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Gitea-Tools/docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md
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jcwalker3andClaude Opus 4.8 1ec4672fad fix(mcp): block manual daemon killing as workflow recovery (Closes #630)
A session that ran `pkill -f mcp_server.py`, waited for the IDE to respawn
the daemons, and then closed an issue left no trace distinguishing that
closure from one performed over a sanctioned runtime. Detection existed only
as advisory strings (`native_mcp_preference.classify_command_path`,
`review_workflow_boundary`) and never failed closed on the mutations that
followed.

Adds `runtime_recovery_guard.py`, mirroring the #671 stable-branch
contamination model so the two cannot drift apart: classification of
kill/pkill/killall commands and known-pid kills, a durable
`runtime_recovery_contamination` marker, a fail-closed pre-flight gate over
the shared review/merge/close/completion task set, and reconciler-only
clearing. `comment_issue` and `lock_issue` stay allowed so a contaminated
worker can still post its audit comment and hand off. The marker is
recovery-critical, so contamination cannot expire into cleanliness with the
session-state TTL.

Read-only inspection (`ps aux | grep mcp_server`), sanctioned reconnects,
and process management unrelated to the daemons are never flagged; a bare
`kill` of an unknown pid is reported as ambiguous rather than contaminating,
so ordinary subprocess work is not false-blocked. A pattern broad enough to
sweep unrelated namespaces (`pkill -f python`) is contamination even when it
never names MCP.

Operator-authorized host maintenance stays permitted, but the authorization
is read from GITEA_OPERATOR_DAEMON_MAINTENANCE_AUTHORIZATION in the process
environment only and never from a tool argument, so a session cannot
authorize itself.

Final-report rules reject clean-session claims and require the contaminated
recovery to be surfaced. Two tools are registered (inventory 112 to 114) and
the sanctioned-versus-forbidden contrast is documented in the namespace
recovery doc and the workflow skill.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-21 17:54:19 -05:00

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Markdown

# Recovering from `client is closing: EOF` on a Gitea MCP namespace (#543)
## Symptom
A tool call through a Gitea MCP namespace — `gitea-author`, `gitea-reviewer`,
`gitea-merger`, or the shared `gitea-tools` namespace — fails immediately with:
```
client is closing: EOF
```
Every subsequent call to that same namespace returns the same error, including
cheap read tools such as `gitea_whoami` and `gitea_list_profiles`. Other MCP
servers registered with the same client (for example `context7`) keep working,
so this is **not** a global MCP-client outage.
## Why this is not a code defect
This failure is a **transport-level** condition in the IDE / MCP client manager,
not a missing or broken tool:
- The tool can be present and registered in the Python `FastMCP` tool manager.
- Direct Python inspection of the server confirms the tool exists.
- Running the server manually and sending JSON-RPC over stdio works fine
(offline spawn) — that path does **not** prove the IDE namespace is healthy.
The client manager entered a closed state after the backing subprocess for that
namespace terminated (or was killed) behind its back. Once closed, the client
does **not** re-spawn the child on the next tool call — it just replays
`client is closing: EOF`. The OS process may even still be alive if a parent
language-server process is holding the stdio pipes open.
This is the canonical "registered in FastMCP ≠ callable through the namespace"
false-ready state. It is distinct from the **stale-runtime** family in #531 /
#544, where the process is reachable but running behind `master`; that case is
detected by the `ps`-based `_check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics` in
`gitea_mcp_server.py`. The EOF case is a dead/closed transport, not a stale one,
so the `ps` check alone will not surface it.
## Recovery path (canonical — client reconnect only)
Do the steps in order. Stop as soon as a live **client-namespace** call succeeds.
1. **Confirm the blast radius.** Call a cheap read tool on the failing namespace
(`gitea_whoami` or `gitea_list_profiles`). Then call the same tool on a
different MCP server (e.g. `context7`).
- Only the Gitea namespace fails → single-namespace transport close. Continue.
- Every server fails → restart the whole MCP client, not just one namespace.
2. **Reconnect the namespace through the client, not the shell.** Use the IDE /
client MCP-reconnect action for that server entry (in Claude Code:
`/mcp` → reconnect the affected `gitea-*` server). Reconnecting forces the
client to spawn a fresh subprocess and re-open the pipe. This clears the
closed-client state that a bare `kill`/respawn from a terminal does **not**.
3. **Do not "fix" it by importing the server or poking the process.** Reaching
for `python -c 'import gitea_mcp_server ...'`, raw JSON-RPC from a shell,
killing PIDs to force a respawn, or touching MCP config mtimes does **not**
restore the *client's* view of the namespace and violates the daemon-import
guard (#558, `docs/mcp-daemon-import-guard.md`). The only sanctioned repair
is a **client reconnect / relaunch**.
4. **Verify through the same path the workflow will use.** After reconnect, call
the specific tool the blocked workflow needs — not just any tool — through
the target namespace. For a merge that means calling the merger-authorized
adoption/merge tool through `gitea-merger`. A green `gitea_whoami` on one
namespace does **not** prove another namespace or another tool is callable.
Record success with:
```text
gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_health(..., probe_source="client_namespace")
```
5. **If reconnect does not clear it,** relaunch the client entirely, then repeat
step 4. If EOF persists after a full relaunch, the backing subprocess is
failing to start — inspect its stderr / launch config (command path, venv,
`*_MCP_CONFIG`, `*_MCP_PROFILE` env) rather than retrying the call. Still
do not use PID kill or config-touch as the primary recovery.
## Diagnostics to capture when reporting EOF
Include all of these so the failure is actionable and reproducible:
- **Namespace name** that returned EOF (`gitea-author` / `gitea-reviewer` /
`gitea-merger` / `gitea-tools`).
- **Tool** that was called and the **exact** error string.
- **PID** of the backing process (if any) and whether it was still alive
(informational only — not a recovery action).
- **Profile / env** for that namespace (execution profile, `*_MCP_PROFILE`,
worktree binding such as `GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE`).
- **Config path** the client launched the server from.
- Result of the **cross-server control** call (did `context7` succeed?).
## Offline spawn probe (non-authoritative)
`test_mcp_conn.py` performs a full JSON-RPC handshake against a **fresh
subprocess** (`initialize` → `initialized` → `tools/list` → `tools/call`) and
classifies with `probe_source=offline_spawn`. That is useful for offline
launch/registration debugging. It is **not** proof the IDE-managed namespace is
healthy. See `docs/mcp-namespace-health.md`.
## Do-not list during EOF recovery
- Do **not** retry a blocked merge/adoption until the required tool is confirmed
callable through the merger-authorized **client** namespace (see #543).
- Do **not** clean, reset, or rebind a **foreign** worktree to work around the
error.
- Do **not** bypass the namespace with direct imports, raw API/curl, or
in-memory state restoration.
- Do **not** kill MCP PIDs or touch config mtimes as a substitute for client
reconnect.
## Sanctioned recovery vs forbidden process manipulation (#630)
Both restore a working namespace. Only one leaves the session trustworthy.
**Sanctioned — the runtime is repaired by whoever owns it:**
- IDE/host auto-reconnect, or an explicit client reconnect (`/mcp reconnect`).
- Relaunching the IDE/client so it respawns the daemons it started.
- An operator-owned restart performed outside the workflow session.
**Forbidden — the session manipulates the processes its own proof depends on:**
- `pkill -f mcp_server.py`, `pkill -f gitea_mcp_server`, broad `pkill -f mcp`.
- `killall` of a daemon, or `kill <pid>` of an MCP daemon pid.
- Any pattern broad enough to take unrelated namespaces with it
(`pkill -f python`), even when it never names MCP.
Read-only inspection (`ps aux | grep mcp_server`) is neither: it proves nothing
and breaks nothing. A `kill` of some unrelated pid is reported as *ambiguous*
rather than contaminating, so ordinary subprocess work is never false-blocked.
**What happens on a detected attempt.** `gitea_record_daemon_process_kill_attempt`
classifies a proposed command and, when it is a manual daemon kill, writes a
durable contamination marker for the active profile identity. While that marker
is live every review / merge / close / completion mutation fails closed;
`comment_issue` and `lock_issue` stay allowed so the contaminated worker can
still post its audit comment and hand off. The final report must surface the
contaminated recovery and must not claim a clean session.
Contamination is **not self-clearable**. Only
`gitea_audit_runtime_recovery_contamination` with `action=clear`, run under a
reconciler profile, removes it. The marker is recovery-critical, so it does not
expire into cleanliness when the session-state TTL lapses.
**Operator-authorized host maintenance stays permitted.** Authorization is read
from the `GITEA_OPERATOR_DAEMON_MAINTENANCE_AUTHORIZATION` environment variable
and from nowhere else — set outside the session by the operator who owns the
host, and recorded as an audit reference on the assessment. It is deliberately
not a tool argument: a session must never be able to authorize itself.
## Related
- #630 — manual daemon killing as contaminated recovery (this contrast, enforced).
- #531 / #544 — stale-runtime detection (`ps`-based); sibling failure mode.
- #558 / `docs/mcp-daemon-import-guard.md` — why shell imports are not a repair.
- `docs/mcp-client-registration.md` — per-server registration contract.
- `docs/mcp-namespace-health.md` — probe sources and mutation enforcement.