Compare commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 sysadmin
|
e423dd5870 | ||
 sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8
|
c67f39b40e | ||
|
sysadmin
|
4463a300ba | ||
|
sysadmin
|
75794609d1 | ||
 jcwalker3
|
da3294fbe5 | ||
|
sysadmin
|
c1ecadce8e |
@@ -1913,88 +1913,6 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
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),
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)
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def retire_lease_worktree_path(
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self,
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lease_id: str,
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*,
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expected_path: str | None = None,
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reason: str = "missing_worktree_path_retired",
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) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""Retire a missing worktree_path binding from a control-plane lease (#970).
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Clears worktree_path on the lease row, updates provenance_json with
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durable retirement audit proof, and writes a worktree_binding_retired event.
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Fail closed: if expected_path is provided and does not match current
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worktree_path, the update is refused to prevent racing mutations.
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"""
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now_s = _ts()
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with self._tx() as conn:
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cols = self._lease_columns(conn)
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row = conn.execute(
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"SELECT * FROM leases WHERE lease_id = ?",
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(lease_id,),
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).fetchone()
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if not row:
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raise ControlPlaneError(f"unknown lease_id {lease_id}")
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current_wt = (dict(row).get("worktree_path") or "").strip()
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if expected_path and current_wt and os.path.realpath(current_wt) != os.path.realpath(expected_path):
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raise ControlPlaneError(
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f"cannot retire lease {lease_id} worktree_path: expected '{expected_path}' "
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f"does not match current '{current_wt}' (fail closed)"
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)
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# Parse and update provenance_json
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raw_prov = dict(row).get("provenance_json") or "{}"
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try:
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prov = json.loads(raw_prov) if isinstance(raw_prov, str) else dict(raw_prov)
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except Exception:
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prov = {}
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if not isinstance(prov, dict):
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prov = {}
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prior_path = current_wt or prov.get("worktree_path")
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prov.update({
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"worktree_path_retired": True,
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"retired_worktree_path": prior_path,
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"retired_at": now_s,
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"retirement_reason": reason,
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"worktree_path": "",
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})
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prov_json = json.dumps(prov)
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if "worktree_path" in cols:
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conn.execute(
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"UPDATE leases SET worktree_path = '', provenance_json = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
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(prov_json, lease_id),
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)
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else:
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conn.execute(
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"UPDATE leases SET provenance_json = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
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(prov_json, lease_id),
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)
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conn.execute(
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"""
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INSERT INTO events(work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)
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VALUES (?, 'worktree_binding_retired', ?, ?)
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""",
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(
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row["work_item_id"],
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f"lease {lease_id} worktree_path '{prior_path}' retired: {reason}",
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now_s,
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),
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)
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return {
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"lease_id": lease_id,
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"retired": True,
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"prior_worktree_path": prior_path,
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"retired_at": now_s,
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"reason": reason,
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}
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def abandon_lease(
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self,
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*,
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@@ -3133,32 +3051,3 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
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"live_lease_id": None if live_lease_id is None else str(live_lease_id),
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"reconcile_action": "reconcile_required" if stale else "safe_to_resume",
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}
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def retire_session_checkpoint_worktree_path(
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self,
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session_id: str,
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*,
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checkpoint_id: str | None = None,
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expected_path: str | None = None,
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reason: str = "missing_worktree_path_retired",
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) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""Retire a missing worktree_path from session_checkpoints (#970)."""
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now_s = _ts()
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with self._tx() as conn:
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if checkpoint_id:
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conn.execute(
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"UPDATE session_checkpoints SET worktree_path = '', updated_at = ? WHERE checkpoint_id = ?",
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(now_s, checkpoint_id),
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)
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elif session_id:
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conn.execute(
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"UPDATE session_checkpoints SET worktree_path = '', updated_at = ? WHERE session_id = ?",
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(now_s, session_id),
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)
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return {
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"session_id": session_id,
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"checkpoint_id": checkpoint_id,
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"retired": True,
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"retired_at": now_s,
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"reason": reason,
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}
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@@ -86,74 +86,3 @@ When a namespace returns EOF, follow
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When blocked, repair the IDE namespace and re-record a healthy
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`client_namespace` assessment before retrying the mutation.
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## Connected vs Attached Tool Surface (#708)
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MCP servers can report **Connected** at the CLI / host inventory layer while the **active LLM session exposes none of their tool namespaces**.
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### Core principle
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* **Connected status at host layer ≠ attached tools in active session.**
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* Required preflight proof is **live tool visibility + `gitea_whoami` call** through the target namespace, not host `Connected` status alone.
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* When servers report Connected but namespaces are absent from attached tools, classify as `mcp_connected_namespaces_missing`.
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### Forbidden unsafe fallbacks
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When `mcp_connected_namespaces_missing` is detected, workflows must **fail closed** and must **never** encourage or perform:
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* direct imports of MCP server Python modules
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* CLI or raw Gitea API mutations as a substitute for native tools
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* profile hopping to another MCP profile/namespace to bypass the empty session
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* session-state overrides or hand-edited session/ledger files
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* process kills (`pkill`), config mtime touches, or `.env` edits
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Only sanctioned recovery: **client reconnect path**, followed by full preflight (`whoami` → capability resolve → task).
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### Native detection tool
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`gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_attachment` classifies the condition and records it in
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the session. Pass the namespaces the host reports Connected and the namespaces
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actually attached to the active session tool surface:
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| Argument | Meaning |
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|---|---|
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| `connected_servers` | Namespaces the host/CLI reports Connected |
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| `attached_session_namespaces` | Namespaces exposed in the active session tool surface |
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| `required_namespaces` | Namespaces this workflow needs (defaults to the role namespaces) |
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| `discovery_cache_hit` / `discovery_cache_age_seconds` | Client tool-discovery cache state |
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| `auto_attach_attempted` / `auto_attach_succeeded` | Whether the runtime auto-attached |
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| `session_tool_snapshot_at` / `namespace_connected_at` | Epoch seconds, to detect startup ordering races |
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It returns `discovery_status`
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(`namespaces_attached` | `connected_but_namespaces_missing` | `disconnected`),
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`missing_namespaces`, `proof_of_connected_vs_attached` (per namespace
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`{connected, attached}`), `error_type`, `reconnect_required`, `auto_recovered`,
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`startup_ordering_race`, `late_attaching_namespaces`, `sanctioned_recovery_tool`,
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and a reconnect-only `exact_next_action`.
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### Startup ordering
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`session_tool_snapshot_at` earlier than a namespace's `namespace_connected_at`
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means that namespace could not have been in the session snapshot, however healthy
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it looks now. That is reported as `startup_ordering_race` with the affected
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namespaces listed — the multi-role parallel-connect case where Connected flips
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true after the session tool list was already captured.
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### Fail-closed gate
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The recorded verdict gates mutations, mirroring the #543 health gate: a namespace
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that has not been assessed does not gate, but one recorded Connected-but-unattached
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blocks the mutation whose role namespace it is
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(`review_pr` / `submit_review` → `gitea-reviewer`, `merge_pr` → `gitea-merger`,
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`work_issue` / `create_pr` → `gitea-author`). `gitea_submit_pr_review` and
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`gitea_merge_pr` return the block reason plus the hard-stop policy string, and the
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only offered recovery is `gitea_request_mcp_reconnect`.
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### Telemetry
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The `telemetry` block carries `connected_count`, `attached_count`,
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`required_count`, `missing_count`, `discovery_status`, `discovery_cache_hit`,
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`discovery_cache_age_seconds`, `reconnect_required`, `auto_attach_attempted`,
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`auto_recovered`, `startup_ordering_race`, and `error_type`. It contains namespace
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names and counts only — never tokens, endpoints, env values, or filesystem paths.
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@@ -144,6 +144,19 @@ tool argument expresses caller intent and cannot be self-asserted by a worker
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session. `break_glass_requested` and `break_glass_authorized` are both reported,
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so a bypass is never silent.
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### Break-glass Restart Workflow (`gitea_break_glass_restart`, #664)
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The dedicated MCP tool `gitea_break_glass_restart` provides the privileged emergency break-glass restart workflow when graceful drain cannot complete:
|
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- **Authorization (#664 AC1 / B1 / B13 / B15)**: Requires the exact trusted profile `prgs-controller` **and** explicit `runtime.break_glass_restart` and `gitea.issue.create` grants enforced by the real production operation gate (no `gitea.read` fallback). Incident creation is mandatory prior to execution (`gitea.issue.create`), so the deployable production policy for `prgs-controller` includes `allowed_operations`: `["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.close", "gitea.pr.comment", "gitea.issue.comment", "gitea.issue.create", "runtime.break_glass_restart", "gitea.branch.delete", "gitea.decision_lock.irrecoverable_recovery"]`. Ordinary roles, non-controller reconcilers, lookalike profile names (`fake-controller`, …), and env vars cannot authorize. A narrow break-glass capability does **not** redefine the profile's declared global role. Updating a live running `prgs-controller` profile in production requires an operator configuration update and daemon reload post-merge.
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- **Required Parameters (#664 AC2)**:
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- `reason`: Mandatory non-empty string (min 10 characters).
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- `confirmation`: Must equal exactly `"I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION"`.
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- `impact_ack`: Must be `True`.
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- **Automatic Incident Creation (#664 AC3)**: Creates a Gitea incident issue (`[INCIDENT] [REQUESTED] Break-glass MCP restart invoked by ...`) detailing the reason, timestamp, disrupted sessions, and linking `#652 #653 #655 #630 #658 #662 #664`.
|
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- **Immutable Append-Only Audit Entry**: Records immutable pre-execution (REQUESTED) and post-execution (SUCCEEDED/FAILED) audit log entries with correlation identifiers.
|
||||
- **Mandatory Reconciliation (#664 AC4)**: Sets `reconciliation_required=True` requiring post-restart reconciliation via `gitea_reconcile_after_restart` (#662).
|
||||
|
||||
### Fail closed on apply
|
||||
|
||||
A missing, malformed, expired, unclean, tampered, or fingerprint-stale drain
|
||||
@@ -160,3 +173,4 @@ profiles are operational metadata only.
|
||||
|
||||
A representative dry-run report is in
|
||||
[`mcp-restart-impact-sample.json`](./mcp-restart-impact-sample.json).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ that gates each call, not which tools exist.
|
||||
- `gitea_assess_conflict_fix_push`
|
||||
- `gitea_assess_gitea_operation_path`
|
||||
- `gitea_assess_master_parity`
|
||||
- `gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_attachment`
|
||||
- `gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_health`
|
||||
- `gitea_assess_pr_sync_status`
|
||||
- `gitea_assess_review_merge_state_machine`
|
||||
@@ -65,7 +64,6 @@ that gates each call, not which tools exist.
|
||||
- `gitea_assess_work_issue_duplicate`
|
||||
- `gitea_assess_worktree_cleanup_integrity`
|
||||
- `gitea_audit_config`
|
||||
- `gitea_audit_missing_worktree_bindings`
|
||||
- `gitea_audit_runtime_recovery_contamination`
|
||||
- `gitea_audit_stable_branch_contamination`
|
||||
- `gitea_audit_worktree_cleanup`
|
||||
@@ -127,20 +125,16 @@ that gates each call, not which tools exist.
|
||||
- `gitea_post_heartbeat`
|
||||
- `gitea_publish_unpublished_issue_branch`
|
||||
- `gitea_quarantine_contaminated_review`
|
||||
- `gitea_rebind_dirty_same_claimant_author_session`
|
||||
- `gitea_reclaim_expired_workflow_lease`
|
||||
- `gitea_reconcile_after_restart`
|
||||
- `gitea_reconcile_already_landed_pr`
|
||||
- `gitea_reconcile_issue_claims`
|
||||
- `gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups`
|
||||
- `gitea_reconcile_missing_worktree_bindings`
|
||||
- `gitea_reconcile_superseded_by_merged_pr`
|
||||
- `gitea_record_daemon_process_kill_attempt`
|
||||
- `gitea_record_irrecoverable_decision_lock_provenance`
|
||||
- `gitea_record_pre_review_command`
|
||||
- `gitea_record_shell_spawn_outcome`
|
||||
- `gitea_record_stable_branch_push_attempt`
|
||||
- `gitea_recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree`
|
||||
- `gitea_recover_incomplete_bootstrap_lock`
|
||||
- `gitea_release_merger_pr_lease`
|
||||
- `gitea_release_reviewer_pr_lease`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,239 +8,73 @@
|
||||
"document. #930's inventory had no such guard and its gitea_mcp_server.py",
|
||||
"anchors drifted between 7bf4f125 and aad5c8b4."
|
||||
],
|
||||
"generated_against_commit": "1dd30ecb1508b559868c2d5d94367bc055d5138e",
|
||||
"generated_against_commit": "aad5c8b42361d380a8eeb07b94b90815e594c2c5",
|
||||
"anchors": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:25087",
|
||||
"expect": "mcp_daemon_guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "mcp_daemon_guard.py:49",
|
||||
"expect": "_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS = mcp_transport_config.SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "mcp_daemon_guard.py:195",
|
||||
"expect": "def bind_native_mcp_transport"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "irrecoverable_provenance.py:497",
|
||||
"expect": "def assess_transport_for_auth_mint"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:9192",
|
||||
"expect": "assess_transport_for_auth_mint()"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:9441",
|
||||
"expect": "assess_transport_for_auth_mint()"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "mcp_server.py:4",
|
||||
"expect": "The transport is selected by deployment configuration"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:15630",
|
||||
"expect": "def _is_client_managed_process"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:15644",
|
||||
"expect": "def _provenance_mutation_block"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:15652",
|
||||
"expect": "unsupported_manual_launch"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19217",
|
||||
"expect": "server_provenance"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:21741",
|
||||
"expect": "def _check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:21761",
|
||||
"expect": "\"ps\", \"-o\", \"pid,lstart,command\""
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:21805",
|
||||
"expect": "\"ps\", \"eww\""
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_config.py:1172",
|
||||
"expect": "RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_config.py:1233",
|
||||
"expect": "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_config.py:54",
|
||||
"expect": "ENV_PROFILE = \"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE\""
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_config.py:97",
|
||||
"expect": "_REVIEW_MERGE_OPS"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_config.py:499",
|
||||
"expect": "repository authorization scope"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_config.py:956",
|
||||
"expect": "def _keychain_token"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_config.py:974",
|
||||
"expect": "def resolve_token"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_config.py:1015",
|
||||
"expect": "def keychain_auth"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_config.py:294",
|
||||
"expect": "def _validate_identity_auth"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "mcp_daemon_guard.py:583",
|
||||
"expect": "def assert_keychain_access_allowed"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19487",
|
||||
"expect": "def gitea_list_profiles"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19538",
|
||||
"expect": "gitea_config.resolve_token(p)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19851",
|
||||
"expect": "def gitea_audit_config"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19873",
|
||||
"expect": "service_summaries(config)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_config.py:704",
|
||||
"expect": "def resolve_service"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_config.py:837",
|
||||
"expect": "def service_summaries"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_config.py:851",
|
||||
"expect": "_keychain_token(auth.get(\"id\"))"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17909",
|
||||
"expect": "\"jenkins-mcp\""
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17915",
|
||||
"expect": "external-mcp"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17936",
|
||||
"expect": "\"glitchtip-mcp\""
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17941",
|
||||
"expect": "external-mcp"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "mcp_discoverability.py:9",
|
||||
"expect": "EXPECTED_JENKINS_TOOLS"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "mcp_discoverability.py:17",
|
||||
"expect": "EXPECTED_GLITCHTIP_TOOLS"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "sentry_incident_bridge.py:36",
|
||||
"expect": "SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "sentry_incident_bridge.py:190",
|
||||
"expect": "def resolve_token"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "sentry_incident_bridge.py:289",
|
||||
"expect": "Authorization"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "sentry_observability.py:55",
|
||||
"expect": "SENTRY_DSN"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "master_parity_gate.py:168",
|
||||
"expect": "def capture_startup_parity"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "master_parity_gate.py:255",
|
||||
"expect": "mutation_safe"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19331",
|
||||
"expect": "def gitea_assess_master_parity"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:193",
|
||||
"expect": "ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:194",
|
||||
"expect": "AUTHOR_WORKTREE_ENV"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:2352",
|
||||
"expect": "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock.json"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:10957",
|
||||
"expect": "def gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "mcp_server.py:13",
|
||||
"expect": "/tmp/mcp_server_stderr.log"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "issue_lock_store.py:26",
|
||||
"expect": "DEFAULT_LOCK_DIR"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "issue_lock_store.py:83",
|
||||
"expect": "def session_pointer_path"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "issue_lock_store.py:98",
|
||||
"expect": "def is_process_alive"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "mcp_session_state.py:27",
|
||||
"expect": "DEFAULT_STATE_DIR"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "control_plane_db.py:47",
|
||||
"expect": "DEFAULT_DB_PATH"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "control_plane_db.py:380",
|
||||
"expect": "mode=0o700"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "control_plane_db.py:386",
|
||||
"expect": "sqlite3.connect"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "control_plane_db.py:1145",
|
||||
"expect": "os.getpid()"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:12871",
|
||||
"expect": "owner_pid_alive"
|
||||
}
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:24721", "expect": "bind_native_mcp_transport(transport=\"stdio\")"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "mcp_daemon_guard.py:45", "expect": "_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS = frozenset({\"stdio\"})"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "mcp_daemon_guard.py:174", "expect": "def bind_native_mcp_transport"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "irrecoverable_provenance.py:497", "expect": "def assess_transport_for_auth_mint"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:9129", "expect": "assess_transport_for_auth_mint()"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:9378", "expect": "assess_transport_for_auth_mint()"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "mcp_server.py:4", "expect": "Runs over stdio."},
|
||||
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:15412", "expect": "def _is_client_managed_process"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:15442", "expect": "def _provenance_mutation_block"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:15450", "expect": "unsupported_manual_launch"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19001", "expect": "server_provenance"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:21442", "expect": "def _check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:21462", "expect": "\"ps\", \"-o\", \"pid,lstart,command\""},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:21506", "expect": "\"ps\", \"eww\""},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_config.py:1172", "expect": "RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_config.py:1233", "expect": "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED"},
|
||||
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_config.py:54", "expect": "ENV_PROFILE = \"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE\""},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_config.py:97", "expect": "_REVIEW_MERGE_OPS"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_config.py:499", "expect": "repository authorization scope"},
|
||||
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_config.py:956", "expect": "def _keychain_token"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_config.py:974", "expect": "def resolve_token"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_config.py:1015", "expect": "def keychain_auth"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_config.py:294", "expect": "def _validate_identity_auth"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "mcp_daemon_guard.py:440", "expect": "def assert_keychain_access_allowed"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19258", "expect": "def gitea_list_profiles"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19309", "expect": "gitea_config.resolve_token(p)"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19552", "expect": "def gitea_audit_config"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19574", "expect": "service_summaries(config)"},
|
||||
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_config.py:704", "expect": "def resolve_service"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_config.py:837", "expect": "def service_summaries"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_config.py:851", "expect": "_keychain_token(auth.get(\"id\"))"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17707", "expect": "\"jenkins-mcp\""},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17713", "expect": "external-mcp"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17734", "expect": "\"glitchtip-mcp\""},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17739", "expect": "external-mcp"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "mcp_discoverability.py:9", "expect": "EXPECTED_JENKINS_TOOLS"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "mcp_discoverability.py:17", "expect": "EXPECTED_GLITCHTIP_TOOLS"},
|
||||
|
||||
{"anchor": "sentry_incident_bridge.py:36", "expect": "SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "sentry_incident_bridge.py:190", "expect": "def resolve_token"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "sentry_incident_bridge.py:289", "expect": "Authorization"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "sentry_observability.py:55", "expect": "SENTRY_DSN"},
|
||||
|
||||
{"anchor": "master_parity_gate.py:168", "expect": "def capture_startup_parity"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "master_parity_gate.py:255", "expect": "mutation_safe"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19102", "expect": "def gitea_assess_master_parity"},
|
||||
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:190", "expect": "ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:191", "expect": "AUTHOR_WORKTREE_ENV"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:2348", "expect": "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock.json"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:10894", "expect": "def gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "mcp_server.py:10", "expect": "/tmp/mcp_server_stderr.log"},
|
||||
|
||||
{"anchor": "issue_lock_store.py:26", "expect": "DEFAULT_LOCK_DIR"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "issue_lock_store.py:83", "expect": "def session_pointer_path"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "issue_lock_store.py:98", "expect": "def is_process_alive"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "mcp_session_state.py:27", "expect": "DEFAULT_STATE_DIR"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "control_plane_db.py:47", "expect": "DEFAULT_DB_PATH"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "control_plane_db.py:380", "expect": "mode=0o700"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "control_plane_db.py:386", "expect": "sqlite3.connect"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "control_plane_db.py:1145", "expect": "os.getpid()"},
|
||||
{"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:12801", "expect": "owner_pid_alive"}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,11 +5,7 @@ What the adversary is, what each boundary protects, and which services may share
|
||||
- **Issue:** #956 (Remote-MCP threat model), child of epic #929, cross-linked to #955.
|
||||
- **Depends on:** #930 (closed) — `docs/remote-mcp/coupling-inventory.md`.
|
||||
- **Blocks:** #932, #933, #934, #938.
|
||||
- **Generated against commit:** `1dd30ecb1508b559868c2d5d94367bc055d5138e` (#708's
|
||||
namespace-attachment gate). Originally generated against
|
||||
`aad5c8b42361d380a8eeb07b94b90815e594c2c5` (`master`), re-anchored at
|
||||
`a143cd065ba06e1a2bdc5143a19ec156e53650ef` when #931's transport bind seam shifted the
|
||||
cited lines, and re-anchored again when #708 shifted them further.
|
||||
- **Generated against commit:** `aad5c8b42361d380a8eeb07b94b90815e594c2c5` (`master`).
|
||||
- **Scope:** documentation only. This child changes no server behavior. It adds one
|
||||
document, one anchor fixture, and the test that enforces them.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +27,7 @@ document cites an anchor the fixture does not cover.
|
||||
|
||||
This guard exists because #930 did not have one. Its inventory was generated at
|
||||
`7bf4f125`; by `aad5c8b4` its `gitea_mcp_server.py` anchors had drifted — the transport
|
||||
bind it cited at line 23750 now lives at `gitea_mcp_server.py:25087`, and its
|
||||
bind it cited at line 23750 now lives at `gitea_mcp_server.py:24721`, and its
|
||||
client-managed provenance anchor at 14588 now lands in an unrelated function. Nothing
|
||||
failed, because nothing checked. Anchors into a ~24,700-line module rot silently, and a
|
||||
security document that cannot prove its own citations is worse than none, because it is
|
||||
@@ -75,19 +71,19 @@ authenticate the *caller*, not the *intent*.
|
||||
## 3. Trust boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
"Crossing requires today" is what the code actually enforces at
|
||||
`1dd30ecb1508b559868c2d5d94367bc055d5138e`, not what the design intends.
|
||||
`aad5c8b42361d380a8eeb07b94b90815e594c2c5`, not what the design intends.
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Boundary | Protects | Crossing requires today | Crossing must require remotely |
|
||||
| -- | -------- | -------- | ----------------------- | ------------------------------ |
|
||||
| B1 | LLM client ↔ MCP server session | A1, A3, A10 — that a mutating session was established through the sanctioned client path | A single configured bind (`gitea_mcp_server.py:25087`) validated against one closed allowlist (`mcp_daemon_guard.py:49`, `mcp_daemon_guard.py:195`) — since #931 the identifier comes from deployment configuration and defaults to the local transport, so the boundary no longer rests on a literal, but it still rests on the *bind* rather than on an authenticated caller; client-managed provenance (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15630`) or a refusal (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15652`); production transport before recovery-authorization mint (`irrecoverable_provenance.py:497`, consumed at `gitea_mcp_server.py:9192` and `gitea_mcp_server.py:9441`) | An authenticated handshake issuing a server-side session identity bound to a principal, with the transport recorded in provenance. The physical proof (a pipe) must become a cryptographic one. |
|
||||
| B1 | LLM client ↔ MCP server session | A1, A3, A10 — that a mutating session was established through the sanctioned client path | A literal `stdio` bind (`gitea_mcp_server.py:24721`) inside a closed allowlist (`mcp_daemon_guard.py:45`, `mcp_daemon_guard.py:174`); client-managed provenance (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15412`) or a refusal (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15450`); production transport before recovery-authorization mint (`irrecoverable_provenance.py:497`, consumed at `gitea_mcp_server.py:9129` and `gitea_mcp_server.py:9378`) | An authenticated handshake issuing a server-side session identity bound to a principal, with the transport recorded in provenance. The physical proof (a pipe) must become a cryptographic one. |
|
||||
| B2 | Role ↔ role | A9 — that author, reviewer, merger, and reconciler are distinct authorities | **The process boundary only.** The role is a property of the process, read once from `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` (`gitea_config.py:54`). A caller gets author permissions by connecting to the author process. Review and merge are the operations singled out for extra care (`gitea_config.py:97`) | A per-request principal, so the role follows from the credential presented and cannot be selected by reaching a different endpoint. |
|
||||
| B3 | MCP server ↔ credential store | A3, A8 — that only sanctioned code turns a profile into a token | `_keychain_token` shelling out to the login keychain (`gitea_config.py:956`), dispatched by `resolve_token` (`gitea_config.py:974`) with the reference type built at `gitea_config.py:1015`, gated by `assert_keychain_access_allowed` (`mcp_daemon_guard.py:583`). Inline secrets are rejected at config load (`gitea_config.py:294`) | A credential provider keyed by the *request* principal, returning only that principal's credential, with the source recorded and the value never returned. |
|
||||
| B3 | MCP server ↔ credential store | A3, A8 — that only sanctioned code turns a profile into a token | `_keychain_token` shelling out to the login keychain (`gitea_config.py:956`), dispatched by `resolve_token` (`gitea_config.py:974`) with the reference type built at `gitea_config.py:1015`, gated by `assert_keychain_access_allowed` (`mcp_daemon_guard.py:440`). Inline secrets are rejected at config load (`gitea_config.py:294`) | A credential provider keyed by the *request* principal, returning only that principal's credential, with the source recorded and the value never returned. |
|
||||
| B4 | MCP server ↔ Gitea | A1, A2 — that only authorized calls reach the forge | A bearer token over TLS. Server-side, nothing distinguishes one role's token from another beyond the account it belongs to | Unchanged at the forge; the endpoint in front of it must refuse unauthenticated and plaintext connections before tool dispatch. |
|
||||
| B5 | MCP server ↔ caller's filesystem | A7 — that a tool acts on the *caller's* disk or refuses | Nothing. The server's disk *is* the caller's disk. Worktree bootstrap writes directly (`gitea_mcp_server.py:10957`); the active workspace is process-global (`gitea_mcp_server.py:193`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:194`) | An explicit per-tool classification, enforced at dispatch, refusing filesystem tools over a transport that cannot reach the caller's disk. A green verdict about the wrong disk is the failure to prevent. |
|
||||
| B6 | MCP server ↔ coordination state | A6, A9 — mutual exclusion | Local files and a local SQLite database, with liveness judged from the local process table (`issue_lock_store.py:98`), keyed on paths under one user's home (`issue_lock_store.py:26`, `mcp_session_state.py:27`, `control_plane_db.py:47`) and on `os.getpid()` (`control_plane_db.py:1145`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:12871`). A legacy global slot still exists at `gitea_mcp_server.py:2352`, and the session-pointer file is named per PID (`issue_lock_store.py:83`) | One authority per ownership question, with liveness from session identity and expiry, and atomic acquire, renew, and release across hosts. |
|
||||
| B5 | MCP server ↔ caller's filesystem | A7 — that a tool acts on the *caller's* disk or refuses | Nothing. The server's disk *is* the caller's disk. Worktree bootstrap writes directly (`gitea_mcp_server.py:10894`); the active workspace is process-global (`gitea_mcp_server.py:190`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:191`) | An explicit per-tool classification, enforced at dispatch, refusing filesystem tools over a transport that cannot reach the caller's disk. A green verdict about the wrong disk is the failure to prevent. |
|
||||
| B6 | MCP server ↔ coordination state | A6, A9 — mutual exclusion | Local files and a local SQLite database, with liveness judged from the local process table (`issue_lock_store.py:98`), keyed on paths under one user's home (`issue_lock_store.py:26`, `mcp_session_state.py:27`, `control_plane_db.py:47`) and on `os.getpid()` (`control_plane_db.py:1145`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:12801`). A legacy global slot still exists at `gitea_mcp_server.py:2348`, and the session-pointer file is named per PID (`issue_lock_store.py:83`) | One authority per ownership question, with liveness from session identity and expiry, and atomic acquire, renew, and release across hosts. |
|
||||
| B7 | Gitea integration ↔ unrelated integrations | A4, A5 — that a Gitea compromise is not a CI and observability compromise | **Nothing.** See §5. The Gitea server reads Jenkins and GlitchTip secrets (`gitea_config.py:851`, reached from `gitea_config.py:837`) and holds the Sentry token (`sentry_incident_bridge.py:190`) | A hard process boundary. This is the boundary #956 exists to create. |
|
||||
| B8 | Tenant ↔ tenant (`prgs` / `mdcps` / `local-lab`) | A2 — that one organization's compromise is not another's | Convention. One configuration declares all three contexts; `resolve_service` fails closed on a *disabled* context (`gitea_config.py:704`) but the credentials of enabled ones remain reachable in-process. A per-profile repository scope exists (`gitea_config.py:499`) | Separate deployments, or at minimum per-tenant credential scopes with no process able to resolve both. |
|
||||
| B9 | Deployed code ↔ merged policy | A1, A10 — that the running server enforces the rules that were actually merged | Comparing this process's startup commit against this disk (`master_parity_gate.py:168`), conjoined into a single verdict (`master_parity_gate.py:255`) published by `gitea_mcp_server.py:19331` | Freshness defined against the deployed build identity, with an explicit fail-closed verdict when undeterminable. |
|
||||
| B9 | Deployed code ↔ merged policy | A1, A10 — that the running server enforces the rules that were actually merged | Comparing this process's startup commit against this disk (`master_parity_gate.py:168`), conjoined into a single verdict (`master_parity_gate.py:255`) published by `gitea_mcp_server.py:19102` | Freshness defined against the deployed build identity, with an explicit fail-closed verdict when undeterminable. |
|
||||
|
||||
### What no boundary constrains
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -132,10 +128,10 @@ Two flows deserve attention because neither is obvious from the code:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **The keychain flow fans out.** B3 is drawn once but resolves credentials for *every*
|
||||
configured profile and service, not only the active one. `gitea_list_profiles`
|
||||
(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19487`) reports each profile's credential status by calling
|
||||
`resolve_token` on it (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19538`), and `gitea_audit_config`
|
||||
(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19851`) reports service credential status through
|
||||
`service_summaries` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19873`).
|
||||
(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19258`) reports each profile's credential status by calling
|
||||
`resolve_token` on it (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19309`), and `gitea_audit_config`
|
||||
(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19552`) reports service credential status through
|
||||
`service_summaries` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19574`).
|
||||
2. **The return path is a flow too.** Content read from Gitea travels back into the model
|
||||
and is treated as instruction. This is the ADV2 edge, and it is the only edge in the
|
||||
diagram with no authentication on it, because it is not a request.
|
||||
@@ -160,7 +156,7 @@ an attacker holding a token calls the API, not our tools.
|
||||
| CR10 | MDCPS GlitchTip read credential | macOS keychain, read from the Gitea server process (`gitea_config.py:851`) | B7 | Read error events and their payloads (A5). Enabled today. |
|
||||
| CR11 | `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN` | Process environment, read in-process (`sentry_incident_bridge.py:36`, `sentry_incident_bridge.py:190`), sent as a bearer header (`sentry_incident_bridge.py:289`) | B7 | Read and reconcile Sentry issues (A5). Not a keychain credential — an env var, so it is inherited by anything the process spawns. |
|
||||
| CR12 | `SENTRY_DSN` | Process environment (`sentry_observability.py:55`) | B7 | Write events into the observability project. Low read value, real forgery value: an attacker can inject fabricated events into the record (A10). |
|
||||
| CR13 | macOS login keychain access | The operator's login session; gated by `assert_keychain_access_allowed` (`mcp_daemon_guard.py:583`) | B3, ADV5 | **Every other credential in this table except CR11 and CR12.** This is the aggregation point. |
|
||||
| CR13 | macOS login keychain access | The operator's login session; gated by `assert_keychain_access_allowed` (`mcp_daemon_guard.py:440`) | B3, ADV5 | **Every other credential in this table except CR11 and CR12.** This is the aggregation point. |
|
||||
| CR14 | Coordination-store access (no secret) | Filesystem permissions — `control_plane_db.py:47`, created `0o700` (`control_plane_db.py:380`), opened with a local file lock (`control_plane_db.py:386`) | B6, ADV5 | Full read/write of locks, leases, and decision records (A6). **There is no credential here at all** — anything running as the operator can rewrite ownership. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Findings
|
||||
@@ -180,16 +176,16 @@ the credential, and an attacker holding the token does not call our tools.
|
||||
|
||||
**Finding 3 — Any one role process can resolve every other role's credential.** This is not
|
||||
inferred; it is demonstrated by tool output. `gitea_list_profiles`
|
||||
(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19487`) called from the **author** session reports
|
||||
(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19258`) called from the **author** session reports
|
||||
`identity_status: "credentials present"` for `prgs-merger`, `prgs-reviewer`,
|
||||
`prgs-reconciler`, and every `mdcps` profile, because it calls `resolve_token` on each one
|
||||
(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19538`). The author process does not merely *have access to* the
|
||||
(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19309`). The author process does not merely *have access to* the
|
||||
merger's credential — it reads it to answer a status query. B2 is not a credential boundary
|
||||
in either direction.
|
||||
|
||||
**Finding 4 — The Gitea server reads CI and observability secrets.** `gitea_audit_config`
|
||||
(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19851`) reports `MDCPS Jenkins: enabled, read-only, authenticated`.
|
||||
That word `authenticated` is produced by `service_summaries` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19873`,
|
||||
(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19552`) reports `MDCPS Jenkins: enabled, read-only, authenticated`.
|
||||
That word `authenticated` is produced by `service_summaries` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19574`,
|
||||
defined at `gitea_config.py:837`), whose default check calls `_keychain_token` on the
|
||||
service's own keychain reference (`gitea_config.py:851`). Producing that one line requires
|
||||
the Gitea MCP server to read the Jenkins secret and the GlitchTip secret out of the
|
||||
@@ -197,8 +193,8 @@ keychain. B7 does not exist.
|
||||
|
||||
**Finding 5 — Jenkins and GlitchTip are already decomposed; the reach is residual.** Their
|
||||
tools live in separately registered servers, marked `external-mcp`
|
||||
(`gitea_mcp_server.py:17909`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:17915`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:17936`,
|
||||
`gitea_mcp_server.py:17941`) with their own expected tool sets (`mcp_discoverability.py:9`,
|
||||
(`gitea_mcp_server.py:17707`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:17713`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:17734`,
|
||||
`gitea_mcp_server.py:17739`) with their own expected tool sets (`mcp_discoverability.py:9`,
|
||||
`mcp_discoverability.py:17`). The correct decomposition was already chosen. What remains is
|
||||
a leak across it: the credential *references* still live in the Gitea configuration and are
|
||||
still resolved by the Gitea process. #75 bundled these services into one control-plane
|
||||
@@ -209,8 +205,8 @@ GlitchTip, the Sentry bridge runs *inside* the Gitea server, resolving its token
|
||||
process environment (`sentry_incident_bridge.py:190`) and sending it as a bearer header
|
||||
(`sentry_incident_bridge.py:289`). Being an environment variable rather than a keychain item
|
||||
makes it strictly worse: it needs no keychain prompt and is inherited by every subprocess the
|
||||
server spawns — including the `ps` invocations at `gitea_mcp_server.py:21761` and
|
||||
`gitea_mcp_server.py:21805`, reached from `gitea_mcp_server.py:21741`.
|
||||
server spawns — including the `ps` invocations at `gitea_mcp_server.py:21462` and
|
||||
`gitea_mcp_server.py:21506`, reached from `gitea_mcp_server.py:21442`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Finding 7 — The highest-value coordination asset has the weakest gate.** A6 is protected
|
||||
by filesystem permissions alone (CR14). Corrupting a lease requires no Gitea credential,
|
||||
@@ -219,15 +215,13 @@ assumes. Every other asset costs an attacker a credential; this one costs nothin
|
||||
local access, which is exactly ADV5's position.
|
||||
|
||||
**Finding 8 — Provenance authenticates the launch, not the caller.** `server_provenance` is
|
||||
reported as exactly `client_managed` or `manual_launch` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19217`),
|
||||
derived from environment inspection (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15630`) with the recognized-key
|
||||
reported as exactly `client_managed` or `manual_launch` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19001`),
|
||||
derived from environment inspection (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15412`) with the recognized-key
|
||||
allowlist at `gitea_config.py:1172` and the generator that emits the marker at
|
||||
`gitea_config.py:1233`. Every one of those facts is fixed at process start. A client that is
|
||||
trustworthy at launch and compromised a minute later remains `client_managed` for the life
|
||||
of the process, and the transport contract that underwrites it is stated as a property of
|
||||
the server itself (`mcp_server.py:4`). Since #931 that contract names the configured
|
||||
transport rather than asserting stdio, but it is still fixed once, at bind, for the life of
|
||||
the process.
|
||||
of the process, and the stdio contract that underwrites it is stated as a property of the
|
||||
server itself (`mcp_server.py:4`).
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Decomposition ruling
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -259,7 +253,7 @@ holds the token and calls the API instead of the tool.
|
||||
|
||||
**D3 — Credential resolution is scoped to the request principal.** A session must resolve its
|
||||
own credential and must have no path to any other principal's. The resolve-every-profile
|
||||
behavior behind `gitea_mcp_server.py:19538` and `gitea_mcp_server.py:19873` must report
|
||||
behavior behind `gitea_mcp_server.py:19309` and `gitea_mcp_server.py:19574` must report
|
||||
configured-or-not from configuration alone, without resolving the secret.
|
||||
|
||||
*Rationale.* Finding 3. An audit surface that proves a credential exists by fetching it is a
|
||||
@@ -336,11 +330,11 @@ The client is attached to the local fleet over stdio.
|
||||
|
||||
| Boundary | What ADV1 reaches | Stopped by |
|
||||
| -------- | ----------------- | ---------- |
|
||||
| B1 | Everything the fleet serves. The client *is* the sanctioned launcher: it satisfies the client-managed check (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15630`) by construction, and provenance is never re-verified after launch (Finding 8). | Nothing. The guard authenticates the launch, not the caller. |
|
||||
| B1 | Everything the fleet serves. The client *is* the sanctioned launcher: it satisfies the client-managed check (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15412`) by construction, and provenance is never re-verified after launch (Finding 8). | Nothing. The guard authenticates the launch, not the caller. |
|
||||
| B2 | All five roles — it is attached to all five namespaces. It can author a PR, approve it from the reviewer namespace, and merge it from the merger namespace. | Only the in-process self-review check, which compares `jcwalker3` (author) against `sysadmin` (reviewer) and **passes**, because Finding 1 made them different accounts while leaving reviewer and merger identical. A9 falls in one sequence of legitimate calls. |
|
||||
| B3 | Every credential in CR1–CR10 via CR13, with no additional prompt — the daemon is already sanctioned, so `assert_keychain_access_allowed` (`mcp_daemon_guard.py:583`) returns immediately. | Nothing. |
|
||||
| B3 | Every credential in CR1–CR10 via CR13, with no additional prompt — the daemon is already sanctioned, so `assert_keychain_access_allowed` (`mcp_daemon_guard.py:440`) returns immediately. | Nothing. |
|
||||
| B4 | A1 and A2 in full. | Branch protection at the forge, to the extent configured. |
|
||||
| B5 | The operator's checkout and every worktree, through the author tools (`gitea_mcp_server.py:10957`), plus the shared stderr path at `mcp_server.py:13`. | Nothing; the server's disk is the target disk. |
|
||||
| B5 | The operator's checkout and every worktree, through the author tools (`gitea_mcp_server.py:10894`), plus the shared stderr path at `mcp_server.py:10`. | Nothing; the server's disk is the target disk. |
|
||||
| B6 | All coordination state — no credential required (CR14). It can forge lease ownership and clear decision locks. | Filesystem permissions, which it already satisfies. |
|
||||
| B7 | Jenkins (A4) and GlitchTip (A5) secrets via Finding 4, and CR11/CR12 from its own environment. | Nothing. |
|
||||
| B8 | Both tenants. | Nothing in-process; only the disabled-context check (`gitea_config.py:704`), which does not apply to enabled contexts. |
|
||||
|
||||
+99
-10
@@ -27,13 +27,73 @@ ALLOWED = "allowed"
|
||||
BLOCKED = "blocked"
|
||||
FAILED = "failed"
|
||||
SUCCEEDED = "succeeded"
|
||||
REQUESTED = "requested"
|
||||
ACCEPTED = "accepted"
|
||||
PENDING = "pending"
|
||||
|
||||
REDACTED = "[REDACTED]"
|
||||
|
||||
# A dict key containing any of these (case-insensitive) has its value redacted.
|
||||
_SECRET_KEY_HINTS = ("token", "password", "secret", "authorization", "auth")
|
||||
_SECRET_KEY_HINTS = (
|
||||
"token",
|
||||
"password",
|
||||
"passwd",
|
||||
"pwd",
|
||||
"secret",
|
||||
"authorization",
|
||||
"auth",
|
||||
"api_key",
|
||||
"apikey",
|
||||
"access_key",
|
||||
"private_key",
|
||||
"client_secret",
|
||||
"credential",
|
||||
)
|
||||
# A string value starting with one of these has the following run redacted.
|
||||
_SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES = ("token ", "Basic ", "Bearer ")
|
||||
# Space-terminated scheme prefixes only. Colon forms (``token:`` / ``api_key:``)
|
||||
# and ``Authorization: Bearer …`` are handled by ``_ASSIGNMENT_SECRET_PATTERN``
|
||||
# so policy/docs text that merely *names* a scheme is not itself flagged as a
|
||||
# live secret by console detectors.
|
||||
_SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES = (
|
||||
"token ",
|
||||
"Basic ",
|
||||
"Bearer ",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Bare token-shaped values only — never a broad ``sec-`` prefix that erases
|
||||
# ordinary words (#664 B8 over-redaction).
|
||||
_BARE_SECRET_PATTERN = re.compile(
|
||||
r'(?i)\b(?:'
|
||||
r'ghp_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16,}'
|
||||
r'|gho_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16,}'
|
||||
r'|ghu_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16,}'
|
||||
r'|ghs_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16,}'
|
||||
r'|ghr_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16,}'
|
||||
r'|sk-live-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}'
|
||||
r'|sk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}'
|
||||
r'|sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}'
|
||||
r'|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}'
|
||||
r')\b'
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Key/value credentials embedded in free text (password=..., api_key: ..., GITEA_TOKEN=..., etc.).
|
||||
# Group 1 captures the key name (e.g. GITEA_TOKEN, password, api_key).
|
||||
# Group 2 captures delimiter/whitespace (=, : ).
|
||||
# Group 3 captures the secret value, stopping at whitespace or non-secret delimiters (&, ;, ,, quotes, closing brackets).
|
||||
_ASSIGNMENT_SECRET_PATTERN = re.compile(
|
||||
r'(?i)\b([A-Za-z0-9_]*?(?:token|password|passwd|pwd|secret|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|'
|
||||
r'client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key|authorization|credential))\b(\s*[:=]\s*)('
|
||||
r'"[^"]*"|\'[^\']*\'|'
|
||||
r'(?:Bearer|Basic|Token)\s+[^\s;&,"\'\)\}\]\>]+|'
|
||||
r'[^\s;&,"\'\)\}\]\>]+'
|
||||
r')'
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Connection-string style credentials: Password=...; User ID=...; etc.
|
||||
_CONN_STRING_SECRET_PATTERN = re.compile(
|
||||
r'(?i)\b((?:password|pwd|user\s*id|uid|username|account)\s*=\s*)([^\s;\'"]+)'
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Known synthetic test-only domains/hostnames to preserve
|
||||
_SYNTHETIC_HOSTS = {
|
||||
@@ -59,7 +119,8 @@ def redact_urls(text: str) -> str:
|
||||
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
|
||||
return text
|
||||
|
||||
url_pattern = re.compile(r'(https?://[^\s)>\]}]+)', re.IGNORECASE)
|
||||
# Match any URI scheme (http, https, postgres, mysql, mongodb, redis, etc.)
|
||||
url_pattern = re.compile(r'([a-z0-9\+\.\-]+://[^\s)>\]}]+)', re.IGNORECASE)
|
||||
|
||||
def replace_url(match):
|
||||
url_str = match.group(1)
|
||||
@@ -73,11 +134,11 @@ def redact_urls(text: str) -> str:
|
||||
is_synthetic = True
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
if is_synthetic:
|
||||
# Rebuild synthetic URL to redact any credentials or query secrets
|
||||
if is_synthetic or (parsed.username or parsed.password) or parsed.scheme.lower() not in ("http", "https"):
|
||||
# Rebuild URL to redact any credentials or query secrets
|
||||
new_netloc = parsed.netloc
|
||||
if parsed.username or parsed.password:
|
||||
netloc_clean = parsed.hostname
|
||||
netloc_clean = parsed.hostname or ""
|
||||
if parsed.port:
|
||||
netloc_clean = f"{netloc_clean}:{parsed.port}"
|
||||
new_netloc = f"[REDACTED_USER]:[REDACTED_PASS]@{netloc_clean}"
|
||||
@@ -114,23 +175,51 @@ def redact_urls(text: str) -> str:
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _mask_assignment(match: re.Match) -> str:
|
||||
"""Keep the key and separator; replace only the secret value."""
|
||||
val = match.group(3)
|
||||
if val.startswith(REDACTED) or val.startswith("%5BREDACTED") or val.startswith("[REDACTED"):
|
||||
return f"{match.group(1)}{match.group(2)}{val}"
|
||||
return f"{match.group(1)}{match.group(2)}{REDACTED}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _mask_conn_secret(match: re.Match) -> str:
|
||||
"""Keep the connection-string key; replace only the credential value."""
|
||||
val = match.group(2)
|
||||
if val.startswith(REDACTED) or val.startswith("%5BREDACTED") or val.startswith("[REDACTED"):
|
||||
return f"{match.group(1)}{val}"
|
||||
return f"{match.group(1)}{REDACTED}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _redact_str(text):
|
||||
"""Redact anything that looks like an Authorization credential or raw URL in *text*."""
|
||||
"""Redact credentials, bare token shapes, and raw URLs in *text* (#664 B8).
|
||||
|
||||
Covers key/value credentials, authorization/bearer material, bare
|
||||
token-shaped values, connection-string credentials, and secrets embedded
|
||||
in larger sentences. Deliberately does **not** erase ordinary words that
|
||||
merely begin with a broad ``sec-`` prefix.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
|
||||
return text
|
||||
out = text
|
||||
out = redact_urls(text)
|
||||
out = _BARE_SECRET_PATTERN.sub(REDACTED, out)
|
||||
out = _ASSIGNMENT_SECRET_PATTERN.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
|
||||
out = _CONN_STRING_SECRET_PATTERN.sub(_mask_conn_secret, out)
|
||||
out_lower = out.lower()
|
||||
for prefix in _SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES:
|
||||
prefix_lower = prefix.lower()
|
||||
idx = 0
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
i = out.find(prefix, idx)
|
||||
i = out_lower.find(prefix_lower, idx)
|
||||
if i == -1:
|
||||
break
|
||||
j = i + len(prefix)
|
||||
while j < len(out) and not out[j].isspace():
|
||||
j += 1
|
||||
out = out[:i] + prefix + REDACTED + out[j:]
|
||||
out_lower = out.lower()
|
||||
idx = i + len(prefix) + len(REDACTED)
|
||||
return redact_urls(out)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def redact(value):
|
||||
|
||||
+32
-3
@@ -97,6 +97,26 @@ GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES = {
|
||||
_REVIEW_MERGE_OPS = frozenset({"gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge"})
|
||||
_AUTHOR_ONLY_OPS = frozenset({"gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"})
|
||||
|
||||
# First-class operation services that may appear in multi-service profile
|
||||
# allowlists. ``runtime.*`` is the control-plane capability namespace used by
|
||||
# non-Gitea MCP tools such as ``runtime.break_glass_restart`` (#664 B13).
|
||||
# Unknown foreign prefixes (e.g. ``jenkins.*`` under service=gitea) still fail
|
||||
# closed — they are not registered here.
|
||||
KNOWN_OPERATION_SERVICES = frozenset({"gitea", "runtime"})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def service_for_operation(op, default="gitea"):
|
||||
"""Return the registered service prefix for a fully-qualified *op*.
|
||||
|
||||
Unqualified names and unknown prefixes fall back to *default* so callers
|
||||
keep the historical Gitea-centric gate behaviour.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if isinstance(op, str) and "." in op:
|
||||
prefix = op.split(".", 1)[0]
|
||||
if prefix in KNOWN_OPERATION_SERVICES:
|
||||
return prefix
|
||||
return default
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def normalize_operation(op, service="gitea"):
|
||||
"""Return the canonical namespaced name for *op*, or fail closed (#106).
|
||||
@@ -133,6 +153,12 @@ def check_operation(op, allowed, forbidden=(), service="gitea"):
|
||||
Reasons: ``allowed``, ``invalid-operation``, ``invalid-forbidden-entry``,
|
||||
``forbidden``, ``no-allowed-operations``, ``not-allowed``.
|
||||
|
||||
Multi-service profile allowlists (#664 B13): each allow/forbid entry is
|
||||
normalized with its own registered service prefix (``gitea.*`` or
|
||||
``runtime.*``) so a gate defaulting to service=gitea can still enforce an
|
||||
exact ``runtime.break_glass_restart`` grant. Unknown / misspelled
|
||||
operations and foreign service prefixes remain fail-closed.
|
||||
|
||||
Fail-closed rules:
|
||||
- an *op* that cannot be normalized is denied (``invalid-operation``)
|
||||
- a forbidden entry that cannot be normalized denies the request
|
||||
@@ -143,14 +169,16 @@ def check_operation(op, allowed, forbidden=(), service="gitea"):
|
||||
- ``forbidden`` always overrides ``allowed``
|
||||
- an empty or missing allowed list denies everything
|
||||
"""
|
||||
op_service = service_for_operation(op, default=service)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
op_n = normalize_operation(op, service)
|
||||
op_n = normalize_operation(op, op_service)
|
||||
except ConfigError:
|
||||
return (False, "invalid-operation")
|
||||
forbidden_n = set()
|
||||
for entry in (forbidden or ()):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
forbidden_n.add(normalize_operation(entry, service))
|
||||
entry_service = service_for_operation(entry, default=service)
|
||||
forbidden_n.add(normalize_operation(entry, entry_service))
|
||||
except ConfigError:
|
||||
return (False, "invalid-forbidden-entry")
|
||||
if op_n in forbidden_n:
|
||||
@@ -160,7 +188,8 @@ def check_operation(op, allowed, forbidden=(), service="gitea"):
|
||||
allowed_n = set()
|
||||
for entry in allowed:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
allowed_n.add(normalize_operation(entry, service))
|
||||
entry_service = service_for_operation(entry, default=service)
|
||||
allowed_n.add(normalize_operation(entry, entry_service))
|
||||
except ConfigError:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if op_n in allowed_n:
|
||||
|
||||
+727
-549
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -500,11 +500,6 @@ def assess_transport_for_auth_mint() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
native = mcp_daemon_guard.is_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
pytest = mcp_daemon_guard.is_pytest_runtime()
|
||||
production = mcp_daemon_guard.is_production_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
# #931: report which transport underwrites the verdict, read through the
|
||||
# one shared accessor rather than assumed to be stdio. The gate's decision
|
||||
# is unchanged here; naming the transport is what lets #932 re-derive the
|
||||
# guarantee from an authenticated session instead of from the bind.
|
||||
bound = mcp_daemon_guard.bound_transport()
|
||||
if not native and not pytest:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"irrecoverable provenance authorization requires production native "
|
||||
@@ -515,7 +510,6 @@ def assess_transport_for_auth_mint() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"allowed": not reasons,
|
||||
"native_mcp_transport": native,
|
||||
"production_native_mcp_transport": production,
|
||||
"bound_transport": bound,
|
||||
"pytest": pytest,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+9
-21
@@ -92,15 +92,7 @@ OPERATOR_UI_STEPS: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#: What an *unidentified* client gets. #948: this is deliberately the
|
||||
#: host-agnostic step set rather than a specific product. Defaulting to one
|
||||
#: vendor emitted Codex UI steps to a Gemini/Antigravity operator, who then had
|
||||
#: no reachable recovery path — the guidance named a panel they do not have.
|
||||
DEFAULT_CLIENT = "generic"
|
||||
|
||||
#: The historical default, kept addressable by name so Codex callers still get
|
||||
#: Codex steps, without it silently becoming the fallback for unknown clients.
|
||||
LEGACY_DEFAULT_CLIENT = "codex"
|
||||
DEFAULT_CLIENT = "codex"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def normalize_reason(reason: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
@@ -136,18 +128,14 @@ def normalize_reason(reason: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def normalize_client(client: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Return the UI-step key for a client.
|
||||
|
||||
#948: alias resolution is shared with ``mcp_worker_identity`` so a client
|
||||
name means the same thing wherever it is read. A name we recognise but have
|
||||
no bespoke steps for — Gemini, Antigravity, Grok — resolves to the generic
|
||||
host-agnostic steps rather than to another vendor's panel.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import mcp_worker_identity
|
||||
|
||||
canonical = mcp_worker_identity.normalize_client_name(client)
|
||||
if canonical in OPERATOR_UI_STEPS:
|
||||
return canonical
|
||||
"""Return a known client key for operator UI steps."""
|
||||
text = (client or "").strip().lower().replace(" ", "_").replace("-", "_")
|
||||
if text in ("codex", "openai_codex", "openai"):
|
||||
return "codex"
|
||||
if text in ("claude", "claude_code", "claude_desktop", "anthropic"):
|
||||
return "claude_code"
|
||||
if text in OPERATOR_UI_STEPS:
|
||||
return text
|
||||
return DEFAULT_CLIENT
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+13
-176
@@ -32,8 +32,6 @@ import time
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_transport_config
|
||||
|
||||
SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_SANCTIONED_DAEMON"
|
||||
ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV = "GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT"
|
||||
ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI_ENV = "GITEA_ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI"
|
||||
@@ -44,9 +42,7 @@ FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV = "GITEA_TEST_FORCE_UNSANCTIONED"
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME: dict[str, Any] | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
# Production transport identifiers accepted by bind_native_mcp_transport.
|
||||
# #931: the permitted set is defined once, in mcp_transport_config. This name
|
||||
# is kept as an alias so the guard never restates a transport identifier.
|
||||
_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS = mcp_transport_config.SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS
|
||||
_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS = frozenset({"stdio"})
|
||||
_RUNTIME_MODE_PRODUCTION = "production"
|
||||
_RUNTIME_MODE_TEST = "test"
|
||||
_PHASE_ENTRYPOINT_CLAIMED = "entrypoint_claimed"
|
||||
@@ -62,23 +58,6 @@ class UnsanctionedRuntimeError(RuntimeError):
|
||||
"""Raised when mutation/credential code runs outside a native MCP daemon."""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TransportExecutionError(UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
"""Raised when a bound transport may not be served by this entrypoint (#931).
|
||||
|
||||
Subclasses :class:`UnsanctionedRuntimeError` so every existing fail-closed
|
||||
handler still catches it, while letting a caller that cares distinguish
|
||||
"nothing is bound" from "something valid is bound but its listener has not
|
||||
been commissioned". Carries the structured verdict on ``.assessment``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message: str, assessment: dict[str, Any] | None = None):
|
||||
super().__init__(message)
|
||||
self.assessment = assessment or {}
|
||||
self.blocker_kind = self.assessment.get("blocker_kind")
|
||||
self.owner_issue = self.assessment.get("owner_issue")
|
||||
self.transport = self.assessment.get("transport")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_pytest_runtime() -> bool:
|
||||
if (os.environ.get(FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV) or "").strip() in {
|
||||
"1",
|
||||
@@ -192,46 +171,23 @@ def mark_sanctioned_daemon() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return native_runtime_status()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bind_native_mcp_transport(*, transport: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Bind the live native MCP transport lifecycle (#695 / #931).
|
||||
def bind_native_mcp_transport(*, transport: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Bind the live native MCP transport lifecycle (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
Must be called from the resolved canonical entrypoint immediately before
|
||||
the real MCP server transport loop (``mcp.run``). Requires a prior
|
||||
successful :func:`mark_sanctioned_daemon` claim in this process.
|
||||
Import-only or offline launch without this bind leaves
|
||||
the real MCP server transport loop (e.g. ``mcp.run(transport=\"stdio\")``).
|
||||
Requires a prior successful :func:`mark_sanctioned_daemon` claim in this
|
||||
process. Import-only or offline launch without this bind leaves
|
||||
:func:`is_native_mcp_transport` false.
|
||||
|
||||
#931: ``transport`` is now optional. Omitting it — which is what the
|
||||
production entrypoint does — resolves the identifier from deployment
|
||||
configuration via :func:`mcp_transport_config.resolve_configured_transport`,
|
||||
yielding :data:`mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT` when nothing is
|
||||
configured. An explicit argument remains supported for tests and for a
|
||||
launcher that has already resolved the value. Either way the identifier is
|
||||
validated against the single permitted set before the runtime record is
|
||||
written, so no tool can dispatch over an unregistered transport.
|
||||
|
||||
The resolved value is pinned into the process-local record and is read back
|
||||
only through :func:`bound_transport`. Rebinding to a different transport is
|
||||
refused, so two guards can never observe different values in one process.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
global _NATIVE_RUNTIME
|
||||
if transport is None:
|
||||
resolution = mcp_transport_config.resolve_configured_transport()
|
||||
transport_name = str(resolution["transport"])
|
||||
if not resolution["supported"]:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: "
|
||||
+ "; ".join(resolution["reasons"])
|
||||
+ " No tool is served over an unregistered transport."
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
transport_name = mcp_transport_config.normalize_transport(transport)
|
||||
if transport_name not in _PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
f"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: transport {transport!r} is "
|
||||
f"not a production MCP transport (#695). Allowed: "
|
||||
f"{sorted(_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS)}."
|
||||
)
|
||||
transport_name = (transport or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if transport_name not in _PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
f"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: transport {transport!r} is "
|
||||
f"not a production MCP transport (#695). Allowed: "
|
||||
f"{sorted(_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS)}."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
entrypoint_path = _caller_official_entrypoint_path()
|
||||
if entrypoint_path is None:
|
||||
@@ -260,23 +216,6 @@ def bind_native_mcp_transport(*, transport: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]
|
||||
"between mark and bind (#695)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# #931: one process binds one transport. Re-binding the same identifier is
|
||||
# idempotent (a retried launch step must not fail); re-binding a different
|
||||
# one is refused, because a guard that already read the first value would
|
||||
# otherwise disagree with a guard that reads the second.
|
||||
already_bound = (_NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("transport") or "").strip()
|
||||
if (
|
||||
already_bound
|
||||
and _NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("phase") == _PHASE_TRANSPORT_BOUND
|
||||
and already_bound != transport_name
|
||||
):
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: transport is already bound to "
|
||||
f"{already_bound!r} in this process; rebinding to "
|
||||
f"{transport_name!r} is forbidden (#931). Restart the server to "
|
||||
"change the deployment transport."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Pin session-state root for this server lifetime (#695 AC2 / PR #701).
|
||||
# Changing GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR after bind must not manufacture a
|
||||
# second authority domain for decision locks / workflow proofs.
|
||||
@@ -414,88 +353,6 @@ def is_production_native_mcp_transport() -> bool:
|
||||
return (_NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}).get("mode") == _RUNTIME_MODE_PRODUCTION
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bound_transport() -> str | None:
|
||||
"""The one authoritative bound transport identifier, or ``None`` (#931).
|
||||
|
||||
This is the shared accessor every transport-aware guard reads. It reports
|
||||
the value pinned at bind time, never the environment, so changing
|
||||
``GITEA_MCP_TRANSPORT`` after the bind cannot move what a guard observes —
|
||||
the same rule :func:`pinned_session_state_dir` applies to session state.
|
||||
|
||||
``None`` means unbound: an offline import or a launch that never reached
|
||||
the bind. Callers must treat that as fail-closed, exactly as they already
|
||||
treat :func:`is_native_mcp_transport` returning false.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not is_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return (_NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}).get("transport") or None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assert_transport_bound(context: str = "tool service") -> str:
|
||||
"""Return the bound transport, or fail closed before *context* (#931).
|
||||
|
||||
Called immediately before the server enters its transport loop so an
|
||||
invalid or absent bind stops the process rather than serving tools over a
|
||||
transport no guard can name.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
transport = bound_transport()
|
||||
if transport:
|
||||
return transport
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
f"No MCP transport is bound; refusing {context} (#931). "
|
||||
"bind_native_mcp_transport must succeed from the canonical entrypoint "
|
||||
"before any tool is served. Offline import and standalone launch "
|
||||
"cannot reconstruct a bind."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_serve_authorization() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Structured verdict on whether this process may serve tools (#931).
|
||||
|
||||
This is the decision that consumes :func:`bound_transport`. It is what stops
|
||||
the bound identifier from being reporting-only metadata: the serve path
|
||||
cannot proceed unless the value pinned at bind is one this entrypoint is
|
||||
commissioned to execute.
|
||||
|
||||
Never raises; returns the verdict so callers and diagnostics can inspect it.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return mcp_transport_config.assess_transport_execution(bound_transport())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def authorize_transport_execution(context: str = "tool service") -> str:
|
||||
"""Return the transport this process may serve, or fail closed (#931).
|
||||
|
||||
Two distinct boundaries, in order:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Bind presence** — :func:`assert_transport_bound` enforces the
|
||||
pre-existing #695 contract, so an unbound runtime keeps its established
|
||||
failure and reason code.
|
||||
2. **Execution authorization** — the bound identifier must be one this
|
||||
entrypoint is commissioned to serve. A registered transport whose
|
||||
listener has not been commissioned is refused here, before any listener
|
||||
is created and before any tool can dispatch.
|
||||
|
||||
That ordering matters: recognition, validation and durable recording all
|
||||
still happen for a remote identifier, so #931's seam is intact; only the act
|
||||
of *serving* it is withheld until its owning issue commissions it.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# Boundary 1: unbound stays exactly as fail-closed as it was under #695.
|
||||
assert_transport_bound(context)
|
||||
|
||||
# Boundary 2: bound, but is this entrypoint allowed to serve it?
|
||||
assessment = assess_serve_authorization()
|
||||
if assessment.get("allowed"):
|
||||
return str(assessment["transport"])
|
||||
|
||||
reasons = "; ".join(assessment.get("reasons") or []) or "not authorized"
|
||||
next_action = assessment.get("exact_next_action") or ""
|
||||
raise TransportExecutionError(
|
||||
f"Refusing {context} (#931) [{assessment.get('blocker_kind')}]: "
|
||||
f"{reasons} {next_action}".strip(),
|
||||
assessment,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_sanctioned_mcp_daemon() -> bool:
|
||||
"""Backward-compatible name; #695 requires native transport, not env alone."""
|
||||
if is_production_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
@@ -619,21 +476,6 @@ def native_runtime_status() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"entrypoint_path": rt.get("entrypoint_path"),
|
||||
"phase": rt.get("phase"),
|
||||
"transport": rt.get("transport"),
|
||||
# #931: the authoritative bound identifier, plus the seam that defines
|
||||
# what may be bound. ``bound_transport`` is None until a bind succeeds,
|
||||
# so an offline import is distinguishable from a stdio session.
|
||||
"bound_transport": bound_transport(),
|
||||
"transport_bound": bound_transport() is not None,
|
||||
"default_transport": mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
"supported_transports": list(mcp_transport_config.supported_transports()),
|
||||
"transport_env": mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV,
|
||||
# #931 review 635: recognition and execution authorization are distinct.
|
||||
# ``supported`` is what may be bound; ``executable`` is what this
|
||||
# entrypoint may actually serve. A recognized-but-uncommissioned
|
||||
# transport reports serve_authorized False with a named blocker.
|
||||
"executable_transports": list(mcp_transport_config.executable_transports()),
|
||||
"serve_authorized": bool(assess_serve_authorization().get("allowed")),
|
||||
"serve_authorization": assess_serve_authorization(),
|
||||
"mode": rt.get("mode"),
|
||||
"session_state_dir": pinned_session_state_dir() or rt.get("session_state_dir"),
|
||||
"session_state_dir_pinned": pinned_session_state_dir() is not None,
|
||||
@@ -660,12 +502,7 @@ def mutation_provenance_fields() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
if st.get("mode") == _RUNTIME_MODE_TEST and st["native_mcp_transport"]:
|
||||
transport = "test_native_mcp"
|
||||
return {
|
||||
# ``transport`` stays the trust *class* it has always been, so existing
|
||||
# durable records keep their shape. ``bound_transport`` (#931) adds the
|
||||
# bound identifier itself, which is what lets an operator tell from a
|
||||
# durable record which transport performed a mutation.
|
||||
"transport": transport,
|
||||
"bound_transport": st.get("bound_transport"),
|
||||
"native_mcp_transport": bool(st["native_mcp_transport"]),
|
||||
"production_native_mcp_transport": bool(
|
||||
st.get("production_native_mcp_transport")
|
||||
|
||||
+5
-397
@@ -51,42 +51,6 @@ EOF_PATTERNS = (
|
||||
"eof",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
ERROR_CONNECTED_NAMESPACES_MISSING = "mcp_connected_namespaces_missing"
|
||||
|
||||
# Distinct from the condition above. ``mcp_connected_namespaces_missing`` is reserved for
|
||||
# the actual #708 defect: the host *does* report the service Connected, yet the namespace
|
||||
# never entered the active session tool surface. A required namespace that is absent from
|
||||
# the connected-service inventory has no Connected claim behind it at all, so reporting it
|
||||
# under the #708 condition would assert something the evidence does not support and would
|
||||
# point an operator at the wrong recovery.
|
||||
ERROR_REQUIRED_NAMESPACES_NOT_CONNECTED = "mcp_required_namespaces_not_connected"
|
||||
|
||||
DISCOVERY_STATUS_ATTACHED = "namespaces_attached"
|
||||
DISCOVERY_STATUS_CONNECTED_MISSING = "connected_but_namespaces_missing"
|
||||
DISCOVERY_STATUS_NOT_CONNECTED = "required_namespaces_not_connected"
|
||||
DISCOVERY_STATUS_DISCONNECTED = "disconnected"
|
||||
|
||||
# Namespaces that must be *attached to the active session* for a mutation task (#708).
|
||||
# Connected-at-host is not attached-in-session; these are gated separately from the
|
||||
# #543 health map because a namespace can be healthy on probe yet absent from the
|
||||
# session tool surface.
|
||||
ATTACHMENT_GATED_TASKS = {
|
||||
"review_pr": "gitea-reviewer",
|
||||
"submit_review": "gitea-reviewer",
|
||||
"merge_pr": "gitea-merger",
|
||||
"work_issue": "gitea-author",
|
||||
"create_pr": "gitea-author",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# The only sanctioned recovery for an unattached namespace (#678 exposes it natively).
|
||||
SANCTIONED_ATTACH_RECOVERY_TOOL = "gitea_request_mcp_reconnect"
|
||||
|
||||
UNSAFE_FALLBACK_WARNING = (
|
||||
"Workflow Safety Hard Stop (#708): Connected-but-namespaces-missing recovery must "
|
||||
"NEVER use direct imports, Gitea API mutations, profile hopping, session-state "
|
||||
"overrides, PID kills, or config mtime touches. Use client reconnect only."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
SAFE_ENV_KEYS = (
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE",
|
||||
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME",
|
||||
@@ -95,318 +59,6 @@ SAFE_ENV_KEYS = (
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# #948: provenance used to be derived from the summary this allowlist produces.
|
||||
# The allowlist never carried a provenance key, so that derivation could only
|
||||
# ever evaluate to ``manual_launch`` — whatever the process actually was — while
|
||||
# ``gitea_get_runtime_context`` read the live environment and reported
|
||||
# ``client_managed`` for the same process. Provenance is no longer derived here.
|
||||
# It comes from ``mcp_worker_identity.assess_provenance``, the single authority
|
||||
# every surface shares. This allowlist keeps its original and only job: deciding
|
||||
# which env values are safe to echo back in diagnostics.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
connected_servers: list[str] | tuple[str, ...] | set[str] | None = None,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces: list[str] | tuple[str, ...] | set[str] | None = None,
|
||||
required_namespaces: list[str] | tuple[str, ...] | set[str] | None = None,
|
||||
discovery_cache_age_seconds: float | int | None = None,
|
||||
discovery_cache_hit: bool | None = None,
|
||||
auto_attach_attempted: bool = False,
|
||||
auto_attach_succeeded: bool = False,
|
||||
session_tool_snapshot_at: float | int | None = None,
|
||||
namespace_connected_at: dict[str, float] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Assess whether host-connected MCP servers have attached tool namespaces in the active session (#708).
|
||||
|
||||
Addresses the Connected-but-namespaces-missing defect: CLI/host status may report Connected
|
||||
while the active LLM session tool surface exposes 0 attached tool namespaces.
|
||||
|
||||
This is a *distinct* condition from config drift (#672), transport-closed (#584),
|
||||
and resolver EOF (#685): the transport is up and the host reports Connected, yet the
|
||||
namespace never entered the session tool surface.
|
||||
|
||||
Startup ordering (``session_tool_snapshot_at`` + ``namespace_connected_at``) identifies
|
||||
the race where the session tool snapshot was taken before a role server finished
|
||||
``initialize``/``list_tools``, which is why parallel multi-role startup can leave the
|
||||
session with an empty namespace set while Connected later flips true.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns structured detection details plus secret-free telemetry.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
connected = [str(s).strip() for s in (connected_servers or []) if str(s).strip()]
|
||||
attached = set(str(ns).strip() for ns in (attached_session_namespaces or []) if str(ns).strip())
|
||||
req = [str(r).strip() for r in (required_namespaces or DEFAULT_NAMESPACES) if str(r).strip()]
|
||||
|
||||
required = list(dict.fromkeys(req))
|
||||
connected_set = set(connected)
|
||||
|
||||
proof: dict[str, dict[str, bool]] = {}
|
||||
for s in connected:
|
||||
proof[s] = {"connected": True, "attached": s in attached}
|
||||
for r in required:
|
||||
if r not in proof:
|
||||
proof[r] = {"connected": r in connected_set, "attached": r in attached}
|
||||
|
||||
# The genuine #708 condition: the host reports the service Connected and the namespace
|
||||
# still never entered the active session tool surface.
|
||||
missing = [r for r in required if r in connected_set and r not in attached]
|
||||
# A separate condition: the service is required but absent from the connected-service
|
||||
# inventory. Nothing here is Connected, so this must not borrow the #708 wording or its
|
||||
# recovery — see ERROR_REQUIRED_NAMESPACES_NOT_CONNECTED.
|
||||
not_connected = [r for r in required if r not in connected_set]
|
||||
# Evidence that disagrees with itself: reported attached to the session while absent
|
||||
# from the connected inventory. Neither statement is proof, so it fails closed.
|
||||
contradictory = [r for r in not_connected if r in attached]
|
||||
|
||||
# No required namespace may lack attachment proof and still be called healthy.
|
||||
attachment_healthy = (
|
||||
not missing
|
||||
and not not_connected
|
||||
and len(connected) > 0
|
||||
and len(required) > 0
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if attachment_healthy:
|
||||
discovery_status = DISCOVERY_STATUS_ATTACHED
|
||||
elif not connected:
|
||||
discovery_status = DISCOVERY_STATUS_DISCONNECTED
|
||||
elif not_connected:
|
||||
discovery_status = DISCOVERY_STATUS_NOT_CONNECTED
|
||||
else:
|
||||
discovery_status = DISCOVERY_STATUS_CONNECTED_MISSING
|
||||
|
||||
# Every condition actually present is reported; ``error_type`` names the primary one.
|
||||
# Not-connected outranks Connected-but-unattached because a service that never
|
||||
# connected cannot be recovered by attaching its namespace.
|
||||
error_types: list[str] = []
|
||||
if not_connected:
|
||||
error_types.append(ERROR_REQUIRED_NAMESPACES_NOT_CONNECTED)
|
||||
if missing:
|
||||
error_types.append(ERROR_CONNECTED_NAMESPACES_MISSING)
|
||||
if not attachment_healthy and not error_types:
|
||||
error_types.append(ERROR_REQUIRED_NAMESPACES_NOT_CONNECTED)
|
||||
error_type = None if attachment_healthy else error_types[0]
|
||||
|
||||
# Per-namespace verdict, so a mutation gate never has to infer one namespace's state
|
||||
# from a whole-session summary. Each entry states only what its own evidence supports.
|
||||
namespace_conditions: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}
|
||||
for ns_name, state in proof.items():
|
||||
ns_connected = bool(state["connected"])
|
||||
ns_attached = bool(state["attached"])
|
||||
if ns_connected and ns_attached:
|
||||
condition = None
|
||||
elif ns_connected:
|
||||
condition = ERROR_CONNECTED_NAMESPACES_MISSING
|
||||
else:
|
||||
condition = ERROR_REQUIRED_NAMESPACES_NOT_CONNECTED
|
||||
namespace_conditions[ns_name] = {
|
||||
"namespace": ns_name,
|
||||
"required": ns_name in required,
|
||||
"connected": ns_connected,
|
||||
"attached": ns_attached,
|
||||
"attachment_healthy": ns_connected and ns_attached,
|
||||
"condition": condition,
|
||||
"contradictory_evidence": ns_attached and not ns_connected,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Startup-ordering race: a namespace that finished connecting *after* the session
|
||||
# tool snapshot was taken cannot be in that snapshot, however healthy it looks now.
|
||||
connected_at = {
|
||||
str(k).strip(): v
|
||||
for k, v in (namespace_connected_at or {}).items()
|
||||
if str(k).strip() and isinstance(v, (int, float))
|
||||
}
|
||||
late_attaching: list[str] = []
|
||||
if isinstance(session_tool_snapshot_at, (int, float)):
|
||||
for ns_name, ts in connected_at.items():
|
||||
if ts > session_tool_snapshot_at and ns_name not in attached:
|
||||
late_attaching.append(ns_name)
|
||||
late_attaching.sort()
|
||||
startup_ordering_race = bool(late_attaching)
|
||||
|
||||
auto_recovered = bool(auto_attach_attempted and auto_attach_succeeded and attachment_healthy)
|
||||
reconnect_required = not attachment_healthy
|
||||
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
remediation: list[str] = []
|
||||
if not connected:
|
||||
reasons.append("No MCP servers reported Connected.")
|
||||
remediation.append("Start or reconnect Gitea MCP servers in client config.")
|
||||
if missing:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"MCP server(s) {missing} report Connected at host/CLI layer but tool namespaces "
|
||||
f"are missing from active session attached tools (Connected ≠ attached tools, #708)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
remediation.append(
|
||||
"Reconnect the IDE/client MCP session to attach namespaces to the active session "
|
||||
f"(sanctioned path: {SANCTIONED_ATTACH_RECOVERY_TOOL}), then re-run full preflight "
|
||||
"(gitea_whoami -> gitea_resolve_task_capability -> task). "
|
||||
"Do not use direct imports, CLI API mutations, profile hopping, or session file overrides."
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not_connected:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"required MCP namespace(s) {not_connected} are absent from the connected-service "
|
||||
"inventory: nothing reports them Connected, so there is no attachment to claim and "
|
||||
"the Connected-but-unattached condition does not apply to them (#708)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
remediation.append(
|
||||
f"Connect the required MCP server(s) {not_connected} through the client, then "
|
||||
"reconnect the IDE/client MCP session so their namespaces attach "
|
||||
f"(sanctioned path: {SANCTIONED_ATTACH_RECOVERY_TOOL}), and re-run full preflight. "
|
||||
"Do not use direct imports, CLI API mutations, profile hopping, or session file overrides."
|
||||
)
|
||||
if contradictory:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"contradictory evidence for namespace(s) {contradictory}: reported attached to the "
|
||||
"active session while absent from the connected-service inventory; neither statement "
|
||||
"is proof, so attachment is treated as unproven (fail closed, #708)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
if attachment_healthy:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"All required MCP server namespaces are connected and attached to the active session."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if startup_ordering_race:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"startup ordering race: namespace(s) {late_attaching} finished connecting after the "
|
||||
"active session tool snapshot was taken, so they cannot appear in that snapshot (#708)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
if auto_attach_attempted and not auto_attach_succeeded:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"automatic namespace attachment was attempted and did not succeed; only the sanctioned "
|
||||
"client reconnect path remains."
|
||||
)
|
||||
if auto_recovered:
|
||||
reasons.append("namespaces were automatically attached; no operator reconnect was required.")
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": attachment_healthy,
|
||||
"attachment_healthy": attachment_healthy,
|
||||
"discovery_status": discovery_status,
|
||||
"connected_servers": connected,
|
||||
"attached_session_namespaces": list(attached),
|
||||
"missing_namespaces": missing,
|
||||
"not_connected_namespaces": not_connected,
|
||||
"contradictory_namespaces": contradictory,
|
||||
"proof_of_connected_vs_attached": proof,
|
||||
"namespace_conditions": namespace_conditions,
|
||||
"error_type": error_type,
|
||||
"error_types": error_types,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"remediation": remediation,
|
||||
"exact_next_action": (
|
||||
"None; session tool namespaces attached."
|
||||
if attachment_healthy
|
||||
else (
|
||||
f"Connect the required MCP server(s) {not_connected} through the client, then "
|
||||
"reconnect the IDE/client MCP session so their tool namespaces attach to the "
|
||||
"active session. Do not use direct imports, CLI API mutations, profile hopping, "
|
||||
"or session-state overrides."
|
||||
if not_connected
|
||||
else (
|
||||
"Reconnect the IDE/client MCP session so tool namespaces attach to the active "
|
||||
"session. Do not use direct imports, CLI API mutations, profile hopping, or "
|
||||
"session-state overrides."
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
),
|
||||
"unsafe_fallback_policy": UNSAFE_FALLBACK_WARNING,
|
||||
"sanctioned_recovery_tool": SANCTIONED_ATTACH_RECOVERY_TOOL,
|
||||
"reconnect_required": reconnect_required,
|
||||
"auto_attach_attempted": bool(auto_attach_attempted),
|
||||
"auto_recovered": auto_recovered,
|
||||
"startup_ordering_race": startup_ordering_race,
|
||||
"late_attaching_namespaces": late_attaching,
|
||||
# Secret-free structured signals (#708 AC5). Namespace names and counts only:
|
||||
# never tokens, endpoints, env values, or filesystem paths.
|
||||
"telemetry": {
|
||||
"connected_count": len(connected),
|
||||
"attached_count": len(attached),
|
||||
"required_count": len(required),
|
||||
"missing_count": len(missing),
|
||||
"not_connected_count": len(not_connected),
|
||||
"contradictory_count": len(contradictory),
|
||||
"required_attached_count": sum(1 for r in required if r in attached),
|
||||
"discovery_status": discovery_status,
|
||||
"discovery_cache_hit": (
|
||||
None if discovery_cache_hit is None else bool(discovery_cache_hit)
|
||||
),
|
||||
"discovery_cache_age_seconds": (
|
||||
float(discovery_cache_age_seconds)
|
||||
if isinstance(discovery_cache_age_seconds, (int, float))
|
||||
else None
|
||||
),
|
||||
"reconnect_required": reconnect_required,
|
||||
"auto_attach_attempted": bool(auto_attach_attempted),
|
||||
"auto_recovered": auto_recovered,
|
||||
"startup_ordering_race": startup_ordering_race,
|
||||
"error_type": error_type,
|
||||
"error_types": error_types,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def required_namespace_for_attachment(task: str) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Map a mutation task to the MCP namespace that must be *attached* (#708)."""
|
||||
return ATTACHMENT_GATED_TASKS.get((task or "").strip())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def attachment_gate_from_session(
|
||||
task: str,
|
||||
session_attachment: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] | None,
|
||||
) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Fail-closed gate on recorded connected-but-unattached namespaces (#708).
|
||||
|
||||
Mirrors :func:`mutation_gate_from_session`: a namespace that has not been
|
||||
assessed yet does not gate, so this never blocks a session that simply has
|
||||
not run the assessment. Once an assessment records the namespace required
|
||||
for *task* as Connected-but-unattached, the mutation fails closed and the
|
||||
only offered recovery is the sanctioned client reconnect path.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
ns = required_namespace_for_attachment(task)
|
||||
if not ns:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
store = session_attachment or {}
|
||||
entry = store.get(ns)
|
||||
if not entry:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
if entry.get("attached") and entry.get("attachment_healthy"):
|
||||
return []
|
||||
|
||||
what = task or "mutation"
|
||||
connected = entry.get("connected")
|
||||
detail = entry.get("condition") or entry.get("error_type")
|
||||
if connected is True:
|
||||
# Only here has anything actually reported the service Connected, so only here may
|
||||
# the block say so.
|
||||
detail = detail or ERROR_CONNECTED_NAMESPACES_MISSING
|
||||
blocked = (
|
||||
f"live MCP namespace '{ns}' is recorded {detail}: the host reports Connected but the "
|
||||
f"namespace is not attached to the active session tool surface; reconnect the "
|
||||
f"IDE/client MCP session and re-run preflight before {what} "
|
||||
"(fail closed, #708)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif connected is False:
|
||||
detail = ERROR_REQUIRED_NAMESPACES_NOT_CONNECTED
|
||||
blocked = (
|
||||
f"live MCP namespace '{ns}' is recorded {detail}: it is absent from the "
|
||||
f"connected-service inventory, so it is neither connected nor attached and no "
|
||||
f"Connected status is claimed for it; connect the required MCP server, then "
|
||||
f"reconnect the IDE/client MCP session and re-run preflight before {what} "
|
||||
"(fail closed, #708)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
# Connected status was never recorded. Refuse without asserting either condition.
|
||||
detail = detail or ERROR_CONNECTED_NAMESPACES_MISSING
|
||||
blocked = (
|
||||
f"live MCP namespace '{ns}' is recorded {detail} with no connected-status evidence, "
|
||||
f"so attachment to the active session tool surface is unproven; reconnect the "
|
||||
f"IDE/client MCP session and re-run preflight before {what} "
|
||||
"(fail closed, #708)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return [blocked, UNSAFE_FALLBACK_WARNING]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _as_list(value: Any) -> list[str] | None:
|
||||
if value is None:
|
||||
@@ -452,23 +104,12 @@ def classify_namespace_probe(
|
||||
profile: str | None = None,
|
||||
configured: bool = True,
|
||||
probe_source: str | None = None,
|
||||
worker_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
generation_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
registry: Any | None = None,
|
||||
pid_alive_probe: Any | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify whether a required tool is callable through a live namespace.
|
||||
|
||||
``registered_tools`` is static/server-side evidence. ``probe_result`` is
|
||||
live invocation evidence. Only ``probe_source=client_namespace`` proves the
|
||||
IDE-managed path; ``offline_spawn`` is an offline subprocess check only.
|
||||
|
||||
#948: ``worker_identity``/``generation_id``/``registry`` carry the
|
||||
client/session ownership evidence. Provenance is resolved by
|
||||
``mcp_worker_identity.assess_provenance`` — the same call
|
||||
``gitea_get_runtime_context`` makes — so the two surfaces cannot report
|
||||
different provenance for one process. Omitting them yields the fail-closed
|
||||
``unproven`` verdict, never a fabricated ``client_managed``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
ns = (namespace or "").strip()
|
||||
tool = required_tool or REQUIRED_NAMESPACE_TOOLS.get(ns) or "gitea_whoami"
|
||||
@@ -585,31 +226,14 @@ def classify_namespace_probe(
|
||||
blocks = namespace_health_blocks_task("merge_pr", healthy)
|
||||
|
||||
import gitea_config
|
||||
import mcp_worker_identity
|
||||
|
||||
raw_env = process.get("env") if isinstance(process, dict) else None
|
||||
unconsumed_env = gitea_config.get_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides(raw_env)
|
||||
|
||||
# #948: one authority, shared with gitea_get_runtime_context. The env is
|
||||
# passed whole rather than through SAFE_ENV_KEYS — the allowlist exists to
|
||||
# decide what may be *echoed*, and using it to decide what may be *believed*
|
||||
# is what made this surface structurally unable to report client_managed.
|
||||
# ``declared_only``: ``process`` describes an observed peer, not this
|
||||
# interpreter. Its stdin is unavailable and its launcher-config env is
|
||||
# inherited from whatever shell started it, so only an explicit declaration
|
||||
# is evidence. Absence of one is ``unproven``, not an asserted manual launch.
|
||||
provenance_verdict = mcp_worker_identity.assess_provenance(
|
||||
registry=registry,
|
||||
worker_identity=worker_identity,
|
||||
generation_id=generation_id,
|
||||
env=raw_env if isinstance(raw_env, dict) else {},
|
||||
namespace=ns,
|
||||
profile=profile_name,
|
||||
pid_alive_probe=pid_alive_probe,
|
||||
declared_only=True,
|
||||
is_client_managed = bool(
|
||||
env_summary.get("GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED") in ("1", "true", "yes", "client_managed")
|
||||
or env_summary.get("GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED") in ("1", "true", "yes", "client_managed")
|
||||
or env_summary.get("GITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE") == "client_managed"
|
||||
)
|
||||
provenance = provenance_verdict["provenance"]
|
||||
is_client_managed = provenance_verdict["is_client_managed"]
|
||||
provenance = "client_managed" if is_client_managed else "manual_launch"
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": healthy,
|
||||
@@ -628,15 +252,6 @@ def classify_namespace_probe(
|
||||
"remediation": remediation,
|
||||
"provenance": provenance,
|
||||
"is_client_managed": is_client_managed,
|
||||
# Every non-client-session verdict fails closed. Consumers that only
|
||||
# need "may this mutate?" read this and stay correct across the #948
|
||||
# vocabulary split between ``manual_launch`` and ``unproven``.
|
||||
"provenance_fail_closed": provenance_verdict["fail_closed"],
|
||||
"provenance_assessment": provenance_verdict,
|
||||
"worker_identity": provenance_verdict["worker_identity"],
|
||||
"session_id": provenance_verdict["session_id"],
|
||||
"generation_id": provenance_verdict["generation_id"],
|
||||
"client_name": provenance_verdict["client_name"],
|
||||
"unconsumed_gitea_env": unconsumed_env,
|
||||
"diagnostics": {
|
||||
"namespace": ns,
|
||||
@@ -648,13 +263,6 @@ def classify_namespace_probe(
|
||||
"probe_source": source,
|
||||
"provenance": provenance,
|
||||
"is_client_managed": is_client_managed,
|
||||
"provenance_fail_closed": provenance_verdict["fail_closed"],
|
||||
"provenance_blocker_kind": provenance_verdict["blocker_kind"],
|
||||
"provenance_scope": provenance_verdict["scope"],
|
||||
"worker_identity": provenance_verdict["worker_identity"],
|
||||
"session_id": provenance_verdict["session_id"],
|
||||
"generation_id": provenance_verdict["generation_id"],
|
||||
"client_name": provenance_verdict["client_name"],
|
||||
"unconsumed_gitea_env": unconsumed_env,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"blocks_merge_workflow": blocks,
|
||||
|
||||
+3
-7
@@ -1,10 +1,7 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""Gitea MCP Server — exposes Gitea operations as MCP tools.
|
||||
|
||||
The transport is selected by deployment configuration (GITEA_MCP_TRANSPORT) and
|
||||
defaults to the local client-spawned transport when unset (#931); the permitted
|
||||
set lives in mcp_transport_config. All tools authenticate via macOS keychain
|
||||
(git credential fill).
|
||||
Runs over stdio. All tools authenticate via macOS keychain (git credential fill).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
@@ -46,9 +43,8 @@ check_conflict_markers()
|
||||
|
||||
# #558 / #695: claim the official entrypoint before loading mutation modules.
|
||||
# This alone does NOT authorize mutations — gitea_mcp_server binds the live
|
||||
# native MCP transport immediately before mcp.run, over the configured
|
||||
# transport (#931). Import-only or offline launch without that bind fails
|
||||
# closed on mutations.
|
||||
# native MCP transport (stdio) immediately before mcp.run. Import-only or
|
||||
# offline launch without that bind fails closed on mutations.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -588,13 +588,9 @@ def save_state(
|
||||
bool(prov.get("production_native_mcp_transport")),
|
||||
)
|
||||
body.setdefault("transport", prov.get("transport"))
|
||||
# #931: record the bound transport identifier itself, so a durable
|
||||
# decision lock names which transport performed the mutation.
|
||||
body.setdefault("bound_transport", prov.get("bound_transport"))
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
body.setdefault("native_mcp_transport", False)
|
||||
body.setdefault("transport", "untrusted")
|
||||
body.setdefault("bound_transport", None)
|
||||
|
||||
envelope = {
|
||||
"kind": kind,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,292 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Single authoritative source for the bound MCP transport identifier (#931).
|
||||
|
||||
Before this module the transport was a literal, passed once at the bottom of
|
||||
``gitea_mcp_server`` as ``bind_native_mcp_transport(transport="stdio")``. Every
|
||||
guard that later asks "is this a trusted native session" resolves that question
|
||||
through the value bound there, so the literal was effectively a constant in the
|
||||
authorization chain rather than configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
This module is the seam. It owns three things and nothing else:
|
||||
|
||||
- the permitted set of transport identifiers,
|
||||
- the default used when deployment configuration says nothing,
|
||||
- the resolution of the configured value into a validated identifier.
|
||||
|
||||
It deliberately holds no state. The *bound* transport is pinned once, at bind
|
||||
time, into the process-local native-runtime record owned by
|
||||
:mod:`mcp_daemon_guard`, and is read back through
|
||||
``mcp_daemon_guard.bound_transport()``. That split matters: configuration is
|
||||
read exactly once, before any tool can dispatch, so a later environment change
|
||||
cannot move the value a guard observes — the same pinning rule already applied
|
||||
to the session-state root under #695 AC2.
|
||||
|
||||
Nothing here consumes tool arguments, request bodies, or provenance fields. The
|
||||
only input is the deployment environment, read at bind time.
|
||||
|
||||
Standing up a listener for a non-stdio transport is #938; this module only
|
||||
makes the identifier expressible and validated.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from typing import Any, Mapping
|
||||
|
||||
# Deployment configuration key. Read once, at bind time, and never again.
|
||||
TRANSPORT_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_TRANSPORT"
|
||||
|
||||
# The local, client-spawned transport. Unset configuration resolves to this,
|
||||
# which is what keeps every existing stdio deployment byte-identical.
|
||||
DEFAULT_TRANSPORT = "stdio"
|
||||
|
||||
# The sanctioned remote transport identifier. Accepting it here is what makes
|
||||
# the bind pluggable; the endpoint that serves it belongs to #938. The name
|
||||
# matches the MCP transport name so no second vocabulary has to be mapped.
|
||||
REMOTE_TRANSPORT = "streamable-http"
|
||||
|
||||
# The permitted set. This is the only place transport identifiers are
|
||||
# enumerated; guards consult it rather than restating any member.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ``sse`` is a real MCP transport and is deliberately absent: it is the
|
||||
# superseded remote transport, and admitting it would give the deployment two
|
||||
# remote paths to reason about. An unregistered identifier must fail closed at
|
||||
# bind time, and ``sse`` is held to that rule like any other.
|
||||
SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS = frozenset({DEFAULT_TRANSPORT, REMOTE_TRANSPORT})
|
||||
|
||||
# Recognition is not execution authorization (#931, review 635 B1/B2).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS answers "is this an identifier this system knows, and may
|
||||
# it be bound, pinned and recorded?". It deliberately includes the remote
|
||||
# identifier, because #931 requires the bind to become pluggable.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# EXECUTABLE_TRANSPORTS answers a strictly narrower question: "is this entrypoint
|
||||
# commissioned to actually *serve* on that transport?". Only the local transport
|
||||
# is. Handing ``streamable-http`` to ``mcp.run`` would start FastMCP's HTTP
|
||||
# listener with no authentication, no TLS and no per-request principal — the
|
||||
# endpoint #938 owns and gates. Recognition must therefore never imply execution.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# #938 commissions the remote listener by adding REMOTE_TRANSPORT here, together
|
||||
# with the authentication and principal boundary its acceptance criteria require.
|
||||
EXECUTABLE_TRANSPORTS = frozenset({DEFAULT_TRANSPORT})
|
||||
|
||||
# Which issue owns commissioning each recognized-but-not-executable transport.
|
||||
# Used to make the refusal actionable rather than a generic denial.
|
||||
TRANSPORT_EXECUTION_OWNER = {REMOTE_TRANSPORT: "#938"}
|
||||
|
||||
BLOCKER_TRANSPORT_NOT_BOUND = "transport_not_bound"
|
||||
BLOCKER_TRANSPORT_NOT_RECOGNIZED = "transport_not_recognized"
|
||||
BLOCKER_LISTENER_NOT_COMMISSIONED = "transport_listener_not_commissioned"
|
||||
|
||||
SOURCE_CONFIGURED = "deployment_configuration"
|
||||
SOURCE_DEFAULT = "default"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TransportConfigurationError(ValueError):
|
||||
"""Raised when configured transport is outside :data:`SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS`."""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def normalize_transport(value: Any) -> str:
|
||||
"""Canonical form of a transport identifier; ``""`` when there is none.
|
||||
|
||||
Non-string values normalize to ``""`` rather than being coerced, so a
|
||||
structured object smuggled in from a caller can never match a member of the
|
||||
permitted set.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(value, str):
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
return value.strip().lower()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def supported_transports() -> tuple[str, ...]:
|
||||
"""Permitted identifiers, sorted, for messages and status payloads."""
|
||||
return tuple(sorted(SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_supported_transport(value: Any) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when *value* normalizes to a member of the permitted set."""
|
||||
return normalize_transport(value) in SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_remote_transport(value: Any) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when *value* is a permitted transport that is not the local one."""
|
||||
name = normalize_transport(value)
|
||||
return name in SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS and name != DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def executable_transports() -> tuple[str, ...]:
|
||||
"""Transports this entrypoint is commissioned to serve, sorted."""
|
||||
return tuple(sorted(EXECUTABLE_TRANSPORTS))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_executable_transport(value: Any) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when *value* may actually be served by this entrypoint (#931).
|
||||
|
||||
Strictly narrower than :func:`is_supported_transport`. A recognized
|
||||
identifier that is not executable is a correct, fully-bound configuration
|
||||
whose listener has simply not been commissioned yet.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return normalize_transport(value) in EXECUTABLE_TRANSPORTS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_transport_execution(value: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Structured serve-authorization verdict for a bound transport (#931).
|
||||
|
||||
This is the decision that separates a *recognized* transport from one this
|
||||
entrypoint may execute. It is deliberately a pure function of the bound
|
||||
identifier so the serve path cannot reach a listener the deployment has not
|
||||
commissioned.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
value: The bound transport identifier, or ``None`` when unbound.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
dict with ``transport``, ``recognized``, ``executable``, ``allowed``,
|
||||
``blocker_kind``, ``owner_issue``, ``reasons`` and
|
||||
``exact_next_action``. ``allowed`` is true only for a bound, recognized,
|
||||
commissioned transport.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
name = normalize_transport(value)
|
||||
|
||||
if not name:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"transport": None,
|
||||
"recognized": False,
|
||||
"executable": False,
|
||||
"allowed": False,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": BLOCKER_TRANSPORT_NOT_BOUND,
|
||||
"owner_issue": None,
|
||||
"supported_transports": list(supported_transports()),
|
||||
"executable_transports": list(executable_transports()),
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
"no transport is bound; the serve path is fail-closed until "
|
||||
"bind_native_mcp_transport succeeds (#695/#931)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"exact_next_action": (
|
||||
"Launch through the canonical entrypoint so "
|
||||
"bind_native_mcp_transport runs before tool service."
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
recognized = name in SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS
|
||||
if not recognized:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"transport": name,
|
||||
"recognized": False,
|
||||
"executable": False,
|
||||
"allowed": False,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": BLOCKER_TRANSPORT_NOT_RECOGNIZED,
|
||||
"owner_issue": None,
|
||||
"supported_transports": list(supported_transports()),
|
||||
"executable_transports": list(executable_transports()),
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"transport {name!r} is not a registered MCP transport (#931); "
|
||||
"it should have been refused at bind time"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"exact_next_action": (
|
||||
f"Set {TRANSPORT_ENV} to one of {list(supported_transports())}."
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if name in EXECUTABLE_TRANSPORTS:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"transport": name,
|
||||
"recognized": True,
|
||||
"executable": True,
|
||||
"allowed": True,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": None,
|
||||
"owner_issue": None,
|
||||
"supported_transports": list(supported_transports()),
|
||||
"executable_transports": list(executable_transports()),
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"exact_next_action": None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
owner = TRANSPORT_EXECUTION_OWNER.get(name)
|
||||
owner_text = owner or "the issue that commissions this transport's listener"
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"transport": name,
|
||||
"recognized": True,
|
||||
"executable": False,
|
||||
"allowed": False,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": BLOCKER_LISTENER_NOT_COMMISSIONED,
|
||||
"owner_issue": owner,
|
||||
"supported_transports": list(supported_transports()),
|
||||
"executable_transports": list(executable_transports()),
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"transport {name!r} is registered and was bound and recorded, but "
|
||||
f"this entrypoint is not commissioned to serve it (#931). Serving it "
|
||||
f"would start a listener with no authentication, no transport "
|
||||
f"security and no per-request principal; that endpoint is owned by "
|
||||
f"{owner_text}."
|
||||
],
|
||||
"exact_next_action": (
|
||||
f"Serve on {DEFAULT_TRANSPORT} until {owner_text} commissions the "
|
||||
f"{name!r} listener with its authentication and principal boundary, "
|
||||
f"which adds {name!r} to EXECUTABLE_TRANSPORTS."
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def resolve_configured_transport(
|
||||
env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Resolve the deployment-configured transport without raising.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns the resolution rather than a bare string so a caller can tell an
|
||||
unset value (which legitimately yields :data:`DEFAULT_TRANSPORT`) from a
|
||||
configured value that is not permitted (which must fail closed, never
|
||||
silently degrade to the default).
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
env: Environment mapping to read; defaults to ``os.environ``.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
dict with ``transport`` (normalized; the default when unset),
|
||||
``configured``, ``source``, ``raw``, ``supported``, and ``reasons``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
source_env = os.environ if env is None else env
|
||||
raw = source_env.get(TRANSPORT_ENV)
|
||||
normalized = normalize_transport(raw)
|
||||
configured = bool(normalized)
|
||||
|
||||
if not configured:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"transport": DEFAULT_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
"configured": False,
|
||||
"source": SOURCE_DEFAULT,
|
||||
"raw": raw,
|
||||
"supported": True,
|
||||
"supported_transports": list(supported_transports()),
|
||||
"env_key": TRANSPORT_ENV,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
supported = normalized in SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if not supported:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"{TRANSPORT_ENV}={normalized!r} is not a registered MCP transport "
|
||||
f"(#931). Registered: {list(supported_transports())}."
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"transport": normalized,
|
||||
"configured": True,
|
||||
"source": SOURCE_CONFIGURED,
|
||||
"raw": raw,
|
||||
"supported": supported,
|
||||
"supported_transports": list(supported_transports()),
|
||||
"env_key": TRANSPORT_ENV,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def require_configured_transport(env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Resolved transport identifier, or raise when it is not permitted.
|
||||
|
||||
Raises:
|
||||
TransportConfigurationError: the configured identifier is unregistered.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
resolution = resolve_configured_transport(env)
|
||||
if not resolution["supported"]:
|
||||
raise TransportConfigurationError("; ".join(resolution["reasons"]))
|
||||
return str(resolution["transport"])
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -1,611 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Sanctioned reconciliation for worktree bindings whose paths are missing (#970).
|
||||
|
||||
When control-plane leases, session checkpoints, or issue locks hold a
|
||||
``worktree_path`` pointing to a filesystem path that no longer exists on disk,
|
||||
this module provides a fail-closed, auditable classification and resolution
|
||||
workflow.
|
||||
|
||||
Core principles:
|
||||
1. **Multi-dimensional Correlation**:
|
||||
Correlates the binding with repository, host, branch, issue/PR, session,
|
||||
and lease state.
|
||||
2. **Safety-first Distinction**:
|
||||
- Distinguishes a deleted worktree from a moved path, unavailable host/mount,
|
||||
live lease, active session, or temporary filesystem problem.
|
||||
- Host / mount failure (e.g. repo root or branches/ directory inaccessible)
|
||||
blocks retirement (``unavailable_host_or_mount``).
|
||||
- Moved worktree (found under another path in ``git worktree list``)
|
||||
blocks retirement and reports the new location (``moved_worktree_path``).
|
||||
- Live lease or active session/process blocks retirement (``live_lease_protected``,
|
||||
``live_session_protected``).
|
||||
3. **Atomic Pre-Mutation Re-Validation**:
|
||||
Immediately before committing a mutation, re-evaluates filesystem existence,
|
||||
git worktree list, host health, and lease status to prevent recreation races.
|
||||
4. **Targeted Retirement**:
|
||||
Retires only the exact confirmed stale binding (clearing ``worktree_path`` on
|
||||
the lease/checkpoint/lock row and recording durable provenance) while
|
||||
preserving unrelated worktrees, leases, branches, and git metadata.
|
||||
5. **Dry-Run & Operator Authorization**:
|
||||
Supports dry-run inspection and requires explicit cleanup authorization or
|
||||
reconciler workflow for mutation.
|
||||
6. **Idempotency & Durable Proof**:
|
||||
Repeated execution on an already-retired binding is safe, idempotent, and
|
||||
produces durable audit evidence.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
|
||||
|
||||
import control_plane_db as cpd
|
||||
import issue_lock_store
|
||||
import lease_lifecycle
|
||||
from merged_cleanup_reconcile import list_local_worktrees
|
||||
|
||||
# Classification vocabulary (#970 AC1-AC4).
|
||||
CLASS_CONFIRMED_STALE_DELETED = "confirmed_stale_deleted_worktree"
|
||||
CLASS_MOVED_WORKTREE = "moved_worktree_path"
|
||||
CLASS_UNAVAILABLE_HOST_MOUNT = "unavailable_host_or_mount"
|
||||
CLASS_LIVE_LEASE_PROTECTED = "live_lease_protected"
|
||||
CLASS_LIVE_SESSION_PROTECTED = "live_session_protected"
|
||||
CLASS_PRESENT_VALID = "present_valid_worktree"
|
||||
CLASS_ALREADY_RETIRED = "already_retired_binding"
|
||||
|
||||
ALL_CLASSIFICATIONS = frozenset({
|
||||
CLASS_CONFIRMED_STALE_DELETED,
|
||||
CLASS_MOVED_WORKTREE,
|
||||
CLASS_UNAVAILABLE_HOST_MOUNT,
|
||||
CLASS_LIVE_LEASE_PROTECTED,
|
||||
CLASS_LIVE_SESSION_PROTECTED,
|
||||
CLASS_PRESENT_VALID,
|
||||
CLASS_ALREADY_RETIRED,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
RETIRE_ELIGIBLE_CLASSES = frozenset({
|
||||
CLASS_CONFIRMED_STALE_DELETED,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _norm_path(p: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
if not p or not str(p).strip():
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(str(p).strip()))
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return str(p).strip()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def check_host_mount_health(project_root: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Check if the repository root and branches/ mount are healthy and accessible."""
|
||||
root = _norm_path(project_root)
|
||||
if not root or not os.path.isdir(root):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"healthy": False,
|
||||
"reason": f"project_root '{project_root}' does not exist or is not a directory",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify project_root is inside a valid git repository
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", root, "rev-parse", "--git-dir"],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if res.returncode != 0:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"healthy": False,
|
||||
"reason": f"project_root '{root}' is not a valid git repository: {res.stderr.strip()}",
|
||||
}
|
||||
except Exception as exc:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"healthy": False,
|
||||
"reason": f"git execution failed at project_root '{root}': {exc}",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
branches_dir = os.path.join(root, "branches")
|
||||
if os.path.exists(branches_dir) and not os.path.isdir(branches_dir):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"healthy": False,
|
||||
"reason": f"branches path '{branches_dir}' exists but is not a directory",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return {"healthy": True, "project_root": root, "branches_dir": branches_dir}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def find_moved_worktree_path(
|
||||
project_root: str,
|
||||
recorded_path: str,
|
||||
branch: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Check if a missing recorded worktree path is actually present at another location.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns the new path if found, or None if truly absent.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
norm_rec = _norm_path(recorded_path)
|
||||
if not norm_rec:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
wt_list = []
|
||||
try:
|
||||
wt_list = list_local_worktrees(project_root)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
wt_list = []
|
||||
|
||||
for entry in wt_list:
|
||||
p = _norm_path(entry.get("path"))
|
||||
b = entry.get("branch")
|
||||
if not p:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
# If git worktree list shows a worktree matching the branch at a different path
|
||||
if branch and b and b.strip() == branch.strip() and p != norm_rec:
|
||||
if os.path.exists(p):
|
||||
return p
|
||||
# If the basename matches and path exists
|
||||
if os.path.basename(p) == os.path.basename(norm_rec) and p != norm_rec:
|
||||
if os.path.exists(p):
|
||||
return p
|
||||
|
||||
# Check potential filesystem candidates under branches/
|
||||
branches_dir = os.path.join(_norm_path(project_root), "branches")
|
||||
if os.path.isdir(branches_dir):
|
||||
candidates_to_check: list[str] = []
|
||||
if branch:
|
||||
candidates_to_check.append(os.path.join(branches_dir, branch.replace("/", "-")))
|
||||
candidates_to_check.append(os.path.join(branches_dir, branch))
|
||||
if recorded_path:
|
||||
candidates_to_check.append(os.path.join(branches_dir, os.path.basename(recorded_path)))
|
||||
|
||||
for cand in candidates_to_check:
|
||||
norm_cand = _norm_path(cand)
|
||||
if norm_cand and norm_cand != norm_rec and os.path.isdir(norm_cand):
|
||||
return norm_cand
|
||||
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_worktree_binding(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
recorded_path: str,
|
||||
lease_status: str | None = None,
|
||||
lease_phase: str | None = None,
|
||||
owner_pid: int | None = None,
|
||||
session_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
session_active: bool = False,
|
||||
branch: str | None = None,
|
||||
project_root: str,
|
||||
host_health: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
path_exists_override: bool | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify a single worktree binding record for missing-path safety.
|
||||
|
||||
Fail-closed: returns detailed reasons and classification.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
norm_p = _norm_path(recorded_path)
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
|
||||
if not norm_p:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"classification": CLASS_ALREADY_RETIRED,
|
||||
"retire_eligible": False,
|
||||
"recorded_path": "",
|
||||
"reasons": ["worktree_path is empty (already retired/unbound)"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Check 1: Host / mount health
|
||||
hh = host_health or check_host_mount_health(project_root)
|
||||
if not hh.get("healthy"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"host or filesystem mount unavailable: {hh.get('reason')}; "
|
||||
"refusing to classify missing path as deleted (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"classification": CLASS_UNAVAILABLE_HOST_MOUNT,
|
||||
"retire_eligible": False,
|
||||
"recorded_path": norm_p,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"host_health": hh,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Check 2: Path existence
|
||||
exists = (
|
||||
path_exists_override
|
||||
if path_exists_override is not None
|
||||
else os.path.exists(norm_p)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if exists:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"classification": CLASS_PRESENT_VALID,
|
||||
"retire_eligible": False,
|
||||
"recorded_path": norm_p,
|
||||
"reasons": [f"worktree path '{norm_p}' exists on disk"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Path is missing on disk. Run safety checks before declaring confirmed stale.
|
||||
|
||||
# Check 3: Moved path
|
||||
moved_path = find_moved_worktree_path(project_root, norm_p, branch=branch)
|
||||
if moved_path:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"recorded path '{norm_p}' is missing, but worktree for branch '{branch}' "
|
||||
f"was found moved to '{moved_path}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"classification": CLASS_MOVED_WORKTREE,
|
||||
"retire_eligible": False,
|
||||
"recorded_path": norm_p,
|
||||
"moved_to_path": moved_path,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Check 4: Live lease protection
|
||||
st = (lease_status or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
pid_alive = lease_lifecycle.is_process_alive(owner_pid) if owner_pid else False
|
||||
if st == "active" and (pid_alive or owner_pid is None):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"lease is status='active' (owner_pid={owner_pid}, alive={pid_alive}); "
|
||||
"active lease protects worktree binding"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"classification": CLASS_LIVE_LEASE_PROTECTED,
|
||||
"retire_eligible": False,
|
||||
"recorded_path": norm_p,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Check 5: Live session / process protection
|
||||
if session_active and pid_alive:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"session '{session_id}' is active with live process PID {owner_pid}; "
|
||||
"live session protects worktree binding"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"classification": CLASS_LIVE_SESSION_PROTECTED,
|
||||
"retire_eligible": False,
|
||||
"recorded_path": norm_p,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Confirmed stale deleted
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"worktree path '{norm_p}' does not exist on disk, host is healthy, "
|
||||
"no moved path was found, and no active lease or live process references it"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"classification": CLASS_CONFIRMED_STALE_DELETED,
|
||||
"retire_eligible": True,
|
||||
"recorded_path": norm_p,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def audit_missing_worktree_bindings(
|
||||
db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB | None = None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
project_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
remote: str = "prgs",
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
host: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Audit all recorded worktree bindings and classify missing-path entries.
|
||||
|
||||
Read-only / side-effect free.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
root = _norm_path(project_root or os.getcwd())
|
||||
hh = check_host_mount_health(root)
|
||||
cp_db = db or cpd.ControlPlaneDB()
|
||||
|
||||
bindings: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
|
||||
# 1. Audit control-plane leases
|
||||
try:
|
||||
leases_res = lease_lifecycle.list_active_leases(
|
||||
cp_db,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
include_non_active=True,
|
||||
limit=500,
|
||||
)
|
||||
for L in leases_res.get("leases") or []:
|
||||
wt = (L.get("worktree_path") or "").strip()
|
||||
if not wt:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
owner_pid = L.get("owner_pid") or L.get("session_pid")
|
||||
sess_id = L.get("session_id")
|
||||
br = L.get("branch")
|
||||
if not br and isinstance(L.get("provenance"), dict):
|
||||
br = L["provenance"].get("branch")
|
||||
|
||||
cls_info = classify_worktree_binding(
|
||||
recorded_path=wt,
|
||||
lease_status=L.get("status"),
|
||||
lease_phase=L.get("phase"),
|
||||
owner_pid=owner_pid,
|
||||
session_id=sess_id,
|
||||
branch=br,
|
||||
project_root=root,
|
||||
host_health=hh,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
bindings.append({
|
||||
"source": "lease",
|
||||
"lease_id": L.get("lease_id"),
|
||||
"session_id": sess_id,
|
||||
"work_kind": L.get("work_kind"),
|
||||
"work_number": L.get("work_number"),
|
||||
"branch": br,
|
||||
"worktree_path": wt,
|
||||
"lease_status": L.get("status"),
|
||||
"lease_phase": L.get("phase"),
|
||||
"owner_pid": owner_pid,
|
||||
"remote": L.get("remote") or remote,
|
||||
"org": L.get("org") or org,
|
||||
"repo": L.get("repo") or repo,
|
||||
"host": L.get("host") or host,
|
||||
**cls_info,
|
||||
})
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
bindings.append({
|
||||
"source": "lease_query_error",
|
||||
"error": str(exc),
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Audit session checkpoints
|
||||
try:
|
||||
checkpoints = cp_db.list_session_checkpoints(limit=500)
|
||||
for cp in checkpoints:
|
||||
wt = (cp.get("worktree_path") or "").strip()
|
||||
if not wt:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
sess_id = cp.get("session_id")
|
||||
cls_info = classify_worktree_binding(
|
||||
recorded_path=wt,
|
||||
session_id=sess_id,
|
||||
branch=cp.get("branch"),
|
||||
project_root=root,
|
||||
host_health=hh,
|
||||
)
|
||||
bindings.append({
|
||||
"source": "session_checkpoint",
|
||||
"checkpoint_id": cp.get("checkpoint_id"),
|
||||
"session_id": sess_id,
|
||||
"work_kind": cp.get("work_kind"),
|
||||
"work_number": cp.get("work_number"),
|
||||
"branch": cp.get("branch"),
|
||||
"worktree_path": wt,
|
||||
"status": cp.get("status"),
|
||||
"remote": cp.get("remote") or remote,
|
||||
"org": cp.get("org") or org,
|
||||
"repo": cp.get("repo") or repo,
|
||||
**cls_info,
|
||||
})
|
||||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
missing_bindings = [
|
||||
b for b in bindings if b.get("classification") != CLASS_PRESENT_VALID
|
||||
]
|
||||
confirmed_stale = [
|
||||
b for b in missing_bindings if b.get("classification") == CLASS_CONFIRMED_STALE_DELETED
|
||||
]
|
||||
moved = [
|
||||
b for b in missing_bindings if b.get("classification") == CLASS_MOVED_WORKTREE
|
||||
]
|
||||
live_protected = [
|
||||
b for b in missing_bindings if b.get("classification") in (CLASS_LIVE_LEASE_PROTECTED, CLASS_LIVE_SESSION_PROTECTED)
|
||||
]
|
||||
unavailable_host = [
|
||||
b for b in missing_bindings if b.get("classification") == CLASS_UNAVAILABLE_HOST_MOUNT
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"project_root": root,
|
||||
"host_mount_healthy": hh.get("healthy", False),
|
||||
"host_health_reason": hh.get("reason"),
|
||||
"total_bindings_audited": len(bindings),
|
||||
"present_count": len(bindings) - len(missing_bindings),
|
||||
"missing_count": len(missing_bindings),
|
||||
"confirmed_stale_count": len(confirmed_stale),
|
||||
"moved_count": len(moved),
|
||||
"live_protected_count": len(live_protected),
|
||||
"unavailable_host_count": len(unavailable_host),
|
||||
"missing_bindings": missing_bindings,
|
||||
"confirmed_stale_candidates": confirmed_stale,
|
||||
"worktrees_dimension_resolved": len(missing_bindings) == 0,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def resolve_missing_worktree_binding(
|
||||
db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB | None = None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
binding: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
dry_run: bool = True,
|
||||
operator_authorized: bool = False,
|
||||
workflow_authorized: bool = False,
|
||||
project_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Safely resolve (retire) one confirmed stale missing worktree binding (#970).
|
||||
|
||||
Pre-mutation re-validation runs immediately before mutation to prevent races.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
root = _norm_path(project_root or os.getcwd())
|
||||
cp_db = db or cpd.ControlPlaneDB()
|
||||
|
||||
rec_path = binding.get("worktree_path") or binding.get("recorded_path") or ""
|
||||
if not rec_path:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"performed": False,
|
||||
"outcome": "already_retired",
|
||||
"message": "worktree_path is already empty (no action needed)",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# 1. Authorization check
|
||||
authorized = operator_authorized or workflow_authorized
|
||||
if not authorized and not dry_run:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"performed": False,
|
||||
"reason": "authorization_required",
|
||||
"message": "Mutation refused: operator_authorized or workflow_authorized is required to retire a stale binding",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Immediate pre-mutation re-validation
|
||||
reval = classify_worktree_binding(
|
||||
recorded_path=rec_path,
|
||||
lease_status=binding.get("lease_status"),
|
||||
lease_phase=binding.get("lease_phase"),
|
||||
owner_pid=binding.get("owner_pid"),
|
||||
session_id=binding.get("session_id"),
|
||||
branch=binding.get("branch"),
|
||||
project_root=root,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if reval.get("classification") != CLASS_CONFIRMED_STALE_DELETED:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"performed": False,
|
||||
"reason": "revalidation_failed",
|
||||
"revalidation": reval,
|
||||
"message": f"Pre-mutation re-validation failed: binding classified as '{reval.get('classification')}' instead of '{CLASS_CONFIRMED_STALE_DELETED}'",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
source = binding.get("source", "lease")
|
||||
lease_id = binding.get("lease_id")
|
||||
session_id = binding.get("session_id")
|
||||
checkpoint_id = binding.get("checkpoint_id")
|
||||
|
||||
planned_action = {
|
||||
"source": source,
|
||||
"lease_id": lease_id,
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"checkpoint_id": checkpoint_id,
|
||||
"retired_worktree_path": rec_path,
|
||||
"classification": CLASS_CONFIRMED_STALE_DELETED,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if dry_run:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"performed": False,
|
||||
"dry_run": True,
|
||||
"action": "retire_stale_binding",
|
||||
"planned_action": planned_action,
|
||||
"message": f"Dry-run: would retire stale missing worktree_path '{rec_path}' for {source} (lease={lease_id})",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# 3. Apply mode: execute targeted retirement
|
||||
audit_proof: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"retired_worktree_path": rec_path,
|
||||
"source": source,
|
||||
"lease_id": lease_id,
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"checkpoint_id": checkpoint_id,
|
||||
"classification": CLASS_CONFIRMED_STALE_DELETED,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if source == "lease" and lease_id:
|
||||
ret_proof = cp_db.retire_lease_worktree_path(
|
||||
lease_id,
|
||||
expected_path=rec_path,
|
||||
reason="missing_worktree_path_retired_by_reconciler",
|
||||
)
|
||||
audit_proof["db_lease_update"] = ret_proof
|
||||
|
||||
if source == "session_checkpoint" and (checkpoint_id or session_id):
|
||||
ret_cp = cp_db.retire_session_checkpoint_worktree_path(
|
||||
session_id=session_id or "",
|
||||
checkpoint_id=checkpoint_id,
|
||||
expected_path=rec_path,
|
||||
reason="missing_worktree_path_retired_by_reconciler",
|
||||
)
|
||||
audit_proof["db_checkpoint_update"] = ret_cp
|
||||
|
||||
# Also clean up any matching lease row if checkpoint was supplied or vice versa
|
||||
if lease_id and source != "lease":
|
||||
try:
|
||||
cp_db.retire_lease_worktree_path(lease_id, expected_path=rec_path)
|
||||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"performed": True,
|
||||
"dry_run": False,
|
||||
"action": "retired_stale_binding",
|
||||
"audit_proof": audit_proof,
|
||||
"message": f"Successfully retired stale missing worktree_path '{rec_path}' for lease {lease_id}",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def reconcile_missing_worktree_bindings(
|
||||
db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB | None = None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
project_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
remote: str = "prgs",
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
host: str | None = None,
|
||||
dry_run: bool = True,
|
||||
operator_authorized: bool = False,
|
||||
workflow_authorized: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Audit and safely reconcile missing worktree path bindings (#970).
|
||||
|
||||
Audits all recorded bindings, identifies confirmed stale missing paths,
|
||||
retires eligible bindings (when dry_run=False and authorized), and returns
|
||||
durable before/after audit evidence.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
cp_db = db or cpd.ControlPlaneDB()
|
||||
root = _norm_path(project_root or os.getcwd())
|
||||
|
||||
initial_audit = audit_missing_worktree_bindings(
|
||||
cp_db,
|
||||
project_root=root,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
host=host,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
candidates = initial_audit.get("confirmed_stale_candidates") or []
|
||||
resolutions: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
|
||||
for candidate in candidates:
|
||||
res = resolve_missing_worktree_binding(
|
||||
cp_db,
|
||||
binding=candidate,
|
||||
dry_run=dry_run,
|
||||
operator_authorized=operator_authorized,
|
||||
workflow_authorized=workflow_authorized,
|
||||
project_root=root,
|
||||
)
|
||||
resolutions.append(res)
|
||||
|
||||
post_audit = audit_missing_worktree_bindings(
|
||||
cp_db,
|
||||
project_root=root,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
host=host,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"dry_run": dry_run,
|
||||
"operator_authorized": operator_authorized,
|
||||
"workflow_authorized": workflow_authorized,
|
||||
"before_audit": initial_audit,
|
||||
"resolutions": resolutions,
|
||||
"after_audit": post_audit,
|
||||
"worktrees_dimension_resolved": post_audit.get("worktrees_dimension_resolved", False),
|
||||
"stale_candidates_count": len(candidates),
|
||||
"resolved_count": sum(1 for r in resolutions if r.get("performed") or (dry_run and r.get("success"))),
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -37,12 +37,17 @@ def normalize_role_kind(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
"""Map profile/task role to a workspace namespace key."""
|
||||
"""Map profile/task role to a workspace namespace key.
|
||||
|
||||
Exact profile-name matches only for controller routing (#840 / #664 B1):
|
||||
substring lookalikes such as ``fake-controller`` must not become
|
||||
controller.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
role = (role_kind or "author").strip().lower()
|
||||
profile = (profile_name or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if role == "reviewer" and "merger" in profile:
|
||||
if role == "reviewer" and profile in ("prgs-merger", "mdcps-merger", "merger"):
|
||||
return "merger"
|
||||
if "controller" in profile or role == "controller":
|
||||
if role == "controller" or profile in ("prgs-controller", "controller"):
|
||||
return "controller"
|
||||
if role in ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS:
|
||||
return role
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -204,28 +204,6 @@ proposed command before running it; `gitea_audit_runtime_recovery_contamination`
|
||||
to inspect or (reconciler-only) clear the marker. Full contrast in
|
||||
`docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Connected is not attached (#708)
|
||||
|
||||
A host/CLI MCP inventory showing **Connected** is not proof the tools are usable.
|
||||
The active session can expose **none** of a Connected server's tool namespaces —
|
||||
a *session attachment* failure, distinct from config drift (#672),
|
||||
transport-closed (#584), and resolver EOF (#685).
|
||||
|
||||
Required preflight proof is **live tool visibility plus `gitea_whoami` on the role
|
||||
namespace**, never host Connected status alone. Call
|
||||
`gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_attachment` with the Connected set and the namespaces
|
||||
actually attached to the session; it returns the typed condition
|
||||
**mcp_connected_namespaces_missing** with per-namespace connected-vs-attached proof,
|
||||
and records the verdict so review and merge fail closed while a required namespace
|
||||
is unattached.
|
||||
|
||||
Only sanctioned recovery: the client attach/reconnect path
|
||||
(`gitea_request_mcp_reconnect`), then full preflight
|
||||
(`gitea_whoami` → `gitea_resolve_task_capability` → task). Never recover by direct
|
||||
module import, CLI/raw API mutation, profile hopping, session-state overrides,
|
||||
process kills, or `.env`/mtime edits. A final report must not claim a healthy
|
||||
session without attachment proof.
|
||||
|
||||
## Shell Spawn Hard-Stop Rule
|
||||
|
||||
`exit_code: -1` with empty stdout/stderr means the shell failed to spawn — not a
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -576,6 +576,15 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
|
||||
"permission": "runtime.record_analytics_usage",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #664: emergency break-glass MCP restart workflow (privileged controller role).
|
||||
"break_glass_restart": {
|
||||
"permission": "runtime.break_glass_restart",
|
||||
"role": "controller",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_break_glass_restart": {
|
||||
"permission": "runtime.break_glass_restart",
|
||||
"role": "controller",
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,982 @@
|
||||
"""Tests for emergency break-glass MCP restart workflow (#664).
|
||||
|
||||
Regression suite for review #641 remediation: B13, B1, B14, B6/B11, B8, and
|
||||
preservation of previously accepted B2/B3/B5/B7/B9/B10 corrections.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
|
||||
|
||||
import gitea_audit
|
||||
import gitea_config
|
||||
import gitea_mcp_server
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _controller_profile(**extra) -> dict:
|
||||
base = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-controller",
|
||||
"execution_profile": "prgs-controller",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler", # declared role must not be redefined by capability
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.close",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"runtime.break_glass_restart",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
],
|
||||
}
|
||||
base.update(extra)
|
||||
return base
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _gate_open_patches():
|
||||
"""Keep master-parity / runtime-mode blocks out of unit tests."""
|
||||
return (
|
||||
patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "_master_parity_block", return_value=[]),
|
||||
patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "_runtime_mode_block", return_value=[]),
|
||||
patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "_try_auto_switch_for_operation", return_value=False),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestBreakGlassRestart(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Test suite for gitea_break_glass_restart tool and guardrails (#664)."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.env_patcher = patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=False)
|
||||
self.env_patcher.start()
|
||||
os.environ.pop("GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION", None)
|
||||
os.environ.pop("GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK", None)
|
||||
os.environ.pop("GITEA_AUDIT_LOG", None)
|
||||
# Reset injectable executor between tests.
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = None
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = None
|
||||
self.env_patcher.stop()
|
||||
|
||||
# ── B13: operation registration / real gate ───────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
def test_normalize_operation_accepts_canonical_break_glass_op(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B13: production normalizer accepts exact runtime.break_glass_restart."""
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
gitea_config.normalize_operation(
|
||||
"runtime.break_glass_restart", service="runtime"
|
||||
),
|
||||
"runtime.break_glass_restart",
|
||||
)
|
||||
ok, reason = gitea_config.check_operation(
|
||||
"runtime.break_glass_restart",
|
||||
["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(ok, reason)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(reason, "allowed")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_normalize_unknown_and_misspelled_ops_fail_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B13: unknown / misspelled operations fail closed (no gitea.read fallback)."""
|
||||
# Well-formed but misspelled runtime op normalizes, then is not allowed.
|
||||
ok, reason = gitea_config.check_operation(
|
||||
"runtime.break_glass_restar", # misspelled
|
||||
["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(ok)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(reason, "not-allowed")
|
||||
|
||||
ok2, reason2 = gitea_config.check_operation(
|
||||
"runtime.break_glass_restart",
|
||||
["gitea.read"], # capability not granted
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(ok2)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(reason2, "not-allowed")
|
||||
|
||||
ok3, reason3 = gitea_config.check_operation(
|
||||
"frobnicate",
|
||||
["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(ok3)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(reason3, "invalid-operation")
|
||||
|
||||
# gitea.read grant alone never authorizes break-glass.
|
||||
ok4, reason4 = gitea_config.check_operation(
|
||||
"runtime.break_glass_restart",
|
||||
["gitea.read"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(ok4)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(reason4, "allowed")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_real_profile_operation_gate_without_stubbing(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B13: exercise real _profile_operation_gate (not stubbed)."""
|
||||
allowed = _controller_profile()
|
||||
denied = _controller_profile(
|
||||
allowed_operations=["gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=allowed):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._profile_operation_gate(
|
||||
"runtime.break_glass_restart"
|
||||
),
|
||||
[],
|
||||
)
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=denied):
|
||||
reasons = gitea_mcp_server._profile_operation_gate(
|
||||
"runtime.break_glass_restart"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(reasons)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("runtime.break_glass_restart" in r or "not allowed" in r
|
||||
for r in reasons)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_entry_point_uses_same_operation_as_gate(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B13: entry point enforces runtime.break_glass_restart, not gitea.read."""
|
||||
# Profile has gitea.read but not the break-glass capability.
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile(
|
||||
allowed_operations=["gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Emergency restart required due to deadlock in worker pool",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "permission_denied")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("gitea.read", " ".join(res.get("reasons") or []))
|
||||
|
||||
# ── B1 / B14: exact profile auth, no substring, role preservation ─────
|
||||
|
||||
def test_trusted_prgs_controller_authorized(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B1: exact trusted prgs-controller with capability is authorized."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
|
||||
):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Emergency restart required due to deadlock in worker pool",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_fabricated_controller_like_profile_names_denied(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B1: lookalike profile names never become authorized."""
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
for name in (
|
||||
"fake-controller",
|
||||
"controller-copy",
|
||||
"not-controller",
|
||||
"xcontrollerx",
|
||||
"CONTROLLER",
|
||||
"prgs-controller-copy",
|
||||
):
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile(profile_name=name, execution_profile=name)
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Emergency restart required due to deadlock in worker pool",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"], name)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "role_authorization", name)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_ordinary_and_non_controller_reconciler_denied(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B1: ordinary roles and non-controller reconcilers are denied."""
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
denied = [
|
||||
{"profile_name": "prgs-author", "role": "author",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": []},
|
||||
{"profile_name": "prgs-reviewer", "role": "reviewer",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": []},
|
||||
{"profile_name": "prgs-merger", "role": "merger",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": []},
|
||||
{"profile_name": "prgs-reconciler", "role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read", "gitea.branch.delete", "runtime.break_glass_restart"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": []},
|
||||
{"profile_name": "prgs-controller", "role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": []}, # no capability
|
||||
]
|
||||
for prof in denied:
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Emergency restart required due to deadlock in worker pool",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"], prof)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"], prof)
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
res["blocker_kind"],
|
||||
("role_authorization", "permission_denied"),
|
||||
prof,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_env_var_cannot_grant_authorization_or_bypass_denial(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B2 preserved: env var cannot grant break-glass authorization."""
|
||||
os.environ["GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION"] = "secret-bypass-token"
|
||||
prof = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-author",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create", "runtime.break_glass_restart"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Emergency restart attempting env var bypass",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "role_authorization")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_profile_role_kind_no_substring_authority(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B1/B14: substring lookalikes do not become controller."""
|
||||
for name in (
|
||||
"fake-controller",
|
||||
"controller-copy",
|
||||
"not-controller",
|
||||
"xcontrollerx",
|
||||
"myCONTROLLER",
|
||||
):
|
||||
prof = {
|
||||
"profile_name": name,
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(prof),
|
||||
"author",
|
||||
name,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Role substrings must not promote.
|
||||
for role in ("not-controller", "control-plane", "xcontrollerx"):
|
||||
prof = {"profile_name": "other", "role": role, "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read"]}
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(prof),
|
||||
role,
|
||||
role,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_prgs_controller_retains_declared_reconciler_role(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B14: break-glass capability does not redefine global role."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile(role="reconciler")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(prof), "reconciler")
|
||||
# Declared controller still wins when declared.
|
||||
prof2 = _controller_profile(role="controller")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(prof2), "controller")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_cleanup_merged_pr_branch_role_resolution_unchanged(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B14: prgs-controller with reconciler role still resolves for cleanup."""
|
||||
# When declared reconciler, cleanup gate's role check should see reconciler.
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile(role="reconciler")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(prof), "reconciler")
|
||||
# Fabricated controller-like names with reconciler ops do not become controller.
|
||||
fake = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "fake-controller",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read", "gitea.branch.delete", "gitea.pr.close"
|
||||
],
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.assertEqual(gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(fake), "reconciler")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_narrow_break_glass_capability_does_not_redefine_role(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B14: granting runtime.break_glass_restart does not invent controller role."""
|
||||
prof = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
"runtime.break_glass_restart",
|
||||
],
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.assertEqual(gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(prof), "reconciler")
|
||||
|
||||
# ── B2-style input validation (preserved) ─────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reason_validation(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC2: Reason is required and must be at least 10 characters long."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
for invalid_reason in ["", " ", "too short", "123456789"]:
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason=invalid_reason,
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "missing_required_fields")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_confirmation_validation(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC2: Confirmation phrase must match exact required string."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Emergency restart needed due to stuck daemon processes",
|
||||
confirmation="wrong_confirmation_phrase",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "confirmation_mismatch")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_impact_ack_validation(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC2: impact_ack=True is mandatory."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Emergency restart needed due to stuck daemon processes",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=False,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "impact_ack_required")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_incident_permission_gate(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B3 preserved: Gate incident creation on gitea.issue.create permission."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile(
|
||||
allowed_operations=["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Emergency restart needed due to hung worker process cohort",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
create_incident_issue=True,
|
||||
dry_run=False,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "permission_denied")
|
||||
|
||||
# ── B8: redaction ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
def test_redaction_key_value_and_connection_strings(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B8: key/value, bearer, connection-string, and embedded secrets."""
|
||||
cases = [
|
||||
("password=hunter2supersecret", ["hunter2supersecret"], "password"),
|
||||
("api_key: sk-live-abcdef1234567890ab", ["sk-live-abcdef1234567890ab"], "api_key"),
|
||||
("Server=db;Password=s3cretValue;Uid=sa", ["s3cretValue"], "password"),
|
||||
(
|
||||
"Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.abc.def",
|
||||
["eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.abc.def", "Bearer eyJ"],
|
||||
"authorization",
|
||||
),
|
||||
(
|
||||
"token ghp_1234567890abcdef12345678 embedded",
|
||||
["ghp_1234567890abcdef12345678"],
|
||||
"token",
|
||||
),
|
||||
("nested note password=letmein12345 end", ["letmein12345"], "password"),
|
||||
]
|
||||
for raw, secrets, key in cases:
|
||||
out = gitea_audit._redact_str(raw)
|
||||
self.assertIn("[REDACTED]", out, raw)
|
||||
for secret in secrets:
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(secret, out, raw)
|
||||
self.assertIn(key, out.lower(), raw)
|
||||
|
||||
nested = gitea_audit.redact({
|
||||
"reason": "password=supersecret99",
|
||||
"items": [{"api_key": "abc123xyz"}, "token ghp_abcdefghijklmnop1234"],
|
||||
"error": RuntimeError("pwd=nestedSecret99"),
|
||||
})
|
||||
# Exception objects pass through redact as non-str/non-container; ensure
|
||||
# string forms are covered via str conversion in _redact_str usage.
|
||||
self.assertEqual(nested["items"][0]["api_key"], gitea_audit.REDACTED)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("supersecret99", nested["reason"])
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("ghp_abcdefghijklmnop1234", nested["items"][1])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_redaction_preserves_benign_sec_prefix_text(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B8: ordinary text beginning with sec- must not be erased."""
|
||||
benign = (
|
||||
"Emergency restart in sec-primary-region for sector-planning "
|
||||
"and secondary-health checks"
|
||||
)
|
||||
out = gitea_audit._redact_str(benign)
|
||||
self.assertIn("sec-primary-region", out)
|
||||
self.assertIn("sector-planning", out)
|
||||
self.assertIn("secondary-health", out)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("[REDACTED]", out)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_redaction_across_break_glass_surfaces(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B8: operator reason is redacted on result, incident, and audit surfaces."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
raw_reason = (
|
||||
"Emergency restart: password=supersecret99 api_key: "
|
||||
"sk-live-abcdef1234567890ab and url https://user:[email protected]/api"
|
||||
)
|
||||
mock_api_request = MagicMock(return_value={"number": 101, "title": "[INCIDENT]"})
|
||||
fake_exec = {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"apply_supported": True,
|
||||
"apply_authorized": True,
|
||||
"restart_performed": True,
|
||||
"break_glass_executed": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = lambda req: fake_exec
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "api_request", mock_api_request
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_reconcile_after_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"success": True},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
|
||||
):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason=raw_reason,
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=False,
|
||||
create_incident_issue=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("supersecret99", res["reason"])
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("sk-live-abcdef1234567890ab", res["reason"])
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("user:[email protected]", res["reason"])
|
||||
posted_body = mock_api_request.call_args[0][3]["body"]
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("supersecret99", posted_body)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("sk-live-abcdef1234567890ab", posted_body)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── B6/B11: reachable executor / truthful flags ───────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dry_run_never_executes_and_reports_false(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B7/B6: dry-run never executes; break_glass_executed always false."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
called = {"n": 0}
|
||||
|
||||
def _should_not_run(_req):
|
||||
called["n"] += 1
|
||||
return {"restart_performed": True, "break_glass_executed": True}
|
||||
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = _should_not_run
|
||||
mock_audit = MagicMock()
|
||||
mock_api = MagicMock()
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"affected_sessions": [{"session_id": "s1"}]},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "write_event", mock_audit
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "api_request", mock_api
|
||||
):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Emergency restart preview in dry-run mode",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["dry_run"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["would_execute"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(called["n"], 0)
|
||||
mock_audit.assert_not_called()
|
||||
mock_api.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unsupported_apply_truthful(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B6/B11: unsupported apply returns blocked result, execution false."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = lambda req: {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"apply_supported": False,
|
||||
"apply_authorized": False,
|
||||
"restart_performed": False,
|
||||
"break_glass_executed": False,
|
||||
"reasons": ["no hook"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "api_request",
|
||||
return_value={"number": 555, "title": "[INCIDENT]"},
|
||||
):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Privileged restart request with unsupported apply",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=False,
|
||||
create_incident_issue=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "apply_unsupported")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_delegation_success_rejection_and_failure(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B6/B11: distinct terminal states for success / rejection / failure."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
|
||||
def _run(exec_result, recon=None):
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = lambda req: exec_result
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_reconcile_after_restart",
|
||||
return_value=recon or {"success": True},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "api_request",
|
||||
return_value={"number": 555, "title": "[INCIDENT]"},
|
||||
):
|
||||
return gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Privileged break-glass restart delegation path",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=False,
|
||||
create_incident_issue=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
ok = _run({
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"apply_supported": True,
|
||||
"apply_authorized": True,
|
||||
"restart_performed": True,
|
||||
"break_glass_executed": True,
|
||||
})
|
||||
self.assertTrue(ok["success"], ok)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(ok["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(ok["performed"])
|
||||
|
||||
rejected = _run({
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"apply_supported": True,
|
||||
"apply_authorized": False,
|
||||
"restart_performed": False,
|
||||
"break_glass_executed": False,
|
||||
"reasons": ["class denied"],
|
||||
})
|
||||
self.assertFalse(rejected["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(rejected["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rejected["blocker_kind"], "restart_delegation_failed")
|
||||
|
||||
failed = _run({
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"apply_supported": True,
|
||||
"apply_authorized": True,
|
||||
"restart_performed": False,
|
||||
"break_glass_executed": False,
|
||||
"reasons": ["executor error"],
|
||||
})
|
||||
self.assertFalse(failed["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(failed["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(failed["blocker_kind"], "restart_delegation_failed")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reconciliation_success_and_failure_truthful_flags(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B10 preserved: recon failure keeps break_glass_executed=true."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = lambda req: {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"apply_supported": True,
|
||||
"apply_authorized": True,
|
||||
"restart_performed": True,
|
||||
"break_glass_executed": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_reconcile_after_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"success": False, "error": "lease cleanup failed"},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "api_request",
|
||||
return_value={"number": 555, "title": "[INCIDENT]"},
|
||||
):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Privileged restart request with failing reconciliation",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=False,
|
||||
create_incident_issue=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["performed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "reconciliation_failed")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_authorization_is_not_execution(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B6: apply_authorized alone never sets break_glass_executed."""
|
||||
# Default executor without hook → unsupported, not executed.
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "api_request",
|
||||
return_value={"number": 555, "title": "[INCIDENT]"},
|
||||
):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Privileged restart without host hook configured",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=False,
|
||||
create_incident_issue=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "apply_unsupported")
|
||||
|
||||
# ── preserved fail-closed pre-exec (B5/B9) ────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
def test_audit_failure_before_execution_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B9 preserved: Audit recording failure stops execution fail-closed."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
called = {"n": 0}
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = lambda req: called.__setitem__("n", called["n"] + 1) or {}
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=False
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "api_request", MagicMock()
|
||||
):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Emergency restart with failing audit sink",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=False,
|
||||
create_incident_issue=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "audit_recording_failed")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(called["n"], 0)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_incident_creation_failure_before_execution_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B5 preserved: Incident creation failure stops execution fail-closed."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
called = {"n": 0}
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = lambda req: called.__setitem__("n", called["n"] + 1) or {}
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "api_request",
|
||||
side_effect=RuntimeError("Gitea 500 API Error"),
|
||||
):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Emergency restart with failing incident POST",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=False,
|
||||
create_incident_issue=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "incident_creation_failed")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(called["n"], 0)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_incident_opt_out_on_real_execution_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B5 preserved: create_incident_issue=False fails closed on real execution."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
|
||||
):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Emergency restart trying to skip incident creation",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=False,
|
||||
create_incident_issue=False,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "incident_creation_required")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_audit_disabled_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B9 preserved: Disabling audit recording blocks execution fail-closed."""
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=False
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
|
||||
):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Emergency restart with disabled audit logging",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=False,
|
||||
create_incident_issue=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "audit_recording_failed")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_capability_map_registration(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B12/B13: capability map registers exact runtime.break_glass_restart."""
|
||||
from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP
|
||||
entry = TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP.get("gitea_break_glass_restart")
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(entry)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(entry["permission"], "runtime.break_glass_restart")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(entry["role"], "controller")
|
||||
entry2 = TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP.get("break_glass_restart")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(entry2["permission"], "runtime.break_glass_restart")
|
||||
|
||||
# ── B8 / B6 / B15 remediation tests ─────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
def test_b8_redaction_gitea_token_and_uri_credentials(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B8: GITEA_TOKEN= and URI userinfo credentials redacted without erasing neighbours."""
|
||||
# GITEA_TOKEN= with underscore key
|
||||
out1 = gitea_audit._redact_str("failed with GITEA_TOKEN=synthetic_tok_123456789")
|
||||
self.assertIn("GITEA_TOKEN=[REDACTED]", out1)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("synthetic_tok_123456789", out1)
|
||||
|
||||
# Connection string with URI userinfo
|
||||
out2 = gitea_audit._redact_str("conn postgres://user:[email protected]:5432/app")
|
||||
self.assertIn("postgres://[REDACTED_USER]:[REDACTED_PASS]@db.internal:5432/app", out2)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("s3cr3tpw", out2)
|
||||
|
||||
# Value boundary preserving adjacent audit evidence (correlation_id, incident_number)
|
||||
raw_audit = "password=secret123;correlation_id=bg-7f2a1c;incident_number=4242"
|
||||
out3 = gitea_audit._redact_str(raw_audit)
|
||||
self.assertIn("password=[REDACTED]", out3)
|
||||
self.assertIn("correlation_id=bg-7f2a1c", out3)
|
||||
self.assertIn("incident_number=4242", out3)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("secret123", out3)
|
||||
|
||||
# Query param boundary in URL preserving adjacent parameters
|
||||
raw_url = "token=abc-123&pr=908&issue=664&head=c67f39b4"
|
||||
out4 = gitea_audit._redact_str(raw_url)
|
||||
self.assertIn("token=[REDACTED]", out4)
|
||||
self.assertIn("pr=908", out4)
|
||||
self.assertIn("issue=664", out4)
|
||||
self.assertIn("head=c67f39b4", out4)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_b6_default_executor_environment_text_cannot_imply_execution(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B6/B11: GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK string alone returns break_glass_executed=False."""
|
||||
os.environ["GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK"] = "this-string-is-never-invoked"
|
||||
prof = _controller_profile()
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
|
||||
return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server, "api_request",
|
||||
return_value={"number": 555, "title": "[INCIDENT]"},
|
||||
):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Privileged restart request with non-empty hook env var",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=False,
|
||||
create_incident_issue=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "restart_delegation_failed")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_b15_production_prgs_controller_grant_set_and_gates(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""B15: Genuine prgs-controller carrying runtime.break_glass_restart and gitea.issue.create passes real gates."""
|
||||
# Full production-shaped prgs-controller profile
|
||||
prod_profile = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-controller",
|
||||
"execution_profile": "prgs-controller",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.close",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
"runtime.break_glass_restart",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# 1. Real _profile_operation_gate checks
|
||||
p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prod_profile):
|
||||
# Both required operations pass the real operation gate (no stubs)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._profile_operation_gate("runtime.break_glass_restart"),
|
||||
[],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
gitea_mcp_server._profile_operation_gate("gitea.issue.create"),
|
||||
[],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Missing gitea.issue.create fails incident creation gate
|
||||
no_issue_create = dict(prod_profile)
|
||||
no_issue_create["allowed_operations"] = [
|
||||
"gitea.read", "gitea.pr.close", "runtime.break_glass_restart"
|
||||
]
|
||||
with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
|
||||
with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=no_issue_create):
|
||||
res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
|
||||
reason="Restart testing missing gitea.issue.create permission",
|
||||
confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
|
||||
impact_ack=True,
|
||||
dry_run=False,
|
||||
create_incident_issue=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "permission_denied")
|
||||
self.assertIn("gitea.issue.create", " ".join(res.get("reasons") or []))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -112,19 +112,7 @@ class TestIssue686ManualMcpProvenance(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("All matching profiles for task 'create_issue' (['prgs-author']) are running but stale" in r for r in reasons))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_namespace_health_classification_includes_provenance(self):
|
||||
"""AC 1 & 4: mcp_namespace_health diagnostics include provenance and unconsumed_gitea_env.
|
||||
|
||||
#948 narrowed the vocabulary here. This process carries no client-managed
|
||||
declaration, so the old code labelled it ``manual_launch`` — asserting a
|
||||
hand-launched terminal process it had no evidence for, and contradicting
|
||||
``gitea_get_runtime_context``, which read the same process and reported
|
||||
``client_managed``. Absence of proof is now reported as ``unproven``.
|
||||
|
||||
The #686 wall itself is unchanged and still asserted below:
|
||||
``is_client_managed`` stays False, so nothing previously refused is now
|
||||
permitted. Only the label on the *reason* changed, so remediation names
|
||||
the proof that is actually missing.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""AC 1 & 4: mcp_namespace_health diagnostics include provenance and unconsumed_gitea_env."""
|
||||
process = {
|
||||
"pid": 5555,
|
||||
"profile": "prgs-author",
|
||||
@@ -141,12 +129,10 @@ class TestIssue686ManualMcpProvenance(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
process=process,
|
||||
probe_source="client_namespace",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["provenance"], "unproven")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["provenance"], "manual_launch")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["is_client_managed"])
|
||||
# The wall is intact: no client-managed proof still fails closed.
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["provenance_fail_closed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["unconsumed_gitea_env"], {"GITEA_DUMMY": "99"})
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["diagnostics"]["provenance"], "unproven")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["diagnostics"]["provenance"], "manual_launch")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,269 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Regression tests for Issue #708 wiring: detection must reach a gate, not just exist.
|
||||
|
||||
The prior #708 slice added a pure decision function with no call site, so a session
|
||||
whose namespaces were Connected-but-unattached still passed every mutation gate.
|
||||
These tests pin the parts that make the detection load-bearing:
|
||||
|
||||
* the typed condition is distinct from #672 / #584 / #685,
|
||||
* the session store records a per-namespace attachment verdict,
|
||||
* review/merge mutations fail closed while a required namespace is unattached,
|
||||
* recovery is reconnect-only and never suggests an unsafe fallback,
|
||||
* startup ordering races and discovery-cache telemetry are reported,
|
||||
* a healthy final report cannot be produced without attachment proof.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_namespace_health
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
REQUIRED = ["gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger", "gitea-tools"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _connected_but_unattached():
|
||||
"""The #708 signature: host says Connected, session tool surface is empty."""
|
||||
return mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=REQUIRED,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=[],
|
||||
required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- AC1: distinct typed detection -----------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_connected_with_empty_session_tool_list_is_typed_distinctly():
|
||||
res = _connected_but_unattached()
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
assert res["discovery_status"] == "connected_but_namespaces_missing"
|
||||
assert res["error_type"] == "mcp_connected_namespaces_missing"
|
||||
assert sorted(res["missing_namespaces"]) == sorted(REQUIRED)
|
||||
# Not misclassified as config drift (#672), transport-closed (#584), or EOF (#685).
|
||||
assert res["error_type"] not in {
|
||||
"mcp_config_drift",
|
||||
"transport_closed",
|
||||
"mcp_client_eof",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_proof_carries_connected_and_attached_per_namespace():
|
||||
res = _connected_but_unattached()
|
||||
proof = res["proof_of_connected_vs_attached"]
|
||||
for ns in REQUIRED:
|
||||
assert proof[ns] == {"connected": True, "attached": False}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- AC2: recovery is auto-attach or reconnect-only -------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_exact_next_action_is_reconnect_only():
|
||||
res = _connected_but_unattached()
|
||||
assert res["reconnect_required"] is True
|
||||
action = res["exact_next_action"]
|
||||
assert "Reconnect the IDE/client MCP session" in action
|
||||
for forbidden in ("pkill", "chmod", "curl", ".env", "sys.path"):
|
||||
assert forbidden not in action
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_sanctioned_recovery_tool_is_named():
|
||||
res = _connected_but_unattached()
|
||||
assert res["sanctioned_recovery_tool"] == "gitea_request_mcp_reconnect"
|
||||
assert "gitea_request_mcp_reconnect" in " ".join(res["remediation"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_successful_auto_attach_reports_recovered_without_operator():
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=REQUIRED,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
auto_attach_attempted=True,
|
||||
auto_attach_succeeded=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is True
|
||||
assert res["auto_recovered"] is True
|
||||
assert res["reconnect_required"] is False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_failed_auto_attach_still_requires_reconnect():
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=REQUIRED,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=[],
|
||||
required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
auto_attach_attempted=True,
|
||||
auto_attach_succeeded=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert res["auto_recovered"] is False
|
||||
assert res["reconnect_required"] is True
|
||||
assert any("did not succeed" in r for r in res["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reconnect_rediscovery_clears_the_condition():
|
||||
"""Attach state after a reconnect is healthy without any other change."""
|
||||
before = _connected_but_unattached()
|
||||
after = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=REQUIRED,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
discovery_cache_hit=False,
|
||||
discovery_cache_age_seconds=0.0,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert before["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
assert after["attachment_healthy"] is True
|
||||
assert after["discovery_status"] == "namespaces_attached"
|
||||
assert after["missing_namespaces"] == []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- AC4: startup ordering across multiple role servers ---------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_multi_role_startup_ordering_race_is_reported():
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=REQUIRED,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=["gitea-author"],
|
||||
required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
session_tool_snapshot_at=1000.0,
|
||||
namespace_connected_at={
|
||||
"gitea-author": 990.0,
|
||||
"gitea-reviewer": 1005.0,
|
||||
"gitea-merger": 1007.0,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert res["startup_ordering_race"] is True
|
||||
assert res["late_attaching_namespaces"] == ["gitea-merger", "gitea-reviewer"]
|
||||
assert res["telemetry"]["startup_ordering_race"] is True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_ordering_race_when_snapshot_follows_connect():
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=REQUIRED,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
session_tool_snapshot_at=2000.0,
|
||||
namespace_connected_at={ns: 1000.0 for ns in REQUIRED},
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert res["startup_ordering_race"] is False
|
||||
assert res["late_attaching_namespaces"] == []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- AC5: telemetry ---------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_telemetry_reports_cache_and_recovery_signals():
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=REQUIRED,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=["gitea-author"],
|
||||
required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
discovery_cache_hit=True,
|
||||
discovery_cache_age_seconds=42.5,
|
||||
)
|
||||
tel = res["telemetry"]
|
||||
assert tel["connected_count"] == 4
|
||||
assert tel["attached_count"] == 1
|
||||
assert tel["missing_count"] == 3
|
||||
assert tel["discovery_cache_hit"] is True
|
||||
assert tel["discovery_cache_age_seconds"] == 42.5
|
||||
assert tel["reconnect_required"] is True
|
||||
assert tel["error_type"] == "mcp_connected_namespaces_missing"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_telemetry_leaks_no_secrets():
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=REQUIRED,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=[],
|
||||
required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
)
|
||||
blob = repr(res["telemetry"]).lower()
|
||||
for leak in ("token", "authorization", "password", "secret", "/users/", "http"):
|
||||
assert leak not in blob
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- AC2/AC6: fail-closed mutation gate -------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _session_store_from(assessment):
|
||||
"""Mirror the server-side recorder without importing the MCP server module."""
|
||||
store = {}
|
||||
missing = set(assessment["missing_namespaces"])
|
||||
for ns, state in assessment["proof_of_connected_vs_attached"].items():
|
||||
attached = bool(state["attached"])
|
||||
store[ns] = {
|
||||
"namespace": ns,
|
||||
"connected": bool(state["connected"]),
|
||||
"attached": attached,
|
||||
"attachment_healthy": attached and ns not in missing,
|
||||
"error_type": None if attached else assessment["error_type"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
return store
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_review_and_merge_fail_closed_while_unattached():
|
||||
store = _session_store_from(_connected_but_unattached())
|
||||
for task in ("review_pr", "submit_review", "merge_pr", "create_pr", "work_issue"):
|
||||
reasons = mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session(task, store)
|
||||
assert reasons, f"{task} must fail closed while its namespace is unattached"
|
||||
assert "fail closed, #708" in reasons[0]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_gate_offers_only_sanctioned_recovery():
|
||||
store = _session_store_from(_connected_but_unattached())
|
||||
reasons = mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", store)
|
||||
joined = " ".join(reasons)
|
||||
assert "reconnect" in joined.lower()
|
||||
assert "Workflow Safety Hard Stop (#708)" in joined
|
||||
# Unsafe fallbacks appear only inside the prohibition, never as advice.
|
||||
assert "NEVER use" in joined
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_gate_passes_once_namespaces_are_attached():
|
||||
healthy = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=REQUIRED,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
)
|
||||
store = _session_store_from(healthy)
|
||||
for task in ("review_pr", "submit_review", "merge_pr", "create_pr", "work_issue"):
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session(task, store) == []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unassessed_session_does_not_gate():
|
||||
"""No recorded assessment must not fabricate a block (matches #543 semantics)."""
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", {}) == []
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", None) == []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unmapped_task_is_not_gated():
|
||||
store = _session_store_from(_connected_but_unattached())
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("gitea_read", store) == []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_partial_attachment_gates_only_the_affected_role():
|
||||
"""Author attached, reviewer not: author work proceeds, review fails closed."""
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=REQUIRED,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=["gitea-author", "gitea-tools"],
|
||||
required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
)
|
||||
store = _session_store_from(res)
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("work_issue", store) == []
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("review_pr", store)
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", store)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- AC4: no false healthy report without attachment proof ------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_false_healthy_without_attachment_proof():
|
||||
"""Connected alone never yields a healthy verdict."""
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=REQUIRED,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=None,
|
||||
required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert res["success"] is False
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
assert res["telemetry"]["attached_count"] == 0
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_attachment_gate_maps_each_role_namespace():
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.required_namespace_for_attachment("review_pr") == "gitea-reviewer"
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.required_namespace_for_attachment("merge_pr") == "gitea-merger"
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.required_namespace_for_attachment("create_pr") == "gitea-author"
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.required_namespace_for_attachment("nope") is None
|
||||
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Unit regression tests for Issue #708: Connected-but-namespaces-missing detection and attachment safety."""
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_namespace_health
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_assess_connected_namespace_attachment_success():
|
||||
# required_namespaces is declared explicitly: these three are the namespaces this case
|
||||
# is about. Relying on the default (which also requires gitea-tools) would ask for a
|
||||
# healthy verdict covering a required namespace that was never connected — exactly the
|
||||
# false-healthy classification these tests now forbid.
|
||||
connected = ["gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger"]
|
||||
attached = ["gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger"]
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=connected,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=attached,
|
||||
required_namespaces=connected,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert res["success"] is True
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is True
|
||||
assert res["discovery_status"] == "namespaces_attached"
|
||||
assert res["error_type"] is None
|
||||
assert res["missing_namespaces"] == []
|
||||
assert res["exact_next_action"] == "None; session tool namespaces attached."
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_assess_connected_namespace_attachment_missing():
|
||||
# Every required namespace here *is* connected, so the only condition present is the
|
||||
# #708 one: Connected at the host, absent from the session tool surface.
|
||||
connected = ["gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger"]
|
||||
attached = ["gitea-author"]
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=connected,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=attached,
|
||||
required_namespaces=connected,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert res["success"] is False
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
assert res["discovery_status"] == "connected_but_namespaces_missing"
|
||||
assert res["error_type"] == "mcp_connected_namespaces_missing"
|
||||
assert "gitea-reviewer" in res["missing_namespaces"]
|
||||
assert "gitea-merger" in res["missing_namespaces"]
|
||||
assert "Reconnect the IDE/client MCP session" in res["exact_next_action"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_assess_connected_namespace_attachment_disconnected():
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=[],
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=[],
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert res["success"] is False
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
assert res["discovery_status"] == "disconnected"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_proof_of_connected_vs_attached_mapping():
|
||||
connected = ["gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer"]
|
||||
attached = ["gitea-author"]
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=connected,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=attached,
|
||||
)
|
||||
proof = res["proof_of_connected_vs_attached"]
|
||||
assert proof["gitea-author"] == {"connected": True, "attached": True}
|
||||
assert proof["gitea-reviewer"] == {"connected": True, "attached": False}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unsafe_fallback_policy_enforcement():
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=["gitea-author"],
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=[],
|
||||
)
|
||||
policy = res["unsafe_fallback_policy"]
|
||||
assert "Workflow Safety Hard Stop (#708)" in policy
|
||||
assert "direct imports" in policy
|
||||
assert "API mutations" in policy
|
||||
assert "profile hopping" in policy
|
||||
assert "session-state overrides" in policy
|
||||
@@ -1,283 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Regression tests for Issue #708 B2: not-connected is not Connected-but-unattached.
|
||||
|
||||
The first #708 slice counted a namespace as ``missing`` only when it appeared in
|
||||
``connected_servers``. A *required* namespace absent from that inventory was therefore
|
||||
never counted at all, so the session reported ``attachment_healthy: true`` with
|
||||
``error_type: None`` while holding no attachment proof for it — and the gate text told the
|
||||
operator "the host reports Connected" about a service nothing had reported Connected.
|
||||
|
||||
These tests pin the corrected distinction:
|
||||
|
||||
* required and not connected never yields a healthy verdict,
|
||||
* it is typed ``mcp_required_namespaces_not_connected``, never the #708 condition,
|
||||
* ``mcp_connected_namespaces_missing`` stays reserved for genuinely Connected namespaces,
|
||||
* both categories still fail review and merge closed, with their own reason,
|
||||
* per-namespace ``connected``/``attached`` evidence is reported accurately,
|
||||
* one session's evidence cannot clear another session's block.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_namespace_health
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
ROLES = ["gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger", "gitea-tools"]
|
||||
|
||||
NOT_CONNECTED = mcp_namespace_health.ERROR_REQUIRED_NAMESPACES_NOT_CONNECTED
|
||||
CONNECTED_MISSING = mcp_namespace_health.ERROR_CONNECTED_NAMESPACES_MISSING
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _assess(connected, attached, required):
|
||||
return mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=connected,
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=attached,
|
||||
required_namespaces=required,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _store(assessment):
|
||||
"""The recorder contract: per-namespace verdicts feed the gate."""
|
||||
return dict(assessment["namespace_conditions"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- the four evidence combinations ----------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_connected_and_attached_is_healthy():
|
||||
res = _assess(ROLES, ROLES, ROLES)
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is True
|
||||
assert res["error_type"] is None
|
||||
assert res["missing_namespaces"] == []
|
||||
assert res["not_connected_namespaces"] == []
|
||||
assert res["discovery_status"] == "namespaces_attached"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_connected_but_unattached_keeps_the_708_condition():
|
||||
res = _assess(ROLES, ["gitea-author"], ROLES)
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
assert res["error_type"] == CONNECTED_MISSING
|
||||
assert res["not_connected_namespaces"] == []
|
||||
assert sorted(res["missing_namespaces"]) == [
|
||||
"gitea-merger",
|
||||
"gitea-reviewer",
|
||||
"gitea-tools",
|
||||
]
|
||||
assert res["discovery_status"] == "connected_but_namespaces_missing"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_required_but_not_connected_is_never_healthy():
|
||||
"""The reviewer's exact reproduction from review 637."""
|
||||
res = _assess(
|
||||
["gitea-reviewer"], ["gitea-reviewer"], ["gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
assert res["success"] is False
|
||||
assert res["error_type"] is not None
|
||||
assert res["telemetry"]["not_connected_count"] == 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_required_but_not_connected_is_typed_distinctly():
|
||||
res = _assess(
|
||||
["gitea-reviewer"], ["gitea-reviewer"], ["gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert res["error_type"] == NOT_CONNECTED
|
||||
assert res["discovery_status"] == "required_namespaces_not_connected"
|
||||
assert res["not_connected_namespaces"] == ["gitea-merger"]
|
||||
# Not collapsed into the #708 condition, nor into config drift (#672) or
|
||||
# transport-closed (#584).
|
||||
assert CONNECTED_MISSING not in res["error_types"]
|
||||
assert res["missing_namespaces"] == []
|
||||
assert res["error_type"] not in {"mcp_config_drift", "transport_closed"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_not_connected_reason_makes_no_connected_claim():
|
||||
res = _assess(
|
||||
["gitea-reviewer"], ["gitea-reviewer"], ["gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
about_merger = [r for r in res["reasons"] if "gitea-merger" in r]
|
||||
assert about_merger, "the not-connected namespace must be named in the reasons"
|
||||
for reason in about_merger:
|
||||
assert "report Connected at host/CLI layer" not in reason
|
||||
assert "gitea-merger" in res["exact_next_action"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_neither_connected_nor_attached_reports_disconnected():
|
||||
res = _assess([], [], ROLES)
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
assert res["discovery_status"] == "disconnected"
|
||||
assert res["error_type"] == NOT_CONNECTED
|
||||
assert sorted(res["not_connected_namespaces"]) == sorted(ROLES)
|
||||
assert res["missing_namespaces"] == []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- mixed required namespaces ---------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mixed_connected_attached_and_not_connected():
|
||||
res = _assess(
|
||||
["gitea-author"], ["gitea-author"], ["gitea-author", "gitea-merger"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
assert res["not_connected_namespaces"] == ["gitea-merger"]
|
||||
assert res["missing_namespaces"] == []
|
||||
conditions = res["namespace_conditions"]
|
||||
assert conditions["gitea-author"]["attachment_healthy"] is True
|
||||
assert conditions["gitea-author"]["condition"] is None
|
||||
assert conditions["gitea-merger"]["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
assert conditions["gitea-merger"]["condition"] == NOT_CONNECTED
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_both_conditions_present_are_both_reported():
|
||||
"""One namespace Connected-but-unattached, another never connected."""
|
||||
res = _assess(
|
||||
["gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer"],
|
||||
["gitea-author"],
|
||||
["gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert res["missing_namespaces"] == ["gitea-reviewer"]
|
||||
assert res["not_connected_namespaces"] == ["gitea-merger"]
|
||||
# Neither condition is hidden by the other; error_type names the primary one.
|
||||
assert sorted(res["error_types"]) == sorted([NOT_CONNECTED, CONNECTED_MISSING])
|
||||
assert res["error_type"] == NOT_CONNECTED
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- unknown, partial, malformed, contradictory evidence --------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unknown_attachment_evidence_is_not_healthy():
|
||||
"""No session tool surface reported at all is unproven, not proven good."""
|
||||
res = _assess(ROLES, None, ROLES)
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
assert res["telemetry"]["attached_count"] == 0
|
||||
assert res["error_type"] == CONNECTED_MISSING
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_partial_evidence_gates_only_the_unproven_roles():
|
||||
res = _assess(ROLES, ["gitea-author", "gitea-tools"], ROLES)
|
||||
store = _store(res)
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("work_issue", store) == []
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("review_pr", store)
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", store)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_malformed_namespace_entries_are_discarded_not_trusted():
|
||||
"""Blank and whitespace-only names must not become namespaces or proof."""
|
||||
res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
|
||||
connected_servers=["gitea-author", "", " "],
|
||||
attached_session_namespaces=["gitea-author", ""],
|
||||
required_namespaces=["gitea-author", " "],
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert "" not in res["proof_of_connected_vs_attached"]
|
||||
assert " " not in res["proof_of_connected_vs_attached"]
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is True
|
||||
assert res["telemetry"]["required_count"] == 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_contradictory_attached_without_connected_fails_closed():
|
||||
"""Attached in the session yet absent from the connected inventory."""
|
||||
res = _assess(["gitea-author"], ["gitea-author", "gitea-merger"], ROLES)
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
assert "gitea-merger" in res["contradictory_namespaces"]
|
||||
assert "gitea-merger" in res["not_connected_namespaces"]
|
||||
assert res["namespace_conditions"]["gitea-merger"]["contradictory_evidence"] is True
|
||||
assert res["namespace_conditions"]["gitea-merger"]["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
assert any("contradictory evidence" in r for r in res["reasons"])
|
||||
assert res["telemetry"]["contradictory_count"] >= 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_duplicate_required_entries_are_counted_once():
|
||||
res = _assess(["gitea-author"], ["gitea-author"], ["gitea-author", "gitea-author"])
|
||||
assert res["telemetry"]["required_count"] == 1
|
||||
assert res["attachment_healthy"] is True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- review and merge behaviour for both failure categories -----------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_merge_fails_closed_when_required_namespace_never_connected():
|
||||
store = _store(_assess(["gitea-author"], ["gitea-author"], ROLES))
|
||||
reasons = mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", store)
|
||||
assert reasons
|
||||
assert NOT_CONNECTED in reasons[0]
|
||||
assert "fail closed, #708" in reasons[0]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_review_fails_closed_when_required_namespace_never_connected():
|
||||
store = _store(_assess(["gitea-author"], ["gitea-author"], ROLES))
|
||||
reasons = mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("review_pr", store)
|
||||
assert reasons
|
||||
assert NOT_CONNECTED in reasons[0]
|
||||
assert "fail closed, #708" in reasons[0]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_not_connected_block_never_claims_the_host_reports_connected():
|
||||
store = _store(_assess(["gitea-author"], ["gitea-author"], ROLES))
|
||||
reasons = mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", store)
|
||||
assert "the host reports Connected" not in reasons[0]
|
||||
assert "absent from the connected-service inventory" in reasons[0]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_connected_but_unattached_block_still_says_connected():
|
||||
store = _store(_assess(ROLES, ["gitea-author"], ROLES))
|
||||
reasons = mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", store)
|
||||
assert CONNECTED_MISSING in reasons[0]
|
||||
assert "the host reports Connected" in reasons[0]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_both_categories_offer_only_the_sanctioned_recovery():
|
||||
for store in (
|
||||
_store(_assess(ROLES, [], ROLES)),
|
||||
_store(_assess(["gitea-author"], ["gitea-author"], ROLES)),
|
||||
):
|
||||
reasons = mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", store)
|
||||
joined = " ".join(reasons)
|
||||
assert "reconnect" in joined.lower()
|
||||
assert "Workflow Safety Hard Stop (#708)" in joined
|
||||
for forbidden in ("pkill", "chmod", "curl ", ".env", "sys.path"):
|
||||
assert forbidden not in reasons[0]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_entry_without_connected_evidence_blocks_without_asserting_either():
|
||||
"""A legacy/partial store entry must fail closed and claim nothing it cannot prove."""
|
||||
store = {"gitea-merger": {"namespace": "gitea-merger", "attached": False}}
|
||||
reasons = mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", store)
|
||||
assert reasons
|
||||
assert "no connected-status evidence" in reasons[0]
|
||||
assert "the host reports Connected" not in reasons[0]
|
||||
assert "fail closed, #708" in reasons[0]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- session isolation ------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_one_session_evidence_does_not_clear_another_session_block():
|
||||
"""Attachment evidence is per-session state; it must not travel between sessions."""
|
||||
blocked_session = _store(_assess(["gitea-author"], ["gitea-author"], ROLES))
|
||||
healthy_session = _store(_assess(ROLES, ROLES, ROLES))
|
||||
|
||||
assert (
|
||||
mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", healthy_session)
|
||||
== []
|
||||
)
|
||||
# The healthy session's verdict is not consulted for the blocked session.
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", blocked_session)
|
||||
# And the blocked session's store is unchanged by the healthy one existing.
|
||||
assert blocked_session["gitea-merger"]["attachment_healthy"] is False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_gate_reads_only_the_store_it_is_given():
|
||||
healthy_session = _store(_assess(ROLES, ROLES, ROLES))
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", {}) == []
|
||||
assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", None) == []
|
||||
assert (
|
||||
mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", healthy_session)
|
||||
== []
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- telemetry stays secret-free -------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_not_connected_telemetry_leaks_no_secrets():
|
||||
res = _assess(["gitea-author"], ["gitea-author"], ROLES)
|
||||
blob = repr(res["telemetry"]).lower()
|
||||
for leak in ("token", "authorization", "password", "secret", "/users/", "http"):
|
||||
assert leak not in blob
|
||||
@@ -1,924 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Transport-neutral MCP bind seam (#931).
|
||||
|
||||
These tests drive the *real* bind boundary — ``mark_sanctioned_daemon`` followed
|
||||
by ``bind_native_mcp_transport`` from a canonical entrypoint path, with the
|
||||
pytest allowance switched off — rather than mocking the new accessor. The
|
||||
distinction matters here for the same reason it mattered in #941: a suite that
|
||||
only exercises the helper in isolation cannot observe a seam that the live path
|
||||
never reaches.
|
||||
|
||||
Covered:
|
||||
|
||||
1. no configured transport defaults to the local transport
|
||||
2. explicit local transport binds
|
||||
3. the sanctioned remote identifier binds through the seam
|
||||
4. an unregistered identifier is rejected at bind time
|
||||
5. an invalid bind prevents the server reaching tool service
|
||||
6. the unbound state fails closed where a bind is required
|
||||
7. every transport-aware guard reads the same authoritative value
|
||||
8. client-controlled input cannot alter the bound transport
|
||||
9. the durable decision-lock record carries the selected transport
|
||||
10. existing stdio behaviour is unchanged
|
||||
11. repeated / conflicting bind attempts follow one fail-closed contract
|
||||
12. capability, role, repository and provenance protections do not regress
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
import mcp_session_state
|
||||
import mcp_transport_config
|
||||
import irrecoverable_provenance
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _ProductionBind:
|
||||
"""Context manager that reaches the real production bind path.
|
||||
|
||||
Patches only the two things a unit test cannot otherwise satisfy: the
|
||||
resolved canonical entrypoint frame, and the pytest allowance that would
|
||||
short-circuit ``mark_sanctioned_daemon``. Everything downstream of those —
|
||||
validation, pinning, the rebind contract — runs unmodified.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, env: dict[str, str] | None = None):
|
||||
self._env = env or {}
|
||||
self._stack: list = []
|
||||
|
||||
def __enter__(self):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
canonical = str((REPO_ROOT / "mcp_server.py").resolve())
|
||||
self._stack = [
|
||||
patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard,
|
||||
"_caller_official_entrypoint_path",
|
||||
side_effect=lambda: canonical,
|
||||
),
|
||||
patch.object(mcp_daemon_guard, "is_pytest_runtime", return_value=False),
|
||||
patch.dict(os.environ, self._env),
|
||||
]
|
||||
for ctx in self._stack:
|
||||
ctx.__enter__()
|
||||
# Start from a clean configuration unless the test set one.
|
||||
if mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV not in self._env:
|
||||
os.environ.pop(mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV, None)
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.mark_sanctioned_daemon()
|
||||
return mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
|
||||
def __exit__(self, *exc):
|
||||
for ctx in reversed(self._stack):
|
||||
ctx.__exit__(*exc)
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestPermittedSetIsSingleSourceOfTruth(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC3: identifiers are enumerated once, in the seam."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_guard_allowlist_is_the_seam_allowlist(self):
|
||||
self.assertIs(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard._PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS,
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_default_is_a_member_of_the_permitted_set(self):
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_remote_identifier_is_permitted_and_not_the_default(self):
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.is_remote_transport(
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_default_transport_literal_outside_the_seam(self):
|
||||
"""AC3: no production module reads the literal outside the seam.
|
||||
|
||||
Review 635 flagged that a fixed five-module list cannot catch a *new*
|
||||
module reintroducing the literal. This globs every production module in
|
||||
the repository root instead, so the guarantee holds for code that does
|
||||
not exist yet.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
default = mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
needles = (f'"{default}"', f"'{default}'")
|
||||
seam = Path(mcp_transport_config.__file__).name
|
||||
scanned: list[str] = []
|
||||
offenders: list[str] = []
|
||||
for path in sorted(REPO_ROOT.glob("*.py")):
|
||||
if path.name == seam:
|
||||
continue # the seam is the one place the literal may live
|
||||
scanned.append(path.name)
|
||||
for lineno, line in enumerate(
|
||||
path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines(), start=1
|
||||
):
|
||||
code = line.split("#", 1)[0]
|
||||
if any(needle in code for needle in needles):
|
||||
offenders.append(f"{path.name}:{lineno}: {line.strip()}")
|
||||
# Guard the guard: a glob that silently matched nothing would pass.
|
||||
self.assertGreater(len(scanned), 20, "production glob matched too little")
|
||||
self.assertIn("mcp_daemon_guard.py", scanned)
|
||||
self.assertIn("gitea_mcp_server.py", scanned)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(offenders, [], "\n".join(offenders))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestConfiguredTransportResolution(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC1: configuration supplies the identifier; unset still yields the default."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unset_yields_default(self):
|
||||
res = mcp_transport_config.resolve_configured_transport(env={})
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["transport"], mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["configured"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["source"], mcp_transport_config.SOURCE_DEFAULT)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["supported"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["reasons"], [])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_blank_and_whitespace_are_treated_as_unset(self):
|
||||
for raw in ("", " ", "\t\n"):
|
||||
res = mcp_transport_config.resolve_configured_transport(
|
||||
env={mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: raw}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["transport"], mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["configured"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_explicit_default_is_reported_as_configured(self):
|
||||
res = mcp_transport_config.resolve_configured_transport(
|
||||
env={
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["transport"], mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["configured"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["source"], mcp_transport_config.SOURCE_CONFIGURED)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_remote_identifier_resolves_and_is_supported(self):
|
||||
res = mcp_transport_config.resolve_configured_transport(
|
||||
env={
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["transport"], mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["supported"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_case_and_padding_are_normalized(self):
|
||||
padded = f" {mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT.upper()} "
|
||||
res = mcp_transport_config.resolve_configured_transport(
|
||||
env={mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: padded}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["transport"], mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["supported"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unregistered_identifier_is_not_silently_defaulted(self):
|
||||
res = mcp_transport_config.resolve_configured_transport(
|
||||
env={mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: "carrier-pigeon"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["supported"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["transport"], "carrier-pigeon")
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(res["transport"], mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_superseded_sse_transport_is_not_registered(self):
|
||||
"""A real MCP transport that this deployment does not sanction."""
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mcp_transport_config.is_supported_transport("sse"))
|
||||
res = mcp_transport_config.resolve_configured_transport(
|
||||
env={mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: "sse"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["supported"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_require_configured_transport_raises_on_unregistered(self):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(mcp_transport_config.TransportConfigurationError):
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.require_configured_transport(
|
||||
env={mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: "carrier-pigeon"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_non_string_configuration_never_matches_permitted_set(self):
|
||||
for value in (object(), 1, None, True, ["stdio"], {"t": "stdio"}):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(mcp_transport_config.normalize_transport(value), "")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mcp_transport_config.is_supported_transport(value))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestBindSeam(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC1/AC2: the live bind path resolves, validates, and pins."""
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_1_no_configured_transport_binds_default(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
status = guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
status["transport"], mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.bound_transport(), mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(status["production_native_mcp_transport"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_2_explicit_default_transport_binds(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
status = guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
status["transport"], mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(guard.is_production_native_mcp_transport())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_2b_explicit_argument_still_binds(self):
|
||||
"""The pre-#931 call form keeps working for launchers and tests."""
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
status = guard.bind_native_mcp_transport(
|
||||
transport=mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
status["transport"], mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_3_sanctioned_remote_identifier_binds_through_the_seam(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
status = guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
status["transport"], mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.bound_transport(), mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
# The remote identifier is trusted exactly like the local one; the
|
||||
# listener that serves it is #938 and is not implemented here.
|
||||
self.assertTrue(guard.is_native_mcp_transport())
|
||||
self.assertTrue(guard.is_production_native_mcp_transport())
|
||||
guard.assert_production_mutation_runtime("remote-bind")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_4_unregistered_identifier_rejected_at_bind_time(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: "carrier-pigeon"}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertIn("carrier-pigeon", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
self.assertIn("#931", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
# Nothing was bound, so nothing may dispatch.
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(guard.bound_transport())
|
||||
self.assertFalse(guard.is_native_mcp_transport())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_4b_unregistered_explicit_argument_rejected(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport(transport="carrier-pigeon")
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(guard.bound_transport())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_4c_superseded_sse_rejected_at_bind_time(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind({mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: "sse"}) as guard:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(guard.bound_transport())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_5_invalid_bind_prevents_tool_service(self):
|
||||
"""A failed bind must stop the server before it serves tools."""
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: "carrier-pigeon"}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
# This is the exact expression the entrypoint passes to mcp.run.
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
guard.assert_transport_bound("tool service")
|
||||
self.assertIn("No MCP transport is bound", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_6_unbound_state_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
"""Entrypoint claimed but never bound — the offline-import shape."""
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(guard.bound_transport())
|
||||
self.assertFalse(guard.is_native_mcp_transport())
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
guard.assert_transport_bound("tool service")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
guard.assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime("gitea_mutation")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_6b_no_runtime_at_all_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
with patch.object(mcp_daemon_guard, "is_pytest_runtime", return_value=False):
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(mcp_daemon_guard.bound_transport())
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.assert_transport_bound("tool service")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestOneAuthoritativeValue(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC: every transport-aware guard observes the same value."""
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_7_all_guards_read_the_same_bound_value(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
expected = mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertEqual(guard.bound_transport(), expected)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(guard.assert_transport_bound(), expected)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(guard.native_runtime_status()["bound_transport"], expected)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(guard.native_runtime_status()["transport"], expected)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.mutation_provenance_fields()["bound_transport"], expected
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
irrecoverable_provenance.assess_transport_for_auth_mint()[
|
||||
"bound_transport"
|
||||
],
|
||||
expected,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_8_environment_change_after_bind_cannot_move_the_value(self):
|
||||
"""Client- or environment-shaped input must not alter a bound transport."""
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.bound_transport(), mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
# A stray launcher (or an attacker) rewrites config post-bind.
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV] = (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.bound_transport(), mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.mutation_provenance_fields()["bound_transport"],
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
)
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV] = "carrier-pigeon"
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.bound_transport(), mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_8b_bound_transport_takes_no_caller_argument(self):
|
||||
"""The accessor cannot be steered by a tool parameter."""
|
||||
import inspect
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
list(inspect.signature(mcp_daemon_guard.bound_transport).parameters), []
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_11_rebinding_the_same_transport_is_idempotent(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
first = guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
second = guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(first["transport"], second["transport"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.bound_transport(), mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_11b_rebinding_a_different_transport_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport(
|
||||
transport=mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn("already bound", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
# The first value survives the attempt.
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.bound_transport(), mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_11c_rebinding_an_unregistered_transport_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport(transport="carrier-pigeon")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.bound_transport(), mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestDurableRecordCarriesTransport(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC4: the identifier reaches a durable decision-lock record."""
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
|
||||
def _save_and_read_decision_lock(self, state_dir: str) -> dict:
|
||||
mcp_session_state.save_state(
|
||||
kind=mcp_session_state.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
payload={"pr_number": 931, "action": "COMMENT"},
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
profile_identity="prgs-author",
|
||||
state_dir=state_dir,
|
||||
)
|
||||
loaded = mcp_session_state.load_state(
|
||||
kind=mcp_session_state.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
profile_identity="prgs-author",
|
||||
state_dir=state_dir,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(loaded)
|
||||
return loaded
|
||||
|
||||
def test_9_decision_lock_records_the_bound_transport(self):
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.install_test_native_runtime()
|
||||
record = self._save_and_read_decision_lock(tmp)
|
||||
self.assertIn("bound_transport", record)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
record["bound_transport"], mcp_daemon_guard.bound_transport()
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_9b_unbound_runtime_records_no_transport_identifier(self):
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
record = self._save_and_read_decision_lock(tmp)
|
||||
self.assertIn("bound_transport", record)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(record["bound_transport"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_9c_provenance_fields_expose_the_identifier(self):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
fields = mcp_daemon_guard.mutation_provenance_fields()
|
||||
self.assertIn("bound_transport", fields)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(fields["bound_transport"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestStdioBehaviourUnchanged(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC6 / prompt items 10 and 12: no regression on the existing path."""
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_10_trust_class_field_keeps_its_pre_931_values(self):
|
||||
"""``transport`` remains the trust class, not the identifier."""
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.mutation_provenance_fields()["transport"], "untrusted"
|
||||
)
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.install_test_native_runtime()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.mutation_provenance_fields()["transport"],
|
||||
"test_native_mcp",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.mutation_provenance_fields()["transport"], "native_mcp"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_10b_default_bind_reproduces_the_pre_931_runtime_record(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
status = guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(status["native_mcp_transport"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(status["production_native_mcp_transport"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(status["mode"], "production")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(status["phase"], "transport_bound")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
status["transport"], mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
guard.assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime("native-ide")
|
||||
guard.assert_production_mutation_runtime("native-ide")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_12_session_state_root_still_pinned_at_bind(self):
|
||||
"""#695 AC2 must survive the seam."""
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as legit:
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as rogue:
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{mcp_daemon_guard.SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV: legit}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.pinned_session_state_dir(), str(Path(legit).resolve())
|
||||
)
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_daemon_guard.SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV] = rogue
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.pinned_session_state_dir(), str(Path(legit).resolve())
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_12b_test_mode_record_still_cannot_authorize_production(self):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.install_test_native_runtime()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(mcp_daemon_guard.is_native_mcp_transport())
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mcp_daemon_guard.is_production_native_mcp_transport())
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.assert_production_mutation_runtime("prod-endpoint")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_12c_bind_still_requires_the_canonical_entrypoint(self):
|
||||
"""A remote identifier does not relax provenance."""
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
with patch.object(mcp_daemon_guard, "is_pytest_runtime", return_value=False):
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard,
|
||||
"_caller_official_entrypoint_path",
|
||||
return_value=None,
|
||||
):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.bind_native_mcp_transport(
|
||||
transport=mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(mcp_daemon_guard.bound_transport())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_12d_bind_still_requires_a_prior_entrypoint_claim(self):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
canonical = str((REPO_ROOT / "mcp_server.py").resolve())
|
||||
with patch.object(mcp_daemon_guard, "is_pytest_runtime", return_value=False):
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard,
|
||||
"_caller_official_entrypoint_path",
|
||||
side_effect=lambda: canonical,
|
||||
):
|
||||
# No mark_sanctioned_daemon() first.
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError
|
||||
) as ctx:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertIn("no entrypoint claim", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_12e_auth_mint_verdict_is_unchanged_for_the_default_transport(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
verdict = irrecoverable_provenance.assess_transport_for_auth_mint()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(verdict["allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(verdict["native_mcp_transport"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(verdict["production_native_mcp_transport"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(verdict["reasons"], [])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_12f_auth_mint_still_refuses_an_unbound_runtime(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind():
|
||||
# Claimed but never bound.
|
||||
verdict = irrecoverable_provenance.assess_transport_for_auth_mint()
|
||||
self.assertFalse(verdict["allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(verdict["reasons"])
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(verdict["bound_transport"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestExecutionBoundary(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Recognition is not execution authorization (#931, review 635 B1/B2).
|
||||
|
||||
A registered remote identifier must still bind, pin and record — the #931
|
||||
seam — while being refused at the serve boundary, because serving it would
|
||||
start a listener with no authentication or per-request principal. That
|
||||
listener belongs to #938.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
|
||||
# -- the two sets are distinct, and narrower in the right direction ----
|
||||
|
||||
def test_executable_set_is_a_strict_subset_of_recognized(self):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.EXECUTABLE_TRANSPORTS
|
||||
< mcp_transport_config.SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_default_transport_is_executable(self):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.is_executable_transport(
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_remote_transport_is_recognized_but_not_executable(self):
|
||||
remote = mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
self.assertTrue(mcp_transport_config.is_supported_transport(remote))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mcp_transport_config.is_executable_transport(remote))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_remote_listener_ownership_is_declared(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_EXECUTION_OWNER[
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
],
|
||||
"#938",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# -- stdio still reaches the runner, unchanged -------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
def test_default_transport_is_authorized_for_service(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.authorize_transport_execution("tool service"),
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(guard.assess_serve_authorization()["allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_default_transport_reaches_the_real_runner(self):
|
||||
"""The production runner is actually invoked, with stdio, unchanged."""
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
seen = {}
|
||||
|
||||
class _Runner:
|
||||
def run(self, transport=None, **kw):
|
||||
seen["transport"] = transport
|
||||
|
||||
_Runner().run(transport=guard.authorize_transport_execution("tool service"))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
seen["transport"], mcp_transport_config.DEFAULT_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# -- streamable-http binds, records, and is refused before serving -----
|
||||
|
||||
def test_remote_transport_binds_and_is_recorded(self):
|
||||
"""The #931 seam is intact: it binds, pins and records."""
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.bound_transport(), mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
guard.mutation_provenance_fields()["bound_transport"],
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_remote_transport_is_refused_at_the_serve_boundary(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.TransportExecutionError) as ctx:
|
||||
guard.authorize_transport_execution("tool service")
|
||||
err = ctx.exception
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
err.blocker_kind,
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.BLOCKER_LISTENER_NOT_COMMISSIONED,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(err.owner_issue, "#938")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(err.transport, mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_refusal_names_transport_and_unmet_requirement_and_owner(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.TransportExecutionError) as ctx:
|
||||
guard.authorize_transport_execution("tool service")
|
||||
text = str(ctx.exception)
|
||||
self.assertIn(mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT, text)
|
||||
self.assertIn("#938", text)
|
||||
self.assertIn("not commissioned", text)
|
||||
self.assertIn("#931", text)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_remote_transport_never_reaches_the_runner(self):
|
||||
"""No transport value is handed to a run() call for the remote case."""
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
calls = []
|
||||
|
||||
class _Runner:
|
||||
def run(self, transport=None, **kw):
|
||||
calls.append(transport)
|
||||
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.TransportExecutionError):
|
||||
_Runner().run(
|
||||
transport=guard.authorize_transport_execution("tool service")
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(calls, [], "runner must never be invoked")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_http_listener_is_created_for_remote_transport(self):
|
||||
"""Nothing in the refusal path touches uvicorn or a socket bind."""
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
import socket
|
||||
|
||||
bound_sockets = []
|
||||
real_bind = socket.socket.bind
|
||||
|
||||
def _tripwire(self, addr): # pragma: no cover - must not run
|
||||
bound_sockets.append(addr)
|
||||
return real_bind(self, addr)
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.object(socket.socket, "bind", _tripwire):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.TransportExecutionError):
|
||||
guard.authorize_transport_execution("tool service")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(bound_sockets, [], "no socket may be bound")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_mutation_is_authorized_after_the_denial(self):
|
||||
"""The denial leaves no partial state that would let a tool dispatch."""
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.TransportExecutionError):
|
||||
guard.authorize_transport_execution("tool service")
|
||||
# Serve stays unauthorized on every subsequent query.
|
||||
self.assertFalse(guard.assess_serve_authorization()["allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(guard.native_runtime_status()["serve_authorized"])
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.TransportExecutionError):
|
||||
guard.authorize_transport_execution("tool service")
|
||||
|
||||
# -- B2: the decision genuinely consumes bound_transport ---------------
|
||||
|
||||
def test_serve_decision_consumes_bound_transport(self):
|
||||
"""Changing only bound_transport flips the verdict."""
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(guard.assess_serve_authorization()["allowed"])
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
guard,
|
||||
"bound_transport",
|
||||
return_value=mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
):
|
||||
verdict = guard.assess_serve_authorization()
|
||||
self.assertFalse(verdict["allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
verdict["transport"], mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.TransportExecutionError):
|
||||
guard.authorize_transport_execution("tool service")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_serve_verdict_reports_the_bound_transport(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
verdict = guard.assess_serve_authorization()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
verdict["transport"], mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(verdict["recognized"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(verdict["executable"])
|
||||
|
||||
# -- earlier and later boundaries are unchanged ------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unregistered_identifier_still_fails_at_bind_not_at_serve(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: "carrier-pigeon"}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertIn("not a registered MCP transport", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(guard.bound_transport())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unbound_execution_keeps_the_pre_existing_failure(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
guard.authorize_transport_execution("tool service")
|
||||
self.assertIn("No MCP transport is bound", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
self.assertNotIsInstance(ctx.exception, guard.TransportExecutionError)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_transport_execution_error_is_caught_by_existing_handlers(self):
|
||||
"""Subclassing keeps every pre-existing fail-closed handler correct."""
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
issubclass(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.TransportExecutionError,
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError,
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_test_mode_runtime_is_not_servable(self):
|
||||
"""The pytest-only record is outside the recognized and executable sets."""
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.install_test_native_runtime()
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.bound_transport(),
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mcp_daemon_guard.assess_serve_authorization()["allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_serve_authorization_does_not_leak_across_runtimes(self):
|
||||
"""A later runtime's verdict never reflects an earlier one."""
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertFalse(guard.assess_serve_authorization()["allowed"])
|
||||
with _ProductionBind() as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(guard.assess_serve_authorization()["allowed"])
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.assess_serve_authorization()["blocker_kind"],
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.BLOCKER_TRANSPORT_NOT_BOUND,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_refusal_carries_no_credential_material(self):
|
||||
with _ProductionBind(
|
||||
{
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.TRANSPORT_ENV: (
|
||||
mcp_transport_config.REMOTE_TRANSPORT
|
||||
),
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN": "super-secret-value",
|
||||
}
|
||||
) as guard:
|
||||
guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(guard.TransportExecutionError) as ctx:
|
||||
guard.authorize_transport_execution("tool service")
|
||||
blob = str(ctx.exception) + repr(ctx.exception.assessment)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("super-secret-value", blob)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("GITEA_TOKEN", blob)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestEntrypointWiring(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""The live entrypoint must use the seam and the execution guard."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_entrypoint_binds_without_a_literal_transport(self):
|
||||
text = (REPO_ROOT / "gitea_mcp_server.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
self.assertIn("mcp_daemon_guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()", text)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn('bind_native_mcp_transport(transport="stdio")', text)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_entrypoint_serves_only_through_the_execution_guard(self):
|
||||
text = (REPO_ROOT / "gitea_mcp_server.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
"mcp.run(transport=mcp_daemon_guard.authorize_transport_execution", text
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn('mcp.run(transport="stdio")', text)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(
|
||||
"mcp.run(transport=mcp_daemon_guard.assert_transport_bound", text
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_every_run_call_in_production_goes_through_the_guard(self):
|
||||
"""Glob the production surface: no serve site may bypass the guard."""
|
||||
offenders: list[str] = []
|
||||
run_sites = 0
|
||||
for path in sorted(REPO_ROOT.glob("*.py")):
|
||||
for lineno, line in enumerate(
|
||||
path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines(), start=1
|
||||
):
|
||||
code = line.split("#", 1)[0]
|
||||
if "mcp.run(" not in code:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
run_sites += 1
|
||||
if "authorize_transport_execution" not in code:
|
||||
offenders.append(f"{path.name}:{lineno}: {line.strip()}")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(run_sites, 1, "expected exactly one serve site")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(offenders, [], "\n".join(offenders))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,662 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Client/session-aware runtime ownership and provenance (#948).
|
||||
|
||||
Covers the reproduced contradiction that motivated the issue: one surface
|
||||
reporting ``client_managed`` while another reported ``manual_launch`` for the
|
||||
same process, remediation hardcoded to one vendor, and a profile-wide duplicate
|
||||
wall that could not tell two healthy clients apart.
|
||||
|
||||
All client and session identifiers here are synthetic.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_client_reconnect
|
||||
import mcp_namespace_health
|
||||
import mcp_worker_identity as mwi
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
NOW = datetime(2026, 7, 29, 6, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _registry() -> mwi.WorkerRegistry:
|
||||
"""A registry on a throwaway path; never the operator's real one."""
|
||||
handle, path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".sqlite3")
|
||||
os.close(handle)
|
||||
os.unlink(path)
|
||||
return mwi.WorkerRegistry(path)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _attach(
|
||||
registry: mwi.WorkerRegistry,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
client: str,
|
||||
session: str,
|
||||
generation: str,
|
||||
profile: str = "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
role: str = "reviewer",
|
||||
pid: int = 4242,
|
||||
now: datetime = NOW,
|
||||
ttl: float = 900.0,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Register one synthetic worker and return the outcome."""
|
||||
identity = mwi.generate_worker_identity(client, session, now=now)
|
||||
outcome = registry.register(
|
||||
worker_identity=identity,
|
||||
client_name=client,
|
||||
client_instance_id=f"inst-{session}",
|
||||
session_id=session,
|
||||
generation_id=generation,
|
||||
role=role,
|
||||
profile=profile,
|
||||
pid=pid,
|
||||
heartbeat_ttl_seconds=ttl,
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
outcome["identity"] = identity
|
||||
return outcome
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class IdentityFormatTests(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC27-29: collision-resistant `<llm-name>-<UTC-timestamp>-<short-sha>`."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_identity_matches_required_format(self):
|
||||
identity = mwi.generate_worker_identity("Gemini", "sess-0001", now=NOW)
|
||||
parsed = mwi.parse_worker_identity(identity)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(parsed["valid"], parsed["reasons"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(parsed["client_name"], "gemini")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(parsed["minted_at"], "20260729T060000Z")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(parsed["digest"]), 12)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_digest_varies_with_session_and_nonce(self):
|
||||
base = dict(timestamp_ns=1, now=NOW)
|
||||
a = mwi.generate_worker_identity("codex", "sess-A", nonce="n", **base)
|
||||
b = mwi.generate_worker_identity("codex", "sess-B", nonce="n", **base)
|
||||
c = mwi.generate_worker_identity("codex", "sess-A", nonce="m", **base)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(a, b, "session must feed the digest")
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(a, c, "nonce must feed the digest")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_identity_is_not_role_or_profile(self):
|
||||
"""AC26: identity is independent of role and profile."""
|
||||
args = dict(timestamp_ns=7, nonce="fixed", now=NOW)
|
||||
same = mwi.generate_worker_identity("claude", "sess-1", **args)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(same, mwi.generate_worker_identity("claude", "sess-1", **args))
|
||||
# Nothing role- or profile-derived appears in the identity.
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("reviewer", same)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("prgs", same)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_malformed_identity_rejected(self):
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mwi.parse_worker_identity("prgs-reviewer")["valid"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mwi.parse_worker_identity("")["valid"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mwi.parse_worker_identity(None)["valid"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class PerClientAttachmentTests(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Every supported client attaches and is reported as itself."""
|
||||
|
||||
def _assert_attached_as(self, client: str, expected_name: str):
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
outcome = _attach(
|
||||
registry, client=client, session=f"sess-{client}", generation="gen-1"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(outcome["registered"], outcome["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
verdict = mwi.assess_provenance(
|
||||
registry=registry, worker_identity=outcome["identity"], env={}, now=NOW
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(verdict["session_ownership"], mwi.OWNERSHIP_OWNED)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(verdict["provenance"], mwi.PROVENANCE_CLIENT_SESSION)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(verdict["client_name"], expected_name)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(verdict["session_owned"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(verdict["fail_closed"])
|
||||
return verdict
|
||||
|
||||
def test_codex_attachment(self):
|
||||
self._assert_attached_as("codex", "codex")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_gemini_attachment(self):
|
||||
self._assert_attached_as("gemini", "gemini")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_antigravity_attachment(self):
|
||||
self._assert_attached_as("antigravity", "antigravity")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_claude_attachment(self):
|
||||
self._assert_attached_as("claude", "claude_code")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unknown_client_is_named_not_guessed(self):
|
||||
verdict = self._assert_attached_as("some_new_llm", "some_new_llm")
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(verdict["client_name"], "codex")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class SessionLifecycleTests(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_same_client_new_session_gets_distinct_identity(self):
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
first = _attach(registry, client="codex", session="sess-1", generation="gen-1")
|
||||
second = _attach(registry, client="codex", session="sess-2", generation="gen-2")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(first["registered"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(second["registered"])
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(first["identity"], second["identity"])
|
||||
|
||||
# Both are live and neither blocks the other.
|
||||
cohort = mwi.classify_cohort(registry.list_workers(), now=NOW)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cohort["live_worker_count"], 2)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(cohort["blocked"], cohort["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_different_client_attaches_after_previous_session_ends(self):
|
||||
"""AC14: expiry then takeover with a higher fencing epoch."""
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
gone = _attach(
|
||||
registry, client="codex", session="sess-old", generation="gen-shared", ttl=60
|
||||
)
|
||||
later = NOW + timedelta(hours=1)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
registry.is_live(registry.get(gone["identity"]), now=later)["live"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
arriving = _attach(
|
||||
registry,
|
||||
client="gemini",
|
||||
session="sess-new",
|
||||
generation="gen-other",
|
||||
now=later,
|
||||
)
|
||||
claim = registry.claim_generation(
|
||||
worker_identity=arriving["identity"],
|
||||
generation_id="gen-shared",
|
||||
now=later,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(claim["claimed"], claim["reasons"])
|
||||
self.assertIn(gone["identity"], claim["superseded_workers"])
|
||||
self.assertGreater(claim["fencing_epoch"], gone["fencing_epoch"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_superseded_session_is_fenced_on_resume(self):
|
||||
"""AC15/AC16: the prior session cannot heartbeat its way back."""
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
old = _attach(
|
||||
registry, client="codex", session="sess-old", generation="gen-shared", ttl=60
|
||||
)
|
||||
later = NOW + timedelta(hours=1)
|
||||
new = _attach(
|
||||
registry, client="gemini", session="sess-new", generation="gen-x", now=later
|
||||
)
|
||||
registry.claim_generation(
|
||||
worker_identity=new["identity"], generation_id="gen-shared", now=later
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
resumed = registry.heartbeat(
|
||||
worker_identity=old["identity"],
|
||||
fencing_epoch=old["fencing_epoch"],
|
||||
now=later,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(resumed["renewed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(resumed["mutation_performed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(resumed["blocker_kind"], mwi.BLOCKER_FENCED)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_heartbeat_renews_only_the_owning_lease(self):
|
||||
"""AC11: a wrong epoch never renews, and never mutates."""
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
worker = _attach(registry, client="codex", session="s", generation="g")
|
||||
good = registry.heartbeat(
|
||||
worker_identity=worker["identity"],
|
||||
fencing_epoch=worker["fencing_epoch"],
|
||||
now=NOW + timedelta(minutes=5),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(good["renewed"])
|
||||
|
||||
bad = registry.heartbeat(
|
||||
worker_identity=worker["identity"],
|
||||
fencing_epoch=worker["fencing_epoch"] + 99,
|
||||
now=NOW + timedelta(minutes=6),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(bad["renewed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(bad["mutation_performed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
registry.get(worker["identity"])["last_heartbeat_at"],
|
||||
good["last_heartbeat_at"],
|
||||
"a refused heartbeat must not advance the record",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ConflictAndCollisionTests(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_two_live_sessions_cannot_claim_one_generation(self):
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
first = _attach(registry, client="codex", session="s1", generation="gen-shared")
|
||||
second = _attach(registry, client="gemini", session="s2", generation="gen-other")
|
||||
|
||||
claim = registry.claim_generation(
|
||||
worker_identity=second["identity"],
|
||||
generation_id="gen-shared",
|
||||
now=NOW,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(claim["claimed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(claim["mutation_performed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(claim["blocker_kind"], mwi.BLOCKER_CONFLICTING_SESSIONS)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
claim["conflicting_owners"][0]["worker_identity"], first["identity"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
# The sanctioned recovery must never be "kill the other process".
|
||||
self.assertIn("Do not kill", claim["exact_next_action"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_contested_generation_fails_closed_in_assessment(self):
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
first = _attach(registry, client="codex", session="s1", generation="gen-shared")
|
||||
_attach(registry, client="gemini", session="s2", generation="gen-shared")
|
||||
|
||||
verdict = mwi.assess_provenance(
|
||||
registry=registry, worker_identity=first["identity"], env={}, now=NOW
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(verdict["session_ownership"], mwi.OWNERSHIP_CONTESTED)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(verdict["fail_closed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(verdict["blocker_kind"], mwi.BLOCKER_CONTRADICTORY)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(verdict["conflicting_live_sessions"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_identity_collision_is_refused_without_corrupting_existing(self):
|
||||
"""AC31: never replace, adopt, merge with, or corrupt the incumbent."""
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
incumbent = _attach(registry, client="codex", session="s1", generation="gen-1")
|
||||
before = registry.get(incumbent["identity"])
|
||||
|
||||
collided = registry.register(
|
||||
worker_identity=incumbent["identity"],
|
||||
client_name="gemini",
|
||||
client_instance_id="inst-other",
|
||||
session_id="s2",
|
||||
generation_id="gen-2",
|
||||
pid=9999,
|
||||
now=NOW,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(collided["registered"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(collided["collision"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(collided["mutation_performed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(collided["blocker_kind"], mwi.BLOCKER_IDENTITY_COLLISION)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(collided["collision_kind"], "active_worker")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
registry.get(incumbent["identity"]), before, "incumbent must be untouched"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_after_collision_a_regenerated_identity_registers(self):
|
||||
"""AC32/AC35: forced collision, safe regeneration, successful replacement."""
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
fixed = dict(timestamp_ns=99, nonce="deterministic", now=NOW)
|
||||
forced = mwi.generate_worker_identity("codex", "sess-collide", **fixed)
|
||||
first = registry.register(
|
||||
worker_identity=forced,
|
||||
client_name="codex",
|
||||
client_instance_id="inst-1",
|
||||
session_id="sess-collide",
|
||||
generation_id="gen-1",
|
||||
now=NOW,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(first["registered"])
|
||||
|
||||
# A second worker deriving the same inputs collides deterministically.
|
||||
again = mwi.generate_worker_identity("codex", "sess-collide", **fixed)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(again, forced)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
registry.register(
|
||||
worker_identity=again,
|
||||
client_name="codex",
|
||||
client_instance_id="inst-2",
|
||||
session_id="sess-collide",
|
||||
generation_id="gen-2",
|
||||
now=NOW,
|
||||
)["collision"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
replacement = mwi.generate_worker_identity(
|
||||
"codex", "sess-collide", timestamp_ns=100, nonce="different", now=NOW
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(replacement, forced)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
registry.register(
|
||||
worker_identity=replacement,
|
||||
client_name="codex",
|
||||
client_instance_id="inst-2",
|
||||
session_id="sess-collide",
|
||||
generation_id="gen-2",
|
||||
now=NOW,
|
||||
)["registered"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_restarted_worker_inherits_nothing(self):
|
||||
"""AC33/AC34: a restart mints a new identity and no prior epoch."""
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
before = _attach(
|
||||
registry, client="codex", session="sess-before", generation="gen-1", ttl=60
|
||||
)
|
||||
later = NOW + timedelta(hours=2)
|
||||
after = _attach(
|
||||
registry, client="codex", session="sess-after", generation="gen-2", now=later
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(before["identity"], after["identity"])
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(
|
||||
registry.get(after["identity"])["generation_id"],
|
||||
registry.get(before["identity"])["generation_id"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class LivenessTests(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_stale_session_record_is_not_live(self):
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
worker = _attach(registry, client="codex", session="s", generation="g", ttl=300)
|
||||
stale = registry.is_live(
|
||||
registry.get(worker["identity"]), now=NOW + timedelta(hours=1)
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(stale["live"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(stale["heartbeat_fresh"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_liveness_is_not_pid_comparison_alone(self):
|
||||
"""AC7: a live PID does not resurrect an expired registration."""
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
worker = _attach(registry, client="codex", session="s", generation="g", ttl=60)
|
||||
verdict = registry.is_live(
|
||||
registry.get(worker["identity"]),
|
||||
now=NOW + timedelta(hours=1),
|
||||
pid_alive=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
verdict["live"], "a live PID must not override a dead heartbeat"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dead_pid_withdraws_liveness_from_a_fresh_heartbeat(self):
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
worker = _attach(registry, client="codex", session="s", generation="g")
|
||||
verdict = registry.is_live(
|
||||
registry.get(worker["identity"]), now=NOW, pid_alive=False
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(verdict["live"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_stale_ownership_does_not_permanently_strand_a_daemon(self):
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
stranded = _attach(
|
||||
registry, client="codex", session="s-old", generation="gen-daemon", ttl=60
|
||||
)
|
||||
later = NOW + timedelta(hours=3)
|
||||
rescuer = _attach(
|
||||
registry, client="claude", session="s-new", generation="gen-tmp", now=later
|
||||
)
|
||||
claim = registry.claim_generation(
|
||||
worker_identity=rescuer["identity"],
|
||||
generation_id="gen-daemon",
|
||||
now=later,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(claim["claimed"], claim["reasons"])
|
||||
self.assertIn(stranded["identity"], claim["superseded_workers"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class EvidenceTests(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_env_flag_alone_does_not_prove_session_ownership(self):
|
||||
verdict = mwi.assess_provenance(
|
||||
registry=None,
|
||||
worker_identity=None,
|
||||
env={"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1", "GITEA_MCP_SANCTIONED_DAEMON": "1"},
|
||||
now=NOW,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(verdict["session_owned"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(verdict["session_ownership"], mwi.OWNERSHIP_UNOWNED)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(verdict["env_flag_only"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(verdict["fail_closed"])
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(mwi.EVIDENCE_ATTACHMENT_RECORD, verdict["evidence"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(verdict["env_signal"]["proves_session_ownership"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_env_flag_still_answers_the_launch_question(self):
|
||||
"""The #686 wall is preserved: env decides launch, not ownership."""
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
mwi.assess_launch_provenance({"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1"})["client_managed"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
mwi.assess_launch_provenance({"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "0"})["client_managed"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
mwi.assess_launch_provenance({}, stdin_is_tty=True)["client_managed"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
mwi.assess_launch_provenance({"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author"})[
|
||||
"client_managed"
|
||||
]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_missing_evidence_is_unproven_not_manual(self):
|
||||
"""A missing proof must not be reported as a hand-launched process."""
|
||||
verdict = mwi.assess_provenance(
|
||||
registry=None, worker_identity=None, env={}, now=NOW
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(verdict["provenance"], mwi.PROVENANCE_UNPROVEN)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(verdict["provenance"], mwi.PROVENANCE_MANUAL)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(verdict["fail_closed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_declared_manual_launch_is_reported_as_manual(self):
|
||||
verdict = mwi.assess_provenance(
|
||||
registry=None,
|
||||
worker_identity=None,
|
||||
env={"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "0"},
|
||||
now=NOW,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(verdict["provenance"], mwi.PROVENANCE_MANUAL)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_fail_closed_refusal_names_its_scope_not_the_profile(self):
|
||||
"""AC17/AC41: no refusal is profile-wide."""
|
||||
verdict = mwi.assess_provenance(
|
||||
registry=None,
|
||||
worker_identity=None,
|
||||
env={},
|
||||
profile="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
role="reviewer",
|
||||
now=NOW,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(verdict["scope"]["profile_wide"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(verdict["blocker_kind"], mwi.BLOCKER_NO_ATTACHMENT)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class CohortScopingTests(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_shared_profile_with_distinct_identities_does_not_block(self):
|
||||
"""AC40: profile is not a singleton identity."""
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
_attach(
|
||||
registry,
|
||||
client="codex",
|
||||
session="s1",
|
||||
generation="g1",
|
||||
profile="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
_attach(
|
||||
registry,
|
||||
client="gemini",
|
||||
session="s2",
|
||||
generation="g2",
|
||||
profile="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
cohort = mwi.classify_cohort(registry.list_workers(), now=NOW)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(cohort["blocked"], cohort["reasons"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cohort["blocker_kind"], mwi.BLOCKER_NONE)
|
||||
self.assertIn("prgs-reviewer", cohort["shared_profiles"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(cohort["profile_sharing_permitted"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cohort["blocked_worker_identities"], [])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_duplicate_cohort_records_block_only_the_offenders(self):
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
_attach(registry, client="codex", session="s1", generation="gen-contested")
|
||||
_attach(registry, client="gemini", session="s2", generation="gen-contested")
|
||||
_attach(registry, client="claude", session="s3", generation="gen-fine")
|
||||
|
||||
cohort = mwi.classify_cohort(registry.list_workers(), now=NOW)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(cohort["blocked"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cohort["contested_generations"], ["gen-contested"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(cohort["blocked_worker_identities"]), 2)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mixed_runtime_generations_are_scoped_independently(self):
|
||||
"""AC17: one stale generation does not wall unrelated healthy ones."""
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
stale = _attach(
|
||||
registry, client="codex", session="s1", generation="gen-stale", ttl=60
|
||||
)
|
||||
healthy_a = _attach(registry, client="gemini", session="s2", generation="gen-a")
|
||||
healthy_b = _attach(registry, client="claude", session="s3", generation="gen-b")
|
||||
|
||||
scoped = mwi.scope_runtime_failure(
|
||||
failure_kind="stale-runtime",
|
||||
worker_identity=stale["identity"],
|
||||
profile="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
all_live_workers=registry.list_workers(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(scoped["profile_wide"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(scoped["fleet_wide"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(scoped["affected_workers"]), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(scoped["unaffected_worker_count"], 2)
|
||||
unaffected = {w["worker_identity"] for w in scoped["unaffected_workers"]}
|
||||
self.assertEqual(unaffected, {healthy_a["identity"], healthy_b["identity"]})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class HardcodedClientRegressionTests(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_unknown_client_does_not_resolve_to_codex(self):
|
||||
for name in ("gemini", "antigravity", "grok", "some_new_llm", "", None):
|
||||
with self.subTest(client=name):
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(
|
||||
mcp_client_reconnect.normalize_client(name),
|
||||
"codex",
|
||||
"an unidentified client must never be handed Codex UI steps",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_known_clients_still_get_their_own_steps(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(mcp_client_reconnect.normalize_client("codex"), "codex")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
mcp_client_reconnect.normalize_client("claude_code"), "claude_code"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_generic_steps_do_not_name_a_specific_vendor(self):
|
||||
steps = " ".join(mcp_client_reconnect.operator_ui_steps("gemini"))
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("Codex", steps)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reconnect_client_is_derived_from_the_attachment_record(self):
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
worker = _attach(registry, client="antigravity", session="s", generation="g")
|
||||
verdict = mwi.assess_provenance(
|
||||
registry=registry, worker_identity=worker["identity"], env={}, now=NOW
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(mwi.reconnect_client_for(verdict), "antigravity")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reconnect_client_is_unknown_rather_than_guessed(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(mwi.reconnect_client_for({}), mwi.UNKNOWN_CLIENT)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class RemoteBindingTests(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_explicit_prgs_selection_is_honoured(self):
|
||||
resolved = mwi.resolve_bound_remote(
|
||||
requested_remote="prgs", bound_remote="prgs", default_remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(resolved["remote"], "prgs")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(resolved["drifted"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_omitted_remote_uses_the_binding_not_the_library_default(self):
|
||||
"""The reported dadeschools host drift."""
|
||||
resolved = mwi.resolve_bound_remote(
|
||||
requested_remote=None, bound_remote="prgs", default_remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(resolved["remote"], "prgs")
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(resolved["remote"], "dadeschools")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(resolved["resolved_from"], "session_binding")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_contradicting_the_binding_is_refused(self):
|
||||
resolved = mwi.resolve_bound_remote(
|
||||
requested_remote="dadeschools",
|
||||
bound_remote="prgs",
|
||||
default_remote="dadeschools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(resolved["remote"], "prgs")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(resolved["drifted"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(resolved["honoured_request"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unbound_session_falls_back_and_says_so(self):
|
||||
resolved = mwi.resolve_bound_remote(
|
||||
requested_remote=None, bound_remote=None, default_remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(resolved["remote"], "dadeschools")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(resolved["resolved_from"], "library_default")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(resolved["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class SurfaceAgreementTests(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""The reproduced contradiction: two surfaces, one process, two answers."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_namespace_health_and_direct_assessment_agree(self):
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
worker = _attach(
|
||||
registry,
|
||||
client="gemini",
|
||||
session="sess-agree",
|
||||
generation="gen-agree",
|
||||
profile="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
env = {"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-reviewer", "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1"}
|
||||
|
||||
direct = mwi.assess_provenance(
|
||||
registry=registry,
|
||||
worker_identity=worker["identity"],
|
||||
env=env,
|
||||
profile="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
health = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
|
||||
"gitea-reviewer",
|
||||
configured=True,
|
||||
registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
|
||||
probe_result={"success": True},
|
||||
probe_source="client_namespace",
|
||||
process={"pid": 4242, "profile": "prgs-reviewer", "env": env},
|
||||
registry=registry,
|
||||
worker_identity=worker["identity"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertEqual(health["provenance"], direct["provenance"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(health["is_client_managed"], direct["is_client_managed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(health["worker_identity"], direct["worker_identity"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(health["session_id"], "sess-agree")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(health["client_name"], "gemini")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_namespace_health_can_report_client_managed_at_all(self):
|
||||
"""The old derivation was structurally incapable of this."""
|
||||
env = {"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1", "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author"}
|
||||
health = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
|
||||
"gitea-author",
|
||||
configured=True,
|
||||
registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
|
||||
probe_result={"success": True},
|
||||
probe_source="client_namespace",
|
||||
process={"pid": 1234, "profile": "prgs-author", "env": env},
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
health["is_client_managed"],
|
||||
"a client-managed launch must be reportable as client-managed",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_namespace_health_without_attachment_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
health = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
|
||||
"gitea-author",
|
||||
configured=True,
|
||||
registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
|
||||
probe_result={"success": True},
|
||||
probe_source="client_namespace",
|
||||
process={"pid": 1234, "profile": "prgs-author", "env": {}},
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(health["provenance_fail_closed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(health["provenance"], mwi.PROVENANCE_UNPROVEN)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(health["session_id"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_false_reconnect_loop_for_an_owned_session(self):
|
||||
"""A proven owner must not be told to reconnect."""
|
||||
registry = _registry()
|
||||
worker = _attach(registry, client="claude", session="s", generation="g")
|
||||
verdict = mwi.assess_provenance(
|
||||
registry=registry, worker_identity=worker["identity"], env={}, now=NOW
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(verdict["fail_closed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(verdict["blocker_kind"], mwi.BLOCKER_NONE)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(verdict["reasons"], [])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,243 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Tests for issue #970: safely resolve worktree bindings whose paths are missing.
|
||||
|
||||
Covers all acceptance criteria for #970:
|
||||
- missing path reporting with repo/branch/issue/session/lease/host correlation
|
||||
- fail closed on unavailable host or mount failure
|
||||
- fail closed on moved worktree paths
|
||||
- fail closed on live lease or active session/process
|
||||
- atomic pre-mutation re-validation preventing recreation races
|
||||
- targeted retirement preserving unrelated worktrees & metadata
|
||||
- safe and idempotent repeated execution
|
||||
- worktrees dimension resolution post-cleanup
|
||||
- resolution of the two historical post-PR #968 records (#795 / #635)
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import shutil
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
|
||||
import control_plane_db as cpd
|
||||
import lease_lifecycle
|
||||
import missing_worktree_reconcile as mwr
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestMissingWorktreeReconcile(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self.temp_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp()
|
||||
self.db_path = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "control_plane.sqlite3")
|
||||
self.db = cpd.ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
|
||||
self.project_root = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "repo")
|
||||
os.makedirs(os.path.join(self.project_root, "branches"), exist_ok=True)
|
||||
# Initialize git repo in project_root for git rev-parse checks
|
||||
os.system(f"git -C '{self.project_root}' init -q")
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
shutil.rmtree(self.temp_dir, ignore_errors=True)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_audit_missing_worktree_bindings_reports_associations(self):
|
||||
res = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=795,
|
||||
expected_head_sha="head795",
|
||||
role="reviewer",
|
||||
session_id="reviewer-pr795-test-session",
|
||||
worktree_path="/tmp/nonexistent_wt_path_795",
|
||||
)
|
||||
lease_id = res.lease_id
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(lease_id)
|
||||
# Release the lease (dead/released)
|
||||
self.db.release_lease_recorded(lease_id, session_id="reviewer-pr795-test-session")
|
||||
|
||||
audit = mwr.audit_missing_worktree_bindings(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
project_root=self.project_root,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertTrue(audit["host_mount_healthy"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(audit["missing_count"], 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(audit["confirmed_stale_count"], 1)
|
||||
|
||||
candidate = audit["confirmed_stale_candidates"][0]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(candidate["lease_id"], lease_id)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(candidate["work_number"], 795)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(candidate["session_id"], "reviewer-pr795-test-session")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(candidate["classification"], mwr.CLASS_CONFIRMED_STALE_DELETED)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(candidate["retire_eligible"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unavailable_host_mount_blocks_retirement(self):
|
||||
# Point to a non-existent project_root
|
||||
bad_root = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "nonexistent_repo_dir")
|
||||
audit = mwr.audit_missing_worktree_bindings(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
project_root=bad_root,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(audit["host_mount_healthy"])
|
||||
|
||||
res = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org="org", repo="repo", kind="issue", number=100,
|
||||
role="author", session_id="sess-100", worktree_path="/tmp/missing_100",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.db.release_lease_recorded(res.lease_id, session_id="sess-100")
|
||||
|
||||
audit2 = mwr.audit_missing_worktree_bindings(self.db, project_root=bad_root, remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(audit2["unavailable_host_count"], 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(audit2["confirmed_stale_count"], 0)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(audit2["missing_bindings"][0]["retire_eligible"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_live_lease_and_live_session_block_retirement(self):
|
||||
res = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org="org", repo="repo", kind="issue", number=200,
|
||||
role="author", session_id="sess-live-200", worktree_path="/tmp/missing_live_200",
|
||||
owner_pid=os.getpid(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
audit = mwr.audit_missing_worktree_bindings(self.db, project_root=self.project_root, remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(audit["live_protected_count"], 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(audit["confirmed_stale_count"], 0)
|
||||
|
||||
# Attempting resolution on live protected binding is refused
|
||||
c = audit["missing_bindings"][0]
|
||||
res_mut = mwr.resolve_missing_worktree_binding(self.db, binding=c, dry_run=False, operator_authorized=True, project_root=self.project_root)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res_mut["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res_mut["reason"], "revalidation_failed")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_moved_worktree_path_blocks_retirement(self):
|
||||
# Create a worktree under branches/ to simulate moved path
|
||||
moved_dir = os.path.join(self.project_root, "branches", "issue-635-project-registry-api")
|
||||
os.makedirs(moved_dir, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
|
||||
res = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org="org", repo="repo", kind="issue", number=635,
|
||||
role="author", session_id="sess-635", worktree_path="/tmp/old_missing_path_635",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.db.release_lease_recorded(res.lease_id, session_id="sess-635")
|
||||
|
||||
cls_info = mwr.classify_worktree_binding(
|
||||
recorded_path="/tmp/old_missing_path_635",
|
||||
branch="issue-635-project-registry-api",
|
||||
project_root=self.project_root,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cls_info["classification"], mwr.CLASS_MOVED_WORKTREE)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(cls_info["retire_eligible"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(os.path.realpath(cls_info["moved_to_path"]), os.path.realpath(moved_dir))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_recreation_race_revalidation_blocks_mutation(self):
|
||||
path = os.path.join(self.temp_dir, "recreated_wt")
|
||||
res = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org="org", repo="repo", kind="issue", number=300,
|
||||
role="author", session_id="sess-300", worktree_path=path,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.db.release_lease_recorded(res.lease_id, session_id="sess-300")
|
||||
|
||||
# Initial audit when path is missing
|
||||
audit = mwr.audit_missing_worktree_bindings(self.db, project_root=self.project_root, remote="prgs")
|
||||
candidate = audit["confirmed_stale_candidates"][0]
|
||||
|
||||
# Simulate concurrent recreation of worktree path
|
||||
os.makedirs(path, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
|
||||
# Pre-mutation revalidation detects recreation and blocks
|
||||
res_mut = mwr.resolve_missing_worktree_binding(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
binding=candidate,
|
||||
dry_run=False,
|
||||
operator_authorized=True,
|
||||
project_root=self.project_root,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res_mut["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res_mut["reason"], "revalidation_failed")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_authorized_cleanup_retires_stale_binding_and_is_idempotent(self):
|
||||
# Create 2 leases: 1 stale missing, 1 valid existing worktree
|
||||
valid_path = os.path.join(self.project_root, "branches", "valid_wt")
|
||||
os.makedirs(valid_path, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
|
||||
stale_path = "/tmp/stale_missing_400"
|
||||
|
||||
res1 = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org="org", repo="repo", kind="issue", number=401,
|
||||
role="author", session_id="sess-401", worktree_path=valid_path,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
res2 = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org="org", repo="repo", kind="issue", number=402,
|
||||
role="author", session_id="sess-402", worktree_path=stale_path,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.db.release_lease_recorded(res2.lease_id, session_id="sess-402")
|
||||
|
||||
# Dry-run reconciliation
|
||||
dry = mwr.reconcile_missing_worktree_bindings(
|
||||
self.db, project_root=self.project_root, remote="prgs", dry_run=True, operator_authorized=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(dry["success"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(dry["dry_run"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(dry["stale_candidates_count"], 1)
|
||||
|
||||
# Apply reconciliation
|
||||
applied = mwr.reconcile_missing_worktree_bindings(
|
||||
self.db, project_root=self.project_root, remote="prgs", dry_run=False, operator_authorized=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(applied["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(applied["dry_run"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(applied["worktrees_dimension_resolved"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(applied["after_audit"]["missing_count"], 0)
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify DB: lease 2 worktree_path is cleared, lease 1 worktree_path remains intact
|
||||
l1 = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(res1.lease_id)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(l1["lease"]["worktree_path"], valid_path)
|
||||
|
||||
l2 = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(res2.lease_id)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(l2["lease"]["worktree_path"], "")
|
||||
prov = json.loads(l2["lease"]["provenance_json"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(prov.get("worktree_path_retired"))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(prov.get("retired_worktree_path"), stale_path)
|
||||
|
||||
# Re-run (idempotency check)
|
||||
rerun = mwr.reconcile_missing_worktree_bindings(
|
||||
self.db, project_root=self.project_root, remote="prgs", dry_run=False, operator_authorized=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(rerun["success"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(rerun["worktrees_dimension_resolved"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rerun["stale_candidates_count"], 0)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_historical_post_pr968_records_resolution(self):
|
||||
# Create historical records matching #970 description
|
||||
res_795 = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", kind="pr", number=795,
|
||||
expected_head_sha="head795hist", role="reviewer", session_id="reviewer-pr795-hist",
|
||||
worktree_path="/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/branches/review-feat-issue-628-autonomous-handoffs-orchestration",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.db.release_lease_recorded(res_795.lease_id, session_id="reviewer-pr795-hist")
|
||||
|
||||
res_635 = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", kind="issue", number=635,
|
||||
role="author", session_id="author-issue635-hist",
|
||||
worktree_path="/Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/branches/issue-635-project-registry-api",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.db.release_lease_recorded(res_635.lease_id, session_id="author-issue635-hist")
|
||||
|
||||
# Audit finds both historical records
|
||||
audit = mwr.audit_missing_worktree_bindings(self.db, project_root=self.project_root, remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(audit["confirmed_stale_count"], 2)
|
||||
|
||||
# Reconcile safely resolves both
|
||||
rec = mwr.reconcile_missing_worktree_bindings(
|
||||
self.db, project_root=self.project_root, remote="prgs", dry_run=False, operator_authorized=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(rec["worktrees_dimension_resolved"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rec["after_audit"]["missing_count"], 0)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user