e344e68a1345cb21db06776eef839f863b81f3e5
2
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 sysadmin
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e344e68a13 |
fix(fleet): dedicated retirement capability, identity proof, external fencing
Addresses the three blocking findings in review 657 on PR #982 and nothing
else.
B1 — apply was authorized by gitea.read
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Plan and apply shared the observational permission class, so any profile that
could look could also destroy; the mutation landing in the local control-plane
registry rather than in Gitea makes it no less a mutation.
Apply now requires its own capability, gitea.worker_registry.retire, checked at
entry and re-resolved immediately before the registry mutation. Plan stays on
gitea.read. No profile holds the new permission by default, so author,
reviewer, merger, and read-only profiles fail closed on the permission itself
rather than on the role check alone; the controller/reconciler role restriction
remains as defence in depth. Granting it is a deliberate operator edit to
profiles.json, and removing it revokes apply completely. No new Gitea write
permission is introduced and no author permission is broadened.
B2 — complete legacy rows could be retired without identity proof
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"Incomplete identity" previously meant only that pre-existing columns were
null, which a legacy-pid row satisfies trivially. Retirement now requires an
affirmative two-part proof: launcher-minted inst- attribution, plus fencing
evidence (host_id, boot_id, process_start_time) that turns a bare pid into a
statement about one process incarnation.
New mcp_process_fencing supplies those probes; every one returns None rather
than guessing, and None always preserves. Rows written before these columns
existed, and rows on legacy instance identities, are preserved permanently —
they are retired only after re-registering under a trusted identity. That
legacy rows would otherwise remain outstanding is explicitly not treated as
grounds for a weaker proof. A live pid stays an absolute block even across a
boot boundary, and pid reuse is reported distinctly from a live worker.
B3 — lease and OS liveness sat outside the registry transaction
---------------------------------------------------------------
BEGIN IMMEDIATE locks the worker registry only, and the per-target loop runs
after revalidation, so a lease acquired or a pid revived in between would go
unnoticed — the registry-column guard cannot catch it because no registry
column changed.
Two mechanisms now close that window, both applied per target immediately
before its own write: an external_fence_fn version token over active leases,
captured inside the transaction before the authoritative read and re-compared
before every guarded UPDATE (movement aborts the whole transaction; an
unreadable lease store raises rather than comparing equal), and a liveness_fn
re-probe that must affirmatively re-establish that this exact process is gone,
comparing process_start_time so a reused pid is refused. Omitting the re-probe
retires nothing rather than proceeding unfenced. The guarded UPDATE also
asserts the fencing triple is unchanged, and all three columns participate in
the CAS token.
Preserved from the accepted work: registry_fingerprint still excludes
observation time and is order- and numeric-typing stable, plan still mutates
nothing, drift still retires zero, retired rows stay historical, and ordinary
author operations remain ungated by fleet state.
Tests: tests/test_issue_980_stale_worker_retirement.py 87 passed, 46 subtests
(was 40 passed, 23 subtests), covering all three blockers' required
regressions. Adjacent suites (#980, #978, #975, #948, task-capability role
invariants) 242 passed, 156 subtests. Full suite from the branch worktree
28 failed, 6253 passed, 6 skipped, 1152 subtests; master baseline at
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 sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8
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c0c6d14b73 |
feat(fleet): add CAS-protected stale worker retirement capability
Adds a sanctioned controller/reconciler capability that retires conclusively stale MCP worker-registry rows through a dry-run-first, compare-and-swap protected workflow (#980). The #978 fleet snapshot is read-only, and its registry_revision is seeded with snapshot_at at second precision, so a CAS gated on it can never pass. That token is left unchanged; retirement gets its own stable registry_fingerprint derived exclusively from canonical retirement-relevant registry content, plus a candidate_fingerprint pinning the approved set. Identical contents observed at different times produce the same token; row order never affects it; any retirement-relevant change moves it. WorkerRegistry.retire_stale_workers performs the whole decision inside one BEGIN IMMEDIATE transaction: re-read rows, recompute the fingerprint from those rows, recompute the eligibility plan from those rows (re-reading active workflow leases), compare the candidate fingerprint, revalidate every target, then retire each survivor with a guarded UPDATE asserting its status, heartbeat, generation, session, fencing epoch, and pid are unchanged. Drift retires zero workers and reports registry_revision_moved or candidate_set_moved; any exception rolls back and reports transaction_failed, so a partial write is never reported as success. Retirement requires a full conjunction: active status, complete registry fields, parsable heartbeat, not live, pid_alive false, expired heartbeat, stale ownership, canonical repository binding, no identity evidence shared with a live or unprobeable worker, and no active workflow-lease ownership. Everything else is preserved with a structured reason code. Retired rows become historical rather than stale and keep their history; nothing is deleted. Retirement does not repair untrusted live identity: live workers on legacy instance identities are preserved and keep their legacy_incomplete_identity blockers, so the result never claims the fleet became safe. Exposed as gitea_plan_stale_worker_retirement and gitea_apply_stale_worker_retirement, restricted to controller/reconciler role kinds. The Gitea operation gate stays gitea.read because the mutation lands in the local control-plane registry, matching the #601 lease lifecycle; no new Gitea write permission is introduced and no author permission is broadened. Tests: tests/test_issue_980_stale_worker_retirement.py (40 passed, 23 subtests), including the regression test proving the old snapshot_at derivation moved the token one second apart while the new registry CAS token does not. Full suite from the branch worktree matches the master baseline exactly: 28 failed / 6206 passed vs 28 failed / 6166 passed, identical failure set. Closes #980 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> |