append("branch name not declared; fail closed")
+    if not head:
+        reasons.append(
+            "expected_head not declared; publication must name the exact commit"
+        )
+    elif not _SHA_RE.match(head):
+        reasons.append(
+            f"expected_head '{head}' is not a full 40-character commit SHA; "
+            "abbreviated or symbolic revisions are refused"
+        )
+    if not workspace:
+        reasons.append("worktree path not declared; fail closed")
+
+    if branch:
+        match = ISSUE_BRANCH_RE.match(branch)
+        if not match:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"branch '{branch}' is not an issue-linked implementation branch "
+                "((fix|feat|docs|chore)/issue-<number>-<description>); fail closed"
+            )
+        elif int(match.group(2)) != int(issue_number):
+            reasons.append(
+                f"branch '{branch}' does not carry issue number {issue_number}; "
+                "fail closed"
+            )
+        if is_stable_ref(branch):
+            reasons.append(
+                f"refusing to publish stable branch '{branch}'; this operation "
+                "publishes issue branches only"
+            )
+
+    # ── ownership: durable issue-lock record only (AC8, AC20, AC24) ───────
+    if lock is None:
+        reasons.append(
+            "no durable issue-lock record for this issue; publication requires an "
+            "existing recorded claim naming the caller, so this operation cannot "
+            "be used to bypass the author lock"
+        )
+    else:
+        lease = lock.get("work_lease")
+        lease = lease if isinstance(lease, dict) else {}
+        claimant = lease.get("claimant")
+        claimant = claimant if isinstance(claimant, dict) else {}
+        recorded_user = _text(claimant.get("username"))
+        recorded_profile = _text(claimant.get("profile"))
+        recorded_branch = _text(lock.get("branch_name")) or _text(lease.get("branch"))
+        recorded_worktree = _realpath(
+            _text(lock.get("worktree_path")) or _text(lease.get("worktree_path"))
+        )
+        evidence["recorded_claimant"] = {
+            "username": recorded_user or None,
+            "profile": recorded_profile or None,
+        }
+        evidence["recorded_branch"] = recorded_branch or None
+        evidence["recorded_worktree"] = recorded_worktree
+        try:
+            evidence["lock_generation"] = int(lock.get("lock_generation") or 0)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            evidence["lock_generation"] = 0
+
+        try:
+            recorded_issue = int(lock.get("issue_number") or 0)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            recorded_issue = 0
+        if recorded_issue != int(issue_number):
+            reasons.append(
+                f"durable lock records issue {lock.get('issue_number')}, not "
+                f"{issue_number}; ambiguous ownership, fail closed"
+            )
+        for field, declared in (
+            ("remote", _text(remote)),
+            ("org", _text(org)),
+            ("repo", _text(repo)),
+        ):
+            recorded = _text(lock.get(field))
+            if recorded and declared and recorded != declared:
+                reasons.append(
+                    f"durable lock records {field} '{recorded}' but the request "
+                    f"declares '{declared}'; repository mismatch, fail closed"
+                )
+        if recorded_branch and branch and recorded_branch != branch:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"durable lock records branch '{recorded_branch}' but the request "
+                f"declares '{branch}'; fail closed"
+            )
+        if recorded_worktree and workspace and recorded_worktree != workspace:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"durable lock records worktree '{recorded_worktree}' but the "
+                f"request declares '{workspace}'; fail closed"
+            )
+        if not recorded_user or not recorded_profile:
+            reasons.append(
+                "durable lock does not record a claimant username and profile; "
+                "ownership cannot be proven, fail closed"
+            )
+        else:
+            if recorded_user != _text(identity):
+                reasons.append(
+                    f"durable lock claimant '{recorded_user}' is not the acting "
+                    f"identity '{_text(identity) or '(unknown)'}'; foreign claim, "
+                    "fail closed"
+                )
+            if recorded_profile != _text(profile):
+                reasons.append(
+                    f"durable lock claimant profile '{recorded_profile}' is not "
+                    f"the active profile '{_text(profile) or '(unknown)'}'; "
+                    "fail closed"
+                )
+
+    # ── worktree: registered, on-branch, clean, at the expected commit ────
+    if worktree_registered is False:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"worktree '{workspace}' is not listed in git worktree list; #713 "
+            "requires a genuinely registered worktree, fail closed"
+        )
+
+    current_branch = _text(state.get("current_branch"))
+    if not current_branch:
+        reasons.append("worktree branch could not be observed; fail closed")
+    elif branch and current_branch != branch:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"worktree is on branch '{current_branch}', not '{branch}'; fail closed"
+        )
+
+    porcelain = state.get("porcelain_status") or ""
+    dirty_tracked = parse_dirty_tracked_files(porcelain)
+    untracked = parse_untracked_files(porcelain)
+    evidence["dirty_tracked_files"] = dirty_tracked
+    evidence["untracked_files"] = untracked
+    if dirty_tracked:
+        reasons.append(
+            "worktree has dirty tracked files, so the commit is not the whole of "
+            f"the work: {', '.join(dirty_tracked)}. This operation publishes an "
+            "existing clean commit only; uncommitted content is out of scope"
+        )
+    if untracked:
+        reasons.append(
+            "worktree has untracked files that the commit does not carry: "
+            f"{', '.join(untracked)}. Publishing would silently leave them "
+            "behind; fail closed"
+        )
+
+    local_head = _text(state.get("head_sha")).lower()
+    if not local_head:
+        reasons.append("local HEAD could not be observed; fail closed")
+    elif head and local_head != head:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"worktree HEAD is {local_head} but the request declares {head}; the "
+            "local commit changed since it was recorded, fail closed"
+        )
+
+    # ── remote state ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    probe = remote_probe if isinstance(remote_probe, dict) else {}
+    already_published = False
+    if not probe.get("probe_ok"):
+        reasons.append(
+            "remote branch head could not be observed; publication must not "
+            "proceed against an unknown remote state, fail closed"
+        )
+        reasons.extend(probe.get("reasons") or [])
+    else:
+        remote_exists = bool(probe.get("remote_branch_exists"))
+        remote_head = _text(probe.get("remote_head_sha")).lower() or None
+        evidence["remote_branch_exists"] = remote_exists
+        evidence["remote_head_sha"] = remote_head
+        if remote_exists and remote_head and head:
+            if remote_head == head:
+                already_published = True
+                evidence["fast_forward_from_remote"] = True
+            else:
+                anc = ancestry if isinstance(ancestry, dict) else {}
+                is_anc = bool(anc.get("probe_ok")) and bool(anc.get("is_ancestor"))
+                evidence["fast_forward_from_remote"] = is_anc
+                if not is_anc:
+                    reasons.append(
+                        f"remote branch '{branch}' already exists at {remote_head}, "
+                        f"which is not an ancestor of {head}; publishing would "
+                        "discard or rewrite published history, fail closed"
+                    )
+                    reasons.extend(anc.get("reasons") or [])
+        elif remote_exists and not remote_head:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"remote branch '{branch}' exists but its head could not be read; "
+                "fail closed"
+            )
+
+    # ── competing claims ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    competing = [p for p in (competing_open_prs or ()) if p]
+    evidence["competing_open_prs"] = list(competing)
+    if competing:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"open pull request(s) {competing} already claim issue {issue_number} "
+            "or this branch; ambiguous ownership, fail closed"
+        )
+
+    # ── content verification before publication ───────────────────────────
+    if expected_file_hashes:
+        observed = (
+            observed_file_hashes if isinstance(observed_file_hashes, dict) else {}
+        )
+        mismatches: list[str] = []
+        for path, expected_digest in dict(expected_file_hashes).items():
+            actual = observed.get(path)
+            if actual is None:
+                mismatches.append(f"{path}: missing or unreadable in the worktree")
+            elif _text(actual).lower() != _text(expected_digest).lower():
+                mismatches.append(
+                    f"{path}: expected {expected_digest}, observed {actual}"
+                )
+        evidence["hash_mismatches"] = mismatches
+        evidence["file_hashes_verified"] = not mismatches
+        if mismatches:
+            reasons.append(
+                "declared content hashes do not match the worktree: "
+                + "; ".join(mismatches)
+                + ". Refusing to publish content that is not what was recorded"
+            )
+
+    if reasons:
+        return {
+            "outcome": REFUSED,
+            "publish_sanctioned": False,
+            "already_published": False,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+            "evidence": evidence,
+        }
+    return {
+        "outcome": ALREADY_PUBLISHED if already_published else PUBLISH_SANCTIONED,
+        # Idempotent retry: a remote head that already equals the assessed commit
+        # needs no second push, so the caller verifies instead of acting.
+        "publish_sanctioned": not already_published,
+        "already_published": already_published,
+        "reasons": [],
+        "evidence": evidence,
+    }
+
+
+def publish_commit_to_remote_branch(
+    *,
+    worktree_path: str,
+    remote_name: str,
+    branch_name: str,
+    expected_head: str,
+) -> dict:
+    """Send exactly *expected_head* to ``refs/heads/<branch_name>``.
+
+    The refspec names the commit SHA explicitly rather than ``HEAD`` or the
+    local branch, so what lands is the commit that was assessed and nothing
+    else. No force, no lease, no ``+`` prefix: a non-fast-forward is rejected by
+    git itself, the last of several independent guards against overwriting
+    published history.
+    """
+    path = _text(worktree_path)
+    remote = _text(remote_name)
+    branch = _text(branch_name)
+    head = _text(expected_head)
+    result: dict = {
+        "success": False,
+        "pushed_ref": f"refs/heads/{branch}" if branch else None,
+        "pushed_sha": head or None,
+        "stderr": None,
+        "reasons": [],
+    }
+    if not (path and remote and branch and head):
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            "publication requires a worktree path, remote, branch, and commit SHA"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    refspec = f"{head}:refs/heads/{branch}"
+    try:
+        res = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", path, "push", remote, refspec],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+    except OSError as exc:
+        result["reasons"].append(f"publication could not run: {exc}")
+        return result
+
+    if res.returncode != 0:
+        # Redact before surfacing: failures can echo credentialed remote URLs.
+        result["stderr"] = redact_command(res.stderr or "")
+        result["reasons"].append(
+            f"publication of {head} to '{branch}' on remote '{remote}' failed"
+        )
+        return result
+
+    result["success"] = True
+    return result
+
+
+def verify_published_head(
+    *, worktree_path: str, remote_name: str, branch_name: str, expected_head: str
+) -> dict:
+    """Read-after-write: confirm the remote head equals *expected_head* (AC20)."""
+    probe = read_remote_branch_head(worktree_path, remote_name, branch_name)
+    head = _text(expected_head).lower()
+    observed = _text(probe.get("remote_head_sha")).lower() or None
+    verified = bool(head) and bool(probe.get("probe_ok")) and observed == head
+    reasons: list[str] = list(probe.get("reasons") or [])
+    if probe.get("probe_ok") and not verified:
+        reasons.append(
+            "read-after-write verification failed: remote head is "
+            f"{observed or '(absent)'}, expected {head}"
+        )
+    return {
+        "verified": verified,
+        "remote_head_sha": observed,
+        "expected_head": head or None,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+    }

docs/mcp-tool-inventory.md

@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ that gates each call, not which tools exist.
 - `gitea_observability_list_projects`
 - `gitea_observability_reconcile_incident`
 - `gitea_post_heartbeat`
+- `gitea_publish_unpublished_issue_branch`
 - `gitea_quarantine_contaminated_review`
 - `gitea_reclaim_expired_workflow_lease`
 - `gitea_reconcile_already_landed_pr`

docs/webui-authz-audit.md

@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+# Web console authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model (#633)
+
+**Phase 1. Read-only. This document defines the model that future console
+writes must pass through; it enables none of them.**
+
+The MVP deployment boundary ([`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md), #435)
+documents internal-only serving and states plainly that MVP authentication is
+*none* — protection comes from network placement. That is adequate while every
+route is a GET, and inadequate the moment a gated write ships. This document
+and the three modules it describes land **before** any write exists, so no
+Phase 2 action can be added without an authority to check it against.
+
+| Concern | Module |
+|---------|--------|
+| Identity, roles, authorization decision | `webui/console_authz.py` |
+| Secret redaction for every surface | `webui/console_redaction.py` |
+| Audit event schema, retention, sink | `webui/console_audit.py` |
+| Machine-readable publication | `GET /api/console/security-model` |
+
+Two invariants hold everywhere and are non-negotiable for every child of #631:
+
+1. **No secrets reach the browser.** Credentials are resolved server-side and
+   redacted before any payload, page, log line, or audit record leaves.
+2. **No ungated mutations.** Authorization is necessary but never sufficient;
+   execution stays disabled until the Phase 2 framework ships.
+
+## Identity sources
+
+The console performs *authorization*. Authentication is delegated, because a
+console that mints its own sessions is a credential store, and this one must
+not be.
+
+| Source | Mode value | Authenticated | Shared host | Phase |
+|--------|-----------|---------------|-------------|-------|
+| None | `none` (default) | No — anonymous, capped at `viewer` | No | 1 |
+| Local dev | `local-dev` / `local_dev` | Yes, **asserted not verified** | No | 1 |
+| Access proxy | `access-proxy` / `access_proxy` | Yes, asserted by trusted proxy | Yes | 2 |
+
+Selected by `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE`. An unrecognised value falls back to `none`
+rather than erroring open.
+
+**Access-proxy mode** reads the subject from the
+`Cf-Access-Authenticated-User-Email` header, set by Cloudflare Access, WARP, or
+an equivalent org portal that terminates authentication in front of the
+console. If the header is absent the request did not traverse the proxy, so the
+principal degrades to anonymous — it is never trusted by default.
+
+The **role is always server-side configuration**, never a client assertion. It
+comes from `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`, a JSON object of subject → role:
+
+```json
+{"[email protected]": "operator", "[email protected]": "controller"}
+```
+
+An unmapped subject gets `viewer`. Malformed JSON yields an empty map, so
+everyone gets `viewer` — a parse failure loses authority rather than granting
+it.
+
+Full SSO is explicitly a non-goal of this issue.
+
+## Role matrix
+
+Four roles, ordered least to most authority. Each role inherits every lower
+role's actions; the table states the *minimum* rank required.
+
+| Role | Authority |
+|------|-----------|
+| `viewer` | Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase. |
+| `operator` | Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR. |
+| `controller` | Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR. |
+| `admin` | Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions. |
+
+`viewer` holds the empty write set by construction, and a test asserts it stays
+empty.
+
+## Privileged actions
+
+Every console action maps to a `task_key` in `task_capability_map.py`, the same
+single source of truth `gitea_resolve_task_capability` and the MCP tool gates
+use. The console therefore cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not
+already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
+
+| Action | Minimum role | Class | MCP permission | Confirm | Dual control | Break-glass | Phase |
+|--------|--------------|-------|----------------|---------|--------------|-------------|-------|
+| `claim_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `comment_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `create_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `comment_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `create_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `review_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.review` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
+| `close_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
+| `merge_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.merge` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
+| `delete_branch` | admin | destructive | `gitea.branch.delete` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
+
+**Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
+second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is
+expected to be unavailable in normal operation and its use is retained for two
+years. Both are declared here and enforced by the Phase 2 framework; Phase 1
+records the requirement on every decision so the framework cannot ship without
+honouring it.
+
+`delete_branch` is admin-only rather than controller because it is the one
+irreversible action in the set.
+
+### Authorization decision
+
+`authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=False)` returns a decision
+record and **denies by default**. The deny reasons are closed and enumerated:
+
+| Reason code | Meaning |
+|-------------|---------|
+| `unknown_action` | No such console action is registered. |
+| `unauthenticated` | The principal is anonymous. |
+| `unknown_role` | The role is not in the matrix. |
+| `insufficient_role` | The role ranks below the action's minimum. |
+| `phase_not_active` | Execution requested for an action whose phase is not open. |
+| `allowed_preview_only` | Authorized — preview only, execution still disabled. |
+
+There is no implicit allow branch. Even the allow result reports
+`execution_enabled: false` while the console is in Phase 1, so no caller can
+read an allow as permission to mutate.
+
+## Secret redaction
+
+One pass applies to **API payloads, rendered HTML, server logs, and audit
+records** — the four surfaces where a credential could escape.
+
+Redaction reuses `gitea_audit.redact` rather than forking it: that remains the
+authority for secret-looking dict keys, `Authorization` material, and raw URLs.
+The console layer then applies its own patterns:
+
+Each rule below matches an *assignment form*: the named key, followed by `=` or
+`:`, followed by the value. The keys are listed bare rather than spelled out as
+complete assignments, because this document is itself scanned by
+`scan_for_secrets` — writing the examples in full assignment form would make the
+documentation trip the very detectors it documents.
+
+| Rule | Catches (as an assignment) |
+|------|----------------------------|
+| `credential_assignment` | `token`, `password`, `passwd`, `secret`, `api_key`, `access_key`, `client_secret`, `private_key` |
+| `credential_env_assignment` | `GITEA_TOKEN`, `GITEA_PASS`, `GITEA_PASSWORD` and suffixed variants |
+| `keychain_reference` | `keychain:` entry references |
+| `keychain_command` | macOS `security` keychain lookups (`find-generic-password`, `find-internet-password`) |
+| `private_key_block` | PEM `BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY` blocks |
+| `json_web_token` | Three-segment `eyJ...` JWTs |
+| `bearer_credential` | `Bearer` / `Basic` credentials |
+
+Assignments keep the key and replace only the value, so an operator can still
+see *what* was removed. Two behaviours are deliberate:
+
+- **Fail closed.** A value that cannot be redacted becomes `[REDACTED]`
+  outright rather than being emitted raw. Redaction never raises.
+- **Redact before persist.** `console_audit.build_event` redacts before
+  serialization, and `write_event` re-scans and **drops** any record that still
+  trips a detector. An unredacted record is never durable.
+
+`scan_for_secrets` is the assertion helper: it returns the detector names still
+matching a payload, and already-redacted hits are not findings. Tests use it to
+prove the published policy, the security-model endpoint, and this document
+itself carry no secret material.
+
+## Audit event schema
+
+`gitea_audit` records MCP-side *mutations* — which profile and Gitea user
+performed which tool call. It has no console actor, no identity source, no
+correlation identifier, and no retention class, and an authorization **denial**
+is not a mutation, so it would never appear there at all. The console record is
+additive, not a replacement: a Phase 2 action emits both, joined on
+`correlation.request_id`.
+
+Required fields, all asserted by tests so an edit cannot quietly drop one:
+
+| Field | Content |
+|-------|---------|
+| `schema_version` | Currently `1`. |
+| `event_id` | Unique per record. |
+| `timestamp` | Timezone-aware ISO-8601, UTC. |
+| `actor` | `subject`, `role`, `identity_source`, `authenticated`. |
+| `action` | Console action id. |
+| `action_class` | `gated_write`, `privileged`, `destructive`, or `unknown`. |
+| `target` | `{kind, ref}`, e.g. `{"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"}`. |
+| `result` | `allowed`, `denied`, `previewed`, `failed`, `succeeded`. |
+| `reason_code` | The authorization reason code above. |
+| `correlation` | `request_id`, `session_id`, `mcp_task`, `mcp_permission`. |
+| `retention` | `class`, `days`, `expires_at`. |
+| `redacted` | Always `true`; records are redacted at build time. |
+
+An unrecognised `result` degrades to `failed` rather than being stored
+verbatim.
+
+The sink is an append-only JSON Lines file named by
+`WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`. It is **off by default**: with the variable unset,
+events are still built — so callers and tests exercise the schema — but nothing
+is written. Auditing never raises; a failed write returns `False` rather than
+breaking the request it describes.
+
+## Retention
+
+| Class | Applies to | Default |
+|-------|-----------|---------|
+| `standard` | Routine gated writes | 90 days |
+| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
+| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch` | 730 days |
+
+Each record carries its own class, day count, and computed `expires_at`, so
+retention is auditable per record rather than inferred from file age. An
+**unknown action is retained as privileged, not standard** — for a safety
+control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
+
+Nothing in this module updates or deletes. Expiry is enforced by an
+operator-run policy against `expires_at`, never by the console silently
+rewriting its own history.
+
+## Phase 2 integration
+
+Phase 2 opens gated writes. It must reuse this model rather than introduce a
+second one. The integration points are already wired and observable:
+
+- **`GET /api/actions/{action_id}/preview`** attaches an `authorization` block
+  to the existing preview payload and records a `previewed` audit event.
+- **`POST /api/actions/{action_id}/attempt`** attaches the same block and
+  records a `denied` event. The terminal outcome is unchanged — the MVP
+  registry in `webui/gated_actions.py` still fails closed for every action — so
+  Phase 1 cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision
+  instead of adding a parallel check.
+- **`GET /api/console/security-model`** publishes the RBAC matrix, redaction
+  policy, and audit policy as JSON for operators and tests.
+
+To open Phase 2, a child issue must: raise `ACTIVE_PHASE`, implement the
+confirmation and dual-control flow the matrix already declares, emit a
+`succeeded` or `failed` record alongside the `gitea_audit` mutation record, and
+keep `viewer` unable to reach any of it. Turning on execution without the
+confirmation flow contradicts a declared requirement and is a review failure,
+not a shortcut.
+
+## Local-dev mode
+
+`WEBUI_AUTH_MODE=local-dev` reads the principal straight from the environment:
+
+| Variable | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|
+| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | Subject string; absent ⇒ anonymous |
+| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | One of `viewer`, `operator`, `controller`, `admin`; unrecognised ⇒ `viewer` |
+
+**INSECURE — this mode is for loopback development only.** The subject and role
+are *asserted by the developer running the process and verified by nothing*.
+Anyone able to set an environment variable on the host is an `admin`, and
+anyone able to reach the port inherits that principal. It provides no
+authentication whatsoever; it exists so Phase 2 authorization paths can be
+exercised without standing up a proxy.
+
+Never enable local-dev mode on a non-loopback bind. Combining it with
+`WEBUI_ALLOW_PUBLIC_BIND=1` or `WEBUI_ALLOW_REMOTE_BIND=1` publishes an
+unauthenticated admin console.
+
+For anything beyond a laptop use `access-proxy` mode behind Cloudflare Access,
+WARP, or a VPN, as [`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) requires.
+
+### Probe authentication
+
+`WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH=1` declares that non-public probes should require an
+authenticated principal. It is **opt-in**: the default is off so the MVP
+`/health` contract is unchanged.
+
+**This flag is declarative in Phase 1 and enforces nothing today.**
+`console_authz.probe_auth_required()` reports the operator's intent, and no
+route consults it — setting the variable does not currently change the
+behaviour of `/health` or any other endpoint. It is published here so the Phase
+2 action framework has a declared policy to honour rather than inventing a
+second one, exactly as `ACTIVE_PHASE` gates execution while the matrix is
+already declared. A regression test pins this "declared, not enforced" status,
+so wiring it later is a deliberate change rather than a silent one.
+
+Until Phase 2 wires it, probe protection rests on network placement alone, as
+[`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) (#435) states.
+
+## Environment variables
+
+| Variable | Default | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|---------|
+| `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE` | `none` | Identity source selection |
+| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | unset | Local-dev subject (insecure) |
+| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | `viewer` | Local-dev role (insecure) |
+| `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP` | unset | JSON subject → role map |
+| `WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH` | unset | Require auth for non-public probes |
+| `WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG` | unset | Append-only audit sink path |
+
+All are read server-side only. None is ever rendered into a page or returned by
+an API.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No full SSO product; authentication stays delegated to the proxy.
+- No browser-initiated merges or approvals in any phase covered here.
+- No tokens in the frontend, in browser storage, or in committed config.

docs/webui-deployment.md

@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ only.
 ## MVP deployment model
 
 - **Default bind:** `127.0.0.1:8765` (`WEBUI_HOST` / `WEBUI_PORT`)
-- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement
+- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement.
+  The authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model that future gated writes
+  must pass through is defined in
+  [`webui-authz-audit.md`](webui-authz-audit.md) (#633).
 - **Mutations:** read-only routes; gated write actions remain disabled (#434)
 - **Secrets:** resolved server-side via `gitea_auth` / `GITEA_MCP_CONFIG`; never
   embedded in HTML, JavaScript, or browser storage

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -234,12 +234,25 @@ def _effective_workspace_role() -> str:
 
 
 def _profile_role_kind(profile: dict) -> str:
-    """Resolve a profile's declared role before inferring from permissions."""
-    role = (profile.get("role") or profile.get("role_kind") or "").strip()
+    """Resolve a profile's declared role before inferring from permissions.
+
+    Declared ``role`` / ``role_kind`` always wins so a controller profile is
+    never reclassified as reconciler from permission inference (#840).
+    """
+    role = (profile.get("role") or profile.get("role_kind") or "").strip().lower()
     if role:
+        # Normalize aliases / case.
+        if "control" in role:
+            return "controller"
         return role
     profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip().lower()
-    for candidate in ("reconciler", "merger", "reviewer", "author"):
+    for candidate in (
+        "controller",
+        "reconciler",
+        "merger",
+        "reviewer",
+        "author",
+    ):
         if candidate in profile_name:
             return candidate
     return _role_kind(
@@ -2024,6 +2037,7 @@ import review_quarantine  # noqa: E402  # #695 contaminated formal-review quaran
 import mcp_daemon_guard  # noqa: E402  # #695 native transport provenance
 import already_landed_reconcile  # noqa: E402
 import author_mutation_worktree  # noqa: E402
+import branch_publish  # noqa: E402  # #812 AC20 unpublished-commit publication
 import root_checkout_guard  # noqa: E402
 import workflow_scope_guard  # noqa: E402  # #683 production scope / force-on guards
 import stable_branch_push_guard  # noqa: E402
@@ -9082,6 +9096,253 @@ def gitea_commit_files(
     }
 
 
+def _publication_block(reasons: list[str], **extra) -> dict:
+    """Uniform fail-closed shape for publication refusals (#812 AC20)."""
+    payload = {
+        "success": False,
+        "performed": False,
+        "published": False,
+        "verified": False,
+        "outcome": branch_publish.REFUSED,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        # State every record this operation left alone, so a refusal can never
+        # be misread as a lock mutation (#812 AC23).
+        "issue_lock_record_mutated": False,
+        "workflow_lease_touched": False,
+    }
+    payload.update(extra)
+    return payload
+
+
+@mcp.tool()
+def gitea_publish_unpublished_issue_branch(
+    issue_number: int,
+    branch_name: str,
+    worktree_path: str,
+    expected_head: str,
+    remote: str = "dadeschools",
+    host: str | None = None,
+    org: str | None = None,
+    repo: str | None = None,
+    git_remote_name: str | None = None,
+    expected_file_hashes: dict | None = None,
+    dry_run: bool = False,
+) -> dict:
+    """Publish an already-committed, unpublished issue branch (#812 AC20).
+
+    Creates the remote head for a branch whose work is *already* a local commit
+    on a registered, clean worktree, so exact-owner lease renewal
+    (``issue_lock_renewal``) has the published head its evidence model requires.
+    This is the one step of the entry point B deadlock that no existing tool can
+    perform: publication is otherwise lock-derived under #618, and the lock
+    itself is withheld until a remote head exists.
+
+    Not a lock bypass. The branch's **durable issue-lock record must already
+    name the caller as claimant** — ownership is read from the lock file, never
+    asserted by the caller — so this can only publish work the caller already
+    owns. It refuses a dirty or untracked-carrying worktree, an unregistered
+    worktree, a changed local HEAD, a remote head that is not an ancestor of the
+    commit, a competing open PR on another branch for the same issue, and any
+    declared-hash mismatch. It renews, reclaims, and clears nothing: the durable
+    issue-lock file and the control-plane workflow lease are both left untouched
+    (#812 AC23), and the recorded owner pid's liveness is never consulted or
+    asserted (#812 AC24).
+
+    Args:
+        issue_number: The issue whose recorded claim authorizes publication.
+        branch_name: Issue branch to publish, ``(fix|feat|docs|chore)/issue-N-…``.
+        worktree_path: Registered worktree holding the commit.
+        expected_head: Full 40-character SHA of the commit to publish. Required:
+            publication names the exact commit, and a mismatch fails closed.
+        remote: Known instance — 'dadeschools' or 'prgs'.
+        host: Override the Gitea host.
+        org: Override the owner/organization.
+        repo: Override the repository name.
+        git_remote_name: Git remote to publish to; defaults to *remote*.
+        expected_file_hashes: Optional ``{path: sha256}`` verified against the
+            worktree before publication. Any mismatch or missing file refuses.
+        dry_run: Report the decision and evidence, mutate nothing.
+
+    Returns:
+        dict with 'success', 'performed', 'published', 'verified', 'outcome',
+        'remote_head_sha', 'reasons', and 'evidence'.
+    """
+    task = "publish_unpublished_branch"
+    ok, block_reasons = role_session_router.check_author_mutation_after_reviewer_stop(
+        task
+    )
+    if not ok:
+        return _publication_block(block_reasons)
+
+    blocked = _namespace_mutation_block(task, remote=remote)
+    if blocked:
+        return blocked
+    blocked = _profile_permission_block(
+        task_capability_map.required_permission(task),
+        remote=remote, host=host, org=org, repo=repo,
+        org_explicit=org is not None,
+        repo_explicit=repo is not None,
+    )
+    if blocked:
+        return blocked
+
+    # #815: resolve the caller's worktree *before* preflight and forward it, so
+    # every workspace-resolution layer behind verify_preflight_purity — including
+    # the #618 branches-only guard — judges the registered issue worktree this
+    # publication actually operates on. Resolving it afterwards let preflight
+    # fall back to the MCP process root, so a daemon rooted at the stable control
+    # checkout refused a valid explicit worktree before the assessor ever ran.
+    # A caller supplying nothing usable forwards None and keeps the ordinary
+    # fail-closed fallback.
+    explicit_worktree = (worktree_path or "").strip()
+    workspace = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(explicit_worktree or "."))
+
+    verify_preflight_purity(
+        remote,
+        worktree_path=workspace if explicit_worktree else None,
+        task=task,
+        org=org,
+        repo=repo,
+    )
+
+    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
+    git_remote = (git_remote_name or remote or "").strip()
+
+    existing_lock = issue_lock_store.load_issue_lock(
+        remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, issue_number=int(issue_number)
+    )
+    git_state = issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state(workspace)
+    registered = author_mutation_worktree.path_in_git_worktree_list(
+        workspace, PROJECT_ROOT
+    )
+
+    remote_probe = branch_publish.read_remote_branch_head(
+        workspace, git_remote, branch_name
+    )
+    ancestry = None
+    probe_head = (remote_probe.get("remote_head_sha") or "").strip()
+    if probe_head and probe_head.lower() != (expected_head or "").strip().lower():
+        ancestry = branch_publish.read_is_ancestor(workspace, probe_head, expected_head)
+
+    # A PR on this very branch is this work's own PR, not a rival claim. Only an
+    # open PR for the same issue on a *different* branch is a competing claim.
+    competing: list = []
+    for pull in _list_open_pulls(h, o, r, _auth(h)):
+        ref = str((pull.get("head") or {}).get("ref") or "")
+        if not ref or ref == branch_name:
+            continue
+        if issue_lock_adoption.branch_carries_issue_marker(ref, int(issue_number)):
+            competing.append(pull.get("number"))
+
+    observed_hashes = None
+    if expected_file_hashes:
+        observed_hashes = branch_publish.hash_worktree_files(
+            workspace, list(expected_file_hashes.keys())
+        )
+
+    claimant = _work_lease_claimant(h)
+    assessment = branch_publish.assess_unpublished_commit_publication(
+        existing_lock,
+        issue_number=int(issue_number),
+        branch_name=branch_name,
+        worktree_path=workspace,
+        expected_head=expected_head,
+        remote=remote,
+        org=o,
+        repo=r,
+        identity=claimant.get("username"),
+        profile=claimant.get("profile"),
+        worktree_state=git_state,
+        worktree_registered=registered,
+        remote_probe=remote_probe,
+        ancestry=ancestry,
+        competing_open_prs=competing,
+        expected_file_hashes=expected_file_hashes,
+        observed_file_hashes=observed_hashes,
+    )
+
+    if assessment["outcome"] == branch_publish.REFUSED:
+        return _publication_block(
+            assessment["reasons"], evidence=assessment["evidence"]
+        )
+
+    if dry_run:
+        return {
+            "success": True,
+            "performed": False,
+            "published": False,
+            "verified": False,
+            "dry_run": True,
+            "outcome": assessment["outcome"],
+            "would_publish": assessment["publish_sanctioned"],
+            "remote_head_sha": assessment["evidence"].get("remote_head_sha"),
+            "reasons": [],
+            "evidence": assessment["evidence"],
+            "issue_lock_record_mutated": False,
+            "workflow_lease_touched": False,
+        }
+
+    performed = False
+    if assessment["publish_sanctioned"]:
+        with _audited(
+            task, host=h, remote=remote, org=o, repo=r,
+            target_branch=branch_name,
+            request_metadata={
+                "issue_number": int(issue_number),
+                "expected_head": expected_head,
+                "git_remote": git_remote,
+            },
+        ):
+            push = branch_publish.publish_commit_to_remote_branch(
+                worktree_path=workspace,
+                remote_name=git_remote,
+                branch_name=branch_name,
+                expected_head=expected_head,
+            )
+        if not push.get("success"):
+            return _publication_block(
+                push.get("reasons") or ["publication failed"],
+                evidence=assessment["evidence"],
+                stderr=push.get("stderr"),
+            )
+        performed = True
+
+    verification = branch_publish.verify_published_head(
+        worktree_path=workspace,
+        remote_name=git_remote,
+        branch_name=branch_name,
+        expected_head=expected_head,
+    )
+    if not verification.get("verified"):
+        return _publication_block(
+            verification.get("reasons") or ["read-after-write verification failed"],
+            evidence=assessment["evidence"],
+            performed=performed,
+            published=performed,
+            remote_head_sha=verification.get("remote_head_sha"),
+        )
+
+    return {
+        "success": True,
+        "performed": performed,
+        "published": True,
+        "verified": True,
+        "outcome": assessment["outcome"],
+        "remote_head_sha": verification.get("remote_head_sha"),
+        "reasons": [],
+        "evidence": assessment["evidence"],
+        # Publication is the whole of this operation's authority (#812 AC23).
+        "issue_lock_record_mutated": False,
+        "workflow_lease_touched": False,
+        "exact_next_action": (
+            f"Remote head for '{branch_name}' is now observable. Call "
+            f"gitea_lock_issue(issue_number={int(issue_number)}, "
+            f"branch_name='{branch_name}', worktree_path='{workspace}') to renew "
+            "the exact-owner lease, then gitea_create_pr."
+        ),
+    }
+
+
 # Merge methods supported by the Gitea merge API.
 _MERGE_METHODS = ("merge", "squash", "rebase")
 
@@ -15290,7 +15551,8 @@ def mcp_get_control_plane_guide(
     profile = get_profile()
     allowed = profile["allowed_operations"]
     forbidden = profile["forbidden_operations"]
-    role = _role_kind(allowed, forbidden)
+    # Prefer declared profile role so controller is not mislabeled reconciler (#840).
+    role = _profile_role_kind(profile)
     username = _authenticated_username(h)
 
     identity = {
@@ -15349,6 +15611,16 @@ def mcp_get_control_plane_guide(
             "user, and merging requires explicit operator authorization plus the "
             "'MERGE PR <n>' confirmation. "
             "Review and merge are separate workflow roles. A reviewer approval is not merge authorization.")
+    elif role == "controller":
+        guidance.append(
+            "Controller profile: route work via "
+            "gitea_route_task_session(task_type='process_work_queue') then "
+            "gitea_allocate_next_work (allocation_mode=cross_role by default). "
+            "The allocator returns exactly one authoritative selection with "
+            "required_role / required_profile / selected_action. Do not "
+            "implement, review, approve, or merge in this session — schedule "
+            "the matching role namespace instead. Dashboard output is "
+            "explanatory only and never replaces allocator selection.")
     elif role == "mixed":
         guidance.append(
             "WARNING: this profile allows both authoring and "
@@ -15558,7 +15830,8 @@ def gitea_whoami(
             "environment": profile.get("environment"),
             "service": profile.get("service"),
             "identity": profile.get("identity"),
-            "role": profile.get("role"),
+            "role": profile.get("role") or _profile_role_kind(profile),
+            "role_kind": _profile_role_kind(profile),
             "profile_address": profile.get("profile_path"),
             "execution_profile": profile.get("execution_profile"),
             "audit_label": profile.get("audit_label"),
@@ -20342,9 +20615,10 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
     candidates_json: Any = None,
     exclude_issue_numbers: list[int] | None = None,
     expected_candidate_set_fingerprint: str | None = None,
+    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
     limit: int = 50,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Controller-owned next-work allocator using the #613 control-plane DB (#600).
+    """Controller-owned next-work allocator using the #613 control-plane DB (#600/#840).
 
     Workers must not self-select exclusive work under the standard multi-LLM
     workflow. Call this tool instead.
@@ -20354,6 +20628,14 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
     ``ControlPlaneDB.assign_and_lease`` (never file locks or comment-only
     leases as the coordination source).
 
+    *allocation_mode* (#840): when the active role is controller (or mode is
+    ``cross_role``), inspect the complete queue and return exactly one
+    authoritative selection with selected item, action, required_role,
+    required_profile/namespace, pins, and allocation/lease evidence.
+    Role-scoped workers pass ``role=author|reviewer|merger|reconciler`` (or
+    omit for profile role) for single-role filtering. Controller routes only
+    and does not perform downstream mutations.
+
     Outcomes include: ``assigned_work``, ``preview``, ``wait``,
     ``blocked_by_terminal_path``, ``no_safe_work``, ``role_ineligible``,
     ``blocked_by_excluded_own_lease``, ``candidate_set_drift``.
@@ -20488,6 +20770,7 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
             controller_instance_id=allocator_service.resolve_controller_instance_id(),
             exclude_issue_numbers=exclude_issue_numbers,
             expected_candidate_set_fingerprint=expected_candidate_set_fingerprint,
+            allocation_mode=allocation_mode,
         )
     except ValueError as exc:
         return {

namespace_workspace_binding.py

@@ -24,7 +24,12 @@ ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS: dict[str, str] = {
     "reconciler": RECONCILER_WORKTREE_ENV,
 }
 
-NON_AUTHOR_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler"})
+# Controller has no task worktree env — it routes only (#840).
+KNOWN_ROLE_KINDS = frozenset(
+    {"author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"}
+)
+
+NON_AUTHOR_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"})
 
 
 def normalize_role_kind(
@@ -37,8 +42,12 @@ def normalize_role_kind(
     profile = (profile_name or "").strip().lower()
     if role == "reviewer" and "merger" in profile:
         return "merger"
+    if "controller" in profile or role == "controller":
+        return "controller"
     if role in ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS:
         return role
+    if role in KNOWN_ROLE_KINDS:
+        return role
     return "author"
 
 
@@ -80,7 +89,7 @@ def resolve_namespace_workspace(
     """
     env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
     role = normalize_role_kind(role_kind, profile_name=profile_name)
-    role_env_key = ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS[role]
+    role_env_key = ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS.get(role)
 
     # #618: durable author resolution — no silent control/master fallback.
     if role == "author" and verify_paths:
@@ -108,13 +117,17 @@ def resolve_namespace_workspace(
             )
         return workspace, source
 
+    role_env_candidate = (
+        (_env_value(env_map, role_env_key), f"{role_env_key} environment variable", True)
+        if role_env_key
+        else (None, "no role worktree env", True)
+    )
     for candidate, source, env_sourced in (
         (worktree_path, "worktree_path argument", False),
         (worktree, "worktree argument", False),
         (_env_value(env_map, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV),
          f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV} environment variable", True),
-        (_env_value(env_map, role_env_key),
-         f"{role_env_key} environment variable", True),
+        role_env_candidate,
         (session_lease_worktree if role in {"reviewer", "merger"} else None,
          "reviewer PR lease worktree", False),
         # Author lock derivation is handled by the durable path above when
@@ -433,7 +446,8 @@ def assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
         reasons.append(
             f"{role} mutation blocked: workspace is the stable control checkout; "
             f"create or reconnect to a session-owned worktree under branches/ "
-            f"or set {ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS[role]} / {ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV}"
+            f"or set {ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS.get(role, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV)} / "
+            f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV}"
         )
     elif (
         role in {"reviewer", "merger"}

pr_work_lease.py

@@ -228,25 +228,74 @@ def find_active_reviewer_lease(
     return None
 
 
+def _conflict_fix_chain_key(lease: dict) -> tuple | None:
+    """Identity of the lease chain a conflict-fix marker belongs to (#842).
+
+    Keyed by PR number, profile, head_before, and branch. Returns None when any
+    required component (pr_number, profile, head_before) is missing or malformed.
+    """
+    raw = lease.get("raw_fields") or {}
+    pr_number = lease.get("pr_number")
+    profile = (lease.get("profile") or "").strip().lower()
+    head_before = lease.get("head_before")
+    branch = (lease.get("branch") or raw.get("branch") or "").strip()
+    if not (pr_number and profile and head_before):
+        return None
+    return (pr_number, profile, head_before, branch)
+
+
+def _conflict_fix_chain_matches(key1: tuple, key2: tuple) -> bool:
+    """True when two conflict-fix chain keys refer to the same lease chain."""
+    pr1, profile1, head1, branch1 = key1
+    pr2, profile2, head2, branch2 = key2
+    if pr1 != pr2 or profile1 != profile2 or head1 != head2:
+        return False
+    if branch1 and branch2 and branch1 != branch2:
+        return False
+    return True
+
+
+def _conflict_fix_chain_terminated_after(entries: list[dict], index: int) -> bool:
+    """True when a later marker terminates the conflict-fix chain of ``entries[index]``.
+
+    Append-only newest-wins: a terminal marker (phase=released/blocked/done)
+    ends only its matching claim chain (#842).
+    """
+    key = _conflict_fix_chain_key(entries[index])
+    if key is None:
+        return False
+    for later in entries[index + 1:]:
+        phase = (later.get("phase") or "").strip().lower()
+        if phase not in _TERMINAL_CONFLICT_FIX_PHASES:
+            continue
+        later_key = _conflict_fix_chain_key(later)
+        if later_key and _conflict_fix_chain_matches(key, later_key):
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
 def find_active_conflict_fix_lease(
     comments: list[dict],
     *,
     pr_number: int,
     now: datetime | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Return the newest unexpired conflict-fix lease for *pr_number*, if any."""
+    """Return the newest unexpired, non-terminated conflict-fix lease for *pr_number*, if any."""
     now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
     candidates = [
         entry for entry in _comment_entries(comments, pr_number=pr_number)
         if entry.get("lease_kind") == "conflict_fix"
     ]
-    for lease in reversed(candidates):
+    for index in range(len(candidates) - 1, -1, -1):
+        lease = candidates[index]
         if _lease_expired(lease, now=now):
             continue
         phase = (lease.get("phase") or "").strip().lower()
         if phase in _TERMINAL_CONFLICT_FIX_PHASES:
             continue
         if phase in _ACTIVE_CONFLICT_FIX_PHASES or phase:
+            if _conflict_fix_chain_terminated_after(candidates, index):
+                continue
             return lease
     return None
 

role_session_router.py

@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ AUTHOR_TASKS = frozenset({
     "reconcile_landed_pr",
 })
 
+CONTROLLER_TASKS = frozenset({
+    "process_work_queue",
+    "process-work-queue",
+    "cross_role_allocate",
+})
+
 RECONCILER_TASKS = frozenset({
     "cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
     # #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned (gitea.branch.delete is granted
@@ -132,6 +138,10 @@ TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE = {
     "reconcile_close_superseded_pr": "reconciler",
     "reconcile_close_satisfied_issue": "reconciler",
     "reconcile_create_followup_issue": "reconciler",
+    # #840: controller-owned generic queue allocation / routing.
+    "process_work_queue": "controller",
+    "process-work-queue": "controller",
+    "cross_role_allocate": "controller",
 }
 
 WRONG_ROLE_REVIEWER_MSG = (
@@ -147,6 +157,10 @@ WRONG_ROLE_MERGER_MSG = (
     "Wrong role/session for merger task. Launch merger MCP namespace."
 )
 
+WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG = (
+    "Wrong role/session for controller task. Launch controller MCP namespace."
+)
+
 _session_last_route: dict | None = None
 
 
@@ -281,6 +295,27 @@ def route_task_session(
         _record_route(result)
         return result
 
+    if required_role == "controller":
+        result = {
+            "task_type": task_type,
+            "required_role": required_role,
+            "active_role": active_role_kind,
+            "active_profile": active_profile,
+            "route_result": ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE,
+            "downstream_allowed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG,
+                "Controller tasks (process_work_queue / cross-role allocate) "
+                "cannot run in author, reviewer, merger, or reconciler "
+                "worker sessions.",
+            ],
+            "message": WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG,
+            "runtime_switching_supported": runtime_switching_supported,
+            "profile_switch_blocked": not runtime_switching_supported,
+        }
+        _record_route(result)
+        return result
+
     if required_role == "author":
         route = ROUTE_TO_AUTHOR
         message = (

task_capability_map.py

@@ -62,6 +62,14 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.branch.push",
         "role": "author",
     },
+    # #812 AC20: publish an already-committed, unpublished local head so
+    # exact-owner lease renewal has an observable remote head to reason about.
+    # Same authority as any other author push — deliberately not a new
+    # operation name, so it cannot widen an already-configured author profile.
+    "publish_unpublished_branch": {
+        "permission": "gitea.branch.push",
+        "role": "author",
+    },
     "create_pr": {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.create",
         "role": "author",
@@ -301,8 +309,10 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.create",
         "role": "author",
     },
-    # #600: controller-owned allocator — any authenticated profile may call;
-    # routing enforces role match to selected work. Uses control-plane DB (#613).
+    # #600: workers and controller may call with gitea.read; role-scoped workers
+    # pass role=author|reviewer|merger|reconciler. Cross-role routing is the
+    # controller default (#840). The canonical generic queue *task type* is
+    # process_work_queue (controller-only below).
     "allocate_next_work": {
         "permission": "gitea.read",
         "role": "author",
@@ -311,6 +321,19 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.read",
         "role": "author",
     },
+    # #840: documented generic queue task — controller routes only.
+    "process_work_queue": {
+        "permission": "gitea.read",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
+    "process-work-queue": {
+        "permission": "gitea.read",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
+    "cross_role_allocate": {
+        "permission": "gitea.read",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
 
     # #601 first-class lease lifecycle — inspect/list need read; mutations gate on
     # ownership in the control-plane DB (not a separate Gitea write permission).
@@ -500,6 +523,7 @@ ROLE_EXCLUSIVE_TASKS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
         "gitea_release_merger_pr_lease",
         "create_branch",
         "push_branch",
+        "publish_unpublished_branch",
         "create_pr",
         "commit_files",
         "gitea_commit_files",

tests/test_arch01_platform.py

@@ -0,0 +1,572 @@
+"""Executable acceptance tests for ARCH-01 Slice A (#822).
+
+Each acceptance criterion (#822 §12) and named test (#822 §13) is exercised
+against a real SQLite database. The migration runs on a fresh DB in ``setUp``;
+the test-run output is the durable evidence the issue requires (§14).
+
+Enforcement being proven:
+
+* ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` — the ``cp_*`` actor functions exist only on the
+  trusted kernel connection; a raw connection cannot satisfy the triggers.
+* ``[SCHEMA]`` — fail-closed aborts, exact dominance set, NOT-NULL class,
+  immutability, and the last-active-grant floor are enforced by
+  CHECK/FK/trigger, verified here including raw-write bypass and concurrency.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import unittest
+from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
+
+import arch01_platform as ap
+from arch01_platform import (
+    ALREADY_INSTALLED,
+    AUTHORIZATION_DENIED,
+    CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST,
+    DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID,
+    DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+    DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
+    INSTALLED,
+    INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT,
+    INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE,
+    PlatformKernel,
+)
+
+INSTALLER = "platform.installer"
+
+_BOOTSTRAP_TABLES = (
+    "principal_equivalence_classes",
+    "principals",
+    "authoritative_issuers",
+    "authority_dominance",
+    "platform_bootstrap_seed",
+    "platform_bootstrap_grants",
+    "platform_active_invariant",
+    "install_state",
+)
+
+
+def _count(kernel: PlatformKernel, table: str) -> int:
+    return kernel._conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table}").fetchone()[0]
+
+
+def _count_where(kernel: PlatformKernel, table: str, where: str) -> int:
+    return kernel._conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table} WHERE {where}").fetchone()[0]
+
+
+def _all_bootstrap_empty(kernel: PlatformKernel) -> bool:
+    return all(_count(kernel, t) == 0 for t in _BOOTSTRAP_TABLES)
+
+
+class Arch01MemoryTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Single-connection behavior on an in-memory database."""
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.kernel = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self.kernel.close()
+
+    # -- AC1 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_install_clean(self) -> None:  # t_install_clean(+)
+        res = self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res.code, INSTALLED)
+        self.assertTrue(self.kernel.is_installed())
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "install_state"), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.active_grant_count(), 1)
+        self.assertIn(ap.EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED, self.kernel.audit_events())
+        rows = set(
+            self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT dominant, subordinate FROM authority_dominance"
+            ).fetchall()
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(rows, set(DOMINANCE_TUPLES))
+        issuer_ref = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT i.issuer_ref FROM principals p JOIN authoritative_issuers i "
+            "ON p.issuer_id = i.issuer_id WHERE p.principal_id = ?",
+            (INSTALLER,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        self.assertEqual(issuer_ref[0], DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID)
+
+    # -- AC2 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_install_twice(self) -> None:  # t_install_twice(-)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        res2 = self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res2.code, ALREADY_INSTALLED)
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "principals"), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "platform_bootstrap_grants"), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "install_state"), 1)
+
+    # -- AC3 / AC5 -------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_install_stage_rollback(self) -> None:  # t_install_stage_rollback
+        for stop in range(1, 9):
+            with self.subTest(stages=stop):
+                k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+                try:
+                    self._partial_bootstrap_then_rollback(k, stop)
+                    self.assertTrue(
+                        _all_bootstrap_empty(k),
+                        f"partial rows survived rollback at stage {stop}",
+                    )
+                    self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+                finally:
+                    k.close()
+
+    def test_no_partial_after_rollback(self) -> None:  # t_no_partial_after_rollback
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            code = self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1])
+            self.assertEqual(code, DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH)
+            self.assertTrue(_all_bootstrap_empty(k))
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    # -- AC4 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_dominance_missing(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_missing(-)
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1]),
+                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    def test_dominance_extra(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_extra(-)
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            extra = DOMINANCE_TUPLES + (("platform.bootstrap", "rogue.extra"),)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=extra),
+                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    def test_dominance_malformed(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_malformed(-)
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            malformed = DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1] + (("supervisor.root", "WRONG.subordinate"),)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=malformed),
+                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    # -- AC6 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_principal_no_class(self) -> None:  # t_principal_no_class(-)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "install"):
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals"
+                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES ('x', 'operator', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                )
+
+    # -- AC7 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_noninstaller_null_issuer(self) -> None:  # t_nonobstaller_null_issuer(-)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            cur = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+            )
+            class_id = cur.lastrowid
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals"
+                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES ('rogue', 'operator', ?, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')",
+                    (class_id,),
+                )
+            self.assertIn("INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_installer_null_issuer_only_during_install(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("i2", "installer", "install"):
+            cur = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+            )
+            class_id = cur.lastrowid
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals"
+                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES ('i2', 'installer', ?, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')",
+                    (class_id,),
+                )
+
+    # -- AC8 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_context_missing(self) -> None:  # t_context_missing(-)
+        self.assertIsNone(self.kernel._ctx)
+        with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+            self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+            )
+        self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_context_stale(self) -> None:  # t_context_stale(-)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            self.kernel._ctx.expired = True
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                )
+            self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_context_epoch_shift(self) -> None:  # t_context_epoch_shift(-)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            self.kernel._ctx.live_epoch = self.kernel._ctx.bound_epoch + 99
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                )
+            self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_bad_actor_kind_or_mode_rejected(self) -> None:
+        for kind, mode in (("intruder", "normal"), ("operator", "sabotage")):
+            with self.subTest(kind=kind, mode=mode):
+                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", kind, mode):
+                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
+                        self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                            "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) "
+                            "VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                        )
+
+    # -- AC9 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_bootstrap_immutable_update(self) -> None:  # t_bootstrap_immutable_{update}
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        cases = [
+            ("UPDATE install_state SET installed_at = 'x' WHERE id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE"),
+            ("UPDATE platform_bootstrap_seed SET created_at = 'x' WHERE seed_id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_SEED"),
+            ("UPDATE authority_dominance SET subordinate = 'x' WHERE dominant = 'supervisor.root'", "IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE"),
+            (f"UPDATE authoritative_issuers SET issuer_ref = 'x' WHERE issuer_ref = '{DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID}'", "IMMUTABLE_ISSUER"),
+            (f"UPDATE principals SET actor_kind = 'operator' WHERE principal_id = '{INSTALLER}'", "IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL"),
+        ]
+        for sql, tag in cases:
+            with self.subTest(sql=sql):
+                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                        self.kernel._conn.execute(sql)
+                    self.assertIn(tag, str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_bootstrap_immutable_delete(self) -> None:  # t_bootstrap_immutable_{delete}
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        cases = [
+            ("DELETE FROM install_state WHERE id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE"),
+            ("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_SEED"),
+            ("DELETE FROM authority_dominance", "IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE"),
+            ("DELETE FROM authoritative_issuers", "IMMUTABLE_ISSUER"),
+            (f"DELETE FROM principals WHERE principal_id = '{INSTALLER}'", "IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL"),
+            ("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_grants", "IMMUTABLE_GRANT"),
+        ]
+        for sql, tag in cases:
+            with self.subTest(sql=sql):
+                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                        self.kernel._conn.execute(sql)
+                    self.assertIn(tag, str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_grant_reactivation_rejected(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        self.kernel.register_principal(
+            "op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED
+        )
+        gid = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grantee_principal_id = 'op1'"
+        ).fetchone()[0]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code,
+            INSTALLED,
+        )
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "UPDATE platform_bootstrap_grants SET active = 1 WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                    (gid,),
+                )
+            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_GRANT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    # -- AC12 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_raw_write_bypass(self) -> None:  # t_raw_write_bypass(raw-bypass)
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            path = os.path.join(tmp, "p.sqlite3")
+            k = PlatformKernel(path)
+            self.assertEqual(k.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+            k.close()
+            raw = sqlite3.connect(path)
+            raw.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
+            try:
+                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
+                    raw.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES ('forged', '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                    )
+                    raw.commit()
+                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
+                    raw.execute("UPDATE install_state SET installed_at = 'x' WHERE id = 1")
+                    raw.commit()
+                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
+                    raw.execute("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_grants")
+                    raw.commit()
+            finally:
+                raw.close()
+
+    # -- AC13 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_audit_created(self) -> None:  # t_audit_created(+)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        self.kernel.register_principal(
+            "op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED
+        )
+        gid = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grantee_principal_id = 'op1'"
+        ).fetchone()[0]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code,
+            INSTALLED,
+        )
+        events = self.kernel.audit_events()
+        for evt in (
+            ap.EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED,
+            ap.EVT_GRANT_CREATED,
+            ap.EVT_GRANT_REVOKED,
+            ap.EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED,
+        ):
+            self.assertIn(evt, events)
+
+    # -- AC14 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_audit_immutable(self) -> None:  # t_audit_immutable(raw-bypass)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as up:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute("UPDATE audit_records SET event = 'x' WHERE audit_id = 1")
+            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_AUDIT", str(up.exception))
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as dl:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute("DELETE FROM audit_records WHERE audit_id = 1")
+            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_AUDIT", str(dl.exception))
+
+    # -- meta ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_schema_meta(self) -> None:
+        rows = dict(self.kernel._conn.execute("SELECT key, value FROM arch01_meta").fetchall())
+        self.assertEqual(rows["schema_version"], str(ap.SCHEMA_VERSION))
+        self.assertIn("disabled by default", rows["architecture"])
+
+    def test_register_principal_creates_class_first(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        res = self.kernel.register_principal(
+            "svc1", "service", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res.code, INSTALLED)
+        row = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT current_class_id FROM principals WHERE principal_id = 'svc1'"
+        ).fetchone()
+        self.assertIsNotNone(row[0])
+
+    # -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def _partial_bootstrap_then_rollback(self, k: PlatformKernel, stop: int) -> None:
+        """Execute the first ``stop`` bootstrap statements, then ROLLBACK."""
+        now = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
+        k._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+        class_id = None
+        issuer_id = None
+        try:
+            with k.actor_context(INSTALLER, "installer", "install"):
+                c = k._conn
+                if stop >= 1:
+                    class_id = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)", (now,)
+                    ).lastrowid
+                if stop >= 2:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principals(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
+                        (INSTALLER, class_id, INSTALLER, now),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 3:
+                    issuer_id = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) VALUES ('operator-key', ?, ?)",
+                        (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
+                    ).lastrowid
+                if stop >= 4:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
+                        (issuer_id, INSTALLER),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 5:
+                    c.executemany(
+                        "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
+                        DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
+                    )
+                if stop >= 6:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
+                        (INSTALLER, now),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 7:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
+                        (INSTALLER, now),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 8:
+                    c.execute("INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)")
+        finally:
+            k._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+
+    def _seed_bootstrap_and_mark(self, k: PlatformKernel, dominance) -> str:
+        """Seed a full bootstrap with a caller-supplied dominance set, then
+        attempt the marker insert. Returns the classified failure code (or
+        INSTALLED). Rolls back on failure so no partial rows remain."""
+        now = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
+        k._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+        try:
+            with k.actor_context(INSTALLER, "installer", "install"):
+                c = k._conn
+                class_id = c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)", (now,)
+                ).lastrowid
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
+                    (INSTALLER, class_id, INSTALLER, now),
+                )
+                issuer_id = c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) VALUES ('operator-key', ?, ?)",
+                    (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
+                ).lastrowid
+                c.execute(
+                    "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
+                    (issuer_id, INSTALLER),
+                )
+                c.executemany(
+                    "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
+                    dominance,
+                )
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
+                    (INSTALLER, now),
+                )
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
+                    (INSTALLER, now),
+                )
+                c.execute("INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)")
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO install_state(id, marker, installed_at) VALUES (1, 'installed', ?)",
+                    (now,),
+                )
+            k._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+            return INSTALLED
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            k._safe_rollback()
+            return PlatformKernel._classify(exc)
+
+
+class Arch01ConcurrencyTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Concurrency invariants require file-backed DBs and independent connections."""
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "p.sqlite3")
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    # -- AC10 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_concurrent_install(self) -> None:  # t_concurrent_install(concurrency)
+        k1 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=0)
+        k2 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=0)
+        barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
+        results = {}
+
+        def _install(name, kernel):
+            barrier.wait()
+            results[name] = kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code
+
+        try:
+            with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:
+                f1 = ex.submit(_install, "a", k1)
+                f2 = ex.submit(_install, "b", k2)
+                f1.result()
+                f2.result()
+            codes = sorted(results.values())
+            self.assertEqual(codes.count(INSTALLED), 1, f"exactly one install expected: {results}")
+            other = [c for c in results.values() if c != INSTALLED][0]
+            self.assertIn(other, (ALREADY_INSTALLED, CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST))
+            self.assertTrue(k1.is_installed())
+            self.assertEqual(_count(k1, "install_state"), 1)
+            self.assertEqual(_count(k1, "principals"), 1)
+        finally:
+            k1.close()
+            k2.close()
+
+    # -- AC11 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_concurrent_last_grant_revoke(self) -> None:  # t_concurrent_last_grant_revoke
+        setup = PlatformKernel(self.path)
+        self.assertEqual(setup.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        setup.register_principal("op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER)
+        self.assertEqual(setup.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        self.assertEqual(setup.active_grant_count(), 2)
+        gids = [
+            r[0]
+            for r in setup._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE active = 1 ORDER BY grant_id"
+            ).fetchall()
+        ]
+        setup.close()
+        self.assertEqual(len(gids), 2)
+
+        k1 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=3000)
+        k2 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=3000)
+        barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
+        results = {}
+
+        def _revoke(name, kernel, gid):
+            barrier.wait()
+            results[name] = kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code
+
+        try:
+            with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:
+                f1 = ex.submit(_revoke, "a", k1, gids[0])
+                f2 = ex.submit(_revoke, "b", k2, gids[1])
+                f1.result()
+                f2.result()
+            codes = list(results.values())
+            self.assertEqual(codes.count(INSTALLED), 1, f"exactly one revoke should win: {results}")
+            self.assertEqual(codes.count(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED), 1, f"one revoke must be denied: {results}")
+            self.assertEqual(k1.active_grant_count(), 1)
+            self.assertEqual(_count_where(k1, "platform_bootstrap_grants", "active = 1"), 1)
+        finally:
+            k1.close()
+            k2.close()
+
+    def test_revoke_final_grant_denied(self) -> None:
+        k = PlatformKernel(self.path)
+        try:
+            self.assertEqual(k.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+            gid = k._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE active = 1"
+            ).fetchone()[0]
+            res = k.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER)
+            self.assertEqual(res.code, AUTHORIZATION_DENIED)
+            self.assertEqual(k.active_grant_count(), 1)
+            self.assertEqual(_count_where(k, "platform_bootstrap_grants", "active = 1"), 1)
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_cross_role_queue_allocation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,581 @@
+"""Authoritative controller cross-role generic queue allocation (#840)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from allocator_service import (
+    ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+    ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+    OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
+    OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
+    OUTCOME_WAIT,
+    ROLE_AUTHOR,
+    ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+    ROLE_MERGER,
+    ROLE_RECONCILER,
+    ROLE_REVIEWER,
+    WorkCandidate,
+    allocate_next_work,
+    build_selection_dict,
+    classify_skip,
+    required_namespace_for_role,
+    required_profile_for_role,
+    resolve_allocation_mode,
+    selected_action_for_candidate,
+)
+from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
+import role_session_router
+from role_session_router import (
+    ROUTE_ALLOWED,
+    ROUTE_AMBIGUOUS,
+    ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE,
+    route_task_session,
+)
+import namespace_workspace_binding as nwb
+import task_capability_map
+
+
+class CrossRoleAllocationModeTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_controller_defaults_to_cross_role(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_CONTROLLER),
+            ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+
+    def test_worker_defaults_to_role_scoped(self) -> None:
+        for role in (ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER, ROLE_RECONCILER):
+            self.assertEqual(
+                resolve_allocation_mode(role),
+                ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+            )
+
+    def test_explicit_modes(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_CONTROLLER, "role_scoped"),
+            ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_AUTHOR, "cross_role"),
+            ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+
+
+class CrossRoleSelectionPayloadTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_selection_contains_required_fields(self) -> None:
+        c = WorkCandidate(
+            kind="issue",
+            number=840,
+            labels=("status:ready",),
+            title="cross-role",
+            priority=20,
+        )
+        sel = build_selection_dict(
+            c,
+            active_role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            required_role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            profile_name="prgs-controller",
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(sel["number"], 840)
+        self.assertEqual(sel["kind"], "issue")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertEqual(sel["selected_action"], "implement")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["action"], "implement")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["pinned"]["number"], 840)
+        self.assertIsNone(sel["pinned"]["head_sha"])
+
+    def test_profile_prefix_preserved(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            required_profile_for_role(ROLE_REVIEWER, profile_name="dadeschools-controller"),
+            "dadeschools-reviewer",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            required_namespace_for_role(ROLE_MERGER),
+            "gitea-merger",
+        )
+
+    def test_selected_actions_per_role(self) -> None:
+        issue = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
+        pr_review = WorkCandidate(kind="pr", number=2, head_sha="a" * 40)
+        pr_rc = WorkCandidate(
+            kind="pr",
+            number=3,
+            head_sha="b" * 40,
+            request_changes_current_head=True,
+        )
+        pr_merge = WorkCandidate(
+            kind="pr",
+            number=4,
+            head_sha="c" * 40,
+            approval_on_current_head=True,
+            mergeable=True,
+        )
+        pr_recon = WorkCandidate(
+            kind="pr",
+            number=5,
+            head_sha="d" * 40,
+            approval_contaminated=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(selected_action_for_candidate(issue, ROLE_AUTHOR), "implement")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_rc, ROLE_AUTHOR),
+            "address_pr_change_requests",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_review, ROLE_REVIEWER), "review"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(selected_action_for_candidate(pr_merge, ROLE_MERGER), "merge")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_recon, ROLE_RECONCILER),
+            "reconcile_contaminated_approval",
+        )
+
+
+class CrossRoleAllocateServiceTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def _alloc(self, **kwargs):
+        defaults = dict(
+            db=self.db,
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="org",
+            repo="repo",
+            candidates=[],
+            apply=False,
+            profile_name="prgs-controller",
+            username="controller-bot",
+            controller_instance_id="ctrl-1",
+        )
+        defaults.update(kwargs)
+        return allocate_next_work(**defaults)
+
+    def test_eligible_author_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=100,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                title="author work",
+                priority=20,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_PREVIEW)
+        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(res["selected"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 100)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "implement")
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
+        self.assertIn("allocate", res["controller_allowed_actions"])
+        self.assertIn("merge", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_created"])
+
+    def test_eligible_reviewer_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=200,
+                head_sha="e" * 40,
+                title="needs review",
+                priority=30,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 200)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_REVIEWER)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "review")
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_profile"], "prgs-reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["pinned"]["head_sha"], "e" * 40)
+
+    def test_eligible_merger_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=300,
+                head_sha="f" * 40,
+                approval_on_current_head=True,
+                mergeable=True,
+                priority=40,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 300)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_MERGER)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "merge")
+
+    def test_eligible_reconciler_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=400,
+                head_sha="1" * 40,
+                approval_contaminated=True,
+                priority=50,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 400)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_RECONCILER)
+        self.assertIn("reconcile", res["selected_action"])
+
+    def test_no_eligible_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=10,
+                labels=("status:blocked",),
+                blocked=True,
+                priority=99,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=11,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                dependency_unmet=True,
+                dependency_reason="blocked by #10",
+                priority=98,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_NO_SAFE)
+        self.assertIsNone(res["selected"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE)
+
+    def test_leased_work_skipped(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=50,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=20,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=51,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=10,
+            ),
+        ]
+        # Seed a foreign lease on issue 50 via assign_and_lease under another session.
+        other = allocate_next_work(
+            self.db,
+            session_id="other-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="org",
+            repo="repo",
+            candidates=cands[:1],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            controller_instance_id="other-ctrl",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(other["outcome"], "assigned_work")
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(res["selected"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 51)
+        self.assertTrue(any(s["number"] == 50 for s in res["skipped"]))
+        self.assertTrue(res["claims_excluded"])
+
+    def test_dependencies_skipped(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=1,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=99,
+                dependency_unmet=True,
+                dependency_reason="needs #2",
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=2,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=1,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 2)
+        skipped = {s["number"]: s["reason"] for s in res["skipped"]}
+        self.assertIn(1, skipped)
+        self.assertIn("needs #2", skipped[1])
+
+    def test_pagination_limit_only_truncates_skip_report(self) -> None:
+        """Ranking uses full inventory; reporting limit is MCP-layer only.
+
+        Service ranks all candidates; prove higher-priority eligible item
+        wins even when many skipped precede it.
+        """
+        cands = []
+        for n in range(1, 30):
+            cands.append(
+                WorkCandidate(
+                    kind="issue",
+                    number=n,
+                    labels=("status:ready",),
+                    priority=100 - n,
+                    dependency_unmet=True,
+                    dependency_reason=f"dep {n}",
+                )
+            )
+        cands.append(
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=999,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=1,
+            )
+        )
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 999)
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(res["skipped"]), 29)
+
+    def test_role_scoped_controller_legacy_still_restricts(self) -> None:
+        """role_scoped controller only takes reconciler-needed items."""
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=1,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=50,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=2,
+                head_sha="a" * 40,
+                approval_contaminated=True,
+                priority=1,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(
+            candidates=cands,
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 2)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_RECONCILER)
+
+    def test_cross_role_prefers_highest_priority_across_roles(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=10,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=10,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=20,
+                head_sha="b" * 40,
+                priority=50,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=30,
+                head_sha="c" * 40,
+                approval_on_current_head=True,
+                mergeable=True,
+                priority=20,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        # PR #20 highest priority → reviewer
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 20)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_REVIEWER)
+
+    def test_apply_creates_lease_evidence_for_required_role(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=777,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=20,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands, apply=True)
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], "assigned_work")
+        self.assertTrue(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_created"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        proof = res["lease_proof"]
+        self.assertIsNotNone(proof["lease_id"])
+        self.assertEqual(proof["lease_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertIn("implement", proof["allowed_actions"])
+        # Controller isolation: controller still forbids merge/push/create_pr
+        self.assertIn("merge", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
+        self.assertIn("push", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
+
+    def test_metadata_consistency_role_is_controller(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=1,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["role"], ROLE_CONTROLLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res["routing_role"], ROLE_CONTROLLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+
+
+class ProcessWorkQueueRouterTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        role_session_router.clear_route_state()
+
+    def test_process_work_queue_allowed_for_controller(self) -> None:
+        res = route_task_session(
+            "process_work_queue",
+            active_profile="prgs-controller",
+            active_role_kind="controller",
+            allowed_in_current_session=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_ALLOWED)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], "controller")
+        self.assertTrue(res["downstream_allowed"])
+
+    def test_process_work_queue_hyphen_alias(self) -> None:
+        res = route_task_session(
+            "process-work-queue",
+            active_profile="prgs-controller",
+            active_role_kind="controller",
+            allowed_in_current_session=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_ALLOWED)
+
+    def test_process_work_queue_wrong_role_for_author(self) -> None:
+        res = route_task_session(
+            "process_work_queue",
+            active_profile="prgs-author",
+            active_role_kind="author",
+            allowed_in_current_session=False,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], "controller")
+        self.assertFalse(res["downstream_allowed"])
+
+    def test_unknown_still_ambiguous(self) -> None:
+        res = route_task_session(
+            "not_a_real_task",
+            active_profile="prgs-controller",
+            active_role_kind="controller",
+            allowed_in_current_session=False,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_AMBIGUOUS)
+
+    def test_capability_map_process_work_queue_is_controller(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            task_capability_map.required_role("process_work_queue"),
+            "controller",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            task_capability_map.required_permission("process_work_queue"),
+            "gitea.read",
+        )
+
+
+class ControllerRoleMetadataTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_normalize_role_kind_controller(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            nwb.normalize_role_kind("controller"),
+            "controller",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            nwb.normalize_role_kind("author", profile_name="prgs-controller"),
+            "controller",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            nwb.normalize_role_kind("reconciler", profile_name="prgs-controller"),
+            "controller",
+        )
+
+    def test_profile_role_kind_prefers_declared_controller(self) -> None:
+        # Import from worktree package path via sys.path already set by pytest.
+        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp
+
+        profile = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-controller",
+            "role": "controller",
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read",
+                "gitea.issue.comment",
+                "gitea.pr.close",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [
+                "gitea.pr.approve",
+                "gitea.pr.merge",
+                "gitea.pr.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+            ],
+        }
+        # Declared role wins even if permissions look reconciler-like.
+        self.assertEqual(mcp._profile_role_kind(profile), "controller")
+        # Name-based fallback.
+        profile_no_role = dict(profile)
+        profile_no_role["role"] = None
+        profile_no_role["role_kind"] = None
+        self.assertEqual(mcp._profile_role_kind(profile_no_role), "controller")
+
+    def test_permission_inference_without_controller_name_stays_reconciler(self) -> None:
+        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp
+
+        # Pure permission inference still may return reconciler when no controller
+        # declaration exists — that is intentional for reconciler profiles.
+        role = mcp._role_kind(
+            ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.close", "gitea.issue.comment"],
+            ["gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(role, "reconciler")
+
+
+class DashboardRemainsExplanatoryTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_dashboard_prompt_points_at_allocator_not_self_select(self) -> None:
+        import workflow_dashboard as wd
+
+        self.assertIn("gitea_allocate_next_work", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER)
+        self.assertIn("process_work_queue", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER)
+        self.assertIn("never replaces allocator", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER.lower())
+        self.assertNotIn("self-select", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER.lower())
+
+
+class ClassifySkipCrossRoleTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_controller_cross_role_accepts_author_issue(self) -> None:
+        c = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
+        self.assertIsNone(
+            classify_skip(
+                c,
+                role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+                terminal_pr=None,
+                allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_legacy_controller_skips_author_issue(self) -> None:
+        c = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
+        reason = classify_skip(
+            c,
+            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            terminal_pr=None,
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+        )
+        self.assertIsNotNone(reason)
+        self.assertIn("does not require controller", reason or "")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_812_publish_unpublished_commit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,650 @@
+"""Publication of an unpublished local commit (#812 AC20).
+
+Entry point B of #812: a registered worktree, clean, on its issue branch,
+holding a local commit that has never been published. Exact-owner lease renewal
+refuses such a claim for want of an observable remote head, and every existing
+publication path is lock-derived, so the two predicates close a cycle around
+work that is otherwise complete.
+
+These tests exercise the disposition through its *evidence*, never through any
+particular issue number: every case uses an arbitrary issue number against a
+synthetic repository, and the same assertions hold for any other. Nothing here
+reads, writes, or references the live protected worktree named in #812 AC17 —
+that content is preserved evidence for the duration of this work, so the
+fixtures below build their own repositories from scratch.
+
+The remote is a local bare repository, so publication and read-after-write
+verification are genuinely executed rather than mocked.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+
+import branch_publish  # noqa: E402
+import issue_lock_provenance  # noqa: E402
+import issue_lock_renewal  # noqa: E402
+import issue_lock_store  # noqa: E402
+import mcp_server  # noqa: E402
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
+
+ISSUE = 9812
+BRANCH = f"feat/issue-{ISSUE}-publish-fixture"
+IDENTITY = "example-user"
+PROFILE = "test-author-prgs"
+ORG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
+REPO = "Gitea-Tools"
+GIT_REMOTE = "prgs"
+
+
+def _ts(hours: int) -> str:
+    return (
+        (datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=hours))
+        .isoformat()
+        .replace("+00:00", "Z")
+    )
+
+
+class _PublishBase(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Real git repo + real bare remote + durable lock naming the caller.
+
+    The recorded owner pid is deliberately **this live process**. That mirrors
+    the production shape #812 documents, where the pid belongs to a long-running
+    MCP daemon rather than to a dead author client, and it proves publication
+    never depends on a dead process (#812 AC24).
+    """
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.lock_dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.addCleanup(self.lock_dir.cleanup)
+        self.origin = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="issue812-origin-")
+        self.repo = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="issue812-work-")
+        for path in (self.origin, self.repo):
+            self.addCleanup(
+                lambda p=path: subprocess.run(["rm", "-rf", p], check=False)
+            )
+        self._init_repos()
+        self.remotes = patch.dict(
+            mcp_server.REMOTES,
+            {"prgs": {"host": "gitea.prgs.cc", "org": ORG, "repo": REPO}},
+        )
+        self.remotes.start()
+        self.addCleanup(patch.stopall)
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+
+    # ── fixture construction ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+    def _git(self, *args, cwd=None):
+        return subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", cwd or self.repo, *args],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            check=True,
+        )
+
+    def _init_repos(self):
+        subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "init", "-q", "--bare", "-b", "master", self.origin], check=True
+        )
+        self._git("init", "-q", "-b", "master")
+        self._git("config", "user.email", "[email protected]")
+        self._git("config", "user.name", "Test")
+        self._git("remote", "add", GIT_REMOTE, self.origin)
+
+        with open(os.path.join(self.repo, "seed.txt"), "w") as fh:
+            fh.write("seed\n")
+        self._git("add", "seed.txt")
+        self._git("commit", "-q", "-m", "seed")
+        self.base_sha = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD").stdout.strip()
+        self._git("push", "-q", GIT_REMOTE, "master")
+
+        self._git("checkout", "-q", "-b", BRANCH)
+        with open(os.path.join(self.repo, "work.txt"), "w") as fh:
+            fh.write("unpublished implementation\n")
+        self._git("add", "work.txt")
+        self._git("commit", "-q", "-m", "unpublished implementation")
+        self.head_sha = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD").stdout.strip()
+        self.worktree = os.path.realpath(self.repo)
+
+    def lock_path(self):
+        return issue_lock_store.lock_file_path(
+            remote="prgs", org=ORG, repo=REPO, issue_number=ISSUE,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir.name,
+        )
+
+    def write_lock(self, **overrides):
+        path = self.lock_path()
+        claimant = overrides.pop(
+            "claimant", {"username": IDENTITY, "profile": PROFILE}
+        )
+        pid = overrides.pop("session_pid", os.getpid())
+        lease = {
+            "operation_type": issue_lock_store.AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE,
+            "issue_number": ISSUE,
+            "pr_number": None,
+            "branch": overrides.get("branch_name", BRANCH),
+            "worktree_path": overrides.get("worktree_path", self.worktree),
+            "claimant": claimant,
+            "created_at": _ts(-2),
+            "last_heartbeat_at": _ts(-2),
+            # Expired: entry point B's lease has lapsed, which is precisely why
+            # renewal — and therefore a published head — is needed.
+            "expires_at": _ts(-1),
+        }
+        lease.update(overrides.pop("work_lease", {}))
+        data = {
+            "issue_number": ISSUE,
+            "branch_name": BRANCH,
+            "remote": "prgs",
+            "org": ORG,
+            "repo": REPO,
+            "worktree_path": self.worktree,
+            "session_pid": pid,
+            "pid": pid,
+            "lock_generation": 1,
+            "work_lease": lease,
+            "lock_provenance": issue_lock_provenance.build_sanctioned_lock_provenance(
+                tool="gitea_lock_issue", claimant=claimant
+            ),
+        }
+        data.update(overrides)
+        data["lock_file_path"] = path
+        issue_lock_store.save_lock_file(path, data)
+        return path
+
+    def _tool_env(self):
+        env = shared_mutation_env(
+            PROFILE, include_example_repo=True,
+            GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR=self.lock_dir.name,
+        )
+        env["GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR"] = self.lock_dir.name
+        # These tests repoint PROJECT_ROOT at a synthetic repository so the
+        # registered-worktree proof runs for real. Pin the parity gate to the
+        # server's own startup head so that repointing does not read as a stale
+        # daemon; the gate itself stays live and enforced.
+        startup_head = mcp_server._STARTUP_PARITY.get("startup_head") or ""
+        env["GITEA_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD"] = startup_head
+        env["GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD"] = startup_head
+        return env
+
+    # ── tool driver ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    def run_publish(self, *, open_prs=None, expected_head=None, **kwargs):
+        """Drive the public publication tool against the synthetic fixture."""
+        env = self._tool_env()
+        with patch(
+            "mcp_server._list_open_pulls", return_value=list(open_prs or [])
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server._auth", return_value="token x"
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token x"
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server._work_lease_claimant",
+            return_value={"username": IDENTITY, "profile": PROFILE},
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "PROJECT_ROOT", self.repo
+        ), patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            os.environ["GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR"] = self.lock_dir.name
+            return mcp_server.gitea_publish_unpublished_issue_branch(
+                issue_number=kwargs.pop("issue_number", ISSUE),
+                branch_name=kwargs.pop("branch_name", BRANCH),
+                worktree_path=kwargs.pop("worktree_path", self.worktree),
+                expected_head=expected_head or self.head_sha,
+                remote="prgs",
+                git_remote_name=kwargs.pop("git_remote_name", GIT_REMOTE),
+                **kwargs,
+            )
+
+    def remote_head(self, branch=BRANCH):
+        res = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", self.origin, "rev-parse", "--verify", "--quiet", branch],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
+        )
+        return (res.stdout or "").strip() or None
+
+
+class TestSuccessfulPublication(_PublishBase):
+    """AC20 — the branch becomes observable and is verified after the write."""
+
+    def test_publishes_clean_unpublished_commit(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head(), "fixture must start unpublished")
+
+        result = self.run_publish()
+
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"], result.get("reasons"))
+        self.assertTrue(result["performed"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["published"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["verified"], "read-after-write must be proven")
+        self.assertEqual(result["remote_head_sha"], self.head_sha)
+        self.assertEqual(self.remote_head(), self.head_sha)
+
+    def test_publication_does_not_rewrite_the_commit(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        self.run_publish()
+        # The published object is the same commit, not a copy or a rewrite.
+        self.assertEqual(self.remote_head(), self.head_sha)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD").stdout.strip(), self.head_sha
+        )
+
+    def test_exact_next_action_names_the_lock_call(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        result = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertIn("gitea_lock_issue", result["exact_next_action"])
+
+
+class TestFailsClosed(_PublishBase):
+    """AC20/AC9 — each refusal reason, exercised independently."""
+
+    def test_changed_local_head_refuses(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        stale = self.base_sha  # a real commit, but not the declared head
+        result = self.run_publish(expected_head=stale)
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("local commit changed" in r for r in result["reasons"]),
+            result["reasons"],
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head(), "refusal must not publish")
+
+    def test_abbreviated_sha_refuses(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        result = self.run_publish(expected_head=self.head_sha[:8])
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("40-character" in r for r in result["reasons"]), result["reasons"]
+        )
+
+    def test_dirty_tracked_worktree_refuses(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        with open(os.path.join(self.repo, "work.txt"), "a") as fh:
+            fh.write("uncommitted edit\n")
+
+        result = self.run_publish()
+
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("dirty tracked files" in r for r in result["reasons"]),
+            result["reasons"],
+        )
+        self.assertIn("work.txt", result["evidence"]["dirty_tracked_files"])
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head())
+
+    def test_untracked_file_refuses(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        with open(os.path.join(self.repo, "stray.txt"), "w") as fh:
+            fh.write("not committed\n")
+
+        result = self.run_publish()
+
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("untracked files" in r for r in result["reasons"]), result["reasons"]
+        )
+        self.assertIn("stray.txt", result["evidence"]["untracked_files"])
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head())
+
+    def test_unexpected_remote_head_refuses(self):
+        """A remote head that is not an ancestor must never be overwritten."""
+        self.write_lock()
+        # Publish a divergent commit to the branch from a separate line.
+        self._git("checkout", "-q", "-b", "divergent", self.base_sha)
+        with open(os.path.join(self.repo, "other.txt"), "w") as fh:
+            fh.write("someone else's work\n")
+        self._git("add", "other.txt")
+        self._git("commit", "-q", "-m", "divergent")
+        divergent = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD").stdout.strip()
+        self._git("push", "-q", GIT_REMOTE, f"{divergent}:refs/heads/{BRANCH}")
+        self._git("checkout", "-q", BRANCH)
+
+        result = self.run_publish()
+
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("not an ancestor" in r for r in result["reasons"]), result["reasons"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.remote_head(), divergent, "the other head must survive intact"
+        )
+
+    def test_fast_forward_remote_head_is_allowed(self):
+        """An ancestor head is an honest fast-forward, not a conflict."""
+        self.write_lock()
+        self._git("push", "-q", GIT_REMOTE, f"{self.base_sha}:refs/heads/{BRANCH}")
+
+        result = self.run_publish()
+
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"], result.get("reasons"))
+        self.assertTrue(result["evidence"]["fast_forward_from_remote"])
+        self.assertEqual(self.remote_head(), self.head_sha)
+
+    def test_content_hash_mismatch_refuses(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        wrong = {"work.txt": "0" * 64}
+
+        result = self.run_publish(expected_file_hashes=wrong)
+
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("declared content hashes" in r for r in result["reasons"]),
+            result["reasons"],
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["evidence"]["file_hashes_verified"])
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head())
+
+    def test_matching_content_hashes_publish(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        digests = branch_publish.hash_worktree_files(self.worktree, ["work.txt"])
+
+        result = self.run_publish(expected_file_hashes=digests)
+
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"], result.get("reasons"))
+        self.assertTrue(result["evidence"]["file_hashes_verified"])
+
+    def test_missing_declared_file_refuses(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        result = self.run_publish(expected_file_hashes={"absent.txt": "0" * 64})
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("missing or unreadable" in r for r in result["reasons"]),
+            result["reasons"],
+        )
+
+    def test_foreign_claimant_refuses(self):
+        """Ownership comes from the durable record, not from the caller."""
+        self.write_lock(claimant={"username": "someone-else", "profile": PROFILE})
+
+        result = self.run_publish()
+
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("foreign claim" in r for r in result["reasons"]), result["reasons"]
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head())
+
+    def test_foreign_profile_refuses(self):
+        self.write_lock(
+            claimant={"username": IDENTITY, "profile": "test-reviewer-prgs"}
+        )
+        result = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("claimant profile" in r for r in result["reasons"]), result["reasons"]
+        )
+
+    def test_absent_lock_record_refuses(self):
+        """No recorded claim means this cannot be used to bypass the lock."""
+        result = self.run_publish()  # no write_lock()
+
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("no durable issue-lock record" in r for r in result["reasons"]),
+            result["reasons"],
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head())
+
+    def test_branch_mismatch_against_lock_refuses(self):
+        self.write_lock(branch_name=f"feat/issue-{ISSUE}-different")
+        result = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("records branch" in r for r in result["reasons"]), result["reasons"]
+        )
+
+    def test_worktree_mismatch_against_lock_refuses(self):
+        self.write_lock(worktree_path="/tmp/some/other/worktree")
+        result = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("records worktree" in r for r in result["reasons"]), result["reasons"]
+        )
+
+    def test_competing_open_pr_on_another_branch_refuses(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        competing = [{"number": 4242, "head": {"ref": f"fix/issue-{ISSUE}-rival"}}]
+
+        result = self.run_publish(open_prs=competing)
+
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("already claim issue" in r for r in result["reasons"]),
+            result["reasons"],
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head())
+
+    def test_open_pr_on_the_same_branch_is_not_competing(self):
+        """This branch's own PR is not a rival claim against itself."""
+        self.write_lock()
+        own = [{"number": 77, "head": {"ref": BRANCH}}]
+
+        result = self.run_publish(open_prs=own)
+
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"], result.get("reasons"))
+
+
+class TestGuardStrictnessPreserved(_PublishBase):
+    """AC15 — publication is an operation, never a weakening of the guards."""
+
+    def test_non_issue_branch_refuses(self):
+        self._git("checkout", "-q", "-b", "scratch/not-issue-linked")
+        self.write_lock(branch_name="scratch/not-issue-linked")
+
+        result = self.run_publish(branch_name="scratch/not-issue-linked")
+
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("issue-linked" in r for r in result["reasons"]), result["reasons"]
+        )
+
+    def test_stable_branch_refuses(self):
+        self.write_lock(branch_name="master")
+        result = self.run_publish(branch_name="master")
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("issue-linked" in r or "stable branch" in r for r in result["reasons"]),
+            result["reasons"],
+        )
+
+    def test_branch_number_must_match_the_issue(self):
+        other = "feat/issue-7777-mismatched"
+        self._git("checkout", "-q", "-b", other)
+        self.write_lock(branch_name=other)
+        result = self.run_publish(branch_name=other)
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("does not carry issue number" in r for r in result["reasons"]),
+            result["reasons"],
+        )
+
+    def test_unregistered_worktree_refuses(self):
+        """#713 — an improvised directory is not a registered worktree."""
+        path = self.write_lock()
+        assessment = branch_publish.assess_unpublished_commit_publication(
+            issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(path),
+            issue_number=ISSUE, branch_name=BRANCH, worktree_path=self.worktree,
+            expected_head=self.head_sha, remote="prgs", org=ORG, repo=REPO,
+            identity=IDENTITY, profile=PROFILE,
+            worktree_state={
+                "current_branch": BRANCH, "porcelain_status": "",
+                "head_sha": self.head_sha,
+            },
+            worktree_registered=False,
+            remote_probe={"probe_ok": True, "remote_branch_exists": False},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(assessment["outcome"], branch_publish.REFUSED)
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("not listed in git worktree list" in r
+                for r in assessment["reasons"]),
+            assessment["reasons"],
+        )
+
+    def test_unobservable_remote_refuses(self):
+        """An unknown remote state must not be mistaken for an absent branch."""
+        self.write_lock()
+        result = self.run_publish(git_remote_name="no-such-remote")
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("could not be observed" in r for r in result["reasons"]),
+            result["reasons"],
+        )
+
+
+class TestRecordSeparation(_PublishBase):
+    """AC23 — the durable issue lock and the workflow lease are distinct."""
+
+    def test_publication_leaves_the_issue_lock_byte_identical(self):
+        path = self.write_lock()
+        with open(path, "rb") as fh:
+            before = fh.read()
+
+        result = self.run_publish()
+
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"], result.get("reasons"))
+        with open(path, "rb") as fh:
+            after = fh.read()
+        self.assertEqual(before, after, "publication must not mutate the lock record")
+        self.assertFalse(result["issue_lock_record_mutated"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["workflow_lease_touched"])
+
+    def test_refusal_also_reports_untouched_records(self):
+        result = self.run_publish()  # refuses: no lock record
+        self.assertFalse(result["issue_lock_record_mutated"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["workflow_lease_touched"])
+
+    def test_lock_generation_is_not_advanced(self):
+        path = self.write_lock()
+        self.run_publish()
+        lock = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(path)
+        self.assertEqual(lock["lock_generation"], 1)
+
+
+class TestTruthfulProcessEvidence(_PublishBase):
+    """AC24 — a live daemon pid is never represented as a dead process."""
+
+    def test_live_recorded_pid_does_not_block_publication(self):
+        # The recorded pid is this live process, standing in for the live MCP
+        # daemon. Reclaim would refuse here; publication legitimately does not.
+        path = self.write_lock(session_pid=os.getpid())
+        lock = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(path)
+        self.assertEqual(lock["pid"], os.getpid())
+
+        result = self.run_publish()
+
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"], result.get("reasons"))
+        self.assertEqual(self.remote_head(), self.head_sha)
+
+    def test_liveness_is_not_consulted_as_evidence(self):
+        self.write_lock(session_pid=os.getpid())
+        result = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertFalse(result["evidence"]["owner_pid_liveness_consulted"])
+
+    def test_reclaim_still_refuses_for_the_same_live_pid(self):
+        """Publication does not soften the reclaim predicate it routes around."""
+        path = self.write_lock(session_pid=os.getpid())
+        lock = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(path)
+        reclaim = issue_lock_store.assess_expired_lock_reclaim(lock)
+        self.assertFalse(reclaim["reclaim_allowed"])
+
+
+class TestIdempotentRetry(_PublishBase):
+    """AC20 — retry is safe and read-after-write is proven every time."""
+
+    def test_second_publication_reports_already_published(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        first = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertTrue(first["performed"])
+
+        second = self.run_publish()
+
+        self.assertTrue(second["success"], second.get("reasons"))
+        self.assertFalse(second["performed"], "no second push is needed")
+        self.assertTrue(second["published"])
+        self.assertTrue(second["verified"])
+        self.assertEqual(second["outcome"], branch_publish.ALREADY_PUBLISHED)
+        self.assertEqual(self.remote_head(), self.head_sha)
+
+
+class TestDryRun(_PublishBase):
+    """AC12 — dry run reports the decision and mutates nothing."""
+
+    def test_dry_run_reports_intent_without_publishing(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+
+        result = self.run_publish(dry_run=True)
+
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["dry_run"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["would_publish"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["performed"])
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head(), "dry run must not publish")
+
+    def test_dry_run_and_apply_agree_on_a_refusal(self):
+        """AC11 — the reported decision does not depend on which mode ran."""
+        self.write_lock(claimant={"username": "someone-else", "profile": PROFILE})
+
+        dry = self.run_publish(dry_run=True)
+        applied = self.run_publish()
+
+        self.assertFalse(dry["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(applied["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(dry["reasons"], applied["reasons"])
+
+
+class TestRenewalUnblocked(_PublishBase):
+    """AC20/AC21 — renewal is permitted only after verified publication."""
+
+    def _renewal(self, remote_head):
+        return issue_lock_renewal.assess_exact_owner_lease_renewal(
+            issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(self.lock_path()),
+            issue_number=ISSUE, branch_name=BRANCH, worktree_path=self.worktree,
+            remote="prgs", org=ORG, repo=REPO,
+            identity=IDENTITY, profile=PROFILE,
+            current_branch=BRANCH, porcelain_status="", worktree_exists=True,
+            head_sha=self.head_sha, remote_head_sha=remote_head,
+        )
+
+    def test_renewal_refuses_before_publication(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        decision = self._renewal(None)
+        self.assertFalse(decision["renewal_sanctioned"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("unpublished branch" in r for r in decision["reasons"]),
+            decision["reasons"],
+        )
+
+    def test_renewal_is_sanctioned_after_publication(self):
+        self.write_lock()
+        result = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertTrue(result["verified"], result.get("reasons"))
+
+        decision = self._renewal(self.remote_head())
+
+        self.assertTrue(decision["renewal_sanctioned"], decision["reasons"])
+
+
+class TestProtectedAssetUntouched(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC17 — no test or fixture may reference the protected worktree."""
+
+    def test_no_reference_to_the_protected_worktree(self):
+        here = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
+        root = os.path.dirname(here)
+        needle = "issue-635-project-registry" + "-api"
+        for path in (
+            os.path.join(here, "test_issue_812_publish_unpublished_commit.py"),
+            os.path.join(root, "branch_publish.py"),
+        ):
+            with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+                body = fh.read()
+            self.assertNotIn(needle, body)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_815_preflight_worktree_forwarding.py

@@ -0,0 +1,622 @@
+"""Publication preflight must receive the caller's worktree (#815).
+
+``gitea_publish_unpublished_issue_branch`` takes a **required** ``worktree_path``
+but resolved it only *after* ``verify_preflight_purity`` had already run. Every
+workspace-resolution layer behind that preflight — canonical root, root checkout,
+create-issue bootstrap, the #618 branches-only guard, issue scope, and anti-stomp
+— therefore received ``None`` and fell back to the MCP process root. A daemon
+rooted at the stable control checkout refused a valid registered issue worktree
+that the caller had explicitly supplied, before the publication assessor ever ran.
+
+The #812 suite could not see this. Its fixture sets ``self.worktree =
+os.path.realpath(self.repo)`` and patches ``PROJECT_ROOT`` to that same path, so
+the fallback resolved to the very worktree the argument named. The production
+topology — control checkout on a stable branch, issue worktree somewhere else —
+was never constructed, and preflight additionally no-ops under pytest unless
+production guards are forced on.
+
+These tests build that topology honestly:
+
+* ``PROJECT_ROOT`` is a control checkout sitting on ``master``;
+* the registered issue worktree is a genuinely separate path under ``branches/``;
+* ``GITEA_TEST_FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS`` is set so the #618 guard really runs;
+* no patch makes the issue worktree appear to be ``PROJECT_ROOT``.
+
+Nothing here reads, writes, or references the protected worktree named in #812
+AC17 and #815 AC9. Every fixture is built from scratch against a local bare
+remote, so publication and read-after-write verification genuinely execute.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+
+import issue_lock_provenance  # noqa: E402
+import issue_lock_store  # noqa: E402
+import mcp_server  # noqa: E402
+from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: E402
+
+ISSUE = 9815
+BRANCH = f"feat/issue-{ISSUE}-forwarding-fixture"
+WORKTREE_DIRNAME = BRANCH.replace("/", "-")
+IDENTITY = "example-user"
+PROFILE = "test-author-prgs"
+ORG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
+REPO = "Gitea-Tools"
+GIT_REMOTE = "prgs"
+
+AUTHOR_PROFILE = {
+    "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+    "role": "author",
+    "allowed_operations": [
+        "gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create", "gitea.issue.comment",
+        "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.repo.commit", "gitea.branch.push",
+    ],
+    "forbidden_operations": [],
+    "audit_label": "prgs-author",
+}
+
+
+def _ts(hours: int) -> str:
+    return (
+        (datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=hours))
+        .isoformat()
+        .replace("+00:00", "Z")
+    )
+
+
+class TestPreflightReceivesTheWorktree(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC1 — the supplied path reaches ``verify_preflight_purity`` itself.
+
+    Follows the #735 capture pattern: replace preflight with a recorder that
+    raises, so the argument can be proven forwarded without performing the
+    mutation. This is the direct unit-level statement of the defect.
+    """
+
+    def _capture_preflight(self, **kwargs):
+        captured: dict = {}
+
+        def _capture(*a, **kw):
+            captured.update(kw)
+            captured["_args"] = a
+            raise RuntimeError("capture-only")
+
+        with patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "verify_preflight_purity", side_effect=_capture
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=AUTHOR_PROFILE
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "_resolve",
+            return_value=("gitea.prgs.cc", ORG, REPO),
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "_auth", return_value="token fake",
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server.role_session_router,
+            "check_author_mutation_after_reviewer_stop",
+            return_value=(True, []),
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "_namespace_mutation_block", return_value=None
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "_profile_permission_block", return_value=None
+        ):
+            try:
+                mcp_server.gitea_publish_unpublished_issue_branch(**kwargs)
+            except RuntimeError as exc:
+                if "capture-only" not in str(exc) and not captured:
+                    raise
+        self.assertTrue(
+            captured,
+            "gitea_publish_unpublished_issue_branch never called "
+            "verify_preflight_purity",
+        )
+        return captured
+
+    def _base_kwargs(self, **overrides):
+        kwargs = {
+            "issue_number": ISSUE,
+            "branch_name": BRANCH,
+            "worktree_path": "/tmp/issue-815-explicit-worktree",
+            "expected_head": "a" * 40,
+            "remote": "prgs",
+            "org": ORG,
+            "repo": REPO,
+            "git_remote_name": GIT_REMOTE,
+        }
+        kwargs.update(overrides)
+        return kwargs
+
+    def test_explicit_worktree_path_reaches_preflight(self):
+        captured = self._capture_preflight(**self._base_kwargs())
+        self.assertEqual(
+            captured.get("worktree_path"),
+            os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath("/tmp/issue-815-explicit-worktree")),
+            "the authoritative worktree_path must be forwarded into preflight",
+        )
+
+    def test_forwarded_path_is_the_one_publication_uses(self):
+        """AC4 — preflight and publication must judge the same resolved path."""
+        raw = "/tmp/issue-815-explicit-worktree/./"
+        captured = self._capture_preflight(**self._base_kwargs(worktree_path=raw))
+        expected = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(raw.strip()))
+        self.assertEqual(captured.get("worktree_path"), expected)
+
+    def test_blank_worktree_path_forwards_none(self):
+        """AC5/AC8 — nothing usable supplied keeps the fail-closed fallback."""
+        for blank in ("", "   "):
+            with self.subTest(blank=repr(blank)):
+                captured = self._capture_preflight(
+                    **self._base_kwargs(worktree_path=blank)
+                )
+                self.assertIsNone(
+                    captured.get("worktree_path"),
+                    "a blank worktree must not resolve to the process cwd",
+                )
+
+    def test_org_repo_and_task_forwarding_are_not_regressed(self):
+        """AC6 — #735's org/repo forwarding and the task name still hold."""
+        captured = self._capture_preflight(**self._base_kwargs())
+        self.assertEqual(captured.get("org"), ORG)
+        self.assertEqual(captured.get("repo"), REPO)
+        self.assertEqual(captured.get("task"), "publish_unpublished_branch")
+
+
+class _ProductionTopologyBase(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Control checkout on master + a distinct registered issue worktree.
+
+    This is the shape the production daemon runs in and the shape the #812
+    fixture never built. ``PROJECT_ROOT`` is the control checkout; the issue
+    worktree is a real registered worktree at a different path; production
+    guards are forced on so the #618 branches-only guard genuinely evaluates.
+    """
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.lock_dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.addCleanup(self.lock_dir.cleanup)
+        self.origin = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="issue815-origin-")
+        self.control = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="issue815-control-")
+        for path in (self.origin, self.control):
+            self.addCleanup(
+                lambda p=path: subprocess.run(["rm", "-rf", p], check=False)
+            )
+        self._init_repos()
+        self.remotes = patch.dict(
+            mcp_server.REMOTES,
+            {"prgs": {"host": "gitea.prgs.cc", "org": ORG, "repo": REPO}},
+        )
+        self.remotes.start()
+        self.addCleanup(patch.stopall)
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+
+    def _git(self, *args, cwd=None):
+        return subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", cwd or self.control, *args],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, check=True,
+        )
+
+    def _init_repos(self):
+        subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "init", "-q", "--bare", "-b", "master", self.origin], check=True
+        )
+        self._git("init", "-q", "-b", "master")
+        self._git("config", "user.email", "[email protected]")
+        self._git("config", "user.name", "Test")
+        self._git("remote", "add", GIT_REMOTE, self.origin)
+
+        with open(os.path.join(self.control, "seed.txt"), "w") as fh:
+            fh.write("seed\n")
+        # The real repository gitignores branches/, so a registered worktree
+        # living there does not dirty the stable control checkout. Mirror that,
+        # or the #615 dirty-runtime block fires on the worktree we just created.
+        with open(os.path.join(self.control, ".gitignore"), "w") as fh:
+            fh.write("branches/\n")
+        self._git("add", "seed.txt", ".gitignore")
+        self._git("commit", "-q", "-m", "seed")
+        self.base_sha = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD").stdout.strip()
+        self._git("push", "-q", GIT_REMOTE, "master")
+
+        # The control checkout STAYS on master. This is the whole point: the
+        # daemon's process root is the stable control checkout, never the
+        # worktree the publication targets.
+        self.worktree = os.path.realpath(
+            os.path.join(self.control, "branches", WORKTREE_DIRNAME)
+        )
+        self._git("worktree", "add", "-q", "-b", BRANCH, self.worktree, "master")
+
+        with open(os.path.join(self.worktree, "work.txt"), "w") as fh:
+            fh.write("unpublished implementation\n")
+        self._git("add", "work.txt", cwd=self.worktree)
+        self._git("commit", "-q", "-m", "unpublished implementation", cwd=self.worktree)
+        self.head_sha = self._git("rev-parse", "HEAD", cwd=self.worktree).stdout.strip()
+
+        self.control_branch = self._git(
+            "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"
+        ).stdout.strip()
+
+    # ── durable lock naming the caller and the issue worktree ────────────
+    def lock_path(self):
+        return issue_lock_store.lock_file_path(
+            remote="prgs", org=ORG, repo=REPO, issue_number=ISSUE,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir.name,
+        )
+
+    def write_lock(self, *, bind_session=True, **overrides):
+        path = self.lock_path()
+        claimant = overrides.pop(
+            "claimant", {"username": IDENTITY, "profile": PROFILE}
+        )
+        pid = overrides.pop("session_pid", os.getpid())
+        lease = {
+            "operation_type": issue_lock_store.AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE,
+            "issue_number": ISSUE,
+            "pr_number": None,
+            "branch": overrides.get("branch_name", BRANCH),
+            "worktree_path": overrides.get("worktree_path", self.worktree),
+            "claimant": claimant,
+            "created_at": _ts(-2),
+            "last_heartbeat_at": _ts(-2),
+            "expires_at": _ts(-1),
+        }
+        lease.update(overrides.pop("work_lease", {}))
+        data = {
+            "issue_number": ISSUE,
+            "branch_name": BRANCH,
+            "remote": "prgs",
+            "org": ORG,
+            "repo": REPO,
+            "worktree_path": self.worktree,
+            "session_pid": pid,
+            "pid": pid,
+            "lock_generation": 1,
+            "work_lease": lease,
+            "lock_provenance": issue_lock_provenance.build_sanctioned_lock_provenance(
+                tool="gitea_lock_issue", claimant=claimant
+            ),
+        }
+        data.update(overrides)
+        data["lock_file_path"] = path
+        issue_lock_store.save_lock_file(path, data)
+        # Bind the session pointer so the #683 issue-scope guard resolves an
+        # owning issue for this author session. In real production the publish
+        # task does not require a session lock — require_author_lock is keyed on
+        # the test-only production_guards_forced() flag, which this suite must
+        # set to make preflight run at all — so this pointer is fixture
+        # scaffolding to clear a guard production would not apply here, never a
+        # softening of the worktree-forwarding behaviour under test. The
+        # preflight-negative cases below leave it unbound precisely so the #618
+        # guard is reached with no session fallback to rescue a bad worktree.
+        if bind_session:
+            pointer = {
+                "pid": os.getpid(),
+                "lock_file_path": path,
+                "issue_number": ISSUE,
+                "branch_name": data["branch_name"],
+                "remote": "prgs",
+                "org": ORG,
+                "repo": REPO,
+            }
+            issue_lock_store.save_lock_file(
+                issue_lock_store.session_pointer_path(self.lock_dir.name), pointer
+            )
+        return path
+
+    def _tool_env(self):
+        env = shared_mutation_env(
+            PROFILE, include_example_repo=True,
+            GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR=self.lock_dir.name,
+        )
+        env["GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR"] = self.lock_dir.name
+        # The defect only exists where preflight actually runs. Under pytest the
+        # production root/branches/scope guards are skipped unless forced on, so
+        # force them: this test exists to exercise the #618 guard, not to bypass
+        # it. Parity is pinned to the server's own startup head so repointing
+        # PROJECT_ROOT does not read as a stale daemon.
+        env["GITEA_TEST_FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS"] = "1"
+        # Production is a promoted stable-control runtime. The pytest process
+        # itself runs from a branches/ worktree, which the #615 runtime-mode
+        # gate correctly classifies as dev-test; declaring the sanctioned mode
+        # models the production daemon rather than defeating the gate. Without
+        # this, forcing production guards on would trip the *runtime-mode* block
+        # for a reason unrelated to the #815 worktree-forwarding defect.
+        env["GITEA_MCP_RUNTIME_MODE"] = "stable-control"
+        startup_head = mcp_server._STARTUP_PARITY.get("startup_head") or ""
+        env["GITEA_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD"] = startup_head
+        env["GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD"] = startup_head
+        return env
+
+    def run_publish(self, *, open_prs=None, expected_head=None, **kwargs):
+        """Drive the public tool with PROJECT_ROOT pinned to the CONTROL checkout."""
+        env = self._tool_env()
+        with patch(
+            "mcp_server._list_open_pulls", return_value=list(open_prs or [])
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server._auth", return_value="token x"
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token x"
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server._work_lease_claimant",
+            return_value={"username": IDENTITY, "profile": PROFILE},
+        ), patch.object(
+            # NOTE: the control checkout — deliberately NOT self.worktree.
+            mcp_server, "PROJECT_ROOT", self.control
+        ), patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            os.environ["GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR"] = self.lock_dir.name
+            return mcp_server.gitea_publish_unpublished_issue_branch(
+                issue_number=kwargs.pop("issue_number", ISSUE),
+                branch_name=kwargs.pop("branch_name", BRANCH),
+                worktree_path=kwargs.pop("worktree_path", self.worktree),
+                expected_head=expected_head or self.head_sha,
+                remote="prgs",
+                git_remote_name=kwargs.pop("git_remote_name", GIT_REMOTE),
+                **kwargs,
+            )
+
+    def remote_head(self, branch=BRANCH):
+        res = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", self.origin, "rev-parse", "--verify", "--quiet", branch],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
+        )
+        return (res.stdout or "").strip() or None
+
+
+class TestForwardingClearsThe618Guard(_ProductionTopologyBase):
+    """AC2 — the faithful production reproduction, and the sharpest fix proof.
+
+    The production recovery worker had **no** session issue lock — acquiring one
+    was the very thing the deadlock prevented — so preflight had nothing but the
+    explicit ``worktree_path`` argument to resolve the workspace from. This class
+    reproduces exactly that: no session pointer is bound, so there is no
+    author-lock fallback to rescue a dropped argument.
+
+    With the argument forwarded (fixed source) the #618 branches-only guard
+    accepts the registered issue worktree and the call advances to the next
+    guard. With the argument dropped (the buggy source this issue reports)
+    preflight falls back to ``PROJECT_ROOT`` — the stable control checkout — and
+    the #618 guard traps the call there. The two outcomes are told apart by the
+    guard that fired, on its own error text.
+
+    This test therefore *fails* against the unpatched source (the call is trapped
+    at #618 instead of clearing it), which is what makes it a regression rather
+    than a smoke test.
+    """
+
+    _CONTROL_CHECKOUT_MARKERS = ("stable control checkout", "#618")
+
+    def test_explicit_worktree_clears_618_without_a_session_lock(self):
+        # No write_lock(): the session is deliberately unbound, as in production.
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+            self.run_publish()
+        message = str(ctx.exception)
+        # The workspace guard is satisfied — the failure is the *later* scope
+        # guard (no owning issue), never the control-checkout refusal. If the
+        # argument were dropped, this call would be trapped at #618 instead.
+        for marker in self._CONTROL_CHECKOUT_MARKERS:
+            self.assertNotIn(
+                marker, message,
+                f"the explicit worktree must clear #618; got a control-checkout "
+                f"refusal instead: {message}",
+            )
+        self.assertIn(
+            "owning issue", message,
+            f"expected the downstream scope guard to fire, got: {message}",
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head())
+
+    def test_dropped_argument_would_be_trapped_at_618(self):
+        # Simulate the buggy call shape directly: no session lock, and preflight
+        # given no worktree, exactly as the unpatched source left it. This pins
+        # the control-checkout refusal that the fix eliminates, so the pair of
+        # tests brackets the defect from both sides regardless of which source
+        # version is loaded.
+        env = self._tool_env()
+        with patch(
+            "mcp_server._list_open_pulls", return_value=[]
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server._auth", return_value="token x"
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token x"
+        ), patch(
+            "mcp_server._work_lease_claimant",
+            return_value={"username": IDENTITY, "profile": PROFILE},
+        ), patch.object(
+            mcp_server, "PROJECT_ROOT", self.control
+        ), patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            os.environ["GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR"] = self.lock_dir.name
+            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+                # Drive verify_preflight_purity the way the buggy body did:
+                # no worktree_path forwarded at all.
+                mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(
+                    "prgs",
+                    task="publish_unpublished_branch",
+                    org=ORG,
+                    repo=REPO,
+                )
+        message = str(ctx.exception)
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any(m in message for m in self._CONTROL_CHECKOUT_MARKERS),
+            f"a dropped worktree must trap at the control checkout: {message}",
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head())
+
+
+class TestProductionTopologyPublishes(_ProductionTopologyBase):
+    """AC2/AC4/AC7 — the explicit registered worktree is what preflight validates."""
+
+    def test_fixture_is_genuinely_the_production_topology(self):
+        """Guard the guard: if this drifts, the regression stops meaning anything."""
+        self.assertNotEqual(
+            os.path.realpath(self.control), self.worktree,
+            "the issue worktree must not be PROJECT_ROOT",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.control_branch, "master",
+            "the control checkout must sit on a stable branch",
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(
+            os.path.realpath(self.worktree).startswith(
+                os.path.realpath(os.path.join(self.control, "branches")) + os.sep
+            ),
+            "the issue worktree must live under branches/",
+        )
+        listed = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", self.control, "worktree", "list"],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, check=True,
+        ).stdout
+        self.assertIn(
+            self.worktree, listed, "the issue worktree must be genuinely registered"
+        )
+
+    def test_publishes_from_a_control_rooted_daemon(self):
+        """The exact production failure: this refused with #618 before the fix."""
+        self.write_lock()
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head(), "fixture must start unpublished")
+        res = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertTrue(res.get("success"), res)
+        self.assertTrue(res.get("performed"), res)
+        self.assertEqual(self.remote_head(), self.head_sha)
+
+    def test_dry_run_uses_the_explicit_worktree(self):
+        """AC4 — dry-run reaches the same decision without publishing."""
+        self.write_lock()
+        res = self.run_publish(dry_run=True)
+        self.assertTrue(res.get("success"), res)
+        self.assertFalse(res.get("performed"), res)
+        self.assertTrue(res.get("would_publish"), res)
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head(), "dry-run must not publish")
+
+    def test_dry_run_and_apply_agree_on_the_same_worktree(self):
+        """AC4 — both paths resolve the same workspace, so both succeed."""
+        self.write_lock()
+        dry = self.run_publish(dry_run=True)
+        self.assertTrue(dry.get("would_publish"), dry)
+        applied = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertTrue(applied.get("performed"), applied)
+        self.assertEqual(self.remote_head(), self.head_sha)
+
+    def test_read_after_write_verification_still_runs(self):
+        """AC6 — PR #814's post-publication verification is unchanged."""
+        self.write_lock()
+        res = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertTrue(res.get("verified"), res)
+        self.assertEqual(res.get("remote_head_sha"), self.head_sha)
+
+
+class TestProductionTopologyFailsClosed(_ProductionTopologyBase):
+    """AC3/AC5/AC8 — the fix does not weaken any refusal.
+
+    A refusal reaches the caller by one of two mechanisms, and this class holds
+    them apart deliberately. A bad *workspace* is caught by the #618 preflight
+    guard, which raises before the assessor is built. A bad *content/ownership*
+    fact passes preflight (the worktree itself is fine) and is then refused by
+    the publication assessor, which returns ``success: False``. Both are
+    fail-closed; asserting the wrong mechanism would hide a regression.
+    """
+
+    # ── #618 preflight refusals: no session lock, so nothing rescues a bad
+    #    workspace and the guard fires exactly as it does in production ──────
+    def _assert_preflight_raises(self, **kwargs):
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+            self.run_publish(**kwargs)
+        self.assertIsNone(
+            self.remote_head(), "a blocked publication must not reach the remote"
+        )
+        return str(ctx.exception)
+
+    def test_blank_worktree_path_fails_closed_via_618(self):
+        """AC5 — a blank path forwards None, so preflight sees the control root."""
+        for blank in ("", "   "):
+            with self.subTest(blank=repr(blank)):
+                message = self._assert_preflight_raises(worktree_path=blank)
+                self.assertIn("618", message)
+
+    def test_control_checkout_as_worktree_fails_closed_via_618(self):
+        """AC5 — naming the stable control checkout explicitly is still refused."""
+        message = self._assert_preflight_raises(worktree_path=self.control)
+        self.assertIn("618", message)
+
+    def test_unregistered_directory_fails_closed(self):
+        """AC3 — a plain directory under branches/ is not a registered worktree."""
+        bogus = os.path.join(self.control, "branches", "not-a-worktree")
+        os.makedirs(bogus, exist_ok=True)
+        self._assert_preflight_raises(worktree_path=bogus)
+
+    def test_missing_worktree_path_fails_closed(self):
+        """AC3 — a path that does not exist is refused, not silently replaced."""
+        missing = os.path.join(self.control, "branches", "absent-worktree")
+        self._assert_preflight_raises(worktree_path=missing)
+
+    # ── assessor refusals: preflight passes on a valid worktree, then the
+    #    publication assessor refuses on content/ownership evidence ──────────
+    def _assert_assessor_refuses(self, **kwargs):
+        res = self.run_publish(**kwargs)
+        self.assertFalse(res.get("success"), res)
+        self.assertFalse(res.get("performed"), res)
+        self.assertIsNone(self.remote_head())
+        return res
+
+    def test_changed_local_head_still_refuses(self):
+        """AC6 — the declared expected_head remains authoritative."""
+        self.write_lock()
+        self._assert_assessor_refuses(expected_head="b" * 40)
+
+    def test_foreign_claimant_still_refuses(self):
+        """AC6 — ownership still comes from the durable lock record."""
+        self.write_lock(claimant={"username": "someone-else", "profile": PROFILE})
+        self._assert_assessor_refuses()
+
+    def test_dirty_worktree_still_refuses(self):
+        """AC6 — cleanliness enforcement survives the forwarding change."""
+        self.write_lock()
+        with open(os.path.join(self.worktree, "work.txt"), "a") as fh:
+            fh.write("uncommitted drift\n")
+        self._assert_assessor_refuses()
+
+    def test_competing_open_pr_still_refuses(self):
+        """AC6 — a rival claim on another branch still blocks."""
+        self.write_lock()
+        self._assert_assessor_refuses(
+            open_prs=[{"number": 4242, "head": {"ref": f"fix/issue-{ISSUE}-rival"}}]
+        )
+
+    def test_issue_lock_record_is_not_mutated_by_a_refusal(self):
+        """AC6 — record separation (#812 AC23) is unaffected by this change."""
+        path = self.write_lock()
+        with open(path, "rb") as fh:
+            before = fh.read()
+        self._assert_assessor_refuses(expected_head="c" * 40)
+        with open(path, "rb") as fh:
+            self.assertEqual(before, fh.read())
+
+
+class TestProtectedFixtureNotReferenced(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC9 — this regression never names the protected #635 fixture.
+
+    The forbidden tokens are reconstructed from fragments so this assertion
+    file does not itself contain them and produce a false positive.
+    """
+
+    def test_no_reference_to_the_protected_worktree(self):
+        forbidden = [
+            "issue-635-" + "project-registry-api",
+            "b2f6e9a6dc40e9651ef8" + "76f322dd0a68bddebfd8",
+        ]
+        here = os.path.abspath(__file__)
+        with open(here, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            text = fh.read()
+        for token in forbidden:
+            self.assertNotIn(
+                token, text,
+                f"the protected #635 fixture must not be referenced: {token}",
+            )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_pr_work_lease.py

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from pr_work_lease import (  # noqa: E402
     assess_reviewer_mutation_blocked,
     assess_reviewer_stale_head_final_report,
     format_conflict_fix_lease_body,
+    find_active_conflict_fix_lease,
     parse_conflict_fix_lease_comment,
     parse_reviewer_lease_comment,
 )
@@ -203,5 +204,157 @@ class TestFormatLease(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(parsed["pr_number"], 376)
 
 
+class TestConflictFixLeaseLifecycle(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_claim_followed_by_matching_release(self):
+        claim_body = _conflict_fix_body(phase="claimed", worktree="branches/fix-376")
+        expires = (NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+        release_body = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "branch: feat/fix-376",
+            "worktree: branches/fix-376",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+            "phase: released",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
+            f"head_after: {HEAD_B}",
+            f"expires_at: {expires}",
+        ])
+        comments = [{"body": claim_body}, {"body": release_body}]
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
+        self.assertIsNone(lease)
+
+    def test_expired_claim_without_release(self):
+        past_expires = (NOW - timedelta(minutes=10)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+        claim_body = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "phase: claimed",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
+            f"expires_at: {past_expires}",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+        ])
+        comments = [{"body": claim_body}]
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
+        self.assertIsNone(lease)
+
+    def test_mismatched_release_different_head(self):
+        claim_body = _conflict_fix_body(phase="claimed", worktree="branches/fix-376")
+        expires = (NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+        release_body = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+            "phase: released",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_B}",
+            f"expires_at: {expires}",
+        ])
+        comments = [{"body": claim_body}, {"body": release_body}]
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(lease)
+        self.assertEqual(lease["phase"], "claimed")
+
+    def test_mismatched_release_different_branch(self):
+        claim_body = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "branch: feat/branch-A",
+            "phase: claimed",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
+            f"expires_at: {(NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace('+00:00', 'Z')}",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+        ])
+        release_body = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "branch: feat/branch-B",
+            "phase: released",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
+            f"expires_at: {(NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace('+00:00', 'Z')}",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+        ])
+        comments = [{"body": claim_body}, {"body": release_body}]
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(lease)
+        self.assertEqual(lease["phase"], "claimed")
+
+    def test_release_followed_by_newer_claim(self):
+        claim_1 = _conflict_fix_body(phase="claimed", worktree="branches/fix-376")
+        expires = (NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+        release_1 = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+            "phase: released",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
+            f"head_after: {HEAD_B}",
+            f"expires_at: {expires}",
+        ])
+        claim_2 = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+            "phase: claimed",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_B}",
+            f"expires_at: {expires}",
+        ])
+        comments = [{"body": claim_1}, {"body": release_1}, {"body": claim_2}]
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(lease)
+        self.assertEqual(lease["head_before"], HEAD_B)
+
+    def test_malformed_or_ambiguous_markers(self):
+        malformed_release = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "phase: released",
+            # missing head_before and profile
+        ])
+        claim_body = _conflict_fix_body(phase="claimed")
+        comments = [{"body": claim_body}, {"body": malformed_release}]
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(lease)
+
+    def test_pr818_historical_sequence(self):
+        comment_14696 = "\n".join([
+            "<!-- mcp-conflict-fix-lease:v1 -->",
+            "pr: #818",
+            "branch: feat/issue-638-webui-app-shell-phase1",
+            "worktree: /Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/branches/issue-638-webui-app-shell-phase1",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+            "session_id: unknown",
+            "phase: claimed",
+            "head_before: 08061b7b8aebdd099a37d1abf5dafcf38e4fd3fb",
+            "expires_at: 2026-07-23T07:12:13Z",
+            "reviewer_active: no",
+        ])
+        comment_14730 = "\n".join([
+            "<!-- mcp-conflict-fix-lease:v1 -->",
+            "pr: #818",
+            "branch: feat/issue-638-webui-app-shell-phase1",
+            "worktree: /Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/branches/issue-638-webui-app-shell-phase1",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+            "session_id: prgs-author-61241-e5129c60",
+            "phase: released",
+            "head_before: 08061b7b8aebdd099a37d1abf5dafcf38e4fd3fb",
+            "head_after: 64b6eb5d5402663098de5ded3b0617cc3b3df98f",
+            "expires_at: 2026-07-23T06:05:00Z",
+            "reviewer_active: no",
+        ])
+        comments = [{"body": comment_14696}, {"body": comment_14730}]
+        check_now = datetime(2026, 7, 23, 6, 30, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=818, now=check_now)
+        self.assertIsNone(lease)
+        
+        reviewer_gate = assess_reviewer_mutation_blocked(
+            pr_number=818,
+            comments=comments,
+            reviewed_head_sha="64b6eb5d5402663098de5ded3b0617cc3b3df98f",
+            live_head_sha="64b6eb5d5402663098de5ded3b0617cc3b3df98f",
+            mutation="approve",
+            now=check_now,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(reviewer_gate["mutation_allowed"])
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/test_task_capability_role_invariants.py

@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ EXPECTED_ROLE_EXCLUSIVE_TASKS = frozenset(
         "gitea_release_merger_pr_lease",
         "create_branch",
         "push_branch",
+        # #812 AC20: publishing an unpublished local head is author-only for the
+        # same reason every other push is — it writes a branch to the remote.
+        "publish_unpublished_branch",
         "create_pr",
         "commit_files",
         "gitea_commit_files",

tests/test_webui_console_authz_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
+"""Console authorization, redaction, and audit model tests (#633).
+
+Covers each acceptance criterion and each required test named in the issue:
+
+* AC1 — RBAC matrix and privileged-action list.
+* AC2 — redaction rules, unit-tested against sample payloads.
+* AC3 — audit event schema with required fields and retention defaults.
+* AC4 — Phase 2 integration points.
+* AC5 — local-dev mode with explicit insecurity warnings.
+
+Required tests: redaction units (token, keychain, password patterns),
+default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs, and audit record creation for a
+simulated privileged preview.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime
+import json
+import os
+import pathlib
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
+
+from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP  # noqa: E402
+from webui import console_audit, console_authz  # noqa: E402
+from webui.app import create_app  # noqa: E402
+from webui.console_redaction import (  # noqa: E402
+    REDACTED,
+    redact_payload,
+    redact_text,
+    redaction_policy,
+    scan_for_secrets,
+)
+
+DOCS = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "docs"
+AUTHZ_DOC = DOCS / "webui-authz-audit.md"
+
+
+def _principal(role: str) -> console_authz.Principal:
+    return console_authz.Principal(
+        subject=f"{role}@example.com",
+        role=role,
+        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+        authenticated=True,
+    )
+
+
+class TestRoleMatrix(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC1 — the written RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
+
+    def test_roles_are_ordered_least_to_most_authority(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_authz.ROLE_ORDER,
+            ("viewer", "operator", "controller", "admin"),
+        )
+
+    def test_every_role_has_a_description(self):
+        for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
+            with self.subTest(role=role):
+                self.assertTrue(console_authz.ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role].strip())
+
+    def test_higher_roles_inherit_lower_role_actions(self):
+        matrix = {
+            entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
+            for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
+        }
+        for lower, higher in zip(
+            console_authz.ROLE_ORDER, console_authz.ROLE_ORDER[1:]
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(lower=lower, higher=higher):
+                self.assertTrue(matrix[lower].issubset(matrix[higher]))
+
+    def test_viewer_holds_no_write_action(self):
+        matrix = {
+            entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
+            for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
+        }
+        self.assertEqual(matrix["viewer"], set())
+
+    def test_privileged_action_list_is_non_empty_and_classified(self):
+        privileged = console_authz.privileged_actions()
+        self.assertTrue(privileged)
+        ids = {action.action_id for action in privileged}
+        # Merge and branch deletion are the canonical privileged pair.
+        self.assertIn("merge_pr", ids)
+        self.assertIn("delete_branch", ids)
+
+    def test_merge_and_delete_require_dual_control_and_break_glass(self):
+        for action_id in ("merge_pr", "delete_branch"):
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
+                self.assertTrue(action.dual_control)
+                self.assertTrue(action.break_glass)
+                self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
+
+    def test_every_write_action_requires_confirmation(self):
+        for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
+            with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
+                self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
+
+    def test_delete_branch_is_admin_only(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_authz.get_action("delete_branch").minimum_role,
+            console_authz.ADMIN,
+        )
+
+    def test_actions_map_to_real_mcp_capability_vocabulary(self):
+        """The console must not invent an authority the MCP layer lacks."""
+        for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
+            with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
+                self.assertIn(action.task_key, TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP)
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    action.mcp_permission,
+                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["permission"],
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    action.mcp_role,
+                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["role"],
+                )
+
+    def test_matrix_declares_deny_by_default_and_execution_disabled(self):
+        matrix = console_authz.rbac_matrix()
+        self.assertEqual(matrix["default_decision"], "deny")
+        self.assertFalse(matrix["execution_enabled"])
+
+
+class TestAuthorizeDefaultDeny(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Fail-closed behaviour of the authorization decision."""
+
+    def test_anonymous_is_denied_every_action(self):
+        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id)
+                self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
+                )
+
+    def test_unknown_action_is_denied(self):
+        decision = console_authz.authorize(
+            "not_a_real_action", _principal("admin")
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION)
+
+    def test_unknown_role_is_denied(self):
+        rogue = console_authz.Principal(
+            subject="[email protected]",
+            role="superuser",
+            identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+            authenticated=True,
+        )
+        decision = console_authz.authorize("comment_issue", rogue)
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE)
+
+    def test_insufficient_role_is_denied(self):
+        decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("operator"))
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE
+        )
+
+    def test_sufficient_role_allows_preview_only(self):
+        decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("controller"))
+        self.assertTrue(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
+
+    def test_execution_is_refused_while_phase_is_not_active(self):
+        decision = console_authz.authorize(
+            "merge_pr", _principal("controller"), for_execution=True
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE
+        )
+
+    def test_allowed_decision_never_reports_execution_enabled(self):
+        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                decision = console_authz.authorize(
+                    action_id, _principal("admin")
+                )
+                self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
+
+
+class TestIdentityResolution(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC5 — identity sources, including the insecure local-dev mode."""
+
+    def test_no_auth_mode_yields_anonymous_viewer(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(env={})
+        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
+        self.assertEqual(principal.identity_source, console_authz.IDENTITY_NONE)
+
+    def test_local_dev_mode_warns_that_identity_is_unverified(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            env={
+                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev",
+                console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
+                console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "admin",
+            }
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(principal.authenticated)
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, "admin")
+        self.assertTrue(principal.warnings)
+        self.assertIn("asserted", " ".join(principal.warnings).lower())
+
+    def test_local_dev_without_subject_falls_back_to_anonymous(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev"}
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
+
+    def test_local_dev_unknown_role_degrades_to_viewer(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            env={
+                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local_dev",
+                console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
+                console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "root",
+            }
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
+
+    def test_access_proxy_without_header_fails_closed(self):
+        """A proxy-mode request that did not traverse the proxy is anonymous."""
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            headers={},
+            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
+
+    def test_access_proxy_role_comes_from_server_config_not_client(self):
+        env = {
+            console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
+            console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: json.dumps(
+                {"[email protected]": "controller"}
+            ),
+        }
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            headers={
+                console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]",
+                "x-role": "admin",  # client-supplied role must be ignored
+            },
+            env=env,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, "controller")
+
+    def test_access_proxy_unmapped_subject_defaults_to_viewer(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            headers={
+                console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"
+            },
+            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
+
+    def test_malformed_role_map_does_not_raise_and_denies(self):
+        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
+            headers={console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"},
+            env={
+                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
+                console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: "{not json",
+            },
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
+
+    def test_probe_auth_is_opt_in(self):
+        self.assertFalse(console_authz.probe_auth_required(env={}))
+        self.assertTrue(
+            console_authz.probe_auth_required(
+                env={console_authz.REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV: "1"}
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_probe_auth_is_declared_but_not_yet_enforced(self):
+        """Phase 1 declares the probe-auth policy; no route enforces it yet.
+
+        The flag exists so the Phase 2 action framework has a declared policy
+        to honour instead of inventing a second one. Pinning the current
+        not-enforced status here means wiring it later is a deliberate change
+        that updates this test and the documentation together, rather than a
+        silent behaviour shift. The documentation must say so plainly, because
+        an operator who sets the variable believing it protects a probe is
+        worse off than one who knows it does not.
+        """
+        import inspect
+
+        from webui import app as webui_app
+
+        source = inspect.getsource(webui_app)
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            "probe_auth_required",
+            source,
+            msg=(
+                "webui.app now consults probe_auth_required, so probe auth is "
+                "no longer merely declared. Update the 'Probe authentication' "
+                "section of docs/webui-authz-audit.md, which states it "
+                "enforces nothing, and replace this test with real "
+                "enforcement coverage."
+            ),
+        )
+        self.assertIn(
+            "enforces nothing today",
+            AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
+        )
+
+
+class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC2 — required redaction units: token, keychain, password patterns."""
+
+    def test_token_assignment_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("GITEA_TOKEN=abcd1234efgh5678ijkl")
+        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
+        self.assertNotIn("abcd1234efgh5678ijkl", out)
+
+    def test_password_assignment_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("password: hunter2supersecret")
+        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
+        self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", out)
+
+    def test_keychain_reference_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("keychain:gitea-prgs-token")
+        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
+        self.assertNotIn("gitea-prgs-token", out)
+
+    def test_keychain_command_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("security find-generic-password -s gitea -w")
+        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
+        self.assertNotIn("find-generic-password -s gitea", out)
+
+    def test_bearer_credential_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text("Authorization: Bearer abcdef1234567890abcdef")
+        self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890abcdef", out)
+
+    def test_jwt_is_redacted(self):
+        token = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0.abcdefghijklmnop"
+        out = redact_text(f"session={token}")
+        self.assertNotIn(token, out)
+
+    def test_private_key_block_is_redacted(self):
+        pem = (
+            "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+            "MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial\n"
+            "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
+        )
+        out = redact_text(pem)
+        self.assertNotIn("MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial", out)
+
+    def test_api_key_assignment_is_redacted(self):
+        out = redact_text('api_key = "sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210"')
+        self.assertNotIn("sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210", out)
+
+    def test_nested_payload_is_redacted_recursively(self):
+        payload = {
+            "token": "abc123456789",
+            "nested": {"note": "password=letmein12345"},
+            "list": ["keychain:some-entry"],
+            "safe": "plain text",
+        }
+        out = redact_payload(payload)
+        self.assertEqual(out["token"], REDACTED)
+        self.assertNotIn("letmein12345", json.dumps(out))
+        self.assertNotIn("some-entry", json.dumps(out))
+        self.assertEqual(out["safe"], "plain text")
+
+    def test_scan_reports_findings_before_and_none_after(self):
+        dirty = "password: hunter2supersecret"
+        self.assertTrue(scan_for_secrets(dirty))
+        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redact_text(dirty)), [])
+
+    def test_non_strings_pass_through_untouched(self):
+        self.assertEqual(redact_text(42), 42)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            redact_payload({"n": 1, "b": True}), {"n": 1, "b": True}
+        )
+
+    def test_policy_is_documented_and_declares_redact_before_persist(self):
+        policy = redaction_policy()
+        self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
+        self.assertIn("audit_records", policy["applies_to"])
+        self.assertTrue(policy["console_rules"])
+
+    def test_policy_statement_contains_no_secret_material(self):
+        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redaction_policy()), [])
+
+
+class TestAuditSchema(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC3 — audit event schema, required fields, and retention defaults."""
+
+    def _event(self, action_id="merge_pr", **kwargs):
+        return console_audit.build_event(
+            action_id=action_id,
+            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
+            decision=console_authz.authorize(action_id, _principal("operator")),
+            target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
+            request_id="req-test",
+            **kwargs,
+        )
+
+    def test_every_required_field_is_present(self):
+        event = self._event()
+        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_FIELDS:
+            with self.subTest(field=field):
+                self.assertIn(field, event)
+
+    def test_actor_carries_who_and_how_they_were_identified(self):
+        event = self._event()
+        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS:
+            with self.subTest(field=field):
+                self.assertIn(field, event["actor"])
+
+    def test_correlation_ids_are_present(self):
+        event = self._event()
+        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS:
+            with self.subTest(field=field):
+                self.assertIn(field, event["correlation"])
+        self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["request_id"], "req-test")
+        self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["mcp_task"], "merge_pr")
+
+    def test_timestamp_is_timezone_aware_utc_iso8601(self):
+        now = datetime.datetime(
+            2026, 7, 22, 10, 16, 42, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc
+        )
+        event = self._event(now=now)
+        self.assertEqual(event["timestamp"], "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00")
+        parsed = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(event["timestamp"])
+        self.assertIsNotNone(parsed.tzinfo)
+
+    def test_retention_defaults_by_class(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD], 90
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED],
+            365,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS],
+            730,
+        )
+
+    def test_break_glass_action_retains_longest(self):
+        event = self._event("merge_pr")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
+        )
+
+    def test_routine_write_uses_standard_retention(self):
+        event = self._event("comment_issue")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD
+        )
+
+    def test_unknown_action_retains_as_privileged_not_standard(self):
+        """Conservative direction: keep an unclassifiable record longer."""
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.retention_class_for(None),
+            console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED,
+        )
+
+    def test_retention_expiry_matches_declared_days(self):
+        now = datetime.datetime(2026, 7, 22, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
+        event = self._event("comment_issue", now=now)
+        expires = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(
+            event["retention"]["expires_at"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual((expires - now).days, 90)
+
+    def test_invalid_result_degrades_to_failed(self):
+        event = console_audit.build_event(action_id="merge_pr", result="banana")
+        self.assertEqual(event["result"], console_audit.RESULT_FAILED)
+
+    def test_denied_result_is_representable(self):
+        """An authorization denial has no MCP-side mutation record."""
+        self.assertIn(console_audit.RESULT_DENIED, console_audit.RESULTS)
+
+    def test_event_is_redacted_before_it_is_returned(self):
+        event = console_audit.build_event(
+            action_id="merge_pr",
+            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
+            detail="failed with token=abcdef1234567890",
+            metadata={"password": "hunter2supersecret"},
+        )
+        serialized = json.dumps(event)
+        self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890", serialized)
+        self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", serialized)
+        self.assertTrue(event["redacted"])
+
+    def test_audit_policy_reports_schema_and_retention(self):
+        policy = console_audit.audit_policy()
+        self.assertTrue(policy["append_only"])
+        self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            policy["retention_defaults_days"], console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS
+        )
+
+
+class TestAuditSink(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Append-only persistence behaviour."""
+
+    def test_write_is_a_noop_when_sink_is_unconfigured(self):
+        saved = os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
+        try:
+            self.assertFalse(console_audit.audit_enabled())
+            self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event({"schema_version": 1}))
+        finally:
+            if saved is not None:
+                os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = saved
+
+    def test_records_append_one_json_line_each(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
+            for _ in range(3):
+                event = console_audit.build_event(
+                    action_id="merge_pr", result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
+                )
+                self.assertTrue(console_audit.write_event(event, path=sink))
+            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                lines = [json.loads(line) for line in handle if line.strip()]
+            self.assertEqual(len(lines), 3)
+            self.assertEqual(len({line["event_id"] for line in lines}), 3)
+
+    def test_a_record_that_still_carries_a_secret_is_not_persisted(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
+            leaky = {
+                "schema_version": 1,
+                "detail": "password: hunter2supersecret",
+            }
+            self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event(leaky, path=sink))
+            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(sink))
+
+    def test_write_never_raises_on_a_bad_path(self):
+        self.assertFalse(
+            console_audit.write_event(
+                {"schema_version": 1}, path="/nonexistent-dir/audit.jsonl"
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_simulated_privileged_preview_creates_an_audit_record(self):
+        """Required test: audit record creation for a privileged preview."""
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
+            os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = sink
+            try:
+                decision = console_authz.authorize(
+                    "merge_pr", _principal("controller")
+                )
+                outcome = console_audit.record_event(
+                    action_id="merge_pr",
+                    result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
+                    decision=decision,
+                    target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
+                    request_id="req-preview",
+                )
+            finally:
+                os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
+            self.assertTrue(outcome["written"])
+            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
+            self.assertEqual(record["action"], "merge_pr")
+            self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED)
+            self.assertEqual(record["action_class"], "privileged")
+            self.assertTrue(record["decision"]["allowed"])
+            self.assertFalse(record["decision"]["execution_enabled"])
+            self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["role"], "controller")
+
+    def test_decision_block_survives_redaction(self):
+        """Regression: naming it 'authorization' collided with a secret hint.
+
+        ``gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS`` contains "authorization" (for the
+        HTTP header), so a block under that key was replaced wholesale by the
+        placeholder and the record lost its decision entirely.
+        """
+        event = console_audit.build_event(
+            action_id="merge_pr",
+            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
+            decision=console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("admin")),
+        )
+        self.assertIsInstance(event["decision"], dict)
+        self.assertIn("allowed", event["decision"])
+
+
+class TestConsoleRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC4 — the wired Phase 2 integration points, still fail-closed."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app(bind_host="127.0.0.1"))
+
+    def test_unauthenticated_write_stub_is_denied(self):
+        """Required test: default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs."""
+        response = self.client.post(
+            "/api/actions/merge_pr/attempt", json={"pr_number": 99}
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
+        body = response.json()
+        self.assertFalse(body["success"])
+        authorization = body["authorization"]
+        self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            authorization["reason_code"], console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(authorization["execution_enabled"])
+
+    def test_preview_reports_an_authorization_decision(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/actions/merge_pr/preview?pr_number=7")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        authorization = response.json()["authorization"]
+        self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(authorization["dual_control"])
+        self.assertEqual(authorization["required_role"], "controller")
+
+    def test_unknown_action_preview_still_404s(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/actions/no_such_action/preview")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)
+
+    def test_security_model_endpoint_publishes_all_three_policies(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        body = response.json()
+        self.assertIn("rbac", body)
+        self.assertIn("redaction", body)
+        self.assertIn("audit", body)
+        self.assertEqual(body["rbac"]["default_decision"], "deny")
+
+    def test_security_model_endpoint_leaks_no_secrets(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
+        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(response.json()), [])
+
+    def test_security_model_rejects_writes(self):
+        response = self.client.post("/api/console/security-model", json={})
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
+
+    def test_existing_read_routes_are_unaffected(self):
+        for path in ("/", "/health", "/actions", "/api/actions"):
+            with self.subTest(path=path):
+                self.assertEqual(self.client.get(path).status_code, 200)
+
+
+class TestAuthzAuditDoc(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The model must be written down, not only coded."""
+
+    @classmethod
+    def setUpClass(cls):
+        cls.text = (
+            AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8") if AUTHZ_DOC.exists() else ""
+        )
+
+    def test_doc_exists(self):
+        self.assertTrue(AUTHZ_DOC.exists(), f"missing {AUTHZ_DOC}")
+
+    def test_doc_covers_each_required_section(self):
+        for heading in (
+            "Identity sources",
+            "Role matrix",
+            "Privileged actions",
+            "Secret redaction",
+            "Audit event schema",
+            "Retention",
+            "Phase 2 integration",
+            "Local-dev mode",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(heading=heading):
+                self.assertIn(heading, self.text)
+
+    def test_doc_names_every_role(self):
+        for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
+            with self.subTest(role=role):
+                self.assertIn(role, self.text)
+
+    def test_doc_names_every_console_action(self):
+        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                self.assertIn(action_id, self.text)
+
+    def test_doc_states_retention_defaults(self):
+        for days in console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS.values():
+            with self.subTest(days=days):
+                self.assertIn(str(days), self.text)
+
+    def test_doc_warns_local_dev_is_insecure(self):
+        self.assertIn("INSECURE", self.text.upper())
+
+    def test_doc_states_default_deny(self):
+        self.assertIn("deny", self.text.lower())
+
+    def test_doc_contains_no_secret_material(self):
+        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(self.text), [])
+
+    def test_deployment_doc_links_to_the_model(self):
+        deployment = (DOCS / "webui-deployment.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        self.assertIn("webui-authz-audit", deployment)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover
+    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import uuid
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
 from starlette.applications import Starlette
@@ -31,6 +32,9 @@ from final_report_validator import FINAL_REPORT_TASK_KINDS
 
 from webui.gated_actions import attempt_action, load_action_registry, preview_action
 from webui.gated_action_views import render_actions_page
+from webui import console_audit
+from webui.console_authz import authorize, rbac_matrix, resolve_principal
+from webui.console_redaction import redaction_policy
 from webui.audit_validator import audit_report, audit_to_dict
 from webui.audit_views import render_audit_page
 from webui.lease_loader import load_lease_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as lease_snapshot_to_dict
@@ -276,6 +280,49 @@ async def api_actions(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(load_action_registry().to_dict())
 
 
+def _request_id() -> str:
+    return f"req-{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
+
+
+def _audit_target(action_id: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Describe the action target for the audit record (never secrets)."""
+    if "pr_number" in params:
+        return {"kind": "pr", "ref": f"#{params['pr_number']}"}
+    if "issue_number" in params:
+        return {"kind": "issue", "ref": f"#{params['issue_number']}"}
+    if "branch_name" in params:
+        return {"kind": "branch", "ref": str(params["branch_name"])}
+    return {"kind": "unspecified", "ref": action_id}
+
+
+def _authorize_request(
+    request: Request,
+    action_id: str,
+    params: dict[str, object],
+    *,
+    for_execution: bool,
+    result: str,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Resolve principal, decide, and audit. Returns the decision payload.
+
+    Phase 1 records the decision rather than enforcing it as the terminal
+    outcome: ``webui.gated_actions`` already fails closed for every action, so
+    this layer cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision.
+    """
+    principal = resolve_principal(headers=dict(request.headers))
+    decision = authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=for_execution)
+    console_audit.record_event(
+        action_id=action_id,
+        result=result,
+        decision=decision,
+        principal=principal,
+        target=_audit_target(action_id, params),
+        request_id=_request_id(),
+        detail=decision.detail,
+    )
+    return decision.to_dict()
+
+
 async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     action_id = request.path_params["action_id"]
     params = dict(request.query_params)
@@ -285,6 +332,13 @@ async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     result = preview_action(action_id, **params)
     if "error" in result:
         return JSONResponse(result, status_code=404)
+    result["authorization"] = _authorize_request(
+        request,
+        action_id,
+        params,
+        for_execution=False,
+        result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
+    )
     return JSONResponse(result)
 
 
@@ -298,10 +352,31 @@ async def api_action_attempt(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     if not isinstance(body, dict):
         body = {}
     result = attempt_action(action_id, **body)
+    authorization = _authorize_request(
+        request,
+        action_id,
+        body,
+        for_execution=True,
+        result=(
+            console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
+            if not result.get("success")
+            else console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED
+        ),
+    )
+    result["authorization"] = authorization
     status = 403 if not result.get("success") else 200
     return JSONResponse(result, status_code=status)
 
 
+async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    """Read-only publication of the #633 authorization/redaction/audit model."""
+    return JSONResponse({
+        "rbac": rbac_matrix(),
+        "redaction": redaction_policy(),
+        "audit": console_audit.audit_policy(),
+    })
+
+
 async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response:
     path = request.url.path
     if path in _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS and request.method == "POST":
@@ -358,6 +433,11 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
                 methods=["POST"],
             ),
             Route("/api/leases", api_leases, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route(
+                "/api/console/security-model",
+                api_console_security_model,
+                methods=["GET"],
+            ),
         ],
         exception_handlers={405: method_not_allowed},
     )

webui/console_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+"""Console audit event schema, retention, and append-only sink (#633).
+
+``gitea_audit`` records MCP-side *mutations*: which profile and Gitea user
+performed which tool call. It carries no console actor, no identity source, no
+correlation identifier, and no retention class, so it cannot answer the
+question #633 exists to answer — *who sat at the console, what did they
+attempt, and was it authorized?* An authorization denial is not a mutation and
+would never appear there at all.
+
+This module adds the console-side record. It does not replace ``gitea_audit``:
+when a Phase 2 action eventually reaches MCP, both fire, correlated by
+``correlation.request_id``.
+
+Design constraints:
+
+- **Redact before persist.** Every record passes through
+  ``webui.console_redaction.redact_payload`` before serialization, so an
+  unredacted field is never durable.
+- **Append-only.** Records are appended as JSON lines. Nothing here updates or
+  deletes; retention is metadata on each record, enforced by an operator-run
+  policy, never by silent rewriting.
+- **Never raises.** Auditing must not break the request it describes. A failed
+  write returns ``False``.
+- **Off by default.** With ``WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`` unset, events are still
+  *built* (so callers and tests see the schema) but nothing is written.
+
+A record looks like this (synthetic values):
+
+    {"schema_version": 1, "event_id": "evt-0001",
+     "timestamp": "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00",
+     "actor": {"subject": "[email protected]", "role": "operator",
+               "identity_source": "access_proxy", "authenticated": true},
+     "action": "merge_pr", "action_class": "privileged",
+     "target": {"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
+     "result": "denied", "reason_code": "insufficient_role",
+     "correlation": {"request_id": "req-abc", "session_id": null,
+                     "mcp_task": "merge_pr", "mcp_permission": "gitea.pr.merge"},
+     "retention": {"class": "privileged", "days": 365,
+                   "expires_at": "2027-07-22T10:16:42+00:00"},
+     "redacted": true}
+
+Timestamps are timezone-aware ISO-8601 in UTC.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime
+import json
+import os
+import uuid
+from typing import Any
+
+from webui import console_authz
+from webui.console_redaction import redact_payload, scan_for_secrets
+
+SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+AUDIT_LOG_ENV = "WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG"
+
+# Result vocabulary. ``denied`` is the one ``gitea_audit`` has no equivalent
+# for: an authorization refusal never reaches the MCP layer.
+RESULT_ALLOWED = "allowed"
+RESULT_DENIED = "denied"
+RESULT_PREVIEWED = "previewed"
+RESULT_FAILED = "failed"
+RESULT_SUCCEEDED = "succeeded"
+
+RESULTS = frozenset(
+    {
+        RESULT_ALLOWED,
+        RESULT_DENIED,
+        RESULT_PREVIEWED,
+        RESULT_FAILED,
+        RESULT_SUCCEEDED,
+    }
+)
+
+# Retention classes and default lifetimes in days. Privileged and break-glass
+# records outlive routine ones because they are what an incident review needs.
+RETENTION_STANDARD = "standard"
+RETENTION_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
+RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS = "break_glass"
+
+RETENTION_DAYS: dict[str, int] = {
+    RETENTION_STANDARD: 90,
+    RETENTION_PRIVILEGED: 365,
+    RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS: 730,
+}
+
+# Fields every record must carry. Asserted by the test suite so a future edit
+# cannot quietly drop one.
+REQUIRED_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "schema_version",
+    "event_id",
+    "timestamp",
+    "actor",
+    "action",
+    "action_class",
+    "target",
+    "result",
+    "reason_code",
+    "correlation",
+    "retention",
+    "redacted",
+)
+
+REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "subject",
+    "role",
+    "identity_source",
+    "authenticated",
+)
+
+REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "request_id",
+    "session_id",
+    "mcp_task",
+    "mcp_permission",
+)
+
+
+def audit_log_path() -> str | None:
+    """Configured sink path, or ``None`` when console auditing is off."""
+    return (os.environ.get(AUDIT_LOG_ENV) or "").strip() or None
+
+
+def audit_enabled() -> bool:
+    return audit_log_path() is not None
+
+
+def retention_class_for(action: console_authz.ConsoleAction | None) -> str:
+    """Classify retention from the action, defaulting to the longest-lived.
+
+    An unknown action is treated as privileged rather than standard: for a
+    safety control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
+    """
+    if action is None:
+        return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
+    if action.break_glass:
+        return RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
+    if action.privileged:
+        return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
+    return RETENTION_STANDARD
+
+
+def _retention_block(
+    retention_class: str, now: datetime.datetime
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    days = RETENTION_DAYS.get(
+        retention_class, RETENTION_DAYS[RETENTION_PRIVILEGED]
+    )
+    return {
+        "class": retention_class,
+        "days": days,
+        "expires_at": (now + datetime.timedelta(days=days)).isoformat(),
+    }
+
+
+def build_event(
+    *,
+    action_id: str,
+    result: str,
+    decision: console_authz.AuthorizationDecision | None = None,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    target: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    reason_code: str | None = None,
+    request_id: str | None = None,
+    session_id: str | None = None,
+    detail: str | None = None,
+    metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    now: datetime.datetime | None = None,
+    event_id: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build one redacted, JSON-able console audit record.
+
+    Redaction runs here rather than at write time so an in-memory record handed
+    to a template or an API response is already clean.
+    """
+    ts = now or datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
+    action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
+    who = principal or (
+        decision.principal if decision else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
+    )
+    resolved_result = result if result in RESULTS else RESULT_FAILED
+    resolved_reason = reason_code or (
+        decision.reason_code if decision else "unspecified"
+    )
+    retention_class = retention_class_for(action)
+
+    event: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        "event_id": event_id or f"evt-{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
+        "timestamp": ts.isoformat(),
+        "actor": who.to_dict(),
+        "action": action_id,
+        "action_class": action.action_class if action else "unknown",
+        "target": dict(target or {}),
+        "result": resolved_result,
+        "reason_code": resolved_reason,
+        "correlation": {
+            "request_id": request_id,
+            "session_id": session_id,
+            "mcp_task": action.task_key if action else None,
+            "mcp_permission": action.mcp_permission if action else None,
+        },
+        "retention": _retention_block(retention_class, ts),
+        "redacted": True,
+        "detail": detail,
+        "metadata": dict(metadata or {}),
+    }
+    if decision is not None:
+        # Deliberately *not* named "authorization": ``gitea_audit`` treats that
+        # substring as a secret key hint (it matches the HTTP Authorization
+        # header) and would replace this whole block with the placeholder.
+        event["decision"] = {
+            "allowed": decision.allowed,
+            "required_role": decision.required_role,
+            "requires_confirmation": decision.requires_confirmation,
+            "dual_control": decision.dual_control,
+            "break_glass": decision.break_glass,
+            "execution_enabled": decision.execution_enabled,
+        }
+
+    redacted = redact_payload(event)
+    if not isinstance(redacted, dict):  # pragma: no cover - defensive
+        return {"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION, "redacted": True}
+    return redacted
+
+
+def write_event(event: dict[str, Any], path: str | None = None) -> bool:
+    """Append *event* as one JSON line. Never raises.
+
+    Returns ``True`` when a line was written, ``False`` when auditing is off or
+    the write failed. A record that still trips a secret detector is dropped
+    rather than persisted.
+    """
+    sink = path or audit_log_path()
+    if not sink:
+        return False
+    try:
+        if scan_for_secrets(event):
+            return False
+        line = json.dumps(event, default=str, sort_keys=True)
+        with open(sink, "a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            handle.write(line + "\n")
+        return True
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+
+
+def record_event(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build and persist one record; return the record either way.
+
+    Callers get the record back so it can be surfaced in a response or a test
+    regardless of whether a sink is configured.
+    """
+    event = build_event(**kwargs)
+    written = write_event(event)
+    return {"event": event, "written": written}
+
+
+def audit_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Machine-readable audit schema and retention defaults (never secrets)."""
+    return {
+        "schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        "required_fields": list(REQUIRED_FIELDS),
+        "required_actor_fields": list(REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS),
+        "required_correlation_fields": list(REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS),
+        "results": sorted(RESULTS),
+        "retention_defaults_days": dict(RETENTION_DAYS),
+        "sink_env": AUDIT_LOG_ENV,
+        "enabled": audit_enabled(),
+        "append_only": True,
+        "redact_before_persist": True,
+        "timestamp_format": "ISO-8601, timezone-aware, UTC",
+        "relationship_to_mcp_audit": (
+            "webui.console_audit records console intent and authorization "
+            "outcomes; gitea_audit records MCP mutations. A Phase 2 action "
+            "emits both, correlated by correlation.request_id."
+        ),
+    }

webui/console_authz.py

@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
+"""Console authorization and RBAC model (#633, Phase 1).
+
+The read-only MVP (#426–#436) ships with no authentication: protection comes
+from network placement alone (#435). That is adequate while every route is a
+GET, and inadequate the moment Phase 2 wires a gated write. This module is the
+authorization model those writes must go through, landed *before* any of them
+exists so no write can be added without an authority to check against.
+
+Phase 1 scope is the model itself: identity resolution, the role matrix, the
+privileged-action list, and a fail-closed :func:`authorize`. It deliberately
+does **not** enable any write. ``webui.gated_actions`` stays globally disabled,
+so an allow decision here is necessary but never sufficient.
+
+Two invariants hold for every caller:
+
+- **Default deny.** An unrecognised action, an unknown role, or an absent
+  principal denies. There is no implicit allow branch and no "unless" clause.
+- **Authorization is not execution.** :func:`authorize` returns a decision
+  record. It never calls MCP, never mutates, and never consults credentials.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
+from typing import Any
+
+from task_capability_map import required_permission, required_role
+
+# --- Roles ------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Ordered least to most authority. Higher ranks inherit every lower rank's
+# permitted actions; the matrix below is expressed as a minimum required rank.
+VIEWER = "viewer"
+OPERATOR = "operator"
+CONTROLLER = "controller"
+ADMIN = "admin"
+
+ROLE_ORDER: tuple[str, ...] = (VIEWER, OPERATOR, CONTROLLER, ADMIN)
+_ROLE_RANK: dict[str, int] = {role: idx for idx, role in enumerate(ROLE_ORDER)}
+
+ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
+    VIEWER: "Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase.",
+    OPERATOR: "Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR.",
+    CONTROLLER: "Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR.",
+    ADMIN: "Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions.",
+}
+
+# --- Identity sources -------------------------------------------------------
+IDENTITY_NONE = "none"
+IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV = "local_dev"
+IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY = "access_proxy"
+
+IDENTITY_SOURCES: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {
+    IDENTITY_NONE: {
+        "description": (
+            "No authentication configured. Every request is anonymous and "
+            "capped at viewer. This is the MVP default and the only mode "
+            "whose safety rests entirely on network placement (#435)."
+        ),
+        "authenticated": False,
+        "safe_for_shared_host": False,
+        "phase_available": 1,
+    },
+    IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV: {
+        "description": (
+            "Developer-supplied principal read from the environment. INSECURE: "
+            "the subject and role are asserted, never verified. Loopback only."
+        ),
+        "authenticated": True,
+        "safe_for_shared_host": False,
+        "phase_available": 1,
+    },
+    IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY: {
+        "description": (
+            "Subject asserted by a trusted access proxy (Cloudflare Access, "
+            "WARP, or an org VPN portal) via a verified request header. The "
+            "proxy performs authentication; the console performs authorization."
+        ),
+        "authenticated": True,
+        "safe_for_shared_host": True,
+        "phase_available": 2,
+    },
+}
+
+# Environment configuration. All are read server-side and never rendered.
+AUTH_MODE_ENV = "WEBUI_AUTH_MODE"
+DEV_SUBJECT_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT"
+DEV_ROLE_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_ROLE"
+ROLE_MAP_ENV = "WEBUI_ROLE_MAP"
+REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV = "WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH"
+ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER = "cf-access-authenticated-user-email"
+
+# --- Action classes ---------------------------------------------------------
+CLASS_READ = "read"
+CLASS_WRITE = "gated_write"
+CLASS_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
+CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE = "destructive"
+
+# --- Privileged action list -------------------------------------------------
+# ``task_key`` ties each console action back to ``task_capability_map``, so the
+# console cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not already define.
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ConsoleAction:
+    """One console action and the authority required to invoke it."""
+
+    action_id: str
+    task_key: str
+    action_class: str
+    minimum_role: str
+    requires_confirmation: bool
+    dual_control: bool
+    break_glass: bool
+    phase: int
+    summary: str
+
+    @property
+    def mcp_permission(self) -> str:
+        return required_permission(self.task_key)
+
+    @property
+    def mcp_role(self) -> str:
+        return required_role(self.task_key)
+
+    @property
+    def privileged(self) -> bool:
+        return self.action_class in {CLASS_PRIVILEGED, CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE}
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        data = asdict(self)
+        data["mcp_permission"] = self.mcp_permission
+        data["mcp_role"] = self.mcp_role
+        data["privileged"] = self.privileged
+        return data
+
+
+_ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="claim_issue",
+        task_key="claim_issue",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Apply status:in-progress to an issue.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="comment_issue",
+        task_key="comment_issue",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Post an issue comment.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="create_issue",
+        task_key="create_issue",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Open a new tracking issue.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="comment_pr",
+        task_key="comment_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Post a PR thread comment.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="create_pr",
+        task_key="create_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
+        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Open a PR from a locked feature branch.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="review_pr",
+        task_key="review_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
+        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=3,
+        summary="Submit an approve / request-changes verdict.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="close_pr",
+        task_key="close_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
+        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=3,
+        summary="Close a pull request without merging.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="merge_pr",
+        task_key="merge_pr",
+        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
+        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=True,
+        break_glass=True,
+        phase=3,
+        summary="Merge an approved pull request.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="delete_branch",
+        task_key="delete_branch",
+        action_class=CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE,
+        minimum_role=ADMIN,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=True,
+        break_glass=True,
+        phase=3,
+        summary="Remove a remote feature branch.",
+    ),
+)
+
+ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}
+
+
+def privileged_actions() -> tuple[ConsoleAction, ...]:
+    """Actions requiring dual control, break-glass, or controller+ authority."""
+    return tuple(a for a in _ACTION_SPECS if a.privileged)
+
+
+def get_action(action_id: str) -> ConsoleAction | None:
+    return ACTIONS.get(action_id)
+
+
+# --- Principals -------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Principal:
+    """Who is making a request, and how strongly that is known."""
+
+    subject: str
+    role: str
+    identity_source: str
+    authenticated: bool
+    warnings: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
+
+    @property
+    def rank(self) -> int:
+        return _ROLE_RANK.get(self.role, -1)
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "subject": self.subject,
+            "role": self.role,
+            "identity_source": self.identity_source,
+            "authenticated": self.authenticated,
+            "warnings": list(self.warnings),
+        }
+
+
+ANONYMOUS = Principal(
+    subject="anonymous",
+    role=VIEWER,
+    identity_source=IDENTITY_NONE,
+    authenticated=False,
+    warnings=("No authentication configured; capped at viewer.",),
+)
+
+
+def auth_mode(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
+    """Resolve the configured identity source, defaulting to ``none``."""
+    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
+    raw = (source.get(AUTH_MODE_ENV) or "").strip().lower().replace("-", "_")
+    if raw in IDENTITY_SOURCES:
+        return raw
+    return IDENTITY_NONE
+
+
+def _role_map(env: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Parse ``WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`` (JSON subject→role). Invalid config yields {}."""
+    raw = (env.get(ROLE_MAP_ENV) or "").strip()
+    if not raw:
+        return {}
+    try:
+        parsed = json.loads(raw)
+    except Exception:
+        return {}
+    if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
+        return {}
+    return {
+        str(k): str(v).strip().lower()
+        for k, v in parsed.items()
+        if str(v).strip().lower() in _ROLE_RANK
+    }
+
+
+def resolve_principal(
+    headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> Principal:
+    """Resolve the requesting principal. Unknown or unconfigured → anonymous.
+
+    Never raises and never trusts a client-supplied role: the role always comes
+    from server-side configuration keyed by the resolved subject.
+    """
+    source_env = dict(env) if env is not None else dict(os.environ)
+    lowered = {str(k).lower(): str(v) for k, v in (headers or {}).items()}
+    mode = auth_mode(source_env)
+
+    if mode == IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV:
+        subject = (source_env.get(DEV_SUBJECT_ENV) or "").strip()
+        if not subject:
+            return ANONYMOUS
+        role = (source_env.get(DEV_ROLE_ENV) or VIEWER).strip().lower()
+        if role not in _ROLE_RANK:
+            role = VIEWER
+        return Principal(
+            subject=subject,
+            role=role,
+            identity_source=IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV,
+            authenticated=True,
+            warnings=(
+                "local-dev identity is asserted, not verified; never use "
+                "outside loopback.",
+            ),
+        )
+
+    if mode == IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY:
+        subject = (lowered.get(ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER) or "").strip()
+        if not subject:
+            # Proxy mode with no proxy header means the request did not
+            # traverse the proxy. Fail closed rather than trust it.
+            return ANONYMOUS
+        role = _role_map(source_env).get(subject, VIEWER)
+        return Principal(
+            subject=subject,
+            role=role,
+            identity_source=IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+            authenticated=True,
+        )
+
+    return ANONYMOUS
+
+
+def probe_auth_required(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> bool:
+    """Whether non-public probes must be authenticated. Default False.
+
+    #633 requires the console to *fail closed on missing auth for non-public
+    health probes if configured*. The default stays off so the MVP ``/health``
+    contract is unchanged; an operator opts in explicitly.
+    """
+    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
+    return (source.get(REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {
+        "1",
+        "true",
+        "yes",
+    }
+
+
+# --- Authorization ----------------------------------------------------------
+
+DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION = "unknown_action"
+DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED = "unauthenticated"
+DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE = "insufficient_role"
+DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE = "unknown_role"
+DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE = "phase_not_active"
+ALLOW_PREVIEW = "allowed_preview_only"
+
+# Phase 1 is the only active console phase. Phase 2 opens gated writes and is
+# gated on this model landing; nothing here enables it.
+ACTIVE_PHASE = 1
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AuthorizationDecision:
+    """Result of an authorization check. Never an execution grant."""
+
+    allowed: bool
+    reason_code: str
+    detail: str
+    action_id: str
+    principal: Principal
+    required_role: str | None = None
+    action_class: str | None = None
+    requires_confirmation: bool = False
+    dual_control: bool = False
+    break_glass: bool = False
+    execution_enabled: bool = False
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "allowed": self.allowed,
+            "reason_code": self.reason_code,
+            "detail": self.detail,
+            "action_id": self.action_id,
+            "principal": self.principal.to_dict(),
+            "required_role": self.required_role,
+            "action_class": self.action_class,
+            "requires_confirmation": self.requires_confirmation,
+            "dual_control": self.dual_control,
+            "break_glass": self.break_glass,
+            "execution_enabled": self.execution_enabled,
+            "active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
+        }
+
+
+def authorize(
+    action_id: str,
+    principal: Principal | None = None,
+    *,
+    for_execution: bool = False,
+) -> AuthorizationDecision:
+    """Decide whether *principal* may invoke *action_id*. Deny by default.
+
+    ``for_execution`` distinguishes a read-only preview from a real invocation.
+    Even an allowed decision reports ``execution_enabled=False`` while the
+    console is in Phase 1, so no caller can read an allow as permission to
+    mutate.
+    """
+    who = principal if principal is not None else ANONYMOUS
+    action = get_action(action_id)
+
+    if action is None:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION,
+            detail=f"No console action registered as {action_id!r}.",
+            action_id=action_id,
+            principal=who,
+        )
+
+    base: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "action_id": action_id,
+        "principal": who,
+        "required_role": action.minimum_role,
+        "action_class": action.action_class,
+        "requires_confirmation": action.requires_confirmation,
+        "dual_control": action.dual_control,
+        "break_glass": action.break_glass,
+        "execution_enabled": False,
+    }
+
+    if not who.authenticated:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED,
+            detail=(
+                "Write actions require an authenticated principal; this "
+                "request is anonymous."
+            ),
+            **base,
+        )
+
+    if who.rank < 0:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE,
+            detail=f"Role {who.role!r} is not in the console role matrix.",
+            **base,
+        )
+
+    if who.rank < _ROLE_RANK[action.minimum_role]:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE,
+            detail=(
+                f"Action {action_id!r} requires {action.minimum_role!r}; "
+                f"principal holds {who.role!r}."
+            ),
+            **base,
+        )
+
+    if for_execution and action.phase > ACTIVE_PHASE:
+        return AuthorizationDecision(
+            allowed=False,
+            reason_code=DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE,
+            detail=(
+                f"Action {action_id!r} belongs to phase {action.phase}; the "
+                f"console is in phase {ACTIVE_PHASE}. Execution is not wired."
+            ),
+            **base,
+        )
+
+    return AuthorizationDecision(
+        allowed=True,
+        reason_code=ALLOW_PREVIEW,
+        detail=(
+            "Principal holds the required role. Preview only — execution "
+            "remains disabled until the Phase 2 action framework ships."
+        ),
+        **base,
+    )
+
+
+def rbac_matrix() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Machine-readable RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
+    return {
+        "model_version": 1,
+        "active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
+        "roles": [
+            {
+                "role": role,
+                "rank": _ROLE_RANK[role],
+                "description": ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role],
+                "permitted_actions": sorted(
+                    a.action_id
+                    for a in _ACTION_SPECS
+                    if _ROLE_RANK[role] >= _ROLE_RANK[a.minimum_role]
+                ),
+            }
+            for role in ROLE_ORDER
+        ],
+        "identity_sources": IDENTITY_SOURCES,
+        "actions": [a.to_dict() for a in _ACTION_SPECS],
+        "privileged_actions": [a.action_id for a in privileged_actions()],
+        "default_decision": "deny",
+        "execution_enabled": False,
+    }

webui/console_redaction.py

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+"""Secret redaction policy for every console surface (#633).
+
+The MVP already redacts MCP-side mutation records through ``gitea_audit``.
+This module is the console-facing policy: one redaction pass applied to API
+payloads, rendered HTML, log lines, and audit records *before* they leave the
+server or reach persistent storage.
+
+Design constraints:
+
+- **Reuse, never fork.** ``gitea_audit.redact`` remains the authority for
+  secret-looking dict keys, ``Authorization`` material, and raw URLs. This
+  module runs that pass first and then applies console-specific patterns for
+  keychain references, key/value assignments, private-key blocks, and JWTs.
+- **Never raises.** Redaction is a safety control; a malformed payload must
+  degrade to a redacted placeholder rather than propagate an exception.
+- **Redact before persist.** ``webui.console_audit`` calls this module before
+  writing, so an unredacted record is never durable.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import re
+from typing import Any
+
+import gitea_audit
+
+REDACTED = gitea_audit.REDACTED
+
+# Console-specific patterns applied after the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass.
+# Each keeps the identifying key so an operator can still tell *what* was
+# removed, and replaces only the secret run itself.
+_KEYCHAIN_REF = re.compile(r"(?i)\bkeychain:[\w.\-/@]+")
+_KEYCHAIN_CMD = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)\bsecurity\s+find-(?:generic|internet)-password\b[^\n]*"
+)
+_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)\b(token|password|passwd|secret|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|"
+    r"client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key)\b(\s*[:=]\s*)"
+    r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
+)
+_ENV_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)\b(GITEA_(?:TOKEN|PASS|PASSWORD)[A-Z0-9_]*)(\s*=\s*)"
+    r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
+)
+_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK = re.compile(
+    r"-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----",
+    re.S,
+)
+_JWT = re.compile(
+    r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\b"
+)
+
+# Shapes that mean a payload still carries a secret. ``scan_for_secrets`` uses
+# these to assert a surface is clean.
+_DETECTORS: tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...] = (
+    ("keychain_reference", _KEYCHAIN_REF),
+    ("keychain_command", _KEYCHAIN_CMD),
+    ("credential_assignment", _ASSIGNMENT),
+    ("credential_env_assignment", _ENV_ASSIGNMENT),
+    ("private_key_block", _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK),
+    ("json_web_token", _JWT),
+    ("bearer_credential", re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:bearer|basic)\s+\S{8,}")),
+)
+
+
+def _mask_assignment(match: re.Match[str]) -> str:
+    """Keep the key and separator, replace the value."""
+    return f"{match.group(1)}{match.group(2)}{REDACTED}"
+
+
+def redact_text(text: Any) -> Any:
+    """Redact secret material from a single string.
+
+    Non-strings are returned unchanged so this is safe to map over mixed
+    payloads. Runs the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass first, then the
+    console-specific patterns.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
+        return text
+    try:
+        out = gitea_audit.redact(text)
+        if not isinstance(out, str):  # defensive; redact() returns str for str
+            return REDACTED
+        out = _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK.sub(f"{REDACTED}_PRIVATE_KEY", out)
+        out = _ENV_ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
+        out = _ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
+        out = _KEYCHAIN_CMD.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_COMMAND", out)
+        out = _KEYCHAIN_REF.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_REF", out)
+        out = _JWT.sub(f"{REDACTED}_JWT", out)
+        return out
+    except Exception:
+        # Fail closed: an unredactable string is dropped rather than emitted raw.
+        return REDACTED
+
+
+def redact_payload(value: Any) -> Any:
+    """Recursively redact a JSON-able payload for any console surface.
+
+    Secret-looking dict keys are replaced wholesale by the shared
+    ``gitea_audit`` policy; every remaining string is run through
+    :func:`redact_text`.
+    """
+    try:
+        shared = gitea_audit.redact(value)
+    except Exception:
+        return REDACTED
+    return _walk(shared)
+
+
+def _walk(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {k: _walk(v) for k, v in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
+        return [_walk(v) for v in value]
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return redact_text(value)
+    return value
+
+
+def scan_for_secrets(value: Any) -> list[str]:
+    """Return detector names that still match *value* after serialization.
+
+    Used to assert an outbound payload or rendered page is clean. An empty
+    list means no known secret shape was found. Already-redacted hits are not
+    findings.
+    """
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        text = value
+    else:
+        try:
+            text = json.dumps(value, default=str)
+        except Exception:
+            text = str(value)
+    findings: list[str] = []
+    for name, pattern in _DETECTORS:
+        for match in pattern.finditer(text):
+            if REDACTED in match.group(0):
+                continue
+            findings.append(name)
+            break
+    return findings
+
+
+def redaction_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Machine-readable statement of the redaction rules (never secrets)."""
+    return {
+        "policy_version": 1,
+        "applies_to": [
+            "json_api_responses",
+            "rendered_html",
+            "server_logs",
+            "audit_records",
+        ],
+        "ordering": "shared gitea_audit pass, then console patterns",
+        "redact_before_persist": True,
+        "shared_rules": {
+            "source": "gitea_audit.redact",
+            "secret_key_hints": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS),
+            "secret_value_prefixes": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES),
+            "urls": "credentials, secret query parameters, and real hosts redacted",
+        },
+        "console_rules": [
+            {"name": name, "pattern": pattern.pattern}
+            for name, pattern in _DETECTORS
+        ],
+        "placeholder": REDACTED,
+        "failure_mode": "fail closed — unredactable values become the placeholder",
+    }

workflow_dashboard.py

@@ -65,9 +65,11 @@ PROMPT_RECONCILER = (
     "reconciliation (already-landed / post-merge cleanup). Do not approve or merge."
 )
 PROMPT_CONTROLLER = (
-    "CONTROLLER session: inspect gitea_workflow_dashboard + control-plane leases, "
-    "diagnose blocked/terminal-locked items for {remote}/{org}/{repo}, and schedule "
-    "exactly one fresh role-scoped cycle. Do not implement, review, or merge in-band."
+    "CONTROLLER session: call gitea_route_task_session(task_type='process_work_queue') "
+    "then gitea_allocate_next_work (cross_role default) for {remote}/{org}/{repo}; "
+    "use the returned required_role/profile/action to schedule exactly one downstream "
+    "role cycle. Dashboard is explanatory only and never replaces allocator selection. "
+    "Do not implement, review, approve, or merge in-band."
 )
 PROMPT_IDLE = (
     "IDLE: no safe assignable work for role '{role}' on {remote}/{org}/{repo}. "