docs: update safety and boundary docs for Jenkins/GlitchTip (#79 )

2026-07-02 14:34:31 -04:00
32 changed files with 86 additions and 3695 deletions
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 # Real JSON runtime-profile configs may reference private hosts; keep only the example.
 gitea-mcp*.json
 !gitea-mcp.example.json
 !gitea-mcp.v2-contexts.example.json
 .vscode/
 graphify-out/
 branches/
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
 # Changelog
 All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 ## [v1.1.0] - 2026-07-02
 ### Added
 - Read-only identity and eligibility tooling: `gitea_whoami` authenticated-user lookup (#11), `gitea_get_profile` runtime-profile discovery (#13), and `gitea_check_pr_eligibility` fail-closed PR eligibility checks (#14).
 - Identity lookup aliases (`gitea_get_authenticated_user` and `gitea_get_current_user`) for common MCP/LLM tool discovery (#9).
 - Gated PR review actions (`gitea_submit_pr_review`) reusing the eligibility gates (#15).
 - Gated PR merge workflow (`gitea_merge_pr`) with explicit `MERGE PR <n>` confirmation, head-SHA and changed-file pinning, and self-merge blocking as the only merge path (#16).
 - Task-scoped Gitea MCP execution profiles: documented profile model (#12) and runtime profiles via environment config with `allowed_operations` (#19).
 - Audit logging for all mutating MCP actions with execution-profile metadata and secret redaction (#18).
 - Shared API pagination (`api_get_all`) and hardened failure handling in `gitea_auth.api_request`: request timeouts, clear network/DNS errors, explicit 502/503/504 upstream errors, malformed-JSON handling, and redacted error text (#67).
 - `scripts/release-tag` SemVer-gated annotated-tag helper (safe-by-default, master-only, tests required) (#50).
 - Automatic `status:in-progress` release on issue close and PR close/merge (#56, #58).
 - `LLM-Agent-SHA` opaque agent attribution convention (Phase 0): documentation, handoff/review templates, and negative tests proving the SHA can never bypass self-review/self-merge gates (#86).
 - macOS `com.apple.provenance` cleanup helper tool and documentation (#3).
 - `manage_labels.py` refactored into reusable modes (`--create-labels`, `--apply-mapping`, `--add-label`) (#6).
 ### Changed
 - HTTP 429 responses now honor `Retry-After` with jittered exponential backoff (#27).
 - Read-only list tools (`gitea_list_issues`, `gitea_list_prs`, `gitea_list_labels`) now paginate across pages with bounded page caps (#67).
 - Automatic `status:in-progress` cleanup on issue/PR close and merge.
 - Label cleanup now utilizes safe targeted label deletion behavior rather than replacing the entire label set.
 ### Documentation
 - MCP security model and trust-boundary documentation (#8).
 - Developer testing guidelines (#70).
 - Jenkins read-only build-status tools design (#72).
 - Jenkins repo/branch/PR → job mapping design (#77).
 - Safety and boundary docs updated for Jenkins/GlitchTip: `glitchtip-mcp` boundary, read-only-first policy, mutation gating (#79).
 - Proposed label taxonomy for Jenkins/GlitchTip workflows (#80).
 - GlitchTip read-only error/event tools design (#73).
 - Multi-service MCP profile model extension (#76).
 ## [v1.0.1]
 - Fix Recent Timesheets Remove button text clipping and copy theme/whats_new in build.
 ## [v1.0.0]
 - Initial versioned release.
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
 # GlitchTip-Gitea Deduplication and Linking Design
 - **Status:** Design (child of #74)
 - **Issue:** #78 (parent: #74 / #75)
 - **Date:** 2026-07-02
 ## 1. Overview and Goals
 To prevent automated error-reporting from flooding the Gitea issue tracker with duplicate tickets for the same underlying GlitchTip error, the filing orchestrator must deduplicate reports. Every filed Gitea issue will be cleanly linked back to its originating GlitchTip error via structured metadata.
 ## 2. Structured Metadata Marker
 Each Gitea issue filed by the orchestrator will contain a machine-readable, structured metadata block in its body. This metadata will contain the GlitchTip issue ID and fingerprint.
 We will use a hidden HTML comment at the end of the issue body:
 ```markdown
 <!-- glitchtip-metadata: {"issue_id": "12345", "fingerprint": "abc123xyz"} -->
 ```
 Adding this as a hidden comment allows orchestrators to parse the metadata reliably without cluttering the user interface or affecting human readability.
 ## 3. Search and Duplicate Detection Strategy
 Before the orchestrator files a new issue, it must search the target Gitea repository for any existing issues referencing the same GlitchTip error.
 ### Search Process:
 1. **API Query:** Query the Gitea repository's issues endpoint using the search term `"glitchtip-metadata"`. This narrows the results down to issues filed by this workflow. The query must search **both open and closed** issues (using Gitea API `state=all`).
 2. **Client-side Parsing:** Fetch the details/body of matching issues and extract the metadata block.
 3. **Identity Match:** Check if the Gitea issue's `issue_id` or `fingerprint` matches the incoming GlitchTip error. If a match is found, it is flagged as a duplicate.
 ## 4. Handling Closed Matching Issues (Open Owner Decision)
 When a matching duplicate Gitea issue is found but its status is **closed**, the workflow cannot assume a single correct behavior (e.g. reopening could cause infinite loops on flaky errors; creating new issues could cause duplicate spam).
 The orchestrator must support configurable modes for this scenario:
 * Mode A: **Ask Human** (Prompt for decision: reopen, file new, or ignore) - *Default Mode*.
 * Mode B: **Comment-Only** (Post a comment in the closed Gitea issue noting that the error recurred, rather than reopening it).
 * Mode C: **Reopen** (Reopen the closed Gitea issue and apply `status:triage` / `status:in-progress`).
 * Mode D: **Create New** (Ignore the closed issue and file a new one, linking it to the previous closed issue).
 > [!IMPORTANT]
 > **Open Owner Decision:** The final default behavior and Mode configuration must be confirmed by the owner prior to implementation.
 ## 5. Concurrency and Race Condition Mitigation
 Since multiple runs of the orchestrator could occur concurrently (e.g. parallel Jenkins builds or multiple webhook deliveries), there is a risk of two runs checking for duplicates simultaneously and both creating new issues.
 ### Mitigation Strategies:
 1. **Single-Concurrency Gate:** Limit execution of the issue filing runbook to a single-concurrency queue (e.g. GHA `concurrency` groups, Jenkins lockable resources).
 2. **Double-Check Query:** Add a randomized delay/jitter (0-5 seconds) before creating the issue, and perform a final check of Gitea issues immediately prior to POSTing the new issue.
 3. **Idempotency Header / Cache:** (Optional) Keep a lightweight, short-lived external state store or cache if a persistent runner is used.
 ## 6. Spam Prevention (Spam Cap)
 To protect Gitea from an unexpected surge in errors (e.g., during a major site outage), the orchestrator must enforce a maximum spam cap per execution:
 - **Default Cap:** Maximum of 5 new Gitea issues filed per execution run.
 - **Exceeded Behavior:** If the cap is reached, the runbook will halt filing new issues, log a warning, and print a summary of all skipped issues to the console/audit logs.
 ## 7. Testing Strategy (Mocked Verification)
 Unit tests for the implementing orchestrator must use mocked Gitea/GlitchTip APIs to assert:
 1. **Deduplication:** A second run with a matching fingerprint does not trigger issue creation.
 2. **State Search:** Both open and closed issues are queried (`state=all`).
 3. **Closed Match mode:** Mode logic operates as configured (`comment`, `reopen`, `new`, `ask`).
 4. **Spam Cap:** Asserts that only the capped limit of issues is created, even if more errors are fetched from GlitchTip.
 5. **No Secrets/PII Leak:** Check that metadata and issue content are clean of credentials.
@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
 # GlitchTip Read-Only Error/Event Tools — Design Notes
 - **Status:** Design (implementation-ready notes; **no implementation in this repo**)
 - **Issue:** #73 (umbrella: #75; boundary decision: ADR-0001, #71)
 - **Related:** #74 (GlitchTip→Gitea filing workflow — composes these read tools),
  #78 (dedup/linking, child of #74), #76 (per-service profile schema)
 - **Date:** 2026-07-02
 ## 1. Purpose and scope
 Define the minimum **read-only** GlitchTip MCP tool set that lets an LLM answer:
 *"What unresolved errors does project X have (by environment/release), and what
 is this specific error?"* — with privacy-safe output suitable for LLM context,
 issue bodies, and audit logs.
 Strictly read-only, per ADR-0001:
 - **No mutation tools** — no resolving/ignoring/assigning issues, no comment
  posting, no project/team/key administration, no deletes.
 - **No automatic GlitchTip→Gitea filing** (that is #74's *orchestrated,
  explicitly-invoked* workflow; it composes these read tools and Gitea write
  tools — never one dual-credential server).
 - **This server never holds Gitea write credentials.**
 ## 2. Boundary placement (namespace pending)
 These tools belong to the GlitchTip observability boundary of the MCP Control
 Plane — `glitchtip-mcp` (ADR-0001's recommendation), `observability-mcp`, or
 folded into `ops-mcp`. **ADR-0001 open owner decision #2 picks the name; this
 design does not assume it.** Tool names below use the `glitchtip_` prefix for
 readability and rename mechanically with the decision.
 Fixed regardless of the name (per `tool-boundaries.md`,
 `credential-isolation.md`):
 - Own server process, own `.env`, GlitchTip credentials only.
 - No Gitea, Jenkins, or Ops tokens in this runtime; no GlitchTip token
  anywhere else.
 ## 3. API surface note (Sentry compatibility)
 GlitchTip implements a Sentry-compatible REST API (`/api/0/...` — organizations,
 projects, issues, events). The design targets **GlitchTip's documented subset**
 only; Sentry-only endpoints must not be assumed. The implementation should pin
 against a tested GlitchTip version and treat missing endpoints/fields as
 degraded-but-safe (omit field, never crash).
 ## 4. Minimum read-only tool set
 | Tool | Purpose |
 |---|---|
 | `glitchtip_whoami` | Verify authenticated identity + active profile (mirror of `gitea_whoami`; fail-closed identity proof) |
 | `glitchtip_list_projects` | Projects visible to the token (org-scoped), with pagination bounds |
 | `glitchtip_list_unresolved` | Unresolved issues for a project, filterable (§6), sorted by last-seen |
 | `glitchtip_get_issue` | Safe detail of one issue (fields §5) |
 | `glitchtip_recent_events` | Recent events for an issue (summaries only, §5) |
 | `glitchtip_search` | Issue search within a project (query + filters §6) |
 All tools are `GET`-only. No tool issues PUT/POST/DELETE.
 ## 5. Privacy: field-level allowlist (the core rule)
 Error events routinely contain PII and secrets (request bodies, cookies,
 headers, tokens, user emails/IPs, local variables). Therefore: **allowlist
 projection only — raw event/issue payloads are never passed through.**
 ### Issue-level safe fields (`glitchtip_list_unresolved`, `glitchtip_get_issue`, `glitchtip_search`)
 | Field | Notes |
 |---|---|
 | `issue_id` | GlitchTip issue ID (dedup key for #78) |
 | `fingerprint` | When available (dedup key for #78) |
 | `title` / `culprit` | Error type + short message/transaction — redactor-passed |
 | `project` | Slug |
 | `level` | error/warning/… |
 | `status` | unresolved/… |
 | `environment` | When filtered/available |
 | `release` | Version string |
 | `first_seen` / `last_seen` | ISO-8601 UTC |
 | `event_count` / `user_count` | Numbers only — never user identities |
 | `permalink` | GlitchTip web URL (the "link, not dump" principle) |
 ### Event-level safe fields (`glitchtip_recent_events`)
 `event_id`, `timestamp`, `level`, `environment`, `release`, redactor-passed
 `message`, and a **stack summary** only: top N (default 5) frames as
 `module/filename:function:line` — in-app frames preferred.
 ### Redact / omit — never returned
 Request headers; cookies; auth/session fields; user emails, usernames, IPs;
 request/form bodies; query strings; local variables; full raw stack frames
 (source context lines); SDK/device metadata beyond platform name; breadcrumbs;
 any `extra`/`context` blobs.
 Full raw frames or request context require a **separate, explicitly approved**
 operation (`glitchtip.event.read_raw`) that is absent from default profiles —
 same pattern as `jenkins.console.read` in the #72 design. Even then, output
 passes the shared secret redactor; redaction failure ⇒ error, never raw text.
 **Default output = fingerprint / release / summary + permalink.** The
 permalink carries the human to the full data in GlitchTip's own UI, where its
 access control applies — the MCP layer does not re-serve raw payloads.
 ## 6. Filtering and pagination
 Filters (all optional, combinable): `project` (required for issue/event
 queries), `environment`, `release`, `fingerprint`, free-text `query`
 (GlitchTip search syntax, e.g. `is:unresolved`).
 Pagination: cursor-based per the API. Bounds: per-page cap 50; default overall
 cap 100 items; hard cap `max_pages` (default 10) against runaway loops —
 mirroring `gitea_auth.api_get_all`. Truncation is **explicit** in the return
 (`"truncated": true`) — never silent.
 ## 7. Credentials and profile requirements
 Per-service profile model (`gitea-execution-profiles.md`, extended by #76):
 - Env/config: `GLITCHTIP_URL`, `GLITCHTIP_ORG`, `GLITCHTIP_TOKEN_SOURCE_NAME`
  (secret **name** only; value resolved at runtime, never logged/committed).
 - Profile: e.g. `glitchtip-readonly` with namespaced
  `allowed_operations: ["glitchtip.read", "glitchtip.event.read"]`
  (+ `glitchtip.event.read_raw` only with explicit approval);
  `forbidden_operations: ["glitchtip.issue.mutate", "glitchtip.admin"]`
  belt-and-braces though no mutating tool exists.
 - Missing URL/org/token/profile ⇒ **fail closed** before any network call.
 - Read-only ⇒ no confirmation gates; identity (`glitchtip_whoami`) must work so
  workflows can prove which account they read as.
 ## 8. Failure behavior (fail closed, clear, safe)
 | Condition | Behavior |
 |---|---|
 | Unknown project/issue | Explicit `{"found": false, ...}` — no fuzzy matching |
 | GlitchTip unreachable (DNS/timeout) | `"network error contacting GlitchTip: <redacted reason>"` — mirror `gitea_auth.api_request` conversion |
 | 502/503/504 | "GlitchTip upstream unavailable" |
 | 401/403 | "GlitchTip auth failed / insufficient permissions" — no credential echo |
 | 429 | Honor Retry-After with capped jittered backoff (as `gitea_auth`) |
 | Malformed JSON | "malformed JSON response from GlitchTip" — no raw-body dump |
 | Missing profile/creds | Fail closed before any network call (§7) |
 All error text passes the shared secret redactor.
 ## 9. Testing strategy (mocked; for the implementing package)
 Mocked-GlitchTip unit tests only, per `docs/developer-testing-guidelines.md`:
 - Assert method is always `GET`; URL/filter/cursor shape correct.
 - **Projection tests:** response fixtures containing emails, IPs, cookies,
  headers, request bodies, locals, full frames ⇒ none appear in output
  (explicit negative assertions per §5's redact list).
 - Stack summary: top-N frame cap enforced; source-context lines absent.
 - Pagination: per-page/overall/max-pages caps; explicit `truncated` flag.
 - Filters: environment/release/fingerprint/query passed through correctly.
 - Failure matrix of §8 incl. no-token-in-error assertions.
 - Profile gate: missing/insufficient profile ⇒ no network call
  (`mock_api.assert_not_called()` pattern).
 - `read_raw` op absent ⇒ raw-frame request refused without an API call.
 ## 10. Implementation-readiness checklist
 Ready to implement once:
 1. ADR-0001 owner decision #2 (namespace/placement) is made — mechanical
   rename of the `glitchtip_` prefix if needed.
 2. ADR-0001 owner decision #1 (repo home) is made.
 3. #76 profile schema exists (or a minimal `glitchtip-readonly` profile is
   hand-rolled to the same rules).
 4. A pinned GlitchTip version is chosen for API-subset testing (§3).
 Explicitly **not** unlocked by this document: any GlitchTip mutation, any
 automatic Gitea filing (#74 designs that as a gated, explicitly-invoked
 orchestrated workflow), any Gitea credentials in this boundary.
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
 # GlitchTip-to-Gitea Issue Filing Workflow Design
 - **Status:** Design (no implementation in this repo)
 - **Issue:** #74 (parent umbrella: #75)
 - **Related:** #78 (deduplication design, child of #74)
 - **Date:** 2026-07-02
 ## 1. Boundary and Orchestration
 * **GlitchTip-to-Gitea filing is NOT a GlitchTip MCP capability.** The `glitchtip-mcp` boundary remains strictly read-only per ADR-0001.
 * The filing capability lives in an **orchestrator / runbook / release workflow**. It **composes** separate GlitchTip **read** tools (from the `glitchtip-mcp` server) and Gitea **issue** tools (from the `gitea-mcp` server).
 * The orchestrator **must not centralize credentials** into a single server. The GlitchTip MCP holds only GlitchTip tokens, and the Gitea MCP holds only Gitea tokens.
 ## 2. Invocation and Safety
 * **Explicit invocation only:** There is no automatic, unsupervised filing in phase 1. A human or an explicitly-triggered automation must initiate the workflow.
 * **Dry-run / Preview required:** The orchestrator must present a preview of the drafted Gitea issue (title, body, labels) and obtain explicit confirmation before calling the Gitea mutation tool to file the issue.
 * **Gitea Profile Checks & Audit Logging:** The actual Gitea issue creation relies on `gitea-mcp`, and therefore inherently subjects the mutation to Gitea profile checks and audit logging as standard.
 ## 3. Gitea Issue Format
 The workflow generates a Gitea issue using the following format and fields:
 ### Required Fields
 The issue body MUST include the following extracted fields from GlitchTip:
 - **Project**
 - **Environment**
 - **Release**
 - **First seen / Last seen**
 - **Event count / User count**
 - **Stack summary** (Truncated/summarized, no raw frames)
 - **GlitchTip URL / linkback:** A permalink back to the GlitchTip web UI so users can view the full unredacted data securely.
 ### Title Format
 `[GlitchTip] {Project} - {Error Type}: {Short Message}`
 ### Labels
 The orchestrator must apply the following labels upon creation:
 * `source:glitchtip`
 * `bug`
 * `status:triage`
 ## 4. Redaction Rules
 To prevent PII or secret leakage into Gitea, the orchestrator and the underlying `glitchtip-mcp` read tools strictly omit and redact the following from the Gitea issue body:
 * Request bodies
 * Cookies and headers
 * Authentication tokens / Session IDs
 * PII (User emails, usernames, IPs)
 * Full raw stack traces (source code lines)
 The principle is: **"Link, don't dump"**. The generated issue acts as an alert/pointer, while the raw context remains protected inside GlitchTip.
 ## 5. Deduplication and Linking (Deferred)
 Deduplication logic (e.g. searching existing Gitea issues, managing GlitchTip issue IDs, and race condition handling) is specifically handled by **Issue #78** and will augment this design.
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
 # Jenkins Repo/Branch/PR → Job Mapping — Design Notes
 - **Status:** Design (implementation-ready notes; **no implementation in this repo**)
 - **Issue:** #77 (parent: #72 read-only tools design; umbrella: #75; boundary: ADR-0001, #71)
 - **Related docs:** [`jenkins-readonly-build-status-design.md`](jenkins-readonly-build-status-design.md)
 - **Date:** 2026-07-02
 ## 1. Purpose
 The #72 tool set addresses Jenkins jobs by **explicit fully-qualified job
 path**. This document designs the layer above it: how a *(repository, branch,
 PR)* tuple — the vocabulary of Gitea workflows — resolves deterministically to
 a Jenkins job path, so an LLM can ask "did the build for `Gitea-Tools`
 `master` pass?" without knowing Jenkins internals.
 Hard constraints inherited from #72 / ADR-0001:
 - **No silent guessing of job names.** Unmapped input returns an explicit
  "no mapping" result — never a fuzzy match, never a constructed-and-probed
  name.
 - **Read-only.** Mapping introduces no Jenkins write actions.
 - Lives in the **`jenkins-mcp`** boundary; no Gitea credentials involved.
 ## 2. Mapping format
 Declarative, versioned config (TOML or JSON — match whatever config format
 `jenkins-mcp` adopts; illustrated here as TOML):
 ```toml
 version = 1
 [[mapping]]
 # Source side (what the caller supplies)
 repo   = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"   # org/repo, exact
 # Target side (where it lives in Jenkins)
 job    = "scaled-tech/gitea-tools"              # foldered job path
 type   = "multibranch"                           # "multibranch" | "single" | "parameterized-view"
 [[mapping]]
 repo   = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet"
 branch = "master"                                # optional: branch-specific override
 job    = "scaled-tech/timesheet-master"
 type   = "single"
 ```
 Field semantics:
 | Field | Required | Meaning |
 |---|---|---|
 | `repo` | yes | Exact `org/repo` (case-insensitive compare, stored canonical) |
 | `branch` | no | Exact branch name this entry pins; absent = all branches |
 | `job` | yes | Fully-qualified Jenkins job path, folders `/`-joined |
 | `type` | yes | How branch/PR resolves under the job (§3) |
 Rules:
 - **Exact matching only** on `repo` and `branch`. No globs in v1 (globs invite
  accidental over-matching; add later behind an explicit `pattern = true` flag
  if ever needed).
 - Unknown `type` or malformed entry ⇒ config load fails closed with a clear
  error naming the entry — a broken mapping file must not half-load.
 - Duplicate `(repo, branch)` keys ⇒ load error (ambiguity is refused, not
  resolved).
 ## 3. Resolution semantics by job type
 Given caller input `(repo, branch?, pr?)`:
 - **`multibranch`** — branch job addressed as `<job>/<url-encoded-branch>`
  (e.g. `feature/x` → `feature%2Fx`). PRs addressed as `<job>/PR-<number>`
  (Jenkins multibranch PR-discovery naming). Both per #72 §8.
 - **`single`** — the job path is used as-is; `branch`/`pr` input beyond the
  entry's pinned branch is a **no-mapping** result (a single job cannot answer
  for arbitrary branches).
 - **`parameterized-view`** — read-only variant for jobs that encode branch as
  a build parameter: resolution returns the base job path plus a
  `branch_param` filter hint the status tools may apply client-side when
  scanning recent builds. It never triggers anything (read-only rule).
 ## 4. Precedence
 Most-specific entry wins, evaluated in this order:
 1. `(repo, branch)` exact entry — branch-pinned override.
 2. `(repo)` entry — repo-wide (multibranch typical).
 3. Nothing → **no mapping** (§5).
 PR input resolves through the same chain: a PR belongs to its **base repo**'s
 mapping; forks never introduce their own mapping (a fork's head repo is not
 consulted — CI runs live under the base repo's job). If the base repo is
 unmapped, the PR is unmapped.
 Ties are impossible by construction (duplicate keys refused at load).
 ## 5. No-match behavior
 ```json
 {
  "mapped": false,
  "repo": "org/unknown-repo",
  "branch": "master",
  "error": "no Jenkins job mapping for this repo/branch",
  "hint": "add an entry to the jenkins-mcp mapping config"
 }
 ```
 - Deterministic, explicit, machine-checkable (`mapped: false`).
 - **Never** falls back to name construction ("repo name probably equals job
  name"), never probes Jenkins for candidates, never string-similarity ranks.
 - The hint names the config, not a guessed job.
 ## 6. Where the mapping config lives
 - **In the `jenkins-mcp` package/deployment** (e.g. `jenkins-mcp/mapping.toml`),
  version-controlled next to the server that consumes it — *not* in Gitea-Tools
  and *not* in per-user env vars (mappings are shared team facts, not
  credentials).
 - Path overridable via env (`JENKINS_MCP_MAPPING_FILE`) for tests/containers.
 - Contains **no secrets** — job paths and repo names only — so it is safe to
  commit and review like any other config.
 - Reloaded at server start; a hot-reload tool is out of scope (restart is the
  documented path).
 ## 7. Exposed tool surface (read-only)
 One addition to the #72 tool set:
 | Tool | Purpose |
 |---|---|
 | `jenkins_resolve_job` | `(repo, branch?, pr?)` → `{mapped, job, addressed_path, type}` or the §5 no-match result. Pure config lookup — **no Jenkins API call at all.** |
 Status tools (`jenkins_latest_build` etc.) accept either an explicit job path
 (as designed in #72) **or** `(repo, branch)` which they resolve via the same
 mapping layer first. Resolution failure surfaces the §5 payload rather than
 querying Jenkins.
 ## 8. Testing strategy (mocked; for the implementing package)
 Config-layer tests (no network at all):
 - Exact-match hit: repo-wide and branch-pinned entries.
 - Precedence: branch-pinned beats repo-wide.
 - Multibranch encoding: `feature/x` → `<job>/feature%2Fx`; PR → `<job>/PR-7`.
 - `single` type with non-pinned branch ⇒ no-mapping.
 - Fork PR resolves through base repo; unmapped base ⇒ no-mapping.
 - Unknown repo/branch ⇒ §5 payload, and **no Jenkins client call**
  (`mock_api.assert_not_called()`).
 - Malformed config / duplicate keys / unknown type ⇒ load fails closed with
  entry-naming error.
 - No-secret check: mapping load/error paths never touch or print credentials.
 Integration with mocked Jenkins API (per #72 §9): resolved path is used
 verbatim in the GET URL; no write verbs anywhere.
 ## 9. Standalone-worthiness and readiness
 #77 was split from #72 on the condition it stays "standalone only if mapping
 is nontrivial." The precedence rules, fork/PR semantics, three job types, and
 fail-closed config loading above are the nontrivial part; this document is the
 justification.
 Ready to implement in `jenkins-mcp` when #72's readiness checklist clears
 (ADR-0001 owner decision #1; profile schema per #76 or hand-rolled
 `jenkins-readonly`). Nothing here unlocks build triggers, deploys, or
 parameterized launches.
@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
 # Jenkins Read-Only Build Status Tools — Design Notes
 - **Status:** Design (implementation-ready notes; **no implementation in this repo**)
 - **Issue:** #72 (parent umbrella: #75; boundary decision: ADR-0001, #71)
 - **Related:** #77 (repo/branch/PR → job mapping, designed separately)
 - **Date:** 2026-07-02
 ## 1. Purpose and scope
 Define the minimum **read-only** Jenkins MCP tool set that lets an LLM answer:
 *"Did the latest build for this project/branch succeed or fail?"* — plus enough
 detail (build URL, number, timing, result) to report or investigate.
 Phase 1 is **strictly read-only**, per ADR-0001
 ([`adr-0001-mcp-control-plane-boundaries.md`](adr-0001-mcp-control-plane-boundaries.md)):
 - **Excluded: build triggers.**
 - **Excluded: deploy triggers.**
 - **Excluded: parameterized job launches.**
 - Excluded: job creation/deletion/config changes, queue manipulation, node
  management — any Jenkins mutation whatsoever.
 ## 2. Boundary placement
 These tools belong to the **`jenkins-mcp`** package/server of the MCP Control
 Plane — **never** inside `gitea-mcp` (`mcp_server.py` in this repo).
 Consequences (from `tool-boundaries.md`, `credential-isolation.md`, ADR-0001):
 - `jenkins-mcp` runs as its own server process with its own `.env`.
 - **Jenkins credentials never enter the Gitea MCP runtime**, and Gitea
  credentials never enter `jenkins-mcp`.
 - This document lands in this repo only because the repo currently hosts the
  Control Plane's architecture docs; the code ships elsewhere (owner decision
  #1 of ADR-0001).
 ## 3. Minimum read-only tool set
 | Tool | Purpose |
 |---|---|
 | `jenkins_whoami` | Verify authenticated Jenkins identity + active profile (mirror of `gitea_whoami`; fail-closed identity proof before anything else) |
 | `jenkins_list_jobs` | List visible jobs (supports folder paths), with pagination bounds |
 | `jenkins_latest_build` | The primary question: latest build of a job (or job+branch for multibranch) → status summary |
 | `jenkins_build_status` | Status of a specific build number (job, number) |
 | `jenkins_get_build` | Full safe detail of a build (fields in §4) |
 | `jenkins_console_tail` | Bounded, redacted tail of a build's console log (§6) — optional, approval-gated addition |
 All tools are `GET`-only against the Jenkins JSON API (`/api/json`,
 `.../lastBuild/api/json`, `.../consoleText`). No tool issues POST/PUT/DELETE.
 ## 4. Return payloads (safe fields)
 `jenkins_latest_build` / `jenkins_build_status` / `jenkins_get_build` return:
 | Field | Source | Notes |
 |---|---|---|
 | `job` | request | Fully-qualified job path (folders joined with `/`) |
 | `build_number` | `number` | int |
 | `result` | `result` | `SUCCESS` / `FAILURE` / `UNSTABLE` / `ABORTED` / `NOT_BUILT`; `null` → `IN_PROGRESS` when `building=true` |
 | `building` | `building` | bool |
 | `url` | `url` | Build URL |
 | `branch` | multibranch job name / SCM action | Best-effort; omitted when unknown |
 | `timestamp` | `timestamp` | ISO-8601 UTC (converted from epoch ms) |
 | `duration_seconds` | `duration` | 0/omitted while building |
 | `commit_sha` | SCM build action | Best-effort; omitted when unknown |
 Rules: no raw Jenkins payload passthrough (allowlist projection only); no
 `Authorization` header, token, or crumb material in any output or error
 (reuse the shared redaction approach of `safety-model.md` §3 / `gitea_audit`).
 ## 5. Failure behavior (fail closed, clear, safe)
 | Condition | Behavior |
 |---|---|
 | Unknown job | Explicit `{"found": false, "job": "<path>", "error": "job not found"}` — never guess or fuzzy-match a job name (hard rule; see also #77) |
 | Jenkins unreachable (DNS/timeout/conn refused) | Clear `"network error contacting Jenkins: <redacted reason>"`; no retry storm — mirror `gitea_auth.api_request` timeout + failure conversion |
 | 502/503/504 | Explicit "Jenkins upstream unavailable" |
 | 401/403 | "Jenkins auth failed / insufficient permissions" — **without** echoing credentials or the request's auth material |
 | Malformed JSON | "malformed JSON response from Jenkins" (no raw-body dump) |
 | Missing profile/creds | Fail closed before any network call (§7) |
 ## 6. Console tail safety (`jenkins_console_tail`)
 Console logs are the highest-risk surface (secrets, tokens, internal hosts
 routinely leak into build logs). If included at all (owner may defer it):
 - **Bounded:** hard server-side cap (default: last 200 lines AND ≤ 64 KiB,
  whichever is smaller; caller may request less, never more).
 - **Redacted:** pass through the shared secret redactor (token/`Basic`/`Bearer`/
  password/key-value patterns) before returning; redaction failure ⇒ return an
  error, never the raw text.
 - **Default off:** summary fields (`result`, failing stage if cheaply available)
  are preferred; the tail requires an explicit `allowed_operations` entry
  (`jenkins.console.read`) distinct from plain `jenkins.build.read`.
 ## 7. Credentials and profile requirements
 Follows the per-service profile model (`gitea-execution-profiles.md`, extended
 by #76):
 - Env/config: `JENKINS_URL`, `JENKINS_USER`, `JENKINS_TOKEN_SOURCE_NAME`
  (name-of-secret only — value resolved at runtime, never logged/committed).
 - Profile: e.g. `jenkins-readonly` with namespaced
  `allowed_operations: ["jenkins.read", "jenkins.build.read"]`
  (+ `jenkins.console.read` only if the tail tool is approved);
  `forbidden_operations: ["jenkins.build.trigger", "jenkins.deploy", "jenkins.job.configure"]`
  as belt-and-braces even though no mutating tool exists.
 - Missing URL/user/token/profile ⇒ **fail closed** with a clear message.
 - Since every tool is read-only, no confirmation gates are needed — but
  identity (`jenkins_whoami`) must still work so workflows can prove which
  Jenkins account they act as.
 ## 8. Job addressing and mapping
 Tools accept an explicit fully-qualified job path (folder-aware:
 `folder/subfolder/job`). How a *repo/branch/PR* resolves to that job path is
 **out of scope here** and designed in **#77**, with these fixed constraints:
 - No silent guessing of job names — unmapped input returns an explicit
  "no mapping" result.
 - Multibranch pipelines address a branch job as `<job>/<branch>` with proper
  URL-encoding of branch names (e.g. `feature%2Fx`).
 ## 9. Testing strategy (for the implementing package)
 Mocked-Jenkins unit tests only (no live Jenkins in unit CI), mirroring this
 repo's conventions (`docs/developer-testing-guidelines.md`):
 - Patch the HTTP client; assert method is always `GET` and URL shape is correct
  (folders, multibranch encoding).
 - Success projections: field allowlist exactly as §4; unknown fields dropped.
 - `result=null + building=true` ⇒ `IN_PROGRESS`.
 - Unknown job ⇒ found:false, no fuzzy match, no API retry.
 - Timeout/DNS/5xx/malformed-JSON ⇒ safe errors, no secret/credential leakage
  (explicit no-token-in-error assertions).
 - Console tail: cap enforcement (lines and bytes), redaction applied, redaction
  failure ⇒ error not raw text, gated behind `jenkins.console.read`.
 - Profile gate: missing/insufficient profile ⇒ no network call
  (`mock_api.assert_not_called()` pattern).
 ## 10. Implementation-readiness checklist
 Ready to implement in `jenkins-mcp` once:
 1. ADR-0001 owner decision #1 (where `jenkins-mcp` lives) is made.
 2. #76 profile schema exists (or a minimal `jenkins-readonly` profile is
   hand-rolled to the same rules).
 3. #77 mapping design is accepted (or tools ship path-addressed only, mapping
   deferred).
 Explicitly **not** unlocked by this document: build triggers, deploys,
 parameterized launches, any Jenkins code in `mcp_server.py`.
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
 # MCP Gitea Server Refactor: Compatibility Matrix & Staged Plan
 - **Status:** Staging/Design (First phase of #65)
 - **Issue:** #65 (Staged refactor of `mcp_server.py` into a modular package)
 - **Date:** 2026-07-02
 ## 1. Overview and Refactoring Contract
 The goal of this refactor is to split the monolith `mcp_server.py` (~1689 lines) into a clean, maintainable, and modular Python package (`gitea_tools`).
 To ensure complete backward compatibility, we establish a strict contract:
 * **No functional changes:** Code behaviour, API endpoint targets, parameter sets, and return formats must remain identical.
 * **No gate bypasses:** Allowed operations, forbidden operations, identity resolving, and audit logging must continue to execute exactly as they do in the monolith.
 * **Independent testing:** The full pytest suite must pass with 100% success after every single stage.
 ---
 ## 2. Compatibility Matrix
 The following table documents every MCP tool's expected signature, parameters, return payload shape, and error behavior that must be preserved.
 ### 2.1 Issue & Label Management Tools
 | Tool Name | Parameters | Return Payload Shape | Error Behavior / Edge Cases |
 | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
 | `gitea_create_issue` | `title: str`, `body: str`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict containing issue details (`number`, `title`, `body`, `state`, `labels`, `assignee`, `url`) | Raises error on auth failure, missing parameters, or Gitea API validation error. |
 | `gitea_close_issue` | `issue_number: int`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict detailing the closed issue. | Raises 404 if issue doesn't exist; fails closed if user has insufficient permission. |
 | `gitea_list_issues` | `state: str`, `label: str \| None`, `limit: int`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | List of dicts representing matched issues. | Limits pagination per page and overall maximum caps. |
 | `gitea_view_issue` | `issue_number: int`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict of detailed issue attributes. | Returns clear 404 error if not found. |
 | `gitea_mark_issue` | `issue_number: int`, `action: str`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict indicating current label states (presence of `status:in-progress`). | Rejects unknown actions; fails if label doesn't exist on Gitea. |
 | `gitea_list_labels` | `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | List of dicts representing labels. | Basic auth error fallback behavior. |
 | `gitea_create_label` | `name: str`, `color: str`, `description: str`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict of created label properties. | Fails on duplicate names or invalid color hex formats. |
 | `gitea_set_issue_labels` | `issue_number: int`, `labels: list[str]`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | List of all labels currently applied to the issue. | Fails closed if any label name does not exist. |
 ### 2.2 PR & Review Management Tools
 | Tool Name | Parameters | Return Payload Shape | Error Behavior / Edge Cases |
 | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
 | `gitea_create_pr` | `title: str`, `head: str`, `base: str`, `body: str`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict detailing the created PR. | Fails on missing branches, existing duplicate PR, or invalid base branch. |
 | `gitea_list_prs` | `state: str`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | List of dicts representing open/closed PRs. | Standard limits apply. |
 | `gitea_view_pr` | `pr_number: int`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict of detailed PR attributes. | Fails if PR does not exist. |
 | `gitea_check_pr_eligibility` | `pr_number: int`, `action: str`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict: `{"eligible": bool, "reasons": list[str]}` | Non-gated, safe, read-only. Fails on invalid actions. |
 | `gitea_submit_pr_review` | `pr_number: int`, `action: str`, `body: str`, `expected_head_sha: str \| None`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict of submitted review properties. | Rejects self-review; fails if head SHA has changed in the meantime. |
 | `gitea_edit_pr` | `pr_number: int`, `title: str \| None`, `body: str \| None`, `state: str \| None`, `base: str \| None`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict of updated PR attributes. | Fails on invalid fields or if PR state transition is blocked. |
 | `gitea_merge_pr` | `pr_number: int`, `confirmation: str`, `expected_head_sha: str \| None`, `expected_changed_files: list[str] \| None`, `do: str`, `title: str \| None`, `message: str \| None`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict of merge result details. | Fails if any gating eligibility checks fail (e.g. self-merge, wrong confirmation, SHA mismatch). |
 | `gitea_review_pr` | `pr_number: int`, `event: str`, `body: str`, `merge: bool`, `merge_method: str`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict representing legacy review output. | Backward compatibility wrapper; delegates to review/merge logic. |
 | `gitea_delete_branch` | `branch: str`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict indicating branch deletion status. | Fails on protected branches or non-existent refs. |
 ### 2.3 File, Identity, and Utility Tools
 | Tool Name | Parameters | Return Payload Shape | Error Behavior / Edge Cases |
 | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
 | `gitea_get_file` | `filepath: str`, `ref: str`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict containing metadata and Base64 content of the target file. | Fails if path or reference branch does not exist. |
 | `gitea_commit_files` | `files: list[dict]`, `message: str`, `branch: str \| None`, `new_branch: str \| None`, `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `org: str \| None`, `repo: str \| None` | Dict describing commit hash and ref state. | Fails on file path conflicts or commit collisions. |
 | `gitea_whoami` | `remote: str`, `host: str \| None` | Dict detailing verified login user (e.g., `sysadmin`). | Alias targets: `gitea_get_authenticated_user`, `gitea_get_current_user` must be preserved. |
 | `gitea_get_profile` | `remote: str`, `host: str \| None`, `resolve_identity: bool` | Dict of loaded profile constraints and active configuration details. | Fails closed on invalid/missing profile specs. |
 | `gitea_mirror_refs` | `apply: bool`, `force: bool` | Dict summarizing mirrored branch/tag logs. | Fails on Git CLI mirror action exceptions. |
 ---
 ## 3. Staged Refactoring Plan
 We will perform the refactoring in five discrete stages. Each stage will land as its own independent PR to master, verifying that the codebase compiles and passes the complete test suite at each step.
 ### Stage 1: API and Client Core Extraction
 * **Goal:** Extract common network request wrappers, pagination handlers, and HTTP exception conversions.
 * **Target File:** `gitea_tools/client.py`
 * **Contents:** `api_request`, `api_get_all`, HTTP error maps, and token/credential redaction helper `_redact`.
 ### Stage 2: Auth and Configuration Extraction
 * **Goal:** Extract Gitea profile parsers, credential loading logic, and helper scripts.
 * **Target File:** `gitea_tools/config.py`
 * **Contents:** `get_auth_header`, `get_profile`, `repo_api_url`, and profile config schemas.
 ### Stage 3: Audit Logging and Security Gates
 * **Goal:** Extract security filters, audit logging mechanisms, and metadata decorators.
 * **Target File:** `gitea_tools/audit.py`
 * **Contents:** `AuditSink`, `_audited`, and audit message templates.
 ### Stage 4: Tool Implementations (Domain-Driven Modules)
 * **Goal:** Group and move the core implementation logic of the 24 tools out of `mcp_server.py`.
 * **Target Files:**
  * `gitea_tools/issues.py` — Issues, labels, and mark status tools.
  * `gitea_tools/prs.py` — PRs, reviews, merge gating, and branch delete.
  * `gitea_tools/files.py` — File retrieval and atomic commits.
  * `gitea_tools/identity.py` — whoami and runtime profile descriptions.
  * `gitea_tools/utilities.py` — Mirroring scripts and miscellaneous tasks.
 ### Stage 5: Final Tool Registration Layer
 * **Goal:** Clean up the root `mcp_server.py` to be a pure registration layer.
 * **Contents:** Imports the modular functions from the `gitea_tools` package and wraps them inside the standard FastMCP `@mcp.tool()` decorators.
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
 # Multi-Service MCP Profile and Configuration Model
 - **Status:** Design (no implementation in this repo yet)
 - **Issue:** #76 (parent umbrella: #75; boundary decision: ADR-0001, #71)
 - **Date:** 2026-07-02
 ## 1. Purpose and Scope
 Extend the existing Gitea execution-profile model (`docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md`) into a generic **per-service** MCP profile/config model. This supports integrating Jenkins and GlitchTip into the MCP Control Plane while strictly preserving isolation and fail-closed safety.
 **Crucial Constraints:**
 * The shared profile/config model is a **schema / library**, **not a shared credential pool**.
 * Tokens remain **service-local**; profiles are **per service**.
 * Orchestrators **must not** directly hold every service credential.
 ## 2. Profile Schema (Per Service)
 The schema reuses the proven Gitea field model, adapted per service.
 ```json
 {
  "profile_name": "readonly-metrics",
  "service": "glitchtip",
  "token_source_name": "GLITCHTIP_API_TOKEN_READONLY",
  "allowed_operations": [
    "glitchtip.event.read",
    "glitchtip.issue.read"
  ],
  "forbidden_operations": [
    "glitchtip.issue.resolve",
    "glitchtip.issue.delete"
  ]
 }
 ```
 ### Schema Rules
 * `allowed_operations` are **namespaced** (e.g., `gitea.issue.create`, `jenkins.build.read`, `glitchtip.event.read`).
 * `forbidden_operations`, if present, **always override** `allowed_operations`.
 * `token_source_name` records the source **name only, never the value**. Tokens must never be printed, logged, or included in telemetry.
 ## 3. Fail-Closed Behavior
 The model enforces strict fail-closed constraints before any network call occurs:
 * **Missing Profile:** If a requested profile is undefined for the target service, the operation fails immediately.
 * **Missing Credentials:** If the `token_source_name` cannot be resolved to a valid token at runtime, the operation fails immediately without retrying or prompting.
 ## 4. Environment Overrides
 Profiles can be dynamically overridden or injected via environment variables, following the established hierarchy:
 1. **Explicit Environment Variable:** (Highest precedence) e.g., `MCP_GLITCHTIP_TOKEN` overrides any JSON profile.
 2. **Profile Mapping in JSON:** Resolved via `token_source_name` (e.g., `GLITCHTIP_API_TOKEN_READONLY`) mapping to an environment variable or secret store.
 3. **No Auth:** Fails closed.
 ## 5. Audit Logging
 To maintain accountability across multi-service workflows, all mutating actions must include the audit identity and source:
 * The audit log must record the `profile_name`, the orchestrator source (e.g., `sysadmin`, `jenkins-mcp`), and the action taken.
 * The audit system must sanitize all output to ensure tokens are stripped (see `safety-model.md`).
 ## 6. Backward Compatibility
 The existing Gitea profile behavior (`gitea_whoami`, etc.) remains strictly backward compatible. The generic profile library will parse existing Gitea profile objects without requiring them to migrate their schemas, defaulting the `service` attribute to `gitea`.
 ## 7. Implementation Boundary
 Per the namespace decisions in #71 and #75, this generic model belongs in the `common` package or library. It will be imported by `gitea-mcp` (this repo), `jenkins-mcp`, and `glitchtip-mcp` without forcing a monolithic architecture.
@@ -208,18 +208,17 @@ git diff --cached | grep -nEi "authorization: (basic|bearer)|password|token=[A-Z
 ---
-## 8. Unit tests vs. Docker integration tests
+## 8. Unit tests vs. future Docker integration tests
-* **Unit tests (default):** fast, fully mocked, no network, no keychain.
+* **Unit tests (today, default):** fast, fully mocked, no network, no keychain.
  This is where the vast majority of coverage lives and where new tests should
  go. They must stay fast and must not require credentials.
-* **Docker/local-Gitea integration tests (#66, `tests/integration/`):** opt-in
+* **Docker/local-Gitea integration tests (planned, see #66):** opt-in and
-  and skipped by default — enabled only by `GITEA_INTEGRATION=1` and run
+  skipped by default, gated behind an explicit environment variable and run
-  against a pinned, disposable Gitea container
+  against a pinned, disposable Gitea container. They validate real API behavior
-  (`tests/integration/gitea-integration up|token|down`). They validate real
+  (pagination, permissions, label/PR-review endpoints, error payloads) that
-  API behavior (pagination, permissions, label endpoints, error payloads) that
+  mocks cannot prove. They must not require production credentials and must not
-  mocks cannot prove. They must not use production credentials and must not
+  leak tokens.
  leak tokens. See [`../tests/integration/README.md`](../tests/integration/README.md).
 Rule of thumb: prove **logic and request-shaping** with unit tests; reserve
 integration tests for **real-server compatibility**. Do not convert unit tests
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
 # Label Taxonomy
 This document catalogs the issue labels used for MCP workflows, including Jenkins and GlitchTip (observability).
 > **Approval Required:** Do not create or apply new labels in `manage_labels.py` without explicit owner approval of this document.
 ## Existing Labels
 * **`jenkins`**
  * Description: Jenkins integration
  * Color: `d93f0b`
  * Use: Used to mark issues, PRs, or tasks that involve the `jenkins-mcp` boundaries, CI/CD designs, or build failures.
 * **`glitchtip`**
  * Description: GlitchTip integration
  * Color: `b60205`
  * Use: Used to mark issues related to the `glitchtip-mcp` boundary and observability integration.
 ## Proposed / Missing Labels
 * **`observability`**
  * Proposed Description: Observability, metrics, and monitoring tasks
  * Proposed Color: `5319e7`
  * Use: Broader than GlitchTip alone; covers logging, metrics, traces, and general observability pipeline improvements.
 * **`source:glitchtip`**
  * Proposed Description: Issue filed automatically by GlitchTip orchestration
  * Proposed Color: `b60205`
  * Use: Applied automatically by the orchestrator when a GlitchTip error event is converted into a Gitea issue.
 * **`status:triage`**
  * Proposed Description: Issue needs human or orchestrator triage
  * Proposed Color: `fbca04`
  * Use: Used for incoming issues (especially automated ones like `source:glitchtip`) that have not yet been evaluated for priority or resolution.
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
 # LLM-Agent-SHA — Opaque Agent Attribution (Phase 0)
 Convention for attributing work to a specific LLM session/workstream across
 issues, branches, PRs, and review handoffs, without exposing a human or model
 identity. Approved by the owner decision on issue #86
 (`#issuecomment-1354`); this document implements **Phase 0 only**.
 ## The one rule that matters
 `LLM-Agent-SHA` is **informational attribution metadata only**. It must never
 be used for authentication, authorization, review eligibility, merge
 eligibility, profile permissions, or any other security decision.
 The security gates remain, unchanged:
 - the **authenticated Gitea user** (self-review/self-merge protection),
 - the **active MCP profile** and its `allowed_operations`
  (see [`gitea-execution-profiles.md`](gitea-execution-profiles.md)),
 - the fail-closed eligibility checks in `gitea_check_pr_eligibility`.
 Two sessions with different `LLM-Agent-SHA` values that authenticate as the
 same Gitea user are **the same actor** for review/merge safety. A different
 SHA never unlocks self-review or self-merge. `tests/test_llm_agent_sha.py`
 proves the eligibility logic never consults the SHA.
 ## Format
 ```text
 LLM-Agent-SHA: llm-<12 lowercase hex chars>
 ```
 Validation regex:
 ```text
 ^llm-[0-9a-f]{12}$
 ```
 Examples: `llm-8f3a9c2d6b41`, `llm-41d0e7aa9f2c`, `llm-b7c93d441a08`.
 ### Generation
 Generate 48 random bits, e.g. `python3 -c "import secrets; print('llm-' +
 secrets.token_hex(6))"`, or hash a non-secret session UUID. An
 operator-provided opaque ID is also fine.
 Do **not** derive the value from any of:
 - a Gitea token or other secret,
 - an email address or username,
 - a machine hostname or private filesystem path,
 - a model or provider name,
 - conversation contents.
 The SHA must contain no model name, provider name, human name, email,
 hostname, token, private path, or conversation-derived content. It is safe to
 include in PR bodies, issue comments, and audit logs — and only there.
 ## Lifetime
 Canonical lifetime is **per PR/workstream**: pick one SHA when starting an
 issue and keep it through the branch, PR, and handoff for that workstream. A
 per-session SHA is acceptable when the session maps cleanly to one
 workstream. Do not reuse a SHA across unrelated workstreams.
 ## Placement
 Phase 0 uses **visible markdown metadata blocks** (not hidden HTML
 comments). Include the block in PR bodies and review handoffs; keep it out of
 ordinary comments unless attribution is genuinely useful there.
 **Never put the SHA in branch or worktree names.** Branches stay
 issue-linked and human-readable (`docs/issue-86-llm-agent-sha-phase0`), per
 the branch standard.
 ### Handoff metadata block (implementer → PR body / handoff report)
 ```markdown
 LLM Handoff Metadata:
 - LLM-Agent-SHA: llm-8f3a9c2d6b41
 - LLM-Role: implementer
 - Authenticated-Gitea-User: jcwalker3
 - MCP-Profile: gitea-default
 - Branch: docs/example-branch
 - Worktree: branches/docs-example-branch
 - Self-review allowed: no
 ```
 ### Review metadata block (reviewer → review comment)
 ```markdown
 Review Metadata:
 - LLM-Agent-SHA: llm-41d0e7aa9f2c
 - LLM-Role: reviewer
 - Authenticated-Gitea-User: sysadmin
 - MCP-Profile: prgs-reviewer
 - Eligibility: passed
 ```
 ## Same SHA vs same user vs same profile
 Reviewers and operators must keep three distinct identities straight:
 | Comparison | Meaning | Effect on eligibility |
 |---|---|---|
 | same `LLM-Agent-SHA` | same LLM session/workstream wrote both artifacts | **none — attribution only** |
 | same authenticated Gitea user | same Gitea actor | **blocks** self-review / self-merge, regardless of SHA |
 | same MCP profile | same capability set | governs `allowed_operations` (what actions are permitted at all) |
 Concretely: an implementer session (`llm-8f3a…`, user `jcwalker3`) and a
 would-be reviewer session (`llm-41d0…`, also user `jcwalker3`) have different
 SHAs but the **same Gitea user** — the reviewer session is still the PR
 author to Gitea and must not review, approve, or merge. Review handoffs
 require a genuinely different authenticated user (e.g. `sysadmin` /
 `prgs-reviewer`).
 ## Phase 0 scope (and what is deferred)
 Phase 0 is documentation, handoff/review templates, and negative tests only.
 Deferred to later owner-approved phases; none of this exists yet:
 - launcher-enforced SHA generation,
 - `LLM_AGENT_SHA` / `LLM_AGENT_ROLE` environment injection,
 - `gitea_whoami` returning SHA/role,
 - automatic PR body injection by MCP tools,
 - audit schema changes requiring the SHA,
 - release/orchestrator lineage tracking.
 MCP tools neither read nor emit the SHA. Setting an `LLM_AGENT_SHA`
 environment variable has no effect on any tool; the negative tests assert
 eligibility results are byte-identical with and without it.
 ## Related documents
 - [`llm-workflow-runbooks.md`](llm-workflow-runbooks.md) — the runbooks whose
  handoffs carry these blocks
 - [`gitea-execution-profiles.md`](gitea-execution-profiles.md) — profiles and
  `allowed_operations` (the real permission gate)
 - [`safety-model.md`](safety-model.md) — audit, redaction, confirmation gates
@@ -45,18 +45,6 @@ Use any eligible reviewer profile to review PR #N.
 Use any eligible merger profile to merge PR #N if checks pass.
 ```
 ### Attribution: `LLM-Agent-SHA` (metadata only)
 Sessions may attribute their work with an opaque `LLM-Agent-SHA`
 (`llm-<12 lowercase hex>`, e.g. `llm-8f3a9c2d6b41`) in PR-body and
 review-handoff metadata blocks — see
 [`llm-agent-sha.md`](llm-agent-sha.md) for the full convention. It is
 **attribution only**: eligibility is decided solely by the authenticated
 Gitea user and the profile's allowed operations. Two sessions with different
 SHAs under the same Gitea user are the same actor — a different SHA never
 permits self-review or self-merge. Keep the SHA out of branch and worktree
 names.
 ## Prerequisites: canonical config + thin launchers
 Runtime profiles live in **one canonical JSON file**, referenced by every LLM
@@ -124,35 +112,8 @@ and the two `GITEA_MCP_*` variables — never a token or password:
 }
 ```
-### Dual-profile MCP launcher pattern (Recommended)
+Run the same server as several launcher entries (e.g. `-author`, `-reviewer`,
-
+`-merger`), each pointing at a different `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE`.
 To avoid the bottleneck of relaunching/restarting the MCP server to switch between author and reviewer roles, the client should register **both** profiles concurrently as separate server instances in the client's MCP configuration:
 ```json
 "gitea-author": {
  "command": "/path/to/Gitea-Tools/venv/bin/python3",
  "args": ["/path/to/Gitea-Tools/mcp_server.py"],
  "env": {
    "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": "/path/to/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json",
    "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author"
  }
 },
 "gitea-reviewer": {
  "command": "/path/to/Gitea-Tools/venv/bin/python3",
  "args": ["/path/to/Gitea-Tools/mcp_server.py"],
  "env": {
    "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": "/path/to/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json",
    "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-reviewer"
  }
 }
 ```
 * **Tool Namespaces:** Tool calls become distinct and identity-scoped in the client UI:
  * `mcp__gitea-author__*` (for creating issues, pushing branches, creating PRs)
  * `mcp__gitea-reviewer__*` (for reviewing PRs, approving, requesting changes, merging)
 * **Trust Model:** Separate tokens remain separate in the keychain/environment. Each instance operates under its own `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` and enforces its own `allowed_operations`. A runtime `whoami` identity check is still performed independently, and self-review/self-merge checks remain strictly mandatory. The dual-server pattern is a operational convenience and never a security bypass.
 * **Reviewer-Identity PR Creation Deadlock:** Reviewer/merge identities must not create PRs or push branches. Doing so makes the reviewer identity the PR author in Gitea, blocking subsequent independent review and causing a review deadlock. Normally, PRs must be created by the author/work identity (`gitea-author`), leaving the reviewer identity (`gitea-reviewer`) clean and available for independent review and merge.
 * **Fallback:** If the dual-profile MCP launcher pattern is not supported or configured in the client, the LLM must relaunch or restart the client/MCP with the correct profile environment variable before claiming or working on any tasks.
 ## Setup runbook — interactive menu
@@ -227,7 +188,7 @@ tied to an issue number so the work is traceable end to end:
 | Issue | `#123` (claimed with `status:in-progress`) |
 | Branch | `(fix\|feat\|docs\|chore)/issue-123-<slug>` (review: `review/pr-456-<slug>`) |
 | Worktree | `branches/fix-issue-123-<slug>` (slashes → hyphens) |
-| PR | body says `Closes #123` or `Fixes #123` (closes issue); `Implements #123` or `Refs #123` (does NOT close) |
+| PR | body says `Closes #123` (closes) or `Refs #123` (related) |
 | Cleanup | remove remote+local branch + worktree folder; drop `status:in-progress` |
 `scripts/worktree-start` **rejects** implementation branches that are not
@@ -313,8 +274,7 @@ touching anything.
  `fix/...` / `docs/...`); `cd` into that worktree; implement narrowly; add or
  update tests if behavior changes; run the full suite; commit with an
  issue-linked message; open a PR to `master`. **Do not** review or merge your
-  own PR. Include an `LLM Handoff Metadata` block (with `LLM-Agent-SHA`) in
+  own PR.
  the PR body — see [`llm-agent-sha.md`](llm-agent-sha.md).
 - **Prompt:** `Use an author profile to implement issue #N and open a PR to
  master. Do not self-review or self-merge.`
@@ -325,11 +285,7 @@ touching anything.
 - **Steps:** confirm identity + eligibility (menu eligibility check or
  `gitea_check_pr_eligibility`); read the diff; confirm scope matches the linked
  issue; post the review (`comment` / `request_changes` / `approve`) via the
-  gated review tool. Pin the reviewed head SHA where supported. Include a
+  gated review tool. Pin the reviewed head SHA where supported.
  `Review Metadata` block (with your own `LLM-Agent-SHA`) in the review —
  and remember: a different `LLM-Agent-SHA` does **not** make you a different
  actor; only a different authenticated Gitea user does
  ([`llm-agent-sha.md`](llm-agent-sha.md)).
 - **Prompt:** `Use any eligible reviewer profile to review PR #N. Approve only
  if scope matches issue #M and checks pass; otherwise request changes.`
@@ -339,25 +295,22 @@ touching anything.
 - **Steps:** confirm eligibility; require explicit confirmation
  (`MERGE PR <n>`); optionally pin head SHA / changed-file set; merge only when
  Gitea reports the PR mergeable (branch-protection checks satisfied). No force,
-  no ignore-checks. Verify that remote master contains the merge commit or the expected squashed changes (do not assume a "closed" PR succeeded without verifying the actual landed changes).
+  no ignore-checks.
 - **Prompt:** `Use any eligible merger profile to merge PR #N if checks pass and
  it is mergeable. Confirm with "MERGE PR N". Do not force-merge.`
 ### Close the issue after merge / Reconciliation
 - **Profile:** issue-manager or merger.
- **Steps:** Verify remote `master` actually contains the merge (post-merge file-presence verification):
+- **Steps:** verify remote `master` actually contains the merge; close the
-  - Run: `git fetch <remote> --prune; git checkout master; git pull <remote> master --ff-only`
+  issue; release `status:in-progress` (if it cannot be removed, report why).
  - Verify that expected files added/modified in the PR are present on `master` (or absent if deleted).
  - Alternatively, verify with: `git log --oneline -- <expected-file>` or `git merge-base --is-ancestor <pr-head-sha> master`
  - Close the issue; release `status:in-progress` (if it cannot be removed, report why).
 - **If closed but not merged (`merged=false`):** Stop normal flow. Do not delete worktrees. Compare PR content to remote `master`.
  - **fully landed:** comment it landed, remove `status:in-progress`, clean up.
  - **partially landed:** reopen issue, create corrective PR for missing pieces.
  - **not landed:** reopen issue/PR, do not clean up.
 - **Direct push to master:** is forbidden except as a documented recovery exception. Final reports must include why, commits, PR metadata, and repaired labels.
- **Final reports:** must include both PR metadata (state, merged flag, merge commit) and Git content (remote master hash, expected content present, verification method used & results).
+- **Final reports:** must include both PR metadata (state, merged flag, merge commit) and Git content (remote master hash, expected content present).
- **Prompt (normal):** `After verifying master contains the merge of PR #N using post-merge file-presence verification, close issue #M and delete the merged branch. Include verification details in the report.`
+- **Prompt (normal):** `After confirming master contains the merge of PR #N, close issue #M and delete the merged branch.`
 - **Prompt (reconcile):** `Reconcile closed-not-merged PR #N by verifying if its content landed on master.`
 ### Stop on blocker
@@ -367,38 +320,6 @@ touching anything.
  files, detected secret, or any production/deploy behavior — **stop, report the
  blocker, and take no mutating action.** Fail closed; never work around a gate.
 ## Controller Handoff (required, every task)
 Every task — implementation, review, merge, triage, documentation,
 discussion-only, or blocked planning — **must end with a
 `Controller Handoff`** so a controller LLM can pick up the state
 without rereading the conversation. The canonical formats and rules live in
 the portable skill:
 [`../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md`](../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md) §K.
 **Compact format is the default** — nine lines (`Task / Repo/state /
 Issues/PRs / Changed / Validation / Blockers / Review / Next / Safety`),
 written for controller-LLM readability, not a full human status report. The
 `Safety:` line is never omitted (usually
 `no self-review; no self-merge; no tags; no secrets; no prod`). PR bodies
 still carry the full review detail — the handoff never replaces PR
 documentation.
 **The long form** (Work performed · Current state · Files changed ·
 Validation · Issues encountered · Review needed? · Next recommended action ·
 Safety confirmations) **is reserved for high-risk or complex tasks**: a
 merge/tag/release happened, validation failed, permissions/profile gates
 blocked work, secrets or production access were involved, an owner decision
 is complicated, the task spanned multiple repos or cross-issue state, or the
 owner explicitly asks for it.
 Hard rules: never omit it; never bury blockers earlier only; an opened PR
 means "Review needed — PR is open"; a blocked merge names the exact gate;
 discussion-only comments need owner/design feedback, not code review; any
 touched release state names the exact tag/commit and why. Design debates
 belong in **discussion/RFC issues** (e.g. #100 `profiles.json v2`) — comment
 on the issue, create no branches/PRs, and end the comment with this handoff.
 ## Fail-closed behavior
 Before any mutating action the workflow verifies identity, active profile,
@@ -470,7 +391,6 @@ scripts/release-tag v0.4.0 --notes-file /tmp/release-notes.md --push
 - [`../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md`](../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md) — portable cross-project LLM workflow skill.
 - [`gitea-execution-profiles.md`](gitea-execution-profiles.md) — the profile model.
 - [`llm-agent-sha.md`](llm-agent-sha.md) — opaque agent attribution metadata (never an eligibility input).
 - [`safety-model.md`](safety-model.md) — trust boundaries and audit logging.
 - [`tool-boundaries.md`](tool-boundaries.md) — per-tool allowed operations.
 - [`credential-isolation.md`](credential-isolation.md) — credential handling.
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
 {
  "version": 2,
  "contexts": {
    "example-context": {
      "enabled": true,
      "label": "Example environment",
      "description": "One deployment environment: its Gitea plus non-Gitea services.",
      "default_owner": "Example-Org",
      "gitea": {
        "enabled": true,
        "kind": "gitea",
        "base_url": "https://gitea.example.invalid"
      },
      "services": {
        "jenkins": {
          "enabled": true,
          "kind": "jenkins",
          "label": "Example Jenkins",
          "base_url": "https://jenkins.example.invalid",
          "auth": { "type": "keychain", "id": "example-jenkins-token" },
          "capabilities": ["read"]
        },
        "glitchtip": {
          "enabled": false,
          "kind": "glitchtip",
          "label": "Example GlitchTip (disabled: defined but unavailable)",
          "base_url": "",
          "auth": { "type": "keychain", "id": "example-glitchtip-token" },
          "capabilities": ["read"],
          "allow_raw_events": false
        }
      }
    }
  },
  "profiles": {
    "example-author": {
      "enabled": true,
      "context": "example-context",
      "role": "author",
      "username": "author-user",
      "execution_profile": "example-author",
      "audit_label": "example-author",
      "auth": { "type": "keychain", "id": "example-gitea-author-token" },
      "allowed_operations": ["read", "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr", "comment"],
      "forbidden_operations": ["approve", "request_changes", "merge"]
    },
    "example-reviewer": {
      "enabled": true,
      "context": "example-context",
      "role": "reviewer",
      "username": "reviewer-user",
      "execution_profile": "example-reviewer",
      "audit_label": "example-reviewer",
      "auth": { "type": "keychain", "id": "example-gitea-reviewer-token" },
      "allowed_operations": ["read", "review", "comment", "approve", "request_changes", "merge"],
      "forbidden_operations": ["branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr"]
    }
  },
  "projects": {
    "/absolute/path/to/local/repo": {
      "enabled": true,
      "context": "example-context",
      "default_owner": "Example-Org",
      "default_repo": "Example-Repo",
      "default_author_profile": "example-author",
      "default_reviewer_profile": "example-reviewer"
    }
  },
  "rules": {
    "disabled_behavior": "Defined but unavailable for action. MCP tools may report disabled entries during audits, but must not use them automatically.",
    "no_silent_fallback": true,
    "tokens_in_json": false,
    "token_storage": "keychain",
    "identity_must_match_task": true,
    "same_username_cannot_review_own_pr": true,
    "hide_service_urls_from_llm": true,
    "hide_keychain_ids_from_llm": true,
    "mcp_resolves_endpoints": true
  }
 }
@@ -123,17 +123,13 @@ def get_auth_header(host):
            token = os.environ.get("GITEA_TOKEN")
    # 3. Fall back to a JSON runtime-profile token reference (token_env).
-    #    Explicit env tokens above take precedence. When GITEA_MCP_CONFIG is
+    #    Explicit env tokens above take precedence. A broken config never breaks
-    #    configured, a broken config or unresolvable profile/credential fails
+    #    auth here — it fails closed to "no token"; the clear error surfaces via
-    #    closed here (no silent fallback to Basic auth or another source,
+    #    get_profile() / startup instead.
    #    #120). Without a configured JSON layer, env-only behaviour is
    #    unchanged.
    if not token:
        try:
            token = gitea_config.resolve_token(gitea_config.resolve_profile())
        except gitea_config.ConfigError:
            if gitea_config.config_path():
                raise
            token = None
    if token:
@@ -54,67 +54,11 @@ ENV_CONFIG_PATH = "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG"
 ENV_PROFILE = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE"
 SUPPORTED_VERSION = 1
 SUPPORTED_VERSIONS = (1, 2)
 _AUTH_TYPES = ("keychain", "env")
 # Profile names go into env vars, keychain ids, and JSON keys — keep them tame.
 _PROFILE_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$")
 # v2 address segments (environment / service / identity) must be dot-free so
 # the dotted profile address {env}.{service}.{identity} stays unambiguous.
 _SEGMENT_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_-]*$")
 # Placeholder usernames must never activate (fail closed until provisioned).
 _TBD_RE = re.compile(r"(?i)^tbd(-|$)")
 # Keys that would mean an inline secret wherever they appear.
 _INLINE_SECRET_KEYS = ("token", "password", "secret")
 # ── Minimal operation normalization (#103) ─────────────────────────────────────
 # Only what the #103 invariants need. The full normalization table, deprecation
 # handling, and enforcement test matrix belong to issue #106 — do not grow this
 # beyond invariant safety here.
 _MINIMAL_GITEA_OP_MAP = {
    "read": "gitea.read",
    "review": "gitea.pr.review",
    "comment": "gitea.pr.comment",
    "approve": "gitea.pr.approve",
    "request_changes": "gitea.pr.request_changes",
    "merge": "gitea.pr.merge",
    "pr.create": "gitea.pr.create",
    "branch.push": "gitea.branch.push",
    # Contexts-shape author verbs (#120) — the invariant checks below depend on
    # "push"/"open_pr" normalizing to the two author-only ops.
    "branch": "gitea.branch.create",
    "commit": "gitea.repo.commit",
    "push": "gitea.branch.push",
    "open_pr": "gitea.pr.create",
 }
 _REVIEW_MERGE_OPS = frozenset({"gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge"})
 _AUTHOR_ONLY_OPS = frozenset({"gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"})
 def _normalize_op(service, op, addr):
    """Normalize *op* for *service*, or fail closed (#103 minimal subset).
    - already namespaced for this service (``{service}.*``) → unchanged
    - known unqualified Gitea ops → mapped via ``_MINIMAL_GITEA_OP_MAP``
    - unqualified single-word ops on non-Gitea services → ``{service}.{op}``
    - anything else (foreign prefixes, unknown unqualified names) → ConfigError
    """
    if not isinstance(op, str) or not op:
        raise ConfigError(f"identity '{addr}' has an empty or non-string operation")
    if op.startswith(service + "."):
        return op
    if service == "gitea" and op in _MINIMAL_GITEA_OP_MAP:
        return _MINIMAL_GITEA_OP_MAP[op]
    if service != "gitea" and "." not in op:
        return f"{service}.{op}"
    raise ConfigError(
        f"identity '{addr}' has operation {op!r} that cannot be normalized "
        f"safely for service '{service}' (fail closed; full table is issue #106)"
    )
 # Default canonical config location (one file shared by all LLM launchers).
 DEFAULT_CONFIG_PATH = os.path.join(
    os.path.expanduser("~"), ".config", "gitea-tools", "profiles.json"
@@ -164,550 +108,16 @@ def load_config(path=None):
        ) from None
    except OSError as exc:
        raise ConfigError(f"could not read {path}: {exc.strerror}") from None
-    if not isinstance(data, dict):
+    if not isinstance(data, dict) or not isinstance(data.get("profiles"), dict):
-        raise ConfigError(f"{path} must be a JSON object")
+        raise ConfigError(f"{path} must be a JSON object with a 'profiles' object")
-    version = data.get("version")
+    version = data.get("version", SUPPORTED_VERSION)
    if version is None:
        # Fail closed (#103): an unversioned config is ambiguous between v1 and
        # v2 shapes, so it is refused rather than guessed.
        raise ConfigError(
            f"{path} is missing the required 'version' field; "
            f"expected one of {list(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)}"
        )
    if version == 2:
        return _load_v2_any(data, path)
    if version != SUPPORTED_VERSION:
        raise ConfigError(
-            f"{path} has unsupported version {version!r}; "
+            f"{path} has unsupported version {version!r}; expected {SUPPORTED_VERSION}"
            f"expected one of {list(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)}"
        )
    if not isinstance(data.get("profiles"), dict):
        raise ConfigError(f"{path} must be a JSON object with a 'profiles' object")
    return data
 # ── profiles.json version 2 (#103): environment → service → identity ──────────
 # v2 files are validated and *flattened* at load time into the same
 # {"profiles": {...}} shape v1 consumers already understand, keyed by the
 # canonical dotted address {environment}.{service}.{identity}. Two extra
 # top-level keys are carried: "aliases" (exact-name compatibility selectors)
 # and "unavailable" (addresses that fail closed at selection, e.g. TBD users).
 def _validate_identity_auth(addr, auth):
    """Require and validate an identity 'auth' reference. Rejects inline secrets."""
    if auth is None:
        raise ConfigError(f"identity '{addr}' is missing an 'auth' reference")
    if not isinstance(auth, dict):
        raise ConfigError(f"identity '{addr}' has a non-object 'auth'")
    for key in _INLINE_SECRET_KEYS:
        if key in auth:
            raise ConfigError(
                f"identity '{addr}' auth must not contain an inline '{key}'; "
                "store secrets in the keychain and reference them by id"
            )
    _validate_auth(addr, auth)
 def _flatten_identity(env_name, svc_name, svc, ident_name, ident):
    """Validate one v2 identity and return (addr, flattened_profile).
    The flattened profile is v1-shaped (base_url/auth/username/defaults) plus
    v2 metadata (profile_path, environment, service, identity, role) and
    normalized operation lists. Raises ConfigError on any invariant violation.
    """
    addr = f"{env_name}.{svc_name}.{ident_name}"
    if not isinstance(ident, dict):
        raise ConfigError(f"identity '{addr}' must be a JSON object")
    for key in _INLINE_SECRET_KEYS:
        if key in ident:
            raise ConfigError(
                f"identity '{addr}' must not contain an inline '{key}'; "
                "use an 'auth' reference instead"
            )
    _validate_identity_auth(addr, ident.get("auth"))
    base_url = ident.get("base_url") or svc.get("base_url")
    if not base_url:
        raise ConfigError(
            f"identity '{addr}' has no 'base_url' at identity or service level"
        )
    allowed = ident.get("allowed_operations") or []
    forbidden = ident.get("forbidden_operations") or []
    if not isinstance(allowed, list) or not isinstance(forbidden, list):
        raise ConfigError(f"identity '{addr}' operation fields must be lists")
    allowed_n = {_normalize_op(svc_name, op, addr) for op in allowed}
    forbidden_n = {_normalize_op(svc_name, op, addr) for op in forbidden}
    # Reviewer-identity deadlock rule (#100/#103): an identity that may approve
    # or merge PRs must explicitly forbid creating PRs and pushing branches,
    # so the reviewer identity can never author the PR it must review.
    if allowed_n & _REVIEW_MERGE_OPS:
        missing = sorted(_AUTHOR_ONLY_OPS - forbidden_n)
        if missing:
            raise ConfigError(
                f"identity '{addr}' allows PR approve/merge but does not forbid "
                f"{missing}; reviewer identities must forbid gitea.pr.create and "
                "gitea.branch.push (reviewer-identity deadlock rule)"
            )
    profile = {
        "profile_path": addr,
        "environment": env_name,
        "service": svc_name,
        "identity": ident_name,
        "base_url": base_url,
        "auth": ident["auth"],
        "allowed_operations": sorted(allowed_n),
        "forbidden_operations": sorted(forbidden_n),
    }
    # Service-level defaults inherit unless the identity overrides them.
    for key in ("default_owner", "default_repo", "default_org"):
        value = ident.get(key, svc.get(key))
        if value:
            profile[key] = value
    for key in ("role", "username", "execution_profile", "audit_label"):
        if ident.get(key):
            profile[key] = ident[key]
    return addr, profile
 def _load_v2(data, path):
    """Validate a v2 config and return the flattened, resolvable structure."""
    environments = data.get("environments")
    if not isinstance(environments, dict) or not environments:
        raise ConfigError(
            f"{path} version 2 config requires a non-empty 'environments' object"
        )
    profiles = {}
    unavailable = {}
    for env_name, env in environments.items():
        if not _SEGMENT_RE.match(env_name or ""):
            raise ConfigError(f"invalid environment name {env_name!r} (no dots)")
        if not isinstance(env, dict):
            raise ConfigError(f"environment '{env_name}' must be a JSON object")
        services = env.get("services")
        if not isinstance(services, dict) or not services:
            raise ConfigError(
                f"environment '{env_name}' requires a non-empty 'services' object"
            )
        for svc_name, svc in services.items():
            if not _SEGMENT_RE.match(svc_name or ""):
                raise ConfigError(
                    f"invalid service name {svc_name!r} in '{env_name}' (no dots)"
                )
            if not isinstance(svc, dict):
                raise ConfigError(
                    f"service '{env_name}.{svc_name}' must be a JSON object"
                )
            identities = svc.get("identities")
            if not isinstance(identities, dict) or not identities:
                raise ConfigError(
                    f"service '{env_name}.{svc_name}' requires a non-empty "
                    "'identities' object"
                )
            for ident_name, ident in identities.items():
                if not _SEGMENT_RE.match(ident_name or ""):
                    raise ConfigError(
                        f"invalid identity name {ident_name!r} in "
                        f"'{env_name}.{svc_name}' (no dots)"
                    )
                addr, profile = _flatten_identity(
                    env_name, svc_name, svc, ident_name, ident
                )
                username = profile.get("username") or ""
                if _TBD_RE.match(username):
                    # Fail closed at selection, without blocking every other
                    # identity in the file (see #103 acceptance criteria).
                    unavailable[addr] = (
                        f"identity '{addr}' username {username!r} is a TBD "
                        "placeholder; provision the account before use "
                        "(fail closed)"
                    )
                else:
                    profiles[addr] = profile
    aliases = data.get("aliases") or {}
    if not isinstance(aliases, dict):
        raise ConfigError(f"{path} 'aliases' must be a JSON object")
    known = set(profiles) | set(unavailable)
    for alias, target in aliases.items():
        if not isinstance(target, str) or not target:
            raise ConfigError(f"alias '{alias}' target must be a non-empty string")
        if alias in known and alias != target:
            raise ConfigError(
                f"selector '{alias}' is both an alias and a profile address "
                "with a different target (conflicting selector; fail closed)"
            )
        if target not in known:
            raise ConfigError(
                f"alias '{alias}' points to unknown profile '{target}'"
            )
    return {
        "version": 2,
        "profiles": profiles,
        "aliases": dict(aliases),
        "unavailable": unavailable,
    }
 # ── profiles.json version 2 *contexts* shape (#120) ───────────────────────────
 # The canonical machine config groups everything by context: top-level
 # "contexts" (each with a gitea block and non-Gitea "services"), flat
 # "profiles" (Gitea identities pointing at a context), "projects" (local repo
 # paths mapped to a context), and "rules". Every context/profile/service/
 # project carries a required boolean "enabled": disabled entries are surfaced
 # in audits but fail closed at selection — never a silent fallback. Loading
 # flattens profiles into the same {"profiles": {...}, "unavailable": {...}}
 # model v1 consumers and select_profile() already understand, and carries the
 # validated "contexts"/"projects"/"rules" through for service resolution.
 def _load_v2_any(data, path):
    """Dispatch a version-2 file to its shape loader; ambiguity fails closed."""
    has_contexts = "contexts" in data
    has_environments = "environments" in data
    if has_contexts and has_environments:
        raise ConfigError(
            f"{path} version 2 config must not mix 'contexts' and "
            "'environments' shapes (ambiguous; fail closed)"
        )
    if has_contexts:
        return _load_v2_contexts(data, path)
    return _load_v2(data, path)
 def _require_enabled(kind, name, obj):
    """Return the required boolean ``enabled`` flag, failing closed."""
    enabled = obj.get("enabled")
    if not isinstance(enabled, bool):
        raise ConfigError(
            f"{kind} '{name}' requires a boolean 'enabled' flag (fail closed)"
        )
    return enabled
 def _reject_inline_secrets(kind, name, obj):
    for key in _INLINE_SECRET_KEYS:
        if key in obj:
            raise ConfigError(
                f"{kind} '{name}' must not contain an inline '{key}'; "
                "store secrets in the keychain and reference them by id"
            )
 def _validate_context_service(ctx_name, svc_name, svc):
    """Validate one context service entry (auth reference only, no secrets)."""
    addr = f"{ctx_name}.{svc_name}"
    if not isinstance(svc, dict):
        raise ConfigError(f"service '{addr}' must be a JSON object")
    _require_enabled("service", addr, svc)
    _reject_inline_secrets("service", addr, svc)
    if "auth" in svc:
        _validate_auth(addr, svc["auth"])
 def _load_v2_contexts(data, path):
    """Validate a v2 contexts-shape config and return the resolvable structure."""
    contexts = data.get("contexts")
    if not isinstance(contexts, dict) or not contexts:
        raise ConfigError(
            f"{path} version 2 contexts config requires a non-empty "
            "'contexts' object"
        )
    for ctx_name, ctx in contexts.items():
        if not _PROFILE_NAME_RE.match(ctx_name or ""):
            raise ConfigError(f"invalid context name {ctx_name!r}")
        if not isinstance(ctx, dict):
            raise ConfigError(f"context '{ctx_name}' must be a JSON object")
        _require_enabled("context", ctx_name, ctx)
        gitea = ctx.get("gitea")
        if gitea is not None:
            if not isinstance(gitea, dict):
                raise ConfigError(
                    f"context '{ctx_name}' has a non-object 'gitea' block")
            _require_enabled("service", f"{ctx_name}.gitea", gitea)
            _reject_inline_secrets("service", f"{ctx_name}.gitea", gitea)
        services = ctx.get("services") or {}
        if not isinstance(services, dict):
            raise ConfigError(
                f"context '{ctx_name}' has a non-object 'services' block")
        for svc_name, svc in services.items():
            _validate_context_service(ctx_name, svc_name, svc)
    raw_profiles = data.get("profiles")
    if not isinstance(raw_profiles, dict) or not raw_profiles:
        raise ConfigError(
            f"{path} version 2 contexts config requires a non-empty "
            "'profiles' object"
        )
    profiles = {}
    unavailable = {}
    for name, raw in raw_profiles.items():
        if not is_valid_profile_name(name):
            raise ConfigError(f"invalid profile name {name!r}")
        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
            raise ConfigError(f"profile '{name}' must be a JSON object")
        enabled = _require_enabled("profile", name, raw)
        _reject_inline_secrets("profile", name, raw)
        _validate_identity_auth(name, raw.get("auth"))
        ctx_name = raw.get("context")
        if ctx_name not in contexts:
            raise ConfigError(
                f"profile '{name}' references unknown context {ctx_name!r}")
        context = contexts[ctx_name]
        allowed = raw.get("allowed_operations") or []
        forbidden = raw.get("forbidden_operations") or []
        if not isinstance(allowed, list) or not isinstance(forbidden, list):
            raise ConfigError(f"profile '{name}' operation fields must be lists")
        allowed_n = {_normalize_op("gitea", op, name) for op in allowed}
        forbidden_n = {_normalize_op("gitea", op, name) for op in forbidden}
        # Reviewer-identity deadlock rule (#100/#103) applies here unchanged.
        if allowed_n & _REVIEW_MERGE_OPS:
            missing = sorted(_AUTHOR_ONLY_OPS - forbidden_n)
            if missing:
                raise ConfigError(
                    f"profile '{name}' allows PR approve/merge but does not "
                    f"forbid {missing}; reviewer identities must forbid "
                    "gitea.pr.create and gitea.branch.push "
                    "(reviewer-identity deadlock rule)"
                )
        profile = dict(raw)
        profile["allowed_operations"] = sorted(allowed_n)
        profile["forbidden_operations"] = sorted(forbidden_n)
        gitea = context.get("gitea") or {}
        if not profile.get("base_url") and gitea.get("enabled"):
            profile["base_url"] = gitea.get("base_url")
        username = profile.get("username") or ""
        if not enabled:
            unavailable[name] = (
                f"profile '{name}' is disabled (enabled: false); defined but "
                "unavailable for action — refusing, no fallback"
            )
        elif not context.get("enabled"):
            unavailable[name] = (
                f"profile '{name}' belongs to context '{ctx_name}' which is "
                "disabled (enabled: false); refusing, no fallback"
            )
        elif not profile.get("base_url"):
            unavailable[name] = (
                f"profile '{name}' has no usable base_url (none set and the "
                f"context '{ctx_name}' gitea service is disabled or has none); "
                "fail closed"
            )
        elif _TBD_RE.match(username):
            unavailable[name] = (
                f"profile '{name}' username {username!r} is a TBD placeholder; "
                "provision the account before use (fail closed)"
            )
        else:
            profiles[name] = profile
            continue
        # Unavailable profiles keep their (secret-free) body for audits only.
        profile["_unavailable_reason"] = unavailable[name]
        profiles.setdefault("_audit_only", {})
        profiles["_audit_only"][name] = profile
    projects = data.get("projects") or {}
    if not isinstance(projects, dict):
        raise ConfigError(f"{path} 'projects' must be a JSON object")
    for proj_path, proj in projects.items():
        if not isinstance(proj, dict):
            raise ConfigError(f"project '{proj_path}' must be a JSON object")
        _require_enabled("project", proj_path, proj)
        if proj.get("context") not in contexts:
            raise ConfigError(
                f"project '{proj_path}' references unknown context "
                f"{proj.get('context')!r}"
            )
    rules = data.get("rules") or {}
    if not isinstance(rules, dict):
        raise ConfigError(f"{path} 'rules' must be a JSON object")
    audit_only = profiles.pop("_audit_only", {})
    return {
        "version": 2,
        "shape": "contexts",
        "profiles": profiles,
        "unavailable": unavailable,
        "audit_only_profiles": audit_only,
        "contexts": contexts,
        "projects": projects,
        "rules": rules,
    }
 def resolve_service(config, context_name, service_name):
    """Return one context service's config for *internal* MCP use.
    The returned dict includes the endpoint base_url and the keychain auth
    *reference* — both are for MCP-internal resolution only and must never be
    echoed into normal LLM-facing output (see audit_config/service_summaries).
    Fails closed on an unknown or disabled context/service; never falls back
    to another service.
    """
    contexts = (config or {}).get("contexts")
    if not isinstance(contexts, dict):
        raise ConfigError(
            "service resolution requires a version 2 contexts config")
    ctx = contexts.get(context_name)
    if ctx is None:
        raise ConfigError(
            f"unknown context '{context_name}' (fail closed, no fallback)")
    if not ctx.get("enabled"):
        raise ConfigError(
            f"context '{context_name}' is disabled; its services are defined "
            "but unavailable for action (no fallback)"
        )
    if service_name == "gitea":
        service = ctx.get("gitea")
    else:
        service = (ctx.get("services") or {}).get(service_name)
    if service is None:
        raise ConfigError(
            f"unknown service '{service_name}' in context '{context_name}' "
            "(fail closed, no fallback)"
        )
    if not service.get("enabled"):
        raise ConfigError(
            f"service '{context_name}.{service_name}' is disabled; defined "
            "but unavailable for action — refusing, no fallback"
        )
    return dict(service)
 def project_for_path(config, path):
    """Map a local project *path* to its context entry, failing closed.
    Returns None when the path is not configured (feature off for that repo).
    Raises :class:`ConfigError` when the project or its context is disabled —
    a configured-but-disabled project must never be acted on.
    """
    projects = (config or {}).get("projects") or {}
    project = projects.get(path)
    if project is None:
        return None
    if not project.get("enabled"):
        raise ConfigError(
            f"project '{path}' is disabled (enabled: false); refusing, "
            "no fallback"
        )
    contexts = (config or {}).get("contexts") or {}
    ctx = contexts.get(project.get("context")) or {}
    if not ctx.get("enabled"):
        raise ConfigError(
            f"project '{path}' maps to context '{project.get('context')}' "
            "which is disabled; refusing, no fallback"
        )
    return dict(project)
 def _audit_profile_entry(name, profile, enabled, reveal_endpoints):
    """One LLM-safe audit row: no endpoint URLs, no keychain ids, no tokens."""
    auth = profile.get("auth") if isinstance(profile, dict) else None
    entry = {
        "name": name,
        "enabled": enabled,
        "context": profile.get("context") or profile.get("environment"),
        "role": profile.get("role"),
        "username": profile.get("username"),
        "auth": (auth or {}).get("type") if isinstance(auth, dict) else None,
    }
    reason = profile.get("_unavailable_reason")
    if reason:
        entry["reason"] = reason
    if reveal_endpoints:
        entry["base_url"] = profile.get("base_url")
        entry["auth_source"] = auth_source_name(profile)
    return entry
 def audit_config(config, reveal_endpoints=False):
    """Report enabled/disabled profiles and services without secrets.
    Default output is LLM-safe: names, contexts, enabled state, capability
    labels, and the auth *type* only — never endpoint URLs, keychain ids,
    token values, or auth source names. ``reveal_endpoints=True`` is the
    explicit admin/debug opt-in for local diagnostics: it adds base URLs and
    non-secret auth source names (``keychain:<id>`` / env var name). Token
    values are never included on any path.
    """
    if config is None:
        return {"version": None, "profiles": [], "services": []}
    report = {
        "version": config.get("version"),
        "shape": config.get("shape") or ("environments"
                                         if config.get("aliases") is not None
                                         else "profiles"),
        "profiles": [],
        "services": [],
    }
    for name, profile in (config.get("profiles") or {}).items():
        if not isinstance(profile, dict):
            continue
        report["profiles"].append(_audit_profile_entry(
            name, profile, True, reveal_endpoints))
    for name, profile in (config.get("audit_only_profiles") or {}).items():
        report["profiles"].append(_audit_profile_entry(
            name, profile, False, reveal_endpoints))
    for ctx_name, ctx in (config.get("contexts") or {}).items():
        ctx_enabled = bool(ctx.get("enabled"))
        for svc_name, svc in (ctx.get("services") or {}).items():
            entry = {
                "context": ctx_name,
                "name": svc_name,
                "kind": svc.get("kind"),
                "label": svc.get("label"),
                "enabled": ctx_enabled and bool(svc.get("enabled")),
                "capabilities": list(svc.get("capabilities") or []),
                "auth": (svc.get("auth") or {}).get("type"),
            }
            if reveal_endpoints:
                entry["base_url"] = svc.get("base_url")
                entry["auth_source"] = auth_source_name(svc)
            report["services"].append(entry)
    return report
 def service_summaries(config, auth_check=None):
    """Safe one-line service summaries for LLM sessions.
    Each line reports label + state only (e.g. ``PRGS Jenkins: enabled,
    read-only, authenticated`` / ``PRGS Sentry: disabled``) — never endpoint
    URLs, keychain ids, or token values. *auth_check* is a callable taking the
    service dict and returning True when its credential resolves; it defaults
    to a local keychain presence check and its result is reported only as
    ``authenticated`` / ``no credential``.
    """
    if auth_check is None:
        def auth_check(service):
            auth = service.get("auth") or {}
            if auth.get("type") == "keychain":
                return _keychain_token(auth.get("id")) is not None
            if auth.get("type") == "env":
                return bool(os.environ.get(auth.get("name") or ""))
            return False
    lines = []
    for ctx_name, ctx in (config.get("contexts") or {}).items():
        ctx_enabled = bool(ctx.get("enabled"))
        for svc_name, svc in (ctx.get("services") or {}).items():
            label = svc.get("label") or f"{ctx_name} {svc_name}"
            if not (ctx_enabled and svc.get("enabled")):
                lines.append(f"{label}: disabled")
                continue
            caps = list(svc.get("capabilities") or [])
            cap_part = "read-only" if caps == ["read"] else ", ".join(caps)
            auth_part = "authenticated" if auth_check(svc) else "no credential"
            parts = ["enabled"] + ([cap_part] if cap_part else []) + [auth_part]
            lines.append(f"{label}: " + ", ".join(parts))
    return lines
 def _validate_auth(name, auth):
    """Validate a profile's optional ``auth`` reference. Never echoes secrets."""
    if auth is None:
@@ -737,25 +147,18 @@ def select_profile(config, name=None):
    if config is None:
        return None
    profiles = config.get("profiles", {})
    aliases = config.get("aliases") or {}
    unavailable = config.get("unavailable") or {}
    name = name or selected_profile_name()
-    available = sorted(set(profiles) | set(aliases))
+    available = sorted(profiles)
    if not name:
        raise ConfigError(
            f"{ENV_CONFIG_PATH} is set but {ENV_PROFILE} is not; "
            f"available profiles: {available}"
        )
-    # Strict resolution order (#103): exact alias → exact profile address →
+    if name not in profiles:
    # fail closed. No fuzzy matching, no partial matches, no defaults.
    resolved = aliases.get(name, name)
    if resolved in unavailable:
        raise ConfigError(unavailable[resolved])
    if resolved not in profiles:
        raise ConfigError(
            f"profile '{name}' not found in config; available profiles: {available}"
        )
-    profile = profiles[resolved]
+    profile = profiles[name]
    if not isinstance(profile, dict):
        raise ConfigError(f"profile '{name}' must be a JSON object")
    for secret_key in ("token", "password"):
@@ -889,21 +292,9 @@ def validate_config(config):
    problems = []
    if not isinstance(config, dict):
        return ["config is not a JSON object"]
-    version = config.get("version")
+    if config.get("version", SUPPORTED_VERSION) != SUPPORTED_VERSION:
    if version is None:
        problems.append(
-            f"missing required 'version' (expected one of {list(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)})"
+            f"unsupported version {config.get('version')!r} (expected {SUPPORTED_VERSION})"
        )
    elif version == 2:
        # v2 validation is all-or-nothing via the loader's invariants.
        try:
            _load_v2_any(config, "<config>")
        except ConfigError as exc:
            problems.append(str(exc))
        return problems
    elif version != SUPPORTED_VERSION:
        problems.append(
            f"unsupported version {version!r} (expected one of {list(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)})"
        )
    profiles = config.get("profiles")
    if not isinstance(profiles, dict):
@@ -1054,20 +445,5 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover - thin CLI dispatch
    if len(sys.argv) > 1 and sys.argv[1] == "menu":
        import gitea_config_menu
        raise SystemExit(gitea_config_menu.main(sys.argv[2:]))
-    if len(sys.argv) > 1 and sys.argv[1] == "audit":
+    print("usage: python gitea_config.py menu", file=sys.stderr)
        # Local admin/debug diagnostics (#120). --reveal-endpoints is the
        # explicit opt-in that adds base URLs and non-secret auth source
        # names; token values are never printed on any path.
        try:
            config = load_config(config_path() or DEFAULT_CONFIG_PATH)
            report = audit_config(
                config, reveal_endpoints="--reveal-endpoints" in sys.argv[2:])
            report["summaries"] = service_summaries(config)
        except ConfigError as exc:
            print(f"config error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
            raise SystemExit(1)
        print(json.dumps(report, indent=2))
        raise SystemExit(0)
    print("usage: python gitea_config.py menu | audit [--reveal-endpoints]",
          file=sys.stderr)
    raise SystemExit(2)
@@ -43,16 +43,6 @@ from gitea_auth import (  # noqa: E402
    get_profile,
 )
 import gitea_audit  # noqa: E402
 import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
 def _reveal_endpoints() -> bool:
    """Admin/debug opt-in (#120): include endpoint URLs and token source
    names in tool output. Off by default so normal LLM-facing responses
    expose only logical names and status. Never affects token values, which
    are excluded on every path."""
    return (os.environ.get("GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS") or "").strip().lower() \
        in ("1", "true", "yes")
 mcp = FastMCP("gitea-tools", instructions=(
    "Gitea issue tracker and PR management for dadeschools and prgs instances. "
@@ -63,7 +53,7 @@ mcp = FastMCP("gitea-tools", instructions=(
 def extract_linked_issue_numbers(text: str | None, branch_name: str | None = None) -> list[int]:
    issues = set()
    if text:
-        pattern = re.compile(r'(?i)(?:close[sd]?|fix(?:e[sd])?|resolve[sd]?|implement[s]?|implemented)\s+#(\d+)')
+        pattern = re.compile(r'(?i)(?:close[sd]?|fix(?:e[sd])?|resolve[sd]?|ref[s]?)\s+#(\d+)')
        issues.update(int(m) for m in pattern.findall(text))
    if branch_name:
        pattern = re.compile(r'(?i)issue-(\d+)')
@@ -1108,30 +1098,16 @@ def gitea_merge_pr(
            payload["MergeMessageField"] = message
        api_request("POST", merge_url, auth, payload)
        # Best-effort read-back of the merge commit SHA (redacted on error).
        merged = None
        try:
            merged = api_request(
                "GET", f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls/{pr_number}", auth
            )
            result["merge_commit"] = (merged or {}).get("merged_commit_sha")
            cleanup = cleanup_in_progress_for_pr(merged or {}, remote, host, org, repo)
            result["cleanup_status"] = cleanup.get("cleanup_status")
        except Exception:
            result["merge_commit"] = None
        # Tracker cleanup (#98): never blocks the merge, and always surfaces an
        # explicit cleanup_status once the merge mutation has happened. Cleanup
        # needs the PR title/body/branch, which only the read-back payload
        # carries here — so a failed read-back is an explicit skip, not a
        # silent one.
        if merged is None:
            result["cleanup_status"] = "skipped (merge read-back failed)"
        else:
            try:
                cleanup = cleanup_in_progress_for_pr(merged, remote, host, org, repo)
                result["cleanup_status"] = cleanup.get("cleanup_status")
            except Exception as cleanup_exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — redact before surfacing
                result["cleanup_status"] = (
                    f"skipped (cleanup error: {_redact(str(cleanup_exc))})"
                )
    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — redact before surfacing
        reasons.append(f"merge failed: {_redact(str(exc))}")
        return result
@@ -1392,26 +1368,21 @@ def gitea_whoami(
            "Verify the configured token is valid for this instance."
        )
    # Runtime profile metadata is non-secret (name + allowed op categories).
-    # The token is resolved separately and is never included here. Endpoint
+    # The token is resolved separately and is never included here.
    # URLs stay out of normal LLM-facing output (#120): the logical remote
    # name is the addressing surface; 'server' appears only under the
    # GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS admin opt-in.
    profile = get_profile()
-    result = {
+    return {
        "authenticated": True,
        "username": data.get("login"),
        "display_name": data.get("full_name") or None,
        "user_id": data.get("id"),
        "email": data.get("email") or None,
        "server": f"https://{h}",
        "remote": remote,
        "profile": {
            "profile_name": profile["profile_name"],
            "allowed_operations": profile["allowed_operations"],
        },
    }
    if _reveal_endpoints():
        result["server"] = f"https://{h}"
    return result
@@ -1442,11 +1413,9 @@ def gitea_get_profile(
    Read-only. Reports the non-secret configuration of the running MCP
    process (profile name, allowed/forbidden operation categories, audit
-    label, auth *status*). Endpoint URLs and token source names are hidden
+    label, token *source name*, base URL) plus the resolved server for the
-    from normal output (#120) and appear only under the
+    given remote. Optionally resolves the authenticated username via
-    GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS admin opt-in. Optionally resolves the
+    ``gitea_whoami``'s endpoint so an LLM can see who this runtime acts as.
    authenticated username via ``gitea_whoami``'s endpoint so an LLM can see
    who this runtime acts as.
    This tool never mutates Gitea and never approves, merges, comments, or
    creates anything. It never returns the token value, Authorization header,
@@ -1464,25 +1433,18 @@ def gitea_get_profile(
        'verified', 'unknown', 'unavailable', or 'not_resolved'.
    """
    profile = get_profile()
    reveal = _reveal_endpoints()
    result = {
        "profile_name": profile["profile_name"],
        "allowed_operations": profile["allowed_operations"],
        "forbidden_operations": profile["forbidden_operations"],
        "audit_label": profile["audit_label"],
-        # Auth is reported as a status only (#120): the token source *name*
+        "token_source_name": profile["token_source_name"],
-        # (env var name / keychain id) joins endpoint URLs behind the
+        "base_url": profile["base_url"],
        # GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS admin opt-in. Token values never appear.
        "auth_status": ("configured" if profile["token_source_name"]
                        else "unconfigured"),
        "remote": remote if remote in REMOTES else None,
        "server": None,
        "authenticated_username": None,
        "identity_status": "not_resolved",
    }
    if reveal:
        result["token_source_name"] = profile["token_source_name"]
        result["base_url"] = profile["base_url"]
        result["server"] = None
    if remote not in REMOTES:
        # Mark ambiguity rather than raising: the tool stays inspectable.
@@ -1491,8 +1453,7 @@ def gitea_get_profile(
        return result
    h = host or REMOTES[remote]["host"]
-    if reveal:
+    result["server"] = f"https://{h}"
        result["server"] = f"https://{h}"
    if resolve_identity:
        try:
@@ -1512,33 +1473,6 @@ def gitea_get_profile(
    return result
@mcp.tool()
 def gitea_audit_config() -> dict:
    """Audit the configured profiles/services: enabled state, no secrets.
    Read-only and local-only: loads the canonical profiles.json named by
    GITEA_MCP_CONFIG and reports profile/service names, contexts, enabled
    state, capabilities, auth *status*, and one-line service summaries (e.g.
    ``PRGS Jenkins: enabled, read-only, authenticated``). Disabled entries
    are listed so they can be audited, but the server refuses to act with
    them and never falls back to another profile or service.
    Never includes endpoint URLs, keychain ids, token source names, or token
    values. Endpoint-revealing diagnostics exist only in the local admin CLI
    (``python3 gitea_config.py audit --reveal-endpoints``), never over MCP.
    """
    config = gitea_config.load_config()
    if config is None:
        return {
            "configured": False,
            "message": "No GITEA_MCP_CONFIG configured; env-only mode.",
        }
    report = gitea_config.audit_config(config)
    report["configured"] = True
    report["summaries"] = gitea_config.service_summaries(config)
    return report
@mcp.tool()
 def gitea_mark_issue(
    issue_number: int,
@@ -41,18 +41,6 @@ editing, deleting, or `chmod`-ing files; docs; scripts; commits; pushes; and PRs
 Reading the repo, running read-only status/`git log`, and creating/claiming the
 issue itself are allowed from the orchestration checkout without a prior issue.
 Additional issue-first rules:
 - Do not implement code without an issue unless explicitly authorized.
 - **Design-only work uses a discussion/RFC issue** — create one or comment on
  the existing one. Design debates belong on the issue, where other LLMs
  comment directly. Discussion-only tasks must **not** create branches or PRs;
  their comments should include recommendations, risks, open questions, and a
  Controller Handoff (§K; compact format unless high-risk).
 - **If the repo/tracker home for the work is unclear, stop and ask for an
  owner decision.** Do not create a new repository or a new tracker unless
  explicitly approved by the owner.
 ## B. Isolated worktree rule
 **Never implement or review in the main checkout.** The main checkout is for
@@ -90,8 +78,8 @@ is maintained by:
 - the branch name (contains the issue number),
 - a claim comment on the issue, e.g.
  `Claimed. Branch: fix/issue-123-short-description. Worktree: branches/fix-issue-123-short-description.`,
- the PR body — `Closes #123` or `Fixes #123` when the PR should close the issue
+- the PR body — `Closes #123` when the PR should close the issue, `Refs #123`
-  (do NOT use `Implements #123` or `Refs #123` to close, as Gitea will not auto-close),
+  when related but not closing,
 - cleanup after merge — remove the remote branch, local branch, and the issue
  worktree folder, and drop `status:in-progress`.
@@ -116,17 +104,16 @@ interpreter path, or create a venv inside the branch folder.
 ## C. Identity and profile safety
- Use canonical execution profiles where available; the profile is the role, not the LLM. A task selects a profile; a profile is not permanently assigned.
+- Use canonical execution profiles where available; the profile is the role, not
  the LLM. A task selects a profile; a profile is not permanently assigned.
 - **Author and reviewer identities must be distinct.**
- Never place raw tokens/passwords in an LLM/MCP client config. Reference secrets by keychain id or environment variable name only. Prefer a single canonical config file selected by two env vars, e.g.:
+- Never place raw tokens/passwords in an LLM/MCP client config. Reference secrets
  by keychain id or environment variable name only. Prefer a single canonical
  config file selected by two env vars, e.g.:
  - `GITEA_MCP_CONFIG` — path to the canonical profiles file
  - `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` — the profile to activate
- **Dual-Profile MCP Launcher Pattern (Recommended):** To avoid relaunch bottlenecks and PR-author deadlocks, register multiple instances of the same MCP server in the client's configuration simultaneously (e.g., `gitea-author` and `gitea-reviewer`), each pointing to its respective `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE`.
+- **If the authenticated user equals the PR author, stop** — no self-review, no
-  - Tool calls become namespace-scoped: `mcp__gitea-author__*` and `mcp__gitea-reviewer__*`.
+  self-merge.
  - **Trust Model:** Separate tokens remain separate. Profile gates enforce allowed operations, `whoami` is still checked, and self-review/self-merge prevention remains mandatory. This pattern is for convenience and does not bypass security gates.
  - **Deadlock Warning:** Reviewer/merge identities must not be used to create PRs, as this makes the reviewer the PR author in Gitea and blocks independent review. PRs should normally be created by the author/work identity, keeping the reviewer identity available for reviews.
  - **Fallback:** If a dual-server launcher is not available in the client, relaunch or restart the client with the correct profile environment variable before claiming work.
 - **If the authenticated user equals the PR author, stop** — no self-review, no self-merge.
 ## D. Branch naming
@@ -175,14 +162,9 @@ Worktree folder = branch with `/` replaced by `-`
 ## G. Merge / cleanup workflow
-Only an eligible (non-author) reviewer merges. Before merging: always verify
+Only an eligible (non-author) reviewer merges. After a real merge:
 the authenticated identity **and** the PR author; respect runtime profile
 gates; run independent validation (do not trust the author's reported
 results); and merge with a **pinned head SHA** and, where supported, the
 **expected changed-file set**, so a moved head or widened diff refuses the
 merge. After a real merge:
-1. Confirm remote `master` actually contains the merge commit or expected squashed changes via post-merge file-presence verification (A PR is not done just because `master` moved or is marked "closed". Verify that expected files added/modified in the PR are actually present on `master` using `git pull`, `git log --oneline -- <file>`, or `git merge-base --is-ancestor`; linked issues are closed; `status:in-progress` is removed).
+1. Confirm remote `master` actually contains the merge commit (A PR is not done just because `master` moved. A PR is done only when: Gitea reports the PR merged or reconciliation documents equivalent content on `master`; remote `master` contains the expected content; linked issues are closed; `status:in-progress` is removed).
 2. Close/release the issue.
 3. Whenever an issue is closed, check for `status:in-progress`: remove it, or report why it could not be removed.
 4. Do not delete the remote source branch until: PR `merged=true`, or reconciliation confirms content is safely landed, or the issue owner explicitly abandons the work.
@@ -190,7 +172,7 @@ merge. After a real merge:
 6. Remove the branch worktree folder (`scripts/worktree-clean --delete-branch <branch>`). Branches/worktrees are cleaned only after the above is verified.
 7. Fetch/prune.
 8. Confirm the main checkout is clean and current (`0	0` vs remote).
-9. Final merge/reconciliation reports must include: PR metadata (state, merged flag, merge commit/hash), Git content (remote master hash, expected content present or not), and the exact post-merge verification method used & results.
+9. Final merge/reconciliation reports must include both: PR metadata (state, merged flag, merge commit/hash) and Git content (remote master hash, expected content present or not).
 Never run cleanup before the merge is confirmed on remote `master`.
@@ -248,169 +230,6 @@ Ready-to-copy templates live in [`templates/`](templates/):
 - [`worktree-cleanup.md`](templates/worktree-cleanup.md) — clean up after merge.
 - [`release-tag.md`](templates/release-tag.md) — create a release tag.
 ## K. Controller Handoff (required, every task)
 Every LLM task **must end with a `Controller Handoff`** — whether the
 task was implementation, review, merge, issue triage, documentation,
 discussion-only, or blocked planning. It lets a controller LLM understand the
 current state immediately, without rereading the conversation.
 **The compact format is the default.** It is written for controller-LLM
 readability, not as a full human status report. PR bodies still carry the
 full review detail — the handoff never replaces PR documentation.
 Compact format (default):
 ```md
 ## Controller Handoff
 - Task:
 - Repo/state:
 - Issues/PRs:
 - Changed:
 - Validation:
 - Blockers:
 - Review:
 - Next:
 - Safety:
 ```
 The `Safety:` line is never omitted; it is usually:
 ```text
 no self-review; no self-merge; no tags; no secrets; no prod
 ```
 Rules (both formats):
 - Never omit the handoff, and never omit the safety confirmations.
 - Never bury blockers in earlier text only — they must appear here.
 - If you opened a PR, state clearly that review is needed.
 - If you reviewed but could not merge, name the exact gate that blocked it.
 - If you only commented on a discussion issue, say no code review is needed
  but owner/design feedback may be needed.
 - If release state was touched, state exactly which tag/commit changed and why.
 - If blocked (permissions, missing repo, missing second reviewer identity,
  stale dependency, unclear tracker home): stop and report clearly; **never
  bypass classifiers, profile gates, missing permissions, or live-consent
  requirements**; give the owner concrete options.
 **Use the long format below instead of the compact one only when the task was
 high-risk or complex** — i.e. when any of these happened:
 - a merge, tag, or release
 - failed validation
 - permissions/profile gates blocked work
 - secrets or production access were involved
 - a complicated owner decision
 - multiple repos or cross-issue state
 - the owner explicitly asks for the full format
 Long format (high-risk/complex tasks only):
 ```md
 ## Controller Handoff Summary
 ### Work performed
 Briefly state what was done.
 ### Current state
 Include:
 - current repo
 - current branch or master commit
 - issue number(s)
 - PR number(s), if any
 - whether work is complete, blocked, ready for review, or discussion-only
 ### Files changed
 List files changed, or say `None`.
 ### Validation
 List commands run and results, or say `Not applicable — discussion only`.
 ### Issues encountered
 List errors, confusing state, permission/profile problems, stale branches,
 failing tests, missing labels, or blocked decisions.
 ### Review needed?
 Say one of:
 - `No review needed — discussion/comment only`
 - `Review needed — PR is open`
 - `Independent non-author review needed`
 - `Owner decision needed`
 - `Blocked`
 ### Next recommended action
 State exactly what should happen next.
 ### Safety confirmations
 Confirm:
 - no self-review
 - no self-merge
 - no release/tag changes unless explicitly requested
 - no secrets committed
 - no production access used unless explicitly authorized
 ```
 ### Example blocked handoff
 ```md
 ## Example blocked handoff
 ### Work performed
 Audited phase-2 MCP Control Plane planning. Found target repo
 `mcp-control-plane` does not exist. Prepared issue pack but did not file it.
 ### Current state
 - Repo: `Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools`, unmodified
 - Target repo: `mcp-control-plane`, missing
 - Issues: none open in Gitea-Tools
 - PRs: none open
 - Status: blocked pending owner decision
 ### Files changed
 None.
 ### Validation
 Tracker/repo audit only. No code validation required.
 ### Issues encountered
 Repo creation was denied by permission/classifier because it would be scope
 escalation without live consent.
 ### Review needed?
 Owner decision needed.
 ### Next recommended action
 Owner must choose:
 1. create `Scaled-Tech-Consulting/mcp-control-plane`
 2. authorize repo creation while present
 3. file phase-2 issues in Gitea-Tools instead
 ### Safety confirmations
 - no self-review
 - no self-merge
 - no release/tag changes
 - no secrets committed
 - no production access used
 ```
 ## Adapting to a project
 Replace these project-specific names when copying the skill elsewhere:
@@ -423,7 +242,7 @@ Replace these project-specific names when copying the skill elsewhere:
 | `branches/` | Ignored worktree directory | `branches/` |
 | helper scripts | Worktree helpers | `scripts/worktree-start` / `-review` / `-clean` |
-The rules in §A–§K are project-agnostic and should not change.
+The rules in §A–§I are project-agnostic and should not change.
 ## Versioning And Tagging
@@ -444,14 +263,6 @@ Tags must:
 **Never tag** feature branches, dirty worktrees, unreviewed or self-authored
 work, or commits not present on remote `master`.
 Additional tag rules:
 - Do **not** create, move, delete, or push tags unless explicitly instructed.
 - Tag only **after** the intended PR is merged, and tag only the **verified
  final master merge commit** (never the PR branch head unless the merge
  commit is exactly that commit).
 - Always **report the tag target commit** in the final report / handoff.
 Release process (see [`templates/release-tag.md`](templates/release-tag.md)):
 1. `git fetch <remote> --prune`.
@@ -13,27 +13,17 @@ Rules (llm-project-workflow):
 - If the PR is closed but `merged=false`, STOP and run reconciliation. Do not clean up.
 Steps:
-1. Identity Checklist: Before claiming/working on merge, verify and state:
+1. Verify authenticated identity + active profile.
-   - Required identity/profile for this task: merger (allowed to merge PRs)
+2. Confirm PR #<pr>: author (not you), state open, mergeable, review approved.
-   - Current authenticated identity (from whoami): <username>
+3. If any gate fails → STOP and report.
   - Target task role: merger identity (must NOT be the PR author)
   *If the current identity does not match the required role (or is the PR author), STOP. Relaunch/switch to the correct profile first.*
 2. Verify authenticated identity + active profile.
 3. Confirm PR #<pr>: author (not you), state open, mergeable, review approved. Check if PR body uses `Closes #N` or `Fixes #N`; if it uses `Implements #N` or `Refs #N`, manual closing will be needed in step 29.
 4. If any gate fails → STOP and report.
 4. Merge with explicit confirmation (e.g. confirmation="MERGE PR <pr>"),
   optionally pinning the reviewed head SHA / changed-file set.
-5. Confirm remote master now contains the merge commit (or the expected changes if squash merged).
+5. Confirm remote master now contains the merge commit.
   *Note: Gitea PR "closed" state is NOT equivalent to "merged". Do not assume a closed PR succeeded without verifying the actual landed changes.*
 Then run the cleanup template (worktree-cleanup.md):
 - Verify expected file/commit presence on master (post-merge file-presence verification):
  - Run: git fetch <remote> --prune; git checkout master; git pull <remote> master --ff-only
  - Verify that the expected files added/modified in the PR are present on master (or absent if deleted).
  - Alternatively, verify with: git log --oneline -- <expected-file> or git merge-base --is-ancestor <pr-head-sha> master
 - close/release issue #<n>, remove status:in-progress (if it cannot be removed, report why)
 - delete remote branch, remove local branch + worktree folder
 - fetch/prune; confirm main checkout is clean and current (0 0).
-Handoff: reviewer identity, merge result + commit, cleanup done, issue closed, PR metadata state/merged flag/hash, remote master hash, post-merge verification method used & verification results.
+Handoff: reviewer identity, merge result + commit, cleanup done, issue closed, PR metadata state/merged flag/hash, remote master hash & Git content check.
 ```
@@ -8,36 +8,19 @@ Task: review PR #<pr> for issue #<n>.
 Rules (llm-project-workflow):
 - Review in a SEPARATE detached review worktree, never the author's folder.
 - You must NOT be the PR author. If the authenticated user == PR author, stop.
  A different LLM-Agent-SHA does NOT make you a different actor — only a
  different authenticated Gitea user does (docs/llm-agent-sha.md).
 - Do not merge if any check fails.
 Steps:
-1. Identity Checklist: Before claiming/working on review, verify and state:
+1. Verify your authenticated identity (whoami) and the active profile.
-   - Required identity/profile for this task: reviewer (allowed to review/approve/request_changes)
+2. Fetch the PR facts: PR author, head SHA, state (must be open), base branch.
-   - Current authenticated identity (from whoami): <username>
+3. If authenticated user == PR author → STOP (no self-review).
   - Target task role: reviewer identity (must NOT be the PR author)
   *If the current identity does not match the required role (or is the PR author), STOP. Relaunch/switch to the correct profile first.*
 2. Verify your authenticated identity (whoami) and the active profile.
 3. Fetch the PR facts: PR author, head SHA, state (must be open), base branch.
 4. If authenticated user == PR author → STOP (no self-review).
 4. scripts/worktree-review <pr-head-branch>          # detached, branches/review-*
   cd branches/review-<pr-head-branch-slug>
 5. Confirm the worktree is clean. Inspect the FULL diff; confirm scope matches
-   issue #<n>; flag any unrelated files, secrets, or formatting churn. Check that the PR body correctly uses Gitea-closing keywords (`Closes #N` or `Fixes #N`) instead of non-closing ones (`Implements #N`, `Refs #N`).
+   issue #<n>; flag any unrelated files, secrets, or formatting churn.
 6. Run the test suite; note results.
 7. Post the review verdict: approve only if scope is clean and checks pass;
   otherwise request changes with specifics. Never merge from this review step.
   Include a "Review Metadata" block (attribution only — docs/llm-agent-sha.md):
-   Review Metadata:
+Handoff: reviewer identity, PR author, scope verdict, checks + results, decision.
   - LLM-Agent-SHA: llm-<12 lowercase hex, e.g. llm-41d0e7aa9f2c>
   - LLM-Role: reviewer
   - Authenticated-Gitea-User: <whoami result>
   - MCP-Profile: <profile name>
   - Eligibility: passed/failed
 Handoff: reviewer identity, PR author, scope verdict, checks + results, decision —
 formatted per SKILL.md §K (compact by default; long form if a merge happened
 or a gate blocked you); if you could not merge, name the exact gate.
 ```
@@ -13,36 +13,17 @@ Rules (llm-project-workflow):
 - Do not self-review or self-merge.
 Steps:
-1. Identity Checklist: Before claiming work, verify and state:
+1. Verify the orchestration checkout is the right repo and clean.
-   - Required identity/profile for this task: author (allowed to push branches / create PRs)
+2. git fetch <remote> --prune; confirm local master == <remote>/master (0 0).
-   - Current authenticated identity (from whoami): <username>
+3. Create the issue "<title>" (problem, scope, acceptance) and claim it
   - Target task role: author/work identity
   *If the current identity does not match the required role (or lacks push/PR permissions), STOP before claiming the issue. Relaunch/switch to the correct profile first.*
 2. Verify the orchestration checkout is the right repo and clean.
 3. git fetch <remote> --prune; confirm local master == <remote>/master (0 0).
 4. Create the issue "<title>" (problem, scope, acceptance) and claim it
   (status:in-progress + a "starting work" comment naming the branch).
-5. scripts/worktree-start <type>/issue-<n>-<slug>   # type = fix|feat|docs
+4. scripts/worktree-start <type>/issue-<n>-<slug>   # type = fix|feat|docs
   cd branches/<type>-issue-<n>-<slug>
-6. Implement the narrow scope only; add/update focused tests if behavior changes.
+5. Implement the narrow scope only; add/update focused tests if behavior changes.
-7. Checks: run the test suite, compile/lint changed files, git diff --check,
+6. Checks: run the test suite, compile/lint changed files, git diff --check,
   and scan the diff for secrets.
-8. Commit (issue-linked message), push the branch, open a PR to master.
+7. Commit (issue-linked message), push the branch, open a PR to master.
-   *The PR body MUST use closing keywords like `Closes #N` or `Fixes #N` to close the issue; do NOT use `Implements #N` or `Refs #N` for closing, as Gitea will not auto-close it.*
+8. Stop before review/merge — you are the author.
   Include an "LLM Handoff Metadata" block in the PR body (attribution only;
   never an eligibility input — docs/llm-agent-sha.md):
-   LLM Handoff Metadata:
+Handoff: issue #, branch, worktree path, files changed, checks + results, PR URL.
   - LLM-Agent-SHA: llm-<12 lowercase hex, e.g. llm-8f3a9c2d6b41>
   - LLM-Role: implementer
   - Authenticated-Gitea-User: <whoami result>
   - MCP-Profile: <profile name>
   - Branch: <branch>
   - Worktree: <worktree path>
   - Self-review allowed: no
 9. Stop before review/merge — you are the author.
 Handoff: issue #, branch, worktree path, files changed, checks + results, PR URL —
 formatted as the compact Controller Handoff (SKILL.md §K; long form only on
 the high-risk triggers); Review line: "Review needed — PR is open".
 ```
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
 # Opt-in Gitea Integration Tests (#66)
 Real-Gitea integration tests for the shared API client
 (`gitea_auth.api_request` / `api_get_all`). **Skipped by default** — the unit
 suite (`pytest tests/ -q`) stays fast, mocked, and network-free.
 ## What they prove
 Against a real, disposable Gitea instance:
 - issue listing + pagination (multi-page walk, overall `limit`)
 - PR listing through the same paginated client
 - targeted label add/remove (one label removed, others untouched)
 - permission denial fails closed (bad token → clear `401` error, token never echoed)
 - real Gitea error payloads surface as safe, redacted `RuntimeError`s
 ## Environment variables
 | Variable | Meaning |
 |---|---|
 | `GITEA_INTEGRATION=1` | opt-in switch — the suite is skipped without it |
 | `GITEA_INTEGRATION_URL` | base URL (default `http://localhost:3003`) |
 | `GITEA_INTEGRATION_TOKEN` | API token for the **local test** instance |
 Never point these at a production Gitea and never use production tokens. The
 token is used only in the `Authorization` header; tests assert it does not
 appear in any error output.
 ## Quick start (Docker)
 ```bash
 tests/integration/gitea-integration up
 export GITEA_INTEGRATION_TOKEN="$(tests/integration/gitea-integration token)"
 GITEA_INTEGRATION=1 ./venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/integration/ -q
 tests/integration/gitea-integration down
 ```
 - Image is **pinned** (`gitea/gitea:1.22.6` in `docker-compose.yml`); bump the
  pin deliberately, never `:latest`.
 - `up` waits until `/api/v1/version` answers (60s timeout).
 - `token` idempotently creates a TEST-ONLY admin (`inttest-admin`) inside the
  container and prints a fresh API token to stdout — nothing is written to disk.
 - `down` removes the container **and its volume** (full teardown).
 An existing local Gitea works too: set `GITEA_INTEGRATION_URL` and a token for
 any account allowed to create/delete its own repos.
 ## Seed data and cleanup
 - Each session creates one uniquely-named repo (`inttest-<8 hex>`), seeds
  issues/labels/one PR inside it, and deletes the repo on teardown
  (best-effort; a leaked repo is disposable and obvious).
 - Nothing outside the seed repo is touched; the suite never mutates
  pre-existing repos, users, or instance settings.
 ## Relationship to the unit suite
 Unit tests remain the default and must stay mocked. Add an integration test
 only for behavior that genuinely depends on a real server (pagination
 metadata, permission semantics, live error payloads).
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
 """Fixtures for the opt-in Docker/local Gitea integration suite (#66).
 Everything here is inert unless GITEA_INTEGRATION=1 — the test modules carry
 a module-level skipif, so a default ``pytest tests/ -q`` run never touches the
 network and never needs Docker.
 Required environment (see tests/integration/README.md):
 - GITEA_INTEGRATION=1                 opt-in switch
 - GITEA_INTEGRATION_URL               base URL (default http://localhost:3003)
 - GITEA_INTEGRATION_TOKEN             API token for the *local test* instance
 The token is a throwaway credential for the disposable container. It is never
 printed, logged, or asserted on. Production credentials must never be used.
 """
 import os
 import sys
 import uuid
 from pathlib import Path
 import pytest
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent))
 from gitea_auth import api_request  # noqa: E402
 ENABLED = os.environ.get("GITEA_INTEGRATION") == "1"
 def _base_url():
    return os.environ.get("GITEA_INTEGRATION_URL", "http://localhost:3003").rstrip("/")
@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
 def gitea():
    """Session facts: base URL, auth header string, authenticated login."""
    token = os.environ.get("GITEA_INTEGRATION_TOKEN")
    if not token:
        pytest.fail(
            "GITEA_INTEGRATION=1 but GITEA_INTEGRATION_TOKEN is unset; "
            "run tests/integration/gitea-integration token"
        )
    base = _base_url()
    auth = f"token {token}"
    me = api_request("GET", f"{base}/api/v1/user", auth)
    return {"base": base, "auth": auth, "login": me["login"]}
@pytest.fixture(scope="session")
 def seed_repo(gitea):
    """Create a disposable, uniquely-named repo; delete it on teardown."""
    name = f"inttest-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
    repo = api_request(
        "POST", f"{gitea['base']}/api/v1/user/repos", gitea["auth"],
        payload={"name": name, "auto_init": True,
                 "description": "gitea-tools #66 integration seed (disposable)"},
    )
    owner = repo["owner"]["login"]
    yield {"owner": owner, "name": name,
           "api": f"{gitea['base']}/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}"}
    # Teardown: best-effort delete; a leaked repo is visible and disposable.
    try:
        api_request("DELETE", f"{gitea['base']}/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}",
                    gitea["auth"])
    except RuntimeError:
        pass
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
 # Disposable Gitea for the opt-in integration suite (#66).
 # Pinned image for reproducibility — bump deliberately, never use :latest.
 # Usage: tests/integration/gitea-integration up|token|down
 services:
  gitea:
    image: gitea/gitea:1.22.6
    container_name: gitea-tools-integration
    environment:
      - GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true
      - GITEA__server__ROOT_URL=http://localhost:3003/
      - GITEA__server__HTTP_PORT=3000
      - GITEA__service__DISABLE_REGISTRATION=true
      - GITEA__log__LEVEL=Warn
    ports:
      - "3003:3000"
    volumes:
      - gitea-integration-data:/data
 volumes:
  gitea-integration-data:
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
 set -euo pipefail
 # gitea-integration — manage the disposable Gitea container for the opt-in
 # integration suite (#66). See tests/integration/README.md.
 #
 #   tests/integration/gitea-integration up      start pinned Gitea, wait ready
 #   tests/integration/gitea-integration token   create test admin + print token
 #   tests/integration/gitea-integration down    stop container, delete volume
 #
 # The admin credentials below are TEST-ONLY, for the throwaway local container
 # started by this script. They are not secrets and must never be reused for a
 # real instance. The generated API token is printed ONCE to stdout (for
 # `export GITEA_INTEGRATION_TOKEN=$(...)`) and is never written to any file.
 here="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 compose() { docker compose -f "$here/docker-compose.yml" "$@"; }
 base_url="${GITEA_INTEGRATION_URL:-http://localhost:3003}"
 admin_user="inttest-admin"
 admin_pass="inttest-local-only-pass"   # TEST-ONLY, disposable container
 admin_email="inttest-admin@example.invalid"
 case "${1:-}" in
  up)
    compose up -d
    printf 'gitea-integration: waiting for %s ' "$base_url"
    for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
      if curl -fsS "$base_url/api/v1/version" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
        printf '\ngitea-integration: ready\n'
        exit 0
      fi
      printf '.'
      sleep 1
    done
    printf '\ngitea-integration: Gitea did not become ready in 60s\n' >&2
    exit 1
    ;;
  token)
    # Idempotent admin creation (ignore "already exists").
    compose exec -T -u git gitea gitea admin user create \
      --username "$admin_user" --password "$admin_pass" \
      --email "$admin_email" --admin --must-change-password=false \
      >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
    # Unique token name per call; Gitea prints the token as the last field.
    tok_name="inttest-$(date +%s)"
    out="$(compose exec -T -u git gitea gitea admin user generate-access-token \
      --username "$admin_user" --scopes all --token-name "$tok_name")"
    printf '%s\n' "$out" | sed -n 's/.*successfully created[:!]* *//p' | tr -d '[:space:]'
    printf '\n'
    ;;
  down)
    compose down -v
    ;;
  *)
    printf 'usage: tests/integration/gitea-integration up|token|down\n' >&2
    exit 2
    ;;
 esac
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
 """Opt-in integration tests against a real (containerized) Gitea (#66).
 Skipped by default. Enable with GITEA_INTEGRATION=1 plus a local instance and
 token — see tests/integration/README.md. These prove real Gitea behavior that
 the mocked unit suite can only simulate: pagination, targeted label edits,
 permission fail-closed, and error payload surfacing — all through the shared
 client (``gitea_auth.api_request`` / ``api_get_all``, #65/#67 shape).
 No production credentials; tokens never appear in output or assertions.
 """
 import os
 import sys
 from pathlib import Path
 import pytest
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent))
 from gitea_auth import api_request, api_get_all  # noqa: E402
 pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(
    os.environ.get("GITEA_INTEGRATION") != "1",
    reason="integration tests are opt-in: set GITEA_INTEGRATION=1 (see tests/integration/README.md)",
 )
 # --- issue listing + pagination --------------------------------------------
 N_ISSUES = 7  # > page_size below, forcing a real multi-page walk
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
 def issues(gitea, seed_repo):
    created = []
    for i in range(N_ISSUES):
        created.append(api_request(
            "POST", f"{seed_repo['api']}/issues", gitea["auth"],
            payload={"title": f"pagination seed {i}"}))
    return created
 def test_issue_pagination_walks_all_pages(gitea, seed_repo, issues):
    got = api_get_all(f"{seed_repo['api']}/issues?state=open", gitea["auth"],
                      page_size=3)
    titles = {i["title"] for i in got}
    assert {f"pagination seed {i}" for i in range(N_ISSUES)} <= titles
    assert len(got) >= N_ISSUES
 def test_issue_pagination_honors_overall_limit(gitea, seed_repo, issues):
    got = api_get_all(f"{seed_repo['api']}/issues?state=open", gitea["auth"],
                      page_size=3, limit=4)
    assert len(got) == 4
 # --- PR listing --------------------------------------------------------------
 def test_pr_listing_via_shared_client(gitea, seed_repo, issues):
    # Create a branch (via the contents API) and a real PR, then list.
    api_request(
        "POST", f"{seed_repo['api']}/contents/inttest.txt", gitea["auth"],
        payload={"content": "aW50ZWdyYXRpb24gc2VlZAo=",  # "integration seed"
                 "message": "seed PR branch", "new_branch": "inttest-pr"})
    pr = api_request(
        "POST", f"{seed_repo['api']}/pulls", gitea["auth"],
        payload={"title": "integration seed PR", "head": "inttest-pr",
                 "base": "main"})
    got = api_get_all(f"{seed_repo['api']}/pulls?state=open", gitea["auth"],
                      page_size=1)
    assert any(p["number"] == pr["number"] for p in got)
 # --- targeted label add/remove ----------------------------------------------
 def test_targeted_label_add_and_remove(gitea, seed_repo, issues):
    labels = {}
    for name, color in (("keep-me", "#00ff00"), ("drop-me", "#ff0000")):
        labels[name] = api_request(
            "POST", f"{seed_repo['api']}/labels", gitea["auth"],
            payload={"name": name, "color": color})
    issue_no = issues[0]["number"]
    issue_labels_url = f"{seed_repo['api']}/issues/{issue_no}/labels"
    api_request("POST", issue_labels_url, gitea["auth"],
                payload={"labels": [labels["keep-me"]["id"],
                                    labels["drop-me"]["id"]]})
    # Targeted removal of one label must not disturb the other.
    api_request("DELETE", f"{issue_labels_url}/{labels['drop-me']['id']}",
                gitea["auth"])
    remaining = {l["name"] for l in api_request("GET", issue_labels_url,
                                                gitea["auth"])}
    assert "keep-me" in remaining
    assert "drop-me" not in remaining
 # --- permission denial / fail-closed -----------------------------------------
 def test_bad_token_fails_closed_without_leaking_it(gitea):
    bogus = "token 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567"
    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc:
        api_request("GET", f"{gitea['base']}/api/v1/user", bogus)
    msg = str(exc.value)
    assert "401" in msg
    assert "0123456789abcdef" not in msg  # credential never echoed
 def test_real_error_payload_surfaces_safely(gitea, seed_repo):
    # A genuinely missing resource: Gitea's real 404 error payload must become
    # a clear RuntimeError, not a stack trace, and must not echo the token.
    with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc:
        api_request("GET", f"{seed_repo['api']}/issues/999999", gitea["auth"])
    msg = str(exc.value)
    assert "404" in msg
    token = os.environ.get("GITEA_INTEGRATION_TOKEN", "")
    if token:
        assert token not in msg
@@ -127,14 +127,11 @@ class TestLoadSelect(_ConfigBase):
                gitea_config.resolve_profile()
        self.assertIn("version", str(ctx.exception))
-    def test_missing_version_fails_closed(self):
+    def test_missing_version_defaults_ok(self):
        # Changed by #103: an unversioned config is ambiguous between the v1
        # and v2 shapes, so the loader now refuses to guess.
        self._write({"profiles": {"prgs": {"base_url": "https://x"}}})
        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("prgs"), clear=True):
-            with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
+            self.assertEqual(
-                gitea_config.resolve_profile()
+                gitea_config.resolve_profile()["base_url"], "https://x")
        self.assertIn("version", str(ctx.exception))
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -284,13 +281,11 @@ class TestAuthIntegration(_ConfigBase):
        self.assertEqual(header, "token process-token")
    def test_auth_header_unresolvable_ref_fails_closed(self):
-        # env token ref points at an unset var -> with GITEA_MCP_CONFIG set the
+        # env token ref points at an unset var -> ConfigError inside resolve is
-        # ConfigError propagates (fail closed, #120): no silent fallback to
+        # swallowed to "no token"; auth falls through to (mocked-empty) basic.
        # Basic auth or another credential source.
        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("mdcps-env"), clear=True):
            with patch("gitea_auth.get_credentials", return_value=("", "")):
-                with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
+                self.assertIsNone(gitea_auth.get_auth_header("gitea.example.com"))
                    gitea_auth.get_auth_header("gitea.example.com")
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1,367 +0,0 @@
 """Tests for profiles.json version 2 (#103): environment → service → identity.
 Covers: v2 loading + flattening, dotted-path and alias resolution with strict
 order (exact alias → exact address → fail closed), legacy v1 names via aliases,
 fail-closed validation (missing/unknown version, malformed hierarchy, ambiguous
 selectors, TBD-* usernames, reviewer-identity deadlock rule, inline secrets,
 missing auth, unnormalizable operations), service-default inheritance, and that
 flattened v2 profiles still work with resolve_token. No network, no secrets.
 """
 import os
 import sys
 import copy
 import json
 import tempfile
 import unittest
 from unittest.mock import patch
 sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
 FAKE_TOKEN = "fake-token-for-tests"  # not a real credential
 def v2_config():
    """A fresh, valid v2 config exercising both environments."""
    return {
        "version": 2,
        "environments": {
            "prgs": {
                "services": {
                    "gitea": {
                        "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
                        "default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
                        "identities": {
                            "author": {
                                "role": "author",
                                "username": "jcwalker3",
                                "auth": {"type": "keychain",
                                         "id": "prgs.gitea.author.token"},
                                "execution_profile": "prgs-author",
                                "audit_label": "prgs-author",
                                "allowed_operations": [
                                    "gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create",
                                    "gitea.branch.push", "gitea.pr.create",
                                ],
                                "forbidden_operations": [
                                    "gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge",
                                ],
                            },
                            "reviewer": {
                                "role": "reviewer",
                                "username": "sysadmin",
                                "auth": {"type": "env",
                                         "name": "PRGS_REVIEWER_TOKEN"},
                                "execution_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
                                "audit_label": "prgs-reviewer",
                                "default_repo": "Gitea-Tools",
                                "allowed_operations": [
                                    "read", "review", "comment", "approve",
                                    "request_changes", "merge",
                                ],
                                "forbidden_operations": [
                                    "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push",
                                ],
                            },
                        },
                    },
                },
            },
            "mdcps": {
                "services": {
                    "gitea": {
                        "base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
                        "identities": {
                            "author": {
                                "role": "author",
                                "username": "913443",
                                "auth": {"type": "keychain",
                                         "id": "mdcps.gitea.author.token"},
                                "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read"],
                                "forbidden_operations": [
                                    "gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge",
                                ],
                            },
                            "reviewer": {
                                "role": "reviewer",
                                "username": "TBD-second-mdcps-user",
                                "auth": {"type": "keychain",
                                         "id": "mdcps.gitea.reviewer.token"},
                                "allowed_operations": [
                                    "gitea.read", "gitea.pr.approve",
                                    "gitea.pr.merge",
                                ],
                                "forbidden_operations": [
                                    "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push",
                                ],
                            },
                        },
                    },
                    "jenkins": {
                        "base_url": "https://jenkins.dadeschools.net",
                        "identities": {
                            "reader": {
                                "role": "reader",
                                "username": "svc-jenkins-read",
                                "auth": {"type": "keychain",
                                         "id": "mdcps.jenkins.reader.token"},
                                "allowed_operations": ["read", "jenkins.build.read"],
                                "forbidden_operations": ["jenkins.build.trigger"],
                            },
                        },
                    },
                },
            },
        },
        "aliases": {
            "mdcps": "mdcps.gitea.author",
            "prgs-author": "prgs.gitea.author",
            "prgs-reviewer": "prgs.gitea.reviewer",
        },
    }
 class _V2Base(unittest.TestCase):
    def setUp(self):
        self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
        self.path = os.path.join(self._dir.name, "profiles.json")
        self._write(v2_config())
    def tearDown(self):
        self._dir.cleanup()
    def _write(self, obj):
        with open(self.path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
            fh.write(obj if isinstance(obj, str) else json.dumps(obj))
    def _env(self, profile, **extra):
        env = {"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.path, "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile}
        env.update(extra)
        return env
    def _resolve(self, profile):
        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env(profile), clear=True):
            return gitea_config.resolve_profile()
    def _load_raises(self, mutate, needle):
        cfg = v2_config()
        mutate(cfg)
        self._write(cfg)
        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("prgs.gitea.author"), clear=True):
            with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
                gitea_config.resolve_profile()
        self.assertIn(needle, str(ctx.exception))
        return str(ctx.exception)
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Happy path: loading, dotted paths, aliases, inheritance
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 class TestV2Loads(_V2Base):
    def test_dotted_path_resolution(self):
        p = self._resolve("prgs.gitea.author")
        self.assertEqual(p["base_url"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
        self.assertEqual(p["username"], "jcwalker3")
        self.assertEqual(p["profile_path"], "prgs.gitea.author")
        self.assertEqual(p["environment"], "prgs")
        self.assertEqual(p["service"], "gitea")
        self.assertEqual(p["identity"], "author")
        self.assertEqual(p["role"], "author")
    def test_alias_resolution_legacy_names(self):
        for legacy, addr in (
            ("mdcps", "mdcps.gitea.author"),
            ("prgs-author", "prgs.gitea.author"),
            ("prgs-reviewer", "prgs.gitea.reviewer"),
        ):
            p = self._resolve(legacy)
            self.assertEqual(p["profile_path"], addr, legacy)
    def test_service_defaults_inherit_and_identity_overrides(self):
        author = self._resolve("prgs.gitea.author")
        self.assertEqual(author["default_owner"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
        self.assertNotIn("default_repo", author)
        reviewer = self._resolve("prgs.gitea.reviewer")
        self.assertEqual(reviewer["default_owner"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
        self.assertEqual(reviewer["default_repo"], "Gitea-Tools")
    def test_unqualified_ops_normalized_minimally(self):
        reviewer = self._resolve("prgs.gitea.reviewer")
        self.assertIn("gitea.pr.merge", reviewer["allowed_operations"])
        self.assertIn("gitea.read", reviewer["allowed_operations"])
        self.assertNotIn("merge", reviewer["allowed_operations"])
        jenkins = self._resolve("mdcps.jenkins.reader")
        self.assertIn("jenkins.read", jenkins["allowed_operations"])
        self.assertIn("jenkins.build.read", jenkins["allowed_operations"])
    def test_resolve_token_works_on_flattened_profile(self):
        with patch.dict(
            os.environ,
            self._env("prgs.gitea.reviewer", PRGS_REVIEWER_TOKEN=FAKE_TOKEN),
            clear=True,
        ):
            profile = gitea_config.resolve_profile()
            self.assertEqual(gitea_config.resolve_token(profile), FAKE_TOKEN)
    def test_auth_source_name_on_flattened_profile(self):
        p = self._resolve("mdcps.gitea.author")
        self.assertEqual(
            gitea_config.auth_source_name(p), "keychain:mdcps.gitea.author.token"
        )
    def test_v1_config_still_loads(self):
        self._write({
            "version": 1,
            "profiles": {"prgs": {
                "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
                "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-gitea-token"},
            }},
        })
        p = self._resolve("prgs")
        self.assertEqual(p["base_url"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
    def test_validate_config_accepts_valid_v2(self):
        self.assertEqual(gitea_config.validate_config(v2_config()), [])
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Fail-closed: selectors
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 class TestV2Selectors(_V2Base):
    def test_unknown_selector_fails_closed(self):
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
            self._resolve("prgs.gitea")  # partial address — no fuzzy matching
        self.assertIn("not found", str(ctx.exception))
    def test_no_fuzzy_matching_on_near_miss(self):
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
            self._resolve("prgs-reviewers")
    def test_conflicting_alias_and_address_fails_closed(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            cfg["aliases"]["prgs.gitea.author"] = "prgs.gitea.reviewer"
        self._load_raises(mutate, "conflicting selector")
    def test_alias_to_unknown_target_fails_closed(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            cfg["aliases"]["ghost"] = "prgs.gitea.nope"
        self._load_raises(mutate, "unknown profile")
    def test_tbd_username_fails_closed_on_selection(self):
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
            self._resolve("mdcps.gitea.reviewer")
        msg = str(ctx.exception)
        self.assertIn("TBD", msg)
        self.assertIn("provision", msg)
    def test_tbd_identity_does_not_block_other_identities(self):
        # Same file contains the TBD reviewer; author still resolves.
        p = self._resolve("mdcps.gitea.author")
        self.assertEqual(p["username"], "913443")
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Fail-closed: structure and versions
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 class TestV2Structure(_V2Base):
    def test_missing_version_fails_closed(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            del cfg["version"]
        self._load_raises(mutate, "version")
    def test_unknown_version_fails_closed(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            cfg["version"] = 3
        self._load_raises(mutate, "unsupported version")
    def test_missing_environments_fails_closed(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            del cfg["environments"]
        self._load_raises(mutate, "environments")
    def test_malformed_environment_fails_closed(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            cfg["environments"]["prgs"] = "not-an-object"
        self._load_raises(mutate, "must be a JSON object")
    def test_missing_services_fails_closed(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            cfg["environments"]["prgs"]["services"] = {}
        self._load_raises(mutate, "services")
    def test_missing_identities_fails_closed(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            cfg["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]["identities"] = {}
        self._load_raises(mutate, "identities")
    def test_dotted_segment_name_fails_closed(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            envs = cfg["environments"]
            envs["bad.env"] = copy.deepcopy(envs["prgs"])
        self._load_raises(mutate, "invalid environment name")
    def test_missing_base_url_fails_closed(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            svc = cfg["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]
            del svc["base_url"]
        self._load_raises(mutate, "base_url")
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Fail-closed: identity invariants
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 class TestV2IdentityInvariants(_V2Base):
    def _ident(self, cfg, addr="prgs.gitea.author"):
        env, svc, ident = addr.split(".")
        return cfg["environments"][env]["services"][svc]["identities"][ident]
    def test_missing_auth_fails_closed(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            del self._ident(cfg)["auth"]
        self._load_raises(mutate, "missing an 'auth' reference")
    def test_inline_secret_in_identity_rejected(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            self._ident(cfg)["token"] = "oops-not-a-real-secret"
        msg = self._load_raises(mutate, "inline 'token'")
        self.assertNotIn("oops-not-a-real-secret", msg)
    def test_inline_secret_in_auth_rejected(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            self._ident(cfg)["auth"]["password"] = "oops-not-a-real-secret"
        msg = self._load_raises(mutate, "inline 'password'")
        self.assertNotIn("oops-not-a-real-secret", msg)
    def test_reviewer_deadlock_invariant_enforced(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            reviewer = self._ident(cfg, "prgs.gitea.reviewer")
            reviewer["forbidden_operations"] = []  # can approve/merge AND create
        msg = self._load_raises(mutate, "deadlock")
        self.assertIn("gitea.pr.create", msg)
    def test_reviewer_deadlock_applies_to_unqualified_merge(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            author = self._ident(cfg)
            author["allowed_operations"] = ["merge"]  # normalized to gitea.pr.merge
            author["forbidden_operations"] = []
        self._load_raises(mutate, "deadlock")
    def test_unnormalizable_operation_fails_closed(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            self._ident(cfg)["allowed_operations"] = ["frobnicate"]
        self._load_raises(mutate, "cannot be normalized")
    def test_foreign_namespace_operation_fails_closed(self):
        def mutate(cfg):
            reader = self._ident(cfg, "mdcps.jenkins.reader")
            reader["allowed_operations"] = ["gitea.pr.merge"]
        self._load_raises(mutate, "cannot be normalized")
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -1,446 +0,0 @@
 """Tests for profiles.json version 2 *contexts* shape (#120).
 The canonical machine config uses ``contexts`` / ``profiles`` / ``projects`` /
 ``rules`` with explicit ``enabled`` flags. Covers: loading + active-profile
 resolution via GITEA_MCP_PROFILE, fail-closed refusal of disabled profiles /
 contexts / services / projects, project-to-context mapping, base-URL fallback
 from the context's gitea block, keychain-only auth references, LLM-safe audit
 output (no endpoint URLs, no keychain ids, no tokens) with an explicit
 admin/debug opt-in, v1 compatibility, and the no-silent-fallback rule in
 gitea_auth.get_auth_header. No network, no real secrets.
 """
 import json
 import os
 import sys
 import tempfile
 import unittest
 from unittest.mock import patch
 sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
 import gitea_auth  # noqa: E402
 FAKE_TOKEN = "fake-token-for-tests"  # not a real credential
 def contexts_config():
    """A fresh, valid v2 contexts-shape config with enabled/disabled entries."""
    return {
        "version": 2,
        "contexts": {
            "prgs": {
                "enabled": True,
                "label": "Local / PRGS",
                "default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
                "gitea": {
                    "enabled": True,
                    "kind": "gitea",
                    "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
                },
                "services": {
                    "jenkins": {
                        "enabled": True,
                        "kind": "jenkins",
                        "label": "PRGS Jenkins",
                        "base_url": "https://jenkins.prgs.cc",
                        "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-jenkins-token"},
                        "capabilities": ["read"],
                    },
                    "sentry": {
                        "enabled": False,
                        "kind": "sentry",
                        "label": "PRGS Sentry",
                        "base_url": "",
                        "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-sentry-token"},
                        "capabilities": ["read"],
                    },
                },
            },
            "lab": {
                "enabled": False,
                "gitea": {"enabled": False, "kind": "gitea", "base_url": ""},
                "services": {
                    "jenkins": {
                        "enabled": False,
                        "kind": "jenkins",
                        "label": "Lab Jenkins",
                        "base_url": "http://localhost:8080",
                        "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "lab-jenkins-token"},
                        "capabilities": ["read"],
                    },
                },
            },
        },
        "profiles": {
            "prgs-author": {
                "enabled": True,
                "context": "prgs",
                "role": "author",
                "username": "jcwalker3",
                "execution_profile": "prgs-author",
                "audit_label": "prgs-author",
                "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
                "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-gitea-author-token"},
                "allowed_operations": [
                    "read", "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr", "comment",
                ],
                "forbidden_operations": [
                    "approve", "request_changes", "merge",
                ],
            },
            "prgs-reviewer": {
                "enabled": True,
                "context": "prgs",
                "role": "reviewer",
                "username": "sysadmin",
                "execution_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
                "audit_label": "prgs-reviewer",
                # no base_url on purpose: must fall back to context gitea
                "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-gitea-reviewer-token"},
                "allowed_operations": [
                    "read", "review", "comment", "approve",
                    "request_changes", "merge",
                ],
                "forbidden_operations": [
                    "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr",
                ],
            },
            "retired-author": {
                "enabled": False,
                "context": "prgs",
                "role": "author",
                "username": "jcwalker3",
                "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
                "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "retired-token-ref"},
                "allowed_operations": ["read"],
                "forbidden_operations": [],
            },
            "lab-author": {
                "enabled": True,
                "context": "lab",
                "role": "author",
                "username": "jcwalker3",
                "base_url": "http://localhost:3000",
                "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "lab-gitea-author-token"},
                "allowed_operations": ["read"],
                "forbidden_operations": [],
            },
        },
        "projects": {
            "/repo/one": {
                "enabled": True,
                "context": "prgs",
                "default_owner": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
                "default_repo": "One",
                "default_author_profile": "prgs-author",
                "default_reviewer_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
            },
            "/repo/lab": {
                "enabled": False,
                "context": "lab",
            },
        },
        "rules": {
            "disabled_behavior": "report in audits, never act",
            "no_silent_fallback": True,
            "tokens_in_json": False,
            "token_storage": "keychain",
            "hide_service_urls_from_llm": True,
            "hide_keychain_ids_from_llm": True,
            "mcp_resolves_endpoints": True,
        },
    }
 def write_config(data):
    """Write *data* to a temp JSON file and return its path."""
    fd, path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".json")
    with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
        json.dump(data, fh)
    return path
 def load(data):
    """Load *data* through gitea_config via a temp file, then clean up."""
    path = write_config(data)
    try:
        return gitea_config.load_config(path)
    finally:
        os.unlink(path)
 class LoadContextsShapeTests(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_contexts_shape_loads(self):
        config = load(contexts_config())
        self.assertEqual(config["version"], 2)
        self.assertIn("prgs-author", config["profiles"])
        self.assertIn("prgs-reviewer", config["profiles"])
    def test_active_profile_resolved_from_env(self):
        path = write_config(contexts_config())
        try:
            with patch.dict(os.environ, {
                gitea_config.ENV_CONFIG_PATH: path,
                gitea_config.ENV_PROFILE: "prgs-author",
            }):
                profile = gitea_config.resolve_profile()
        finally:
            os.unlink(path)
        self.assertEqual(profile["username"], "jcwalker3")
        self.assertEqual(profile["base_url"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
        self.assertEqual(profile["context"], "prgs")
    def test_base_url_falls_back_to_context_gitea(self):
        profile = gitea_config.select_profile(load(contexts_config()),
                                              "prgs-reviewer")
        self.assertEqual(profile["base_url"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
    def test_profile_without_any_base_url_is_refused(self):
        data = contexts_config()
        del data["profiles"]["prgs-author"]["base_url"]
        data["contexts"]["prgs"]["gitea"]["enabled"] = False
        config = load(data)
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
            gitea_config.select_profile(config, "prgs-author")
    def test_v1_config_still_loads(self):
        config = load({
            "version": 1,
            "profiles": {
                "prgs": {
                    "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-gitea-token"},
                },
            },
        })
        profile = gitea_config.select_profile(config, "prgs")
        self.assertEqual(profile["base_url"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
    def test_mixed_contexts_and_environments_rejected(self):
        data = contexts_config()
        data["environments"] = {"x": {"services": {}}}
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
            load(data)
    def test_missing_enabled_flag_is_refused(self):
        data = contexts_config()
        del data["profiles"]["prgs-author"]["enabled"]
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
            load(data)
        self.assertIn("enabled", str(ctx.exception))
 class DisabledRefusalTests(unittest.TestCase):
    def setUp(self):
        self.config = load(contexts_config())
    def test_disabled_profile_refused(self):
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
            gitea_config.select_profile(self.config, "retired-author")
        self.assertIn("disabled", str(ctx.exception))
    def test_profile_in_disabled_context_refused(self):
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
            gitea_config.select_profile(self.config, "lab-author")
        self.assertIn("disabled", str(ctx.exception))
    def test_enabled_profile_still_selectable(self):
        profile = gitea_config.select_profile(self.config, "prgs-author")
        self.assertEqual(profile["context"], "prgs")
    def test_disabled_service_refused(self):
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
            gitea_config.resolve_service(self.config, "prgs", "sentry")
        self.assertIn("disabled", str(ctx.exception))
    def test_enabled_service_resolves_internally_with_auth_reference(self):
        # Internal resolution keeps the URL + auth reference for MCP's own use;
        # they must never appear in LLM-facing (audit/summary) output.
        service = gitea_config.resolve_service(self.config, "prgs", "jenkins")
        self.assertEqual(service["base_url"], "https://jenkins.prgs.cc")
        self.assertEqual(service["auth"], {"type": "keychain",
                                           "id": "prgs-jenkins-token"})
        self.assertNotIn("token", service)
    def test_service_in_disabled_context_refused(self):
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
            gitea_config.resolve_service(self.config, "lab", "jenkins")
        self.assertIn("disabled", str(ctx.exception))
    def test_unknown_service_fails_closed(self):
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
            gitea_config.resolve_service(self.config, "prgs", "nope")
 class ProjectMappingTests(unittest.TestCase):
    def setUp(self):
        self.config = load(contexts_config())
    def test_project_maps_to_context(self):
        project = gitea_config.project_for_path(self.config, "/repo/one")
        self.assertEqual(project["context"], "prgs")
        self.assertEqual(project["default_reviewer_profile"], "prgs-reviewer")
    def test_unknown_project_returns_none(self):
        self.assertIsNone(
            gitea_config.project_for_path(self.config, "/repo/unknown"))
    def test_disabled_project_refused(self):
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
            gitea_config.project_for_path(self.config, "/repo/lab")
        self.assertIn("disabled", str(ctx.exception))
 class SecretHandlingTests(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_inline_profile_token_rejected(self):
        data = contexts_config()
        data["profiles"]["prgs-author"]["token"] = FAKE_TOKEN
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
            load(data)
        self.assertNotIn(FAKE_TOKEN, str(ctx.exception))
    def test_inline_service_token_rejected(self):
        data = contexts_config()
        data["contexts"]["prgs"]["services"]["jenkins"]["token"] = FAKE_TOKEN
        with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError) as ctx:
            load(data)
        self.assertNotIn(FAKE_TOKEN, str(ctx.exception))
    def test_selected_profile_resolves_token_via_keychain(self):
        profile = gitea_config.select_profile(load(contexts_config()),
                                              "prgs-author")
        token = gitea_config.resolve_token(
            profile, keychain_lookup=lambda item_id: FAKE_TOKEN
            if item_id == "prgs-gitea-author-token" else None)
        self.assertEqual(token, FAKE_TOKEN)
 class AuditTests(unittest.TestCase):
    """LLM-facing audit output: enabled/disabled state only — no endpoint
    URLs, no keychain ids, no token values. Admin opt-in reveals endpoints
    and auth source names (never token values)."""
    def setUp(self):
        self.config = load(contexts_config())
    def test_audit_reports_enabled_and_disabled(self):
        report = gitea_config.audit_config(self.config)
        profiles = {p["name"]: p for p in report["profiles"]}
        self.assertTrue(profiles["prgs-author"]["enabled"])
        self.assertFalse(profiles["retired-author"]["enabled"])
        services = {(s["context"], s["name"]): s for s in report["services"]}
        self.assertTrue(services[("prgs", "jenkins")]["enabled"])
        self.assertFalse(services[("prgs", "sentry")]["enabled"])
        self.assertFalse(services[("lab", "jenkins")]["enabled"])
    def test_audit_hides_urls_keychain_ids_and_tokens_by_default(self):
        rendered = json.dumps(gitea_config.audit_config(self.config))
        for leaked in ("https://", "http://", "prgs-gitea-author-token",
                       "prgs-jenkins-token", "base_url", FAKE_TOKEN):
            self.assertNotIn(leaked, rendered)
        # Auth is reported as a status, not a reference.
        report = gitea_config.audit_config(self.config)
        profiles = {p["name"]: p for p in report["profiles"]}
        self.assertEqual(profiles["prgs-author"]["auth"], "keychain")
    def test_audit_admin_optin_reveals_endpoints_but_never_tokens(self):
        report = gitea_config.audit_config(self.config, reveal_endpoints=True)
        rendered = json.dumps(report)
        self.assertIn("https://jenkins.prgs.cc", rendered)
        self.assertIn("keychain:prgs-gitea-author-token", rendered)
        self.assertNotIn(FAKE_TOKEN, rendered)
    def test_audit_works_for_v1_config(self):
        report = gitea_config.audit_config({
            "version": 1,
            "profiles": {
                "prgs": {
                    "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
                    "auth": {"type": "keychain", "id": "prgs-gitea-token"},
                },
            },
        })
        profiles = {p["name"]: p for p in report["profiles"]}
        self.assertTrue(profiles["prgs"]["enabled"])
        self.assertEqual(profiles["prgs"]["auth"], "keychain")
        self.assertNotIn("https://", json.dumps(report))
 class ServiceSummaryTests(unittest.TestCase):
    """Safe one-line summaries for LLM sessions: label + state only."""
    def setUp(self):
        self.config = load(contexts_config())
    def test_summaries_show_state_without_urls_or_ids(self):
        lines = gitea_config.service_summaries(
            self.config, auth_check=lambda service: True)
        text = "\n".join(lines)
        self.assertIn("PRGS Jenkins: enabled, read-only, authenticated", text)
        self.assertIn("PRGS Sentry: disabled", text)
        self.assertIn("Lab Jenkins: disabled", text)
        for leaked in ("https://", "http://", "keychain",
                       "prgs-jenkins-token"):
            self.assertNotIn(leaked, text)
    def test_summary_reports_missing_auth_without_secrets(self):
        lines = gitea_config.service_summaries(
            self.config, auth_check=lambda service: False)
        text = "\n".join(lines)
        self.assertIn("PRGS Jenkins: enabled, read-only, no credential", text)
 class NoSilentFallbackTests(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_broken_config_fails_auth_instead_of_falling_back(self):
        """With GITEA_MCP_CONFIG set but unloadable, auth must fail closed."""
        path = write_config({"version": 2})  # invalid: no contexts/environments
        env = {
            gitea_config.ENV_CONFIG_PATH: path,
            gitea_config.ENV_PROFILE: "prgs-author",
        }
        try:
            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False), \
                 patch.object(gitea_auth, "get_credentials",
                              return_value=(None, None)):
                for var in ("GITEA_TOKEN", "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS",
                            "GITEA_TOKEN_DADESCHOOLS"):
                    os.environ.pop(var, None)
                with self.assertRaises(gitea_config.ConfigError):
                    gitea_auth.get_auth_header("https://gitea.prgs.cc")
        finally:
            os.unlink(path)
    def test_env_only_users_unaffected(self):
        """Without GITEA_MCP_CONFIG, a missing token still degrades quietly."""
        env = dict(os.environ)
        env.pop(gitea_config.ENV_CONFIG_PATH, None)
        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True), \
             patch.object(gitea_auth, "get_credentials",
                          return_value=(None, None)):
            for var in ("GITEA_TOKEN", "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS",
                        "GITEA_TOKEN_DADESCHOOLS"):
                os.environ.pop(var, None)
            self.assertIsNone(
                gitea_auth.get_auth_header("https://gitea.prgs.cc"))
 class ValidateConfigTests(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_valid_contexts_config_has_no_problems(self):
        self.assertEqual(gitea_config.validate_config(contexts_config()), [])
    def test_repo_example_file_validates(self):
        example = __import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent \
            / "gitea-mcp.v2-contexts.example.json"
        with open(example, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
            self.assertEqual(gitea_config.validate_config(json.load(fh)), [])
    def test_broken_contexts_config_reports_problems(self):
        data = contexts_config()
        data["profiles"]["prgs-author"]["context"] = "nope"
        problems = gitea_config.validate_config(data)
        self.assertTrue(problems)
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -1,195 +0,0 @@
 """Negative tests for LLM-Agent-SHA attribution (#86, Phase 0).
 ``LLM-Agent-SHA`` (docs/llm-agent-sha.md) is attribution metadata ONLY. These
 tests prove it can never bypass the review/merge safety gates:
 1. Same Gitea user + different LLM-Agent-SHA still fails self-review/approval.
 2. Same Gitea user + different LLM-Agent-SHA still fails self-merge.
 3. The eligibility logic does not consult SHA metadata at all — results are
   identical with no SHA, one SHA, or a different SHA in the environment, and
   no gate accepts an agent-SHA input.
 Phase 0 adds no SHA support to any MCP tool; the environment variables set
 here (``LLM_AGENT_SHA`` / ``LLM_AGENT_ROLE``) simulate a future launcher and
 must be ignored by every gate.
 """
 import inspect
 import os
 import re
 import sys
 import unittest
 from unittest.mock import patch
 sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 from mcp_server import (  # noqa: E402
    gitea_check_pr_eligibility,
    gitea_merge_pr,
    gitea_review_pr,
    gitea_submit_pr_review,
 )
 FAKE_AUTH = "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
 SHA_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^llm-[0-9a-f]{12}$")
 # Two distinct, well-formed agent SHAs "belonging" to the same Gitea user.
 SHA_IMPLEMENTER = "llm-8f3a9c2d6b41"
 SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER = "llm-41d0e7aa9f2c"
 def _pr(author, state="open", sha="abc123", mergeable=True):
    return {
        "user": {"login": author},
        "state": state,
        "head": {"sha": sha},
        "mergeable": mergeable,
    }
 class TestShaFormatConvention(unittest.TestCase):
    """The documented format: llm-<12 lowercase hex>, nothing identifying."""
    def test_documented_examples_are_valid(self):
        for value in (SHA_IMPLEMENTER, SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER, "llm-b7c93d441a08"):
            self.assertRegex(value, SHA_PATTERN)
    def test_identifying_or_malformed_values_are_rejected(self):
        for bad in (
            "llm-8F3A9C2D6B41",          # uppercase
            "llm-8f3a9c2d6b4",           # too short
            "llm-8f3a9c2d6b411",         # too long
            "llm-opus4",                 # model name, not hex
            "claude-8f3a9c2d6b41",       # provider prefix
            "jcwalker3",                 # username
            "llm-user@example.com",      # email
            "8f3a9c2d6b41",              # missing prefix
            "",
        ):
            self.assertNotRegex(bad, SHA_PATTERN)
 class TestShaCannotBypassSelfReview(unittest.TestCase):
    """Scenario: user A (SHA 1) authored the PR; user A (SHA 2) tries to act."""
    def _env(self, agent_sha, role):
        # Reviewer-capable profile + a simulated launcher-injected agent SHA.
        return {
            "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
            "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve,merge",
            "LLM_AGENT_SHA": agent_sha,
            "LLM_AGENT_ROLE": role,
        }
    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
    def test_same_user_different_sha_cannot_approve(self, _auth, mock_api):
        mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, _pr("jcwalker3")]
        env = self._env(SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER, "reviewer")
        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
            r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=9, action="approve", remote="prgs")
        self.assertFalse(r["eligible"])
        self.assertIn("authenticated user is PR author", r["reasons"])
    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
    def test_same_user_different_sha_cannot_merge(self, _auth, mock_api):
        mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, _pr("jcwalker3")]
        env = self._env(SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER, "merger")
        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
            r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=9, action="merge", remote="prgs")
        self.assertFalse(r["eligible"])
        self.assertIn("authenticated user is PR author", r["reasons"])
    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
    def test_gated_merge_tool_refuses_self_merge_despite_sha(self, _auth, mock_api):
        # Even the fully-confirmed gated merge path must refuse: correct
        # confirmation string, mergeable PR, merge-capable profile — but the
        # authenticated user is the PR author, whatever the agent SHA says.
        mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, _pr("jcwalker3")]
        env = self._env(SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER, "merger")
        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
            r = gitea_merge_pr(
                pr_number=9, confirmation="MERGE PR 9", remote="prgs")
        self.assertFalse(r.get("performed"))
        for call in mock_api.call_args_list:
            method, url = call.args[0], call.args[1]
            self.assertFalse(
                method == "POST" and url.endswith("/merge"),
                f"self-merge mutation reached the API: {method} {url}",
            )
    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
    def test_review_tool_refuses_self_approval_despite_sha(self, _auth, mock_api):
        mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, _pr("jcwalker3")]
        env = self._env(SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER, "reviewer")
        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
            r = gitea_review_pr(
                pr_number=9, event="APPROVE", body="self approve", merge=False,
                remote="prgs")
        self.assertFalse(r["success"])
        self.assertIn("authenticated user is PR author", r["message"])
        for call in mock_api.call_args_list:
            method, url = call.args[0], call.args[1]
            self.assertFalse(
                method == "POST" and url.endswith("/reviews"),
                f"self-review mutation reached the API: {method} {url}",
            )
 class TestEligibilityNeverConsultsSha(unittest.TestCase):
    """The gates have no SHA input: not via env, not via parameters."""
    def _run_eligibility(self, extra_env):
        env = {
            "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
            "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve",
        }
        env.update(extra_env)
        with patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH), \
                patch("mcp_server.api_request") as mock_api:
            mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "reviewer-bot"}, _pr("author-bot")]
            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
                return gitea_check_pr_eligibility(
                    pr_number=5, action="approve", remote="prgs")
    def test_result_identical_with_without_and_across_shas(self):
        baseline = self._run_eligibility({})
        with_one = self._run_eligibility(
            {"LLM_AGENT_SHA": SHA_IMPLEMENTER, "LLM_AGENT_ROLE": "implementer"})
        with_other = self._run_eligibility(
            {"LLM_AGENT_SHA": SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER, "LLM_AGENT_ROLE": "reviewer"})
        self.assertEqual(baseline, with_one)
        self.assertEqual(baseline, with_other)
        self.assertTrue(baseline["eligible"])  # sanity: a real decision ran
    def test_eligibility_result_carries_no_agent_sha(self):
        r = self._run_eligibility(
            {"LLM_AGENT_SHA": SHA_IMPLEMENTER, "LLM_AGENT_ROLE": "implementer"})
        blob = repr(r)
        self.assertNotIn(SHA_IMPLEMENTER, blob)
        self.assertNotIn("LLM_AGENT", blob)
    def test_gate_functions_accept_no_agent_sha_parameter(self):
        for fn in (gitea_check_pr_eligibility, gitea_merge_pr,
                   gitea_review_pr, gitea_submit_pr_review):
            for param in inspect.signature(fn).parameters:
                lowered = param.lower()
                self.assertNotIn("agent", lowered,
                                 f"{fn.__name__} accepts agent param {param!r}")
                self.assertNotIn("llm", lowered,
                                 f"{fn.__name__} accepts llm param {param!r}")
    def test_gate_sources_never_read_agent_sha(self):
        # Phase 0 guarantee: no gate reads LLM_AGENT_* metadata at all.
        for fn in (gitea_check_pr_eligibility, gitea_merge_pr,
                   gitea_review_pr, gitea_submit_pr_review):
            src = inspect.getsource(fn)
            self.assertNotIn("LLM_AGENT", src,
                             f"{fn.__name__} reads LLM_AGENT metadata")
            self.assertNotIn("agent_sha", src,
                             f"{fn.__name__} consults an agent SHA")
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 Each tool is tested by calling the underlying function directly (not through
 the MCP protocol) with mocked API responses.
 """
 import json
 import os
 import sys
 import unittest
@@ -371,55 +370,6 @@ class TestMergePR(unittest.TestCase):
                expected_changed_files=["b.py", "a.py"], remote="prgs")
        self.assertTrue(r["performed"])
    # -- read-back / cleanup surfacing (#98) -----------------------------------
    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
    def test_readback_failure_reports_skipped_cleanup(self, _auth, mock_api):
        """Merge OK + read-back GET failure => explicit cleanup skip, not silence."""
        mock_api.side_effect = [
            {"login": "merger-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot"),
            {},  # merge POST
            RuntimeError("HTTP 502: Gitea upstream unavailable"),  # read-back fails
        ]
        env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
               "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
            r = gitea_merge_pr(pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8),
                               remote="prgs")
        # The merge itself is still reported performed/successful.
        self.assertTrue(r["performed"])
        self.assertEqual(r["merge_result"], "PR #8 merged via 'merge'.")
        self.assertIsNone(r["merge_commit"])
        # The skip is explicit, not silent.
        self.assertEqual(r["cleanup_status"], "skipped (merge read-back failed)")
        # No tracker-cleanup API traffic after the failed read-back:
        # user, PR (eligibility), merge POST, read-back — and nothing more.
        self.assertEqual(mock_api.call_count, 4)
        for c in mock_api.call_args_list:
            self.assertNotEqual(c.args[0], "DELETE")
    @patch("mcp_server.cleanup_in_progress_for_pr",
           side_effect=RuntimeError("boom token secret-xyz"))
    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
    def test_cleanup_exception_surfaced_and_redacted(self, _auth, mock_api, _cleanup):
        """Unexpected cleanup exception => merge still succeeds; error surfaced redacted."""
        mock_api.side_effect = [
            {"login": "merger-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot"),
            {},  # merge POST
            {"merged_commit_sha": "c9"},  # read-back OK
        ]
        env = {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-merger",
               "GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,merge"}
        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
            r = gitea_merge_pr(pr_number=8, confirmation=self._confirm(8),
                               remote="prgs")
        self.assertTrue(r["performed"])
        self.assertEqual(r["merge_commit"], "c9")
        self.assertTrue(r["cleanup_status"].startswith("skipped (cleanup error:"))
        self.assertNotIn("secret-xyz", r["cleanup_status"])
    # -- confirmation ---------------------------------------------------------
    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
@@ -881,9 +831,7 @@ class TestWhoami(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertEqual(result["username"], "reviewer-bot")
        self.assertEqual(result["display_name"], "Reviewer Bot")
        self.assertEqual(result["user_id"], 42)
-        # Endpoint URLs are hidden from normal LLM-facing output (#120);
+        self.assertEqual(result["server"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
        # the logical remote name is the addressing surface.
        self.assertNotIn("server", result)
        self.assertEqual(result["remote"], "prgs")
        # Read-only: GET against the authenticated-user endpoint.
        call_args = mock_api.call_args
@@ -1038,12 +986,8 @@ class TestProfileDiscovery(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertEqual(result["allowed_operations"], ["read", "review", "approve"])
        self.assertEqual(result["authenticated_username"], "reviewer-bot")
        self.assertEqual(result["identity_status"], "verified")
-        # Endpoint URLs and token source names are hidden from normal
+        self.assertEqual(result["server"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
-        # LLM-facing output (#120); auth is reported as a status only.
+        self.assertEqual(result["token_source_name"], "GITEA_TOKEN")
        self.assertNotIn("server", result)
        self.assertNotIn("base_url", result)
        self.assertNotIn("token_source_name", result)
        self.assertEqual(result["auth_status"], "configured")
        # Read-only: only a GET to the user endpoint was issued.
        self.assertEqual(mock_api.call_args[0][0], "GET")
        self.assertTrue(mock_api.call_args[0][1].endswith("/api/v1/user"))
@@ -1656,158 +1600,3 @@ class TestTrackerHygieneCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
        res = gitea_close_issue(issue_number=1)
        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
        self.assertIn("error:", res["cleanup_status"].get(1))
    def test_extract_linked_issue_numbers_hygiene(self):
        from mcp_server import extract_linked_issue_numbers
        # Standard closing keywords
        self.assertEqual(extract_linked_issue_numbers("Closes #123"), [123])
        self.assertEqual(extract_linked_issue_numbers("Fixes #123"), [123])
        self.assertEqual(extract_linked_issue_numbers("Resolves #123"), [123])
        # New implements/implemented keywords
        self.assertEqual(extract_linked_issue_numbers("Implements #123"), [123])
        self.assertEqual(extract_linked_issue_numbers("implemented #123"), [123])
        self.assertEqual(extract_linked_issue_numbers("implement #123"), [123])
        # refs / ref should NOT match
        self.assertEqual(extract_linked_issue_numbers("Refs #123"), [])
        self.assertEqual(extract_linked_issue_numbers("ref #123"), [])
        # branch name fallback
        self.assertEqual(extract_linked_issue_numbers("", branch_name="issue-123"), [123])
        self.assertEqual(extract_linked_issue_numbers("", branch_name="feat/issue-123-foo"), [123])
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Endpoint/keychain redaction in LLM-facing output — issue #120
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 class TestEndpointRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
    """Normal MCP output hides endpoint URLs and keychain ids; the admin
    opt-in (GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS) restores them for local diagnostics
    without ever revealing token values."""
    def _contexts_config_file(self):
        import tempfile
        config = {
            "version": 2,
            "contexts": {
                "prgs": {
                    "enabled": True,
                    "gitea": {"enabled": True, "kind": "gitea",
                              "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc"},
                    "services": {
                        "jenkins": {
                            "enabled": True, "kind": "jenkins",
                            "label": "PRGS Jenkins",
                            "base_url": "https://jenkins.prgs.cc",
                            "auth": {"type": "keychain",
                                     "id": "prgs-jenkins-token"},
                            "capabilities": ["read"],
                        },
                        "sentry": {
                            "enabled": False, "kind": "sentry",
                            "label": "PRGS Sentry", "base_url": "",
                            "auth": {"type": "keychain",
                                     "id": "prgs-sentry-token"},
                            "capabilities": ["read"],
                        },
                    },
                },
            },
            "profiles": {
                "prgs-author": {
                    "enabled": True, "context": "prgs", "role": "author",
                    "username": "jcwalker3",
                    "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
                    "auth": {"type": "keychain",
                             "id": "prgs-gitea-author-token"},
                    "allowed_operations": ["read"],
                    "forbidden_operations": [],
                },
            },
            "projects": {},
            "rules": {"hide_service_urls_from_llm": True,
                      "hide_keychain_ids_from_llm": True,
                      "mcp_resolves_endpoints": True},
        }
        fd, path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".json")
        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
            json.dump(config, fh)
        return path
    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
    def test_whoami_hides_endpoint_url_by_default(self, _auth, mock_api):
        mock_api.return_value = {"id": 1, "login": "someone"}
        with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
            result = gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
        self.assertNotIn("server", result)
        self.assertNotIn("https://", repr(result))
    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
    def test_whoami_reveals_endpoint_with_admin_optin(self, _auth, mock_api):
        mock_api.return_value = {"id": 1, "login": "someone"}
        with patch.dict(os.environ,
                        {"GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS": "1"}, clear=True):
            result = gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
        self.assertEqual(result["server"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
    def test_get_profile_hides_url_and_token_source_by_default(self):
        env = {
            "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
            "GITEA_BASE_URL": "https://gitea.example.invalid",
            "GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE": "keychain:some-item-id",
        }
        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
            result = gitea_get_profile(remote="prgs",
                                       resolve_identity=False)
        blob = repr(result)
        for leaked in ("https://", "keychain:", "some-item-id",
                       "base_url", "server", "token_source_name"):
            self.assertNotIn(leaked, blob)
        self.assertEqual(result["auth_status"], "configured")
    def test_get_profile_reports_unconfigured_auth(self):
        with patch.dict(os.environ,
                        {"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author"}, clear=True):
            result = gitea_get_profile(remote="prgs",
                                       resolve_identity=False)
        self.assertEqual(result["auth_status"], "unconfigured")
    def test_get_profile_reveals_with_admin_optin(self):
        env = {
            "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
            "GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE": "keychain:some-item-id",
            "GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS": "1",
        }
        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
            result = gitea_get_profile(remote="prgs",
                                       resolve_identity=False)
        self.assertEqual(result["server"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
        self.assertEqual(result["token_source_name"], "keychain:some-item-id")
    def test_audit_tool_reports_state_without_urls_or_ids(self):
        from mcp_server import gitea_audit_config
        path = self._contexts_config_file()
        try:
            env = {"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": path,
                   "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author"}
            with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True), \
                 patch("gitea_config._keychain_token", return_value="x"):
                result = gitea_audit_config()
        finally:
            os.unlink(path)
        blob = json.dumps(result)
        self.assertIn("PRGS Jenkins: enabled, read-only, authenticated",
                      result["summaries"])
        self.assertIn("PRGS Sentry: disabled", result["summaries"])
        for leaked in ("https://", "http://", "prgs-jenkins-token",
                       "prgs-gitea-author-token", "base_url"):
            self.assertNotIn(leaked, blob)
    def test_audit_tool_without_config_reports_off(self):
        with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
            from mcp_server import gitea_audit_config
            result = gitea_audit_config()
        self.assertFalse(result["configured"])