.gitignore

@@ -10,3 +10,7 @@ gitea-mcp*.json
 .vscode/
 graphify-out/
 branches/
+# Throwaway agent commit-encoding helpers (#261) — never commit.
+/_encode_*.py
+/_emit_*.py
+/_inline_*.py

agent_temp_artifacts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+"""Detect throwaway agent helper scripts left in the repo root (#261)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fnmatch
+
+AGENT_TEMP_BASENAME_PATTERNS = (
+    "_encode_*.py",
+    "_emit_*.py",
+    "_inline_*.py",
+)
+
+
+def find_agent_temp_artifacts_from_porcelain(porcelain: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Return untracked repo-root helper paths matching agent temp patterns."""
+    found: list[str] = []
+    for line in (porcelain or "").splitlines():
+        if not line.startswith("??"):
+            continue
+        path = line[3:].strip()
+        if not path or "/" in path or "\\" in path:
+            continue
+        basename = path.split("/")[-1]
+        if any(fnmatch.fnmatch(basename, pat) for pat in AGENT_TEMP_BASENAME_PATTERNS):
+            found.append(path)
+    return sorted(found)

docs/llm-workflow-runbooks.md

@@ -316,6 +316,30 @@ may edit another issue's branch folder unless explicitly assigned to that issue.
 No LLM may clean another issue's branch folder unless the PR is merged or closed
 and cleanup is explicitly part of the task.
 
+## Agent temp artifact cleanup (#261)
+
+Failed or aborted MCP commit attempts sometimes leave throwaway helper scripts in
+the **repository root**. These are not part of any issue scope and pollute
+`git status`, which can break `gitea_lock_issue` and preflight checks.
+
+**Patterns (repo root only, untracked):**
+
+- `_encode_*.py` — base64 payload encoders
+- `_emit_*.py` — commit payload emitters
+- `_inline_*.py` — inline encoding helpers
+
+**Required cleanup (after MCP commit completes or aborts):**
+
+1. Delete any matching files at the repo root (`rm ./_encode_*.py` etc.).
+2. Confirm `git status` is clean on the orchestration checkout before
+   `gitea_lock_issue`.
+3. Prefer native `gitea_commit_files` / gated commit paths — do not leave shell
+   encoding fallbacks behind.
+
+Root-level matches are listed in `.gitignore` so they never get committed.
+`gitea_get_runtime_context` and `gitea_lock_issue` surface **warnings** (not
+hard blocks) when these artifacts are still present.
+
 Implementation work and review work must use separate branch folders. For
 example, an implementation branch might live under
 `branches/fix-issue-123-example`, while a review branch for the resulting PR

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -260,9 +260,19 @@ def assess_preflight_status() -> dict:
             "Reviewer profile modified tracked workspace files after capability resolution "
             f"(offending files: {_format_preflight_files(_preflight_reviewer_violation_files)})"
         )
+    warnings: list[str] = []
+    agent_artifacts = agent_temp_artifacts.find_agent_temp_artifacts_from_porcelain(
+        _get_workspace_porcelain()
+    )
+    if agent_artifacts:
+        warnings.append(
+            "Agent temp artifacts detected at repo root (delete before mutations): "
+            f"{_format_preflight_files(agent_artifacts)}"
+        )
     return {
         "preflight_ready": not reasons,
         "preflight_block_reasons": reasons,
+        "preflight_warnings": warnings,
         "preflight_whoami_verified": _preflight_whoami_called,
         "preflight_capability_resolved": _preflight_capability_called,
         "preflight_whoami_violation_files": list(_preflight_whoami_violation_files),
@@ -373,6 +383,7 @@ import role_session_router  # noqa: E402
 import role_namespace_gate  # noqa: E402
 import task_capability_map  # noqa: E402
 import review_proofs  # noqa: E402
+import agent_temp_artifacts
 import issue_lock_worktree  # noqa: E402
 
 
@@ -877,7 +888,10 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
     except Exception as e:
         raise RuntimeError(f"Could not write issue lock file: {e}")
 
-    return {
+    agent_artifacts = agent_temp_artifacts.find_agent_temp_artifacts_from_porcelain(
+        git_state.get("porcelain_status") or ""
+    )
+    result = {
         "success": True,
         "message": (
             f"Successfully locked issue #{issue_number} to branch '{branch_name}' "
@@ -887,6 +901,12 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
         "branch_name": branch_name,
         "worktree_path": resolved_worktree,
     }
+    if agent_artifacts:
+        result["warnings"] = [
+            "Agent temp artifacts at repo root (delete before implementation): "
+            + ", ".join(agent_artifacts)
+        ]
+    return result
 
 
 @mcp.tool()
@@ -2275,6 +2295,106 @@ def gitea_get_file(
     }
 
 
+def _prepare_commit_payload_files(files: list[dict]) -> tuple[list[dict], list[dict]]:
+    import base64
+    import json
+    import os
+
+    processed_files = []
+    source_proofs = []
+
+    lock_data = {}
+    if os.path.exists(ISSUE_LOCK_FILE):
+        try:
+            with open(ISSUE_LOCK_FILE, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
+                lock_data = json.load(f)
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+    locked_worktree = lock_data.get("worktree_path")
+    if locked_worktree:
+        locked_worktree = os.path.realpath(locked_worktree)
+
+    for f in files:
+        f_copy = dict(f)
+        path = f_copy.get("path", "")
+
+        content_keys = [k for k in ["content", "content_plain", "workspace_path", "local_path"] if k in f_copy]
+        if len(content_keys) > 1:
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"Multiple content sources specified for file '{path}'; provide exactly one of "
+                f"'content', 'content_plain', 'workspace_path', or 'local_path' (fail closed)"
+            )
+
+        source = "none"
+        if "content_plain" in f_copy:
+            content_plain = f_copy.pop("content_plain")
+            if content_plain is not None:
+                content_bytes = content_plain.encode("utf-8")
+                f_copy["content"] = base64.b64encode(content_bytes).decode("utf-8")
+                source = "inline_plain"
+        elif "workspace_path" in f_copy:
+            workspace_path = f_copy.pop("workspace_path")
+            if not locked_worktree:
+                raise RuntimeError(
+                    f"Issue lock is missing or does not define a worktree path. "
+                    f"Cannot resolve workspace_path '{workspace_path}' (fail closed)."
+                )
+            target_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(os.path.join(locked_worktree, workspace_path)))
+
+            is_inside = target_path == locked_worktree or target_path.startswith(os.path.join(locked_worktree, ""))
+            is_tmp = target_path.startswith(os.path.realpath("/tmp") + os.sep) or target_path.startswith("/tmp" + os.sep)
+
+            if not (is_inside or is_tmp):
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"workspace_path '{workspace_path}' resolves to '{target_path}' which falls outside "
+                    f"of locked worktree '{locked_worktree}' (fail closed)"
+                )
+
+            if not os.path.exists(target_path):
+                raise FileNotFoundError(f"File not found: {target_path} (fail closed)")
+
+            with open(target_path, "rb") as fh:
+                file_bytes = fh.read()
+            f_copy["content"] = base64.b64encode(file_bytes).decode("utf-8")
+            source = "workspace_path"
+        elif "local_path" in f_copy:
+            local_path = f_copy.pop("local_path")
+            if not locked_worktree:
+                raise RuntimeError(
+                    f"Issue lock is missing or does not define a worktree path. "
+                    f"Cannot resolve local_path '{local_path}' (fail closed)."
+                )
+            target_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(local_path))
+
+            is_inside = target_path == locked_worktree or target_path.startswith(os.path.join(locked_worktree, ""))
+            is_tmp = target_path.startswith(os.path.realpath("/tmp") + os.sep) or target_path.startswith("/tmp" + os.sep)
+
+            if not (is_inside or is_tmp):
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"local_path '{local_path}' resolves to '{target_path}' which falls outside "
+                    f"of locked worktree '{locked_worktree}' (fail closed)"
+                )
+
+            if not os.path.exists(target_path):
+                raise FileNotFoundError(f"File not found: {target_path} (fail closed)")
+
+            with open(target_path, "rb") as fh:
+                file_bytes = fh.read()
+            f_copy["content"] = base64.b64encode(file_bytes).decode("utf-8")
+            source = "local_path"
+        elif "content" in f_copy:
+            source = "inline_base64"
+
+        processed_files.append(f_copy)
+        source_proofs.append({
+            "path": path,
+            "source": source
+        })
+
+    return processed_files, source_proofs
+
+
 @mcp.tool()
 def gitea_commit_files(
     files: list[dict],
@@ -2289,7 +2409,7 @@ def gitea_commit_files(
     """Commit changes to multiple files in a Gitea repository in a single atomic commit.
 
     Args:
-        files: List of file operations. Each file dict must contain 'operation' ('create', 'update', 'delete', 'rename'), 'path', and 'content' (base64 encoded for create/update), and optionally 'sha' (required for update/delete) or 'from_path' (for rename).
+        files: List of file operations. Each file dict must contain 'operation' ('create', 'update', 'delete', 'rename'), 'path', and one of content payload sources: 'content' (base64), 'content_plain', 'workspace_path', or 'local_path'.
         message: The commit message.
         branch: Optional existing branch to start/commit from.
         new_branch: Optional new branch name to create for this commit.
@@ -2325,12 +2445,14 @@ def gitea_commit_files(
         return blocked
 
     verify_preflight_purity(remote)
+    processed_files, source_proofs = _prepare_commit_payload_files(files)
+
     h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
     auth = _auth(h)
     url = f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/contents"
 
     payload = {
-        "files": files,
+        "files": processed_files,
         "message": message,
     }
     if branch is not None:
@@ -2341,13 +2463,14 @@ def gitea_commit_files(
     with _audited("commit_files", host=h, remote=remote, org=o, repo=r,
                   target_branch=(new_branch or branch),
                   request_metadata={"message": message,
-                                    "paths": [f.get("path") for f in files],
-                                    "operations": [f.get("operation") for f in files]}):
+                                    "paths": [f.get("path") for f in processed_files],
+                                    "operations": [f.get("operation") for f in processed_files]}):
         data = api_request("POST", url, auth, payload)
     return {
         "success": True,
         "commit": data.get("commit", {}).get("sha", ""),
         "branch": data.get("branch", {}).get("name", ""),
+        "content_source_proof": source_proofs,
     }
 
 

review_proofs.py

@@ -1297,6 +1297,16 @@ HANDOFF_ROLE_FIELDS = {
         ("Session authored PR", ("session authored pr", "authored pr")),
         ("Why continuation allowed", ("why continuation", "continuation allowed")),
     ),
+    "issue_filing": (
+        ("Issue created or updated", (
+            "issue created or updated",
+            "issue created",
+            "issue updated",
+            "created issue",
+            "updated issue",
+        )),
+        ("Related issues", ("related issues",)),
+    ),
 }
 
 
@@ -2135,6 +2145,309 @@ def assess_issue_selection_final_report(
     }
 
 
+_SHA_EVIDENCE_LABEL = re.compile(
+    r"(?:\b(?:old|new)\s+head\b|\bhead\s+sha\b|\bcommit\s+sha\b|\bsha\b)"
+    r"\s*[:=]?\s*([0-9a-f]+)",
+    re.IGNORECASE,
+)
+
+
+def assess_issue_filing_sha_evidence(report_text: str) -> dict:
+    """Issue #191: commit evidence must use full 40-hex SHAs."""
+    text = report_text or ""
+    reasons = []
+    for match in _SHA_EVIDENCE_LABEL.finditer(text):
+        sha = match.group(1).strip().lower()
+        if sha and not _FULL_SHA.match(sha):
+            reasons.append(
+                f"abbreviated SHA in evidence ({len(sha)} hex chars); "
+                "full 40-character SHA required"
+            )
+    return {
+        "complete": not reasons,
+        "downgraded": bool(reasons),
+        "reasons": reasons,
+    }
+
+
+def assess_issue_filing_issue_reference(
+    report_text: str,
+    *,
+    issue_number: int | None = None,
+    issue_title: str | None = None,
+    action: str = "created",
+) -> dict:
+    """Issue #191: reports must cite exact issue number and title."""
+    text = (report_text or "").lower()
+    reasons = []
+    if issue_number is None:
+        reasons.append("issue number proof missing from assessment context")
+    else:
+        num_patterns = (f"#{issue_number}", f"issue #{issue_number}",
+                        f"issue {issue_number}")
+        if not any(p in text for p in num_patterns):
+            reasons.append(
+                f"report missing exact issue number #{issue_number}"
+            )
+    if issue_title:
+        title_fragment = issue_title.strip().lower()[:40]
+        if title_fragment and title_fragment not in text:
+            reasons.append("report missing exact issue title")
+    action = (action or "created").strip().lower()
+    if action == "created" and "creat" not in text:
+        reasons.append(
+            "report must distinguish new issue creation from update"
+        )
+    if action == "updated" and "updat" not in text:
+        reasons.append(
+            "report must distinguish issue update from new creation"
+        )
+    return {
+        "complete": not reasons,
+        "downgraded": bool(reasons),
+        "reasons": reasons,
+    }
+
+
+def assess_issue_filing_mutation_capability(
+    report_text: str,
+    mutations: list[str] | None,
+    resolved_capabilities: dict | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Issue #191: every mutation needs exact capability proof in the report."""
+    import task_capability_map
+
+    text = (report_text or "").lower()
+    reasons = []
+    mutation_list = list(mutations or [])
+    if not mutation_list:
+        reasons.append("no mutations listed for capability proof")
+    cap_proof = assess_capability_proof(resolved_capabilities or {})
+    if not cap_proof.get("proven"):
+        reasons.extend(cap_proof.get("reasons") or [])
+
+    for task in mutation_list:
+        try:
+            permission = task_capability_map.required_permission(task)
+        except KeyError:
+            reasons.append(f"unknown mutation task '{task}'")
+            continue
+        if permission.lower() not in text and task.replace("_", " ") not in text:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"mutation '{task}' missing exact capability proof "
+                f"('{permission}')"
+            )
+        if task == "set_issue_labels":
+            label_proof = (
+                "label change",
+                "labels changed",
+                "set label",
+                "label mutation",
+                "issue labels",
+                "label:",
+            )
+            if not any(p in text for p in label_proof):
+                reasons.append(
+                    "label mutation missing label-specific capability proof"
+                )
+    return {
+        "complete": not reasons,
+        "downgraded": bool(reasons),
+        "reasons": reasons,
+    }
+
+
+def assess_issue_filing_mutation_scope(
+    report_text: str,
+    *,
+    performed_mutations: list[str] | None = None,
+    forbidden_mutations: list[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Issue #191: single-mutation runs must state scope and absent mutations."""
+    text = (report_text or "").lower()
+    performed = list(performed_mutations or [])
+    forbidden = list(forbidden_mutations or [
+        "label", "comment", "pr", "review", "merge", "close",
+    ])
+    reasons = []
+
+    if len(performed) == 1:
+        only_phrases = ("only mutation", "only mutations", "sole mutation")
+        if not any(p in text for p in only_phrases):
+            reasons.append(
+                "single-mutation run must state 'Only mutation(s): ...'"
+            )
+        for absent in forbidden:
+            if absent == "comment" and performed[0] in (
+                "comment_issue", "create_issue",
+            ):
+                continue
+            if absent not in text:
+                continue
+            denial_phrases = (
+                f"no {absent}",
+                f"no {absent}s",
+                f"without {absent}",
+                "none performed",
+                "none.",
+                "confirm no",
+            )
+            if any(phrase in text for phrase in denial_phrases):
+                continue
+            reasons.append(
+                f"single-mutation run mentions '{absent}' without "
+                f"confirming it was not performed"
+            )
+        if performed == ["create_issue"]:
+            for check in ("label", "comment", "pr", "review", "merge"):
+                if check in text and f"no {check}" not in text:
+                    if not any(
+                        n in text
+                        for n in (
+                            f"no {check}",
+                            f"no {check}s",
+                            "none performed",
+                            "confirm no",
+                        )
+                    ):
+                        reasons.append(
+                            f"create-only run must confirm no {check} "
+                            "mutations were performed"
+                        )
+
+    return {
+        "complete": not reasons,
+        "downgraded": bool(reasons),
+        "reasons": reasons,
+    }
+
+
+def assess_issue_filing_duplicate_summary(
+    report_text: str,
+    *,
+    issues_searched: int | None = None,
+    closest_matches: list[dict] | None = None,
+    duplicate_result: dict | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Issue #191: duplicate-check evidence must be summarized in the report."""
+    text = (report_text or "").lower()
+    reasons = []
+    dup = duplicate_result or {}
+
+    if issues_searched is not None:
+        count_tokens = (
+            str(issues_searched),
+            f"{issues_searched} open",
+            f"{issues_searched} issue",
+        )
+        if not any(t in text for t in count_tokens):
+            reasons.append(
+                "duplicate-check summary missing open-issues searched count"
+            )
+
+    matches = closest_matches if closest_matches is not None else dup.get("matches")
+    for match in matches or []:
+        num = match.get("number")
+        if num is not None and f"#{num}" not in text and str(num) not in text:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"duplicate-check summary missing closest issue #{num}"
+            )
+            break
+
+    justification_phrases = (
+        "why new",
+        "why update",
+        "rejected update",
+        "new issue justified",
+        "not a duplicate",
+        "no duplicate",
+        "justified",
+        "instead of expanding",
+    )
+    if not any(p in text for p in justification_phrases):
+        reasons.append(
+            "duplicate-check summary missing why update was rejected or "
+            "why a new issue was justified"
+        )
+
+    dup_proof = issue_duplicate_gate.assess_duplicate_search_proof(
+        report_text, matches or []
+    )
+    if not dup_proof.get("valid"):
+        reasons.extend(dup_proof.get("reasons") or [])
+
+    return {
+        "complete": not reasons,
+        "downgraded": bool(reasons),
+        "reasons": reasons,
+    }
+
+
+def assess_issue_filing_final_report(
+    report_text: str,
+    *,
+    issue_number: int | None = None,
+    issue_title: str | None = None,
+    action: str = "created",
+    mutations: list[str] | None = None,
+    resolved_capabilities: dict | None = None,
+    issues_searched: int | None = None,
+    closest_matches: list[dict] | None = None,
+    duplicate_result: dict | None = None,
+    performed_mutations: list[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Issue #191: composite A-bar for issue-filing final reports."""
+    checks = {
+        "controller_handoff": assess_controller_handoff(
+            report_text, role="issue_filing"
+        ),
+        "issue_reference": assess_issue_filing_issue_reference(
+            report_text,
+            issue_number=issue_number,
+            issue_title=issue_title,
+            action=action,
+        ),
+        "sha_evidence": assess_issue_filing_sha_evidence(report_text),
+        "mutation_capability": assess_issue_filing_mutation_capability(
+            report_text,
+            mutations or performed_mutations,
+            resolved_capabilities,
+        ),
+        "mutation_scope": assess_issue_filing_mutation_scope(
+            report_text,
+            performed_mutations=performed_mutations or mutations,
+        ),
+        "duplicate_summary": assess_issue_filing_duplicate_summary(
+            report_text,
+            issues_searched=issues_searched,
+            closest_matches=closest_matches,
+            duplicate_result=duplicate_result,
+        ),
+    }
+
+    reasons = []
+    downgraded = False
+    for name, result in checks.items():
+        verdict = result.get("verdict")
+        if verdict in ("missing", "incomplete"):
+            downgraded = True
+            reasons.extend(result.get("reasons") or [])
+        elif result.get("downgraded") or not result.get("complete", True):
+            downgraded = True
+            reasons.extend(
+                f"{name}: {r}" for r in (result.get("reasons") or [])
+            )
+
+    grade = "A" if not downgraded else "downgraded"
+    return {
+        "grade": grade,
+        "downgraded": downgraded,
+        "checks": checks,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "complete": not downgraded,
+    }
+
+
 def assess_duplicate_search_proof(report_text, matches):
     """#207: reject LLM duplicate summaries that omit known title matches."""
     return issue_duplicate_gate.assess_duplicate_search_proof(

skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md

@@ -462,6 +462,12 @@ Role-specific fields (append to the compact block):
 - review/merge tasks: `Selected PR:`, `Reviewer eligibility:`,
   `Pinned reviewed head:`, `Review decision:`, `Merge result:`,
   `Linked issue status:`, `Cleanup status:`
+- issue-filing tasks (#191): `Issue created or updated:`, `Related issues:`;
+  body must cite exact issue number/title, duplicate-search summary (issues
+  searched, closest matches, why update rejected / new issue justified), full
+  40-char SHAs when citing commits, exact mutation capability per change, and
+  `Only mutation(s):` when a single mutation was performed
+  (`review_proofs.assess_issue_filing_final_report`).
 - author tasks: `Selected issue:`, `Claim/comment status:`,
   `PR number opened:`, `No review/merge:` (explicit confirmation)
 - continuation tasks (#188): `Continuation mode:`, `Existing PR:`,

tests/test_agent_temp_artifacts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+"""Tests for agent temp artifact detection and preflight warnings (#261)."""
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import agent_temp_artifacts
+import mcp_server
+
+
+class TestAgentTempArtifactPatterns(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_detects_root_level_encode_emit_inline(self):
+        porcelain = (
+            "?? _encode_commit_payload.py\n"
+            "?? _emit_payload.py\n"
+            "?? _inline_b64.py\n"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            agent_temp_artifacts.find_agent_temp_artifacts_from_porcelain(porcelain),
+            ["_emit_payload.py", "_encode_commit_payload.py", "_inline_b64.py"],
+        )
+
+    def test_ignores_nested_and_unrelated_untracked(self):
+        porcelain = (
+            "?? scripts/_encode_x.py\n"
+            "?? README-draft.md\n"
+            " M task_capability_map.py\n"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            agent_temp_artifacts.find_agent_temp_artifacts_from_porcelain(porcelain),
+            [],
+        )
+
+
+class TestPreflightWarnings(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._snapshot = (
+            mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called,
+            mcp_server._preflight_capability_called,
+        )
+        mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = True
+        mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = True
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called, mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = (
+            self._snapshot
+        )
+
+    @patch(
+        "mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain",
+        return_value="?? _encode_commit_payload.py\n",
+    )
+    def test_assess_preflight_surfaces_warning_not_block(self, _porcelain):
+        status = mcp_server.assess_preflight_status()
+        self.assertTrue(status["preflight_ready"])
+        self.assertEqual(status["preflight_block_reasons"], [])
+        self.assertEqual(len(status["preflight_warnings"]), 1)
+        self.assertIn("_encode_commit_payload.py", status["preflight_warnings"][0])
+
+
+class TestIssueLockArtifactWarning(unittest.TestCase):
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[])
+    @patch("mcp_server._auth", return_value="token x")
+    @patch("mcp_server._resolve", return_value=("h", "o", "r"))
+    @patch("mcp_server.ISSUE_LOCK_FILE", new_callable=lambda: tempfile.mktemp())
+    @patch("issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state")
+    def test_lock_success_includes_artifact_warning(self, mock_state, _lock_file, *_mocks):
+        mock_state.return_value = {
+            "current_branch": "master",
+            "porcelain_status": "?? _emit_payload.py\n",
+        }
+        result = mcp_server.gitea_lock_issue(
+            issue_number=261,
+            branch_name="docs/issue-261-agent-artifact-cleanup",
+            remote="prgs",
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"])
+        self.assertIn("warnings", result)
+        self.assertIn("_emit_payload.py", result["warnings"][0])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_commit_payloads.py

@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+import json
+import os
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import gitea_config
+import mcp_server
+import task_capability_map
+
+CONFIG = {
+    "version": 2,
+    "contexts": {
+        "ctx": {
+            "enabled": True,
+            "gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.example.com"},
+        }
+    },
+    "profiles": {
+        "full-author": {
+            "enabled": True,
+            "context": "ctx",
+            "role": "author",
+            "username": "author-user",
+            "auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_AUTHOR"},
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read",
+                "gitea.repo.commit",
+                "gitea.pr.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [
+                "gitea.pr.approve",
+                "gitea.pr.merge",
+                "gitea.pr.review",
+            ],
+            "execution_profile": "full-author",
+        },
+    },
+}
+
+
+class TestCommitPayloads(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._remotes = patch.dict(mcp_server.REMOTES, {
+            "prgs": {"host": "gitea.example.com", "org": "Example-Org",
+                     "repo": "Example-Repo"},
+        })
+        self._remotes.start()
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+
+        # Setup temp directories and lock files
+        self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.config_path = os.path.join(self._dir.name, "profiles.json")
+        with open(self.config_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            fh.write(json.dumps(CONFIG))
+
+        self.locked_worktree_dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.locked_worktree_path = os.path.realpath(self.locked_worktree_dir.name)
+
+        self.lock_file_path = "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock.json"
+        self.lock_data = {
+            "issue_number": 263,
+            "branch_name": "feat/issue-263-native-commit-payloads",
+            "remote": "prgs",
+            "org": "Example-Org",
+            "repo": "Example-Repo",
+            "worktree_path": self.locked_worktree_path,
+        }
+        with open(self.lock_file_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            fh.write(json.dumps(self.lock_data))
+
+        # Reset preflight status to bypass/pass verification in tests
+        self.orig_whoami_called = mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called
+        self.orig_capability_called = mcp_server._preflight_capability_called
+        mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = True
+        mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = True
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._remotes.stop()
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+
+        mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = self.orig_whoami_called
+        mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = self.orig_capability_called
+
+        self._dir.cleanup()
+        self.locked_worktree_dir.cleanup()
+        if os.path.exists(self.lock_file_path):
+            os.remove(self.lock_file_path)
+
+    def _env(self, profile: str) -> dict:
+        return {
+            "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
+            "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile,
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_AUTHOR": "author-pass",
+            "GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN": "",
+        }
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
+    def test_commit_files_content_plain(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {
+            "commit": {"sha": "sha-123"},
+            "branch": {"name": "feat/issue-263-native-commit-payloads"}
+        }
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("full-author"), clear=True):
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_commit_files(
+                files=[
+                    {
+                        "operation": "create",
+                        "path": "hello.txt",
+                        "content_plain": "Hello World!",
+                    }
+                ],
+                message="Add hello.txt",
+                remote="prgs",
+            )
+        print("DEBUG RES IS:", res)
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["commit"], "sha-123")
+        self.assertEqual(res["content_source_proof"][0]["source"], "inline_plain")
+
+        # Verify posted base64 content
+        post_args = mock_api.call_args[0]
+        payload = post_args[3]
+        self.assertEqual(payload["files"][0]["content"], "SGVsbG8gV29ybGQh")
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
+    def test_commit_files_workspace_path(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {
+            "commit": {"sha": "sha-456"},
+            "branch": {"name": "feat/issue-263-native-commit-payloads"}
+        }
+
+        # Create a workspace file
+        file_relative = "src/code.py"
+        file_abs = os.path.join(self.locked_worktree_path, file_relative)
+        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(file_abs), exist_ok=True)
+        with open(file_abs, "wb") as fh:
+            fh.write(b"print('hello')")
+
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("full-author"), clear=True):
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_commit_files(
+                files=[
+                    {
+                        "operation": "create",
+                        "path": "src/code.py",
+                        "workspace_path": file_relative,
+                    }
+                ],
+                message="Add code.py",
+                remote="prgs",
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["content_source_proof"][0]["source"], "workspace_path")
+
+        post_args = mock_api.call_args[0]
+        payload = post_args[3]
+        # "print('hello')" in base64 is cHJpbnQoJ2hlbGxvJyk=
+        self.assertEqual(payload["files"][0]["content"], "cHJpbnQoJ2hlbGxvJyk=")
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
+    def test_commit_files_local_path(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {
+            "commit": {"sha": "sha-789"},
+            "branch": {"name": "feat/issue-263-native-commit-payloads"}
+        }
+
+        file_abs = os.path.join(self.locked_worktree_path, "local.bin")
+        with open(file_abs, "wb") as fh:
+            fh.write(b"\x00\x01\x02\x03\xff")
+
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("full-author"), clear=True):
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_commit_files(
+                files=[
+                    {
+                        "operation": "create",
+                        "path": "local.bin",
+                        "local_path": file_abs,
+                    }
+                ],
+                message="Add local.bin",
+                remote="prgs",
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["content_source_proof"][0]["source"], "local_path")
+
+        post_args = mock_api.call_args[0]
+        payload = post_args[3]
+        # b"\x00\x01\x02\x03\xff" in base64 is AAECA/8=
+        self.assertEqual(payload["files"][0]["content"], "AAECA/8=")
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
+    def test_commit_files_traversal_blocked(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        # Remove active lock file to ensure it fails on traversal/invalid locks
+        os.remove(self.lock_file_path)
+
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("full-author"), clear=True):
+            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+                mcp_server.gitea_commit_files(
+                    files=[
+                        {
+                            "operation": "create",
+                            "path": "hack.txt",
+                            "workspace_path": "any.txt",
+                        }
+                    ],
+                    message="Add hack",
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+            self.assertIn("Issue lock is missing", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
+    def test_commit_files_outside_scope_blocked(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("full-author"), clear=True):
+            with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as ctx:
+                mcp_server.gitea_commit_files(
+                    files=[
+                        {
+                            "operation": "create",
+                            "path": "hack.txt",
+                            "workspace_path": "../outside.txt",
+                        }
+                    ],
+                    message="Add hack",
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+            self.assertIn("falls outside of locked worktree", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
+    def test_commit_files_multiple_sources_blocked(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("full-author"), clear=True):
+            with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as ctx:
+                mcp_server.gitea_commit_files(
+                    files=[
+                        {
+                            "operation": "create",
+                            "path": "hello.txt",
+                            "content_plain": "Hello!",
+                            "content": "SGVsbG8=",
+                        }
+                    ],
+                    message="Add hello",
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+            self.assertIn("Multiple content sources specified", str(ctx.exception))

tests/test_review_proofs.py

@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ from review_proofs import (  # noqa: E402
     assess_empty_queue_report,
     assess_fresh_issue_selection,
     assess_inventory_completeness,
+    assess_issue_filing_final_report,
+    assess_issue_filing_mutation_capability,
+    assess_issue_filing_sha_evidence,
     assess_issue_selection_final_report,
     assess_queue_target_final_report,
     assess_reviewer_queue_inventory,
@@ -1929,5 +1932,115 @@ class TestIssueSelectionContinuation(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(result["grade"], "A")
 
 
+class TestIssueFilingFinalReport(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Issue #191: issue-filing runs need A-bar final report proofs."""
+
+    ISSUE_TITLE = (
+        "Implement fail-closed continuation mode for issues already "
+        "represented by open PRs"
+    )
+    FULL_SHA = "a4060c5de00f2b1c9e88f4f6f0f3f9a7b2c1d0e9"
+    CAPABILITIES = {
+        "create_issue": {
+            "requested_task": "create_issue",
+            "required_operation_permission": "gitea.issue.create",
+            "allowed_in_current_session": True,
+        },
+    }
+    CLOSEST = [{"number": 183, "title": "Harden author-run reporting", "state": "open"}]
+
+    def _good_report(self, *, sha_line=None):
+        lines = [
+            "Created Gitea-Tools #189 — "
+            f"`{self.ISSUE_TITLE}`",
+            "Duplicate check: searched 12 open issues.",
+            "Closest existing: #183 — Harden author-run reporting "
+            "(update rejected — different scope).",
+            "Why new issue justified: continuation mode is distinct from #183.",
+            "Only mutation: issue creation (gitea.issue.create).",
+            "Confirm no labels, comments, PRs, reviews, merges, or closes.",
+            "## Controller Handoff",
+            "- Task: file issue",
+            "- Repo: Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools",
+            "- Role: author",
+            "- Identity: prgs-author",
+            "- Issue/PR: #189",
+            "- Branch/SHA: n/a",
+            "- Files changed: none",
+            "- Validation: duplicate gate + create_issue capability resolved",
+            "- Mutations: create_issue via gitea.issue.create",
+            "- Workspace mutations: none",
+            "- Current status: issue created",
+            "- Blockers: none",
+            "- Next: implementation",
+            "- Safety: no review/merge",
+            "- Issue created or updated: created #189",
+            "- Related issues: #183, #188",
+        ]
+        if sha_line:
+            lines.insert(4, sha_line)
+        return "\n".join(lines)
+
+    def test_complete_issue_filing_report_earns_a(self):
+        result = assess_issue_filing_final_report(
+            self._good_report(),
+            issue_number=189,
+            issue_title=self.ISSUE_TITLE,
+            action="created",
+            mutations=["create_issue"],
+            resolved_capabilities=self.CAPABILITIES,
+            issues_searched=12,
+            closest_matches=self.CLOSEST,
+            performed_mutations=["create_issue"],
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result["grade"], "A")
+        self.assertFalse(result["downgraded"])
+
+    def test_missing_controller_handoff_downgrades(self):
+        report = self._good_report().replace("## Controller Handoff", "")
+        result = assess_issue_filing_final_report(
+            report,
+            issue_number=189,
+            issue_title=self.ISSUE_TITLE,
+            mutations=["create_issue"],
+            resolved_capabilities=self.CAPABILITIES,
+            issues_searched=12,
+            performed_mutations=["create_issue"],
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["downgraded"])
+
+    def test_abbreviated_sha_downgrades(self):
+        result = assess_issue_filing_sha_evidence(
+            f"old head: {self.FULL_SHA[:7]}"
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["downgraded"])
+
+    def test_mutation_without_capability_proof_downgrades(self):
+        report = self._good_report().replace("gitea.issue.create", "allowed")
+        result = assess_issue_filing_mutation_capability(
+            report,
+            ["create_issue"],
+            self.CAPABILITIES,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["downgraded"])
+
+    def test_label_mutation_without_label_proof_downgrades(self):
+        caps = {
+            "set_issue_labels": {
+                "requested_task": "set_issue_labels",
+                "required_operation_permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
+                "allowed_in_current_session": True,
+            },
+        }
+        report = "\n".join([
+            "Updated labels with gitea.issue.comment capability resolved.",
+            "Only mutations: set_issue_labels",
+        ])
+        result = assess_issue_filing_mutation_capability(
+            report, ["set_issue_labels"], caps
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["downgraded"])
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()