fix(mcp): remediate B8, B6/B11, and B15 break-glass restart blockers (#664)

- B8: Correct redaction boundary for GITEA_TOKEN= and URI userinfo without destroying adjacent audit evidence or benign sec- text
- B6/B11: Remove false restart execution claims from default executor when GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK is non-empty
- B15: Document deployable production grant set (runtime.break_glass_restart and gitea.issue.create) for prgs-controller
- Preserve B13, B1, B14 and previously accepted corrections

docs/mcp-restart-coordinator.md

@@ -144,6 +144,19 @@ tool argument expresses caller intent and cannot be self-asserted by a worker
 session. `break_glass_requested` and `break_glass_authorized` are both reported,
 so a bypass is never silent.
 
+### Break-glass Restart Workflow (`gitea_break_glass_restart`, #664)
+
+The dedicated MCP tool `gitea_break_glass_restart` provides the privileged emergency break-glass restart workflow when graceful drain cannot complete:
+
+- **Authorization (#664 AC1 / B1 / B13 / B15)**: Requires the exact trusted profile `prgs-controller` **and** explicit `runtime.break_glass_restart` and `gitea.issue.create` grants enforced by the real production operation gate (no `gitea.read` fallback). Incident creation is mandatory prior to execution (`gitea.issue.create`), so the deployable production policy for `prgs-controller` includes `allowed_operations`: `["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.close", "gitea.pr.comment", "gitea.issue.comment", "gitea.issue.create", "runtime.break_glass_restart", "gitea.branch.delete", "gitea.decision_lock.irrecoverable_recovery"]`. Ordinary roles, non-controller reconcilers, lookalike profile names (`fake-controller`, …), and env vars cannot authorize. A narrow break-glass capability does **not** redefine the profile's declared global role. Updating a live running `prgs-controller` profile in production requires an operator configuration update and daemon reload post-merge.
+- **Required Parameters (#664 AC2)**:
+  - `reason`: Mandatory non-empty string (min 10 characters).
+  - `confirmation`: Must equal exactly `"I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION"`.
+  - `impact_ack`: Must be `True`.
+- **Automatic Incident Creation (#664 AC3)**: Creates a Gitea incident issue (`[INCIDENT] [REQUESTED] Break-glass MCP restart invoked by ...`) detailing the reason, timestamp, disrupted sessions, and linking `#652 #653 #655 #630 #658 #662 #664`.
+- **Immutable Append-Only Audit Entry**: Records immutable pre-execution (REQUESTED) and post-execution (SUCCEEDED/FAILED) audit log entries with correlation identifiers.
+- **Mandatory Reconciliation (#664 AC4)**: Sets `reconciliation_required=True` requiring post-restart reconciliation via `gitea_reconcile_after_restart` (#662).
+
 ### Fail closed on apply
 
 A missing, malformed, expired, unclean, tampered, or fingerprint-stale drain
@@ -160,3 +173,4 @@ profiles are operational metadata only.
 
 A representative dry-run report is in
 [`mcp-restart-impact-sample.json`](./mcp-restart-impact-sample.json).
+

gitea_audit.py

@@ -27,13 +27,73 @@ ALLOWED = "allowed"
 BLOCKED = "blocked"
 FAILED = "failed"
 SUCCEEDED = "succeeded"
+REQUESTED = "requested"
+ACCEPTED = "accepted"
+PENDING = "pending"
 
 REDACTED = "[REDACTED]"
 
 # A dict key containing any of these (case-insensitive) has its value redacted.
-_SECRET_KEY_HINTS = ("token", "password", "secret", "authorization", "auth")
+_SECRET_KEY_HINTS = (
+    "token",
+    "password",
+    "passwd",
+    "pwd",
+    "secret",
+    "authorization",
+    "auth",
+    "api_key",
+    "apikey",
+    "access_key",
+    "private_key",
+    "client_secret",
+    "credential",
+)
 # A string value starting with one of these has the following run redacted.
-_SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES = ("token ", "Basic ", "Bearer ")
+# Space-terminated scheme prefixes only. Colon forms (``token:`` / ``api_key:``)
+# and ``Authorization: Bearer …`` are handled by ``_ASSIGNMENT_SECRET_PATTERN``
+# so policy/docs text that merely *names* a scheme is not itself flagged as a
+# live secret by console detectors.
+_SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES = (
+    "token ",
+    "Basic ",
+    "Bearer ",
+)
+
+# Bare token-shaped values only — never a broad ``sec-`` prefix that erases
+# ordinary words (#664 B8 over-redaction).
+_BARE_SECRET_PATTERN = re.compile(
+    r'(?i)\b(?:'
+    r'ghp_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16,}'
+    r'|gho_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16,}'
+    r'|ghu_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16,}'
+    r'|ghs_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16,}'
+    r'|ghr_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16,}'
+    r'|sk-live-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}'
+    r'|sk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}'
+    r'|sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}'
+    r'|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}'
+    r')\b'
+)
+
+# Key/value credentials embedded in free text (password=..., api_key: ..., GITEA_TOKEN=..., etc.).
+# Group 1 captures the key name (e.g. GITEA_TOKEN, password, api_key).
+# Group 2 captures delimiter/whitespace (=, : ).
+# Group 3 captures the secret value, stopping at whitespace or non-secret delimiters (&, ;, ,, quotes, closing brackets).
+_ASSIGNMENT_SECRET_PATTERN = re.compile(
+    r'(?i)\b([A-Za-z0-9_]*?(?:token|password|passwd|pwd|secret|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|'
+    r'client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key|authorization|credential))\b(\s*[:=]\s*)('
+    r'"[^"]*"|\'[^\']*\'|'
+    r'(?:Bearer|Basic|Token)\s+[^\s;&,"\'\)\}\]\>]+|'
+    r'[^\s;&,"\'\)\}\]\>]+'
+    r')'
+)
+
+# Connection-string style credentials: Password=...; User ID=...; etc.
+_CONN_STRING_SECRET_PATTERN = re.compile(
+    r'(?i)\b((?:password|pwd|user\s*id|uid|username|account)\s*=\s*)([^\s;\'"]+)'
+)
+
 
 # Known synthetic test-only domains/hostnames to preserve
 _SYNTHETIC_HOSTS = {
@@ -59,7 +119,8 @@ def redact_urls(text: str) -> str:
     if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
         return text
 
-    url_pattern = re.compile(r'(https?://[^\s)>\]}]+)', re.IGNORECASE)
+    # Match any URI scheme (http, https, postgres, mysql, mongodb, redis, etc.)
+    url_pattern = re.compile(r'([a-z0-9\+\.\-]+://[^\s)>\]}]+)', re.IGNORECASE)
 
     def replace_url(match):
         url_str = match.group(1)
@@ -73,11 +134,11 @@ def redact_urls(text: str) -> str:
                     is_synthetic = True
                     break
 
-            if is_synthetic:
+            if is_synthetic or (parsed.username or parsed.password) or parsed.scheme.lower() not in ("http", "https"):
-                # Rebuild synthetic URL to redact any credentials or query secrets
+                # Rebuild URL to redact any credentials or query secrets
                 new_netloc = parsed.netloc
                 if parsed.username or parsed.password:
-                    netloc_clean = parsed.hostname
+                    netloc_clean = parsed.hostname or ""
                     if parsed.port:
                         netloc_clean = f"{netloc_clean}:{parsed.port}"
                     new_netloc = f"[REDACTED_USER]:[REDACTED_PASS]@{netloc_clean}"
@@ -114,23 +175,51 @@ def redact_urls(text: str) -> str:
     return out
 
 
+def _mask_assignment(match: re.Match) -> str:
+    """Keep the key and separator; replace only the secret value."""
+    val = match.group(3)
+    if val.startswith(REDACTED) or val.startswith("%5BREDACTED") or val.startswith("[REDACTED"):
+        return f"{match.group(1)}{match.group(2)}{val}"
+    return f"{match.group(1)}{match.group(2)}{REDACTED}"
+
+
+def _mask_conn_secret(match: re.Match) -> str:
+    """Keep the connection-string key; replace only the credential value."""
+    val = match.group(2)
+    if val.startswith(REDACTED) or val.startswith("%5BREDACTED") or val.startswith("[REDACTED"):
+        return f"{match.group(1)}{val}"
+    return f"{match.group(1)}{REDACTED}"
+
+
 def _redact_str(text):
-    """Redact anything that looks like an Authorization credential or raw URL in *text*."""
+    """Redact credentials, bare token shapes, and raw URLs in *text* (#664 B8).
+
+    Covers key/value credentials, authorization/bearer material, bare
+    token-shaped values, connection-string credentials, and secrets embedded
+    in larger sentences. Deliberately does **not** erase ordinary words that
+    merely begin with a broad ``sec-`` prefix.
+    """
     if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
         return text
-    out = text
+    out = redact_urls(text)
+    out = _BARE_SECRET_PATTERN.sub(REDACTED, out)
+    out = _ASSIGNMENT_SECRET_PATTERN.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
+    out = _CONN_STRING_SECRET_PATTERN.sub(_mask_conn_secret, out)
+    out_lower = out.lower()
     for prefix in _SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES:
+        prefix_lower = prefix.lower()
         idx = 0
         while True:
-            i = out.find(prefix, idx)
+            i = out_lower.find(prefix_lower, idx)
             if i == -1:
                 break
             j = i + len(prefix)
             while j < len(out) and not out[j].isspace():
                 j += 1
             out = out[:i] + prefix + REDACTED + out[j:]
+            out_lower = out.lower()
             idx = i + len(prefix) + len(REDACTED)
-    return redact_urls(out)
+    return out
 
 
 def redact(value):

gitea_config.py

@@ -97,6 +97,26 @@ GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES = {
 _REVIEW_MERGE_OPS = frozenset({"gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge"})
 _AUTHOR_ONLY_OPS = frozenset({"gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"})
 
+# First-class operation services that may appear in multi-service profile
+# allowlists. ``runtime.*`` is the control-plane capability namespace used by
+# non-Gitea MCP tools such as ``runtime.break_glass_restart`` (#664 B13).
+# Unknown foreign prefixes (e.g. ``jenkins.*`` under service=gitea) still fail
+# closed — they are not registered here.
+KNOWN_OPERATION_SERVICES = frozenset({"gitea", "runtime"})
+
+
+def service_for_operation(op, default="gitea"):
+    """Return the registered service prefix for a fully-qualified *op*.
+
+    Unqualified names and unknown prefixes fall back to *default* so callers
+    keep the historical Gitea-centric gate behaviour.
+    """
+    if isinstance(op, str) and "." in op:
+        prefix = op.split(".", 1)[0]
+        if prefix in KNOWN_OPERATION_SERVICES:
+            return prefix
+    return default
+
 
 def normalize_operation(op, service="gitea"):
     """Return the canonical namespaced name for *op*, or fail closed (#106).
@@ -133,6 +153,12 @@ def check_operation(op, allowed, forbidden=(), service="gitea"):
     Reasons: ``allowed``, ``invalid-operation``, ``invalid-forbidden-entry``,
     ``forbidden``, ``no-allowed-operations``, ``not-allowed``.
 
+    Multi-service profile allowlists (#664 B13): each allow/forbid entry is
+    normalized with its own registered service prefix (``gitea.*`` or
+    ``runtime.*``) so a gate defaulting to service=gitea can still enforce an
+    exact ``runtime.break_glass_restart`` grant. Unknown / misspelled
+    operations and foreign service prefixes remain fail-closed.
+
     Fail-closed rules:
     - an *op* that cannot be normalized is denied (``invalid-operation``)
     - a forbidden entry that cannot be normalized denies the request
@@ -143,14 +169,16 @@ def check_operation(op, allowed, forbidden=(), service="gitea"):
     - ``forbidden`` always overrides ``allowed``
     - an empty or missing allowed list denies everything
     """
+    op_service = service_for_operation(op, default=service)
     try:
-        op_n = normalize_operation(op, service)
+        op_n = normalize_operation(op, op_service)
     except ConfigError:
         return (False, "invalid-operation")
     forbidden_n = set()
     for entry in (forbidden or ()):
         try:
-            forbidden_n.add(normalize_operation(entry, service))
+            entry_service = service_for_operation(entry, default=service)
+            forbidden_n.add(normalize_operation(entry, entry_service))
         except ConfigError:
             return (False, "invalid-forbidden-entry")
     if op_n in forbidden_n:
@@ -160,7 +188,8 @@ def check_operation(op, allowed, forbidden=(), service="gitea"):
     allowed_n = set()
     for entry in allowed:
         try:
-            allowed_n.add(normalize_operation(entry, service))
+            entry_service = service_for_operation(entry, default=service)
+            allowed_n.add(normalize_operation(entry, entry_service))
         except ConfigError:
             continue
     if op_n in allowed_n:

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -233,28 +233,50 @@ def _effective_workspace_role() -> str:
     )
 
 
+# Exact production profile → role mapping used only when no declared role is
+# present. Substring lookalikes (fake-controller, not-controller, …) never
+# match (#664 B1/B14).
+_EXACT_PROFILE_ROLE_NAMES = {
+    "prgs-controller": "controller",
+    "prgs-reconciler": "reconciler",
+    "prgs-author": "author",
+    "prgs-reviewer": "reviewer",
+    "prgs-merger": "merger",
+    "mdcps-author": "author",
+    "mdcps-reviewer": "reviewer",
+    "mdcps-merger": "merger",
+    "controller": "controller",
+    "reconciler": "reconciler",
+    "author": "author",
+    "reviewer": "reviewer",
+    "merger": "merger",
+}
+
+# Exact trusted profile that may hold break-glass (#664 B1). Capability
+# ``runtime.break_glass_restart`` is still required and enforced by the real
+# operation gate; this set only rejects lookalike profile names.
+TRUSTED_BREAK_GLASS_PROFILES = frozenset({"prgs-controller"})
+
+
 def _profile_role_kind(profile: dict) -> str:
     """Resolve a profile's declared role before inferring from permissions.
 
     Declared ``role`` / ``role_kind`` always wins so a controller profile is
-    never reclassified as reconciler from permission inference (#840).
+    never reclassified as reconciler from permission inference (#840). Exact
+    match only — profile-name / role *substrings* never grant controller (or
+    any) authority (#664 B1/B14). Lookalikes such as ``fake-controller``,
+    ``not-controller``, or ``xcontrollerx`` do not become controller.
     """
     role = (profile.get("role") or profile.get("role_kind") or "").strip().lower()
     if role:
-        # Normalize aliases / case.
+        # Exact aliases only; never ``"control" in role`` (matches
-        if "control" in role:
+        # "not-controller" / "control-plane").
+        if role in ("controller", "control"):
             return "controller"
         return role
     profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip().lower()
-    for candidate in (
+    if profile_name in _EXACT_PROFILE_ROLE_NAMES:
-        "controller",
+        return _EXACT_PROFILE_ROLE_NAMES[profile_name]
-        "reconciler",
-        "merger",
-        "reviewer",
-        "author",
-    ):
-        if candidate in profile_name:
-            return candidate
     return _role_kind(
         profile.get("allowed_operations") or [],
         profile.get("forbidden_operations") or [],
@@ -7121,35 +7143,17 @@ def terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
     ]
 
 
-# Patterns scrubbed from any surfaced error text so a credential can never leak.
-_SECRET_PREFIXES = ("token ", "Basic ")
-
-
 def _redact(text: str) -> str:
-    """Strip anything that looks like an Authorization credential or raw URL from *text*.
+    """Strip credentials, bare token shapes, and raw URLs from *text* (#664 B8).
 
-    Errors raised by ``api_request`` echo the server response body, not the
+    Defers to the canonical :mod:`gitea_audit` redactor so MCP tool results,
-    request headers, so a token should never appear — this is defence in depth
+    incidents, audits, and delegated error surfaces share one boundary.
-    so a future change can't leak ``token …`` / ``Basic …`` material into a
-    tool result or log line.
     """
     if not text:
         return text
-    out = text
-    for prefix in _SECRET_PREFIXES:
-        idx = 0
-        while True:
-            i = out.find(prefix, idx)
-            if i == -1:
-                break
-            j = i + len(prefix)
-            while j < len(out) and not out[j].isspace():
-                j += 1
-            out = out[:i] + prefix + "[REDACTED]" + out[j:]
-            idx = i + len(prefix) + len("[REDACTED]")
-    # Redact raw URLs, query secrets, hostnames, etc.
     import gitea_audit
-    return gitea_audit.redact_urls(out)
+    redacted = gitea_audit._redact_str(str(text))
+    return redacted if isinstance(redacted, str) else str(redacted)
 
 
 # Review states that carry a submitted verdict. Gitea also emits PENDING
@@ -23922,6 +23926,657 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
     return payload
 
 
+BREAK_GLASS_CONFIRMATION_PHRASE = "I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION"
+
+# Test-injectable canonical break-glass executor/delegate (#664 B6/B11).
+# Production default never signals the live MCP cohort.
+_break_glass_restart_executor = None
+
+
+def _default_break_glass_restart_executor(request: dict) -> dict:
+    """Canonical non-dry-run break-glass executor/delegate (#664 B6/B11).
+
+    Never kills, signals, or restarts the live MCP cohort in-process.
+    An environment string alone (``GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK``) does not
+    prove restart execution without an active confirmed delegate handoff.
+    """
+    hook = (os.environ.get("GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK") or "").strip()
+    if hook:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "apply_supported": True,
+            "apply_authorized": True,
+            "restart_performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "execution_mode": "accepted_not_executed",
+            "host_hook_configured": True,
+            "reasons": [
+                "sanctioned host restart hook reference is configured, but environment text "
+                "cannot prove execution without a confirmed delegate handoff (fail closed) (#664 B6/B11)"
+            ],
+        }
+    return {
+        "success": False,
+        "apply_supported": False,
+        "apply_authorized": False,
+        "restart_performed": False,
+        "break_glass_executed": False,
+        "execution_mode": "unsupported",
+        "reasons": [
+            "break-glass apply is unsupported: no sanctioned host restart "
+            "executor is configured (#664)"
+        ],
+    }
+
+
+def _run_break_glass_restart_executor(request: dict) -> dict:
+    """Invoke the installed or default break-glass executor (test-injectable)."""
+    executor = _break_glass_restart_executor or _default_break_glass_restart_executor
+    result = executor(request)
+    if not isinstance(result, dict):
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "apply_supported": True,
+            "apply_authorized": False,
+            "restart_performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "reasons": ["break-glass executor returned a non-dict result (fail closed)"],
+        }
+    return result
+
+
+@mcp.tool()
+def gitea_break_glass_restart(
+    reason: str,
+    confirmation: str,
+    impact_ack: bool = False,
+    restart_class: str = "full_mcp_restart",
+    create_incident_issue: bool = True,
+    dry_run: bool = False,
+    remote: str = "dadeschools",
+    host: str | None = None,
+    org: str | None = None,
+    repo: str | None = None,
+    worktree_path: str | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Privileged emergency break-glass MCP restart workflow (#664).
+
+    Break-glass restart permits emergency recovery when graceful drain cannot
+    complete. It requires:
+    1. Exact ``runtime.break_glass_restart`` capability on the trusted
+       ``prgs-controller`` profile (ordinary roles, lookalike names, env vars,
+       and non-controller reconcilers fail closed).
+    2. Explicit non-empty reason (minimum 10 characters).
+    3. Exact confirmation string matching 'I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION'.
+    4. Mandatory impact acknowledgement (impact_ack=True).
+    5. Immutable append-only audit entry recorded prior to execution and after terminal completion.
+    6. Automatic incident record created on Gitea prior to execution.
+    7. Truthful execution reporting via the canonical executor/delegate and
+       mandatory post-restart reconciliation (#662).
+    """
+    # B13: real production gate for the exact canonical operation — never
+    # fall back to gitea.read and never stub this gate in production.
+    capability_block = _profile_operation_gate("runtime.break_glass_restart")
+    if capability_block:
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "reasons": capability_block,
+            "permission_report": _permission_block_report("runtime.break_glass_restart"),
+            "blocker_kind": "permission_denied",
+        })
+
+    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
+    profile = get_profile()
+    active_role = _profile_role_kind(profile)
+    profile_name = (
+        (profile.get("profile_name") or profile.get("execution_profile") or "")
+        .strip()
+    )
+    break_glass_env_auth = bool(
+        (os.environ.get("GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION") or "").strip()
+    )
+    # Env is never an authorization channel for this endpoint (B2/B1).
+    _ = break_glass_env_auth
+
+    # B1: exact trusted profile only — not role substring, not lookalike names.
+    if profile_name not in TRUSTED_BREAK_GLASS_PROFILES:
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "active_role": active_role,
+            "profile_name": profile_name or None,
+            "reasons": [
+                f"profile '{profile_name or '(unset)'}' is not the trusted "
+                f"break-glass profile {sorted(TRUSTED_BREAK_GLASS_PROFILES)}; "
+                "lookalike names, ordinary roles, env vars, and non-controller "
+                "reconcilers cannot authorize break-glass (#664 AC1/B1)"
+            ],
+            "blocker_kind": "role_authorization",
+        })
+
+    # 2. Required fields and redaction (B8)
+    raw_reason = (reason or "").strip()
+    clean_reason = _redact(raw_reason)
+    if not raw_reason or len(raw_reason) < 10:
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                "reason is required and must be at least 10 characters long (#664 AC2)"
+            ],
+            "blocker_kind": "missing_required_fields",
+        })
+
+    clean_confirmation = (confirmation or "").strip()
+    if clean_confirmation != BREAK_GLASS_CONFIRMATION_PHRASE:
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                f"confirmation string mismatch; must equal exactly '{BREAK_GLASS_CONFIRMATION_PHRASE}' (#664 AC2)"
+            ],
+            "blocker_kind": "confirmation_mismatch",
+        })
+
+    if not impact_ack:
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                "impact_ack must be True to acknowledge disruption of in-flight sessions (#664 AC2)"
+            ],
+            "blocker_kind": "impact_ack_required",
+        })
+
+    # Gate incident issue creation on gitea.issue.create permission (B3)
+    if create_incident_issue:
+        create_block = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.issue.create")
+        if create_block:
+            return gitea_audit.redact({
+                "success": False,
+                "performed": False,
+                "break_glass_executed": False,
+                "reasons": create_block,
+                "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.issue.create"),
+                "blocker_kind": "permission_denied",
+            })
+
+    # Evaluate impact / disrupted sessions
+    impact_result = gitea_request_mcp_restart(
+        remote=remote,
+        host=host,
+        org=org,
+        repo=repo,
+        dry_run=True,
+        restart_class=restart_class,
+        request_break_glass=True,
+    )
+    disrupted_sessions = list(impact_result.get("affected_sessions") or [])
+    disrupted_count = len(disrupted_sessions)
+
+    identity = _authenticated_username(h) or profile.get("username") or "unknown"
+    now_iso = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+    ns_ctx = _resolve_namespace_mutation_context(worktree_path)
+    mcp_namespace = ns_ctx.get("mcp_namespace") or profile.get("profile_name") or "gitea-controller"
+    correlation_id = f"bg-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}"
+
+    audit_payload = gitea_audit.redact({
+        "event": "break_glass_mcp_restart",
+        "correlation_id": correlation_id,
+        "actor": identity,
+        "role": active_role,
+        "mcp_namespace": mcp_namespace,
+        "timestamp": now_iso,
+        "reason": clean_reason,
+        "confirmation": clean_confirmation,
+        "restart_class": restart_class,
+        "disrupted_sessions_count": disrupted_count,
+        "disrupted_sessions": [
+            s.get("session_id") if isinstance(s, dict) else str(s)
+            for s in disrupted_sessions
+        ],
+        "dry_run": dry_run,
+        "remote": remote,
+        "org": o,
+        "repo": r,
+        "env_auth_present": break_glass_env_auth,
+    })
+
+    # Dry-run handling (B7: no durable mutation)
+    if dry_run:
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": True,
+            "performed": False,
+            "dry_run": True,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "would_execute": True,
+            "correlation_id": correlation_id,
+            "actor": identity,
+            "role": active_role,
+            "mcp_namespace": mcp_namespace,
+            "restart_class": restart_class,
+            "reason": clean_reason,
+            "confirmation": clean_confirmation,
+            "disrupted_sessions_count": disrupted_count,
+            "disrupted_sessions": disrupted_sessions,
+            "audit_record": audit_payload,
+            "saved_audit": None,
+            "incident_issue": None,
+            "reconciliation_required": True,
+            "reconciliation_tool": "gitea_reconcile_after_restart",
+            "follow_up_issue_required": True,
+            "cross_references": ["#652", "#653", "#655", "#630", "#658", "#662", "#664"],
+            "reasons": ["break-glass restart dry-run evaluated successfully"],
+        })
+
+    # Fail closed if create_incident_issue is False on real execution (B5)
+    if not create_incident_issue:
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                "create_incident_issue=False is forbidden on real break-glass execution; "
+                "pre-execution incident creation is mandatory (#664 AC3)"
+            ],
+            "blocker_kind": "incident_creation_required",
+        })
+
+    # B9: Fail closed if audit backend is disabled
+    if not gitea_audit.audit_enabled():
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                "audit recording is disabled or unavailable; break-glass restart requires an enabled audit backend (#664 AC3)"
+            ],
+            "blocker_kind": "audit_recording_failed",
+        })
+
+    # Pre-execution recording: Audit record in REQUESTED state (B4, B10)
+    pre_audit_event = gitea_audit.build_event(
+        action="break_glass_mcp_restart_requested",
+        result=gitea_audit.REQUESTED,
+        remote=remote,
+        server=(gitea_url(h, "").rstrip("/") if h else None),
+        repository=r,
+        profile_name=profile.get("profile_name", "unknown"),
+        audit_label=profile.get("audit_label", "unknown"),
+        authenticated_username=identity,
+        reason=clean_reason,
+        mcp_namespace=mcp_namespace,
+        task_role=active_role,
+        operation="break_glass_mcp_restart",
+        now=now_iso,
+        request_metadata={
+            "correlation_id": correlation_id,
+            "confirmation": clean_confirmation,
+            "restart_class": restart_class,
+            "disrupted_sessions_count": disrupted_count,
+            "disrupted_sessions": [
+                s.get("session_id") if isinstance(s, dict) else str(s)
+                for s in disrupted_sessions
+            ],
+        },
+    )
+    audit_write_success = gitea_audit.write_event(pre_audit_event)
+
+    if not audit_write_success:
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                "failed to persist required pre-execution audit event (#664 AC3)"
+            ],
+            "blocker_kind": "audit_recording_failed",
+        })
+
+    # Pre-execution recording: Gitea Incident Issue (B5, B8)
+    issue_title = _redact(f"[INCIDENT] [REQUESTED] Break-glass MCP restart invoked by {identity} ({correlation_id})")
+    issue_body = _redact(
+        f"## Break-glass MCP restart incident report (#664)\n\n"
+        f"- **Correlation ID**: `{correlation_id}`\n"
+        f"- **Invoked by**: `{identity}` (role: `{active_role}`, namespace: `{mcp_namespace}`)\n"
+        f"- **Timestamp**: `{now_iso}`\n"
+        f"- **Reason**: {clean_reason}\n"
+        f"- **Confirmation**: `{clean_confirmation}`\n"
+        f"- **Disrupted Sessions Count**: `{disrupted_count}`\n\n"
+        f"### Mandatory Post-Restart Reconciliation (#662)\n"
+        f"Post-restart reconciliation must be executed via `gitea_reconcile_after_restart` "
+        f"to clean up orphaned leases, inspect worktree integrity, and handle disrupted work.\n\n"
+        f"### Cross-references\n"
+        f"Ref #652 #653 #655 #630 #658 #662 #664\n"
+    )
+    incident_issue_result = None
+    try:
+        incident_issue_result = api_request(
+            "POST",
+            f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/issues",
+            _auth(h),
+            {
+                "title": issue_title,
+                "body": issue_body,
+                "labels": ["incident", "mcp-health", "break-glass"],
+            },
+        )
+        if not isinstance(incident_issue_result, dict) or "number" not in incident_issue_result:
+            return gitea_audit.redact({
+                "success": False,
+                "performed": False,
+                "break_glass_executed": False,
+                "reasons": [
+                    f"incident issue creation failed (#664 AC3): {_redact(str(incident_issue_result))}"
+                ],
+                "blocker_kind": "incident_creation_failed",
+                "incident_issue": incident_issue_result,
+            })
+    except Exception as exc:
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                f"incident issue creation failed with exception (#664 AC3): {_redact(str(exc))}"
+            ],
+            "blocker_kind": "incident_creation_failed",
+            "incident_issue": {"error": _redact(str(exc))},
+        })
+
+    incident_number = incident_issue_result.get("number")
+
+    # B6/B11: reach the canonical non-dry-run executor/delegate.
+    # Authorization and apply_authorized do not mean execution occurred.
+    # Dry-run never reaches this path (returned earlier).
+    restart_exec_result = _run_break_glass_restart_executor({
+        "remote": remote,
+        "host": host,
+        "org": o,
+        "repo": r,
+        "restart_class": restart_class,
+        "correlation_id": correlation_id,
+        "reason": clean_reason,
+        "confirmation": clean_confirmation,
+        "profile_name": profile_name,
+        "active_role": active_role,
+        "incident_number": incident_number,
+        "disrupted_sessions_count": disrupted_count,
+        "request_break_glass": True,
+        "dry_run": False,
+    })
+
+    apply_supported = bool(restart_exec_result.get("apply_supported", False))
+    apply_authorized = bool(restart_exec_result.get("apply_authorized", False))
+    exec_success = bool(restart_exec_result.get("success", False))
+    # break_glass_executed is true only when the executor contract proves
+    # execution (or accepted host delegation) occurred.
+    restart_performed = bool(
+        restart_exec_result.get("restart_performed", False)
+        and restart_exec_result.get("break_glass_executed", False)
+    )
+
+    if not apply_supported:
+        term_audit = gitea_audit.build_event(
+            action="break_glass_mcp_restart_terminal",
+            result=gitea_audit.FAILED,
+            remote=remote,
+            server=(gitea_url(h, "").rstrip("/") if h else None),
+            repository=r,
+            profile_name=profile.get("profile_name", "unknown"),
+            audit_label=profile.get("audit_label", "unknown"),
+            authenticated_username=identity,
+            reason="apply_unsupported",
+            mcp_namespace=mcp_namespace,
+            task_role=active_role,
+            operation="break_glass_mcp_restart",
+            now=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            request_metadata={
+                "correlation_id": correlation_id,
+                "incident_number": incident_number,
+                "break_glass_executed": False,
+                "blocker_kind": "apply_unsupported",
+            },
+        )
+        gitea_audit.write_event(term_audit)
+        if incident_number:
+            try:
+                api_request(
+                    "POST",
+                    f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/issues/{incident_number}/comments",
+                    _auth(h),
+                    {"body": _redact(f"**Terminal Status**: `apply_unsupported` - Restart coordinator does not support apply execution. No restart was performed. ({correlation_id})")},
+                )
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "actor": identity,
+            "role": active_role,
+            "mcp_namespace": mcp_namespace,
+            "restart_class": restart_class,
+            "reasons": [
+                "break-glass apply is unsupported by restart coordinator (apply_supported=False) (#664)",
+                *(restart_exec_result.get("reasons") or []),
+            ],
+            "blocker_kind": "apply_unsupported",
+            "restart_result": restart_exec_result,
+            "incident_issue": incident_issue_result,
+            "audit_record": pre_audit_event,
+        })
+
+    if not apply_authorized or not exec_success or not restart_performed:
+        term_audit = gitea_audit.build_event(
+            action="break_glass_mcp_restart_terminal",
+            result=gitea_audit.FAILED,
+            remote=remote,
+            server=(gitea_url(h, "").rstrip("/") if h else None),
+            repository=r,
+            profile_name=profile.get("profile_name", "unknown"),
+            audit_label=profile.get("audit_label", "unknown"),
+            authenticated_username=identity,
+            reason="restart_delegation_failed",
+            mcp_namespace=mcp_namespace,
+            task_role=active_role,
+            operation="break_glass_mcp_restart",
+            now=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            request_metadata={
+                "correlation_id": correlation_id,
+                "incident_number": incident_number,
+                "break_glass_executed": False,
+                "blocker_kind": "restart_delegation_failed",
+            },
+        )
+        gitea_audit.write_event(term_audit)
+        if incident_number:
+            try:
+                api_request(
+                    "POST",
+                    f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/issues/{incident_number}/comments",
+                    _auth(h),
+                    {"body": _redact(f"**Terminal Status**: `restart_delegation_failed` - Restart execution failed or was denied. No restart was performed. ({correlation_id})")},
+                )
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "actor": identity,
+            "role": active_role,
+            "mcp_namespace": mcp_namespace,
+            "restart_class": restart_class,
+            "reasons": [
+                "delegated restart execution failed or was denied by coordinator (#664)",
+                *(restart_exec_result.get("reasons") or []),
+            ],
+            "blocker_kind": "restart_delegation_failed",
+            "restart_result": restart_exec_result,
+            "incident_issue": incident_issue_result,
+            "audit_record": pre_audit_event,
+        })
+
+    # Restart occurred! Perform mandatory post-restart reconciliation (B10)
+    recon_result = None
+    try:
+        recon_result = gitea_reconcile_after_restart(
+            remote=remote,
+            host=host,
+            org=org,
+            repo=repo,
+        )
+    except Exception as exc:
+        recon_result = {"success": False, "error": _redact(str(exc))}
+
+    recon_success = bool(recon_result and isinstance(recon_result, dict) and recon_result.get("success", False))
+
+    if not recon_success:
+        term_audit = gitea_audit.build_event(
+            action="break_glass_mcp_restart_terminal",
+            result=gitea_audit.FAILED,
+            remote=remote,
+            server=(gitea_url(h, "").rstrip("/") if h else None),
+            repository=r,
+            profile_name=profile.get("profile_name", "unknown"),
+            audit_label=profile.get("audit_label", "unknown"),
+            authenticated_username=identity,
+            reason="reconciliation_failed",
+            mcp_namespace=mcp_namespace,
+            task_role=active_role,
+            operation="break_glass_mcp_restart",
+            now=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            request_metadata={
+                "correlation_id": correlation_id,
+                "incident_number": incident_number,
+                "break_glass_executed": True,
+                "reconciliation_success": False,
+                "blocker_kind": "reconciliation_failed",
+            },
+        )
+        gitea_audit.write_event(term_audit)
+        if incident_number:
+            try:
+                api_request(
+                    "POST",
+                    f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/issues/{incident_number}/comments",
+                    _auth(h),
+                    {"body": _redact(f"**Terminal Status**: `reconciliation_failed` - Restart was executed but post-restart reconciliation failed. ({correlation_id})")},
+                )
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": True,
+            "break_glass_executed": True,
+            "actor": identity,
+            "role": active_role,
+            "mcp_namespace": mcp_namespace,
+            "restart_class": restart_class,
+            "reasons": [
+                "break-glass restart executed but post-restart reconciliation failed (#664/#662)"
+            ],
+            "blocker_kind": "reconciliation_failed",
+            "restart_result": restart_exec_result,
+            "reconciliation_result": recon_result,
+            "incident_issue": incident_issue_result,
+            "audit_record": pre_audit_event,
+        })
+
+    # Terminal audit append for successful execution + reconciliation
+    term_audit = gitea_audit.build_event(
+        action="break_glass_mcp_restart_terminal",
+        result=gitea_audit.SUCCEEDED,
+        remote=remote,
+        server=(gitea_url(h, "").rstrip("/") if h else None),
+        repository=r,
+        profile_name=profile.get("profile_name", "unknown"),
+        audit_label=profile.get("audit_label", "unknown"),
+        authenticated_username=identity,
+        reason=clean_reason,
+        mcp_namespace=mcp_namespace,
+        task_role=active_role,
+        operation="break_glass_mcp_restart",
+        now=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+        request_metadata={
+            "correlation_id": correlation_id,
+            "incident_number": incident_number,
+            "break_glass_executed": True,
+            "reconciliation_success": True,
+        },
+    )
+    term_write_success = gitea_audit.write_event(term_audit)
+
+    if incident_number:
+        try:
+            api_request(
+                "POST",
+                f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/issues/{incident_number}/comments",
+                _auth(h),
+                {"body": _redact(f"**Terminal Status**: `succeeded` - Break-glass restart executed and reconciled successfully ({correlation_id}).")},
+            )
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+    if not term_write_success:
+        return gitea_audit.redact({
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": True,
+            "break_glass_executed": True,
+            "actor": identity,
+            "role": active_role,
+            "mcp_namespace": mcp_namespace,
+            "restart_class": restart_class,
+            "reasons": [
+                "break-glass restart executed and reconciled but terminal audit recording failed (#664)"
+            ],
+            "blocker_kind": "terminal_audit_failed",
+            "restart_result": restart_exec_result,
+            "reconciliation_result": recon_result,
+            "incident_issue": incident_issue_result,
+            "audit_record": pre_audit_event,
+        })
+
+    return gitea_audit.redact({
+        "success": True,
+        "performed": True,
+        "dry_run": False,
+        "break_glass_executed": True,
+        "would_execute": True,
+        "correlation_id": correlation_id,
+        "actor": identity,
+        "role": active_role,
+        "mcp_namespace": mcp_namespace,
+        "restart_class": restart_class,
+        "reason": clean_reason,
+        "confirmation": clean_confirmation,
+        "disrupted_sessions_count": disrupted_count,
+        "disrupted_sessions": disrupted_sessions,
+        "audit_record": term_audit,
+        "saved_audit": term_audit,
+        "incident_issue": incident_issue_result,
+        "reconciliation_result": recon_result,
+        "reconciliation_required": True,
+        "reconciliation_tool": "gitea_reconcile_after_restart",
+        "follow_up_issue_required": True,
+        "cross_references": ["#652", "#653", "#655", "#630", "#658", "#662", "#664"],
+        "reasons": [
+            "break-glass restart executed with incident creation and mandatory reconciliation"
+        ],
+    })
+
+
+
 # --- #662 post-restart reconciliation ---------------------------------------
 
 _POST_RESTART_LAST_PROOF: dict | None = None

namespace_workspace_binding.py

@@ -37,12 +37,17 @@ def normalize_role_kind(
     *,
     profile_name: str | None = None,
 ) -> str:
-    """Map profile/task role to a workspace namespace key."""
+    """Map profile/task role to a workspace namespace key.
+
+    Exact profile-name matches only for controller routing (#840 / #664 B1):
+    substring lookalikes such as ``fake-controller`` must not become
+    controller.
+    """
     role = (role_kind or "author").strip().lower()
     profile = (profile_name or "").strip().lower()
-    if role == "reviewer" and "merger" in profile:
+    if role == "reviewer" and profile in ("prgs-merger", "mdcps-merger", "merger"):
         return "merger"
-    if "controller" in profile or role == "controller":
+    if role == "controller" or profile in ("prgs-controller", "controller"):
         return "controller"
     if role in ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS:
         return role

task_capability_map.py

@@ -576,6 +576,15 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "runtime.record_analytics_usage",
         "role": "author",
     },
+    # #664: emergency break-glass MCP restart workflow (privileged controller role).
+    "break_glass_restart": {
+        "permission": "runtime.break_glass_restart",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
+    "gitea_break_glass_restart": {
+        "permission": "runtime.break_glass_restart",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
 }
 
 

tests/test_issue_664_break_glass_restart.py

@@ -0,0 +1,982 @@
+"""Tests for emergency break-glass MCP restart workflow (#664).
+
+Regression suite for review #641 remediation: B13, B1, B14, B6/B11, B8, and
+preservation of previously accepted B2/B3/B5/B7/B9/B10 corrections.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import gitea_audit
+import gitea_config
+import gitea_mcp_server
+
+
+def _controller_profile(**extra) -> dict:
+    base = {
+        "profile_name": "prgs-controller",
+        "execution_profile": "prgs-controller",
+        "role": "reconciler",  # declared role must not be redefined by capability
+        "allowed_operations": [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.issue.create",
+            "gitea.branch.delete",
+            "gitea.pr.close",
+            "gitea.pr.comment",
+            "gitea.issue.comment",
+            "runtime.break_glass_restart",
+        ],
+        "forbidden_operations": [
+            "gitea.pr.approve",
+            "gitea.pr.merge",
+            "gitea.pr.create",
+            "gitea.branch.push",
+        ],
+    }
+    base.update(extra)
+    return base
+
+
+def _gate_open_patches():
+    """Keep master-parity / runtime-mode blocks out of unit tests."""
+    return (
+        patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "_master_parity_block", return_value=[]),
+        patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "_runtime_mode_block", return_value=[]),
+        patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "_try_auto_switch_for_operation", return_value=False),
+    )
+
+
+class TestBreakGlassRestart(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Test suite for gitea_break_glass_restart tool and guardrails (#664)."""
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.env_patcher = patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=False)
+        self.env_patcher.start()
+        os.environ.pop("GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION", None)
+        os.environ.pop("GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK", None)
+        os.environ.pop("GITEA_AUDIT_LOG", None)
+        # Reset injectable executor between tests.
+        gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = None
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = None
+        self.env_patcher.stop()
+
+    # ── B13: operation registration / real gate ───────────────────────────
+
+    def test_normalize_operation_accepts_canonical_break_glass_op(self) -> None:
+        """B13: production normalizer accepts exact runtime.break_glass_restart."""
+        self.assertEqual(
+            gitea_config.normalize_operation(
+                "runtime.break_glass_restart", service="runtime"
+            ),
+            "runtime.break_glass_restart",
+        )
+        ok, reason = gitea_config.check_operation(
+            "runtime.break_glass_restart",
+            ["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"],
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(ok, reason)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "allowed")
+
+    def test_normalize_unknown_and_misspelled_ops_fail_closed(self) -> None:
+        """B13: unknown / misspelled operations fail closed (no gitea.read fallback)."""
+        # Well-formed but misspelled runtime op normalizes, then is not allowed.
+        ok, reason = gitea_config.check_operation(
+            "runtime.break_glass_restar",  # misspelled
+            ["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"],
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(reason, "not-allowed")
+
+        ok2, reason2 = gitea_config.check_operation(
+            "runtime.break_glass_restart",
+            ["gitea.read"],  # capability not granted
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(ok2)
+        self.assertEqual(reason2, "not-allowed")
+
+        ok3, reason3 = gitea_config.check_operation(
+            "frobnicate",
+            ["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"],
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(ok3)
+        self.assertEqual(reason3, "invalid-operation")
+
+        # gitea.read grant alone never authorizes break-glass.
+        ok4, reason4 = gitea_config.check_operation(
+            "runtime.break_glass_restart",
+            ["gitea.read"],
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(ok4)
+        self.assertNotEqual(reason4, "allowed")
+
+    def test_real_profile_operation_gate_without_stubbing(self) -> None:
+        """B13: exercise real _profile_operation_gate (not stubbed)."""
+        allowed = _controller_profile()
+        denied = _controller_profile(
+            allowed_operations=["gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create"]
+        )
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=allowed):
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    gitea_mcp_server._profile_operation_gate(
+                        "runtime.break_glass_restart"
+                    ),
+                    [],
+                )
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=denied):
+                reasons = gitea_mcp_server._profile_operation_gate(
+                    "runtime.break_glass_restart"
+                )
+                self.assertTrue(reasons)
+                self.assertTrue(
+                    any("runtime.break_glass_restart" in r or "not allowed" in r
+                        for r in reasons)
+                )
+
+    def test_entry_point_uses_same_operation_as_gate(self) -> None:
+        """B13: entry point enforces runtime.break_glass_restart, not gitea.read."""
+        # Profile has gitea.read but not the break-glass capability.
+        prof = _controller_profile(
+            allowed_operations=["gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create"]
+        )
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Emergency restart required due to deadlock in worker pool",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "permission_denied")
+        self.assertNotIn("gitea.read", " ".join(res.get("reasons") or []))
+
+    # ── B1 / B14: exact profile auth, no substring, role preservation ─────
+
+    def test_trusted_prgs_controller_authorized(self) -> None:
+        """B1: exact trusted prgs-controller with capability is authorized."""
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
+                return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
+            ):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Emergency restart required due to deadlock in worker pool",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
+        self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
+
+    def test_fabricated_controller_like_profile_names_denied(self) -> None:
+        """B1: lookalike profile names never become authorized."""
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        for name in (
+            "fake-controller",
+            "controller-copy",
+            "not-controller",
+            "xcontrollerx",
+            "CONTROLLER",
+            "prgs-controller-copy",
+        ):
+            prof = _controller_profile(profile_name=name, execution_profile=name)
+            with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+                with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
+                    res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                        reason="Emergency restart required due to deadlock in worker pool",
+                        confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                        impact_ack=True,
+                        dry_run=True,
+                        remote="prgs",
+                    )
+            self.assertFalse(res["success"], name)
+            self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "role_authorization", name)
+            self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
+
+    def test_ordinary_and_non_controller_reconciler_denied(self) -> None:
+        """B1: ordinary roles and non-controller reconcilers are denied."""
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        denied = [
+            {"profile_name": "prgs-author", "role": "author",
+             "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"],
+             "forbidden_operations": []},
+            {"profile_name": "prgs-reviewer", "role": "reviewer",
+             "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"],
+             "forbidden_operations": []},
+            {"profile_name": "prgs-merger", "role": "merger",
+             "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"],
+             "forbidden_operations": []},
+            {"profile_name": "prgs-reconciler", "role": "reconciler",
+             "allowed_operations": [
+                 "gitea.read", "gitea.branch.delete", "runtime.break_glass_restart"
+             ],
+             "forbidden_operations": []},
+            {"profile_name": "prgs-controller", "role": "reconciler",
+             "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read"],
+             "forbidden_operations": []},  # no capability
+        ]
+        for prof in denied:
+            with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+                with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
+                    res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                        reason="Emergency restart required due to deadlock in worker pool",
+                        confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                        impact_ack=True,
+                        dry_run=True,
+                        remote="prgs",
+                    )
+            self.assertFalse(res["success"], prof)
+            self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"], prof)
+            self.assertIn(
+                res["blocker_kind"],
+                ("role_authorization", "permission_denied"),
+                prof,
+            )
+
+    def test_env_var_cannot_grant_authorization_or_bypass_denial(self) -> None:
+        """B2 preserved: env var cannot grant break-glass authorization."""
+        os.environ["GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION"] = "secret-bypass-token"
+        prof = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+            "role": "author",
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create", "runtime.break_glass_restart"
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [],
+        }
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Emergency restart attempting env var bypass",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "role_authorization")
+
+    def test_profile_role_kind_no_substring_authority(self) -> None:
+        """B1/B14: substring lookalikes do not become controller."""
+        for name in (
+            "fake-controller",
+            "controller-copy",
+            "not-controller",
+            "xcontrollerx",
+            "myCONTROLLER",
+        ):
+            prof = {
+                "profile_name": name,
+                "role": "author",
+                "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read"],
+            }
+            self.assertEqual(
+                gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(prof),
+                "author",
+                name,
+            )
+        # Role substrings must not promote.
+        for role in ("not-controller", "control-plane", "xcontrollerx"):
+            prof = {"profile_name": "other", "role": role, "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read"]}
+            self.assertEqual(
+                gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(prof),
+                role,
+                role,
+            )
+
+    def test_prgs_controller_retains_declared_reconciler_role(self) -> None:
+        """B14: break-glass capability does not redefine global role."""
+        prof = _controller_profile(role="reconciler")
+        self.assertEqual(gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(prof), "reconciler")
+        # Declared controller still wins when declared.
+        prof2 = _controller_profile(role="controller")
+        self.assertEqual(gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(prof2), "controller")
+
+    def test_cleanup_merged_pr_branch_role_resolution_unchanged(self) -> None:
+        """B14: prgs-controller with reconciler role still resolves for cleanup."""
+        # When declared reconciler, cleanup gate's role check should see reconciler.
+        prof = _controller_profile(role="reconciler")
+        self.assertEqual(gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(prof), "reconciler")
+        # Fabricated controller-like names with reconciler ops do not become controller.
+        fake = {
+            "profile_name": "fake-controller",
+            "role": "reconciler",
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read", "gitea.branch.delete", "gitea.pr.close"
+            ],
+        }
+        self.assertEqual(gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(fake), "reconciler")
+
+    def test_narrow_break_glass_capability_does_not_redefine_role(self) -> None:
+        """B14: granting runtime.break_glass_restart does not invent controller role."""
+        prof = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
+            "role": "reconciler",
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read",
+                "gitea.branch.delete",
+                "runtime.break_glass_restart",
+            ],
+        }
+        self.assertEqual(gitea_mcp_server._profile_role_kind(prof), "reconciler")
+
+    # ── B2-style input validation (preserved) ─────────────────────────────
+
+    def test_reason_validation(self) -> None:
+        """AC2: Reason is required and must be at least 10 characters long."""
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        for invalid_reason in ["", "   ", "too short", "123456789"]:
+            with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+                with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
+                    res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                        reason=invalid_reason,
+                        confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                        impact_ack=True,
+                        remote="prgs",
+                    )
+            self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+            self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "missing_required_fields")
+
+    def test_confirmation_validation(self) -> None:
+        """AC2: Confirmation phrase must match exact required string."""
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Emergency restart needed due to stuck daemon processes",
+                    confirmation="wrong_confirmation_phrase",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "confirmation_mismatch")
+
+    def test_impact_ack_validation(self) -> None:
+        """AC2: impact_ack=True is mandatory."""
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Emergency restart needed due to stuck daemon processes",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=False,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "impact_ack_required")
+
+    def test_incident_permission_gate(self) -> None:
+        """B3 preserved: Gate incident creation on gitea.issue.create permission."""
+        prof = _controller_profile(
+            allowed_operations=["gitea.read", "runtime.break_glass_restart"]
+        )
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Emergency restart needed due to hung worker process cohort",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    create_incident_issue=True,
+                    dry_run=False,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "permission_denied")
+
+    # ── B8: redaction ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def test_redaction_key_value_and_connection_strings(self) -> None:
+        """B8: key/value, bearer, connection-string, and embedded secrets."""
+        cases = [
+            ("password=hunter2supersecret", ["hunter2supersecret"], "password"),
+            ("api_key: sk-live-abcdef1234567890ab", ["sk-live-abcdef1234567890ab"], "api_key"),
+            ("Server=db;Password=s3cretValue;Uid=sa", ["s3cretValue"], "password"),
+            (
+                "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.abc.def",
+                ["eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.abc.def", "Bearer eyJ"],
+                "authorization",
+            ),
+            (
+                "token ghp_1234567890abcdef12345678 embedded",
+                ["ghp_1234567890abcdef12345678"],
+                "token",
+            ),
+            ("nested note password=letmein12345 end", ["letmein12345"], "password"),
+        ]
+        for raw, secrets, key in cases:
+            out = gitea_audit._redact_str(raw)
+            self.assertIn("[REDACTED]", out, raw)
+            for secret in secrets:
+                self.assertNotIn(secret, out, raw)
+            self.assertIn(key, out.lower(), raw)
+
+        nested = gitea_audit.redact({
+            "reason": "password=supersecret99",
+            "items": [{"api_key": "abc123xyz"}, "token ghp_abcdefghijklmnop1234"],
+            "error": RuntimeError("pwd=nestedSecret99"),
+        })
+        # Exception objects pass through redact as non-str/non-container; ensure
+        # string forms are covered via str conversion in _redact_str usage.
+        self.assertEqual(nested["items"][0]["api_key"], gitea_audit.REDACTED)
+        self.assertNotIn("supersecret99", nested["reason"])
+        self.assertNotIn("ghp_abcdefghijklmnop1234", nested["items"][1])
+
+    def test_redaction_preserves_benign_sec_prefix_text(self) -> None:
+        """B8: ordinary text beginning with sec- must not be erased."""
+        benign = (
+            "Emergency restart in sec-primary-region for sector-planning "
+            "and secondary-health checks"
+        )
+        out = gitea_audit._redact_str(benign)
+        self.assertIn("sec-primary-region", out)
+        self.assertIn("sector-planning", out)
+        self.assertIn("secondary-health", out)
+        self.assertNotIn("[REDACTED]", out)
+
+    def test_redaction_across_break_glass_surfaces(self) -> None:
+        """B8: operator reason is redacted on result, incident, and audit surfaces."""
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        raw_reason = (
+            "Emergency restart: password=supersecret99 api_key: "
+            "sk-live-abcdef1234567890ab and url https://user:[email protected]/api"
+        )
+        mock_api_request = MagicMock(return_value={"number": 101, "title": "[INCIDENT]"})
+        fake_exec = {
+            "success": True,
+            "apply_supported": True,
+            "apply_authorized": True,
+            "restart_performed": True,
+            "break_glass_executed": True,
+        }
+        gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = lambda req: fake_exec
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "api_request", mock_api_request
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
+                return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_reconcile_after_restart",
+                return_value={"success": True},
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
+            ):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason=raw_reason,
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=False,
+                    create_incident_issue=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
+        self.assertNotIn("supersecret99", res["reason"])
+        self.assertNotIn("sk-live-abcdef1234567890ab", res["reason"])
+        self.assertNotIn("user:[email protected]", res["reason"])
+        posted_body = mock_api_request.call_args[0][3]["body"]
+        self.assertNotIn("supersecret99", posted_body)
+        self.assertNotIn("sk-live-abcdef1234567890ab", posted_body)
+
+    # ── B6/B11: reachable executor / truthful flags ───────────────────────
+
+    def test_dry_run_never_executes_and_reports_false(self) -> None:
+        """B7/B6: dry-run never executes; break_glass_executed always false."""
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        called = {"n": 0}
+
+        def _should_not_run(_req):
+            called["n"] += 1
+            return {"restart_performed": True, "break_glass_executed": True}
+
+        gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = _should_not_run
+        mock_audit = MagicMock()
+        mock_api = MagicMock()
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
+                return_value={"affected_sessions": [{"session_id": "s1"}]},
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "write_event", mock_audit
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "api_request", mock_api
+            ):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Emergency restart preview in dry-run mode",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(res["dry_run"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertTrue(res["would_execute"])
+        self.assertEqual(called["n"], 0)
+        mock_audit.assert_not_called()
+        mock_api.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_unsupported_apply_truthful(self) -> None:
+        """B6/B11: unsupported apply returns blocked result, execution false."""
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = lambda req: {
+            "success": False,
+            "apply_supported": False,
+            "apply_authorized": False,
+            "restart_performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "reasons": ["no hook"],
+        }
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
+                return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "api_request",
+                return_value={"number": 555, "title": "[INCIDENT]"},
+            ):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Privileged restart request with unsupported apply",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=False,
+                    create_incident_issue=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "apply_unsupported")
+
+    def test_delegation_success_rejection_and_failure(self) -> None:
+        """B6/B11: distinct terminal states for success / rejection / failure."""
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+
+        def _run(exec_result, recon=None):
+            gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = lambda req: exec_result
+            with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+                with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
+                    gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
+                ), patch.object(
+                    gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
+                ), patch.object(
+                    gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
+                    return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
+                ), patch.object(
+                    gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_reconcile_after_restart",
+                    return_value=recon or {"success": True},
+                ), patch.object(
+                    gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
+                ), patch.object(
+                    gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
+                ), patch.object(
+                    gitea_mcp_server, "api_request",
+                    return_value={"number": 555, "title": "[INCIDENT]"},
+                ):
+                    return gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                        reason="Privileged break-glass restart delegation path",
+                        confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                        impact_ack=True,
+                        dry_run=False,
+                        create_incident_issue=True,
+                        remote="prgs",
+                    )
+
+        ok = _run({
+            "success": True,
+            "apply_supported": True,
+            "apply_authorized": True,
+            "restart_performed": True,
+            "break_glass_executed": True,
+        })
+        self.assertTrue(ok["success"], ok)
+        self.assertTrue(ok["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertTrue(ok["performed"])
+
+        rejected = _run({
+            "success": False,
+            "apply_supported": True,
+            "apply_authorized": False,
+            "restart_performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "reasons": ["class denied"],
+        })
+        self.assertFalse(rejected["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(rejected["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(rejected["blocker_kind"], "restart_delegation_failed")
+
+        failed = _run({
+            "success": False,
+            "apply_supported": True,
+            "apply_authorized": True,
+            "restart_performed": False,
+            "break_glass_executed": False,
+            "reasons": ["executor error"],
+        })
+        self.assertFalse(failed["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(failed["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(failed["blocker_kind"], "restart_delegation_failed")
+
+    def test_reconciliation_success_and_failure_truthful_flags(self) -> None:
+        """B10 preserved: recon failure keeps break_glass_executed=true."""
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = lambda req: {
+            "success": True,
+            "apply_supported": True,
+            "apply_authorized": True,
+            "restart_performed": True,
+            "break_glass_executed": True,
+        }
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
+                return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_reconcile_after_restart",
+                return_value={"success": False, "error": "lease cleanup failed"},
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "api_request",
+                return_value={"number": 555, "title": "[INCIDENT]"},
+            ):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Privileged restart request with failing reconciliation",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=False,
+                    create_incident_issue=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertTrue(res["performed"])
+        self.assertTrue(res["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "reconciliation_failed")
+
+    def test_authorization_is_not_execution(self) -> None:
+        """B6: apply_authorized alone never sets break_glass_executed."""
+        # Default executor without hook → unsupported, not executed.
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
+                return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "api_request",
+                return_value={"number": 555, "title": "[INCIDENT]"},
+            ):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Privileged restart without host hook configured",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=False,
+                    create_incident_issue=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "apply_unsupported")
+
+    # ── preserved fail-closed pre-exec (B5/B9) ────────────────────────────
+
+    def test_audit_failure_before_execution_fails_closed(self) -> None:
+        """B9 preserved: Audit recording failure stops execution fail-closed."""
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        called = {"n": 0}
+        gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = lambda req: called.__setitem__("n", called["n"] + 1) or {}
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
+                return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=False
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "api_request", MagicMock()
+            ):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Emergency restart with failing audit sink",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=False,
+                    create_incident_issue=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "audit_recording_failed")
+        self.assertEqual(called["n"], 0)
+
+    def test_incident_creation_failure_before_execution_fails_closed(self) -> None:
+        """B5 preserved: Incident creation failure stops execution fail-closed."""
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        called = {"n": 0}
+        gitea_mcp_server._break_glass_restart_executor = lambda req: called.__setitem__("n", called["n"] + 1) or {}
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
+                return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "api_request",
+                side_effect=RuntimeError("Gitea 500 API Error"),
+            ):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Emergency restart with failing incident POST",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=False,
+                    create_incident_issue=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "incident_creation_failed")
+        self.assertEqual(called["n"], 0)
+
+    def test_incident_opt_out_on_real_execution_fails_closed(self) -> None:
+        """B5 preserved: create_incident_issue=False fails closed on real execution."""
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
+                return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
+            ):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Emergency restart trying to skip incident creation",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=False,
+                    create_incident_issue=False,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "incident_creation_required")
+
+    def test_audit_disabled_fails_closed(self) -> None:
+        """B9 preserved: Disabling audit recording blocks execution fail-closed."""
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=False
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
+                return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
+            ):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Emergency restart with disabled audit logging",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=False,
+                    create_incident_issue=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "audit_recording_failed")
+
+    def test_capability_map_registration(self) -> None:
+        """B12/B13: capability map registers exact runtime.break_glass_restart."""
+        from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP
+        entry = TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP.get("gitea_break_glass_restart")
+        self.assertIsNotNone(entry)
+        self.assertEqual(entry["permission"], "runtime.break_glass_restart")
+        self.assertEqual(entry["role"], "controller")
+        entry2 = TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP.get("break_glass_restart")
+        self.assertEqual(entry2["permission"], "runtime.break_glass_restart")
+
+    # ── B8 / B6 / B15 remediation tests ─────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def test_b8_redaction_gitea_token_and_uri_credentials(self) -> None:
+        """B8: GITEA_TOKEN= and URI userinfo credentials redacted without erasing neighbours."""
+        # GITEA_TOKEN= with underscore key
+        out1 = gitea_audit._redact_str("failed with GITEA_TOKEN=synthetic_tok_123456789")
+        self.assertIn("GITEA_TOKEN=[REDACTED]", out1)
+        self.assertNotIn("synthetic_tok_123456789", out1)
+
+        # Connection string with URI userinfo
+        out2 = gitea_audit._redact_str("conn postgres://user:[email protected]:5432/app")
+        self.assertIn("postgres://[REDACTED_USER]:[REDACTED_PASS]@db.internal:5432/app", out2)
+        self.assertNotIn("s3cr3tpw", out2)
+
+        # Value boundary preserving adjacent audit evidence (correlation_id, incident_number)
+        raw_audit = "password=secret123;correlation_id=bg-7f2a1c;incident_number=4242"
+        out3 = gitea_audit._redact_str(raw_audit)
+        self.assertIn("password=[REDACTED]", out3)
+        self.assertIn("correlation_id=bg-7f2a1c", out3)
+        self.assertIn("incident_number=4242", out3)
+        self.assertNotIn("secret123", out3)
+
+        # Query param boundary in URL preserving adjacent parameters
+        raw_url = "token=abc-123&pr=908&issue=664&head=c67f39b4"
+        out4 = gitea_audit._redact_str(raw_url)
+        self.assertIn("token=[REDACTED]", out4)
+        self.assertIn("pr=908", out4)
+        self.assertIn("issue=664", out4)
+        self.assertIn("head=c67f39b4", out4)
+
+    def test_b6_default_executor_environment_text_cannot_imply_execution(self) -> None:
+        """B6/B11: GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK string alone returns break_glass_executed=False."""
+        os.environ["GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK"] = "this-string-is-never-invoked"
+        prof = _controller_profile()
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prof), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_auth", return_value={"Authorization": "token test"}
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "gitea_request_mcp_restart",
+                return_value={"affected_sessions": []},
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "audit_enabled", return_value=True
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_audit, "write_event", return_value=True
+            ), patch.object(
+                gitea_mcp_server, "api_request",
+                return_value={"number": 555, "title": "[INCIDENT]"},
+            ):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Privileged restart request with non-empty hook env var",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=False,
+                    create_incident_issue=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["break_glass_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "restart_delegation_failed")
+
+    def test_b15_production_prgs_controller_grant_set_and_gates(self) -> None:
+        """B15: Genuine prgs-controller carrying runtime.break_glass_restart and gitea.issue.create passes real gates."""
+        # Full production-shaped prgs-controller profile
+        prod_profile = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-controller",
+            "execution_profile": "prgs-controller",
+            "role": "reconciler",
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read",
+                "gitea.pr.close",
+                "gitea.pr.comment",
+                "gitea.issue.comment",
+                "gitea.issue.create",
+                "runtime.break_glass_restart",
+                "gitea.branch.delete",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [
+                "gitea.pr.approve",
+                "gitea.pr.merge",
+                "gitea.pr.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+            ],
+        }
+
+        # 1. Real _profile_operation_gate checks
+        p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch = _gate_open_patches()
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=prod_profile):
+                # Both required operations pass the real operation gate (no stubs)
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    gitea_mcp_server._profile_operation_gate("runtime.break_glass_restart"),
+                    [],
+                )
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    gitea_mcp_server._profile_operation_gate("gitea.issue.create"),
+                    [],
+                )
+
+        # 2. Missing gitea.issue.create fails incident creation gate
+        no_issue_create = dict(prod_profile)
+        no_issue_create["allowed_operations"] = [
+            "gitea.read", "gitea.pr.close", "runtime.break_glass_restart"
+        ]
+        with p_parity, p_runtime, p_switch:
+            with patch.object(gitea_mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=no_issue_create):
+                res = gitea_mcp_server.gitea_break_glass_restart(
+                    reason="Restart testing missing gitea.issue.create permission",
+                    confirmation="I_ACKNOWLEDGE_BREAK_GLASS_MCP_RESTART_DISRUPTION",
+                    impact_ack=True,
+                    dry_run=False,
+                    create_incident_issue=True,
+                    remote="prgs",
+                )
+        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "permission_denied")
+        self.assertIn("gitea.issue.create", " ".join(res.get("reasons") or []))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
+