#706 routed the #274 filesystem guards and the session repository slug through
the configured canonical_repository_root. Three consumption paths were left
deriving from the Gitea-Tools installation checkout.
F1 — gitea_get_runtime_context did not normalize its `remote` argument, while
gitea_whoami did. On a prgs-hosted namespace whose first native call was the
runtime-context path, the 'dadeschools' argument default was pinned: identity
resolved against the wrong host, and because first-bind is first-write-wins a
later correct gitea_whoami(remote="prgs") could not repair the binding. It now
calls _effective_remote before any host lookup, identity resolution, or session
seeding. Explicit remotes pass through untouched and a dadeschools-hosted
profile still resolves to dadeschools.
F2 — _delete_branch_repository_binding_block derived its expected slug from
_workspace_repository_slug, which reads _local_git_remote_url in PROJECT_ROOT
(always Gitea-Tools). For a cross-repository namespace this inverted the guard:
the genuinely bound target was rejected and Gitea-Tools was accepted. The
canonical-root branch already present in _trusted_session_repository is
extracted as _canonical_repository_slug and shared by both call sites. A
configured-but-unresolvable root now fails closed instead of falling back to
the installation identity; unconfigured namespaces keep the install-derived
default unchanged.
F3 — gitea_assess_master_parity measures Gitea-Tools server implementation
parity only. That is intentional and is preserved: startup_head, current_head,
in_parity, stale, and restart_required keep their existing meaning and values,
and only the server dimension gates mutations. Two separately labelled
dimensions are added — server_implementation (installation root and commit) and
target_repository (canonical root, repository slug, checkout head, last-known
remote master head, staleness) — so cross-repository commissioning evidence can
distinguish them. The target assessment makes no network call: the remote side
is read from the existing remote-tracking ref, and an unfetched target is
reported indeterminate rather than guessed at.
Verified intentional and left unchanged: the #274 workspace-membership,
author-mutation-worktree, and branches-only guards already validate against the
configured canonical root; explicit org/repo may confirm but never authorize a
binding; and the four-role repository-specific configuration surface already
passes audit and bind-time validation with a wrong root failing closed.
Tests: 31 new cases in tests/test_cross_repo_canonical_consumption.py using
real git repositories and no network. Full suite 3298 passed / 6 skipped
against a clean-baseline 3267; the 2 failures
(test_issue_702_review_findings_f1_f6, test_reconciler_supersession_close)
reproduce identically on unmodified master a8d2087 and are pre-existing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013jUxaLVLkPHuTQwAzFzztW
Addresses REQUEST_CHANGES review 457 on PR #736.
Root cause: _trusted_session_repository derived the session org/repository
solely from _workspace_repository_slug -> _local_git_remote_url, which runs
`git remote get-url` in PROJECT_ROOT (the Gitea-Tools install checkout). A
cross-repository namespace with a configured canonical_repository_root then
pinned the Gitea-Tools identity while #274 filesystem membership bound the
external target, so _enforce_canonical_repository_root failed closed on a
self-inflicted identity mismatch and the mcp-control-plane / eagenda
namespaces stayed blocked end-to-end.
Fix: when a canonical_repository_root is configured (env over profile) and
passes existence / git-toplevel / resolvable-remote-identity validation, the
session repository slug is derived from repository_identity_slug(configured
root) instead of the install remote. The derived identity is still authorized
by the profile allowed_repositories allowlist (never self-authorizing); the
canonical filesystem root and org/repo identity remain immutable for the
session; invalid / non-git / unresolvable / unallowlisted / forged / drift
cases fail closed; unconfigured single-repo Gitea-Tools namespaces keep the
install-derived slug unchanged.
Tests: new tests/test_issue_706_f1_seed_identity_integration.py drives the
real _seed_session_context -> _enforce_canonical_repository_root path with two
real temporary git repositories (install=Gitea-Tools, configured target=
mcp-control-plane): env + profile config, reviewer + merger role kinds, and
fail-closed cases (nonexistent / non-git / unallowlisted / forged identity
drift). Reproduces the F1 block before the fix; green after.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Session-bound author mutations (create_issue, lock_issue, create_pr, etc.)
called verify_preflight_purity without org/repo, so anti-stomp filled the
remote-wide REMOTES default (prgs → Timesheet) and false-positived wrong_repo
against a Gitea-Tools checkout even when callers passed explicit coordinates.
Mirror _resolve: prefer workspace-derived identity for omitted coordinates on
session-bound tasks; keep delete_branch's explicit-target contract (#733).
Also forward org/repo at author mutation call sites. Add cross-repo regression
coverage. Do not change REMOTES["prgs"]["repo"].
The MCP server derived the canonical repository root from the install
checkout the server script lives in (PROJECT_ROOT), so any namespace that
ran the server against an external repository (e.g. eagenda-author, or the
mcp-control-plane reviewer/merger namespaces) failed every mutation: the
branches-only / worktree-membership guards (#274) compared the task
workspace against the Gitea-Tools .git directory it can never belong to.
Separate the two concepts:
- PROJECT_ROOT stays the immutable code/install root.
- A new, optional, namespace-scoped canonical_repository_root binds the
session to the working root of the target repository.
Implementation:
- canonical_repository_root.py: resolve the binding from profile/env
(GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_ROOT overrides the profile field), validate
existence + git identity, fail closed on missing/conflicting/forged
bindings. Preserves the single-repo default when unconfigured.
- session_context_binding.py: pin canonical_repository_root into the
immutable #714 session context; drift fails closed.
- namespace_workspace_binding.py: route the configured target root through
resolve_namespace_mutation_context so #274 / membership guards evaluate
against the target repository.
- gitea_mcp_server.py: seed + enforce the binding in the mutation preflight
(both purity-order and FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS paths); validate repository
identity and git common-directory membership.
- gitea_config.py: validate the optional absolute-path profile field.
- gitea_auth.py: surface the config-sourced field through get_profile.
No weakening of root-checkout, remote/repository, or anti-stomp guards; the
single-repo Gitea-Tools path is unchanged.
Tests: two distinct real git repositories/worktrees prove cross-repository
bindings resolve, enforce membership, and fail closed on forged/conflicting
identity and simultaneous prgs/mdcps isolation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
gitea_delete_branch accepted explicit org/repo but did not propagate them
through the anti-stomp preflight. During a deletion targeting
Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools, preflight resolved the remote-wide prgs
default (Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet) and failed closed with wrong_repo
before any deletion — because verify_preflight_purity was called without
org/repo and the shared #604 anti-stomp resolution fell back to the REMOTES
default.
Fix (delete_branch only; REMOTES untouched):
1. Forward the explicit org/repo into verify_preflight_purity so the shared
#604 anti-stomp resolution validates the *targeted* repository instead of
the remote-wide default. Explicit Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools now
propagates through role/workspace verification, verify_preflight_purity,
anti-stomp repository resolution, and the final native deletion request.
2. Add a workspace-derived repository-binding gate
(_delete_branch_repository_binding_block) that validates explicit
coordinates against the immutable, workspace-aligned repository identity.
Wrong, substituted, or unverified coordinates fail closed — independent of
the anti-stomp remote/repo guard, which by the #530 contract trusts explicit
caller intent. REMOTES defaults are never consulted as an authorization
scope.
Preserved: reconciler-only ownership of gitea.branch.delete; author/reviewer/
merger denial; protected and preservation/evidence gates; missing coordinates
still fail closed via the anti-stomp default resolution.
Regression matrix (tests/test_issue_733_delete_branch_repo_forwarding.py):
Timesheet-default + explicit Gitea-Tools permits an eligible deletion and
forwards the coordinates; wrong/substituted/unverified coordinates fail closed;
author/reviewer/merger remain denied; protected and preservation branches
remain blocked; anti-stomp resolution marks explicit coordinates authoritative
and fails closed on the remote-wide default for omitted coordinates; the
task-capability and role-routing maps stay consistent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UVDxVKANhuGYzZgayDU3QS
Mutation tools (create_issue, create_pr, delete_branch, issue-lock) returned
reason_code=internal_error / retryable=false with no class, message, HTTP
status, or actionable detail. The #699/#701 tool-error boundary intentionally
collapses every non-typed exception to a fixed "Internal tool error" and drops
the class and message, so a mutation failure is undiagnosable — and the #695
runtime guard blocks standalone reproduction. The true failing stage was
therefore invisible by two independent mechanisms.
Make the failure observable and actionable without weakening the secret-free
contract:
- Boundary (internal_error path ONLY): capture a safe exception class (a Python
type identifier, never instance text) plus a strictly-redacted `detail`
(token/Authorization/Bearer credentials, JSON/kv secret values incl. short
passwords, raw URLs/hostnames, and absolute filesystem paths all stripped;
whitespace collapsed; length-bounded) and an optional `mutation_stage`. Typed
auth/authz/network/config/http paths are unchanged and still emit no detail.
- Convert raw exceptions into typed structured errors via a safe
`gitea_reason_code` attribute contract: server raisers may self-declare a
known reason and the boundary emits it (fixed message) instead of an opaque
internal_error. Pre-flight order violations now raise `_PreflightOrderError`
(a RuntimeError subclass → preflight_order_violation).
- Add a `_mutation_stage` context manager tagging escaping exceptions with the
stage name (preflight_purity / resolve_auth / api_*), applied to
delete_branch, create_issue, create_pr.
Fail-closed identity/repo/worktree/role/permission/lock/lease/ancestry gates
are untouched; only error *reporting* changed. New suite
test_mutation_error_diagnostics.py (18 tests) pins the redaction, class capture,
stage tagging, typed conversion, and adversarial no-leak contract. Existing
boundary suite (25), core server (209), and preflight (92) suites stay green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Remote post-merge branch deletion was blocked because the capability
resolver classified delete_branch as an author-role task while
gitea.branch.delete is granted only to prgs-reconciler. No configured
profile could satisfy both the permission gate and the role gate, so
every deletion failed closed with performed=false.
Re-home delete_branch from the author role to the reconciler role in
both single-source-of-truth maps:
- task_capability_map.TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP["delete_branch"].role
- role_session_router: TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE + AUTHOR_TASKS/RECONCILER_TASKS
resolve_task_capability("delete_branch") now resolves to prgs-reconciler.
In gitea_delete_branch, the reconciler is now the delete-capable role and
performs raw deletion through the existing reconciliation-cleanup-phase
authorization gate (operator approval + safe_to_delete proof) plus the
preservation/protected guards; the prior reconciler->cleanup redirect is
removed as it would orphan that guarded flow. Author, reviewer, and
merger stay denied by the permission gate and the required-role gate.
gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch remains a separate reconciler-owned path
with independent merged/ancestry/ownership verification.
Tests: reconciler resolves + performs eligible deletion; author/reviewer/
merger denied even when holding the permission; protected/preservation
branches remain fail-closed; both role maps asserted in agreement.
Updated pre-existing tests that encoded the superseded author-delete /
#687 reconciler-redirect contract. Full suite: 3190 passed, 6 skipped,
1 pre-existing unrelated failure (test_issue_702 create_pr stale-binding).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UracxyRHQw49rZBaexHdft
_verify_role_mutation_workspace dropped org/repo, so anti-stomp resolved bare
remote=prgs to Timesheet and failed closed wrong_repo on Gitea-Tools. Forward
explicit org/repo for merger/reviewer lease acquire, adopt, review, merge, and
lease release. Add regression for merger acquire forwarding.
Fixes#718
Refs #723
gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease previously continued when GET /pulls returned
an empty head SHA. Fail closed so exact-head scoping never proceeds with an
unresolvable live head. Add regression coverage for empty head payloads.
Fixes#718
Refs #723
Prevent approved PRs from stalling when master advances. Add
gitea_assess_pr_sync_status and gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge with
head/base pinning, author-only updates, conflict handoff, and approval
invalidation after head changes. Wire task capability map, sequential
controller routing in review-merge workflow, and hermetic AC tests.
Harden gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease with required candidate_head, live-head
match, and fail-closed POST handling. Add capability-map aliases for reviewer
and merger lease acquire/adopt. Make unknown tasks return structured
unknown_task (no ValueError escape). Expand tests for roles, head scoping,
aliases, and unknown_task.
Closes#718. Addresses #723 resolver unknown_task and lease task mapping.
This implements the native merger lease acquisition tool to allow a merger session to acquire its own lease when a reviewer lease does not exist or has expired, unblocking #679 adoption.
Stale-runtime detection remains fail-closed, but gitea_resolve_task_capability
must never touch mcp_config.json, spawn recovery threads, or call os._exit.
- Remove _trigger_mcp_auto_restart from the read-only diagnostics path
- Return blocker_kind=runtime_reconnect_required with mutation_performed=false
- Keep exact_safe_next_action pointing at IDE/client reconnect when stale
- Add regression suite across author/reviewer/merger/reconciler profiles
EXCEPTIONAL OPERATOR-AUTHORIZED BREAK-GLASS RECOVERY - incident #722.
Commit 970e68b ("fix: adopt_merger_pr_lease requires merger role") was an
unreviewed direct push that flipped 11 task_capability_map.py entries to
role="merger" instead of the intended 1. Merger profiles forbid the review
permissions, so no configured profile could resolve review_pr / approve_pr /
request_changes_pr (matching_configured_profile was empty repository-wide)
and no fix PR could be formally reviewed. The operator resolved the catch-22
with a one-time break-glass authorization recorded on issue #722
(comment 11918); this commit is the authorized minimum and nothing more.
Changes:
- task_capability_map.py restored to blob 02826af (the preserved intended
correction, local commit c071f8a1): the 10 regressive entries return to
role="reviewer"; adopt_merger_pr_lease keeps role="merger"; merge_pr is
untouched.
- tests/test_task_capability_role_invariants.py added (#723 AC1/AC2):
profile-coverage invariant for formal review tasks, map/router agreement,
merger-only adopt_merger_pr_lease and merge_pr, merger profiles cannot
hold review permissions.
Validation: focused role-mapping tests 72 passed (+22 subtests); full suite
2900 passed, 6 skipped, 1 known warning, 195 subtests.
Recovery step 1 for incident #722; code-defect follow-ups tracked in #723.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EnHNSVQvJ8nCk7KZ9kL4Ym
Terminal review-decision ledgers are recovery-critical provenance, not
disposable session cache. A generic four-hour TTL previously made
fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed unreachable after age expiry on open
PRs (PR #616 / review 443 reproduction).
- Classify KIND_DECISION_LOCK as RECOVERY_CRITICAL so load/mark_final work
after >4h without hand-editing session-state files
- Stamp kind + recovery_critical on save for compatibility
- Add inspect_state_envelope so assessment reports on-disk evidence instead
of silent "no lock" when TTL would hide non-critical kinds
- Surface disk_inspect on stale decision-lock cleanup assessment
Preserves same-head #332 hard-stop, #620 head-scoped fresh review, #594
moot cleanup, and #709 irrecoverable authorization (no ordinary-profile
permission grant).
Require branch-scoped post-delete not-found (not generic/repo/host 404),
emit consistent top-level cleanup fields, fail closed on ownership inventory
errors, never auto-reclaim expired control-plane leases, include active
comment-backed reviewer leases, apply the same gates to reconcile_merged_cleanups,
and match ownership with normalized host identity.
Require authoritative not-found readback after merged-PR branch DELETE, and
block cleanup when active author/reviewer/merger/controller/reconciler
session, lease, or worktree-binding ownership still uses the target branch.
Close the #714 remediation gap left at 943d402 where env-only mutation
profiles, REMOTES Timesheet defaults treated as explicit caller input, and
machine-dependent Git remotes produced false greens.
- Fail closed when mutations lack a config-backed profile with non-empty
allowed_repositories; env ops cannot invent mutation authority.
- Preserve omitted-vs-explicit org/repo provenance through the mutation
gate; omitted targets bind to the verified workspace repository.
- Prefer workspace-aligned Git remotes over historical Timesheet defaults
in MCP _resolve and CLI resolve_remote.
- Centralize deterministic config-backed mutation fixtures; migrate
mutation tests off env-only authority without weakening security
assertions.
Full suite: 2744 passed, 6 skipped.
The independent review reproduced a real hole: the production first-bind path
never pinned repository/org, so the drift checks it feeds were skipped.
Root cause
----------
gitea_whoami, gitea_get_runtime_context, gitea_resolve_task_capability and
gitea_activate_profile all seeded the session context without repository or
org. First-bind-wins then made the mutation gate's later seed a no-op, and
assess_session_context only compares repository/org when the bound fields are
non-null. Result, reproduced in production order with the real REMOTES:
after whoami: repository=None org=None
same-host repo=Other-Tools -> NOT BLOCKED
same-host org=Other-Org -> NOT BLOCKED
cross-host -> blocked (this part always worked)
Binding REMOTES defaults would not fix it: REMOTES['prgs'].repo is 'Timesheet'
(a default *target*, not an authorization scope, see #530), so pinning it fails
closed on every legitimate Gitea-Tools mutation. There was no trusted source
for repository scope, so this adds one.
Design
------
- New optional profile field `allowed_repositories`: canonical owner/repository
slugs. An authorization boundary, never the binding itself. Config-only —
no env var can widen or forge it.
- The session repository is derived from the verified, workspace-aligned git
remote, never from caller-supplied org/repo, and validated against that
allowlist. The session binds immutably to exactly one canonical slug; org is
derived from it. A profile authorizing several repositories still binds to
the single verified one.
- Every first-bind entry point now pins the same complete context. Activation
rejects an unauthorized/unverifiable workspace. Mutations fail closed when
repository/org is unverified, and a tool-level org/repo override that
disagrees with the binding is rejected before the write.
- A mutation request can no longer establish, complete, or replace the binding
(it previously seeded from `org or REMOTES[...]`, i.e. caller-controlled).
- Enforcement is opt-in per profile: a profile without the field keeps prior
behaviour, so existing static-profile namespaces stay functional.
First-bind-wins, immutability, the RLock, profile isolation, host/identity
validation and the private pytest-only reset are unchanged.
gitea_auth.get_profile() built an explicit whitelist dict and silently dropped
`allowed_repositories`; the new integration tests caught that the scope was
never enforced through the real path.
Tests
-----
New tests/test_issue_714_production_first_bind.py drives the real entry points
in production order rather than constructing _SessionContext directly. Covers
complete first bind via each entry point, same-host repo/org drift, Timesheet
and other-repo/other-org rejection, unverified and unauthorized workspaces,
caller values unable to establish the binding, concurrent init selecting one
repository, and the PR #715 author path staying functional. Mutation-verified:
disabling trusted derivation, override validation, the scope check, or the
get_profile passthrough each fails these tests (9/8/4/5 failures).
No security assertion was weakened, removed, skipped, or rewritten.
Focused: 26 passed. Issue #714 total: 46 passed. Prior failing modules: 240
passed. Config/profile/remote modules: 130 passed. Full suite: 2739 passed,
6 skipped, 1 pre-existing warning, 161 subtests in 25.80s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The formal REQUEST_CHANGES review on PR #715 was resolved by the test
isolation commit (29ffe14); the full suite is green. Auditing the required
session-lifecycle coverage surfaced three gaps that the suite did not prove:
- Every cross-host test pinned mdcps-reviewer and denied prgs. The reverse
direction (a pinned MDCPS profile must never serve a prgs request, nor be
swapped for prgs-author) was unproven.
- test_parallel_calls_cannot_overwrite_established_binding binds first and
then races, so concurrent *initialization* from an unbound context — N
threads racing to first-bind, exactly one winner, no torn context — was
unproven.
- assess_session_context checks repository and org drift, but no test bound a
repository/org and asserted a same-host mismatch fails closed.
Adds three tests covering those cases. Each was mutation-verified: disabling
the first-bind-wins guard, the cross-host denial, and the repository/org drift
checks makes the corresponding test fail.
Additive only — no production code changed and no existing security assertion
weakened, skipped, or rewritten.
Focused: 20 passed. Full suite: 2713 passed, 6 skipped, 1 pre-existing warning,
161 subtests passed in 23.05s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Address formal review 438 REQUEST_CHANGES on PR #710 (F6/F7/F8).
F6 — HMAC key-version validation fails closed:
- verify_authorization_artifact validates key_version BEFORE any MAC work, so an
attacker-chosen version can never select the signing key.
- Require exactly one nonempty, well-formed key-version field; missing, empty,
unknown, malformed, duplicated (including identical-valued and nested
aliases), and mismatched versions all fail. No versionless legacy fallback.
- Artifact version must equal the configured active version; production now
requires GITEA_IRRECOVERABLE_AUTH_HMAC_KEY_VERSION explicitly (an implicit
default made rotation ambiguous). Version stays inside the signed material.
F7 — strictly canonical incident evidence:
- Replace substring/first-match parsing with an exact schema: marker on line 1,
every field once, fixed order, no duplicate/unknown/empty/conflicting fields
in or outside the signed block. The parsed body is re-rendered and compared
for exact equality before acceptance.
- content_digest now binds the full recovery scope: repository identity, PR,
decision-lock identity, destroyed subject, recovery action, recorded and
expected head, incident issue, evidence author, minting actor, key version,
nonce and issued_at.
- Actor identity is the immutable user id with login consistency; conflicting
ids/logins and display-name-only identities fail closed. Edited comments are
rejected. The independent-author rule is preserved and enforced by stable id.
- build_canonical_incident_body is the single source of the accepted format and
refuses to emit ambiguous evidence.
F8 — archival is a prerequisite for clearing terminal evidence:
- _clear_decision_lock_for_profile no longer swallows archive failures. It
requires a successful write plus a durable read-back matching the PR/head,
and otherwise returns a structured, retry-safe failure that retains the lock
and records actionable recovery evidence.
- Fixes a latent bug the read-back exposed: the archive payload inherited the
source lock's session_profile_lock, so save_state keyed the archive under the
reviewer profile instead of the archive identity and it never read back.
Adversarial regressions added for every listed case: key-version missing/empty/
unknown/malformed/duplicate/rotation/wrong-key-after-restart, reordered fields,
duplicate identical and conflicting fields, conflicting actor ids/names,
digest-preserving substitution, decision-lock and recovery-action substitution,
cross-PR/repo/org/remote/head replay, archive exception/timeout/false/empty/
partial-readback with proof the lock survives, exactly-one permitted clear, and
retry after archive failure. No existing assertion was weakened.
Validation: focused 150 passed in three module orders; full tests/ 2809 passed,
6 skipped, 1 warning (pre-existing StarletteDeprecationWarning in
tests/test_webui_audit.py:8), 161 subtests passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Capability resolution and mutation gates no longer auto-switch profiles.
Session profile/remote/host/identity are bound after pin or first seed,
and drift or cross-host resolution fails closed before writes.
Co-Authored-By: Grok <[email protected]>
sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8
jcwalker3
jcwalker3
