Files
Gitea-Tools/mcp_session_state.py
sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8 5933d87647 feat(guard): block direct stable-branch pushes from MCP workflow sessions (Closes #671)
Prevention hardening for the #670 incident (bare direct-to-master commit
2fa97c26 and the PR #654 merger stable-branch push attempt). Worker sessions
must never publish stable branches directly; stable updates land only through
sanctioned Gitea merge tooling or an authorized reconciler path.

New pure module stable_branch_push_guard.py:
- classify_push_command: detects git push <remote> <stable-ref> equivalents
  including refspecs (HEAD:<ref>, +refs/heads/x:refs/heads/<ref>), --force,
  --delete/:<ref>, and --dry-run/-n no-op probes (dry-run still proves intent).
  Fetch/pull and feature-branch pushes are never flagged; sanctioned
  gitea_merge_pr / API merge is not a push.
- assess_root_checkout_local_commit: detects control-checkout commits not on an
  issue feature branch (branches/ worktrees exempt).
- redact_command: strips URL userinfo/token assignments before logging.
- build_contamination_record + assess_contamination_gate: durable marker shape
  and fail-closed gate (reconciler-exempt; comment/lock stay allowed for handoff).

Server wiring (gitea_mcp_server.py, mcp_session_state.py):
- KIND_STABLE_BRANCH_CONTAMINATION durable session marker (per profile identity).
- _enforce_stable_branch_contamination_gate wired into verify_preflight_purity
  so review/merge/close/completion mutations fail closed while contaminated.
- gitea_record_stable_branch_push_attempt: classify + mark on detection.
- gitea_audit_stable_branch_contamination: reconciler-only inspect/clear; a
  worker session can never self-clear.

Tests (AC5): no-op dry-run push, real direct push, sanctioned Gitea merge,
fetch-only, root-checkout local commit, feature-branch push allowed, gate
block/reconciler-exempt, redaction. 51 new tests; full suite 2596 passed.

Docs: llm-project-workflow SKILL.md — universal rule, blocker class, and a
dedicated "Stable Branch Push Protection" section (worker sessions must never
push stable branches directly).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-11 20:07:40 -04:00

400 lines
12 KiB
Python

"""Durable MCP session validation state shared across daemon process pools (#559).
The IDE often routes sequential MCP tool calls to different daemon processes.
Session-scoped proofs (workflow load, review decision lock) must therefore
survive process boundaries while remaining fail-closed against spoofing.
Security notes (extends #211):
- Never store under host-global ``/tmp`` (world-writable, spoofable).
- Default root is ``~/.cache/gitea-tools/session-state`` (mode ``0o700``).
- Files are written atomically with mode ``0o600``.
- Records are keyed by remote + org + repo + profile identity, not by PID.
- TTL prevents indefinitely stale reuse across unrelated sessions.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import fcntl
import json
import os
import re
import tempfile
from contextlib import contextmanager
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from typing import Any
STATE_DIR_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR"
DEFAULT_STATE_DIR = os.path.expanduser("~/.cache/gitea-tools/session-state")
TTL_HOURS_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_TTL_HOURS"
DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS = 4.0
KIND_WORKFLOW_LOAD = "review_workflow_load"
KIND_DECISION_LOCK = "review_decision_lock"
KIND_REVIEW_DRAFT = "review_draft"
# Durable marker set when a worker session attempts a direct stable-branch push
# or a root-checkout local commit (#671). Keyed per profile identity like the
# other session proofs; a contaminated session fails closed on gated mutations
# until a reconciler audits and clears it.
KIND_STABLE_BRANCH_CONTAMINATION = "stable_branch_contamination"
_SAFE_SEGMENT_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._+-]+")
SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK_ENV = "GITEA_SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK"
def default_state_dir() -> str:
raw = (os.environ.get(STATE_DIR_ENV) or DEFAULT_STATE_DIR).strip()
return raw or DEFAULT_STATE_DIR
def ttl_hours() -> float:
raw = (os.environ.get(TTL_HOURS_ENV) or "").strip()
if not raw:
return DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS
try:
value = float(raw)
except ValueError:
return DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS
return value if value > 0 else DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS
def _sanitize_segment(value: str) -> str:
text = (value or "").strip()
if not text:
return "_"
return _SAFE_SEGMENT_RE.sub("_", text)
def current_profile_identity(
profile_name: str | None = None,
session_profile_lock: str | None = None,
profile_identity: str | None = None,
) -> str:
"""Resolve the session profile identity used as the durable key."""
env_lock = (os.environ.get(SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK_ENV) or "").strip()
explicit = (profile_identity or session_profile_lock or "").strip()
lock = (explicit or env_lock or "").strip()
name = (profile_name or "").strip()
return lock or name or "unknown-profile"
def state_key(
*,
kind: str,
remote: str | None = None,
org: str | None = None,
repo: str | None = None,
profile_identity: str | None = None,
) -> str:
"""Build durable filename key.
Session proofs are one-active-per-profile (workflow load / decision lock),
so the primary key is kind + profile identity. Remote/org/repo are stored
inside the payload and validated on load (#559), which lets a later daemon
process recover state without already knowing the remote argument.
"""
# Keep remote/org/repo parameters for API stability / future kinds; they are
# intentionally not part of the filename for session-scoped proofs.
_ = (remote, org, repo)
return "-".join(
_sanitize_segment(part)
for part in (
kind,
profile_identity or "unknown-profile",
)
)
def state_file_path(
*,
kind: str,
remote: str | None = None,
org: str | None = None,
repo: str | None = None,
profile_identity: str | None = None,
state_dir: str | None = None,
) -> str:
root = (state_dir or default_state_dir()).strip()
name = state_key(
kind=kind,
remote=remote,
org=org,
repo=repo,
profile_identity=profile_identity,
)
return os.path.join(root, f"{name}.json")
def _ensure_state_dir(state_dir: str | None = None) -> str:
root = (state_dir or default_state_dir()).strip()
os.makedirs(root, mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
return root
def _now_utc() -> datetime:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
def _parse_iso(value: str | None) -> datetime | None:
text = (value or "").strip()
if not text:
return None
if text.endswith("Z"):
text = text[:-1] + "+00:00"
try:
parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(text)
except ValueError:
return None
if parsed.tzinfo is None:
return parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc)
@contextmanager
def _exclusive_file_lock(lock_path: str):
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(lock_path) or ".", exist_ok=True)
fd = os.open(lock_path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_RDWR, 0o600)
try:
fcntl.flock(fd, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
yield fd
finally:
try:
fcntl.flock(fd, fcntl.LOCK_UN)
finally:
os.close(fd)
def _read_json(path: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
if not path or not os.path.exists(path):
return None
try:
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
data = json.load(handle)
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
return None
return data if isinstance(data, dict) else None
def _write_json(path: str, data: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
parent = os.path.dirname(path) or "."
os.makedirs(parent, mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
payload = json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n"
fd, temp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".session-", suffix=".json", dir=parent)
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
handle.write(payload)
handle.flush()
os.fsync(handle.fileno())
os.chmod(temp_path, 0o600)
os.replace(temp_path, path)
try:
os.chmod(path, 0o600)
except OSError:
pass
finally:
if os.path.exists(temp_path):
try:
os.remove(temp_path)
except OSError:
pass
def identity_match_reasons(
record: dict[str, Any] | None,
*,
remote: str | None = None,
org: str | None = None,
repo: str | None = None,
profile_identity: str | None = None,
) -> list[str]:
"""Return fail-closed reasons when durable record identity does not match."""
if record is None:
return []
reasons: list[str] = []
expected_profile = current_profile_identity(profile_identity=profile_identity)
stored_profile = (
(record.get("session_profile_lock") or record.get("profile_identity") or "")
.strip()
)
if stored_profile and expected_profile and stored_profile != expected_profile:
if expected_profile != "unknown-profile":
reasons.append(
"session state profile identity mismatch "
f"(stored={stored_profile!r}, active={expected_profile!r}; fail closed)"
)
for field, expected in (
("remote", remote),
("org", org),
("repo", repo),
):
want = (expected or "").strip()
have = (str(record.get(field) or "")).strip()
if want and have and want != have:
reasons.append(
f"session state {field} mismatch "
f"(stored={have!r}, expected={want!r}; fail closed)"
)
recorded_at = _parse_iso(record.get("recorded_at") or record.get("updated_at"))
if recorded_at is None:
reasons.append("session state missing recorded_at timestamp (fail closed)")
else:
age = _now_utc() - recorded_at
if age > timedelta(hours=ttl_hours()):
reasons.append(
f"session state expired after {ttl_hours():g}h (fail closed)"
)
if age < timedelta(0):
reasons.append("session state recorded_at is in the future (fail closed)")
return reasons
def load_state(
*,
kind: str,
remote: str | None = None,
org: str | None = None,
repo: str | None = None,
profile_identity: str | None = None,
state_dir: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Load durable state payload when identity checks pass."""
profile = current_profile_identity(profile_identity=profile_identity)
path = state_file_path(
kind=kind,
remote=remote,
org=org,
repo=repo,
profile_identity=profile,
state_dir=state_dir,
)
lock_path = f"{path}.lock"
with _exclusive_file_lock(lock_path):
envelope = _read_json(path)
if not envelope:
return None
payload = envelope.get("payload")
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return None
# Identity fields live on both envelope and payload for convenience.
merged = dict(payload)
for key in (
"kind",
"remote",
"org",
"repo",
"profile_identity",
"session_profile_lock",
"recorded_at",
"updated_at",
"writer_pid",
):
if key in envelope and key not in merged:
merged[key] = envelope[key]
reasons = identity_match_reasons(
merged,
remote=remote,
org=org,
repo=repo,
profile_identity=profile,
)
if reasons:
return None
return merged
def save_state(
*,
kind: str,
payload: dict[str, Any] | None,
remote: str | None = None,
org: str | None = None,
repo: str | None = None,
profile_identity: str | None = None,
state_dir: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Persist or clear durable state for the given session identity key."""
profile = current_profile_identity(
profile_name=payload.get("session_profile") if payload else None,
session_profile_lock=(
(payload or {}).get("session_profile_lock") or profile_identity
),
)
# Prefer explicit args over payload fields for key location.
key_remote = remote if remote is not None else (payload or {}).get("remote")
key_org = org if org is not None else (payload or {}).get("org")
key_repo = repo if repo is not None else (payload or {}).get("repo")
root = _ensure_state_dir(state_dir)
path = state_file_path(
kind=kind,
remote=key_remote,
org=key_org,
repo=key_repo,
profile_identity=profile,
state_dir=root,
)
lock_path = f"{path}.lock"
with _exclusive_file_lock(lock_path):
if payload is None:
for candidate in (path, lock_path):
if os.path.exists(candidate):
try:
os.remove(candidate)
except OSError:
pass
return None
now = _now_utc().isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
body = dict(payload)
body.setdefault("session_pid", os.getpid())
body["writer_pid"] = os.getpid()
body["profile_identity"] = profile
if not (body.get("session_profile_lock") or "").strip():
body["session_profile_lock"] = profile
body["recorded_at"] = body.get("recorded_at") or now
body["updated_at"] = now
if key_remote is not None:
body["remote"] = key_remote
if key_org is not None:
body["org"] = key_org
if key_repo is not None:
body["repo"] = key_repo
envelope = {
"kind": kind,
"remote": key_remote,
"org": key_org,
"repo": key_repo,
"profile_identity": profile,
"session_profile_lock": body.get("session_profile_lock"),
"recorded_at": body["recorded_at"],
"updated_at": body["updated_at"],
"writer_pid": body["writer_pid"],
"payload": body,
}
_write_json(path, envelope)
return dict(body)
def clear_state(
*,
kind: str,
remote: str | None = None,
org: str | None = None,
repo: str | None = None,
profile_identity: str | None = None,
state_dir: str | None = None,
) -> None:
save_state(
kind=kind,
payload=None,
remote=remote,
org=org,
repo=repo,
profile_identity=profile_identity,
state_dir=state_dir,
)