fix(cleanup): harden readback scope and ownership fail-closed (#687)

Require branch-scoped post-delete not-found (not generic/repo/host 404),
emit consistent top-level cleanup fields, fail closed on ownership inventory
errors, never auto-reclaim expired control-plane leases, include active
comment-backed reviewer leases, apply the same gates to reconcile_merged_cleanups,
and match ownership with normalized host identity.

branch_cleanup_guard.py

@@ -7,6 +7,19 @@ from typing import Any
 
 PROTECTED_BRANCHES = frozenset({"master", "main", "dev"})
 
+# Evidence / preservation branches must never be removed by cleanup tools
+# (e.g. chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip).
+_PRESERVATION_MARKERS = ("preserve", "preservation", "evidence")
+
+
+def is_preservation_or_evidence_branch(branch: str | None) -> bool:
+    """Return True when *branch* is a preservation/evidence ref that must stay."""
+    if not branch:
+        return False
+    name = str(branch).lower()
+    return any(marker in name for marker in _PRESERVATION_MARKERS)
+
+
 _RAW_BRANCH_DELETE_PATTERNS = (
     re.compile(r"\bgit(?:\s+-C\s+\S+)?\s+branch\s+-[dD]\b[^\n\r]*", re.I),
     re.compile(r"\bgit(?:\s+-C\s+\S+)?\s+push\b[^\n\r]*\s--delete\b[^\n\r]*", re.I),
@@ -72,6 +85,11 @@ def assess_merged_pr_branch_cleanup(
         reasons.append("PR head branch is missing")
     if head_branch in protected:
         reasons.append(f"branch '{head_branch}' is protected")
+    if is_preservation_or_evidence_branch(head_branch):
+        reasons.append(
+            f"branch '{head_branch}' is a preservation/evidence branch and "
+            "cannot be deleted through merged-PR cleanup"
+        )
     if head_branch in open_pr_heads:
         reasons.append("an open PR still references this head branch")
     if head_on_target is False:
@@ -96,3 +114,490 @@ def assess_merged_pr_branch_cleanup(
         "block_reasons": reasons,
         "recommended_action": "delete_remote_branch" if safe else "keep_remote_branch",
     }
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# #687 remediation: post-delete readback + active ownership protection
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+READBACK_NOT_FOUND = "not_found"
+READBACK_EXISTS = "exists"
+READBACK_AUTHENTICATION = "authentication_error"
+READBACK_AUTHORIZATION = "authorization_error"
+READBACK_TRANSPORT = "transport_error"
+READBACK_UNEXPECTED = "unexpected_response"
+READBACK_AMBIGUOUS_404 = "ambiguous_not_found"
+
+# Scope of a 404: only branch-scoped absence may set verified_absent.
+NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH = "branch"
+NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_REPOSITORY = "repository"
+NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_HOST = "host"
+NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_UNKNOWN = "unknown"
+
+ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION = "authentication"
+ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION = "authorization"
+ERROR_CLASS_TRANSPORT = "transport"
+ERROR_CLASS_UNEXPECTED = "unexpected"
+
+OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_SESSION = "author_session"
+OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE = "author_lease"
+OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_REVIEWER_LEASE = "reviewer_lease"
+OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_MERGER_LEASE = "merger_lease"
+OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_CONTROLLER_LEASE = "controller_lease"
+OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_RECONCILER_LEASE = "reconciler_lease"
+OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING = "worktree_binding"
+OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR = "ownership_inventory_error"
+
+_ROLE_TO_OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY = {
+    "author": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
+    "reviewer": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_REVIEWER_LEASE,
+    "merger": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_MERGER_LEASE,
+    "controller": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_CONTROLLER_LEASE,
+    "reconciler": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_RECONCILER_LEASE,
+}
+
+_ACTIVE_OWNERSHIP_STATUSES = frozenset(
+    {"active", "live", "claimed", "in_progress", "working", "pushing", "pushed"}
+)
+_TERMINAL_OWNERSHIP_STATUSES = frozenset(
+    {"released", "abandoned", "done", "blocked", "terminal", "closed"}
+)
+_EXPIRED_STATUSES = frozenset({"expired"})
+_STALE_STATUSES = frozenset({"stale", "stale_dead_process", "stale_missing_worktree"})
+
+
+def _norm_str(value: Any) -> str:
+    return str(value or "").strip()
+
+
+def normalize_host(host: str | None) -> str:
+    """Normalize a host identity for ownership matching (no credentials)."""
+    text = _norm_str(host).lower()
+    for prefix in ("https://", "http://"):
+        if text.startswith(prefix):
+            text = text[len(prefix) :]
+    # Drop path/query if a full URL slipped through.
+    text = text.split("/", 1)[0]
+    text = text.split("?", 1)[0]
+    return text.rstrip(".")
+
+
+def ownership_category_for_role(role: str | None) -> str:
+    """Map a role kind to a non-secret ownership category label."""
+    key = _norm_str(role).lower()
+    return _ROLE_TO_OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY.get(key, f"{key or 'unknown'}_lease")
+
+
+def classify_branch_readback_http_status(
+    status_code: int | None,
+    *,
+    not_found_scope: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Classify a GET-branch HTTP status into a secret-free readback result.
+
+    R1: A bare/generic/repository/wrong-host 404 never yields
+    ``verified_absent=True``. Only an authoritative *branch-scoped* not-found
+    (``not_found_scope='branch'``) may verify deletion.
+    """
+    if status_code == 404:
+        scope = _norm_str(not_found_scope).lower() or NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_UNKNOWN
+        if scope == NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH:
+            return {
+                "status": READBACK_NOT_FOUND,
+                "error_class": None,
+                "verified_absent": True,
+                "branch_present": False,
+                "not_found_scope": NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH,
+                "reasons": [],
+            }
+        # repository / host / unknown / generic 404 — not verified absence
+        reason = {
+            NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_REPOSITORY: (
+                "post-delete readback 404 is repository-scoped, not branch absence"
+            ),
+            NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_HOST: (
+                "post-delete readback 404 is host-scoped, not branch absence"
+            ),
+        }.get(
+            scope,
+            "post-delete readback 404 is ambiguous (not branch-scoped); "
+            "cannot verify absence",
+        )
+        return {
+            "status": READBACK_AMBIGUOUS_404,
+            "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_UNEXPECTED,
+            "verified_absent": False,
+            "branch_present": None,
+            "not_found_scope": scope,
+            "reasons": [reason],
+        }
+    if status_code in (401, 407):
+        return {
+            "status": READBACK_AUTHENTICATION,
+            "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
+            "verified_absent": False,
+            "branch_present": None,
+            "reasons": ["post-delete branch readback authentication failed"],
+        }
+    if status_code == 403:
+        return {
+            "status": READBACK_AUTHORIZATION,
+            "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
+            "verified_absent": False,
+            "branch_present": None,
+            "reasons": ["post-delete branch readback authorization failed"],
+        }
+    if status_code is not None and 200 <= int(status_code) < 300:
+        return {
+            "status": READBACK_EXISTS,
+            "error_class": None,
+            "verified_absent": False,
+            "branch_present": True,
+            "reasons": ["post-delete readback found branch still present"],
+        }
+    if status_code is not None and int(status_code) >= 500:
+        return {
+            "status": READBACK_TRANSPORT,
+            "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_TRANSPORT,
+            "verified_absent": False,
+            "branch_present": None,
+            "reasons": ["post-delete branch readback transport/upstream failure"],
+        }
+    return {
+        "status": READBACK_UNEXPECTED,
+        "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_UNEXPECTED,
+        "verified_absent": False,
+        "branch_present": None,
+        "reasons": ["post-delete branch readback returned an unexpected response"],
+        "http_status": status_code,
+    }
+
+
+def _extract_http_status(exc: BaseException) -> int | None:
+    """Extract an HTTP status code from an exception chain (secret-free)."""
+    seen: set[int] = set()
+    current: BaseException | None = exc
+    while current is not None and id(current) not in seen:
+        seen.add(id(current))
+        for attr in ("code", "status", "status_code"):
+            value = getattr(current, attr, None)
+            if isinstance(value, int) and 100 <= value <= 599:
+                return value
+        text = str(current) if current is not None else ""
+        match = re.match(r"HTTP\s+(\d{3})\b", text)
+        if match:
+            return int(match.group(1))
+        current = current.__cause__ or current.__context__
+    return None
+
+
+def classify_branch_readback_exception(
+    exc: BaseException,
+    *,
+    not_found_scope: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Classify a GET-branch exception without leaking credentials or bodies.
+
+    R1: substring ``404`` / ``not found`` alone never becomes verified_absent.
+    Callers must pass ``not_found_scope='branch'`` only after authoritative
+    proof that the repository/host is still reachable and the 404 is branch-level.
+    """
+    status_code = _extract_http_status(exc)
+    if status_code is None:
+        lower = str(exc).lower() if exc is not None else ""
+        if any(
+            token in lower
+            for token in (
+                "timed out",
+                "timeout",
+                "connection",
+                "network",
+                "temporarily unavailable",
+                "name or service not known",
+                "nodename nor servname",
+            )
+        ):
+            return {
+                "status": READBACK_TRANSPORT,
+                "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_TRANSPORT,
+                "verified_absent": False,
+                "branch_present": None,
+                "reasons": [
+                    "post-delete branch readback transport/upstream failure"
+                ],
+            }
+        if "unauthorized" in lower:
+            status_code = 401
+        elif "forbidden" in lower:
+            status_code = 403
+        elif "404" in lower or "not found" in lower:
+            # Ambiguous: do NOT treat as branch absence without scope proof.
+            status_code = 404
+            if not_found_scope is None:
+                not_found_scope = NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_UNKNOWN
+
+    if status_code is not None:
+        return classify_branch_readback_http_status(
+            status_code, not_found_scope=not_found_scope
+        )
+
+    return {
+        "status": READBACK_UNEXPECTED,
+        "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_UNEXPECTED,
+        "verified_absent": False,
+        "branch_present": None,
+        "reasons": ["post-delete branch readback returned an unexpected response"],
+    }
+
+
+def assess_post_delete_readback(readback: dict[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Decide whether DELETE success may be reported after branch readback.
+
+    Success requires authoritative branch-scoped not-found
+    (``verified_absent=True``). DELETE HTTP success alone is never enough.
+    Generic/repository/host 404 cannot verify absence (R1).
+    """
+    payload = dict(readback or {})
+    status = _norm_str(payload.get("status")) or READBACK_UNEXPECTED
+    # Only explicit verified_absent flag counts — never infer from status alone
+    # when status is a bare not_found without branch scope proof.
+    verified = bool(payload.get("verified_absent")) is True
+    if verified and status == READBACK_NOT_FOUND:
+        return {
+            "ok": True,
+            "success": True,
+            "verified_absent": True,
+            "readback": {
+                "status": READBACK_NOT_FOUND,
+                "verified_absent": True,
+                "branch_present": False,
+                "error_class": None,
+                "not_found_scope": NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH,
+            },
+            "reasons": [],
+        }
+
+    reasons = list(payload.get("reasons") or [])
+    if not reasons:
+        if status == READBACK_EXISTS:
+            reasons = ["post-delete readback found branch still present"]
+        elif status == READBACK_AUTHENTICATION:
+            reasons = ["post-delete branch readback authentication failed"]
+        elif status == READBACK_AUTHORIZATION:
+            reasons = ["post-delete branch readback authorization failed"]
+        elif status == READBACK_TRANSPORT:
+            reasons = ["post-delete branch readback transport/upstream failure"]
+        elif status == READBACK_AMBIGUOUS_404:
+            reasons = [
+                "post-delete readback 404 is not branch-scoped; "
+                "cannot verify absence"
+            ]
+        else:
+            reasons = ["post-delete branch readback could not verify deletion"]
+
+    return {
+        "ok": False,
+        "success": False,
+        "verified_absent": False,
+        "readback": {
+            "status": status,
+            "verified_absent": False,
+            "branch_present": payload.get("branch_present"),
+            "error_class": payload.get("error_class"),
+            "not_found_scope": payload.get("not_found_scope"),
+        },
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "blocker_kind": "post_delete_readback_failed",
+    }
+
+
+def cleanup_result_envelope(
+    *,
+    success: bool,
+    performed: bool,
+    delete_acknowledged: bool,
+    verified_absent: bool,
+    **extra: Any,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """R2: consistent top-level cleanup result fields on every return path."""
+    out: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "success": bool(success),
+        "performed": bool(performed),
+        "delete_acknowledged": bool(delete_acknowledged),
+        "verified_absent": bool(verified_absent),
+    }
+    out.update(extra)
+    return out
+
+
+def _repo_matches(
+    record: dict[str, Any],
+    *,
+    remote: str,
+    org: str,
+    repo: str,
+    host: str | None = None,
+) -> bool:
+    """Match ownership record to target remote/org/repo and normalized host."""
+    if (
+        _norm_str(record.get("remote")).lower() != _norm_str(remote).lower()
+        or _norm_str(record.get("org")).lower() != _norm_str(org).lower()
+        or _norm_str(record.get("repo")).lower() != _norm_str(repo).lower()
+    ):
+        return False
+    expected_host = normalize_host(host)
+    record_host = normalize_host(record.get("host") or record.get("host_name"))
+    # When both sides declare a host, they must agree after normalization.
+    # A record host that disagrees with the expected host is out of scope.
+    # Legacy records without host still match when remote/org/repo agree.
+    if expected_host and record_host and expected_host != record_host:
+        return False
+    return True
+
+
+def _branch_matches(record: dict[str, Any], branch: str) -> bool:
+    return _norm_str(record.get("branch")) == _norm_str(branch)
+
+
+def assess_ownership_record_activity(record: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Classify one ownership record as blocking or non-blocking.
+
+    Distinguishes active ownership from expired/released/terminal/stale records.
+    Expired/stale records block unless reclaim_allowed is *explicitly* True
+    (O2: never treat missing/unknown reclaim as auto-allowed).
+    """
+    status = _norm_str(record.get("status")).lower()
+    category = _norm_str(record.get("category")) or "unknown"
+    reclaim_allowed = record.get("reclaim_allowed")
+
+    if category == OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR:
+        return {
+            "blocks": True,
+            "status": status or "unknown",
+            "category": category,
+            "reason": "ownership inventory failed closed",
+        }
+
+    if status in _TERMINAL_OWNERSHIP_STATUSES:
+        return {
+            "blocks": False,
+            "status": status,
+            "category": category,
+            "reason": f"{category} ownership is terminal/released ({status})",
+        }
+    if status in _ACTIVE_OWNERSHIP_STATUSES:
+        return {
+            "blocks": True,
+            "status": status,
+            "category": category,
+            "reason": f"active {category} ownership still uses the target branch",
+        }
+    if status in _EXPIRED_STATUSES or status in _STALE_STATUSES:
+        # O2: only explicit reclaim_allowed=True skips the block.
+        if reclaim_allowed is True:
+            return {
+                "blocks": False,
+                "status": status,
+                "category": category,
+                "reason": (
+                    f"{category} ownership is {status} and reclaimable; "
+                    "does not block deletion"
+                ),
+            }
+        return {
+            "blocks": True,
+            "status": status,
+            "category": category,
+            "reason": (
+                f"{status} {category} ownership still protects the target "
+                "branch (reclaim not proven; fail closed)"
+            ),
+        }
+    # Unknown status → fail closed
+    return {
+        "blocks": True,
+        "status": status or "unknown",
+        "category": category,
+        "reason": (
+            f"unclassified {category} ownership status "
+            f"'{status or 'unknown'}'; fail closed"
+        ),
+    }
+
+
+def assess_active_branch_ownership(
+    *,
+    remote: str,
+    org: str,
+    repo: str,
+    branch: str,
+    host: str | None = None,
+    records: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Assess whether any active ownership still uses *branch* in *repo*.
+
+    Matching requires remote/org/repo/branch and, when provided, normalized
+    host identity. Other repositories, hosts, or branches never false-block.
+    """
+    target_branch = _norm_str(branch)
+    expected_host = normalize_host(host)
+    considered: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    blocking: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    ignored: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    for raw in records or []:
+        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+            continue
+        if not _repo_matches(
+            raw, remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo, host=expected_host or None
+        ):
+            ignored.append(
+                {
+                    "category": _norm_str(raw.get("category")) or "unknown",
+                    "reason": "different repository or host scope",
+                }
+            )
+            continue
+        if not _branch_matches(raw, target_branch):
+            ignored.append(
+                {
+                    "category": _norm_str(raw.get("category")) or "unknown",
+                    "reason": "different branch",
+                }
+            )
+            continue
+        activity = assess_ownership_record_activity(raw)
+        entry = {
+            "category": activity["category"],
+            "status": activity["status"],
+            "blocks": activity["blocks"],
+            "reason": activity["reason"],
+        }
+        considered.append(entry)
+        if activity["blocks"]:
+            blocking.append(entry)
+
+    block = bool(blocking)
+    categories = sorted({b["category"] for b in blocking})
+    reasons = [
+        (
+            "active ownership protects branch "
+            f"'{target_branch}': " + "; ".join(b["reason"] for b in blocking)
+        )
+    ] if block else []
+    return {
+        "block": block,
+        "safe_to_delete": not block,
+        "remote": remote,
+        "org": org,
+        "repo": repo,
+        "host": expected_host or None,
+        "branch": target_branch,
+        "blocking_categories": categories,
+        "blocking": blocking,
+        "considered": considered,
+        "ignored_out_of_scope": ignored,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership" if block else None,
+        "recommended_action": "keep_remote_branch" if block else "delete_remote_branch",
+    }

docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md

@@ -238,11 +238,43 @@ narrow operation set:
 - `gitea.issue.comment`
 - `gitea.issue.close`
 - `gitea.pr.close`
+- `gitea.branch.delete` (merged-branch cleanup only — see below)
 
 Forbidden on reconciler profiles: `gitea.pr.approve`, `gitea.pr.merge`,
 `gitea.pr.review`, `gitea.pr.create`, `gitea.branch.push`, and
 `gitea.repo.commit`.
 
+### Merged-branch cleanup ownership (`gitea.branch.delete`)
+
+The reconciler is the repository-supported owner of merged-PR source-branch
+cleanup: `task_capability_map` maps `cleanup_merged_pr_branch` (and
+`reconciliation_cleanup`) to role `reconciler` with permission
+`gitea.branch.delete`. Post-merge branch lifecycle is reconciliation work —
+it happens after the author, reviewer, and merger roles have completed, and
+it must not be reachable from those roles.
+
+Least-privilege constraints:
+
+- `gitea.branch.delete` is granted **only** to reconciler profiles. Author,
+  reviewer, and merger profiles must never hold it; `gitea_delete_branch`
+  and `gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch` fail closed on any profile without
+  the permission.
+- Even with the permission, reconciler deletion is only supported through the
+  guarded `gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch` path (#514 / #687): the PR must be
+  merged, the head an ancestor of the target, the branch not protected
+  (`master`/`main`/`dev`), the branch not a preservation/evidence ref (e.g.
+  `chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip`), no open PR may still use the
+  head, and an explicit `CLEANUP MERGED PR <n> BRANCH <branch>` confirmation is
+  required. Raw `gitea_delete_branch` is **denied** to reconciler even when
+  `gitea.branch.delete` is present.
+- Raw `git branch -d` / `git push --delete` cleanup remains blocked by
+  `branch_cleanup_guard` and the final-report validator regardless of
+  profile permissions.
+- `gitea.branch.delete` has no short alias in `GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES`;
+  write it fully qualified in `allowed_operations`. Migration must emit
+  canonical names such as `gitea.pr.close` (never bare `pr.close` /
+  `issue.close`, which the production normalizer rejects or drops).
+
 Launch a static `gitea-reconciler` MCP namespace with
 `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler`. Profile shape is validated by
 `reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile` (#304). Use the
@@ -251,6 +283,159 @@ Launch a static `gitea-reconciler` MCP namespace with
 fresh target-branch fetch, recorded target SHA, and ancestor proof. PRs whose
 heads are not already landed cannot be closed through this path.
 
+### Operational runbook: grant reconciler `gitea.branch.delete` (#687)
+
+Merging a code PR that updates `migrate_profiles.py` / `reconciler_profile.py`
+**does not** change the live operator profile on disk. Apply the profile
+change deliberately, then reconnect the client-managed namespace.
+
+1. **Approved migration / profile-update command** (from the repo root, using
+   the project venv if present):
+
+   ```bash
+   # Dry-run first (default): validates v2 output, writes nothing
+   python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json
+
+   # Apply: creates backup then writes migrated v2 config
+   python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json -w
+   # Optional explicit paths:
+   # python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json \
+   #   -o ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json \
+   #   --backup ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json.bak -w
+   ```
+
+   If the live file is already v2, edit the reconciler identity’s
+   `allowed_operations` / `forbidden_operations` under
+   `environments.<env>.services.gitea.identities.reconciler` (or the
+   `prgs-reconciler` alias target) so allowed includes the canonical set
+   below — then re-validate with a load of the config (see step 3).
+
+2. **Inspect the generated (or edited) profile** — confirm the reconciler
+   identity, for example:
+
+   ```bash
+   python3 - <<'PY'
+   import json
+   from pathlib import Path
+   cfg = json.loads(Path.home().joinpath(".config/gitea-tools/profiles.json").read_text())
+   # v2 environments shape:
+   ident = cfg["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]["identities"]["reconciler"]
+   print("role:", ident.get("role"))
+   print("allowed:", ident.get("allowed_operations"))
+   print("forbidden:", ident.get("forbidden_operations"))
+   PY
+   ```
+
+3. **Validate canonical operation names and least privilege**
+
+   Expected canonical **allowed** (defaults after migration):
+
+   - `gitea.read`
+   - `gitea.pr.close` (required)
+   - `gitea.pr.comment`
+   - `gitea.issue.comment`
+   - `gitea.issue.close`
+   - `gitea.branch.delete` (recommended; cleanup only)
+
+   Expected **forbidden** includes at least: `gitea.pr.approve`,
+   `gitea.pr.merge`, `gitea.pr.review`, `gitea.pr.create`,
+   `gitea.branch.push`, `gitea.repo.commit`.
+
+   No shorthand (`pr.close`, `issue.close`, `pr.comment`) may remain.
+   Validate with the production loader:
+
+   ```bash
+   python3 - <<'PY'
+   import gitea_config, reconciler_profile
+   from pathlib import Path
+   path = str(Path.home() / ".config/gitea-tools/profiles.json")
+   gitea_config.load_config(path)  # fails closed on invalid config
+   # Or assess the reconciler lists directly after extracting them:
+   # print(reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile(allowed, forbidden))
+   PY
+   ```
+
+4. **Merging PR #688 (or any code PR) does not update the live profile.**
+   Code changes only the migration helper, schema, docs, and tests. The
+   operator must still run `migrate_profiles.py -w` or an equivalent
+   authorized edit of `~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json`.
+
+5. **Supported apply method:** `python3 migrate_profiles.py … -w` (backup
+   created automatically) **or** operator-authorized edit of the live
+   profiles file after backup. Unsupported: silent mtime tricks, manual
+   process kill to “reload”, or undocumented env overrides.
+
+6. **Backup and validation:** `-w` copies the input to
+   `<input_path>.bak` (or `--backup PATH`) before writing. Re-run
+   `load_config` / `assess_reconciler_profile` after write. Keep the
+   `.bak` until live whoami/capability checks pass.
+
+7. **Client-managed namespace reconnect/reload:** reconnect or reload the
+   IDE MCP client so `gitea-reconciler` restarts from current `master` and
+   the updated `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler` config. Do not hand-launch
+   `mcp_server.py` / `gitea_mcp_server.py` with ad hoc `GITEA_*` env
+   (see #686 / #630).
+
+8. **Live reverification** (through the client-managed `gitea-reconciler`
+   namespace only):
+
+   - `gitea_whoami` → identity + profile `prgs-reconciler`
+   - `gitea_assess_master_parity` → `stale=false`, `restart_required=false`
+   - `gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="cleanup_merged_pr_branch")` →
+     `allowed_in_current_session=true` only when permission and role match
+   - `gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="delete_branch")` →
+     **not** allowed for reconciler (role denial must be enforced)
+
+9. **Guarded cleanup usage** (example for a merged PR whose source branch
+   remains on the remote):
+
+   ```text
+   gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
+     pr_number=<N>,
+     branch=<exact PR head branch>,
+     confirmation="CLEANUP MERGED PR <N> BRANCH <exact PR head branch>",
+     remote="prgs",
+     org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+     repo="Gitea-Tools",
+     worktree_path="<path under branches/>",
+   )
+   ```
+
+   The tool refuses unmerged PRs, protected branches, preservation/evidence
+   branches, open-PR heads, mismatched branch names, and wrong confirmation.
+
+10. **Prohibitions**
+
+    - No raw `git push --delete`, `git branch -d` / `-D`, or delete refspecs
+    - No arbitrary `gitea_delete_branch` from reconciler
+    - No unsupported profile switching mid-run without full re-preflight
+    - No ad hoc hand-edits of live profiles **unless** operator-authorized,
+      backed up, and revalidated as above
+
+Canonical migrated reconciler example:
+
+```json
+{
+  "role": "reconciler",
+  "allowed_operations": [
+    "gitea.read",
+    "gitea.pr.close",
+    "gitea.pr.comment",
+    "gitea.issue.comment",
+    "gitea.issue.close",
+    "gitea.branch.delete"
+  ],
+  "forbidden_operations": [
+    "gitea.pr.approve",
+    "gitea.pr.merge",
+    "gitea.pr.review",
+    "gitea.pr.create",
+    "gitea.branch.push",
+    "gitea.repo.commit"
+  ]
+}
+```
+
 ## Identity and fail-closed rules
 
 Before **any** mutating action, a workflow must know both:

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -5925,6 +5925,65 @@ def gitea_delete_branch(
             "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.branch.delete"),
         }
 
+    # Possessing gitea.branch.delete alone is not enough for arbitrary deletion.
+    # task_capability_map maps delete_branch → author; reconciler must use the
+    # guarded cleanup_merged_pr_branch path only (#687 / #514).
+    profile = get_profile()
+    active_role = _profile_role_kind(profile)
+    required_role = task_capability_map.required_role("delete_branch")
+    if active_role == "reconciler":
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
+            "required_role_kind": required_role,
+            "active_role_kind": active_role,
+            "reasons": [
+                "reconciler profile cannot use raw gitea_delete_branch; "
+                "use gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch for a fully merged PR "
+                "source branch only (fail closed)"
+            ],
+            "exact_next_action": (
+                "Call gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch with pr_number, the "
+                "exact PR head branch, and confirmation "
+                "'CLEANUP MERGED PR <n> BRANCH <branch>' after capability "
+                "resolve for cleanup_merged_pr_branch."
+            ),
+            "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.branch.delete"),
+        }
+    if active_role != required_role:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
+            "required_role_kind": required_role,
+            "active_role_kind": active_role,
+            "reasons": [
+                f"Active profile role '{active_role}' cannot perform "
+                f"{required_role} task 'delete_branch' even when "
+                "gitea.branch.delete is present (fail closed)"
+            ],
+            "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.branch.delete"),
+        }
+
+    if branch_cleanup_guard.is_preservation_or_evidence_branch(branch):
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
+            "reasons": [
+                f"branch '{branch}' is a preservation/evidence branch and "
+                "cannot be deleted (fail closed)"
+            ],
+        }
+    if branch in branch_cleanup_guard.PROTECTED_BRANCHES:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
+            "reasons": [f"branch '{branch}' is protected (fail closed)"],
+        }
+
     audit_allowed, audit_reasons = (
         audit_reconciliation_mode.check_audit_mutation_allowed("delete_branch")
     )
@@ -5967,41 +6026,49 @@ def gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
     """Delete a merged PR source branch through the guarded MCP path (#514)."""
     gate_reasons = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.branch.delete")
     if gate_reasons:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "performed": False,
-            "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
-            "reasons": gate_reasons,
-            "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.branch.delete"),
-        }
+        return branch_cleanup_guard.cleanup_result_envelope(
+            success=False,
+            performed=False,
+            delete_acknowledged=False,
+            verified_absent=False,
+            required_permission="gitea.branch.delete",
+            reasons=gate_reasons,
+            permission_report=_permission_block_report("gitea.branch.delete"),
+        )
 
     profile = get_profile()
-    active_role = _role_kind(
-        profile.get("allowed_operations", []),
-        profile.get("forbidden_operations", []),
-    )
-    if active_role == "reviewer":
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "performed": False,
-            "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
-            "reasons": [
-                "reviewer profile is not authorized for merged branch cleanup "
-                "(fail closed)"
+    active_role = _profile_role_kind(profile)
+    # cleanup_merged_pr_branch is reconciler-owned (task_capability_map).
+    # Author/reviewer/merger must not reach this path even if they somehow
+    # hold gitea.branch.delete.
+    if active_role != "reconciler":
+        return branch_cleanup_guard.cleanup_result_envelope(
+            success=False,
+            performed=False,
+            delete_acknowledged=False,
+            verified_absent=False,
+            required_permission="gitea.branch.delete",
+            required_role_kind="reconciler",
+            active_role_kind=active_role,
+            reasons=[
+                f"profile role '{active_role}' is not authorized for merged "
+                "branch cleanup; required role is reconciler (fail closed)"
             ],
-            "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.branch.delete"),
-        }
+            permission_report=_permission_block_report("gitea.branch.delete"),
+        )
 
     if worktree_path is None or "/branches/" not in os.path.realpath(worktree_path):
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "performed": False,
-            "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
-            "reasons": [
+        return branch_cleanup_guard.cleanup_result_envelope(
+            success=False,
+            performed=False,
+            delete_acknowledged=False,
+            verified_absent=False,
+            required_permission="gitea.branch.delete",
+            reasons=[
                 "merged branch cleanup requires an explicit branches/ worktree "
                 "path; root checkout branch ref mutation is blocked (fail closed)"
             ],
-        }
+        )
 
     verify_preflight_purity(
         remote,
@@ -6019,16 +6086,18 @@ def gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
     target_branch = (pr.get("base") or {}).get("ref") or "master"
 
     if branch and branch != pr_head.get("ref"):
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "performed": False,
-            "pr_number": pr_number,
-            "branch": branch,
-            "reasons": [
+        return branch_cleanup_guard.cleanup_result_envelope(
+            success=False,
+            performed=False,
+            delete_acknowledged=False,
+            verified_absent=False,
+            pr_number=pr_number,
+            branch=branch,
+            reasons=[
                 f"requested branch '{branch}' does not match PR head "
                 f"'{pr_head.get('ref')}'"
             ],
-        }
+        )
 
     open_prs = api_get_all(f"{base}/pulls?state=open", auth)
     open_heads = {
@@ -6058,19 +6127,86 @@ def gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
         confirmation=confirmation,
     )
     if not assessment["safe_to_delete"]:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "performed": False,
-            "pr_number": pr_number,
-            "branch": head_branch,
-            "assessment": assessment,
-            "reasons": assessment["block_reasons"],
-        }
+        return branch_cleanup_guard.cleanup_result_envelope(
+            success=False,
+            performed=False,
+            delete_acknowledged=False,
+            verified_absent=False,
+            pr_number=pr_number,
+            branch=head_branch,
+            assessment=assessment,
+            reasons=assessment["block_reasons"],
+        )
+
+    # #687: active ownership protection (sessions/leases/worktree bindings).
+    # Do not rely only on the caller worktree living under branches/.
+    ownership_bundle = _collect_branch_ownership_records(
+        remote=remote,
+        host=h,
+        org=o,
+        repo=r,
+        branch=head_branch,
+        pr_number=pr_number,
+        project_root=PROJECT_ROOT,
+        auth=auth,
+        base_api=base,
+    )
+    ownership_records = ownership_bundle.get("records") or []
+    if ownership_bundle.get("inventory_error"):
+        # O1: control-plane / ownership inventory failure fails closed.
+        ownership_records = list(ownership_records) + [
+            {
+                "category": branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR,
+                "status": "unknown",
+                "remote": remote,
+                "host": h,
+                "org": o,
+                "repo": r,
+                "branch": head_branch,
+                "reclaim_allowed": False,
+                "role": "inventory",
+            }
+        ]
+    ownership = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_active_branch_ownership(
+        remote=remote,
+        org=o,
+        repo=r,
+        branch=head_branch,
+        host=h,
+        records=ownership_records,
+    )
+    if ownership.get("block"):
+        return branch_cleanup_guard.cleanup_result_envelope(
+            success=False,
+            performed=False,
+            delete_acknowledged=False,
+            verified_absent=False,
+            pr_number=pr_number,
+            branch=head_branch,
+            assessment=assessment,
+            ownership={
+                "block": True,
+                "blocking_categories": ownership.get("blocking_categories") or [],
+                "reasons": ownership.get("reasons") or [],
+                "blocker_kind": ownership.get("blocker_kind"),
+                "checked": True,
+            },
+            reasons=ownership.get("reasons")
+            or ["active ownership protects the target branch"],
+            blocker_kind="active_branch_ownership",
+        )
 
     import urllib.parse
 
     encoded_branch = urllib.parse.quote(head_branch, safe="")
     url = f"{base}/branches/{encoded_branch}"
+    request_metadata = {
+        "branch": head_branch,
+        "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
+        "cleanup_path": "gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
+        "ownership_checked": True,
+        "ownership_blocking_categories": [],
+    }
     with _audited(
         "cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
         host=h,
@@ -6079,36 +6215,416 @@ def gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
         repo=r,
         pr_number=pr_number,
         target_branch=head_branch,
-        request_metadata={
-            "branch": head_branch,
-            "required_permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
-            "cleanup_path": "gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
-        },
+        request_metadata=request_metadata,
     ):
         api_request("DELETE", url, auth)
-    return {
-        "success": True,
-        "performed": True,
-        "pr_number": pr_number,
-        "branch": head_branch,
-        "message": f"Merged PR #{pr_number} source branch '{head_branch}' deleted.",
-        "assessment": assessment,
+
+    # #687: authoritative post-delete readback. DELETE success alone is not
+    # enough — only branch-scoped not-found proves deletion (R1).
+    readback = _probe_remote_branch(h, o, r, auth, head_branch)
+    readback_assessment = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_post_delete_readback(readback)
+    verified_absent = bool(readback_assessment.get("verified_absent"))
+    request_metadata["post_delete_readback"] = {
+        "status": (readback_assessment.get("readback") or {}).get("status"),
+        "verified_absent": verified_absent,
+        "error_class": (readback_assessment.get("readback") or {}).get(
+            "error_class"
+        ),
+        "not_found_scope": (readback_assessment.get("readback") or {}).get(
+            "not_found_scope"
+        ),
     }
+    if gitea_audit.audit_enabled():
+        _audit(
+            "cleanup_merged_pr_branch_readback",
+            host=h,
+            remote=remote,
+            org=o,
+            repo=r,
+            result=(
+                gitea_audit.SUCCEEDED
+                if readback_assessment.get("ok")
+                else gitea_audit.FAILED
+            ),
+            reason="; ".join(readback_assessment.get("reasons") or []) or None,
+            request_metadata=request_metadata,
+            pr_number=pr_number,
+            target_branch=head_branch,
+        )
+
+    if not readback_assessment.get("ok"):
+        return branch_cleanup_guard.cleanup_result_envelope(
+            success=False,
+            performed=True,
+            delete_acknowledged=True,
+            verified_absent=False,
+            pr_number=pr_number,
+            branch=head_branch,
+            assessment=assessment,
+            ownership={
+                "block": False,
+                "blocking_categories": [],
+                "checked": True,
+            },
+            readback=readback_assessment.get("readback"),
+            reasons=readback_assessment.get("reasons")
+            or ["post-delete branch readback could not verify deletion"],
+            blocker_kind=readback_assessment.get("blocker_kind")
+            or "post_delete_readback_failed",
+            message=(
+                f"DELETE accepted for '{head_branch}' but post-delete readback "
+                "did not verify absence"
+            ),
+        )
+
+    return branch_cleanup_guard.cleanup_result_envelope(
+        success=True,
+        performed=True,
+        delete_acknowledged=True,
+        verified_absent=True,
+        pr_number=pr_number,
+        branch=head_branch,
+        message=(
+            f"Merged PR #{pr_number} source branch '{head_branch}' deleted "
+            "and verified absent via branch-scoped post-delete readback."
+        ),
+        assessment=assessment,
+        ownership={
+            "block": False,
+            "blocking_categories": [],
+            "checked": True,
+        },
+        readback=readback_assessment.get("readback"),
+    )
 
 
-def _remote_branch_exists(h: str, o: str, r: str, auth: str, branch: str) -> bool:
+def _probe_remote_branch(
+    h: str, o: str, r: str, auth: str, branch: str
+) -> dict:
+    """GET a remote branch and return a secret-free structured readback.
+
+    R1: On HTTP 404, re-probe the repository endpoint. Only when the repo is
+    still reachable is the 404 treated as branch-scoped absence. Generic,
+    repository-scoped, or host-level 404 never sets verified_absent.
+    """
     import urllib.parse
 
     encoded = urllib.parse.quote(branch, safe="")
     url = f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/branches/{encoded}"
     try:
         api_request("GET", url, auth)
-        return True
+        return branch_cleanup_guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(200)
     except Exception as exc:
-        message = str(exc).lower()
-        if "404" in message or "not found" in message:
-            return False
-        raise
+        status = branch_cleanup_guard._extract_http_status(exc)
+        if status != 404:
+            return branch_cleanup_guard.classify_branch_readback_exception(exc)
+
+        # Distinguish branch vs repository/host 404 via repo reachability.
+        repo_url = repo_api_url(h, o, r)
+        try:
+            api_request("GET", repo_url, auth)
+            # Repo reachable → branch-scoped not-found.
+            return branch_cleanup_guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
+                404,
+                not_found_scope=branch_cleanup_guard.NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH,
+            )
+        except Exception as repo_exc:
+            repo_status = branch_cleanup_guard._extract_http_status(repo_exc)
+            if repo_status == 404:
+                return branch_cleanup_guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
+                    404,
+                    not_found_scope=branch_cleanup_guard.NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_REPOSITORY,
+                )
+            if repo_status in (401, 407):
+                return branch_cleanup_guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
+                    401
+                )
+            if repo_status == 403:
+                return branch_cleanup_guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
+                    403
+                )
+            # Host/transport/unknown: not branch-verified.
+            return branch_cleanup_guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
+                404,
+                not_found_scope=branch_cleanup_guard.NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_UNKNOWN,
+            )
+
+
+def _remote_branch_exists(h: str, o: str, r: str, auth: str, branch: str) -> bool:
+    """True when the remote branch exists; False on authoritative branch 404.
+
+    Authentication, authorization, transport, and ambiguous 404 failures are
+    raised rather than treated as absence.
+    """
+    probe = _probe_remote_branch(h, o, r, auth, branch)
+    status = probe.get("status")
+    if (
+        status == branch_cleanup_guard.READBACK_NOT_FOUND
+        and probe.get("verified_absent")
+    ):
+        return False
+    if status == branch_cleanup_guard.READBACK_EXISTS:
+        return True
+    error_class = probe.get("error_class") or "unexpected"
+    raise RuntimeError(
+        f"remote branch probe failed ({error_class}/{status})"
+    )
+
+
+def _collect_branch_ownership_records(
+    *,
+    remote: str,
+    host: str,
+    org: str,
+    repo: str,
+    branch: str,
+    pr_number: int | None,
+    project_root: str,
+    auth: str | None = None,
+    base_api: str | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Gather canonical ownership records for *branch* (secret-free).
+
+    Sources:
+    - author issue locks (task-session / lease files)
+    - control-plane leases (author/reviewer/merger/controller/reconciler)
+    - comment-backed active reviewer leases (O3)
+    - local worktree bindings checked out to the branch
+
+    Returns ``{"records": [...], "inventory_error": bool}``. Control-plane
+    inventory errors set inventory_error=True so callers fail closed (O1).
+    """
+    records: list[dict] = []
+    inventory_error = False
+    target_branch = (branch or "").strip()
+    if not target_branch:
+        return {"records": records, "inventory_error": False}
+
+    host_n = branch_cleanup_guard.normalize_host(host)
+
+    def _base_rec(**kwargs):
+        rec = {
+            "remote": remote,
+            "host": host_n or host,
+            "org": org,
+            "repo": repo,
+            "branch": target_branch,
+        }
+        rec.update(kwargs)
+        return rec
+
+    # --- Author issue locks (session + lease) ---
+    try:
+        for path in issue_lock_store.iter_lock_files():
+            lock = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(path)
+            if not isinstance(lock, dict):
+                continue
+            if (
+                str(lock.get("remote") or "") != str(remote)
+                or str(lock.get("org") or "") != str(org)
+                or str(lock.get("repo") or "") != str(repo)
+            ):
+                continue
+            # Host identity when present on the lock
+            lock_host = branch_cleanup_guard.normalize_host(
+                lock.get("host") or lock.get("host_name")
+            )
+            if host_n and lock_host and host_n != lock_host:
+                continue
+            if str(lock.get("branch_name") or "").strip() != target_branch:
+                continue
+            freshness = issue_lock_store.assess_lock_freshness(lock)
+            reclaim = issue_lock_store.assess_expired_lock_reclaim(lock)
+            status = str(freshness.get("status") or "unknown")
+            if freshness.get("live"):
+                status = "active"
+            records.append(
+                _base_rec(
+                    category=branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
+                    status=status,
+                    reclaim_allowed=bool(reclaim.get("reclaim_allowed")),
+                    role="author",
+                )
+            )
+            if freshness.get("live"):
+                records.append(
+                    _base_rec(
+                        category=(
+                            branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_SESSION
+                        ),
+                        status="active",
+                        reclaim_allowed=False,
+                        role="author",
+                    )
+                )
+    except Exception:
+        inventory_error = True
+        records.append(
+            _base_rec(
+                category=branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
+                status="unknown",
+                reclaim_allowed=False,
+                role="author",
+            )
+        )
+
+    # --- Control-plane leases (role-tagged) ---
+    try:
+        db = None
+        if hasattr(control_plane_db, "get_db"):
+            try:
+                db = control_plane_db.get_db()
+            except Exception:
+                db = None
+        if db is None and hasattr(control_plane_db, "ControlPlaneDB"):
+            try:
+                db = control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB()
+            except Exception:
+                db = None
+                inventory_error = True
+        if db is None:
+            # O1: unavailable control-plane inventory fails closed.
+            inventory_error = True
+        else:
+            listed = lease_lifecycle.list_active_leases(
+                db,
+                remote=remote,
+                org=org,
+                repo=repo,
+                include_non_active=True,
+                limit=200,
+            )
+            for lease in listed.get("leases") or []:
+                work_kind = str(lease.get("work_kind") or "")
+                work_number = lease.get("work_number")
+                lease_branch = str(
+                    lease.get("branch")
+                    or lease.get("branch_name")
+                    or ""
+                ).strip()
+                matches_branch = lease_branch == target_branch
+                matches_pr = (
+                    work_kind == "pr"
+                    and pr_number is not None
+                    and int(work_number or 0) == int(pr_number)
+                )
+                if not (matches_branch or matches_pr):
+                    continue
+                if matches_pr and not lease_branch:
+                    lease_branch = target_branch
+                if lease_branch != target_branch:
+                    continue
+                lease_host = branch_cleanup_guard.normalize_host(
+                    lease.get("host") or lease.get("host_name")
+                )
+                if host_n and lease_host and host_n != lease_host:
+                    continue
+                fr = lease.get("freshness") or lease_lifecycle.classify_lease_freshness(
+                    lease
+                )
+                freshness_status = str(
+                    (fr.get("freshness") if isinstance(fr, dict) else None)
+                    or lease.get("status")
+                    or "unknown"
+                )
+                role = str(lease.get("role") or "unknown")
+                category = branch_cleanup_guard.ownership_category_for_role(role)
+                # O2: expired never auto-receives reclaim_allowed=True.
+                if freshness_status == "active":
+                    status = "active"
+                    reclaim_allowed = False
+                elif freshness_status in {"released", "abandoned"}:
+                    status = freshness_status
+                    reclaim_allowed = True
+                elif freshness_status == "expired" or (
+                    isinstance(fr, dict) and fr.get("expired_by_time")
+                ):
+                    status = "expired"
+                    reclaim_allowed = False  # O2 fail closed
+                else:
+                    status = freshness_status
+                    reclaim_allowed = False
+                records.append(
+                    _base_rec(
+                        category=category,
+                        status=status,
+                        reclaim_allowed=reclaim_allowed,
+                        role=role,
+                        host=lease_host or host_n or host,
+                    )
+                )
+    except Exception:
+        # O1: fail closed on control-plane inventory errors.
+        inventory_error = True
+        records.append(
+            _base_rec(
+                category=branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR,
+                status="unknown",
+                reclaim_allowed=False,
+                role="control_plane",
+            )
+        )
+
+    # --- O3: comment-backed active reviewer leases ---
+    if pr_number is not None and auth and base_api:
+        try:
+            comments = api_get_all(
+                f"{base_api}/issues/{int(pr_number)}/comments", auth
+            )
+            active = reviewer_pr_lease.find_active_reviewer_lease(
+                comments, pr_number=int(pr_number)
+            )
+            if active:
+                records.append(
+                    _base_rec(
+                        category=(
+                            branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_REVIEWER_LEASE
+                        ),
+                        status="active",
+                        reclaim_allowed=False,
+                        role="reviewer",
+                    )
+                )
+        except Exception:
+            inventory_error = True
+            records.append(
+                _base_rec(
+                    category=branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR,
+                    status="unknown",
+                    reclaim_allowed=False,
+                    role="reviewer_comment_lease",
+                )
+            )
+
+    # --- Worktree bindings checked out to the target branch ---
+    try:
+        for entry in worktree_cleanup_audit.list_worktrees(project_root):
+            wt_branch = str(entry.get("branch") or "").strip()
+            if wt_branch != target_branch:
+                continue
+            records.append(
+                _base_rec(
+                    category=(
+                        branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING
+                    ),
+                    status="active",
+                    reclaim_allowed=False,
+                    role="worktree",
+                )
+            )
+    except Exception:
+        inventory_error = True
+        records.append(
+            _base_rec(
+                category=branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING,
+                status="unknown",
+                reclaim_allowed=False,
+                role="worktree",
+            )
+        )
+
+    return {"records": records, "inventory_error": inventory_error}
+
 
 
 @mcp.tool()
@@ -6295,6 +6811,66 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
         if remote_assessment.get("safe_to_delete_remote"):
             import urllib.parse
 
+            pr_num = entry.get("pr_number")
+            try:
+                pr_num_int = int(pr_num) if pr_num is not None else None
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                pr_num_int = None
+            ownership_bundle = _collect_branch_ownership_records(
+                remote=remote,
+                host=h,
+                org=o,
+                repo=r,
+                branch=head_branch,
+                pr_number=pr_num_int,
+                project_root=PROJECT_ROOT,
+                auth=auth,
+                base_api=base,
+            )
+            ownership_records = list(ownership_bundle.get("records") or [])
+            if ownership_bundle.get("inventory_error"):
+                ownership_records.append(
+                    {
+                        "category": (
+                            branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR
+                        ),
+                        "status": "unknown",
+                        "remote": remote,
+                        "host": h,
+                        "org": o,
+                        "repo": r,
+                        "branch": head_branch,
+                        "reclaim_allowed": False,
+                        "role": "inventory",
+                    }
+                )
+            ownership = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_active_branch_ownership(
+                remote=remote,
+                org=o,
+                repo=r,
+                branch=head_branch,
+                host=h,
+                records=ownership_records,
+            )
+            if ownership.get("block"):
+                actions.append(
+                    {
+                        "action": "delete_remote_branch",
+                        "branch": head_branch,
+                        "success": False,
+                        "performed": False,
+                        "delete_acknowledged": False,
+                        "verified_absent": False,
+                        "blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership",
+                        "reasons": ownership.get("reasons") or [],
+                        "blocking_categories": ownership.get(
+                            "blocking_categories"
+                        )
+                        or [],
+                    }
+                )
+                continue
+
             encoded = urllib.parse.quote(head_branch, safe="")
             url = f"{base}/branches/{encoded}"
             with _audited(
@@ -6304,14 +6880,28 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
                 org=o,
                 repo=r,
                 target_branch=head_branch,
-                request_metadata={"branch": head_branch, "source": "reconcile_merged_cleanups"},
+                request_metadata={
+                    "branch": head_branch,
+                    "source": "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
+                    "ownership_checked": True,
+                },
             ):
                 api_request("DELETE", url, auth)
+            readback = _probe_remote_branch(h, o, r, auth, head_branch)
+            readback_assessment = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_post_delete_readback(
+                readback
+            )
+            verified = bool(readback_assessment.get("verified_absent"))
             actions.append(
                 {
                     "action": "delete_remote_branch",
                     "branch": head_branch,
-                    "success": True,
+                    "success": bool(readback_assessment.get("ok")),
+                    "performed": True,
+                    "delete_acknowledged": True,
+                    "verified_absent": verified,
+                    "readback": readback_assessment.get("readback"),
+                    "reasons": readback_assessment.get("reasons") or [],
                 }
             )
 
@@ -11269,6 +11859,8 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
         "gitea_commit_files",
         "address_pr_change_requests",
         "delete_branch",
+        "cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
+        "reconciliation_cleanup",
         "work_issue",
         "work-issue",
     }

migrate_profiles.py

@@ -20,12 +20,114 @@ if PROJECT_ROOT not in sys.path:
 import gitea_config
 
 
-AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = ["read", "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr", "comment"]
-AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = ["approve", "request_changes", "merge"]
-REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
-    "read", "review", "comment", "approve", "request_changes", "merge"
+# Defaults emit *canonical* operation names only. Shorthand that is not in
+# gitea_config.GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES (e.g. ``pr.close``, ``issue.close``)
+# is silently dropped by the production loader and must never appear here.
+AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
+    "gitea.read",
+    "gitea.branch.create",
+    "gitea.repo.commit",
+    "gitea.branch.push",
+    "gitea.pr.create",
+    "gitea.pr.comment",
 ]
-REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = ["branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr"]
+AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = [
+    "gitea.pr.approve",
+    "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+    "gitea.pr.merge",
+]
+REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
+    "gitea.read",
+    "gitea.pr.review",
+    "gitea.pr.comment",
+    "gitea.pr.approve",
+    "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+    "gitea.pr.merge",
+]
+REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = [
+    "gitea.branch.create",
+    "gitea.repo.commit",
+    "gitea.branch.push",
+    "gitea.pr.create",
+]
+# Required reconciler ops (read + pr.close) plus recommended comment/close and
+# branch.delete for guarded merged-PR cleanup. All names must normalize via
+# gitea_config.normalize_operation without being dropped.
+RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
+    "gitea.read",
+    "gitea.pr.close",
+    "gitea.pr.comment",
+    "gitea.issue.comment",
+    "gitea.issue.close",
+    "gitea.branch.delete",
+]
+RECONCILER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = [
+    "gitea.pr.approve",
+    "gitea.pr.merge",
+    "gitea.pr.review",
+    "gitea.pr.create",
+    "gitea.branch.push",
+    "gitea.repo.commit",
+]
+
+# Migration-only expansions for common shorthands that are *not* in
+# GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES. Emitted output is always the canonical form so a
+# second canonicalize pass is a no-op (idempotent).
+_MIGRATION_ONLY_ALIASES = {
+    "pr.close": "gitea.pr.close",
+    "pr.comment": "gitea.pr.comment",
+    "issue.close": "gitea.issue.close",
+    "branch.delete": "gitea.branch.delete",
+}
+
+# Reconciler required ops that must survive migration (from reconciler_profile).
+RECONCILER_REQUIRED_CANONICAL = ("gitea.read", "gitea.pr.close")
+
+
+def canonicalize_operation(op: str) -> str:
+    """Return a canonical operation name accepted by the production loader.
+
+    Fail closed on unknown/ambiguous spellings so required permissions cannot
+    be silently dropped by ``check_operation`` later.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(op, str) or not op.strip():
+        raise ValueError("operation must be a non-empty string (fail closed)")
+    op = op.strip()
+    try:
+        return gitea_config.normalize_operation(op)
+    except gitea_config.ConfigError:
+        pass
+    if op in _MIGRATION_ONLY_ALIASES:
+        return _MIGRATION_ONLY_ALIASES[op]
+    raise ValueError(
+        f"operation {op!r} cannot be canonicalized for migration "
+        "(unknown/ambiguous; fail closed — production loader would drop it)"
+    )
+
+
+def canonicalize_operations(ops, *, context: str = "operations") -> list[str]:
+    """Canonicalize a list of operations; preserve order, drop duplicates."""
+    if not isinstance(ops, list):
+        raise ValueError(f"{context} must be a list (fail closed)")
+    out: list[str] = []
+    seen: set[str] = set()
+    for entry in ops:
+        canon = canonicalize_operation(entry)
+        if canon not in seen:
+            seen.add(canon)
+            out.append(canon)
+    return out
+
+
+def _assert_reconciler_required_survive(allowed: list[str], profile_name: str) -> None:
+    """Fail visibly when migration would leave a reconciler without required ops."""
+    missing = [op for op in RECONCILER_REQUIRED_CANONICAL if op not in set(allowed)]
+    if missing:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"Profile '{profile_name}' (reconciler) is missing required "
+            f"operation(s) after migration: {missing}. Refusing to emit a "
+            "profile that would silently fail pr.close / read (fail closed)."
+        )
 
 
 def infer_role(name, execution_profile):
@@ -90,9 +192,11 @@ def migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data):
             ident_name = "reviewer"
         elif role == "author":
             ident_name = "author"
+        elif role == "reconciler":
+            ident_name = "reconciler"
         else:
             role = prof.get("role")
-            if role not in (None, "author", "reviewer"):
+            if role not in (None, "author", "reviewer", "reconciler"):
                 raise ValueError(
                     f"Profile '{name}' has unsupported role {role!r}"
                 )
@@ -124,20 +228,35 @@ def migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data):
                 raise ValueError(
                     f"Profile '{name}' operation fields must be lists"
                 )
-            identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(allowed)
-            identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(forbidden)
+            try:
+                identity_data["allowed_operations"] = canonicalize_operations(
+                    allowed, context=f"profile '{name}' allowed_operations"
+                )
+                identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = canonicalize_operations(
+                    forbidden, context=f"profile '{name}' forbidden_operations"
+                )
+            except ValueError as exc:
+                raise ValueError(f"Profile '{name}': {exc}") from exc
         elif role == "author":
             identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
             identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
         elif role == "reviewer":
             identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
             identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
+        elif role == "reconciler":
+            identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
+            identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(RECONCILER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
         else:
             raise ValueError(
                 f"Profile '{name}' has no explicit operation lists and no "
                 "unambiguous author/reviewer role marker (fail closed)"
             )
 
+        if role == "reconciler":
+            _assert_reconciler_required_survive(
+                identity_data["allowed_operations"], name
+            )
+
         # Nest inside environments/services structure
         env = environments.setdefault(env_name, {})
         services = env.setdefault("services", {})

reconciler_profile.py

@@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ RECONCILER_RECOMMENDED_OPERATIONS = (
     "gitea.pr.comment",
     "gitea.issue.comment",
     "gitea.issue.close",
+    # Merged-branch cleanup is reconciler-owned (task_capability_map maps
+    # cleanup_merged_pr_branch -> reconciler). The permission is only
+    # exercisable through the guarded gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path
+    # (#514): merged proof, protected-branch refusal, explicit confirmation.
+    "gitea.branch.delete",
 )
 
 RECONCILER_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS = (

tests/test_audit_reconciliation_mode.py

@@ -27,7 +27,13 @@ from task_capability_map import required_permission, required_role
 
 DELETE_PROFILE = {
     "profile_name": "prgs-author-delete",
-    "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.branch.delete"],
+    "role": "author",
+    "allowed_operations": [
+        "gitea.read",
+        "gitea.pr.create",
+        "gitea.branch.push",
+        "gitea.branch.delete",
+    ],
     "forbidden_operations": [],
     "audit_label": "prgs-author-delete",
 }

tests/test_mcp_server.py

@@ -1425,10 +1425,16 @@ class TestReviewPR(unittest.TestCase):
 class TestDeleteBranch(unittest.TestCase):
 
     DELETE_PROFILE = {
-        "profile_name": "test-deleter",
-        "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.branch.delete"],
+        "profile_name": "test-author-deleter",
+        "role": "author",
+        "allowed_operations": [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.pr.create",
+            "gitea.branch.push",
+            "gitea.branch.delete",
+        ],
         "forbidden_operations": [],
-        "audit_label": "test-deleter",
+        "audit_label": "test-author-deleter",
     }
 
     @patch("mcp_server.get_profile", return_value=DELETE_PROFILE)

tests/test_migrate_profiles.py

@@ -92,14 +92,19 @@ class TestMigrateProfiles(unittest.TestCase):
         author = prgs_gitea["identities"]["author"]
         self.assertEqual(author["username"], "jcwalker3")
         self.assertEqual(author["auth"]["id"], "redacted-author-ref")
-        self.assertEqual(author["allowed_operations"], ["read", "comment"])
-        self.assertEqual(author["forbidden_operations"], ["approve", "merge"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            author["allowed_operations"], ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.comment"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            author["forbidden_operations"],
+            ["gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge"],
+        )
 
         reviewer = prgs_gitea["identities"]["reviewer"]
         self.assertEqual(reviewer["role"], "reviewer")
         self.assertEqual(reviewer["username"], "sysadmin")
         self.assertEqual(reviewer["auth"]["id"], "redacted-reviewer-ref")
-        self.assertIn("merge", reviewer["allowed_operations"])
+        self.assertIn("gitea.pr.merge", reviewer["allowed_operations"])
 
     def test_alias_generation(self):
         """Test that aliases are correctly generated to support old profile names."""
@@ -188,7 +193,7 @@ class TestMigrateProfiles(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertNotIn("token", stdout_output.lower())
 
     def test_explicit_operations_are_preserved(self):
-        """Explicit v1 permissions must not be replaced by role defaults."""
+        """Explicit v1 permissions are canonicalized, not replaced by role defaults."""
         v1_data = json.loads(json.dumps(self.v1_content))
         v1_data["profiles"]["prgs-reviewer"]["allowed_operations"] = ["read"]
         v1_data["profiles"]["prgs-reviewer"]["forbidden_operations"] = ["merge"]
@@ -198,8 +203,8 @@ class TestMigrateProfiles(unittest.TestCase):
             v2_data["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]
             ["identities"]["reviewer"]
         )
-        self.assertEqual(reviewer["allowed_operations"], ["read"])
-        self.assertEqual(reviewer["forbidden_operations"], ["merge"])
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["allowed_operations"], ["gitea.read"])
+        self.assertEqual(reviewer["forbidden_operations"], ["gitea.pr.merge"])
 
     def test_inferred_role_defaults_only_when_unambiguous(self):
         """Role defaults are allowed only for clear author/reviewer profiles."""
@@ -306,6 +311,171 @@ class TestMigrateProfiles(unittest.TestCase):
                 migrate_profiles.main()
             self.assertEqual(cm.exception.code, 1)
 
+    def test_reconciler_profile_migration(self):
+        """Legacy reconciler shorthands migrate to valid canonical operations."""
+        import gitea_config
+        import reconciler_profile
+
+        v1_data = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-reconciler": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "reconciler-agent",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "reconciler-ref"},
+                    "execution_profile": "prgs-reconciler",
+                    "allowed_operations": [
+                        "read",
+                        "pr.close",
+                        "pr.comment",
+                        "issue.comment",
+                        "issue.close",
+                        "gitea.branch.delete",
+                    ],
+                    "forbidden_operations": [
+                        "merge",
+                        "approve",
+                        "review",
+                        "pr.create",
+                        "branch.push",
+                        "commit",
+                    ],
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+        reconciler = (
+            v2_data["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]
+            ["identities"]["reconciler"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(reconciler["role"], "reconciler")
+        allowed = reconciler["allowed_operations"]
+        forbidden = reconciler["forbidden_operations"]
+        # No invalid shorthand remains
+        for bad in ("pr.close", "pr.comment", "issue.close", "read", "merge"):
+            self.assertNotIn(bad, allowed)
+            self.assertNotIn(bad, forbidden)
+        for required in (
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.pr.close",
+            "gitea.pr.comment",
+            "gitea.issue.comment",
+            "gitea.issue.close",
+            "gitea.branch.delete",
+        ):
+            self.assertIn(required, allowed)
+            # Production loader accepts every allowed op
+            self.assertEqual(
+                gitea_config.normalize_operation(required), required
+            )
+        self.assertEqual(v2_data["aliases"]["prgs-reconciler"], "prgs.gitea.reconciler")
+        assessment = reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile(allowed, forbidden)
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["valid"])
+        self.assertTrue(migrate_profiles.validate_v2_data(v2_data))
+
+    def test_reconciler_profile_defaults(self):
+        """Reconciler defaults are fully canonical and loader-valid."""
+        import gitea_config
+        import reconciler_profile
+
+        v1_data = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-reconciler": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "reconciler-agent",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "reconciler-ref"},
+                    "execution_profile": "prgs-reconciler",
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        v2_data = migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+        reconciler = (
+            v2_data["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]
+            ["identities"]["reconciler"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(reconciler["role"], "reconciler")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            reconciler["allowed_operations"],
+            migrate_profiles.RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            reconciler["forbidden_operations"],
+            migrate_profiles.RECONCILER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN,
+        )
+        for op in reconciler["allowed_operations"]:
+            self.assertEqual(gitea_config.normalize_operation(op), op)
+            self.assertTrue(op.startswith("gitea."))
+        assessment = reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile(
+            reconciler["allowed_operations"],
+            reconciler["forbidden_operations"],
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["valid"])
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            "gitea.branch.delete", assessment["missing_recommended_operations"]
+        )
+
+    def test_reconciler_migration_idempotent_canonicalize(self):
+        """Second canonicalize of already-canonical ops is a no-op."""
+        first = migrate_profiles.canonicalize_operations(
+            list(migrate_profiles.RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
+        )
+        second = migrate_profiles.canonicalize_operations(first)
+        self.assertEqual(first, second)
+        self.assertEqual(first, list(migrate_profiles.RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED))
+
+    def test_reconciler_missing_required_fails_visibly(self):
+        """Missing gitea.pr.close after migration fails closed (not silent drop)."""
+        v1_data = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-reconciler": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "reconciler-agent",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "reconciler-ref"},
+                    "execution_profile": "prgs-reconciler",
+                    "allowed_operations": ["read", "gitea.branch.delete"],
+                    "forbidden_operations": ["merge"],
+                }
+            },
+        }
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "missing required"):
+            migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+
+    def test_unknown_operation_fails_visibly(self):
+        v1_data = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "profiles": {
+                "prgs-author": {
+                    "base_url": "redacted-prgs-service",
+                    "username": "jcwalker3",
+                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "hidden-author-ref"},
+                    "execution_profile": "prgs-author",
+                    "allowed_operations": ["read", "not.a.real.op"],
+                    "forbidden_operations": ["merge"],
+                }
+            },
+        }
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "cannot be canonicalized"):
+            migrate_profiles.migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data)
+
+    def test_role_inference_author_reviewer_merger_reconciler(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            migrate_profiles.infer_role("prgs-author", "prgs-author"), "author"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            migrate_profiles.infer_role("prgs-reviewer", "prgs-reviewer"),
+            "reviewer",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            migrate_profiles.infer_role("prgs-reconciler", "prgs-reconciler"),
+            "reconciler",
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(
+            migrate_profiles.infer_role("prgs-merger", "prgs-merger")
+        )
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()
+

tests/test_reconciler_profile.py

@@ -82,6 +82,42 @@ class TestReconcilerProfileModel(unittest.TestCase):
             "reconciler",
         )
 
+    def test_branch_delete_is_recommended_for_reconciler(self):
+        self.assertIn(
+            "gitea.branch.delete",
+            reconciler_profile.RECONCILER_RECOMMENDED_OPERATIONS,
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            "gitea.branch.delete",
+            reconciler_profile.RECONCILER_REQUIRED_OPERATIONS,
+        )
+
+    def test_reconciler_with_branch_delete_stays_valid(self):
+        allowed = PRGS_RECONCILER_ALLOWED + ["gitea.branch.delete"]
+        result = reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile(
+            allowed,
+            PRGS_RECONCILER_FORBIDDEN,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["is_reconciler_profile"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["valid"])
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            "gitea.branch.delete", result["missing_recommended_operations"]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            mcp_server._role_kind(allowed, PRGS_RECONCILER_FORBIDDEN),
+            "reconciler",
+        )
+
+    def test_reconciler_without_branch_delete_reports_missing_recommended(self):
+        result = reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile(
+            PRGS_RECONCILER_ALLOWED,
+            PRGS_RECONCILER_FORBIDDEN,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["valid"])
+        self.assertIn(
+            "gitea.branch.delete", result["missing_recommended_operations"]
+        )
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()