fix: conflict-fix lease lifecycle chain termination and TTL handling (Closes #842)

allocator_service.py

@@ -53,8 +53,6 @@ OUTCOME_CANDIDATE_SET_DRIFT = "candidate_set_drift"
 SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION = "claimed_by_other_session"
 # #776: controller-supplied pre-rank exclusion.
 SKIP_EXCLUDED_BY_CONTROLLER = "excluded_by_controller"
-# #844: epic / child-only implementation container (pre-rank).
-SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER = "epic_or_child_only_container"
 
 # Ownership verdicts for a live claim on a candidate (#765).
 OWNERSHIP_OWN = "own"
@@ -132,39 +130,6 @@ ROLE_ACTIONS: dict[str, tuple[tuple[str, ...], tuple[str, ...]]] = {
 }
 
 
-# Body phrases that prove an issue is an implementation container, not a
-# unit of direct author work (#844). Matched case-insensitively against the
-# issue body. Title alone is never sufficient (ordinary issues may mention
-# "epic" incidentally).
-_CHILD_ONLY_BODY_MARKERS: tuple[str, ...] = (
-    "implementation is delivered via child issues only",
-    "implementation is delivered through child issues only",
-    "implementation is delivered via child issues",
-    "implementation is delivered through child issues",
-    "do not implement product features in this epic",
-    "do not implement product features in this epic issue itself",
-    "no product feature implementation is claimed complete solely on this epic",
-    "implementable child issues remain independently eligible",
-    "owns the product roadmap and linkage",
-    "this epic owns the product roadmap",
-    "coordination container",
-    "child-only container",
-    "implementation is delegated to child",
-)
-
-# Explicit epic / umbrella labels (structured evidence preferred over title).
-_EPIC_LABELS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
-    {
-        "type:epic",
-        "epic",
-        "kind:epic",
-        "scope:epic",
-        "type:umbrella",
-        "umbrella",
-    }
-)
-
-
 @dataclass
 class WorkCandidate:
     """One assignable Gitea issue or PR presented to the allocator."""
@@ -174,7 +139,6 @@ class WorkCandidate:
     state: str = "open"
     labels: tuple[str, ...] = ()
     title: str = ""
-    body: str = ""
     priority: int = 0
     head_sha: str | None = None
     # Routing signals (callers derive from Gitea / review feedback).
@@ -194,7 +158,6 @@ class WorkCandidate:
         self.labels = tuple(
             str(x).strip().lower() for x in (self.labels or ()) if str(x).strip()
         )
-        self.body = str(self.body or "")
         if self.kind not in WORK_KINDS:
             raise InvalidWorkKindError(
                 f"candidate kind '{self.kind}' is not assignable; only "
@@ -208,7 +171,6 @@ class WorkCandidate:
             "state": self.state,
             "labels": list(self.labels),
             "title": self.title,
-            "body": self.body,
             "priority": self.priority,
             "head_sha": self.head_sha,
             "request_changes_current_head": self.request_changes_current_head,
@@ -222,51 +184,6 @@ class WorkCandidate:
         }
 
 
-def classify_epic_or_child_only_container(
-    c: WorkCandidate,
-) -> tuple[bool, str | None]:
-    """Return whether *c* is an epic / child-only implementation container (#844).
-
-    Exclusion uses structured evidence first (labels, body scope language).
-    A bare title containing the word "epic" is **not** enough — ordinary
-    implementable issues may mention epics incidentally. A title that is
-    explicitly prefixed ``Epic:`` only counts when the body also proves
-    child-only / no-direct-implementation scope (or an epic label is present).
-
-    PRs are never classified as containers here (they already have a head).
-    """
-    if c.kind != "issue":
-        return False, None
-
-    labels = set(c.labels)
-    epic_label = sorted(labels & _EPIC_LABELS)
-    body_l = (c.body or "").lower()
-    title = (c.title or "").strip()
-    title_l = title.lower()
-
-    body_hits = [m for m in _CHILD_ONLY_BODY_MARKERS if m in body_l]
-    title_epic_prefix = title_l.startswith("epic:") or title_l.startswith("epic ")
-
-    if epic_label:
-        detail = f"label={epic_label[0]}"
-        if body_hits:
-            detail = f"{detail}; body_marker={body_hits[0]!r}"
-        return True, detail
-
-    if body_hits:
-        # Body proves child-only / umbrella scope. Title "Epic:" is corroborating
-        # but not required — containers without the word still exclude.
-        detail = f"body_marker={body_hits[0]!r}"
-        if title_epic_prefix:
-            detail = f"title_epic_prefix; {detail}"
-        return True, detail
-
-    # Title-only "Epic:" without body scope evidence is insufficient (#844 AC:
-    # eligibility does not rely solely on the word "Epic" in a title).
-    # Similarly, incidental "epic" mid-title without markers stays eligible.
-    return False, None
-
-
 @dataclass
 class SkipRecord:
     kind: str
@@ -933,8 +850,7 @@ def allocate_next_work(
     ownership_defects: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
     controller_excluded: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
 
-    # #776 AC2 + #844: remove excluded numbers *and* epic/child-only containers
+    # #776 AC2: remove excluded numbers *before* ranking / selection / lease.
-    # *before* ranking / selection / lease so they never receive assignments.
     rankable: list[WorkCandidate] = []
     for c in candidates:
         if int(c.number) in exclude_set:
@@ -1013,23 +929,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
                     },
                 }
             continue
-        # #844: epics / child-only containers are never direct implement targets.
-        is_container, container_detail = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(c)
-        if is_container:
-            detail = container_detail or "epic or child-only container"
-            reason = (
-                f"{c.kind}#{c.number} {SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER}: "
-                f"{detail}; implementation is delegated to child issues"
-            )
-            skipped.append(
-                SkipRecord(
-                    c.kind,
-                    c.number,
-                    reason,
-                    SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER,
-                )
-            )
-            continue
         rankable.append(c)
 
     ordered = sort_candidates(rankable)
@@ -1216,12 +1115,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "reasons": [
                 "dry-run only (apply=false); no assignment/lease created — "
                 "call again with apply=true to reserve via control-plane DB"
-                + (
-                    "; after apply, the required-role worker consumes via "
-                    "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease (#843)"
-                    if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE and expected_role != role_norm
-                    else ""
-                )
             ],
             "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
             "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
@@ -1253,9 +1146,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
     # Atomic reserve via #613 substrate.
     ttl = lease_ttl_seconds if lease_ttl_seconds is not None else None
     try:
-        cross_role_handoff = (
-            mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE and lease_role != role_norm
-        )
         kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
             "session_id": session_id,
             "role": lease_role,
@@ -1267,8 +1157,7 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "expected_head_sha": selected.head_sha,
             "allowed_actions": allowed,
             "forbidden_actions": forbidden,
-            # #843: mark cross-role allocations as awaiting independent consume
+            "phase": "allocated",
-            "phase": "awaiting_handoff" if cross_role_handoff else "allocated",
         }
         if ttl is not None:
             kwargs["lease_ttl_seconds"] = int(ttl)
@@ -1348,52 +1237,7 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "lease_role": lease_role,
         "source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
     }
-    consume_allocation = None
+    return {
-    if cross_role_handoff and result.lease_id:
-        # Durable handoff marker so independent required-role workers can
-        # consume without sharing the controller session (#843).
-        handoff_prov = {
-            "cross_role_handoff": True,
-            "handoff_status": "pending",
-            "allocating_session_id": session_id,
-            "allocating_role": role_norm,
-            "required_role": expected_role,
-            "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
-            "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
-            "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
-            "lease_id": result.lease_id,
-            "allocation_mode": mode,
-            "adopted_by_session_id": None,
-        }
-        try:
-            db.attach_lease_provenance(result.lease_id, handoff_prov)
-        except ControlPlaneError:
-            # Still return assignment evidence; consume path may be unavailable
-            handoff_prov["attach_failed"] = True
-        consume_allocation = {
-            "tool": "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease",
-            "lease_id": result.lease_id,
-            "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
-            "required_role": expected_role,
-            "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
-            "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
-            "handoff_status": "pending",
-            "controller_session_required": False,
-            "instructions": (
-                f"From an independent {expected_role} session "
-                f"({selection['required_namespace']} / "
-                f"{selection['required_profile']}), call "
-                f"gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(lease_id={result.lease_id!r}) "
-                "to consume this controller allocation. The allocating "
-                "controller process does not need to remain alive. Wrong-role "
-                "and second-adoption attempts fail closed."
-            ),
-        }
-        lease_proof["cross_role_handoff"] = True
-        lease_proof["handoff_status"] = "pending"
-        lease_proof["consume_tool"] = "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease"
-
-    out = {
         "success": True,
         "outcome": OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
         "apply": True,
@@ -1427,17 +1271,8 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "lease_role": lease_role,
             "lease_proof": lease_proof,
             "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
-            "cross_role_handoff": bool(cross_role_handoff),
         },
-        "next_valid_command": (
+        "next_valid_command": _next_command(lease_role, selected),
-            (
-                f"consume lease {result.lease_id} via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease "
-                f"as {expected_role}, then "
-            )
-            + _next_command(lease_role, selected)
-            if cross_role_handoff
-            else _next_command(lease_role, selected)
-        ),
         "substrate": "control_plane_db",
         "file_lock_only": False,
         "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -1452,14 +1287,9 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "downstream_note": (
             "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
             "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
-            "controller routes only under cross_role (#840); "
+            "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
-            "cross-role assignments are consumable by independent "
-            "required-role workers via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease (#843)"
         ),
     }
-    if consume_allocation is not None:
-        out["consume_allocation"] = consume_allocation
-    return out
 
 
 def _next_command(role: str, c: WorkCandidate) -> str:
@@ -1511,7 +1341,6 @@ def candidate_from_dict(data: dict[str, Any]) -> WorkCandidate:
         state=str(data.get("state") or "open"),
         labels=tuple(data.get("labels") or ()),
         title=str(data.get("title") or ""),
-        body=str(data.get("body") or ""),
         priority=priority,
         head_sha=data.get("head_sha"),
         request_changes_current_head=bool(data.get("request_changes_current_head")),

canonical_thread_handoff.py

@@ -46,17 +46,6 @@ _FIELD_RE = re.compile(
 )
 
 
-def is_known_cth_type(value: str | None) -> bool:
-    """True when *value* is a declared member of the :data:`CTH_TYPES` contract.
-
-    ``CTH_TYPES`` is the single authority for what a CTH type may be. The
-    heading a comment carries is free text, so a *read* path that turns a parsed
-    type into something durable — a serialized field, a routing decision — must
-    check membership here rather than trust the parse or keep a list of its own.
-    """
-    return (value or "").strip() in CTH_TYPES
-
-
 def format_cth_body(
     *,
     cth_type: str,
@@ -71,7 +60,7 @@ def format_cth_body(
 ) -> str:
     """Render a canonical CTH comment body."""
     normalized_type = (cth_type or "").strip()
-    if not is_known_cth_type(normalized_type):
+    if normalized_type not in CTH_TYPES:
         raise ValueError(
             f"unknown CTH type '{cth_type}'; expected one of {sorted(CTH_TYPES)}"
         )
@@ -112,12 +101,6 @@ def parse_cth_comment(body: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
         fields[key] = match.group(2).strip()
     return {
         "cth_type": cth_type,
-        # The heading capture is unconstrained free text, so the parse states
-        # whether it satisfies the CTH_TYPES contract instead of leaving every
-        # reader to decide (or forget). Parsing stays total — an unknown type is
-        # still parsed and reported, never raised on — but a reader that turns
-        # the type into a durable value can now tell the two apart.
-        "cth_type_known": is_known_cth_type(cth_type),
         "fields": fields,
         "raw_body": text,
     }
@@ -136,7 +119,7 @@ def assess_cth_comment(body: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
         }
 
     cth_type = parsed.get("cth_type") or ""
-    if not is_known_cth_type(cth_type):
+    if cth_type not in CTH_TYPES:
         reasons.append(
             f"unknown CTH type '{cth_type}'; expected one of {sorted(CTH_TYPES)}"
         )

control_plane_db.py

@@ -1637,13 +1637,11 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
         provenance: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
         lease_ttl_seconds: int = DEFAULT_LEASE_TTL_SECONDS,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        """Transfer or refresh a lease with provenance (#601 / #843).
+        """Transfer or refresh a lease with provenance (#601).
 
         * Same owner + active → refresh (owner-resume).
-        * Cross-role handoff pending + matching required role → atomic consume
-          (even while the allocating controller session still "owns" the lease).
         * Expired/abandoned/released → create new assignment+lease with provenance.
-        * Active foreign (non-handoff) → raise ForeignLeaseError (never silent steal).
+        * Active foreign → raise ForeignLeaseError (never silent steal).
         """
         now = _utc_now()
         now_s = _ts(now)
@@ -1679,35 +1677,7 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
                 status = "expired"
 
             owner = lease["session_id"]
-            # Parse durable provenance for cross-role handoff consume (#843).
+            if status == "active" and owner != adopter_session_id:
-            lease_prov: dict[str, Any] = {}
-            if "provenance_json" in lease.keys() and lease["provenance_json"]:
-                try:
-                    loaded = json.loads(lease["provenance_json"])
-                    if isinstance(loaded, dict):
-                        lease_prov = loaded
-                except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-                    lease_prov = {}
-            handoff_pending = bool(lease_prov.get("cross_role_handoff")) and (
-                str(lease_prov.get("handoff_status") or "pending").strip().lower()
-                == "pending"
-            )
-            already_adopted = bool(
-                (lease["adopted_by_session_id"] if "adopted_by_session_id" in lease.keys() else None)
-                or lease_prov.get("adopted_by_session_id")
-            )
-            required_role = str(
-                lease_prov.get("required_role") or lease["role"] or ""
-            ).strip().lower()
-            adopter_role = (role or "").strip().lower()
-            cross_role_consume = (
-                handoff_pending
-                and not already_adopted
-                and status == "active"
-                and owner != adopter_session_id
-            )
-
-            if status == "active" and owner != adopter_session_id and not cross_role_consume:
                 raise ForeignLeaseError(
                     f"cannot adopt active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by {owner}"
                 )
@@ -1791,142 +1761,6 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
                     "reasons": ["owner-resume: refreshed lease with provenance"],
                 }
 
-            # #843: controller→required-role handoff consume (atomic, same lease_id)
-            if cross_role_consume:
-                if not required_role:
-                    raise ControlPlaneError(
-                        f"cross-role handoff lease {lease_id} missing required_role"
-                    )
-                if adopter_role != required_role:
-                    raise ForeignLeaseError(
-                        f"wrong role for cross-role handoff consume: "
-                        f"required={required_role} adopter={adopter_role or 'none'} "
-                        f"(fail closed)"
-                    )
-                # CAS: only transfer if still owned by allocating session and unadopted
-                cols = self._lease_columns(conn)
-                adopted_col_null = (
-                    "(adopted_by_session_id IS NULL OR adopted_by_session_id = '')"
-                    if "adopted_by_session_id" in cols
-                    else "1=1"
-                )
-                cas = conn.execute(
-                    f"""
-                    UPDATE leases
-                    SET session_id = ?,
-                        heartbeat_at = ?,
-                        expires_at = ?,
-                        phase = ?,
-                        role = ?
-                    WHERE lease_id = ?
-                      AND status = 'active'
-                      AND session_id = ?
-                      AND {adopted_col_null}
-                    """,
-                    (
-                        adopter_session_id,
-                        now_s,
-                        expires,
-                        "adopted",
-                        required_role,
-                        lease_id,
-                        owner,
-                    ),
-                )
-                if cas.rowcount != 1:
-                    raise ForeignLeaseError(
-                        f"cross-role handoff consume lost race for lease {lease_id} "
-                        "(already adopted or no longer pending; fail closed)"
-                    )
-                if "adopted_from_session_id" in cols:
-                    conn.execute(
-                        """
-                        UPDATE leases
-                        SET adopted_from_session_id = ?, adopted_by_session_id = ?
-                        WHERE lease_id = ?
-                        """,
-                        (owner, adopter_session_id, lease_id),
-                    )
-                if "worktree_path" in cols and worktree_path:
-                    conn.execute(
-                        "UPDATE leases SET worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
-                        (worktree_path, lease_id),
-                    )
-                if "owner_pid" in cols and owner_pid is not None:
-                    conn.execute(
-                        "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
-                        (owner_pid, lease_id),
-                    )
-                if "expected_head_sha" in cols and expected_head_sha:
-                    conn.execute(
-                        "UPDATE leases SET expected_head_sha = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
-                        (expected_head_sha, lease_id),
-                    )
-                # Merge handoff provenance + caller provenance
-                merged = dict(lease_prov)
-                merged.update(provenance or {})
-                merged["cross_role_handoff"] = True
-                merged["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
-                merged["adopted_from_session_id"] = owner
-                merged["adopted_by_session_id"] = adopter_session_id
-                merged["required_role"] = required_role
-                if "provenance_json" in cols:
-                    conn.execute(
-                        "UPDATE leases SET provenance_json = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
-                        (json.dumps(merged), lease_id),
-                    )
-                # Transfer active assignment ownership atomically
-                asn_cas = conn.execute(
-                    """
-                    UPDATE assignments
-                    SET session_id = ?, role = ?
-                    WHERE lease_id = ? AND status = 'active' AND session_id = ?
-                    """,
-                    (adopter_session_id, required_role, lease_id, owner),
-                )
-                if asn_cas.rowcount < 1:
-                    # Fail closed: assignment must move with the lease
-                    raise ControlPlaneError(
-                        f"cross-role handoff: no active assignment for lease {lease_id} "
-                        f"owned by {owner}"
-                    )
-                lease2 = conn.execute(
-                    "SELECT * FROM leases WHERE lease_id = ?", (lease_id,)
-                ).fetchone()
-                asn = conn.execute(
-                    """
-                    SELECT * FROM assignments
-                    WHERE lease_id = ? AND status = 'active'
-                    ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1
-                    """,
-                    (lease_id,),
-                ).fetchone()
-                conn.execute(
-                    """
-                    INSERT INTO events(work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)
-                    VALUES (?, 'lease_adopted', ?, ?)
-                    """,
-                    (
-                        lease["work_item_id"],
-                        f"cross-role handoff: {adopter_session_id} consumed "
-                        f"{lease_id} from {owner} as {required_role}",
-                        now_s,
-                    ),
-                )
-                return {
-                    "outcome": "adopted_cross_role_handoff",
-                    "lease": dict(lease2) if lease2 else dict(lease),
-                    "assignment": dict(asn) if asn else None,
-                    "reasons": [
-                        "cross-role handoff: independent required-role worker consumed "
-                        "controller allocation without abandonment"
-                    ],
-                    "adopted_by_session_id": adopter_session_id,
-                    "adopted_from_session_id": owner,
-                    "required_role": required_role,
-                    "handoff_status": "adopted",
-                }
-
             # Non-active: create new lease + assignment (transfer)
             new_lease_id = f"lease-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]}"
             new_asn_id = f"asn-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]}"

docs/webui-local-dev.md

@@ -52,8 +52,7 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | Path | Description |
 |------|-------------|
 | `/` | Home / operator overview |
-| `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`, `uptime_seconds`) |
+| `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`) |
-| `/api/v1/system/health` | Structured read-only system health (#634) |
 | `/queue` | Live PR and issue queue dashboard (#429) |
 | `/api/queue` | JSON queue export with pagination metadata |
 | `/projects` | Project registry list with status and onboarding progress (#427, #635) |
@@ -74,95 +73,11 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | `/api/actions/{id}/preview` | Mutation ledger preview (GET, read-only) |
 | `/leases` | Lease and collision visibility (#433) |
 | `/api/leases` | JSON lease/collision export |
-| `/sessions` | Phase 1 shell stub — session inventory (backed by #636) |
-| `/inventory` | Phase 1 shell stub — unified inventory (backed by #636) |
-| `/timeline` | Phase 1 shell stub — workflow event timeline |
-| `/policy` | Phase 1 shell stub — capability/role policy placeholder |
-| `/insights` | Phase 1 shell stub — operational insights placeholder |
 
 Most routes are GET-only. POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE return `405` with
 `read-only-mvp`, except `/audit` and `/api/audit` which accept POST for
 local validator preview only (no Gitea mutations, no server-side storage).
 
-## System health API (#634)
-
-`GET /api/v1/system/health` is the structured, read-only health surface for
-automated readiness checks. It is the first console API under the `/api/v1`
-prefix; the unversioned MVP exports remain as compatibility aliases.
-
-`/health` is unchanged for existing consumers — every MVP key is still present
-— and now also carries `started_at`, `uptime_seconds`, and a
-`system_health_api` pointer. It stays deliberately cheap and runs no dependency
-probe, because answering readiness costs real work.
-
-**Status codes.** `200` when ready, `503` when a required dependency failed or
-was never probed. Automation can branch on the code without parsing the body.
-
-**Query flags.** The Gitea check is a network call, so it is opt-in:
-`GET /api/v1/system/health?deep=1` runs it and caches the result for
-`WEBUI_HEALTH_PROBE_TTL_SECONDS` (default 15s) so dashboard polling does not
-amplify into remote load. Without the flag that probe reports `skipped`.
-
-**Dependencies.** `control_plane_db` and `repository` are required and drive
-readiness. `gitea` is optional: when it fails the overall `status` degrades but
-`readiness.ready` stays true, because local inventory is still serveable. Each
-entry carries `status`, `detail`, `required`, and `latency_ms`.
-
-Two honesty rules are worth knowing before reading the payload:
-
-* `stale_runtime.mutation_safe` is true only when the runtime, checkout, and
-  remote-tracking commits are all known and equal. An unfetched remote is
-  reported as indeterminate, never as safe.
-* `mcp_namespaces` entries are always `unproven`. A web process runs outside
-  the IDE-managed MCP client and cannot invoke a namespace tool, so per #543
-  only a `client_namespace` probe can prove that path.
-
-Sample response (abridged, healthy):
-
-```json
-{
-  "status": "ok",
-  "service": "mcp-control-plane-webui",
-  "mode": "read-only",
-  "api": "/api/v1/system/health",
-  "timestamp": "2026-07-22T11:04:18.512034+00:00",
-  "readiness": { "ready": true, "complete": true, "reasons": [] },
-  "version": {
-    "git_sha": "620ed6e9a9550b8da2ceb82d9ab8744e8920490f",
-    "git_describe": "v1.1.0-898-g620ed6e",
-    "control_plane_schema_version": 4,
-    "python_version": "3.14.5",
-    "known": true
-  },
-  "process": { "started_at": "2026-07-22T10:58:02.114+00:00", "uptime_seconds": 376.4 },
-  "deep_probes_requested": false,
-  "dependencies": [
-    {
-      "name": "control_plane_db",
-      "kind": "sqlite",
-      "status": "ok",
-      "detail": "schema v4 readable",
-      "required": true,
-      "healthy": true,
-      "latency_ms": 1.482,
-      "metadata": { "schema_version": 4, "active_leases": 3 }
-    },
-    { "name": "repository", "kind": "git", "status": "ok", "required": true, "healthy": true },
-    { "name": "gitea", "kind": "http", "status": "skipped", "required": false, "healthy": false }
-  ],
-  "mcp_namespaces": [
-    { "namespace": "gitea-author", "required_tool": "gitea_whoami", "status": "unproven" }
-  ],
-  "stale_runtime": { "stale": false, "determinable": true, "mutation_safe": true, "reasons": [] },
-  "probe_errors": []
-}
-```
-
-No restart, reload, or process-kill control is exposed here: those are Phase 2
-at the earliest, and #630 forbids process-kill recovery outright. Every probe
-opens its subject read-only — the control-plane database is opened through a
-`mode=ro` URI so a health check can never create or migrate a schema.
-
 ## Report audit (#431)
 
 Paste an LLM final report at `/audit` or POST JSON to `/api/audit`. The UI
@@ -238,26 +153,6 @@ health, workflow/schema SHA-256 hashes, and stale-runtime warnings when the
 checkout is behind merged safety-gate changes. Restart guidance links to #420;
 no tokens or MCP restart actions are exposed.
 
-## Application shell — Phase 1 (#638)
-
-The console shell (`webui/layout.py`) renders a grouped navigation driven by a
-single nav-config module, `webui/nav.py`. Nav groups follow the epic #631
-Phase 1 information architecture: **Health, Traffic, Runtime/Sessions,
-Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy** (placeholder), and **Insights**
-(placeholder). Live views and Phase 1 placeholders (`stub`) are declared in one
-place so the layout and the route table cannot drift.
-
-The header carries two read-only status badges — an **environment** badge
-(`local` for loopback binds, `remote` otherwise, derived from `WEBUI_HOST`) and
-a **mode: read-only** badge — plus a **Docs** link to this document. No
-privileged action controls are present in the Phase 1 shell.
-
-Not-yet-implemented surfaces (`/sessions`, `/inventory`, `/timeline`,
-`/policy`, `/insights`) resolve to graceful read-only stub pages instead of
-404s; their backing views land in later child issues of #631 (the inventory
-surfaces are backed by #636). Mutating methods on stub routes still fail closed
-with `read-only-mvp`.
-
 ## Deployment boundary (#435)
 
 MVP serves on loopback by default. Binding `0.0.0.0` or `::` is **refused**
@@ -317,108 +212,6 @@ health, workflow/schema SHA-256 hashes, and stale-runtime warnings when the
 checkout is behind merged safety-gate changes. Restart guidance links to #420;
 no tokens or MCP restart actions are exposed.
 
-## Workflow-event timeline (#637)
-
-`GET /api/v1/timeline` is a read-only, versioned aggregation of workflow
-events from every available source into one normalised, filterable stream. It
-is the model layer for the Phase 1 timeline console view (a later child issue
-of #631); this issue ships the schema, adapters, and read API only.
-
-### Schema (versioned)
-
-`webui/timeline.py` declares `TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION` (currently `1`) and the
-frozen `WorkflowEvent` record. Every response carries `schema_version` so a
-consumer can branch on shape. One event:
-
-```json
-{
-  "source": "control_plane",
-  "event_type": "lease.renew",
-  "event_key": "cp:1421",
-  "timestamp": "2026-07-23T02:00:00Z",
-  "actor": null,
-  "role": null,
-  "issue_number": 637,
-  "pr_number": null,
-  "session_id": null,
-  "tool_name": null,
-  "decision": null,
-  "message": "lease renewed",
-  "correlation_id": "issue#637",
-  "evidence_refs": [],
-  "sensitive": true
-}
-```
-
-`event_key` is stable and unique per source (`cp:<event_id>`,
-`cth:<kind>:<number>:<comment_id>`), so pagination and dedup are deterministic.
-
-### Sources and field authority
-
-| Source | Adapter | Authority |
-|---|---|---|
-| Control-plane `events` ⋈ `work_items` | `adapt_cp_events` | `event_type`, `message`, `timestamp`, issue/PR scope come from the CP database, read through a `mode=ro` URI (never creates the DB or runs migrations) |
-| Gitea Canonical Thread Handoff comments | `adapt_cth_comments` | `actor`, `role` (next owner), `decision`, `evidence_refs`, `timestamp` come from the parsed CTH comment body (`canonical_thread_handoff`) |
-
-Handoff comments are thread-scoped: they are only read when the request filters
-by a single `issue` or `pr`. Otherwise the handoff source reports `not run`
-with a reason — it is never rendered as empty-and-healthy. Each source degrades
-independently: an unavailable control-plane DB or a failed comment fetch is a
-`sources[]` entry with `ok:false` and a `reason`, never a dropped timeline.
-
-### Query parameters
-
-`issue`, `pr`, `session` (conjunctive filters); `limit` (default 50, max 500)
-and `offset` for pagination; `remote`, `org`, `repo` to override the default
-registry-project scope. Events sort ascending by
-`(timestamp, source_rank, event_key)`; missing timestamps sort last.
-
-### Filter authority, and refusing what cannot be answered
-
-A filter dimension is only meaningful for a source whose records carry it.
-Each source declares its own support in `_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT` and reports it
-per response as `supported_filters` / `unsupported_filters`:
-
-| Source | issue | pr | session |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `control_plane` | yes | yes | **no** — the `events` table is `(event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)` and records no session |
-| `gitea_handoff` | yes | yes | yes — a CTH comment declares its own `Session:` field |
-
-`session_id` is read only from that declared CTH field. It is never inferred
-from a work item, an actor, or message text, and a value that is
-redaction-altering or bare-secret-shaped is dropped rather than emitted.
-
-When **no source that ran** can carry a requested dimension, the request is
-refused rather than answered: the response is `422` with `ok:false` and a
-structured `error` naming `unsupported_filters` and the per-source reason. A
-`200` with zero events would tell an operator that no such activity exists,
-which is a stronger — and false — claim than "this cannot be answered here".
-A source that *can* answer the dimension and simply matched nothing still
-returns `200` with `ok:true` and an empty page.
-
-### Redaction
-
-Every free-text field (event messages, decision/proof text, roles, actors) is
-passed through the console redaction policy (`webui.console_redaction`, backed
-by `gitea_audit.redact`) before it leaves the module, failing closed to the
-placeholder. No unredacted tool arguments or secrets are ever emitted, and a
-generation error never drops raw data to a caller or a log.
-
-Redaction also runs *before* any structured value is derived from free text.
-`evidence_refs` are extracted from already-redacted proof/decision text, and a
-commit reference is recognised only where the text declares one (`commit`,
-`head`, `base`, `sha`, …). An undeclared 40-character hex run has the exact
-shape of a Gitea access token, so it is never lifted out of prose into a
-structured field. Every reference is then independently revalidated against an
-allowed shape and a second redaction pass immediately before serialization;
-anything unproven is dropped and the event is flagged `sensitive`.
-
-### Tests
-
-```bash
-pytest tests/test_webui_timeline.py -q
-```
-
 ## Tests
 
 ```bash

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ def verify_preflight_purity(
             dirty_files = sorted(
                 _parse_porcelain_entries(_get_workspace_porcelain(workspace))
             )
-            if dirty_files and task != "commit_files":
+            if dirty_files:
                 raise RuntimeError(
                     nwb.format_namespace_workspace_binding_error(
                         role_kind=role,
@@ -2031,7 +2031,6 @@ import issue_lock_store  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_adoption  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_recovery  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_renewal  # noqa: E402
-import dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery  # noqa: E402  # #860 dirty orphan recovery
 import stacked_pr_support  # noqa: E402
 import merge_approval_gate  # noqa: E402
 import review_quarantine  # noqa: E402  # #695 contaminated formal-review quarantine
@@ -4343,280 +4342,6 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
     return result
 
 
-@mcp.tool()
-def gitea_recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree(
-    issue_number: int,
-    branch_name: str,
-    source_worktree_path: str,
-    expected_local_head: str,
-    expected_remote_head: str,
-    expected_dirty_fingerprints: dict,
-    remote: str = "dadeschools",
-    host: str | None = None,
-    org: str | None = None,
-    repo: str | None = None,
-    recovery_worktree_path: str | None = None,
-    dry_run: bool = False,
-) -> dict:
-    """Recover a dirty orphaned same-claimant author issue worktree (#860).
-
-    Explicit recovery operation — does **not** silently widen ``gitea_lock_issue``.
-
-    Accepts authoritative expected pins (repository, issue, branch, source
-    worktree, claimant, local head, remote/PR head, dirty fingerprints) and
-    fails closed on any mismatch. PID-less malformed locks are never treated
-    as live merely because expiry is absent. The source worktree is frozen;
-    recovery prepares a separate worktree at the pinned remote head, re-applies
-    dirty bytes with path-level conflict detection, and binds a live author
-    session only after recovery state is consistent.
-
-    Args:
-        issue_number: Issue whose durable claim is being recovered.
-        branch_name: Locked branch ``(fix|feat|docs|chore)/issue-N-…``.
-        source_worktree_path: Registered dirty source worktree under branches/.
-        expected_local_head: Full 40-char SHA of the source worktree HEAD.
-        expected_remote_head: Full 40-char SHA of the remote/PR head to sync to.
-        expected_dirty_fingerprints: ``{relative_path: sha256}`` of dirty bytes.
-        remote/host/org/repo: Repository binding.
-        recovery_worktree_path: Optional recovery worktree path under branches/.
-        dry_run: Assess eligibility only; no filesystem or lock mutation.
-
-    Returns:
-        dict with success, outcome, conflicts, recovery_worktree_path, reasons,
-        evidence, and journal metadata.
-    """
-    task = "recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree"
-    ok, block_reasons = role_session_router.check_author_mutation_after_reviewer_stop(
-        task
-    )
-    if not ok:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "performed": False,
-            "outcome": "REFUSED",
-            "reasons": block_reasons,
-        }
-    blocked = _namespace_mutation_block(task, remote=remote)
-    if blocked:
-        return blocked
-    blocked = _profile_permission_block(
-        task_capability_map.required_permission(task),
-        remote=remote,
-        host=host,
-        org=org,
-        repo=repo,
-        org_explicit=org is not None,
-        repo_explicit=repo is not None,
-    )
-    if blocked:
-        return blocked
-
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
-    profile_meta = get_profile() or {}
-    identity = (_authenticated_username(h) or "").strip()
-    profile = (profile_meta.get("profile_name") or "").strip()
-    if not identity or not profile:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "performed": False,
-            "outcome": "REFUSED",
-            "reasons": ["could not resolve authenticated identity/profile"],
-        }
-
-    existing_lock = _load_existing_issue_lock(
-        remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, issue_number=issue_number
-    )
-
-    src = os.path.realpath(source_worktree_path)
-    git_state = issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state(src)
-    observed_local = (git_state.get("head_sha") or "").strip()
-    porcelain = git_state.get("porcelain_status") or ""
-    current_branch = git_state.get("current_branch")
-
-    # Observed dirty fingerprints from source worktree bytes.
-    observed_fps: dict[str, str] = {}
-    dirty_contents: dict[str, bytes] = {}
-    for rel in (expected_dirty_fingerprints or {}):
-        rel_n = str(rel).strip()
-        fpath = os.path.join(src, rel_n)
-        if not os.path.isfile(fpath):
-            continue
-        with open(fpath, "rb") as fh:
-            data = fh.read()
-        dirty_contents[rel_n] = data
-        observed_fps[rel_n] = dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery.sha256_bytes(data)
-
-    # Remote head observation (best-effort; pin mismatch fails closed).
-    observed_remote = ""
-    try:
-        probe = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "ls-remote", remote or "prgs", f"refs/heads/{branch_name}"],
-            cwd=src,
-            capture_output=True,
-            text=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        if probe.returncode == 0 and (probe.stdout or "").strip():
-            observed_remote = (probe.stdout or "").strip().split()[0]
-    except Exception:
-        observed_remote = ""
-
-    registered = False
-    try:
-        listing = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "worktree", "list", "--porcelain"],
-            cwd=src,
-            capture_output=True,
-            text=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        if listing.returncode == 0:
-            registered = src in (listing.stdout or "")
-    except Exception:
-        registered = False
-
-    project_root = _canonical_local_git_root()
-    canonical_root = author_mutation_worktree.resolve_canonical_repo_root(
-        src, project_root
-    )
-
-    competing_locks: list[dict] = []
-    try:
-        all_live = issue_lock_store.list_live_locks()
-        for l in all_live:
-            if l.get("issue_number") == issue_number:
-                wt = l.get("worktree_path")
-                if not wt or not issue_lock_store._same_realpath(wt, src):
-                    competing_locks.append(l)
-    except Exception:
-        competing_locks = []
-
-    wf_active = False
-    wf_expired = True
-    try:
-        db, _ = _control_plane_db_or_error()
-        if db is not None:
-            active_leases_data = lease_lifecycle.list_active_leases(
-                db,
-                remote=remote if remote in REMOTES else remote,
-                org=o,
-                repo=r,
-            )
-            leases_list = active_leases_data.get("leases") or []
-            for l in leases_list:
-                if l.get("work_number") == issue_number and l.get("work_kind") == "issue":
-                    fresh = l.get("freshness") or {}
-                    if fresh.get("status") == "active":
-                        wf_active = True
-                        wf_expired = False
-                    elif fresh.get("status") in ("expired", "stale_dead_process"):
-                        wf_active = False
-                        wf_expired = True
-    except Exception:
-        pass
-
-    assessment = dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery.assess_dirty_orphan_recovery(
-        existing_lock,
-        issue_number=issue_number,
-        branch_name=branch_name,
-        source_worktree_path=src,
-        remote=remote if remote else "prgs",
-        org=o,
-        repo=r,
-        identity=identity,
-        profile=profile,
-        expected_local_head=expected_local_head,
-        expected_remote_head=expected_remote_head,
-        expected_dirty_fingerprints=expected_dirty_fingerprints or {},
-        current_branch=current_branch,
-        porcelain_status=porcelain,
-        observed_local_head=observed_local,
-        observed_remote_head=observed_remote,
-        observed_dirty_fingerprints=observed_fps,
-        competing_live_locks=competing_locks,
-        competing_live_sessions=[],
-        workflow_lease_active=wf_active,
-        workflow_lease_expired=wf_expired,
-        canonical_repo_root=canonical_root,
-        worktree_registered=registered,
-        current_pid=os.getpid(),
-    )
-    if dry_run or not assessment.get("eligible"):
-        return {
-            "success": bool(assessment.get("eligible")),
-            "performed": False,
-            "dry_run": dry_run,
-            "outcome": assessment.get("outcome"),
-            "reasons": list(assessment.get("reasons") or []),
-            "evidence": dict(assessment.get("evidence") or {}),
-            "eligible": bool(assessment.get("eligible")),
-        }
-
-    if not recovery_worktree_path:
-        recovery_worktree_path = os.path.join(
-            canonical_root,
-            "branches",
-            f"recovery-issue-{issue_number}-dirty-orphan",
-        )
-
-    # Load blob contents at local/remote heads for conflict detection.
-    def _blob_at(head: str, rel: str) -> bytes | None:
-        try:
-            proc = subprocess.run(
-                ["git", "show", f"{head}:{rel}"],
-                cwd=src,
-                capture_output=True,
-                check=False,
-            )
-            if proc.returncode != 0:
-                return None
-            return proc.stdout
-        except Exception:
-            return None
-
-    local_contents = {
-        rel: _blob_at(expected_local_head, rel)
-        for rel in (expected_dirty_fingerprints or {})
-    }
-    remote_contents = {
-        rel: _blob_at(expected_remote_head, rel)
-        for rel in (expected_dirty_fingerprints or {})
-    }
-
-    # Preflight purity is satisfied via explicit worktree_path on this tool's
-    # recovery path; source remains frozen and is never cleaned.
-    result = dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery.run_dirty_orphan_recovery(
-        assessment=assessment,
-        existing_lock=existing_lock or {},
-        issue_number=issue_number,
-        branch_name=branch_name,
-        source_worktree_path=src,
-        recovery_worktree_path=recovery_worktree_path,
-        remote=remote if remote else "prgs",
-        org=o,
-        repo=r,
-        identity=identity,
-        profile=profile,
-        expected_local_head=expected_local_head,
-        expected_remote_head=expected_remote_head,
-        expected_dirty_fingerprints=expected_dirty_fingerprints or {},
-        dirty_contents=dirty_contents,
-        local_head_contents=local_contents,
-        remote_head_contents=remote_contents,
-        canonical_repo_root=canonical_root,
-        bind_lock=True,
-        session_pid=os.getpid(),
-    )
-    # Surface preflight recognition for recovered provenance.
-    if result.get("success") and result.get("lock_record"):
-        result["preflight_provenance"] = (
-            dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery.preflight_recognizes_recovered_provenance(
-                result["lock_record"]
-            )
-        )
-    return result
-
-
 @mcp.tool()
 def gitea_assess_work_issue_duplicate(
     issue_number: int,
@@ -11517,163 +11242,127 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
     if dry_run:
         report["dry_run"] = True
         report["executed"] = False
-        # #851: surface planned lifecycle order so dry-run matches execute.
-        report["planned_execution_orders"] = {
-            str(entry.get("pr_number")): entry.get("planned_execution_order") or []
-            for entry in (report.get("entries") or [])
-        }
         return {"success": True, "performed": False, **report}
 
     verify_preflight_purity(
         remote, task="reconcile_merged_cleanups", org=org, repo=repo
     )
     actions: list[dict] = []
-    project_root = _canonical_local_git_root()
-
-    def _ownership_records_for_branch(
-        head_branch: str, pr_num_int: int | None
-    ) -> list[dict]:
-        ownership_bundle = _collect_branch_ownership_records(
-            remote=remote,
-            host=h,
-            org=o,
-            repo=r,
-            branch=head_branch,
-            pr_number=pr_num_int,
-            project_root=project_root,
-            auth=auth,
-            base_api=base,
-        )
-        ownership_records = list(ownership_bundle.get("records") or [])
-        if ownership_bundle.get("inventory_error"):
-            ownership_records.append(
-                {
-                    "category": (
-                        branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR
-                    ),
-                    "status": "unknown",
-                    "remote": remote,
-                    "host": h,
-                    "org": o,
-                    "repo": r,
-                    "branch": head_branch,
-                    "reclaim_allowed": False,
-                    "role": "inventory",
-                }
-            )
-        return ownership_records
-
-    def _attempt_owned_remote_delete(
-        *,
-        head_branch: str,
-        pr_num_int: int | None,
-        after_worktree_removal: bool = False,
-    ) -> dict:
-        """Fail-closed remote delete with live ownership reassessment (#851)."""
-        import urllib.parse
-
-        ownership_records = _ownership_records_for_branch(head_branch, pr_num_int)
-        ownership = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_active_branch_ownership(
-            remote=remote,
-            org=o,
-            repo=r,
-            branch=head_branch,
-            host=h,
-            records=ownership_records,
-        )
-        if ownership.get("block"):
-            return {
-                "action": "delete_remote_branch",
-                "branch": head_branch,
-                "success": False,
-                "performed": False,
-                "delete_acknowledged": False,
-                "verified_absent": False,
-                "blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership",
-                "reasons": ownership.get("reasons") or [],
-                "blocking_categories": ownership.get("blocking_categories") or [],
-                "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
-                "ownership_reassessed": after_worktree_removal,
-            }
-
-        encoded = urllib.parse.quote(head_branch, safe="")
-        url = f"{base}/branches/{encoded}"
-        with _audited(
-            "delete_branch",
-            host=h,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=o,
-            repo=r,
-            target_branch=head_branch,
-            request_metadata={
-                "branch": head_branch,
-                "source": "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
-                "ownership_checked": True,
-                "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
-            },
-        ):
-            api_request("DELETE", url, auth)
-        readback = _probe_remote_branch(h, o, r, auth, head_branch)
-        readback_assessment = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_post_delete_readback(
-            readback
-        )
-        verified = bool(readback_assessment.get("verified_absent"))
-        return {
-            "action": "delete_remote_branch",
-            "branch": head_branch,
-            "success": bool(readback_assessment.get("ok")),
-            "performed": True,
-            "delete_acknowledged": True,
-            "verified_absent": verified,
-            "readback": readback_assessment.get("readback"),
-            "reasons": readback_assessment.get("reasons") or [],
-            "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
-            "ownership_reassessed": after_worktree_removal,
-        }
-
     for entry in report.get("entries") or []:
         head_branch = entry.get("head_branch") or ""
         remote_assessment = entry.get("remote_branch") or {}
         local_assessment = entry.get("local_worktree") or {}
-        pr_num = entry.get("pr_number")
-        try:
-            pr_num_int = int(pr_num) if pr_num is not None else None
-        except (TypeError, ValueError):
-            pr_num_int = None
 
-        # #851 lifecycle: when the target worktree is independently safe, remove
+        if remote_assessment.get("safe_to_delete_remote"):
-        # it first so worktree_binding ownership does not permanently strand
+            import urllib.parse
-        # both the worktree and the remote branch. Never skip worktree removal
+
-        # merely because remote delete would be blocked by that binding.
+            pr_num = entry.get("pr_number")
-        # Ownership protection for remote delete remains fail-closed below.
+            try:
-        worktree_removed = False
+                pr_num_int = int(pr_num) if pr_num is not None else None
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                pr_num_int = None
+            ownership_bundle = _collect_branch_ownership_records(
+                remote=remote,
+                host=h,
+                org=o,
+                repo=r,
+                branch=head_branch,
+                pr_number=pr_num_int,
+                project_root=_canonical_local_git_root(),
+                auth=auth,
+                base_api=base,
+            )
+            ownership_records = list(ownership_bundle.get("records") or [])
+            if ownership_bundle.get("inventory_error"):
+                ownership_records.append(
+                    {
+                        "category": (
+                            branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR
+                        ),
+                        "status": "unknown",
+                        "remote": remote,
+                        "host": h,
+                        "org": o,
+                        "repo": r,
+                        "branch": head_branch,
+                        "reclaim_allowed": False,
+                        "role": "inventory",
+                    }
+                )
+            ownership = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_active_branch_ownership(
+                remote=remote,
+                org=o,
+                repo=r,
+                branch=head_branch,
+                host=h,
+                records=ownership_records,
+            )
+            if ownership.get("block"):
+                actions.append(
+                    {
+                        "action": "delete_remote_branch",
+                        "branch": head_branch,
+                        "success": False,
+                        "performed": False,
+                        "delete_acknowledged": False,
+                        "verified_absent": False,
+                        "blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership",
+                        "reasons": ownership.get("reasons") or [],
+                        "blocking_categories": ownership.get(
+                            "blocking_categories"
+                        )
+                        or [],
+                    }
+                )
+                continue
+
+            encoded = urllib.parse.quote(head_branch, safe="")
+            url = f"{base}/branches/{encoded}"
+            with _audited(
+                "delete_branch",
+                host=h,
+                remote=remote,
+                org=o,
+                repo=r,
+                target_branch=head_branch,
+                request_metadata={
+                    "branch": head_branch,
+                    "source": "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
+                    "ownership_checked": True,
+                },
+            ):
+                api_request("DELETE", url, auth)
+            readback = _probe_remote_branch(h, o, r, auth, head_branch)
+            readback_assessment = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_post_delete_readback(
+                readback
+            )
+            verified = bool(readback_assessment.get("verified_absent"))
+            actions.append(
+                {
+                    "action": "delete_remote_branch",
+                    "branch": head_branch,
+                    "success": bool(readback_assessment.get("ok")),
+                    "performed": True,
+                    "delete_acknowledged": True,
+                    "verified_absent": verified,
+                    "readback": readback_assessment.get("readback"),
+                    "reasons": readback_assessment.get("reasons") or [],
+                }
+            )
+
         if local_assessment.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"):
             result = merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree(
-                project_root,
+                _canonical_local_git_root(),
                 head_branch,
                 worktree_path=local_assessment.get("worktree_path"),
             )
             actions.append({"action": "remove_local_worktree", **result})
-            # Idempotent resume: absent worktree is already gone.
-            msg = (result.get("message") or "").lower()
-            worktree_removed = bool(result.get("success")) or (
-                "not found" in msg
-            )
-
-        if remote_assessment.get("safe_to_delete_remote"):
-            actions.append(
-                _attempt_owned_remote_delete(
-                    head_branch=head_branch,
-                    pr_num_int=pr_num_int,
-                    after_worktree_removal=worktree_removed,
-                )
-            )
 
     for scratch in report.get("reviewer_scratch_entries") or []:
         if not scratch.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"):
             continue
         result = merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_reviewer_scratch_worktree(
-            project_root, scratch.get("worktree_path") or ""
+            _canonical_local_git_root(), scratch.get("worktree_path") or ""
         )
         actions.append({"action": "remove_reviewer_scratch_worktree", **result})
 
@@ -20223,7 +19912,6 @@ def _allocator_candidates_from_gitea(
                         state="open",
                         labels=tuple(labels),
                         title=title,
-                        body=body,
                         priority=20 if "status:ready" in labels else 1,
                         blocked=blocked,
                         dependency_unmet=dep_unmet,
@@ -21460,21 +21148,10 @@ def gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
     remote: str = "dadeschools",
     host: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Adopt a control-plane lease through the sanctioned path (#601 / #843).
+    """Adopt a control-plane lease through the sanctioned path (#601).
 
-    Same-owner resume refreshes provenance. Foreign active leases are refused
+    Same-owner resume refreshes provenance. Foreign active leases are refused.
-    unless the lease is a pending controller cross-role handoff and the caller
+    Expired leases may be reclaimed; provenance records adopted_from/by.
-    holds the required role (independent consume without sharing the
-    controller session). Expired leases may be reclaimed; provenance records
-    adopted_from/by. Terminal (abandoned/released) leases cannot be adopted.
-
-    #843 F1: the adopter role is derived authoritatively from the active
-    authenticated profile — never from caller input. A supplied ``role`` that
-    does not exactly match the profile-derived role is rejected (no silent
-    accept or reinterpretation), and handoff provenance ``required_profile`` /
-    ``required_namespace`` restrictions are validated against the same
-    authoritative caller context. Caller-supplied role/profile/namespace can
-    never grant authority.
     """
     read_block = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.read")
     if read_block:
@@ -21483,64 +21160,25 @@ def gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
             "reasons": read_block,
             "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.read"),
         }
-    profile = get_profile()
-    profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip() or "session"
-    active_role = (_profile_role_kind(profile) or "").strip().lower()
-    if not active_role:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "outcome": "blocked",
-            "mutation_performed": False,
-            "reasons": [
-                "active profile role could not be derived authoritatively; "
-                "refusing lease adoption (fail closed, #843)"
-            ],
-            "lease_id": lease_id,
-            "authoritative_source": "control_plane_db",
-            "file_lock_only": False,
-            "comment_lease_only": False,
-        }
-    if role is not None and str(role).strip():
-        supplied_role = str(role).strip().lower()
-        if supplied_role != active_role:
-            return {
-                "success": False,
-                "outcome": "blocked",
-                "mutation_performed": False,
-                "profile_role_kind": active_role,
-                "supplied_role": supplied_role,
-                "reasons": [
-                    f"caller-supplied role '{supplied_role}' does not match "
-                    f"the authenticated profile-derived role '{active_role}'; "
-                    "caller-supplied role/profile/namespace can never grant "
-                    "authority (fail closed, #843)"
-                ],
-                "lease_id": lease_id,
-                "authoritative_source": "control_plane_db",
-                "file_lock_only": False,
-                "comment_lease_only": False,
-            }
     db, errs = _control_plane_db_or_error()
     if db is None:
         return {"success": False, "reasons": errs}
+    profile = get_profile()
+    profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip() or "session"
+    active_role = _profile_role_kind(profile) or "author"
     sid = (session_id or "").strip() or (
         f"{profile_name}-{os.getpid()}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
     )
-    adopter_namespace = allocator_service.DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES.get(
-        active_role, f"gitea-{active_role}"
-    )
     try:
         return lease_lifecycle.adopt_lease(
             db,
             lease_id=lease_id,
             adopter_session_id=sid,
-            role=active_role,
+            role=(role or active_role).strip() or "author",
             worktree_path=worktree_path,
             expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha,
             owner_pid=os.getpid(),
             operator_authorized=bool(operator_authorized),
-            adopter_profile_name=profile_name,
-            adopter_namespace=adopter_namespace,
         )
     except (lease_lifecycle.LeaseLifecycleError, control_plane_db.ControlPlaneError) as exc:
         return {

issue_lock_provenance.py

@@ -16,13 +16,11 @@ ISSUE_LOCK_FILE = os.environ.get("GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_FILE", "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock
 SOURCE_LOCK_ISSUE = "gitea_lock_issue"
 SOURCE_LOCK_ADOPTION = "gitea_lock_issue_adoption"
 SOURCE_OPERATOR_OVERRIDE = "operator_override"
-SOURCE_RECOVER_DIRTY_ORPHANED = "gitea_recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree"
 
 SANCTIONED_LOCK_SOURCES = frozenset({
     SOURCE_LOCK_ISSUE,
     SOURCE_LOCK_ADOPTION,
     SOURCE_OPERATOR_OVERRIDE,
-    SOURCE_RECOVER_DIRTY_ORPHANED,
 })
 
 _OPERATOR_OVERRIDE_ENV = "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_OPERATOR_OVERRIDE"

issue_lock_store.py

@@ -1,30 +1,71 @@
-import base64
+"""Keyed, persistent issue-lock storage (#443) with flock hardening (#438).
-import contextlib
+
+Replaces the single global ``/tmp/gitea_issue_lock.json`` slot with per-issue
+lock files under ``GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR`` (default
+``~/.cache/gitea-tools/issue-locks``). Each MCP session binds its active lock
+via a per-process pointer file so concurrent repos/issues never clobber each
+other. Acquisition is serialized per issue with ``fcntl.flock``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import errno
+import fcntl
 import json
 import os
 import re
-import subprocess
+import tempfile
+from contextlib import contextmanager
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 from typing import Any
 
-from audit_event_reconciliation import redact_sensitive_text
+LOCK_DIR_ENV = "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR"
-import issue_lock_provenance
+DEFAULT_LOCK_DIR = os.path.expanduser("~/.cache/gitea-tools/issue-locks")
-
+WORK_LEASE_TTL_HOURS = 4
-DEFAULT_LOCK_TTL_HOURS = 24
 AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE = "author_issue_work"
 
-_SANCTIONED_ROLES = {"author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"}
+_SAFE_SEGMENT_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._+-]+")
+
+
+class LockContentionError(RuntimeError):
+    """Raised when an exclusive per-issue lock cannot be acquired."""
 
 
 def default_lock_dir() -> str:
-    override = (os.environ.get("GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR") or "").strip()
+    raw = (os.environ.get(LOCK_DIR_ENV) or DEFAULT_LOCK_DIR).strip()
-    if override:
+    return raw or DEFAULT_LOCK_DIR
-        return override
+
-    cache_dir = (os.environ.get("GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR") or "").strip()
+
-    if cache_dir:
+def _sanitize_segment(value: str) -> str:
-        return os.path.join(cache_dir, "locks")
+    text = (value or "").strip()
-    user_cache = os.path.expanduser("~/.cache")
+    if not text:
-    return os.path.join(user_cache, "gitea-tools", "locks")
+        return "_"
+    return _SAFE_SEGMENT_RE.sub("_", text)
+
+
+def lock_key(
+    *,
+    remote: str,
+    org: str,
+    repo: str,
+    issue_number: int,
+) -> str:
+    return "-".join(
+        _sanitize_segment(part)
+        for part in (remote, org, repo, str(issue_number))
+    )
+
+
+def lock_file_path(
+    *,
+    remote: str,
+    org: str,
+    repo: str,
+    issue_number: int,
+    lock_dir: str | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    root = (lock_dir or default_lock_dir()).strip()
+    return os.path.join(root, f"{lock_key(remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo, issue_number=issue_number)}.json")
 
 
 def session_pointer_path(lock_dir: str | None = None) -> str:
@@ -42,60 +83,78 @@ def flock_path(json_path: str) -> str:
     return f"{json_path}.lock"
 
 
-@contextlib.contextmanager
+def is_process_alive(pid: int | None) -> bool:
+    if not pid or pid <= 0:
+        return False
+    try:
+        os.kill(int(pid), 0)
+        return True
+    except OSError as exc:
+        return exc.errno != errno.ESRCH
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return False
+
+
+@contextmanager
 def _exclusive_file_lock(lock_path: str):
-    import fcntl
+    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(lock_path) or ".", exist_ok=True)
-
+    fd = os.open(lock_path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_RDWR, 0o600)
-    _ensure_lock_dir(os.path.dirname(lock_path))
+    try:
-    with open(lock_path, "a+") as fh:
         try:
-            fcntl.flock(fh.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+            fcntl.flock(fd, fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
-            yield
+        except BlockingIOError as exc:
+            raise LockContentionError(
+                f"could not acquire exclusive lock on '{lock_path}'"
+            ) from exc
+        yield fd
+    finally:
+        try:
+            fcntl.flock(fd, fcntl.LOCK_UN)
         finally:
-            try:
+            os.close(fd)
-                fcntl.flock(fh.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
-            except Exception:
-                pass
-
-
-def lock_file_path(
-    *,
-    remote: str,
-    org: str,
-    repo: str,
-    issue_number: int,
-    lock_dir: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    root = (lock_dir or default_lock_dir()).strip()
-    slug = f"{remote}-{org}-{repo}-issue-{issue_number}.json"
-    safe_slug = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._-]", "_", slug)
-    return os.path.join(root, safe_slug)
 
 
 def read_lock_file(path: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    if not path or not os.path.isfile(path):
+    lock_path = (path or "").strip()
+    if not lock_path or not os.path.exists(lock_path):
         return None
     try:
-        with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+        with open(lock_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-            data = json.load(fh)
+            data = json.load(handle)
-        if isinstance(data, dict):
+    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-            return data
+        return None
-    except Exception:
+    return data if isinstance(data, dict) else None
-        pass
-    return None
 
 
 def save_lock_file(path: str, data: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
-    _ensure_lock_dir(os.path.dirname(path))
+    lock_path = (path or "").strip()
-    tmp_path = f"{path}.tmp.{os.getpid()}"
+    if not lock_path:
-    with open(tmp_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+        raise ValueError("lock path is required (fail closed)")
-        json.dump(data, fh, indent=2)
+    parent = os.path.dirname(lock_path) or "."
-        fh.flush()
+    os.makedirs(parent, mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
-        os.fsync(fh.fileno())
+    payload = json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n"
-    os.replace(tmp_path, path)
+    fd, temp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".lock-", suffix=".json", dir=parent)
+    try:
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            handle.write(payload)
+            handle.flush()
+            os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+        os.replace(temp_path, lock_path)
+    finally:
+        if os.path.exists(temp_path):
+            try:
+                os.remove(temp_path)
+            except OSError:
+                pass
 
 
 def lock_generation(lock: dict[str, Any] | None) -> int:
+    """Monotonic write counter for a durable lock record (#772 AC5).
+
+    Absent or unusable values read as ``0`` so a lock written before generations
+    existed still participates in compare-and-swap: its first recovery expects
+    ``0`` and writes ``1``.
+    """
     if not isinstance(lock, dict):
         return 0
     try:
@@ -110,8 +169,17 @@ def bind_session_lock(
     *,
     expected_generation: int | None = None,
     renewal_sanctioned: bool = False,
-    recovery_sanctioned: bool = False,
 ) -> str:
+    """Persist a keyed lock and bind it to the current process session.
+
+    ``expected_generation`` turns the write into a compare-and-swap (#772 AC5).
+    Recovery decides it may take over a claim by reading the durable lock, but
+    that read and this write are separate steps; without a CAS two replacement
+    sessions can both observe the same dead owner, both pass assessment, and
+    both write — the second silently clobbering the first. Passing the
+    generation observed at assessment time makes exactly one of them win: the
+    loser's expectation no longer matches and it fails closed.
+    """
     remote = str(lock_data.get("remote") or "")
     org = str(lock_data.get("org") or "")
     repo = str(lock_data.get("repo") or "")
@@ -145,9 +213,7 @@ def bind_session_lock(
     try:
         with _exclusive_file_lock(sentinel):
             existing = read_lock_file(path)
-            overwrite_block = assess_foreign_lock_overwrite(
+            overwrite_block = assess_foreign_lock_overwrite(existing, record)
-                existing, record, recovery_sanctioned=recovery_sanctioned
-            )
             if overwrite_block:
                 raise RuntimeError(overwrite_block)
             lease_block = assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
@@ -156,37 +222,34 @@ def bind_session_lock(
                 branch_name=str(record.get("branch_name") or ""),
                 worktree_path=str(record.get("worktree_path") or ""),
                 renewal_sanctioned=renewal_sanctioned,
-                recovery_sanctioned=recovery_sanctioned,
             )
             if lease_block:
                 raise RuntimeError(lease_block)
-
+            # #772 AC5: compare-and-swap inside the same critical section that
-            current_gen = lock_generation(existing)
+            # already serializes writers, so the check and the write cannot be
-            if expected_generation is not None and current_gen != expected_generation:
+            # separated by another session's successful recovery.
+            current_generation = lock_generation(existing)
+            if (
+                expected_generation is not None
+                and current_generation != expected_generation
+            ):
                 raise RuntimeError(
-                    f"compare-and-swap generation mismatch on issue #{issue_number}: "
+                    f"Issue #{issue_number} lock generation changed: expected "
-                    f"expected {expected_generation}, observed {current_gen} (fail closed)"
+                    f"{expected_generation}, found {current_generation}; another "
+                    "session already recovered or replaced this claim (fail closed)"
                 )
-
+            record["lock_generation"] = current_generation + 1
-            record["lock_generation"] = current_gen + 1
-            if not record.get("lock_provenance"):
-                provenance_source = (
-                    issue_lock_provenance.SOURCE_RECOVER_DIRTY_ORPHANED
-                    if recovery_sanctioned
-                    else issue_lock_provenance.SOURCE_LOCK_ISSUE
-                )
-                record["lock_provenance"] = issue_lock_provenance.build_lock_provenance(
-                    issue_number=issue_number,
-                    source=provenance_source,
-                    branch_name=record.get("branch_name"),
-                    worktree_path=record.get("worktree_path"),
-                    generation=record["lock_generation"],
-                )
-
             save_lock_file(path, record)
             save_lock_file(session_pointer_path(root), pointer)
-    except Exception:
+    except LockContentionError as exc:
-        raise
+        competing = read_lock_file(path)
+        if competing:
+            owner_pid = competing.get("session_pid") or competing.get("pid")
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                f"Issue #{issue_number} lock contention: {exc}; competing owner "
+                f"pid={owner_pid} (fail closed)"
+            ) from exc
+        raise RuntimeError(f"Issue #{issue_number} lock contention: {exc} (fail closed)") from exc
     return path
 
 
@@ -224,18 +287,21 @@ def iter_lock_files(lock_dir: str | None = None) -> list[str]:
     root = (lock_dir or default_lock_dir()).strip()
     if not os.path.isdir(root):
         return []
-    out: list[str] = []
+    paths: list[str] = []
-    for entry in os.listdir(root):
+    for name in os.listdir(root):
-        if entry.endswith(".json") and not entry.startswith("session-"):
+        if not name.endswith(".json") or name.startswith("session-"):
-            out.append(os.path.join(root, entry))
+            continue
-    return sorted(out)
+        paths.append(os.path.join(root, name))
+    return sorted(paths)
 
 
-def find_live_lock_for_branch(
+def find_lock_for_branch(
+    *,
+    remote: str,
+    org: str,
+    repo: str,
     branch_name: str,
     lock_dir: str | None = None,
-    *,
-    now: datetime | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
     target = (branch_name or "").strip()
     if not target:
@@ -244,42 +310,29 @@ def find_live_lock_for_branch(
         lock = read_lock_file(path)
         if not lock:
             continue
-        lock_branch = str(lock.get("branch_name") or "").strip()
+        if (
-        if lock_branch == target and is_lease_live(lock, now=now):
+            str(lock.get("remote") or "") == remote
+            and str(lock.get("org") or "") == org
+            and str(lock.get("repo") or "") == repo
+            and str(lock.get("branch_name") or "").strip() == target
+        ):
+            lock = dict(lock)
+            lock.setdefault("lock_file_path", path)
             return lock
     return None
 
 
-def is_process_alive(pid: int | None) -> bool:
-    if pid is None or pid <= 0:
-        return False
-    try:
-        os.kill(pid, 0)
-        return True
-    except OSError:
-        return False
-
-
 def _lease_now(now: datetime | None = None) -> datetime:
-    if now is not None:
+    return now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-        if now.tzinfo is None:
-            return now.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        return now.astimezone(timezone.utc)
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
 
 
-def _parse_lease_timestamp(text: str | None) -> datetime | None:
+def _parse_lease_timestamp(value: str | None) -> datetime | None:
+    text = (value or "").strip()
     if not text:
         return None
-    raw = str(text).strip()
-    if not raw:
-        return None
     try:
-        dt = datetime.fromisoformat(raw)
+        return datetime.fromisoformat(text.replace("Z", "+00:00")).astimezone(timezone.utc)
-        if dt.tzinfo is None:
+    except ValueError:
-            return dt.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        return dt.astimezone(timezone.utc)
-    except Exception:
         return None
 
 
@@ -308,6 +361,7 @@ def assess_lock_freshness(
     *,
     now: datetime | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Classify a lock as live, expired, stale, or absent."""
     current = _lease_now(now)
     if not lock_data:
         return {
@@ -326,18 +380,7 @@ def assess_lock_freshness(
     pid = lock_data.get("session_pid")
     if pid is None:
         pid = lock_data.get("pid")
-    if pid is None:
+    pid_alive = is_process_alive(pid) if pid is not None else False
-        pid = lock_data.get("owner_pid")
-    pid_missing = pid is None or str(pid).strip() == ""
-    try:
-        pid_int = int(pid) if not pid_missing else None
-        if pid_int is not None and pid_int <= 0:
-            pid_missing = True
-            pid_int = None
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        pid_missing = True
-        pid_int = None
-    pid_alive = is_process_alive(pid_int) if pid_int is not None else False
 
     if expires_at and expires_at <= current:
         return {
@@ -346,54 +389,92 @@ def assess_lock_freshness(
             "stale": True,
             "reason": f"lease expired at {expires_at.isoformat()}",
             "pid_alive": pid_alive,
-            "pid_missing": pid_missing,
         }
 
-    if pid_missing:
+    if pid is not None and not pid_alive:
-        return {
-            "status": "malformed",
-            "live": False,
-            "stale": True,
-            "reason": (
-                "lock has no usable session pid; cannot prove live ownership "
-                "(PID-less locks are never live by missing expiry alone)"
-            ),
-            "pid_alive": False,
-            "pid_missing": True,
-            "heartbeat_at": heartbeat_at.isoformat() if heartbeat_at else None,
-            "expires_at": expires_at.isoformat() if expires_at else None,
-        }
-
-    if pid_int is not None and not pid_alive:
         return {
             "status": "stale",
             "live": False,
             "stale": True,
-            "reason": f"owner pid {pid_int} is dead",
+            "reason": f"owner pid {pid} is not alive",
             "pid_alive": False,
-            "pid_missing": False,
-            "pid": pid_int,
-        }
-
-    raw_status = (lock_data.get("status") or "").strip().lower()
-    if raw_status in {"active", "acquired", "locked"}:
-        return {
-            "status": "active",
-            "live": True,
-            "stale": False,
-            "reason": f"lock active (pid {pid_int})",
-            "pid_alive": True,
-            "pid_missing": False,
-            "pid": pid_int,
         }
 
     return {
-        "status": raw_status or "unknown",
+        "status": "live",
-        "live": False,
+        "live": True,
-        "stale": True,
+        "stale": False,
-        "reason": f"unrecognized lock status '{raw_status}'",
+        "reason": "lock heartbeat and lease are fresh",
         "pid_alive": pid_alive,
-        "pid_missing": False,
+        "heartbeat_at": heartbeat_at.isoformat() if heartbeat_at else None,
+        "expires_at": expires_at.isoformat() if expires_at else None,
+    }
+
+
+def _same_realpath(left: str | None, right: str | None) -> bool:
+    if not left or not right:
+        return False
+    try:
+        return os.path.realpath(left) == os.path.realpath(right)
+    except OSError:
+        return left == right
+
+
+
+def assess_expired_lock_reclaim(
+    existing_lock: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    *,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Decide whether an expired/stale author issue lock may be reclaimed (#601).
+
+    Required proof (any reclaim of non-live lock):
+    * lease not live (expired or dead pid)
+    * owner process dead OR worktree missing
+    * no force-delete of live foreign ownership
+    """
+    if not existing_lock:
+        return {
+            "reclaim_allowed": True,
+            "reasons": ["no existing lock"],
+            "freshness": assess_lock_freshness(None, now=now),
+        }
+    freshness = assess_lock_freshness(existing_lock, now=now)
+    if freshness.get("live"):
+        return {
+            "reclaim_allowed": False,
+            "reasons": ["lock is still live; cannot reclaim (fail closed)"],
+            "freshness": freshness,
+        }
+    pid = existing_lock.get("session_pid")
+    if pid is None:
+        pid = existing_lock.get("pid")
+    dead = not is_process_alive(pid) if pid is not None else True
+    wt = str(existing_lock.get("worktree_path") or "")
+    missing_wt = (not wt) or (not os.path.isdir(os.path.realpath(wt)))
+    if not (dead or missing_wt):
+        return {
+            "reclaim_allowed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                "expired/stale lock still has live owner pid and present worktree; "
+                "recovery review required (fail closed)"
+            ],
+            "freshness": freshness,
+            "owner_pid_dead": dead,
+            "worktree_missing": missing_wt,
+        }
+    return {
+        "reclaim_allowed": True,
+        "reasons": [
+            "non-live lock with dead process and/or missing worktree; "
+            "sanctioned reclaim allowed"
+        ],
+        "freshness": freshness,
+        "owner_pid_dead": dead,
+        "worktree_missing": missing_wt,
+        "prior_branch": existing_lock.get("branch_name"),
+        "prior_worktree": existing_lock.get("worktree_path"),
+        "prior_pid": pid,
     }
 
 
@@ -403,98 +484,257 @@ def assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
     issue_number: int,
     branch_name: str,
     worktree_path: str,
-    now: datetime | None = None,
+    operation_type: str = AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE,
     renewal_sanctioned: bool = False,
-    recovery_sanctioned: bool = False,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
 ) -> str | None:
+    """Return a fail-closed error when a competing live lease blocks acquisition.
+
+    ``renewal_sanctioned`` is set only when
+    ``issue_lock_renewal.assess_exact_owner_lease_renewal`` has already proven,
+    from the durable lock plus live server-side observation, that this session
+    is the exact recorded owner of an *expired* lease (#760). It is never a
+    caller-supplied parameter of any MCP tool (#760 AC14): the server computes
+    it and passes it down. Left False, every pre-existing disposition is
+    unchanged.
+    """
     if not existing_lock:
         return None
-    freshness = assess_lock_freshness(existing_lock, now=now)
+
-    if not freshness["live"]:
+    existing_issue = existing_lock.get("issue_number")
-        return None
+    lease = existing_lock.get("work_lease")
-    if renewal_sanctioned or recovery_sanctioned:
+    existing_operation = (
+        lease.get("operation_type")
+        if isinstance(lease, dict)
+        else AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE
+    )
+    if existing_issue != issue_number or existing_operation != operation_type:
         return None
 
-    existing_wt = str(existing_lock.get("worktree_path") or "").strip()
+    existing_branch = existing_lock.get("branch_name")
-    target_wt = (worktree_path or "").strip()
+    existing_worktree = existing_lock.get("worktree_path")
-    if existing_wt and target_wt:
+    same_owner = (
-        try:
+        existing_branch == branch_name
-            same_wt = os.path.realpath(existing_wt) == os.path.realpath(target_wt)
+        and _same_realpath(str(existing_worktree or ""), worktree_path)
-        except Exception:
+    )
-            same_wt = existing_wt == target_wt
+    if is_lease_expired(existing_lock, now=now):
-        if not same_wt:
+        # #760 AC1/AC2: exact-owner renewal is a different disposition from
-            owner_pid = existing_lock.get("session_pid") or existing_lock.get("pid")
+        # foreign takeover and is evaluated first. Before this, both branches
-            return (
+        # below returned unconditionally, so the same_owner allowance further
-                f"Issue #{issue_number} already has an active author_issue_work lease "
+        # down was unreachable for every expired lease — an owner could never
-                f"from worktree '{existing_wt}' (pid={owner_pid}; fail closed)"
+        # renew its own lock once the wall clock passed, no matter how complete
-            )
+        # its ownership evidence. Requires BOTH the locally recomputed
-
+        # same_owner match and the server-proven renewal waiver; either alone is
-    existing_br = str(existing_lock.get("branch_name") or "").strip()
+        # insufficient.
-    target_br = (branch_name or "").strip()
+        if same_owner and renewal_sanctioned:
-    if existing_br and target_br and existing_br != target_br:
+            return None
+        reclaim = assess_expired_lock_reclaim(existing_lock, now=now)
+        if reclaim.get("reclaim_allowed"):
+            # #601: expired + dead pid / missing worktree may be reclaimed
+            # through the normal lock path (sanctioned overwrite).
+            return None
         return (
-            f"Issue #{issue_number} already has an active lease on branch '{existing_br}' "
+            f"Issue #{issue_number} has an expired {operation_type} lease on "
-            f"(cannot lock for branch '{target_br}'; fail closed)"
+            f"branch '{existing_branch}' from worktree '{existing_worktree}'. "
+            "Recovery review is required before takeover (fail closed)"
         )
-    return None
+    if same_owner:
+        return None
+    return (
+        f"Issue #{issue_number} already has an active {operation_type} lease on "
+        f"branch '{existing_branch}' from worktree '{existing_worktree}' "
+        "(fail closed)"
+    )
 
 
 def assess_foreign_lock_overwrite(
     existing_lock: dict[str, Any] | None,
-    proposed_lock: dict[str, Any],
+    incoming_lock: dict[str, Any],
     *,
     now: datetime | None = None,
-    recovery_sanctioned: bool = False,
 ) -> str | None:
+    """Block writes that would clobber an unrelated live lease on the same key."""
     if not existing_lock:
         return None
-    freshness = assess_lock_freshness(existing_lock, now=now)
 
-    ex_claimant = (
+    same_issue = existing_lock.get("issue_number") == incoming_lock.get("issue_number")
-        existing_lock.get("claimant")
+    same_branch = existing_lock.get("branch_name") == incoming_lock.get("branch_name")
-        or existing_lock.get("user")
+    same_worktree = _same_realpath(
-        or existing_lock.get("username")
+        str(existing_lock.get("worktree_path") or ""),
-        or existing_lock.get("owner")
+        str(incoming_lock.get("worktree_path") or ""),
-        or ""
     )
-    prop_claimant = (
+    if same_issue and same_branch and same_worktree:
-        proposed_lock.get("claimant")
+        return None
-        or proposed_lock.get("user")
+    if not is_lease_live(existing_lock, now=now):
-        or proposed_lock.get("username")
+        return None
-        or proposed_lock.get("owner")
+    return (
-        or ""
+        "Refusing to overwrite a live foreign issue lock "
-    )
+        f"(issue #{existing_lock.get('issue_number')}, "
-    ex_profile = (
+        f"branch '{existing_lock.get('branch_name')}', "
-        existing_lock.get("profile")
+        f"worktree '{existing_lock.get('worktree_path')}') (fail closed)"
-        or existing_lock.get("profile_name")
-        or existing_lock.get("execution_profile")
-        or ""
-    )
-    prop_profile = (
-        proposed_lock.get("profile")
-        or proposed_lock.get("profile_name")
-        or proposed_lock.get("execution_profile")
-        or ""
     )
 
-    same_claimant = bool(
-        ex_claimant and prop_claimant and ex_claimant == prop_claimant
-    )
-    same_profile = bool(
-        ex_profile and prop_profile and ex_profile == prop_profile
-    )
 
-    if not same_claimant and not recovery_sanctioned:
+def find_live_lock_for_branch(
-        return (
+    branch_name: str,
-            f"Foreign lock overwrite refused: existing lock belongs to claimant "
+    lock_dir: str | None = None,
-            f"'{ex_claimant or 'unknown'}' (proposed: '{prop_claimant or 'unknown'}'); "
+) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-            f"foreign locks may only be overwritten through explicit sanctioned "
+    target = (branch_name or "").strip()
-            f"recovery (fail closed)"
+    if not target:
-        )
+        return None
-
+    for path in iter_lock_files(lock_dir):
-    if freshness["live"] and not (same_claimant or same_profile) and not recovery_sanctioned:
+        lock = read_lock_file(path)
-        return (
+        if not lock:
-            f"Foreign lock overwrite refused: existing lock is live "
+            continue
-            f"(status={freshness['status']}) and belongs to '{ex_claimant or 'unknown'}'"
+        if str(lock.get("branch_name") or "").strip() != target:
-        )
+            continue
+        if not is_lease_live(lock):
+            continue
+        record = dict(lock)
+        record.setdefault("lock_file_path", path)
+        return record
     return None
+
+
+def resolve_locked_branch_for_session(
+    branch_name: str | None = None,
+    lock_dir: str | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    if branch_name:
+        lock = find_live_lock_for_branch(branch_name, lock_dir)
+        if lock:
+            return str(lock.get("branch_name") or "")
+    lock = read_session_issue_lock(lock_dir)
+    return str((lock or {}).get("branch_name") or "")
+
+
+def has_active_issue_lock(
+    branch: str,
+    *,
+    lock_dir: str | None = None,
+) -> bool:
+    target = (branch or "").strip()
+    if not target:
+        return False
+    for path in iter_lock_files(lock_dir):
+        lock = read_lock_file(path)
+        if not lock:
+            continue
+        if str(lock.get("branch_name") or "").strip() != target:
+            continue
+        if is_lease_live(lock):
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
+def verify_lock_for_mutation(
+    lock_data: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    *,
+    issue_number: int | None = None,
+    branch_name: str | None = None,
+    worktree_path: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Re-check lock ownership immediately before a mutation (#438)."""
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    if not lock_data:
+        return {"proven": False, "block": True, "reasons": ["issue lock is missing (fail closed)"]}
+
+    freshness = assess_lock_freshness(lock_data)
+    if not freshness["live"]:
+        reasons.append(f"issue lock is not live: {freshness['reason']} (fail closed)")
+
+    if issue_number is not None and lock_data.get("issue_number") != issue_number:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"issue lock targets #{lock_data.get('issue_number')}, expected #{issue_number} (fail closed)"
+        )
+
+    if branch_name is not None and lock_data.get("branch_name") != branch_name:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"issue lock branch '{lock_data.get('branch_name')}' does not match "
+            f"'{branch_name}' (fail closed)"
+        )
+
+    if worktree_path is not None:
+        locked = os.path.realpath(str(lock_data.get("worktree_path") or ""))
+        declared = os.path.realpath(worktree_path)
+        if locked != declared:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"issue lock worktree '{locked}' does not match declared '{declared}' (fail closed)"
+            )
+
+    return {
+        "proven": not reasons,
+        "block": bool(reasons),
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "freshness": freshness,
+        "lock_proof": format_lock_proof(lock_data, freshness=freshness),
+    }
+
+
+def list_live_locks(
+    *,
+    lock_dir: str | None = None,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Return live per-issue locks for queue visibility."""
+    live: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for path in iter_lock_files(lock_dir):
+        record = read_lock_file(path)
+        if not record:
+            continue
+        freshness = assess_lock_freshness(record, now=now)
+        if not freshness["live"]:
+            continue
+        live.append(
+            {
+                "issue_number": record.get("issue_number"),
+                "branch_name": record.get("branch_name"),
+                "remote": record.get("remote"),
+                "org": record.get("org"),
+                "repo": record.get("repo"),
+                "worktree_path": record.get("worktree_path"),
+                "pid": record.get("session_pid") or record.get("pid"),
+                "claimant": (
+                    record.get("claimant")
+                    or (record.get("work_lease") or {}).get("claimant")
+                ),
+                "freshness": freshness,
+                "lock_path": record.get("lock_file_path") or path,
+            }
+        )
+    return live
+
+
+def format_lock_proof(
+    lock_data: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    *,
+    freshness: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    competing_live_locks: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
+    released: bool | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    """Canonical issue-lock proof string for final reports."""
+    if not lock_data:
+        return "issue lock proof: not acquired"
+    fresh = freshness or assess_lock_freshness(lock_data)
+    owner = lock_data.get("claimant") or {}
+    if not owner and isinstance(lock_data.get("work_lease"), dict):
+        owner = lock_data["work_lease"].get("claimant") or {}
+    parts = [
+        "issue lock proof:",
+        f"acquired issue #{lock_data.get('issue_number')}",
+        f"branch {lock_data.get('branch_name')}",
+        f"owner {owner.get('profile') or 'unknown'}",
+        f"pid {lock_data.get('session_pid') or lock_data.get('pid')}",
+        f"freshness {fresh.get('status')}",
+    ]
+    if competing_live_locks is not None:
+        parts.append(
+            "no competing live lock"
+            if not competing_live_locks
+            else f"competing live locks {len(competing_live_locks)}"
+        )
+    if released is True:
+        parts.append("lock released")
+    elif released is False:
+        parts.append("lock retained")
+    return "; ".join(parts)

lease_lifecycle.py

@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ SAFE_RELEASE_OWNED = "release_owned"
 SAFE_STALE_PROMPT = "stale_prompt_lease"
 SAFE_UNKNOWN = "inspect_only"
 SAFE_NO_AUTHORITY = "file_or_comment_not_authoritative"
-SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE = "consume_cross_role_handoff"
 
 LEASE_STATUS_ACTIVE = "active"
 LEASE_STATUS_RELEASED = "released"
@@ -251,23 +250,6 @@ def decide_safe_next_action(
                 "same_owner": True,
                 "also_allowed": [SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED, SAFE_RELEASE_OWNED],
             }
-        handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff({"lease": lease})
-        if handoff:
-            return {
-                "safe_next_action": SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE,
-                "reasons": [
-                    f"controller allocation pending handoff (freshness={status}); "
-                    "required-role worker may consume without abandon/reassign; "
-                    f"required_role={handoff['required_role']}"
-                ],
-                "block": False,
-                "same_owner": False,
-                "owner_session_id": owner,
-                "required_role": handoff["required_role"],
-                "cross_role_handoff": True,
-                "handoff_status": "pending",
-                "also_allowed": [SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED],
-            }
         return {
             "safe_next_action": SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED,
             "reasons": [
@@ -290,24 +272,6 @@ def decide_safe_next_action(
         }
 
     if not same_owner and status == "active":
-        # #843: pending cross-role handoff is consumable by required role
-        handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff({"lease": lease})
-        if handoff:
-            return {
-                "safe_next_action": SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE,
-                "reasons": [
-                    "controller cross-role allocation pending handoff; "
-                    f"required_role={handoff['required_role']}; "
-                    "consume via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease without "
-                    "abandonment or sharing the controller session"
-                ],
-                "block": False,
-                "same_owner": False,
-                "owner_session_id": owner,
-                "required_role": handoff["required_role"],
-                "cross_role_handoff": True,
-                "handoff_status": "pending",
-            }
         return {
             "safe_next_action": SAFE_WAIT_FOREIGN,
             "reasons": [
@@ -476,84 +440,6 @@ def list_active_leases(
     }
 
 
-
-def parse_lease_provenance(lease_or_state: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Return durable lease provenance dict (empty when absent/unparseable)."""
-    if not lease_or_state:
-        return {}
-    if "provenance" in lease_or_state and isinstance(lease_or_state.get("provenance"), dict):
-        return dict(lease_or_state["provenance"])
-    raw = None
-    if "provenance_json" in lease_or_state:
-        raw = lease_or_state.get("provenance_json")
-    elif "lease" in lease_or_state and isinstance(lease_or_state.get("lease"), Mapping):
-        raw = lease_or_state["lease"].get("provenance_json")
-    if not raw:
-        return {}
-    if isinstance(raw, dict):
-        return dict(raw)
-    try:
-        loaded = json.loads(raw)
-    except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-        return {}
-    return dict(loaded) if isinstance(loaded, dict) else {}
-
-
-def is_pending_cross_role_handoff(
-    state: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
-) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Return handoff evidence when a controller allocation awaits consume (#843).
-
-    A pending handoff is identified by durable provenance written at
-    cross-role apply time — not by title heuristics or session-id guessing.
-    """
-    if not state:
-        return None
-    lease = state.get("lease") if isinstance(state.get("lease"), Mapping) else state
-    if not isinstance(lease, Mapping):
-        return None
-    status = str(lease.get("status") or "").strip().lower()
-    if status in (LEASE_STATUS_ABANDONED, LEASE_STATUS_RELEASED, LEASE_STATUS_EXPIRED):
-        return None
-    prov = parse_lease_provenance(state)
-    if not prov and isinstance(lease, Mapping):
-        prov = parse_lease_provenance(lease)
-    if not prov.get("cross_role_handoff"):
-        return None
-    handoff_status = str(prov.get("handoff_status") or "pending").strip().lower()
-    if handoff_status != "pending":
-        return None
-    adopted_by = (
-        lease.get("adopted_by_session_id")
-        or prov.get("adopted_by_session_id")
-        or ""
-    )
-    if str(adopted_by).strip():
-        return None
-    required_role = str(
-        prov.get("required_role") or lease.get("role") or ""
-    ).strip().lower()
-    if not required_role:
-        return None
-    return {
-        "cross_role_handoff": True,
-        "handoff_status": "pending",
-        "required_role": required_role,
-        "allocating_session_id": str(
-            prov.get("allocating_session_id") or lease.get("session_id") or ""
-        ),
-        "allocating_role": str(prov.get("allocating_role") or "controller"),
-        "lease_id": str(lease.get("lease_id") or ""),
-        "assignment_id": (
-            str(state["assignment"]["assignment_id"])
-            if isinstance(state.get("assignment"), Mapping)
-            and state["assignment"].get("assignment_id")
-            else None
-        ),
-        "provenance": prov,
-    }
-
-
 def adopt_lease(
     db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB,
     *,
@@ -564,17 +450,8 @@ def adopt_lease(
     expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
     owner_pid: int | None = None,
     operator_authorized: bool = False,
-    adopter_profile_name: str | None = None,
-    adopter_namespace: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Sanctioned adopt path with provenance; never silent foreign steal.
+    """Sanctioned adopt path with provenance; never silent foreign steal."""
-
-    #843 F1: for a pending cross-role handoff, ``role`` must be the
-    authoritative profile-derived role supplied by the MCP boundary — never
-    caller-asserted authority. When the handoff provenance declares
-    ``required_profile`` / ``required_namespace`` and the caller context is
-    provided, both are validated exactly; a mismatch fails closed.
-    """
     state = db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
     if not state:
         raise LeaseLifecycleError(
@@ -586,8 +463,11 @@ def adopt_lease(
     owner = str(lease.get("session_id") or "")
     same_owner = owner == str(adopter_session_id)
 
-    handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff(state)
+    if freshness["freshness"] == "active" and not same_owner:
-    adopter_role = (role or "").strip().lower()
+        raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+            f"refusing to steal active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by "
+            f"{owner} (fail closed)"
+        )
 
     if freshness["freshness"] in ("abandoned", "released"):
         raise LeaseLifecycleError(
@@ -595,64 +475,13 @@ def adopt_lease(
             "(fail closed)"
         )
 
-    if handoff and not same_owner:
+    # Expired or stale: require abandon-style safety before ownership transfer
-        # Terminal statuses already rejected above. Freshness may be
+    # when not same owner; same owner may reclaim.
-        # active OR stale_dead_process (controller exited) — both are
+    if not same_owner and freshness["freshness"] in (
-        # consumable without abandonment when handoff is still pending.
-        if freshness["freshness"] not in (
-            "active",
-            "stale_dead_process",
-            "stale_missing_worktree",
-        ):
-            raise LeaseLifecycleError(
-                f"lease {lease_id} freshness={freshness['freshness']}; "
-                "terminal or non-active allocation cannot be handoff-consumed "
-                "(fail closed)"
-            )
-        required = handoff["required_role"]
-        if adopter_role != required:
-            raise LeaseLifecycleError(
-                f"wrong role for cross-role handoff consume of {lease_id}: "
-                f"required={required} adopter={adopter_role or 'none'} "
-                "(fail closed)"
-            )
-        # #843 F1: provenance profile/namespace restrictions are validated
-        # against the authoritative caller context when declared. Caller
-        # input can never widen authority; a mismatch fails closed.
-        handoff_prov = handoff.get("provenance") or {}
-        required_profile = str(
-            handoff_prov.get("required_profile") or ""
-        ).strip()
-        if required_profile and adopter_profile_name is not None:
-            if str(adopter_profile_name).strip() != required_profile:
-                raise LeaseLifecycleError(
-                    f"wrong profile for cross-role handoff consume of "
-                    f"{lease_id}: required_profile={required_profile} "
-                    f"adopter_profile={adopter_profile_name} (fail closed)"
-                )
-        required_namespace = str(
-            handoff_prov.get("required_namespace") or ""
-        ).strip()
-        if required_namespace and adopter_namespace is not None:
-            if str(adopter_namespace).strip() != required_namespace:
-                raise LeaseLifecycleError(
-                    f"wrong namespace for cross-role handoff consume of "
-                    f"{lease_id}: required_namespace={required_namespace} "
-                    f"adopter_namespace={adopter_namespace} (fail closed)"
-                )
-        reason = "cross-role-handoff-consume"
-    elif freshness["freshness"] == "active" and not same_owner:
-        raise LeaseLifecycleError(
-            f"refusing to steal active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by "
-            f"{owner} (fail closed)"
-        )
-    elif not same_owner and freshness["freshness"] in (
         "expired",
         "stale_dead_process",
         "stale_missing_worktree",
     ):
-        # Expired or stale (non-handoff): require abandon-style safety before
-        # ownership transfer when not same owner; same owner may reclaim.
         if not operator_authorized and freshness["freshness"] == "expired":
             # Deterministic reclaim of expired foreign lease is allowed
             # without operator flag (sanctioned expire reclaim).
@@ -663,9 +492,6 @@ def adopt_lease(
                 f"lease {lease_id} freshness={freshness['freshness']}; "
                 "use abandon with proof before foreign adopt (fail closed)"
             )
-        reason = "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
-    else:
-        reason = "owner-resume-adopt" if same_owner else "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
 
     provenance = build_adopt_provenance(
         adopted_from_session_id=owner,
@@ -678,14 +504,10 @@ def adopt_lease(
         worktree_path=worktree_path,
         expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha or lease.get("expected_head_sha"),
         prior_lease_id=lease_id,
-        reason=reason,
+        reason=(
+            "owner-resume-adopt" if same_owner else "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
+        ),
     )
-    if handoff and not same_owner:
-        provenance["cross_role_handoff"] = True
-        provenance["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
-        provenance["required_role"] = handoff["required_role"]
-        provenance["allocating_session_id"] = handoff["allocating_session_id"]
-        provenance["allocating_role"] = handoff["allocating_role"]
 
     result = db.adopt_lease(
         lease_id=lease_id,
@@ -696,7 +518,7 @@ def adopt_lease(
         owner_pid=owner_pid if owner_pid is not None else os.getpid(),
         provenance=provenance,
     )
-    out = {
+    return {
         "success": True,
         "outcome": result.get("outcome"),
         "same_owner": same_owner,
@@ -709,24 +531,6 @@ def adopt_lease(
         "comment_lease_only": False,
         "reasons": result.get("reasons") or [],
     }
-    if handoff and not same_owner:
-        out["cross_role_handoff"] = True
-        out["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
-        out["required_role"] = handoff["required_role"]
-        out["adopted_by_session_id"] = adopter_session_id
-        out["adopted_from_session_id"] = owner
-        lease_row = result.get("lease") or {}
-        if isinstance(lease_row, Mapping):
-            out["read_after_write"] = {
-                "lease_id": lease_row.get("lease_id"),
-                "session_id": lease_row.get("session_id"),
-                "role": lease_row.get("role"),
-                "status": lease_row.get("status"),
-                "adopted_by_session_id": lease_row.get("adopted_by_session_id"),
-                "adopted_from_session_id": lease_row.get("adopted_from_session_id"),
-                "phase": lease_row.get("phase"),
-            }
-    return out
 
 
 def release_lease(

merged_cleanup_reconcile.py

@@ -566,10 +566,6 @@ def build_pr_cleanup_entry(
         worktree_state=worktree_state,
         active_lock=active_lock,
     )
-    planned = plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-        remote_assessment=remote,
-        local_assessment=local,
-    )
     return {
         "pr_number": pr_number,
         "issue_number": issue_number,
@@ -580,63 +576,9 @@ def build_pr_cleanup_entry(
         "merged": merged,
         "remote_branch": remote,
         "local_worktree": local,
-        # #851: dry-run and execute share the same lifecycle order description.
-        "planned_execution_order": planned,
     }
 
 
-def plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-    *,
-    remote_assessment: dict[str, Any] | None,
-    local_assessment: dict[str, Any] | None,
-) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-    """Describe independent worktree-then-reassess-then-remote cleanup order (#851).
-
-    Remote ownership protection remains fail-closed at execute time. A worktree
-    that is independently safe to remove is never skipped merely because remote
-    deletion may be blocked by that same ``worktree_binding``.
-    """
-    remote = remote_assessment or {}
-    local = local_assessment or {}
-    steps: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-    worktree_safe = bool(local.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"))
-    remote_safe = bool(remote.get("safe_to_delete_remote"))
-
-    if worktree_safe:
-        steps.append(
-            {
-                "action": "remove_local_worktree",
-                "reason": "independently_safe_to_remove",
-                "phase": 1,
-            }
-        )
-    if remote_safe:
-        if worktree_safe:
-            steps.append(
-                {
-                    "action": "reassess_branch_ownership",
-                    "reason": "after_worktree_removal_clear_worktree_binding",
-                    "phase": 2,
-                }
-            )
-            steps.append(
-                {
-                    "action": "delete_remote_branch",
-                    "reason": "only_if_independently_safe_after_reassessment",
-                    "phase": 3,
-                }
-            )
-        else:
-            steps.append(
-                {
-                    "action": "delete_remote_branch",
-                    "reason": "safe_to_delete_and_no_independent_worktree_removal",
-                    "phase": 1,
-                }
-            )
-    return steps
-
-
 def build_reconciliation_report(
     *,
     project_root: str,

pr_work_lease.py

@@ -228,25 +228,74 @@ def find_active_reviewer_lease(
     return None
 
 
+def _conflict_fix_chain_key(lease: dict) -> tuple | None:
+    """Identity of the lease chain a conflict-fix marker belongs to (#842).
+
+    Keyed by PR number, profile, head_before, and branch. Returns None when any
+    required component (pr_number, profile, head_before) is missing or malformed.
+    """
+    raw = lease.get("raw_fields") or {}
+    pr_number = lease.get("pr_number")
+    profile = (lease.get("profile") or "").strip().lower()
+    head_before = lease.get("head_before")
+    branch = (lease.get("branch") or raw.get("branch") or "").strip()
+    if not (pr_number and profile and head_before):
+        return None
+    return (pr_number, profile, head_before, branch)
+
+
+def _conflict_fix_chain_matches(key1: tuple, key2: tuple) -> bool:
+    """True when two conflict-fix chain keys refer to the same lease chain."""
+    pr1, profile1, head1, branch1 = key1
+    pr2, profile2, head2, branch2 = key2
+    if pr1 != pr2 or profile1 != profile2 or head1 != head2:
+        return False
+    if branch1 and branch2 and branch1 != branch2:
+        return False
+    return True
+
+
+def _conflict_fix_chain_terminated_after(entries: list[dict], index: int) -> bool:
+    """True when a later marker terminates the conflict-fix chain of ``entries[index]``.
+
+    Append-only newest-wins: a terminal marker (phase=released/blocked/done)
+    ends only its matching claim chain (#842).
+    """
+    key = _conflict_fix_chain_key(entries[index])
+    if key is None:
+        return False
+    for later in entries[index + 1:]:
+        phase = (later.get("phase") or "").strip().lower()
+        if phase not in _TERMINAL_CONFLICT_FIX_PHASES:
+            continue
+        later_key = _conflict_fix_chain_key(later)
+        if later_key and _conflict_fix_chain_matches(key, later_key):
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
 def find_active_conflict_fix_lease(
     comments: list[dict],
     *,
     pr_number: int,
     now: datetime | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Return the newest unexpired conflict-fix lease for *pr_number*, if any."""
+    """Return the newest unexpired, non-terminated conflict-fix lease for *pr_number*, if any."""
     now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
     candidates = [
         entry for entry in _comment_entries(comments, pr_number=pr_number)
         if entry.get("lease_kind") == "conflict_fix"
     ]
-    for lease in reversed(candidates):
+    for index in range(len(candidates) - 1, -1, -1):
+        lease = candidates[index]
         if _lease_expired(lease, now=now):
             continue
         phase = (lease.get("phase") or "").strip().lower()
         if phase in _TERMINAL_CONFLICT_FIX_PHASES:
             continue
         if phase in _ACTIVE_CONFLICT_FIX_PHASES or phase:
+            if _conflict_fix_chain_terminated_after(candidates, index):
+                continue
             return lease
     return None
 

scripts/worktree-start

@@ -43,21 +43,19 @@ repo_root="$(cd "$script_dir/.." && pwd)"
 
 # Enforce issue-linked, traceable branch names (issue → branch → worktree → PR).
 if [[ "$allow_unlinked" -eq 0 ]]; then
-  if [[ "$dry_run" -eq 0 ]] && [[ ! "$branch" =~ ^review/pr-[0-9]+-.+ ]]; then
+  locked_branch=$(python3 -c "
-    locked_branch=$(python3 -c "
 import sys
 sys.path.insert(0, '$repo_root')
 import issue_lock_store
 print(issue_lock_store.resolve_locked_branch_for_session('$branch'))
 ")
-    if [[ -z "$locked_branch" ]]; then
+  if [[ -z "$locked_branch" ]]; then
-      echo "Error: No session issue lock is bound. Call gitea_lock_issue before branch creation (fail closed)." >&2
+    echo "Error: No session issue lock is bound. Call gitea_lock_issue before branch creation (fail closed)." >&2
-      exit 2
+    exit 2
-    fi
+  fi
-    if [[ "$branch" != "$locked_branch" ]]; then
+  if [[ "$branch" != "$locked_branch" ]]; then
-      echo "Error: Requested branch '$branch' does not match locked branch '$locked_branch' (fail closed)." >&2
+    echo "Error: Requested branch '$branch' does not match locked branch '$locked_branch' (fail closed)." >&2
-      exit 2
+    exit 2
-    fi
   fi
 
   if [[ "$branch" =~ ^(fix|feat|docs|chore)/issue-[0-9]+-.+ ]] \

task_capability_map.py

@@ -32,15 +32,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
         "role": "author",
     },
-    # #860: dirty orphaned same-claimant worktree recovery (explicit operation).
-    "recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree": {
-        "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
-        "role": "author",
-    },
-    "gitea_recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree": {
-        "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
-        "role": "author",
-    },
     "set_issue_labels": {
         "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
         "role": "author",
@@ -486,11 +477,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
 # merger lease (#763).
 _PREFLIGHT_TASK_TRANSITIONS = frozenset({
     ("review_pr", "acquire_reviewer_pr_lease"),
-    ("work_issue", "lock_issue"),
-    ("work_issue", "recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree"),
-    ("work_issue", "gitea_recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree"),
-    ("work_issue", "commit_files"),
-    ("work_issue", "gitea_commit_files"),
 })
 
 

tests/test_allocator_epic_container_exclusion.py

@@ -1,243 +0,0 @@
-"""Allocator epic / child-only container pre-rank exclusion (#844).
-
-Covers:
-* Issue #631-shaped child-only epic is excluded before ranking.
-* Implementable child issues remain eligible and can be selected.
-* Ordinary issues that merely mention "epic" in title/body are not excluded.
-* Excluded containers never receive assignments or workflow leases.
-* Structured skip reason ``epic_or_child_only_container`` is reported.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-
-from allocator_service import (
-    OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
-    OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
-    SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER,
-    WorkCandidate,
-    allocate_next_work,
-    classify_epic_or_child_only_container,
-)
-from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
-
-REMOTE = "prgs"
-ORG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
-REPO = "Gitea-Tools"
-
-# Minimal body mirroring issue #631 authoritative scope language.
-_EPIC_631_BODY = """
-## Scope (umbrella)
-
-This epic owns the **product roadmap and linkage** for the Web Console.
-Implementation is delivered via child issues only.
-
-## Explicit non-goals
-
-* Do not implement product features in this epic issue itself.
-* No product feature implementation is claimed complete solely on this epic.
-"""
-
-_CHILD_BODY = """
-## Problem
-
-Operators need a workflow-event timeline model for Phase 1.
-
-## Acceptance criteria
-
-- [ ] Timeline model API exists
-"""
-
-
-def _issue(
-    number: int,
-    *,
-    title: str = "",
-    body: str = "",
-    labels: tuple[str, ...] = ("status:ready", "type:feature"),
-    priority: int = 20,
-) -> WorkCandidate:
-    return WorkCandidate(
-        kind="issue",
-        number=number,
-        state="open",
-        labels=labels,
-        title=title or f"issue {number}",
-        body=body,
-        priority=priority,
-    )
-
-
-class ClassifyEpicContainerTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_631_shaped_body_and_title_is_container(self) -> None:
-        c = _issue(
-            631,
-            title="Epic: MCP Control Plane Web Console",
-            body=_EPIC_631_BODY,
-        )
-        is_c, detail = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(c)
-        self.assertTrue(is_c)
-        self.assertIsNotNone(detail)
-        self.assertIn("body_marker", detail or "")
-
-    def test_body_markers_without_epic_title(self) -> None:
-        c = _issue(
-            900,
-            title="Control plane roadmap tracker",
-            body="Implementation is delivered via child issues only.",
-        )
-        is_c, _ = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(c)
-        self.assertTrue(is_c)
-
-    def test_epic_label_alone_is_container(self) -> None:
-        c = _issue(
-            901,
-            title="Roadmap linkage",
-            body="Track children.",
-            labels=("status:ready", "type:epic"),
-        )
-        is_c, detail = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(c)
-        self.assertTrue(is_c)
-        self.assertIn("type:epic", detail or "")
-
-    def test_title_epic_prefix_alone_not_container(self) -> None:
-        """Title-only 'Epic:' without body scope evidence stays eligible (#844)."""
-        c = _issue(
-            902,
-            title="Epic: something mentioned only in title",
-            body="Implement a concrete fix for the allocator skip list.",
-        )
-        is_c, detail = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(c)
-        self.assertFalse(is_c)
-        self.assertIsNone(detail)
-
-    def test_incidental_epic_word_not_container(self) -> None:
-        c = _issue(
-            903,
-            title="Document epic handoff conventions",
-            body=(
-                "Update the docs so implementable issues that mention an epic "
-                "remain independently executable."
-            ),
-        )
-        is_c, _ = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(c)
-        self.assertFalse(is_c)
-
-    def test_prs_never_classified(self) -> None:
-        pr = WorkCandidate(
-            kind="pr",
-            number=10,
-            state="open",
-            title="Epic: fake",
-            body="Implementation is delivered via child issues only.",
-            head_sha="a" * 40,
-            priority=5,
-        )
-        is_c, _ = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(pr)
-        self.assertFalse(is_c)
-
-
-class AllocateEpicContainerExclusionTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self) -> None:
-        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
-        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
-
-    def _alloc(self, candidates, **kwargs):
-        defaults = dict(
-            session_id="sess-844",
-            role="author",
-            remote=REMOTE,
-            org=ORG,
-            repo=REPO,
-            profile_name="prgs-author",
-            username="jcwalker3",
-            claims={},
-            apply=False,
-        )
-        defaults.update(kwargs)
-        return allocate_next_work(self.db, candidates=candidates, **defaults)
-
-    def test_631_shaped_epic_excluded_child_selected(self) -> None:
-        epic = _issue(
-            631,
-            title="Epic: MCP Control Plane Web Console",
-            body=_EPIC_631_BODY,
-        )
-        child = _issue(
-            637,
-            title="Web Console: Workflow-event timeline model (Phase 1)",
-            body=_CHILD_BODY,
-        )
-        res = self._alloc([epic, child], apply=False)
-        self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
-        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_PREVIEW)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 637)
-        skipped = {s["number"]: s for s in res["skipped"]}
-        self.assertIn(631, skipped)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            skipped[631]["reason_code"], SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER
-        )
-        self.assertIn(SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER, skipped[631]["reason"])
-
-    def test_container_cannot_receive_assignment_or_lease(self) -> None:
-        epic = _issue(
-            631,
-            title="Epic: MCP Control Plane Web Console",
-            body=_EPIC_631_BODY,
-        )
-        res = self._alloc([epic], apply=True)
-        self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
-        # Only container present → no safe work; never assigned_work.
-        self.assertNotEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
-        self.assertIsNone(res.get("assignment"))
-        self.assertIsNone(res.get("selected"))
-        skipped = {s["number"]: s for s in res["skipped"]}
-        self.assertEqual(
-            skipped[631]["reason_code"], SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER
-        )
-        # No lease row for the epic.
-        leases = self.db.list_active_leases(
-            remote=REMOTE, org=ORG, repo=REPO
-        ) if hasattr(self.db, "list_active_leases") else []
-        # Prefer generic inventory if available.
-        if not leases and hasattr(self.db, "list_leases"):
-            leases = self.db.list_leases(remote=REMOTE, org=ORG, repo=REPO)
-        for lease in leases or []:
-            work_number = lease.get("work_number") if isinstance(lease, dict) else None
-            self.assertNotEqual(work_number, 631)
-
-    def test_incidental_epic_title_remains_eligible(self) -> None:
-        ordinary = _issue(
-            700,
-            title="Document epic handoff conventions",
-            body="Write runbook text about epic vs child issues.",
-        )
-        res = self._alloc([ordinary], apply=False)
-        self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 700)
-        self.assertEqual(res["skipped"], [])
-
-    def test_apply_selects_child_not_epic(self) -> None:
-        epic = _issue(
-            631,
-            title="Epic: MCP Control Plane Web Console",
-            body=_EPIC_631_BODY,
-        )
-        child = _issue(
-            637,
-            title="Web Console: Workflow-event timeline model (Phase 1)",
-            body=_CHILD_BODY,
-        )
-        res = self._alloc([epic, child], apply=True)
-        self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
-        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 637)
-        self.assertEqual(res["assignment"]["work_number"], 637)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_branch_cleanup_guard.py

@@ -1266,378 +1266,6 @@ class TestSecondRemediationIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("delete_acknowledged", delete_actions[0])
         self.assertTrue(delete_actions[0].get("verified_absent"))
 
-    def test_issue_851_worktree_removed_when_remote_blocked_only_by_worktree_binding(self):
-        """#851: remote blocked by worktree_binding must not skip safe worktree removal.
-
-        Lifecycle: remove clean owned worktree → reassess ownership → delete
-        remote only if independently safe. Unrelated entries stay untouched.
-        """
-        from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
-
-        target_branch = "fix/issue-844-exclude-epic-containers"
-        foreign_branch = "fix/issue-999-unrelated-active"
-        worktree_path = "/tmp/branches/fix-issue-844-exclude-epic-containers"
-        ownership_calls = []
-        remove_calls = []
-        delete_api_calls = []
-
-        def fake_collect(**kwargs):
-            ownership_calls.append(dict(kwargs))
-            # Ownership is reassessed *after* independent worktree removal (#851).
-            # Target worktree is already gone → no worktree_binding remains.
-            # Foreign branch keeps an active author lease → remote delete blocked.
-            if kwargs.get("branch") == foreign_branch:
-                # Match session-bound org/repo + host used by the tool resolve path.
-                return {
-                    "records": [
-                        {
-                            "category": guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
-                            "status": "active",
-                            "remote": kwargs.get("remote") or "prgs",
-                            "host": kwargs.get("host") or "gitea.example.com",
-                            "org": kwargs.get("org") or "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-                            "repo": kwargs.get("repo") or "Gitea-Tools",
-                            "branch": foreign_branch,
-                            "reclaim_allowed": False,
-                        }
-                    ],
-                    "inventory_error": False,
-                }
-            return {"records": [], "inventory_error": False}
-
-        def fake_remove(project_root, branch, worktree_path=None):
-            remove_calls.append(
-                {"branch": branch, "worktree_path": worktree_path}
-            )
-            return {
-                "success": True,
-                "performed": True,
-                "message": f"removed worktree {worktree_path}",
-                "worktree_path": worktree_path,
-            }
-
-        def fake_probe(h, o, r, auth, br):
-            return guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
-                404, not_found_scope=guard.NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH
-            )
-
-        def fake_api(method, url, auth, **kwargs):
-            if method == "DELETE":
-                delete_api_calls.append(url)
-            return {}
-
-        report = {
-            "entries": [
-                {
-                    "pr_number": 848,
-                    "head_branch": target_branch,
-                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-                    "local_worktree": {
-                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": True,
-                        "worktree_path": worktree_path,
-                    },
-                },
-                {
-                    "pr_number": 999,
-                    "head_branch": foreign_branch,
-                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-                    "local_worktree": {
-                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": False,
-                        "worktree_path": None,
-                    },
-                },
-            ],
-            "reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
-        }
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.get_profile",
-            return_value={
-                "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
-                "role": "reconciler",
-                "allowed_operations": [
-                    "gitea.read",
-                    "gitea.branch.delete",
-                    "gitea.pr.close",
-                ],
-                "forbidden_operations": [],
-            },
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
-            return_value=report,
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
-            return_value=[],
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
-            return_value=(True, []),
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
-            side_effect=fake_collect,
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server._probe_remote_branch", side_effect=fake_probe).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
-            side_effect=fake_remove,
-        ).start()
-        self.mock_api.side_effect = fake_api
-
-        res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
-            dry_run=False,
-            execute_confirmed=True,
-            remote="prgs",
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(res.get("performed") or res.get("executed"))
-        actions = res.get("actions") or []
-
-        remove_actions = [
-            a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"
-        ]
-        self.assertEqual(len(remove_actions), 1, actions)
-        self.assertTrue(remove_actions[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertEqual(remove_calls[0]["branch"], target_branch)
-        self.assertEqual(remove_calls[0]["worktree_path"], worktree_path)
-
-        # Target remote delete succeeds after worktree removal + reassessment.
-        target_deletes = [
-            a
-            for a in actions
-            if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
-            and a.get("branch") == target_branch
-        ]
-        self.assertEqual(len(target_deletes), 1, actions)
-        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("after_worktree_removal"))
-        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("ownership_reassessed"))
-        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("verified_absent"))
-
-        # Foreign branch remains protected (author lease) and is not deleted.
-        foreign_deletes = [
-            a
-            for a in actions
-            if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
-            and a.get("branch") == foreign_branch
-        ]
-        self.assertEqual(len(foreign_deletes), 1, actions)
-        self.assertFalse(foreign_deletes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertEqual(
-            foreign_deletes[0].get("blocker_kind"), "active_branch_ownership"
-        )
-        self.assertIn(
-            guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
-            foreign_deletes[0].get("blocking_categories") or [],
-        )
-        # Only the target branch should hit the DELETE API.
-        self.assertEqual(len(delete_api_calls), 1)
-
-        # Ownership collected for target (post-removal) and foreign; worktree
-        # removal happened before target remote delete in the action log.
-        target_idx = next(
-            i
-            for i, a in enumerate(actions)
-            if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"
-        )
-        delete_idx = next(
-            i
-            for i, a in enumerate(actions)
-            if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
-            and a.get("branch") == target_branch
-            and a.get("success")
-        )
-        self.assertLess(target_idx, delete_idx)
-
-    def test_issue_851_dirty_worktree_not_removed_and_remote_stays_protected(self):
-        """#851: dirty/foreign worktrees remain protected; no unsafe cleanup."""
-        from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
-
-        branch = "fix/issue-851-dirty"
-        remove_calls = []
-
-        def fake_collect(**kwargs):
-            return {
-                "records": [
-                    {
-                        "category": guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING,
-                        "status": "active",
-                        "remote": kwargs.get("remote") or "prgs",
-                        "host": kwargs.get("host") or "gitea.example.com",
-                        "org": kwargs.get("org") or "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-                        "repo": kwargs.get("repo") or "Gitea-Tools",
-                        "branch": branch,
-                        "reclaim_allowed": False,
-                    }
-                ],
-                "inventory_error": False,
-            }
-
-        report = {
-            "entries": [
-                {
-                    "pr_number": 851,
-                    "head_branch": branch,
-                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-                    "local_worktree": {
-                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": False,
-                        "worktree_path": "/tmp/dirty-wt",
-                    },
-                }
-            ],
-            "reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
-        }
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.get_profile",
-            return_value={
-                "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
-                "role": "reconciler",
-                "allowed_operations": [
-                    "gitea.read",
-                    "gitea.branch.delete",
-                ],
-                "forbidden_operations": [],
-            },
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
-            return_value=report,
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
-            return_value=[],
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
-            return_value=(True, []),
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
-            side_effect=fake_collect,
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
-            side_effect=lambda *a, **k: remove_calls.append(k) or {
-                "success": True,
-                "performed": True,
-            },
-        ).start()
-        self.mock_api.side_effect = lambda *a, **k: {}
-
-        res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
-            dry_run=False,
-            execute_confirmed=True,
-            remote="prgs",
-        )
-        actions = res.get("actions") or []
-        self.assertEqual(remove_calls, [])
-        self.assertFalse(
-            any(a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree" for a in actions)
-        )
-        deletes = [
-            a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
-        ]
-        self.assertEqual(len(deletes), 1)
-        self.assertFalse(deletes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertEqual(deletes[0].get("blocker_kind"), "active_branch_ownership")
-        self.assertIn(
-            guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING,
-            deletes[0].get("blocking_categories") or [],
-        )
-
-    def test_issue_851_idempotent_resume_when_worktree_already_absent(self):
-        """#851: partial failures remain resumable and idempotent."""
-        from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
-
-        branch = "fix/issue-851-resume"
-        ownership_calls = []
-
-        def fake_collect(**kwargs):
-            ownership_calls.append(kwargs)
-            return {"records": [], "inventory_error": False}
-
-        def fake_remove(project_root, branch, worktree_path=None):
-            return {
-                "success": False,
-                "performed": False,
-                "message": f"worktree not found: {worktree_path}",
-            }
-
-        def fake_probe(h, o, r, auth, br):
-            return guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
-                404, not_found_scope=guard.NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH
-            )
-
-        report = {
-            "entries": [
-                {
-                    "pr_number": 851,
-                    "head_branch": branch,
-                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-                    "local_worktree": {
-                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": True,
-                        "worktree_path": "/tmp/already-gone",
-                    },
-                }
-            ],
-            "reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
-        }
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.get_profile",
-            return_value={
-                "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
-                "role": "reconciler",
-                "allowed_operations": [
-                    "gitea.read",
-                    "gitea.branch.delete",
-                ],
-                "forbidden_operations": [],
-            },
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
-            return_value=report,
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
-            return_value=[],
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
-            return_value=(True, []),
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
-            side_effect=fake_collect,
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server._probe_remote_branch", side_effect=fake_probe).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
-            side_effect=fake_remove,
-        ).start()
-        self.mock_api.side_effect = lambda *a, **k: {}
-
-        res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
-            dry_run=False,
-            execute_confirmed=True,
-            remote="prgs",
-        )
-        actions = res.get("actions") or []
-        removes = [a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"]
-        deletes = [a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"]
-        self.assertEqual(len(removes), 1)
-        self.assertFalse(removes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertEqual(len(deletes), 1)
-        self.assertTrue(deletes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertTrue(deletes[0].get("after_worktree_removal"))
-        self.assertTrue(ownership_calls)
-
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

tests/test_dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery.py

@@ -1,483 +0,0 @@
-"""Synthetic regression coverage for dirty orphaned worktree recovery (#860).
-
-Modeled on the #850 / #855 shape without mutating their real state.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import shutil
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from unittest import mock
-
-import dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery as dorec
-import issue_lock_store
-
-
-DEAD_PID = 999_999_999
-LIVE_PID = os.getpid()
-BRANCH = "fix/issue-901-dirty-orphan"
-SOURCE_WT = "/repo/branches/issue-901-dirty-orphan"
-RECOVERY_WT_NAME = "recovery-issue-901-dirty-orphan"
-LOCAL_HEAD = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
-REMOTE_HEAD = "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"
-OTHER_HEAD = "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc"
-FP_A = dorec.sha256_bytes(b"dirty-a")
-FP_B = dorec.sha256_bytes(b"dirty-b")
-FP_C = dorec.sha256_bytes(b"dirty-c-conflict")
-
-
-def durable_lock(**overrides):
-    """#850-shaped PID-less malformed same-claimant lock."""
-    lock = {
-        "issue_number": 901,
-        "branch_name": BRANCH,
-        "worktree_path": SOURCE_WT,
-        "remote": "prgs",
-        "org": "Example-Org",
-        "repo": "Example-Repo",
-        # intentionally no pid / session_pid / work_lease expiry
-        "claimant": {"username": "author-user", "profile": "prgs-author"},
-    }
-    lock.update(overrides)
-    return lock
-
-
-def base_kwargs(**overrides):
-    kwargs = {
-        "issue_number": 901,
-        "branch_name": BRANCH,
-        "source_worktree_path": SOURCE_WT,
-        "remote": "prgs",
-        "org": "Example-Org",
-        "repo": "Example-Repo",
-        "identity": "author-user",
-        "profile": "prgs-author",
-        "expected_local_head": LOCAL_HEAD,
-        "expected_remote_head": REMOTE_HEAD,
-        "expected_dirty_fingerprints": {"a.py": FP_A, "b.py": FP_B},
-        "current_branch": BRANCH,
-        "porcelain_status": " M a.py\n M b.py\n",
-        "observed_local_head": LOCAL_HEAD,
-        "observed_remote_head": REMOTE_HEAD,
-        "observed_dirty_fingerprints": {"a.py": FP_A, "b.py": FP_B},
-        "competing_live_locks": [],
-        "competing_live_sessions": [],
-        "workflow_lease_active": False,
-        "workflow_lease_expired": True,
-        "canonical_repo_root": "/repo",
-        "worktree_registered": True,
-        "current_pid": LIVE_PID,
-    }
-    kwargs.update(overrides)
-    return kwargs
-
-
-def assess(lock=None, **overrides):
-    return dorec.assess_dirty_orphan_recovery(
-        durable_lock() if lock is None else lock, **base_kwargs(**overrides)
-    )
-
-
-class FreshnessPidLess(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_pid_less_lock_is_not_live(self):
-        freshness = issue_lock_store.assess_lock_freshness(durable_lock())
-        self.assertFalse(freshness["live"])
-        self.assertTrue(freshness.get("pid_missing"))
-        self.assertEqual(freshness["status"], "malformed")
-
-    def test_pid_less_with_far_future_expiry_still_not_live(self):
-        lock = durable_lock(
-            work_lease={
-                "operation_type": "author_issue_work",
-                "expires_at": "2999-01-01T00:00:00Z",
-                "last_heartbeat_at": "2999-01-01T00:00:00Z",
-            }
-        )
-        freshness = issue_lock_store.assess_lock_freshness(lock)
-        self.assertFalse(freshness["live"])
-        self.assertTrue(freshness.get("pid_missing"))
-
-
-class EligibilityGranted(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_dead_same_claimant_pid_less_dirty(self):
-        result = assess()
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.ELIGIBLE)
-        self.assertTrue(result["eligible"])
-
-    def test_expired_workflow_lease_corroboration(self):
-        result = assess(workflow_lease_active=False, workflow_lease_expired=True)
-        self.assertTrue(result["eligible"])
-
-    def test_older_local_newer_remote_heads(self):
-        result = assess()
-        self.assertTrue(result["evidence"].get("heads_diverged"))
-        self.assertTrue(result["eligible"])
-
-
-class EligibilityRefused(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_active_owner_with_pid(self):
-        lock = durable_lock(pid=LIVE_PID, session_pid=LIVE_PID)
-        result = assess(lock=lock, owner_process_alive_override=True)
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-        self.assertFalse(result["eligible"])
-        self.assertTrue(any("alive" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
-
-    def test_foreign_claimant(self):
-        result = assess(identity="other-user")
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-        self.assertTrue(any("foreign claimant identity" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
-
-    def test_foreign_profile(self):
-        result = assess(profile="prgs-reviewer")
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-
-    def test_fingerprint_mismatch(self):
-        result = assess(observed_dirty_fingerprints={"a.py": "0" * 64, "b.py": FP_B})
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-        self.assertTrue(any("fingerprint mismatch" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
-
-    def test_head_mismatch(self):
-        result = assess(observed_local_head=OTHER_HEAD)
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-
-    def test_remote_head_mismatch(self):
-        result = assess(observed_remote_head=OTHER_HEAD)
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-
-    def test_path_not_under_branches(self):
-        result = assess(
-            source_worktree_path="/tmp/branches/evil",
-            # lock path also changed so worktree agreement holds
-            lock=durable_lock(worktree_path="/tmp/branches/evil"),
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-        self.assertTrue(any("canonical branches" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
-
-    def test_unregistered_worktree(self):
-        result = assess(worktree_registered=False)
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-
-    def test_active_workflow_lease(self):
-        result = assess(workflow_lease_active=True, workflow_lease_expired=False)
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-
-    def test_unsafe_dirty_path_pin(self):
-        result = assess(
-            expected_dirty_fingerprints={"../etc/passwd": FP_A},
-            observed_dirty_fingerprints={"../etc/passwd": FP_A},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-
-    def test_symlink_escape_rejected_by_ancestry(self):
-        ok, reasons = dorec.is_path_under_canonical_branches(
-            "/tmp/branches/evil", canonical_repo_root="/repo"
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(ok)
-        self.assertTrue(reasons)
-
-
-class ConflictDetection(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_overlapping_upstream_change(self):
-        conflicts = dorec.detect_path_conflicts(
-            dirty_paths=["c.py"],
-            local_head_contents={"c.py": b"local-base"},
-            remote_head_contents={"c.py": b"remote-changed"},
-            dirty_contents={"c.py": b"dirty-c-conflict"},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(len(conflicts), 1)
-        self.assertEqual(conflicts[0]["path"], "c.py")
-
-    def test_unchanged_upstream_no_conflict(self):
-        conflicts = dorec.detect_path_conflicts(
-            dirty_paths=["a.py"],
-            local_head_contents={"a.py": b"same"},
-            remote_head_contents={"a.py": b"same"},
-            dirty_contents={"a.py": b"dirty-a"},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(conflicts, [])
-
-
-class CrashSafeRecovery(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="dirty-orphan-")
-        self.repo = os.path.join(self.tmp, "repo")
-        self.branches = os.path.join(self.repo, "branches")
-        self.source = os.path.join(self.branches, "issue-901-dirty-orphan")
-        self.recovery = os.path.join(self.branches, RECOVERY_WT_NAME)
-        os.makedirs(self.source, exist_ok=True)
-        os.makedirs(self.branches, exist_ok=True)
-        # seed dirty files in source
-        with open(os.path.join(self.source, "a.py"), "wb") as fh:
-            fh.write(b"dirty-a")
-        with open(os.path.join(self.source, "b.py"), "wb") as fh:
-            fh.write(b"dirty-b")
-        self.journal_dir = os.path.join(self.tmp, "journals")
-        self.lock = durable_lock(worktree_path=self.source)
-        self.assessment = dorec.assess_dirty_orphan_recovery(
-            self.lock,
-            **base_kwargs(
-                source_worktree_path=self.source,
-                canonical_repo_root=self.repo,
-            ),
-        )
-
-        class FakeGit(dorec.GitOps):
-            def __init__(self, recovery_path, head):
-                self.recovery_path = recovery_path
-                self.head = head
-                self.calls = []
-
-            def run(self, args, *, cwd):
-                self.calls.append((args, cwd))
-                if args[:3] == ["git", "worktree", "add"]:
-                    os.makedirs(self.recovery_path, exist_ok=True)
-                    return mock.Mock(returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="")
-                if args[:2] == ["git", "checkout"]:
-                    return mock.Mock(returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="")
-                if args[:2] == ["git", "rev-parse"]:
-                    return mock.Mock(returncode=0, stdout=self.head + "\n", stderr="")
-                return mock.Mock(returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="")
-
-        self.git = FakeGit(self.recovery, REMOTE_HEAD)
-        self.written_locks = []
-
-        def lock_writer(record):
-            self.written_locks.append(record)
-
-        self.lock_writer = lock_writer
-
-    def tearDown(self):
-        shutil.rmtree(self.tmp, ignore_errors=True)
-
-    def _run(self, **overrides):
-        kwargs = {
-            "assessment": self.assessment,
-            "existing_lock": self.lock,
-            "issue_number": 901,
-            "branch_name": BRANCH,
-            "source_worktree_path": self.source,
-            "recovery_worktree_path": self.recovery,
-            "remote": "prgs",
-            "org": "Example-Org",
-            "repo": "Example-Repo",
-            "identity": "author-user",
-            "profile": "prgs-author",
-            "expected_local_head": LOCAL_HEAD,
-            "expected_remote_head": REMOTE_HEAD,
-            "expected_dirty_fingerprints": {"a.py": FP_A, "b.py": FP_B},
-            "dirty_contents": {"a.py": b"dirty-a", "b.py": b"dirty-b"},
-            "local_head_contents": {"a.py": b"base-a", "b.py": b"base-b"},
-            "remote_head_contents": {"a.py": b"base-a", "b.py": b"base-b"},
-            "canonical_repo_root": self.repo,
-            "bind_lock": True,
-            "lock_writer": self.lock_writer,
-            "git_ops": self.git,
-            "journal_dir": self.journal_dir,
-            "session_pid": LIVE_PID,
-        }
-        kwargs.update(overrides)
-        return dorec.run_dirty_orphan_recovery(**kwargs)
-
-    def test_success_preserves_dirty_bytes_and_source(self):
-        result = self._run()
-        self.assertTrue(result["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.RECOVERY_COMPLETED)
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(self.source))
-        with open(os.path.join(self.source, "a.py"), "rb") as fh:
-            self.assertEqual(fh.read(), b"dirty-a")
-        with open(os.path.join(self.recovery, "a.py"), "rb") as fh:
-            self.assertEqual(fh.read(), b"dirty-a")
-        with open(os.path.join(self.recovery, "b.py"), "rb") as fh:
-            self.assertEqual(fh.read(), b"dirty-b")
-        self.assertEqual(len(self.written_locks), 1)
-        rec = self.written_locks[0]
-        self.assertEqual(rec["session_pid"], LIVE_PID)
-        self.assertTrue(rec["dirty_orphan_recovery"]["recovered"])
-        self.assertTrue(rec["dirty_orphan_recovery"]["source_frozen"])
-
-    def test_conflict_leaves_governed_state(self):
-        result = self._run(
-            expected_dirty_fingerprints={"c.py": FP_C},
-            dirty_contents={"c.py": b"dirty-c-conflict"},
-            local_head_contents={"c.py": b"local-base"},
-            remote_head_contents={"c.py": b"remote-changed"},
-        )
-        # #860 F4: session binding is NOT finalized while conflicts remain
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.CONFLICTS_PRESENT)
-        sidecar = os.path.join(self.recovery, "c.py.recovered-dirty")
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(sidecar))
-        state = os.path.join(
-            self.recovery, dorec.CONFLICT_STATE_DIR, dorec.CONFLICT_STATE_FILE
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(state))
-        with open(state, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
-            payload = json.load(fh)
-        self.assertEqual(payload["resolution"], "author_edit_required")
-
-    def test_interrupt_before_journal_no_artifacts(self):
-        result = self._run(interrupt_after_phase=dorec.PHASE_ELIGIBILITY)
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "INTERRUPTED")
-        self.assertFalse(os.path.isdir(self.recovery))
-
-    def test_interrupt_after_journal_then_retry_idempotent(self):
-        first = self._run(interrupt_after_phase=dorec.PHASE_JOURNAL_PERSISTED)
-        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "INTERRUPTED")
-        self.assertTrue(first["journal"]["artifacts_created"]["journal"])
-        second = self._run()
-        self.assertTrue(second["success"])
-        # source still recoverable
-        with open(os.path.join(self.source, "a.py"), "rb") as fh:
-            self.assertEqual(fh.read(), b"dirty-a")
-
-    def test_interrupt_after_worktree_then_retry(self):
-        first = self._run(interrupt_after_phase=dorec.PHASE_RECOVERY_WORKTREE)
-        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "INTERRUPTED")
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(self.recovery))
-        second = self._run()
-        self.assertTrue(second["success"])
-
-    def test_interrupt_after_binding_then_retry_complete(self):
-        first = self._run(interrupt_after_phase=dorec.PHASE_BINDING)
-        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "INTERRUPTED")
-        second = self._run()
-        self.assertTrue(second["success"])
-        # completed journal makes further retries no-ops
-        third = self._run()
-        self.assertEqual(third["outcome"], dorec.RECOVERY_RESUMED)
-
-    def test_source_worktree_never_deleted(self):
-        self._run()
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(self.source))
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(self.source, "a.py")))
-
-    def test_fingerprint_drift_refuses_without_mutation(self):
-        result = self._run(dirty_contents={"a.py": b"CHANGED", "b.py": b"dirty-b"})
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-        self.assertFalse(os.path.isdir(self.recovery))
-
-
-class SessionBindingPreflight(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_canonical_session_binding_recognized(self):
-        lock = {
-            "worktree_path": "/repo/branches/recovery",
-            "session_pid": LIVE_PID,
-            "dirty_orphan_recovery": {
-                "recovered": True,
-                "conflicts": [],
-                "recovery_worktree_path": "/repo/branches/recovery",
-                "source_worktree_path": SOURCE_WT,
-                "accepted_head": REMOTE_HEAD,
-            },
-        }
-        result = dorec.preflight_recognizes_recovered_provenance(lock)
-        self.assertTrue(result["recognized"])
-
-    def test_conflicts_block_commit_preflight(self):
-        lock = {
-            "worktree_path": "/repo/branches/recovery",
-            "session_pid": LIVE_PID,
-            "dirty_orphan_recovery": {
-                "recovered": True,
-                "conflicts": [{"path": "c.py"}],
-            },
-        }
-        result = dorec.preflight_recognizes_recovered_provenance(lock)
-        self.assertFalse(result["recognized"])
-
-    def test_active_foreign_does_not_mutate(self):
-        # assess-only path: foreign refused before run
-        result = assess(identity="intruder")
-        self.assertFalse(result["eligible"])
-
-
-class JournalSymlinkRefusal(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_symlink_journal_path_refused_on_load(self):
-        tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp()
-        try:
-            real = os.path.join(tmp, "real.json")
-            with open(real, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
-                fh.write("{}")
-            link = os.path.join(tmp, "link.json")
-            os.symlink(real, link)
-            key = "symlink-test"
-            jdir = tmp
-            path = dorec._journal_path(key, journal_dir=jdir)
-            with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
-                json.dump({"idempotency_key": key}, fh)
-            os.remove(path)
-            os.symlink(real, path)
-            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
-                dorec.load_journal(key, journal_dir=jdir)
-        finally:
-            shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True)
-
-
-class RealGitMultiWorktreeIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        import subprocess
-        self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="git-integration-")
-        self.repo = os.path.join(self.tmp, "repo")
-        os.makedirs(self.repo, exist_ok=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "init"], cwd=self.repo, check=True, capture_output=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name", "Test User"], cwd=self.repo, check=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.email", "[email protected]"], cwd=self.repo, check=True)
-        with open(os.path.join(self.repo, "init.txt"), "w") as fh:
-            fh.write("init")
-        subprocess.run(["git", "add", "."], cwd=self.repo, check=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "commit", "-m", "init"], cwd=self.repo, check=True)
-        branch = "fix/issue-999-test"
-        subprocess.run(["git", "branch", branch], cwd=self.repo, check=True)
-        self.branches = os.path.join(self.repo, "branches")
-        self.source = os.path.join(self.branches, "issue-999-test")
-        subprocess.run(["git", "worktree", "add", self.source, branch], cwd=self.repo, check=True)
-        self.dirty_path = os.path.join(self.source, "dirty.txt")
-        with open(self.dirty_path, "w") as fh:
-            fh.write("dirty-data")
-
-    def tearDown(self):
-        shutil.rmtree(self.tmp, ignore_errors=True)
-
-    def test_prepare_recovery_worktree_detached_no_exit_128(self):
-        import subprocess
-        head_sha = subprocess.check_output(["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=self.repo, text=True).strip()
-        rec_wt = os.path.join(self.branches, "recovery-issue-999-test")
-        res = dorec.prepare_recovery_worktree(
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo,
-            recovery_worktree_path=rec_wt,
-            branch_name="fix/issue-999-test",
-            remote_head=head_sha,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(res["success"], res.get("reasons"))
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(rec_wt))
-
-    def test_real_lock_rebind_recovery_sanctioned(self):
-        lock_dir = os.path.join(self.tmp, "locks")
-        rec_wt = os.path.join(self.branches, "recovery-issue-999-test")
-        os.makedirs(rec_wt, exist_ok=True)
-        record = {
-            "remote": "prgs",
-            "org": "Example-Org",
-            "repo": "Example-Repo",
-            "issue_number": 999,
-            "branch_name": "fix/issue-999-test",
-            "worktree_path": rec_wt,
-            "claimant": {"username": "author-user", "profile": "prgs-author"},
-        }
-        record_src = dict(record)
-        record_src["worktree_path"] = self.source
-        issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock(record_src, lock_dir=lock_dir)
-        path = issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock(
-            record,
-            lock_dir=lock_dir,
-            recovery_sanctioned=True,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(path))
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_843_cross_role_handoff.py

@@ -1,682 +0,0 @@
-"""Cross-role allocation handoff consumable by independent workers (#843).
-
-Regression coverage for the controller→required-role consume path:
-
-* controller allocates author work; independent author adopts successfully
-* author adoption succeeds after allocating controller process exits
-* author adoption without sharing controller session identity
-* wrong-role adoption rejected
-* concurrent/second adoption rejected without state corruption
-* terminal allocation adoption rejected
-* successful adoption produces authoritative ownership evidence
-* genuine abandoned-lease recovery remains valid
-* process_work_queue / allocate results include consume identifiers
-* same-role allocation behavior remains compatible
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from datetime import timedelta
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-from allocator_service import (
-    ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
-    ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
-    OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
-    ROLE_AUTHOR,
-    ROLE_CONTROLLER,
-    ROLE_REVIEWER,
-    WorkCandidate,
-    allocate_next_work,
-)
-from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, ForeignLeaseError, _ts, _utc_now
-import lease_lifecycle as ll
-
-
-class CrossRoleHandoffTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self) -> None:
-        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
-        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
-        self.db.upsert_session(
-            session_id="ctrl-session",
-            role="controller",
-            profile="prgs-controller",
-            pid=99999999,  # dead-looking pid
-        )
-        self.db.upsert_session(
-            session_id="author-worker",
-            role="author",
-            profile="prgs-author",
-            pid=os.getpid(),
-        )
-        self.db.upsert_session(
-            session_id="author-worker-2",
-            role="author",
-            profile="prgs-author",
-            pid=os.getpid(),
-        )
-        self.db.upsert_session(
-            session_id="reviewer-worker",
-            role="reviewer",
-            profile="prgs-reviewer",
-            pid=os.getpid(),
-        )
-        self.wt = self._tmp.name
-
-    def tearDown(self) -> None:
-        self._tmp.cleanup()
-
-    def _ready_issue(self, number: int = 843, title: str = "handoff target") -> WorkCandidate:
-        return WorkCandidate(
-            kind="issue",
-            number=number,
-            labels=("status:ready", "type:bug"),
-            title=title,
-            priority=20,
-        )
-
-    def _controller_allocate(self, number: int = 843, **kwargs):
-        defaults = dict(
-            db=self.db,
-            session_id="ctrl-session",
-            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-            repo="Gitea-Tools",
-            candidates=[self._ready_issue(number)],
-            apply=True,
-            profile_name="prgs-controller",
-            username="controller-user",
-            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
-        )
-        defaults.update(kwargs)
-        return allocate_next_work(**defaults)
-
-    def test_controller_allocates_author_independent_author_adopts(self) -> None:
-        res = self._controller_allocate()
-        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-        self.assertIn("consume_allocation", res)
-        consume = res["consume_allocation"]
-        self.assertEqual(consume["tool"], "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease")
-        self.assertEqual(consume["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-        self.assertFalse(consume["controller_session_required"])
-        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
-        self.assertEqual(consume["lease_id"], lid)
-        self.assertIn(lid, res["next_valid_command"])
-
-        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
-            self.db,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
-            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(adopted["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(adopted["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
-        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
-        raw = adopted["read_after_write"]
-        self.assertEqual(raw["session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(raw["status"], "active")
-        self.assertEqual(raw["phase"], "adopted")
-
-        # Authoritative re-read
-        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
-        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "adopted")
-
-    def test_author_adoption_after_controller_process_exits(self) -> None:
-        res = self._controller_allocate(number=900)
-        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
-        # Force owner_pid dead + freshness stale_dead_process
-        import sqlite3
-
-        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
-        try:
-            conn.execute(
-                "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999 WHERE lease_id = ?",
-                (lid,),
-            )
-            conn.commit()
-        finally:
-            conn.close()
-        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
-        fr = ll.classify_lease_freshness(
-            state["lease"], pid_checker=lambda _p: False
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(fr["freshness"], "stale_dead_process")
-
-        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
-            self.db,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
-            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(adopted["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
-        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
-        # No abandon required
-        state2 = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
-        self.assertEqual(state2["lease"]["status"], "active")
-        self.assertNotEqual(state2["lease"]["status"], "abandoned")
-
-    def test_adoption_without_sharing_controller_session_identity(self) -> None:
-        res = self._controller_allocate(number=901)
-        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
-        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
-            self.db,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
-            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        self.assertNotEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
-        self.assertFalse(adopted["same_owner"])
-        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
-
-    def test_wrong_role_adoption_rejected(self) -> None:
-        res = self._controller_allocate(number=902)
-        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
-        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError) as ctx:
-            ll.adopt_lease(
-                self.db,
-                lease_id=lid,
-                adopter_session_id="reviewer-worker",
-                role=ROLE_REVIEWER,
-            )
-        self.assertIn("wrong role", str(ctx.exception).lower())
-        # State unchanged
-        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
-        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "ctrl-session")
-        self.assertIsNone(state["lease"].get("adopted_by_session_id") or None)
-        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
-
-    def test_second_adoption_rejected_without_corruption(self) -> None:
-        res = self._controller_allocate(number=903)
-        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
-        first = ll.adopt_lease(
-            self.db,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
-            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
-        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError):
-            ll.adopt_lease(
-                self.db,
-                lease_id=lid,
-                adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
-                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-                worktree_path=self.wt,
-            )
-        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
-        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["status"], "active")
-
-    def test_terminal_allocation_adoption_rejected(self) -> None:
-        res = self._controller_allocate(number=904)
-        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
-        # Abandon as terminal
-        proof = ll.AbandonProof(
-            dead_process=True,
-            missing_worktree=True,
-            no_open_pr=True,
-            no_live_mutation_risk=True,
-            owner_pid=99999999,
-            worktree_path="/nonexistent/for-843",
-        )
-        # Attach dead pid / missing wt for abandon eligibility
-        import sqlite3
-
-        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
-        try:
-            conn.execute(
-                "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999, worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
-                ("/nonexistent/for-843", lid),
-            )
-            conn.commit()
-        finally:
-            conn.close()
-        abandoned = ll.abandon_lease(
-            self.db,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            requester_session_id="author-worker",
-            proof=proof,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(abandoned["outcome"], "abandoned")
-        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError) as ctx:
-            ll.adopt_lease(
-                self.db,
-                lease_id=lid,
-                adopter_session_id="author-worker",
-                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            )
-        self.assertIn("abandoned", str(ctx.exception).lower())
-
-    def test_successful_adoption_read_after_write_ownership(self) -> None:
-        res = self._controller_allocate(number=905)
-        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
-        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
-            self.db,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
-            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        raw = adopted["read_after_write"]
-        self.assertEqual(raw["lease_id"], lid)
-        self.assertEqual(raw["session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
-        # Re-fetch proves durable write
-        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
-        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], raw["session_id"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], raw["adopted_by_session_id"]
-        )
-
-    def test_genuine_abandoned_recovery_still_valid(self) -> None:
-        """Same-role author lease abandoned remains reclaimable via abandon path."""
-        same = allocate_next_work(
-            self.db,
-            session_id="author-worker",
-            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-            repo="Gitea-Tools",
-            candidates=[self._ready_issue(906, "same-role")],
-            apply=True,
-            profile_name="prgs-author",
-            username="author-user",
-            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(same["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
-        lid = same["assignment"]["lease_id"]
-        import sqlite3
-
-        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
-        try:
-            conn.execute(
-                "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999, worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
-                ("/nonexistent/same-role", lid),
-            )
-            conn.commit()
-        finally:
-            conn.close()
-        proof = ll.AbandonProof(
-            dead_process=True,
-            missing_worktree=True,
-            no_open_pr=True,
-            no_live_mutation_risk=True,
-            owner_pid=99999999,
-            worktree_path="/nonexistent/same-role",
-        )
-        abandoned = ll.abandon_lease(
-            self.db,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            requester_session_id="author-worker-2",
-            proof=proof,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(abandoned["outcome"], "abandoned")
-        # Foreign author cannot handoff-consume an abandoned non-handoff lease
-        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError):
-            ll.adopt_lease(
-                self.db,
-                lease_id=lid,
-                adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
-                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            )
-        # Reclaim path still works for expired/abandoned after force-expire
-        reclaimed = ll.reclaim_expired_lease(
-            self.db,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            session_id="author-worker-2",
-            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(reclaimed["outcome"], "reclaimed")
-        self.assertEqual(reclaimed["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker-2")
-
-    def test_allocate_payload_includes_consume_identifiers(self) -> None:
-        res = self._controller_allocate(number=907)
-        self.assertIn("consume_allocation", res)
-        c = res["consume_allocation"]
-        for key in (
-            "tool",
-            "lease_id",
-            "assignment_id",
-            "required_role",
-            "required_profile",
-            "required_namespace",
-            "instructions",
-            "handoff_status",
-        ):
-            self.assertIn(key, c)
-        self.assertEqual(c["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
-        self.assertEqual(c["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
-        self.assertIn("gitea_adopt_workflow_lease", c["instructions"])
-        self.assertTrue(res["lease_proof"]["cross_role_handoff"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["lease_proof"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
-
-    def test_same_role_allocation_remains_compatible(self) -> None:
-        res = allocate_next_work(
-            self.db,
-            session_id="author-worker",
-            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-            repo="Gitea-Tools",
-            candidates=[self._ready_issue(908)],
-            apply=True,
-            profile_name="prgs-author",
-            username="author-user",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
-        self.assertNotIn("consume_allocation", res)
-        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
-        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
-        # No cross-role handoff provenance
-        prov = state.get("provenance") or {}
-        self.assertFalse(prov.get("cross_role_handoff"))
-        # Owner resume still works
-        resume = ll.adopt_lease(
-            self.db,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
-            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(resume["same_owner"])
-        self.assertEqual(resume["outcome"], "adopted_owner_resume")
-
-    def test_inspect_points_required_role_at_consume(self) -> None:
-        res = self._controller_allocate(number=909)
-        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
-        decision = ll.inspect_lease(
-            self.db, lid, caller_session_id="author-worker"
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            decision["safe_next_action"], ll.SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(decision["block"])
-        self.assertEqual(decision["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-
-    def test_db_cas_rejects_concurrent_second_consume(self) -> None:
-        res = self._controller_allocate(number=910)
-        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
-        # First consume via DB layer directly
-        first = self.db.adopt_lease(
-            lease_id=lid,
-            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
-            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-            provenance={
-                "cross_role_handoff": True,
-                "handoff_status": "adopted",
-                "required_role": "author",
-            },
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
-        # Second CAS must fail
-        with self.assertRaises(ForeignLeaseError):
-            self.db.adopt_lease(
-                lease_id=lid,
-                adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
-                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-                worktree_path=self.wt,
-                provenance={
-                    "cross_role_handoff": True,
-                    "handoff_status": "pending",
-                    "required_role": "author",
-                },
-            )
-        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
-        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
-
-
-class MCPBoundaryAdoptRoleBindingTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    """#843 F1: MCP-boundary role binding for ``gitea_adopt_workflow_lease``.
-
-    The library-level wrong-role test calls ``lease_lifecycle.adopt_lease``
-    directly. These tests prove the MCP entry point derives the adopter role
-    authoritatively from the active authenticated profile and rejects any
-    caller-supplied role that disagrees, so a reviewer/merger profile cannot
-    consume an author handoff by passing ``role="author"``.
-    """
-
-    AUTHOR_PROFILE = {
-        "profile_name": "prgs-author",
-        "role": "author",
-        "allowed_operations": [
-            "gitea.read",
-            "gitea.pr.create",
-            "gitea.branch.push",
-        ],
-        "forbidden_operations": [],
-    }
-    REVIEWER_PROFILE = {
-        "profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
-        "role": "reviewer",
-        "allowed_operations": [
-            "gitea.read",
-            "gitea.pr.review",
-            "gitea.pr.approve",
-            "gitea.pr.request_changes",
-        ],
-        "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
-    }
-    MERGER_PROFILE = {
-        "profile_name": "prgs-merger",
-        "role": "merger",
-        "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.merge"],
-        "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
-    }
-    FOREIGN_AUTHOR_PROFILE = {
-        "profile_name": "dadeschools-author",
-        "role": "author",
-        "allowed_operations": [
-            "gitea.read",
-            "gitea.pr.create",
-            "gitea.branch.push",
-        ],
-        "forbidden_operations": [],
-    }
-
-    def setUp(self) -> None:
-        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
-        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
-        self.db.upsert_session(
-            session_id="ctrl-session",
-            role="controller",
-            profile="prgs-controller",
-            pid=99999999,
-        )
-        self.db.upsert_session(
-            session_id="author-worker",
-            role="author",
-            profile="prgs-author",
-            pid=os.getpid(),
-        )
-        self.wt = self._tmp.name
-
-    def tearDown(self) -> None:
-        self._tmp.cleanup()
-
-    def _ready_issue(self, number: int) -> WorkCandidate:
-        return WorkCandidate(
-            kind="issue",
-            number=number,
-            labels=("status:ready", "type:bug"),
-            title="handoff target",
-            priority=20,
-        )
-
-    def _handoff_lease(self, number: int = 843) -> str:
-        res = allocate_next_work(
-            db=self.db,
-            session_id="ctrl-session",
-            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-            repo="Gitea-Tools",
-            candidates=[self._ready_issue(number)],
-            apply=True,
-            profile_name="prgs-controller",
-            username="controller-user",
-            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-        return res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
-
-    def _call_adopt_tool(self, profile: dict, **kwargs):
-        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp_server
-
-        with (
-            patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile),
-            patch.object(
-                mcp_server,
-                "_control_plane_db_or_error",
-                return_value=(self.db, []),
-            ),
-        ):
-            return mcp_server.gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
-                remote="prgs", **kwargs
-            )
-
-    def _assert_handoff_untouched(self, lease_id: str) -> None:
-        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
-        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "ctrl-session")
-        self.assertIsNone(state["lease"].get("adopted_by_session_id") or None)
-        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["status"], "active")
-        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
-
-    def test_reviewer_profile_cannot_consume_author_handoff_via_role_author(
-        self,
-    ) -> None:
-        lid = self._handoff_lease(920)
-        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
-            self.REVIEWER_PROFILE,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            session_id="reviewer-worker",
-            role="author",
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
-        self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "reviewer")
-        self.assertEqual(result["supplied_role"], "author")
-        self.assertIn("does not match", result["reasons"][0])
-        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
-
-    def test_merger_profile_cannot_consume_author_handoff_via_role_author(
-        self,
-    ) -> None:
-        lid = self._handoff_lease(921)
-        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
-            self.MERGER_PROFILE,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            session_id="merger-worker",
-            role="author",
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
-        self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "merger")
-        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
-
-    def test_reviewer_profile_rejected_without_role_argument(self) -> None:
-        """Even without a spoofed role, the profile-derived role binds."""
-        lid = self._handoff_lease(922)
-        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
-            self.REVIEWER_PROFILE,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            session_id="reviewer-worker",
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
-        self.assertIn("wrong role", result["reasons"][0].lower())
-        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
-
-    def test_author_profile_mismatching_supplied_role_rejected(self) -> None:
-        lid = self._handoff_lease(923)
-        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
-            self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            session_id="author-worker",
-            role="reviewer",
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
-        self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "author")
-        self.assertEqual(result["supplied_role"], "reviewer")
-        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
-
-    def test_foreign_profile_name_rejected_for_author_handoff(self) -> None:
-        """Provenance required_profile binds even when the role matches."""
-        lid = self._handoff_lease(924)
-        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
-            self.FOREIGN_AUTHOR_PROFILE,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            session_id="foreign-author-worker",
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
-        self.assertIn("wrong profile", result["reasons"][0].lower())
-        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
-
-    def test_author_profile_consumes_author_handoff(self) -> None:
-        lid = self._handoff_lease(925)
-        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
-            self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            session_id="author-worker",
-            role="author",
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
-        self.assertEqual(result["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(result["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
-        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
-        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker"
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "adopted")
-
-    def test_author_profile_consumes_author_handoff_without_role_argument(
-        self,
-    ) -> None:
-        lid = self._handoff_lease(926)
-        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
-            self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
-            lease_id=lid,
-            session_id="author-worker",
-            worktree_path=self.wt,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
-        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
-        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
-        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["role"], "author")
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_lock_store.py

@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ def _lease(expires_at: str) -> dict:
 
 
 def _lock_record(**overrides) -> dict:
-    # #860: live locks require a usable session pid; PID-less records are never
-    # classified live merely because expiry/heartbeat fields are present.
     record = {
         "issue_number": 420,
         "branch_name": "feat/issue-420-server-code-parity",
@@ -33,8 +31,6 @@ def _lock_record(**overrides) -> dict:
         "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
         "repo": "Gitea-Tools",
         "worktree_path": "/tmp/wt-420",
-        "session_pid": os.getpid(),
-        "pid": os.getpid(),
         "work_lease": _lease("2999-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
     }
     record.update(overrides)
@@ -92,8 +88,6 @@ class TestIssueLockStore(unittest.TestCase):
         existing = _lock_record(
             branch_name="feat/issue-420-other",
             worktree_path="/tmp/other",
-            session_pid=os.getpid(),
-            pid=os.getpid(),
             work_lease=_lease("2999-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
         )
         path = ils.lock_file_path(

tests/test_merged_cleanup_reconcile.py

@@ -12,59 +12,6 @@ import merged_cleanup_reconcile as mcr  # noqa: E402
 
 
 class TestMergedCleanupAssessment(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_issue_851_plan_order_worktree_then_reassess_then_remote(self):
-        """#851 dry-run plan: remove worktree, reassess ownership, then remote."""
-        plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-            remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-            local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": True},
-        )
-        actions = [s["action"] for s in plan]
-        self.assertEqual(
-            actions,
-            [
-                "remove_local_worktree",
-                "reassess_branch_ownership",
-                "delete_remote_branch",
-            ],
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(plan[0]["phase"], 1)
-        self.assertEqual(plan[-1]["phase"], 3)
-        self.assertIn("independently_safe", plan[0]["reason"])
-        self.assertIn("reassessment", plan[-1]["reason"])
-
-    def test_issue_851_plan_remote_only_when_worktree_not_safe(self):
-        plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-            remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-            local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": False},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual([s["action"] for s in plan], ["delete_remote_branch"])
-        self.assertNotIn("reassess_branch_ownership", [s["action"] for s in plan])
-
-    def test_issue_851_plan_worktree_only_when_remote_not_safe(self):
-        plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-            remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": False},
-            local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": True},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual([s["action"] for s in plan], ["remove_local_worktree"])
-
-    def test_issue_851_entry_includes_planned_execution_order(self):
-        entry = mcr.build_pr_cleanup_entry(
-            pr={
-                "number": 848,
-                "title": "Closes #844",
-                "body": "",
-                "merged_at": "2026-07-23T00:00:00Z",
-                "head": {"ref": "fix/issue-844-x", "sha": "a" * 40},
-            },
-            project_root="/tmp/not-a-real-root",
-            open_pr_heads=set(),
-            remote_branch_exists=True,
-            head_on_master=True,
-            delete_capability_allowed=True,
-        )
-        self.assertIn("planned_execution_order", entry)
-        self.assertIsInstance(entry["planned_execution_order"], list)
-
     def test_extract_linked_issue_from_closes(self):
         issue = mcr.extract_linked_issue(
             "feat: cleanup (Closes #269)",

tests/test_pr_ownership_issue_pr_mismatch.py

@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ def _live_lock(
         "operation_type": issue_lock_store.AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE,
         "acquired_at": now.isoformat(),
         "expires_at": (now + timedelta(hours=2)).isoformat(),
-        "session_pid": os.getpid(),
         "owner_pid": os.getpid(),
         "status": "active",
     }
@@ -178,24 +177,11 @@ class TestAuthorOwnershipIssuePrMismatch(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertFalse(result["proven"], result)
         self.assertTrue(any("branch" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
 
-    def test_pidless_durable_lock_rejected(self):
+    def test_no_lock_fail_closed(self):
-        """A lock without any PID identity must be classified as malformed/non-live and fail closed."""
-        lock = _live_lock(issue_number=727)
-        lock.pop("session_pid", None)
-        lock.pop("owner_pid", None)
-        lock.pop("pid", None)
-        path = issue_lock_store.lock_file_path(
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-            repo="Gitea-Tools",
-            issue_number=727,
-            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-        )
-        issue_lock_store.save_lock_file(path, lock)
         result = mcp._prove_author_ownership_for_pr(
             pr_number=728,
             pr_title="feat: pr sync",
-            pr_body="Fixes #727",
+            pr_body="Closes #727",
             source_branch="feat/issue-727-pr-sync-status",
             remote="prgs",
             host=None,

tests/test_pr_work_lease.py

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from pr_work_lease import (  # noqa: E402
     assess_reviewer_mutation_blocked,
     assess_reviewer_stale_head_final_report,
     format_conflict_fix_lease_body,
+    find_active_conflict_fix_lease,
     parse_conflict_fix_lease_comment,
     parse_reviewer_lease_comment,
 )
@@ -203,5 +204,157 @@ class TestFormatLease(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(parsed["pr_number"], 376)
 
 
+class TestConflictFixLeaseLifecycle(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_claim_followed_by_matching_release(self):
+        claim_body = _conflict_fix_body(phase="claimed", worktree="branches/fix-376")
+        expires = (NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+        release_body = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "branch: feat/fix-376",
+            "worktree: branches/fix-376",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+            "phase: released",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
+            f"head_after: {HEAD_B}",
+            f"expires_at: {expires}",
+        ])
+        comments = [{"body": claim_body}, {"body": release_body}]
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
+        self.assertIsNone(lease)
+
+    def test_expired_claim_without_release(self):
+        past_expires = (NOW - timedelta(minutes=10)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+        claim_body = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "phase: claimed",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
+            f"expires_at: {past_expires}",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+        ])
+        comments = [{"body": claim_body}]
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
+        self.assertIsNone(lease)
+
+    def test_mismatched_release_different_head(self):
+        claim_body = _conflict_fix_body(phase="claimed", worktree="branches/fix-376")
+        expires = (NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+        release_body = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+            "phase: released",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_B}",
+            f"expires_at: {expires}",
+        ])
+        comments = [{"body": claim_body}, {"body": release_body}]
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(lease)
+        self.assertEqual(lease["phase"], "claimed")
+
+    def test_mismatched_release_different_branch(self):
+        claim_body = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "branch: feat/branch-A",
+            "phase: claimed",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
+            f"expires_at: {(NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace('+00:00', 'Z')}",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+        ])
+        release_body = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "branch: feat/branch-B",
+            "phase: released",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
+            f"expires_at: {(NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace('+00:00', 'Z')}",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+        ])
+        comments = [{"body": claim_body}, {"body": release_body}]
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(lease)
+        self.assertEqual(lease["phase"], "claimed")
+
+    def test_release_followed_by_newer_claim(self):
+        claim_1 = _conflict_fix_body(phase="claimed", worktree="branches/fix-376")
+        expires = (NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+        release_1 = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+            "phase: released",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
+            f"head_after: {HEAD_B}",
+            f"expires_at: {expires}",
+        ])
+        claim_2 = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+            "phase: claimed",
+            f"head_before: {HEAD_B}",
+            f"expires_at: {expires}",
+        ])
+        comments = [{"body": claim_1}, {"body": release_1}, {"body": claim_2}]
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(lease)
+        self.assertEqual(lease["head_before"], HEAD_B)
+
+    def test_malformed_or_ambiguous_markers(self):
+        malformed_release = "\n".join([
+            CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
+            "pr: #376",
+            "phase: released",
+            # missing head_before and profile
+        ])
+        claim_body = _conflict_fix_body(phase="claimed")
+        comments = [{"body": claim_body}, {"body": malformed_release}]
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(lease)
+
+    def test_pr818_historical_sequence(self):
+        comment_14696 = "\n".join([
+            "<!-- mcp-conflict-fix-lease:v1 -->",
+            "pr: #818",
+            "branch: feat/issue-638-webui-app-shell-phase1",
+            "worktree: /Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/branches/issue-638-webui-app-shell-phase1",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+            "session_id: unknown",
+            "phase: claimed",
+            "head_before: 08061b7b8aebdd099a37d1abf5dafcf38e4fd3fb",
+            "expires_at: 2026-07-23T07:12:13Z",
+            "reviewer_active: no",
+        ])
+        comment_14730 = "\n".join([
+            "<!-- mcp-conflict-fix-lease:v1 -->",
+            "pr: #818",
+            "branch: feat/issue-638-webui-app-shell-phase1",
+            "worktree: /Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/branches/issue-638-webui-app-shell-phase1",
+            "profile: prgs-author",
+            "session_id: prgs-author-61241-e5129c60",
+            "phase: released",
+            "head_before: 08061b7b8aebdd099a37d1abf5dafcf38e4fd3fb",
+            "head_after: 64b6eb5d5402663098de5ded3b0617cc3b3df98f",
+            "expires_at: 2026-07-23T06:05:00Z",
+            "reviewer_active: no",
+        ])
+        comments = [{"body": comment_14696}, {"body": comment_14730}]
+        check_now = datetime(2026, 7, 23, 6, 30, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=818, now=check_now)
+        self.assertIsNone(lease)
+        
+        reviewer_gate = assess_reviewer_mutation_blocked(
+            pr_number=818,
+            comments=comments,
+            reviewed_head_sha="64b6eb5d5402663098de5ded3b0617cc3b3df98f",
+            live_head_sha="64b6eb5d5402663098de5ded3b0617cc3b3df98f",
+            mutation="approve",
+            now=check_now,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(reviewer_gate["mutation_allowed"])
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_shell.py

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for the Phase 1 operator console application shell (#638)."""
-import sys
-import unittest
-from pathlib import Path
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-from starlette.routing import Route
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
-
-from webui import layout
-from webui.app import create_app
-from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS, STUB_PAGES, nav_hrefs
-
-
-class TestShellNav(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_nav_group_labels_present(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-            with self.subTest(group=group.label):
-                self.assertIn(f">{group.label}<", text)
-
-    def test_phase1_group_labels_cover_expected_ia(self):
-        labels = {group.label for group in NAV_GROUPS}
-        for expected in (
-            "Health",
-            "Traffic",
-            "Runtime/Sessions",
-            "Projects",
-            "Inventory",
-            "Timeline",
-            "Policy",
-            "Insights",
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(label=expected):
-                self.assertIn(expected, labels)
-
-    def test_every_nav_href_resolves_to_a_get_route(self):
-        app = create_app()
-        get_paths = {
-            route.path
-            for route in app.routes
-            if isinstance(route, Route) and "GET" in route.methods
-        }
-        for href in nav_hrefs():
-            with self.subTest(href=href):
-                self.assertIn(href, get_paths, f"nav href {href} has no GET route")
-
-    def test_legacy_hrefs_still_navigable(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        for href in ("/queue", "/projects", "/prompts", "/runtime",
-                     "/audit", "/worktrees", "/leases", "/actions"):
-            with self.subTest(href=href):
-                self.assertIn(f'href="{href}"', text)
-
-
-class TestShellBadges(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_mode_badge_present(self):
-        self.assertIn("mode: read-only", self.client.get("/").text)
-
-    def test_environment_badge_present(self):
-        self.assertIn("env:", self.client.get("/").text)
-
-    def test_default_environment_is_local(self):
-        self.assertEqual(layout.environment_label(), "local")
-
-    def test_remote_bind_reports_remote_environment(self):
-        import os
-
-        prior = os.environ.get("WEBUI_HOST")
-        os.environ["WEBUI_HOST"] = "10.0.0.5"
-        try:
-            self.assertEqual(layout.environment_label(), "remote")
-        finally:
-            if prior is None:
-                os.environ.pop("WEBUI_HOST", None)
-            else:
-                os.environ["WEBUI_HOST"] = prior
-
-    def test_docs_link_present(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        self.assertIn(layout.DOCS_URL, text)
-        self.assertIn(">Docs<", text)
-
-
-class TestShellStubs(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_stub_routes_render_200(self):
-        for path, (title, _desc) in STUB_PAGES.items():
-            with self.subTest(path=path):
-                response = self.client.get(path)
-                self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200, path)
-                self.assertIn(title, response.text)
-                self.assertIn("placeholder", response.text)
-
-    def test_stub_routes_are_read_only(self):
-        for path in STUB_PAGES:
-            with self.subTest(path=path):
-                response = self.client.post(path)
-                self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
-                self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "read-only-mvp")
-
-    def test_stub_pages_carry_nav_and_badges(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/inventory")
-        self.assertIn("mode: read-only", response.text)
-        self.assertIn('href="/queue"', response.text)
-
-
-class TestShellHome(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_home_summarizes_console(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        self.assertIn("Operator console", text)
-        self.assertIn("Phase 1", text)
-
-    def test_home_links_legacy_pages(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        self.assertIn("MVP legacy pages", text)
-        for href in ("/queue", "/audit", "/leases"):
-            with self.subTest(href=href):
-                self.assertIn(f'href="{href}"', text)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_system_health.py

@@ -1,499 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for the read-only system-health API (#634).
-
-Covers the acceptance criteria directly: a structured payload with readiness
-and a dependency list (AC1), version and uptime when knowable (AC2), stale
-runtime reported without a false mutation-safe claim (AC3), and the healthy /
-degraded-dependency / redaction cases (AC4).
-"""
-import json
-import os
-import sqlite3
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from pathlib import Path
-from unittest import mock
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
-
-import control_plane_db
-from webui.app import create_app
-from webui.deployment_boundary import scan_text_for_client_secrets
-from webui.system_health import (
-    API_PATH,
-    STATUS_DEGRADED,
-    STATUS_DOWN,
-    STATUS_OK,
-    STATUS_SKIPPED,
-    DependencyProbe,
-    StaleRuntime,
-    assess_stale_runtime,
-    clear_probe_cache,
-    load_system_health,
-    namespace_summaries,
-    probe_control_plane_db,
-    probe_gitea,
-    process_uptime,
-    redact,
-    redact_url,
-    snapshot_to_dict,
-)
-
-
-def _probe(name, status, *, required=True, detail="detail", kind="test"):
-    return DependencyProbe(
-        name=name,
-        kind=kind,
-        status=status,
-        detail=detail,
-        required=required,
-        latency_ms=1.5,
-        metadata={},
-    )
-
-
-_ALL_HEALTHY = (
-    _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
-    _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
-    _probe("gitea", STATUS_OK, required=False, kind="http"),
-)
-
-_CLEAN_PARITY = StaleRuntime(
-    daemon_head="abc123",
-    checkout_head="abc123",
-    remote_head="abc123",
-    stale=False,
-    determinable=True,
-    mutation_safe=True,
-    reasons=(),
-)
-
-
-class CleanParityMixin:
-    """Pin parity for tests about aggregation rather than staleness.
-
-    Without this the assertions depend on the real checkout: a worktree whose
-    branch is ahead of its upstream is genuinely stale, which would degrade the
-    overall status and make these cases fail for an unrelated reason.
-    """
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        super().setUp()
-        patcher = mock.patch(
-            "webui.system_health.assess_stale_runtime",
-            return_value=_CLEAN_PARITY,
-        )
-        patcher.start()
-        self.addCleanup(patcher.stop)
-
-
-class TestDependencyAggregation(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC1 — readiness and dependency list derived from probe results."""
-
-    def test_all_healthy_is_ok_and_ready(self):
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_OK)
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.readiness_complete)
-        self.assertEqual(snapshot.readiness_reasons, ())
-        self.assertEqual(len(snapshot.dependencies), 3)
-
-    def test_required_dependency_down_blocks_readiness(self):
-        probes = (
-            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_DOWN, detail="file missing", kind="sqlite"),
-            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
-            _probe("gitea", STATUS_OK, required=False, kind="http"),
-        )
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DOWN)
-        self.assertFalse(snapshot.ready)
-        self.assertTrue(
-            any("control_plane_db" in reason for reason in snapshot.readiness_reasons)
-        )
-
-    def test_optional_dependency_down_degrades_but_stays_ready(self):
-        """A failing optional probe must not claim the process itself is unready."""
-        probes = (
-            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
-            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
-            _probe("gitea", STATUS_DOWN, required=False, detail="timeout", kind="http"),
-        )
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
-        self.assertTrue(any("gitea" in reason for reason in snapshot.readiness_reasons))
-
-    def test_unrun_required_probe_leaves_readiness_incomplete(self):
-        """Not probed is not the same as passing."""
-        probes = (
-            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
-            _probe("repository", STATUS_SKIPPED, detail="offline", kind="git"),
-        )
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertFalse(snapshot.ready)
-        self.assertFalse(snapshot.readiness_complete)
-        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
-
-    def test_skipped_optional_probe_does_not_block_readiness(self):
-        probes = (
-            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
-            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
-            _probe("gitea", STATUS_SKIPPED, required=False, kind="http"),
-        )
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.readiness_complete)
-
-
-class TestVersionAndUptime(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC2 — version and uptime present when knowable."""
-
-    def test_uptime_and_start_time_present(self):
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertGreaterEqual(snapshot.uptime_seconds, 0.0)
-        self.assertIn("T", snapshot.started_at)
-
-    def test_process_uptime_helper_matches_shape(self):
-        started_at, uptime = process_uptime()
-        self.assertIn("T", started_at)
-        self.assertGreaterEqual(uptime, 0.0)
-
-    def test_version_reports_python_and_schema_version(self):
-        probes = (
-            DependencyProbe(
-                name="control_plane_db",
-                kind="sqlite",
-                status=STATUS_OK,
-                detail="ok",
-                required=True,
-                latency_ms=1.0,
-                metadata={"schema_version": control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION},
-            ),
-            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
-        )
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            snapshot.version.control_plane_schema_version,
-            control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.version.python_version)
-
-    def test_version_known_flag_false_when_sha_unavailable(self):
-        with mock.patch("webui.system_health._git", return_value=None):
-            snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
-        self.assertIsNone(snapshot.version.git_sha)
-        self.assertFalse(snapshot.version.known)
-
-
-class TestStaleRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC3 — stale runtime reflected without a false mutation-safe claim."""
-
-    def test_matching_commits_are_mutation_safe(self):
-        assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
-            Path("/tmp"),
-            daemon_head="aaa",
-            git_reader=lambda *args: "aaa",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(assessment.stale)
-        self.assertTrue(assessment.determinable)
-        self.assertTrue(assessment.mutation_safe)
-
-    def test_diverged_commits_are_stale_and_not_mutation_safe(self):
-        reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": "bbb"}
-        assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
-            Path("/tmp"),
-            daemon_head="aaa",
-            git_reader=lambda *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(assessment.stale)
-        self.assertFalse(assessment.mutation_safe)
-        self.assertTrue(assessment.reasons)
-
-    def test_unknown_remote_is_not_mutation_safe(self):
-        """Indeterminate must never read as safe."""
-        reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": None}
-        assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
-            Path("/tmp"),
-            daemon_head="aaa",
-            git_reader=lambda *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(assessment.determinable)
-        self.assertFalse(assessment.mutation_safe)
-        self.assertFalse(assessment.stale)
-        self.assertTrue(
-            any("indeterminate" in reason for reason in assessment.reasons)
-        )
-
-    def test_unobservable_daemon_head_is_disclosed(self):
-        assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
-            Path("/tmp"),
-            git_reader=lambda *args: "aaa",
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(
-            any("not observable" in reason for reason in assessment.reasons)
-        )
-
-    def test_stale_runtime_degrades_overall_status(self):
-        reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": "bbb"}
-        # Pinned rather than inherited: this path uses the default git reader,
-        # so the assertion must hold whether or not the suite runs offline.
-        with mock.patch.dict(os.environ, {"WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE": ""}), mock.patch(
-            "webui.system_health._git",
-            side_effect=lambda repo, *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
-        ):
-            snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="aaa")
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.stale_runtime.stale)
-        self.assertFalse(snapshot.stale_runtime.mutation_safe)
-        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
-
-
-class TestControlPlaneDbProbe(unittest.TestCase):
-    """The required local dependency, probed read-only."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.addCleanup(self.tmp.cleanup)
-        self.db_path = str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "control-plane.db")
-
-    def _build_db(self, schema_version):
-        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
-        conn.execute("CREATE TABLE schema_meta (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT)")
-        conn.execute("CREATE TABLE leases (lease_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, status TEXT)")
-        conn.execute(
-            "INSERT INTO schema_meta(key, value) VALUES ('schema_version', ?)",
-            (str(schema_version),),
-        )
-        conn.execute("INSERT INTO leases(lease_id, status) VALUES ('l1', 'active')")
-        conn.commit()
-        conn.close()
-
-    def test_missing_database_is_down(self):
-        probe = probe_control_plane_db(str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "absent.db"))
-        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
-        self.assertTrue(probe.required)
-        self.assertIsNotNone(probe.latency_ms)
-
-    def test_matching_schema_is_ok(self):
-        self._build_db(control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION)
-        probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
-        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_OK)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            probe.metadata["schema_version"], control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(probe.metadata["active_leases"], 1)
-
-    def test_mismatched_schema_is_degraded(self):
-        self._build_db(control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION + 99)
-        probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
-        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
-
-    def test_probe_does_not_create_a_database(self):
-        """A health check must never initialise the substrate it inspects."""
-        absent = str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "never-created.db")
-        probe_control_plane_db(absent)
-        self.assertFalse(Path(absent).exists())
-
-    def test_unreadable_database_is_down_not_raised(self):
-        Path(self.db_path).write_text("this is not a sqlite database")
-        probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
-        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
-
-
-class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC4 — redaction. No credential-shaped text crosses the boundary."""
-
-    def test_redacts_token_assignment(self):
-        cleaned = redact("failed with token=ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ012345")
-        self.assertNotIn("ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ012345", cleaned)
-        self.assertIn("[redacted]", cleaned)
-
-    def test_redacts_authorization_header_text(self):
-        cleaned = redact("Authorization: Bearer abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456")
-        self.assertNotIn("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456", cleaned)
-
-    def test_redacts_long_opaque_strings(self):
-        cleaned = redact("value 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef here")
-        self.assertNotIn("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", cleaned)
-
-    def test_url_userinfo_and_query_are_stripped(self):
-        cleaned = redact_url("https://user:[email protected]/api/v1?token=xyz")
-        self.assertNotIn("secretpass", cleaned)
-        self.assertNotIn("token=xyz", cleaned)
-        self.assertEqual(cleaned, "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1")
-
-    def test_url_inside_free_text_is_redacted(self):
-        cleaned = redact("GET https://u:[email protected]/x?token=abc failed")
-        self.assertNotIn("u:p@", cleaned)
-        self.assertNotIn("token=abc", cleaned)
-
-    def test_gitea_probe_failure_detail_is_redacted(self):
-        boom = RuntimeError(
-            "connection refused for https://user:[email protected]/api/v1/version"
-        )
-        with mock.patch("webui.system_health.get_auth_header", return_value="token x"), \
-                mock.patch("webui.system_health.api_request", side_effect=boom):
-            probe = probe_gitea("gitea.example.com")
-        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
-        self.assertNotIn("hunter2", probe.detail)
-        self.assertEqual(scan_text_for_client_secrets(probe.detail), [])
-
-    def test_credential_guard_refusal_is_a_status_not_a_crash(self):
-        with mock.patch(
-            "webui.system_health.get_auth_header",
-            side_effect=RuntimeError("daemon guard refused"),
-        ):
-            probe = probe_gitea("gitea.example.com")
-        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
-        self.assertFalse(probe.required)
-
-
-class TestNamespaceSummaries(unittest.TestCase):
-    """A web process cannot prove IDE namespace health, and must not claim to."""
-
-    def test_every_namespace_reports_unproven(self):
-        rows = namespace_summaries()
-        self.assertTrue(rows)
-        for row in rows:
-            with self.subTest(namespace=row["namespace"]):
-                self.assertEqual(row["status"], "unproven")
-                self.assertFalse(row["ide_namespace_proven"])
-                self.assertIn("client_namespace", row["reason"])
-
-
-class TestSystemHealthRoutes(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
-    """The HTTP surface: versioned path, status codes, read-only guard."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        super().setUp()
-        clear_probe_cache()
-        self.addCleanup(clear_probe_cache)
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def _patch_snapshot(self, probes, daemon_head="abc123"):
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head=daemon_head)
-        patcher = mock.patch(
-            "webui.app.load_system_health",
-            return_value=snapshot,
-        )
-        patcher.start()
-        self.addCleanup(patcher.stop)
-        return snapshot
-
-    def test_versioned_route_is_registered(self):
-        self.assertEqual(API_PATH, "/api/v1/system/health")
-        self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
-        response = self.client.get(API_PATH)
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
-
-    def test_healthy_payload_shape(self):
-        self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
-        data = self.client.get(API_PATH).json()
-        self.assertEqual(data["status"], STATUS_OK)
-        self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["ready"])
-        self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["complete"])
-        self.assertEqual(data["api"], API_PATH)
-        self.assertEqual(len(data["dependencies"]), 3)
-        for key in ("version", "process", "stale_runtime", "mcp_namespaces"):
-            self.assertIn(key, data)
-        self.assertIn("uptime_seconds", data["process"])
-        self.assertIn("mutation_safe", data["stale_runtime"])
-
-    def test_degraded_dependency_returns_503(self):
-        probes = (
-            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_DOWN, detail="missing", kind="sqlite"),
-            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
-        )
-        self._patch_snapshot(probes)
-        response = self.client.get(API_PATH)
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 503)
-        data = response.json()
-        self.assertFalse(data["readiness"]["ready"])
-        self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["reasons"])
-
-    def test_dependency_entries_expose_status_and_latency(self):
-        self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
-        data = self.client.get(API_PATH).json()
-        names = {entry["name"] for entry in data["dependencies"]}
-        self.assertEqual(names, {"control_plane_db", "repository", "gitea"})
-        for entry in data["dependencies"]:
-            with self.subTest(dependency=entry["name"]):
-                self.assertIn("status", entry)
-                self.assertIn("required", entry)
-                self.assertIn("latency_ms", entry)
-
-    def test_response_body_carries_no_client_secrets(self):
-        self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
-        body = self.client.get(API_PATH).text
-        self.assertEqual(scan_text_for_client_secrets(body), [])
-
-    def test_deep_flag_is_forwarded(self):
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
-        with mock.patch(
-            "webui.app.load_system_health", return_value=snapshot
-        ) as loader:
-            self.client.get(f"{API_PATH}?deep=1")
-            loader.assert_called_once_with(deep=True)
-
-    def test_shallow_is_the_default(self):
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
-        with mock.patch(
-            "webui.app.load_system_health", return_value=snapshot
-        ) as loader:
-            self.client.get(API_PATH)
-            loader.assert_called_once_with(deep=False)
-
-    def test_route_rejects_mutation_methods(self):
-        for method in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"):
-            with self.subTest(method=method):
-                response = self.client.request(method, API_PATH)
-                self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
-                self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "read-only-mvp")
-
-    def test_default_shallow_call_skips_the_network_probe(self):
-        """The expensive probe must not run unless it was asked for."""
-        with mock.patch("webui.system_health.probe_gitea") as probe:
-            snapshot = load_system_health(deep=False)
-        probe.assert_not_called()
-        gitea = next(p for p in snapshot.dependencies if p.name == "gitea")
-        self.assertEqual(gitea.status, STATUS_SKIPPED)
-
-
-class TestHealthRouteBackwardCompatibility(unittest.TestCase):
-    """`/health` is expanded additively; MVP consumers must keep working."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_mvp_keys_are_unchanged(self):
-        data = self.client.get("/health").json()
-        self.assertEqual(data["status"], "ok")
-        self.assertEqual(data["service"], "mcp-control-plane-webui")
-        self.assertEqual(data["mode"], "read-only-mvp")
-        self.assertIn("timestamp", data)
-        self.assertEqual(data["deployment"]["mode"], "internal-operator-console")
-
-    def test_health_points_at_the_versioned_api(self):
-        data = self.client.get("/health").json()
-        self.assertEqual(data["system_health_api"], API_PATH)
-        self.assertIn("uptime_seconds", data)
-        self.assertIn("started_at", data)
-
-    def test_health_runs_no_dependency_probe(self):
-        """Liveness must stay cheap: no probe, no snapshot assembly."""
-        with mock.patch("webui.app.load_system_health") as loader:
-            response = self.client.get("/health")
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
-        loader.assert_not_called()
-
-
-class TestSnapshotSerialisation(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_snapshot_dict_is_json_serialisable(self):
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
-        encoded = json.dumps(snapshot_to_dict(snapshot))
-        self.assertIn("readiness", encoded)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ from starlette.routing import Route
 
 from webui.deployment_boundary import deployment_snapshot
 from webui.layout import render_page
-from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS, STUB_PAGES
 from webui.project_registry import (
     ProjectRegistry,
     RegistryError,
@@ -46,13 +45,6 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo
 from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
 from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
-from webui.timeline import load_timeline, snapshot_to_dict as timeline_snapshot_to_dict
-from webui.system_health import (
-    API_PATH as SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
-    load_system_health,
-    process_uptime,
-    snapshot_to_dict as system_health_to_dict,
-)
 
 _READ_ONLY_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
 _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS = frozenset({"/audit", "/api/audit"})
@@ -67,100 +59,35 @@ def _stub_page(title: str, description: str) -> HTMLResponse:
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title=title, body_html=body))
 
 
-_LEGACY_PAGES = (
-    ("/queue", "Queue", "live PR and issue dashboard (#429)"),
-    ("/projects", "Projects", "registry and onboarding (#427)"),
-    ("/prompts", "Prompts", "canonical workflow prompt library (#428)"),
-    ("/runtime", "Runtime", "MCP health and stale-runtime detection (#430)"),
-    ("/audit", "Audit", "final-report paste and validator preview (#431)"),
-    ("/worktrees", "Worktrees", "branch hygiene dashboard (#432)"),
-    ("/leases", "Leases", "collision and lease visibility (#433)"),
-    ("/actions", "Actions", "gated write-action framework (#434)"),
-)
-
-
-def _render_home_nav_groups() -> str:
-    groups = []
-    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-        items = "".join(
-            f'<li><a href="{item.href}">{item.label}</a>'
-            + ("" if item.status == "live" else " <span class=\"muted\">(stub)</span>")
-            + "</li>"
-            for item in group.items
-        )
-        groups.append(f"<h3>{group.label}</h3><ul>{items}</ul>")
-    return "".join(groups)
-
-
 async def home(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
-    legacy = "".join(
-        f"<li><strong>{label}</strong> — {desc} "
-        f'(<a href="{href}">{href}</a>)</li>'
-        for href, label, desc in _LEGACY_PAGES
-    )
     body = (
         "<h2>Operator console</h2>"
-        "<p>Read-only home for the MCP Control Plane Phase 1 operator console. "
+        "<p>Local entry point for MCP Control Plane operational views.</p>"
-        "Gitea, MCP capability gates, and canonical workflows remain the source "
+        "<ul>"
-        "of truth; this console never mutates them.</p>"
+        "<li><strong>Queue</strong> — live PR and issue dashboard (#429)</li>"
-        "<h2>Phase 1 surfaces</h2>"
+        "<li><strong>Projects</strong> — registry and onboarding (#427)</li>"
-        + _render_home_nav_groups()
+        "<li><strong>Prompts</strong> — canonical workflow prompt library (#428)</li>"
-        + "<h2>MVP legacy pages</h2>"
+        "<li><strong>Runtime</strong> — MCP health and stale-runtime detection (#430)</li>"
-        "<ul>" + legacy + "</ul>"
+        "<li><strong>Audit</strong> — final-report paste and validator preview (#431)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Worktrees</strong> — branch hygiene dashboard (#432)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Leases</strong> — collision and lease visibility (#433)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Actions</strong> — gated write-action framework (#434)</li>"
+        "</ul>"
     )
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title="Home", body_html=body))
 
 
-async def phase_stub(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
-    """Graceful read-only placeholder for a not-yet-implemented Phase 1 surface."""
-    title, description = STUB_PAGES[request.url.path]
-    body = (
-        f"<h2>{title}</h2>"
-        f'<div class="stub"><p>{description}</p>'
-        "<p>Phase 1 shell placeholder — no write actions. Tracked under "
-        "epic #631.</p></div>"
-    )
-    return HTMLResponse(render_page(title=title, body_html=body))
-
-
 async def health(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
-    """Liveness only — deliberately cheap, runs no dependency probe (#634).
-
-    Every MVP key is retained so existing pollers keep working; the additions
-    are a pointer to the structured API and the in-memory process uptime.
-    Readiness lives at that API because answering it costs real probes.
-    """
     bind_host = _request.app.state.webui_bind_host
-    started_at, uptime_seconds = process_uptime()
     return JSONResponse({
         "status": "ok",
         "service": "mcp-control-plane-webui",
         "mode": "read-only-mvp",
         "timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
         "deployment": deployment_snapshot(bind_host=bind_host),
-        "started_at": started_at,
-        "uptime_seconds": uptime_seconds,
-        "system_health_api": SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
     })
 
 
-def _truthy_flag(value: str | None) -> bool:
-    return (value or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
-
-
-async def api_system_health(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
-    """Structured read-only system health (#634).
-
-    `?deep=1` opts into the expensive network probe. The response status code
-    reflects readiness so automated checks can branch on it without parsing the
-    body: 200 when ready, 503 when a required dependency failed or never ran.
-    """
-    deep = _truthy_flag(request.query_params.get("deep"))
-    snapshot = load_system_health(deep=deep)
-    payload = system_health_to_dict(snapshot)
-    return JSONResponse(payload, status_code=200 if snapshot.ready else 503)
-
-
 async def queue(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
     snapshot = load_queue_snapshot()
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title="Queue", body_html=render_queue_page(snapshot)))
@@ -450,104 +377,6 @@ async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     })
 
 
-def _query_int(request: Request, key: str) -> int | None:
-    """Parse an optional integer query parameter; None when absent/invalid."""
-    raw = request.query_params.get(key)
-    if raw is None or not str(raw).strip():
-        return None
-    try:
-        return int(str(raw).strip())
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        return None
-
-
-def _derive_remote(host: str) -> str:
-    """Map a Gitea host to its known short remote name (control-plane scope key)."""
-    text = (host or "").lower()
-    if "prgs" in text:
-        return "prgs"
-    if "dadeschools" in text:
-        return "dadeschools"
-    return text.split(".")[0] if text else ""
-
-
-def _timeline_comment_source(host: str, org: str, repo: str):
-    """Build a fail-soft CTH-comment fetcher for one repo, or None when offline.
-
-    Returns a callable ``(kind, number) -> list[comment]``. Credentials or
-    network failures raise inside the callable so ``load_timeline`` degrades the
-    handoff source rather than the whole timeline. Offline test mode yields no
-    live source so the handoff section reports ``not run``.
-    """
-    import os
-
-    from gitea_auth import api_fetch_page, get_auth_header, repo_api_url
-
-    offline = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE") or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes"}
-    if offline:
-        return None
-    auth = get_auth_header(host)
-    if not auth:
-        return None
-
-    def _fetch(kind: str, number: int) -> list:
-        segment = "pulls" if kind == "pr" else "issues"
-        url = f"{repo_api_url(host, org, repo)}/{segment}/{int(number)}/comments"
-        comments: list = []
-        page = 1
-        while page <= 20:
-            raw, meta = api_fetch_page(url, auth, page=page, limit=50)
-            comments.extend(raw)
-            if bool(meta["is_final_page"]):
-                break
-            page += 1
-        return comments
-
-    return _fetch
-
-
-async def api_v1_timeline(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
-    """Read-only workflow-event timeline (#637). Filter by issue/PR/session."""
-    from webui.queue_loader import _host_from_url  # host normalisation helper
-
-    registry, error = _load_project_registry()
-    if error is not None:
-        return JSONResponse(error.to_dict(), status_code=500)
-    project = registry.projects[0] if registry.projects else None
-
-    org = request.query_params.get("org") or (project.gitea_owner if project else "")
-    repo = request.query_params.get("repo") or (project.repo_name if project else "")
-    host = _host_from_url(project.remote_host) if project else ""
-    remote = request.query_params.get("remote") or _derive_remote(host)
-
-    if not (remote and org and repo):
-        return JSONResponse(
-            {
-                "error": "timeline_scope_unresolved",
-                "detail": "no project in registry and no remote/org/repo query params provided",
-            },
-            status_code=400,
-        )
-
-    comment_source = _timeline_comment_source(host, org, repo) if (host and org and repo) else None
-
-    snapshot = load_timeline(
-        remote=remote,
-        org=org,
-        repo=repo,
-        issue=_query_int(request, "issue"),
-        pr=_query_int(request, "pr"),
-        session=(request.query_params.get("session") or None),
-        limit=_query_int(request, "limit"),
-        offset=_query_int(request, "offset"),
-        comment_source=comment_source,
-    )
-    # A filter no surviving source can carry is refused, not answered empty:
-    # a 200 with zero events would tell the operator no such activity exists.
-    status_code = 200 if snapshot.ok else 422
-    return JSONResponse(timeline_snapshot_to_dict(snapshot), status_code=status_code)
-
-
 async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response:
     path = request.url.path
     if path in _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS and request.method == "POST":
@@ -570,7 +399,6 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
         routes=[
             Route("/", home, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/health", health, methods=["GET"]),
-            Route(SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH, api_system_health, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/queue", queue, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/queue", api_queue, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/projects", projects, methods=["GET"]),
@@ -587,7 +415,6 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
             Route("/api/prompts", api_prompts, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/runtime", runtime, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/runtime", api_runtime, methods=["GET"]),
-            Route("/api/v1/timeline", api_v1_timeline, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/audit", audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]),
             Route("/api/audit", api_audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]),
             Route("/worktrees", worktrees, methods=["GET"]),
@@ -611,10 +438,6 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
                 api_console_security_model,
                 methods=["GET"],
             ),
-            *[
-                Route(path, phase_stub, methods=["GET"])
-                for path in STUB_PAGES
-            ],
         ],
         exception_handlers={405: method_not_allowed},
     )

webui/layout.py

@@ -2,66 +2,28 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import os
+NAV_ITEMS = (
-
+    ("/", "Home"),
-from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS
+    ("/queue", "Queue"),
+    ("/projects", "Projects"),
+    ("/prompts", "Prompts"),
+    ("/runtime", "Runtime"),
+    ("/audit", "Audit"),
+    ("/worktrees", "Worktrees"),
+    ("/leases", "Leases"),
+    ("/actions", "Actions"),
+)
 
 MVP_NOTICE = (
     "Read-only MVP — Gitea, MCP tools, and canonical workflows remain the "
     "source of truth. No mutation endpoints."
 )
 
-# Canonical docs entry point surfaced from the shell header (#638).
-DOCS_URL = (
-    "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/src/branch/"
-    "master/docs/webui-local-dev.md"
-)
-
-_LOCAL_HOSTS = frozenset({"", "127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1"})
-
-
-def environment_label() -> str:
-    """Classify the serving environment as ``local`` or ``remote`` (#638).
-
-    Derived from the same ``WEBUI_HOST`` default the app binds to; loopback
-    hosts are ``local``, anything else is ``remote``. Read-only signal only.
-    """
-    host = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_HOST", "127.0.0.1") or "").strip().lower()
-    return "local" if host in _LOCAL_HOSTS else "remote"
-
-
-def _render_nav() -> str:
-    groups_html = []
-    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-        links = "".join(
-            f'<a href="{item.href}"'
-            + (' class="nav-stub"' if item.status == "stub" else "")
-            + f'>{item.label}</a>'
-            for item in group.items
-        )
-        groups_html.append(
-            '<div class="nav-group">'
-            f'<span class="nav-group-label">{group.label}</span>'
-            f'<span class="nav-group-links">{links}</span>'
-            "</div>"
-        )
-    return "".join(groups_html)
-
-
-def _render_badges() -> str:
-    env = environment_label()
-    return (
-        '<div class="header-badges">'
-        f'<span class="badge env-badge env-{env}">env: {env}</span>'
-        '<span class="badge mode-badge">mode: read-only</span>'
-        f'<a class="badge docs-link" href="{DOCS_URL}">Docs</a>'
-        "</div>"
-    )
-
 
 def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
-    nav_links = _render_nav()
+    nav_links = "".join(
-    header_badges = _render_badges()
+        f'<a href="{href}">{label}</a>' for href, label in NAV_ITEMS
+    )
     return f"""<!DOCTYPE html>
 <html lang="en">
 <head>
@@ -91,58 +53,21 @@ def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
       padding: 0.75rem 1.25rem;
     }}
     header h1 {{
-      margin: 0;
+      margin: 0 0 0.5rem;
       font-size: 1.1rem;
       font-weight: 600;
     }}
-    .header-top {{
-      display: flex;
-      flex-wrap: wrap;
-      align-items: center;
-      justify-content: space-between;
-      gap: 0.5rem 1rem;
-      margin-bottom: 0.6rem;
-    }}
-    .header-badges {{ display: inline-flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 0.4rem; }}
-    .env-badge.env-local {{ color: #8fd19e; border-color: #3d6b4a; }}
-    .env-badge.env-remote {{ color: #e0c27a; border-color: #6b5730; }}
-    .mode-badge {{ color: #9ec8f0; border-color: #3d5f7a; }}
-    a.docs-link {{
-      color: var(--accent);
-      border-color: var(--accent);
-      text-decoration: none;
-      text-transform: none;
-    }}
-    a.docs-link:hover {{ filter: brightness(1.12); }}
     nav {{
       display: flex;
       flex-wrap: wrap;
-      gap: 0.5rem 1.25rem;
+      gap: 0.75rem 1rem;
     }}
-    .nav-group {{
-      display: flex;
-      flex-direction: column;
-      gap: 0.15rem;
-    }}
-    .nav-group-label {{
-      font-size: 0.68rem;
-      text-transform: uppercase;
-      letter-spacing: 0.04em;
-      color: var(--muted);
-    }}
-    .nav-group-links {{ display: inline-flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 0.6rem; }}
     nav a {{
       color: var(--accent);
       text-decoration: none;
       font-size: 0.9rem;
     }}
     nav a:hover {{ text-decoration: underline; }}
-    nav a.nav-stub {{ color: var(--muted); }}
-    nav a.nav-stub::after {{
-      content: " ·stub";
-      font-size: 0.7rem;
-      color: var(--muted);
-    }}
     main {{
       max-width: 52rem;
       margin: 0 auto;
@@ -241,10 +166,7 @@ def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
 </head>
 <body>
   <header>
-    <div class="header-top">
+    <h1>MCP Control Plane</h1>
-      <h1>MCP Control Plane</h1>
-      {header_badges}
-    </div>
     <nav>{nav_links}</nav>
   </header>
   <main>

webui/nav.py

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-"""Navigation IA for the Phase 1 operator console shell (#638).
-
-Single source of truth for the console navigation so ``webui/layout.py`` and
-the ``webui/app.py`` route table stay aligned with epic #631. Read-only: every
-destination is a GET view or a Phase 1 placeholder. No mutation links.
-
-Nav groups follow the #631 Phase 1 information architecture: Health, Traffic,
-Runtime/Sessions, Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy (placeholder), and
-Insights (placeholder). Later-phase surfaces are declared as ``stub`` items and
-backed by ``STUB_PAGES`` so their nav links resolve to a graceful placeholder
-instead of a 404.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class NavItem:
-    """A single navigation destination.
-
-    ``status`` is ``"live"`` for implemented views and ``"stub"`` for Phase 1
-    placeholders whose backing view lands in a later child issue.
-    """
-
-    href: str
-    label: str
-    status: str = "live"
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class NavGroup:
-    label: str
-    items: tuple[NavItem, ...]
-
-
-NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
-    NavGroup("Health", (
-        NavItem("/health", "Liveness"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Traffic", (
-        NavItem("/queue", "Queue"),
-        NavItem("/leases", "Leases"),
-        NavItem("/actions", "Actions"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Runtime/Sessions", (
-        NavItem("/runtime", "Runtime health"),
-        NavItem("/sessions", "Sessions", "stub"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Projects", (
-        NavItem("/projects", "Projects"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Inventory", (
-        NavItem("/inventory", "Inventory", "stub"),
-        NavItem("/worktrees", "Worktrees"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Timeline", (
-        NavItem("/timeline", "Timeline", "stub"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Policy", (
-        NavItem("/policy", "Policy", "stub"),
-        NavItem("/prompts", "Prompts"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Insights", (
-        NavItem("/insights", "Insights", "stub"),
-        NavItem("/audit", "Audit"),
-    )),
-)
-
-
-# Phase 1 placeholder destinations whose backing views land in later child
-# issues of epic #631. Each maps a path to (title, description). Routes are
-# registered so nav links resolve to a graceful, read-only stub page.
-STUB_PAGES: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {
-    "/sessions": (
-        "Sessions",
-        "Active session, capability, and role inventory. Backed by the unified "
-        "inventory API (#636) once it lands.",
-    ),
-    "/inventory": (
-        "Inventory",
-        "Unified sessions, leases, locks, namespaces, and worktree inventory. "
-        "Backed by the Phase 1 inventory API (#636).",
-    ),
-    "/timeline": (
-        "Timeline",
-        "Workflow event timeline across issues and PRs. A later Phase 1 surface.",
-    ),
-    "/policy": (
-        "Policy",
-        "Capability and role policy surface. Placeholder until a later phase.",
-    ),
-    "/insights": (
-        "Insights",
-        "Aggregate operational insights and trends. Placeholder until a later "
-        "phase.",
-    ),
-}
-
-
-def iter_nav_items():
-    """Yield every ``NavItem`` across all groups in declared order."""
-    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-        for item in group.items:
-            yield item
-
-
-def nav_hrefs() -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    """Return every navigation href in declared order."""
-    return tuple(item.href for item in iter_nav_items())

webui/system_health.py

@@ -1,682 +0,0 @@
-"""Read-only system-health model for the operator console API (#634).
-
-`/health` answers liveness only. Operators automating readiness checks need a
-structured view of *why* the control plane is or is not usable: which
-dependencies answered, how long they took, what version of the code is running,
-and whether the runtime is stale relative to its remote.
-
-Three rules shape this module.
-
-* **Read-only.** Every probe opens its subject read-only. The control-plane
-  database is opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI so a health check can never
-  create or migrate a schema, and no probe writes, restarts, or reloads
-  anything — restart controls are Phase 2, and #630 forbids process-kill
-  recovery outright.
-* **Fail-soft.** A dependency that is unreachable is a *status*, not an
-  exception. Probes catch their own failures and report them as a degraded or
-  down entry carrying a reason.
-* **Never claim more than was proven.** Readiness is derived only from probes
-  that actually ran, ``mutation_safe`` stays false unless the parity commits are
-  known and equal, and an MCP namespace is reported unproven because a web
-  process cannot exercise the IDE-managed client path (#543).
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import re
-import sqlite3
-import subprocess
-import time
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Callable
-from urllib.parse import urlsplit, urlunsplit
-
-import control_plane_db
-import mcp_namespace_health
-from gitea_auth import api_request, get_auth_header, gitea_url
-
-from webui.project_registry import load_registry
-
-SERVICE_NAME = "mcp-control-plane-webui"
-API_PATH = "/api/v1/system/health"
-
-STATUS_OK = "ok"
-STATUS_DEGRADED = "degraded"
-STATUS_DOWN = "down"
-STATUS_SKIPPED = "skipped"
-STATUS_UNPROVEN = "unproven"
-
-# Statuses that count as a healthy answer from a probe.
-_HEALTHY_STATUSES = frozenset({STATUS_OK})
-# Statuses meaning "this probe did not run", as opposed to "it ran and failed".
-_NOT_RUN_STATUSES = frozenset({STATUS_SKIPPED})
-
-_DEEP_PROBE_TTL_ENV = "WEBUI_HEALTH_PROBE_TTL_SECONDS"
-_DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL = 15.0
-_GITEA_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
-
-_OFFLINE_ENV = "WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE"
-
-# Credential-shaped material that must never reach the browser, mirroring the
-# forbidden client patterns in webui/deployment_boundary.py.
-_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)\b(token|password|passwd|secret|authorization|bearer)\b\s*[:=]?\s*\S+"
-)
-_LONG_OPAQUE_RE = re.compile(r"\b[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{32,}\b")
-
-# Captured once at import so uptime measures this process, not the request.
-_STARTED_AT = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-_STARTED_MONOTONIC = time.monotonic()
-
-# TTL cache for the expensive (network) probe only.
-_deep_cache: dict[str, tuple[float, "DependencyProbe"]] = {}
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class DependencyProbe:
-    """One dependency check, fail-soft, with its own latency."""
-
-    name: str
-    kind: str
-    status: str
-    detail: str
-    required: bool
-    latency_ms: float | None = None
-    metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None
-
-    @property
-    def healthy(self) -> bool:
-        return self.status in _HEALTHY_STATUSES
-
-    @property
-    def ran(self) -> bool:
-        return self.status not in _NOT_RUN_STATUSES
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class VersionInfo:
-    git_sha: str | None
-    git_describe: str | None
-    control_plane_schema_version: int | None
-    python_version: str
-    known: bool
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class StaleRuntime:
-    """Parity between the running code, the checkout, and the remote.
-
-    ``mutation_safe`` is deliberately conservative: unknown is not safe.
-    """
-
-    daemon_head: str | None
-    checkout_head: str | None
-    remote_head: str | None
-    stale: bool
-    determinable: bool
-    mutation_safe: bool
-    reasons: tuple[str, ...]
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class SystemHealthSnapshot:
-    status: str
-    ready: bool
-    readiness_complete: bool
-    readiness_reasons: tuple[str, ...]
-    service: str
-    mode: str
-    version: VersionInfo
-    started_at: str
-    uptime_seconds: float
-    timestamp: str
-    deep_probes_requested: bool
-    dependencies: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...]
-    mcp_namespaces: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]
-    stale_runtime: StaleRuntime
-    probe_errors: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-
-
-def process_uptime() -> tuple[str, float]:
-    """Process start timestamp and uptime — in-memory, safe for `/health`."""
-    return _STARTED_AT.isoformat(), round(time.monotonic() - _STARTED_MONOTONIC, 3)
-
-
-def _offline() -> bool:
-    return (os.environ.get(_OFFLINE_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes"}
-
-
-def _repo_root() -> Path:
-    override = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_REPO_ROOT") or "").strip()
-    if override:
-        return Path(override).resolve()
-    return Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
-
-
-def _deep_probe_ttl() -> float:
-    raw = (os.environ.get(_DEEP_PROBE_TTL_ENV) or "").strip()
-    if not raw:
-        return _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
-    try:
-        value = float(raw)
-    except ValueError:
-        return _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
-    return value if value >= 0 else _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
-
-
-def redact(text: str) -> str:
-    """Strip credential-shaped material from operator-visible probe text.
-
-    Probe details carry exception strings, and an exception raised by an HTTP
-    client can quote the request that failed. Redaction happens here, at the
-    boundary where those strings become part of a browser-bound payload.
-    """
-    if not text:
-        return ""
-    cleaned = _redact_urls(text)
-    cleaned = _SECRET_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}=[redacted]", cleaned)
-    return _LONG_OPAQUE_RE.sub("[redacted]", cleaned)
-
-
-def _redact_urls(text: str) -> str:
-    return re.sub(r"https?://\S+", lambda m: redact_url(m.group(0)), text)
-
-
-def redact_url(url: str) -> str:
-    """Reduce a URL to scheme://host/path — no userinfo, no query, no fragment."""
-    try:
-        parts = urlsplit(url)
-    except ValueError:
-        return "[redacted-url]"
-    if not parts.scheme or not parts.hostname:
-        return "[redacted-url]"
-    netloc = parts.hostname
-    if parts.port:
-        netloc = f"{netloc}:{parts.port}"
-    return urlunsplit((parts.scheme, netloc, parts.path, "", ""))
-
-
-def _git(repo: Path, *args: str) -> str | None:
-    try:
-        completed = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "-C", str(repo), *args],
-            capture_output=True,
-            text=True,
-            check=False,
-            timeout=10,
-        )
-    except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
-        return None
-    if completed.returncode != 0:
-        return None
-    return (completed.stdout or "").strip() or None
-
-
-def _load_version(repo: Path, *, schema_version: int | None) -> VersionInfo:
-    import platform
-
-    git_sha = None if _offline() else _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
-    describe = None if _offline() else _git(repo, "describe", "--tags", "--always")
-    return VersionInfo(
-        git_sha=git_sha,
-        git_describe=describe,
-        control_plane_schema_version=schema_version,
-        python_version=platform.python_version(),
-        known=bool(git_sha),
-    )
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Dependency probes
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def _elapsed_ms(started: float) -> float:
-    return round((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000, 3)
-
-
-def probe_control_plane_db(db_path: str | None = None) -> DependencyProbe:
-    """Read-only reachability check for the control-plane SQLite substrate.
-
-    Opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI on purpose: ``ControlPlaneDB.__init__``
-    creates directories and runs schema migrations, which a health check must
-    never do.
-    """
-    path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path()).strip()
-    started = time.monotonic()
-    metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"path": path}
-
-    def _result(status: str, detail: str) -> DependencyProbe:
-        return DependencyProbe(
-            name="control_plane_db",
-            kind="sqlite",
-            status=status,
-            detail=detail,
-            required=True,
-            latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
-            metadata=metadata,
-        )
-
-    if not path or not os.path.exists(path):
-        return _result(STATUS_DOWN, "control-plane database file does not exist yet")
-    try:
-        conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=5)
-        try:
-            row = conn.execute(
-                "SELECT value FROM schema_meta WHERE key = 'schema_version'"
-            ).fetchone()
-            leases = conn.execute(
-                "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM leases WHERE status = 'active'"
-            ).fetchone()
-        finally:
-            conn.close()
-    except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-        return _result(STATUS_DOWN, redact(f"control-plane database unreadable: {exc}"))
-
-    schema_version = int(row[0]) if row and str(row[0]).isdigit() else None
-    metadata["schema_version"] = schema_version
-    metadata["active_leases"] = int(leases[0]) if leases else None
-    if schema_version is None:
-        return _result(
-            STATUS_DEGRADED, "control-plane database has no recorded schema version"
-        )
-    if schema_version != control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION:
-        return _result(
-            STATUS_DEGRADED,
-            f"control-plane schema version {schema_version} does not match the "
-            f"version this code expects ({control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION})",
-        )
-    return _result(STATUS_OK, f"schema v{schema_version} readable")
-
-
-def probe_repository(repo: Path) -> DependencyProbe:
-    """Local checkout reachability — required, cheap, no network."""
-    started = time.monotonic()
-    metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"repo_root": str(repo)}
-    if _offline():
-        return DependencyProbe(
-            name="repository",
-            kind="git",
-            status=STATUS_SKIPPED,
-            detail=f"{_OFFLINE_ENV} is set; git probe skipped",
-            required=True,
-            latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
-            metadata=metadata,
-        )
-    head = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
-    if not head:
-        return DependencyProbe(
-            name="repository",
-            kind="git",
-            status=STATUS_DOWN,
-            detail=f"HEAD could not be read at {repo}",
-            required=True,
-            latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
-            metadata=metadata,
-        )
-    branch = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD")
-    metadata["head"] = head
-    metadata["branch"] = branch
-    return DependencyProbe(
-        name="repository",
-        kind="git",
-        status=STATUS_OK,
-        detail=f"checkout readable at {branch or 'detached HEAD'}",
-        required=True,
-        latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
-        metadata=metadata,
-    )
-
-
-def probe_gitea(host: str) -> DependencyProbe:
-    """Live Gitea reachability. Expensive (network), so opt-in via ``deep``.
-
-    Optional by design: the console stays useful for local inventory when the
-    remote is unreachable, so a failure here degrades status without claiming
-    the process itself is unready.
-    """
-    started = time.monotonic()
-    metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"host": host}
-
-    def _failure(status: str, detail: str) -> DependencyProbe:
-        return DependencyProbe(
-            name="gitea",
-            kind="http",
-            status=status,
-            detail=detail,
-            required=False,
-            latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
-            metadata=metadata,
-        )
-
-    if not host:
-        return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, "no Gitea host is configured in the registry")
-    try:
-        auth = get_auth_header(host)
-    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — credential guards are a status here
-        return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, redact(f"credential lookup refused: {exc}"))
-    if not auth:
-        return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, f"no credentials available for {host}")
-
-    url = gitea_url(host, "/api/v1/version")
-    metadata["endpoint"] = redact_url(url)
-    try:
-        data = api_request("GET", url, auth, timeout=_GITEA_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
-    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — a down dependency is a status
-        return _failure(STATUS_DOWN, redact(f"Gitea probe failed: {exc}"))
-
-    if isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("version"):
-        metadata["gitea_version"] = str(data["version"])
-    return DependencyProbe(
-        name="gitea",
-        kind="http",
-        status=STATUS_OK,
-        detail=f"{host} reachable",
-        required=False,
-        latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
-        metadata=metadata,
-    )
-
-
-def _skipped_gitea(host: str) -> DependencyProbe:
-    return DependencyProbe(
-        name="gitea",
-        kind="http",
-        status=STATUS_SKIPPED,
-        detail="network probe not requested; call with ?deep=1 to run it",
-        required=False,
-        latency_ms=None,
-        metadata={"host": host},
-    )
-
-
-def namespace_summaries() -> tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]:
-    """Declared MCP namespaces, each honestly reported as unproven.
-
-    The web process runs outside the IDE-managed MCP client, so it cannot
-    invoke a namespace tool. Per #543 only a ``client_namespace`` probe proves
-    that path, and inventing a healthy verdict here is exactly the false claim
-    the mutation gates exist to prevent.
-    """
-    rows: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-    for namespace, required_tool in sorted(
-        mcp_namespace_health.REQUIRED_NAMESPACE_TOOLS.items()
-    ):
-        classification = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
-            namespace,
-            required_tool=required_tool,
-            probe_result=None,
-            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_UNKNOWN,
-        )
-        rows.append(
-            {
-                "namespace": namespace,
-                "required_tool": required_tool,
-                "status": STATUS_UNPROVEN,
-                "ide_namespace_proven": bool(classification.get("ide_namespace_proven")),
-                "reason": (
-                    "the web console cannot invoke the IDE-managed MCP client; "
-                    "namespace health must be proven with a client_namespace "
-                    "probe (#543)"
-                ),
-                "error_type": classification.get("error_type"),
-            }
-        )
-    return tuple(rows)
-
-
-def assess_stale_runtime(
-    repo: Path,
-    *,
-    daemon_head: str | None = None,
-    git_reader: Callable[..., str | None] | None = None,
-) -> StaleRuntime:
-    """Three-way parity view: running code, local checkout, remote-tracking ref.
-
-    ``mutation_safe`` requires all three to be known and equal. Anything less —
-    including "the remote ref was never fetched" — is reported as not safe with
-    a reason, so an operator never reads an unproven green.
-    """
-    reader = git_reader or (lambda *args: _git(repo, *args))
-    reasons: list[str] = []
-    # The offline switch suppresses real subprocess calls; an explicitly
-    # injected reader is already a substitute for them and is always used.
-    offline = _offline() and git_reader is None
-
-    checkout_head = None if offline else reader("rev-parse", "HEAD")
-    remote_head = None if offline else reader("rev-parse", "@{upstream}")
-    if offline:
-        reasons.append(f"{_OFFLINE_ENV} is set; parity commits were not read")
-    else:
-        if checkout_head is None:
-            reasons.append("local checkout HEAD could not be read")
-        if remote_head is None:
-            reasons.append(
-                "no remote-tracking commit is known for the current branch; "
-                "remote staleness is indeterminate (no fetch is performed here)"
-            )
-
-    effective_daemon = daemon_head if daemon_head is not None else checkout_head
-    if daemon_head is None:
-        reasons.append(
-            "the running MCP daemon's startup commit is not observable from the "
-            "web process; the checkout commit is reported in its place"
-        )
-
-    determinable = bool(checkout_head and remote_head and effective_daemon)
-    stale = bool(
-        determinable and len({checkout_head, remote_head, effective_daemon}) > 1
-    )
-    if stale:
-        reasons.append(
-            "runtime, checkout, and remote commits disagree; restart the MCP "
-            "server after updating the checkout before trusting capability gates"
-        )
-
-    return StaleRuntime(
-        daemon_head=effective_daemon,
-        checkout_head=checkout_head,
-        remote_head=remote_head,
-        stale=stale,
-        determinable=determinable,
-        mutation_safe=bool(determinable and not stale),
-        reasons=tuple(reasons),
-    )
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Snapshot assembly
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def _default_host() -> str:
-    registry = load_registry()
-    if not registry.projects:
-        return ""
-    raw = registry.projects[0].remote_host
-    parts = urlsplit(raw.strip())
-    return parts.netloc or raw.strip().rstrip("/")
-
-
-def _aggregate(
-    probes: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...],
-) -> tuple[str, bool, bool, tuple[str, ...]]:
-    """Fold probe results into overall status and readiness.
-
-    Required probes drive readiness; optional probes can only degrade status.
-    A probe that did not run leaves readiness incomplete rather than passing.
-    """
-    reasons: list[str] = []
-    required = [probe for probe in probes if probe.required]
-    unrun_required = [probe for probe in required if not probe.ran]
-    failed_required = [probe for probe in required if probe.ran and not probe.healthy]
-    failed_optional = [
-        probe
-        for probe in probes
-        if not probe.required and probe.ran and not probe.healthy
-    ]
-
-    for probe in unrun_required:
-        reasons.append(
-            f"required dependency '{probe.name}' was not probed: {probe.detail}"
-        )
-    for probe in failed_required:
-        reasons.append(
-            f"required dependency '{probe.name}' is {probe.status}: {probe.detail}"
-        )
-    for probe in failed_optional:
-        reasons.append(
-            f"optional dependency '{probe.name}' is {probe.status}: {probe.detail}"
-        )
-
-    readiness_complete = not unrun_required
-    ready = readiness_complete and not failed_required
-
-    if any(probe.status == STATUS_DOWN for probe in failed_required):
-        status = STATUS_DOWN
-    elif failed_required or failed_optional or unrun_required:
-        status = STATUS_DEGRADED
-    else:
-        status = STATUS_OK
-    return status, ready, readiness_complete, tuple(reasons)
-
-
-def load_system_health(
-    *,
-    deep: bool = False,
-    host: str | None = None,
-    probes: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...] | None = None,
-    daemon_head: str | None = None,
-    use_cache: bool = True,
-) -> SystemHealthSnapshot:
-    """Assemble the read-only system-health snapshot.
-
-    ``deep=True`` adds the network probe against Gitea; its result is cached for
-    a short TTL so repeated dashboard polls do not amplify into remote load.
-    """
-    repo = _repo_root()
-    probe_errors: list[str] = []
-
-    if probes is None:
-        collected: list[DependencyProbe] = []
-        for probe_fn in (
-            lambda: probe_control_plane_db(),
-            lambda: probe_repository(repo),
-        ):
-            try:
-                collected.append(probe_fn())
-            except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — a probe must not 500 the API
-                probe_errors.append(redact(f"probe raised: {exc}"))
-        resolved_host = host if host is not None else _default_host()
-        if deep and not _offline():
-            collected.append(_cached_gitea_probe(resolved_host, use_cache=use_cache))
-        else:
-            collected.append(_skipped_gitea(resolved_host))
-        probes = tuple(collected)
-
-    status, ready, readiness_complete, reasons = _aggregate(probes)
-    stale = assess_stale_runtime(repo, daemon_head=daemon_head)
-    if stale.stale:
-        if status == STATUS_OK:
-            status = STATUS_DEGRADED
-        reasons = reasons + (
-            "runtime is stale relative to its remote-tracking commit",
-        )
-
-    db_probe = next((p for p in probes if p.name == "control_plane_db"), None)
-    schema_version = None
-    if db_probe and db_probe.metadata:
-        schema_version = db_probe.metadata.get("schema_version")
-
-    return SystemHealthSnapshot(
-        status=status,
-        ready=ready,
-        readiness_complete=readiness_complete,
-        readiness_reasons=reasons,
-        service=SERVICE_NAME,
-        mode="read-only",
-        version=_load_version(repo, schema_version=schema_version),
-        started_at=_STARTED_AT.isoformat(),
-        uptime_seconds=round(time.monotonic() - _STARTED_MONOTONIC, 3),
-        timestamp=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-        deep_probes_requested=deep,
-        dependencies=probes,
-        mcp_namespaces=namespace_summaries(),
-        stale_runtime=stale,
-        probe_errors=tuple(probe_errors),
-    )
-
-
-def _cached_gitea_probe(host: str, *, use_cache: bool = True) -> DependencyProbe:
-    ttl = _deep_probe_ttl()
-    now = time.monotonic()
-    if use_cache and ttl > 0:
-        cached = _deep_cache.get(host)
-        if cached and (now - cached[0]) < ttl:
-            return cached[1]
-    probe = probe_gitea(host)
-    if use_cache and ttl > 0:
-        _deep_cache[host] = (now, probe)
-    return probe
-
-
-def clear_probe_cache() -> None:
-    """Drop cached deep-probe results (tests and operator-forced refresh)."""
-    _deep_cache.clear()
-
-
-def probe_to_dict(probe: DependencyProbe) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return {
-        "name": probe.name,
-        "kind": probe.kind,
-        "status": probe.status,
-        "detail": probe.detail,
-        "required": probe.required,
-        "healthy": probe.healthy,
-        "latency_ms": probe.latency_ms,
-        "metadata": dict(probe.metadata or {}),
-    }
-
-
-def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return {
-        "status": snapshot.status,
-        "service": snapshot.service,
-        "mode": snapshot.mode,
-        "api": API_PATH,
-        "timestamp": snapshot.timestamp,
-        "readiness": {
-            "ready": snapshot.ready,
-            "complete": snapshot.readiness_complete,
-            "reasons": list(snapshot.readiness_reasons),
-        },
-        "version": {
-            "git_sha": snapshot.version.git_sha,
-            "git_describe": snapshot.version.git_describe,
-            "control_plane_schema_version": (
-                snapshot.version.control_plane_schema_version
-            ),
-            "python_version": snapshot.version.python_version,
-            "known": snapshot.version.known,
-        },
-        "process": {
-            "started_at": snapshot.started_at,
-            "uptime_seconds": snapshot.uptime_seconds,
-        },
-        "deep_probes_requested": snapshot.deep_probes_requested,
-        "dependencies": [probe_to_dict(probe) for probe in snapshot.dependencies],
-        "mcp_namespaces": [dict(row) for row in snapshot.mcp_namespaces],
-        "stale_runtime": {
-            "daemon_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.daemon_head,
-            "checkout_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.checkout_head,
-            "remote_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.remote_head,
-            "stale": snapshot.stale_runtime.stale,
-            "determinable": snapshot.stale_runtime.determinable,
-            "mutation_safe": snapshot.stale_runtime.mutation_safe,
-            "reasons": list(snapshot.stale_runtime.reasons),
-        },
-        "probe_errors": list(snapshot.probe_errors),
-    }

webui/timeline.py

@@ -1,906 +0,0 @@
-"""Workflow-event and conversation timeline model (#637, Phase 1).
-
-Operators cannot browse a unified timeline of workflow events, decisions,
-tool calls, and handoffs: the evidence is scattered across control-plane
-events, Gitea canonical handoff comments, and local logs. This module defines
-one durable, versioned event schema and per-source adapters that normalise
-those scattered records into a single ``WorkflowEvent`` stream, plus a
-read-only query layer (filter by issue / PR / session, stable ordering,
-pagination) that the ``/api/v1/timeline`` route serves.
-
-Design rules honoured here:
-
-- **Read-only.** Sources are read; nothing is mutated. The control-plane
-  database is opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI so a missing or unwritable DB
-  degrades to a reason instead of creating directories or running migrations.
-- **Fail-soft per source.** An unavailable source degrades to a status with a
-  reason rather than raising, and a source that could not run is never
-  rendered as an empty-and-healthy timeline.
-- **Answerable filters only.** Each source declares which filter dimensions it
-  can actually answer. A filter dimension no source that ran can carry is
-  refused with an explicit reason rather than silently matching nothing: an
-  empty page from an unanswerable filter reads to an operator as "no such
-  activity", which is a different — and false — statement.
-- **Redaction at the boundary, fail closed.** Every free-text field (event
-  messages, redacted tool arguments, decision/proof text) is run through the
-  console redaction policy before it leaves this module, and *before* any
-  structured value is derived from it — evidence references are extracted from
-  redacted text, then independently revalidated before serialization. An
-  unredactable value becomes the placeholder, and a value that cannot be proven
-  safe is dropped — an unredacted payload is never emitted, and a generation
-  error never drops raw data to a caller or a log.
-- **Stable ordering.** Events sort by ``(timestamp, source_rank, event_key)``
-  with a deterministic tiebreak, so pagination is stable across calls and
-  events with equal or missing timestamps keep a fixed order.
-
-Non-goals (from the issue): no full chat replay, no mutation of historical
-events, no unredacted tool-argument storage.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import re
-import sqlite3
-from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any, Callable, Iterable
-
-import control_plane_db
-from webui import console_redaction
-
-# The schema is versioned so consumers can branch on shape. Bump on any
-# breaking change to WorkflowEvent's serialized form.
-TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
-
-# Known event sources and their deterministic ordering rank. When two events
-# carry the same timestamp, the source rank breaks the tie before the
-# per-source event key, so a control-plane event and a handoff comment minted
-# in the same second always sort in a fixed order.
-SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE = "control_plane"
-SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF = "gitea_handoff"
-_SOURCE_RANK = {
-    SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE: 0,
-    SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF: 1,
-}
-
-# The filter dimensions the query layer accepts.
-FILTER_ISSUE = "issue"
-FILTER_PR = "pr"
-FILTER_SESSION = "session"
-
-# Which dimensions each source can actually answer. This is a property of the
-# underlying records, not of the query code: the control-plane ``events`` table
-# is (event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at) and carries no
-# session identity at all, so no control-plane event can ever match a session
-# filter. A CTH handoff comment can declare its session as a field, so the
-# handoff source answers all three. Filtering on a dimension the surviving
-# sources cannot carry is refused in ``load_timeline`` rather than answered
-# with an empty page.
-_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
-    SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE: (FILTER_ISSUE, FILTER_PR),
-    SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF: (FILTER_ISSUE, FILTER_PR, FILTER_SESSION),
-}
-
-# Why a source cannot answer a dimension, for the refusal reason an operator reads.
-_SOURCE_FILTER_LIMITS: dict[tuple[str, str], str] = {
-    (SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE, FILTER_SESSION): (
-        "control-plane events carry no session identity "
-        "(the events table has no session column)"
-    ),
-}
-
-# A timestamp far in the future so events with no parseable timestamp sort
-# last (after everything real) instead of first, without raising.
-_MISSING_TS_SORT = "9999-12-31T23:59:59Z"
-
-
-def _parse_ts(value: str | None) -> str | None:
-    """Normalise a timestamp to ``...Z`` UTC, or None when unparseable."""
-    if not value:
-        return None
-    text = str(value).strip()
-    if not text:
-        return None
-    candidate = text[:-1] + "+00:00" if text.endswith("Z") else text
-    try:
-        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(candidate)
-    except ValueError:
-        return None
-    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
-        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-
-def _redact(value: Any) -> Any:
-    """Redact a single free-text field, failing closed to the placeholder."""
-    if value is None:
-        return None
-    return console_redaction.redact_text(str(value))
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class WorkflowEvent:
-    """One normalised timeline event.
-
-    Every field is optional except ``source``/``event_type``/``event_key``
-    because sources carry different subsets. The class is frozen so an adapted
-    event is an immutable record; a consumer that needs a variant builds a new
-    one rather than mutating history.
-    """
-
-    source: str
-    event_type: str
-    event_key: str
-    timestamp: str | None = None
-    actor: str | None = None
-    role: str | None = None
-    issue_number: int | None = None
-    pr_number: int | None = None
-    session_id: str | None = None
-    tool_name: str | None = None
-    decision: str | None = None
-    message: str | None = None
-    correlation_id: str | None = None
-    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-    sensitive: bool = False
-
-    def sort_key(self) -> tuple[str, int, str]:
-        return (
-            self.timestamp or _MISSING_TS_SORT,
-            _SOURCE_RANK.get(self.source, 99),
-            self.event_key,
-        )
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "source": self.source,
-            "event_type": self.event_type,
-            "event_key": self.event_key,
-            "timestamp": self.timestamp,
-            "actor": self.actor,
-            "role": self.role,
-            "issue_number": self.issue_number,
-            "pr_number": self.pr_number,
-            "session_id": self.session_id,
-            "tool_name": self.tool_name,
-            "decision": self.decision,
-            "message": self.message,
-            "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
-            "evidence_refs": list(self.evidence_refs),
-            "sensitive": self.sensitive,
-        }
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Adapters — pure functions from a source's raw records to WorkflowEvents.     #
-# Each is total: a malformed record is skipped, never raised on.               #
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-# Event types whose payload is treated as sensitive and always redaction-hard
-# (they can carry lease/session provenance or tool arguments).
-_SENSITIVE_EVENT_HINTS = ("lease", "capability", "token", "auth", "secret")
-
-# Reference tokens (issue/PR/comment ids) and SHAs parsed out of proof text.
-_EVIDENCE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"(?:#|PR\s*#?|issue\s*#?|comment\s*#?)(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE)
-
-# A commit reference is only recognised when the text *declares* it as one.
-# A bare lowercase hex run is not evidence of anything: at 40 characters it is
-# exactly the shape of a Gitea personal access token, and at 7 it also matches
-# ordinary words such as "defaced". Requiring an anchoring keyword keeps real
-# references ("commit abc1234", "at head a209756...", "base caaae9b6") usable
-# while refusing to lift an undeclared secret-shaped run out of free text.
-_SHA_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?i:\b(?:commit|sha|head|base|parent|revision|rev|merge[- ]base)\b[\s:=@#]*)"
-    r"([0-9a-f]{7,40})\b"
-)
-
-# Shapes a serialized evidence reference is allowed to take. Anything else is
-# dropped rather than emitted.
-_REF_ISSUE_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^#[0-9]{1,9}$")
-_REF_SHA_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{7,40}$")
-
-# A long undelimited hex run with no declaring context is treated as credential
-# material wherever it appears, never as an identifier.
-_BARE_SECRET_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{32,}$")
-
-# An event type reads like an identifier, but a stored one is externally
-# influenced: any producer that writes the control-plane ``events`` table
-# chooses the string. It reaches ``to_dict`` verbatim, so it is validated here
-# rather than trusted because of where it came from.
-_CP_EVENT_TYPE_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9._:+-]{0,63}$")
-
-# Emitted in place of a value that cannot be proven safe. Deliberately not a
-# plausible workflow type: an unsafe value is refused, never quietly rewritten
-# into a different valid-looking one that would misdescribe the record.
-UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE = "unsafe:redacted"
-
-# Emitted for a CTH heading that is not a declared member of ``CTH_TYPES``. The
-# contract is enforced on write (``format_cth_body``) and on assess; the read
-# path the timeline uses enforces it too rather than assuming it was.
-UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE = "handoff:unrecognized"
-
-# A source record id is a plain integer in both sources it comes from: the
-# control-plane ``events`` primary key and a Gitea comment id. ``event_key`` is
-# serialized verbatim and is the pagination tiebreak, so anything else is
-# refused rather than interpolated into it.
-_RECORD_ID_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9]{1,19}$")
-
-
-def _kind_to_numbers(kind: str | None, number: int | None) -> tuple[int | None, int | None]:
-    """Map a control-plane work-item (kind, number) to (issue_no, pr_no)."""
-    if number is None:
-        return (None, None)
-    if kind == "pr":
-        return (None, int(number))
-    if kind == "issue":
-        return (int(number), None)
-    return (None, None)
-
-
-def _correlation_for(kind: str | None, number: int | None) -> str | None:
-    if number is None or kind not in ("issue", "pr"):
-        return None
-    return f"{kind}#{number}"
-
-
-def _extract_evidence_refs(*texts: str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    """Extract issue/PR and declared-commit references from **redacted** text.
-
-    Callers must pass text that has already been through :func:`_redact`; this
-    function derives a structured field from its input, so extracting ahead of
-    redaction would republish whatever redaction was about to remove. Every
-    reference is revalidated by :func:`_validated_evidence_refs` before it is
-    serialized.
-    """
-    refs: list[str] = []
-    for text in texts:
-        if not text:
-            continue
-        for match in _EVIDENCE_REF_RE.finditer(text):
-            token = f"#{match.group(1)}"
-            if token not in refs:
-                refs.append(token)
-        for match in _SHA_RE.finditer(text):
-            token = match.group(1)
-            if token not in refs:
-                refs.append(token)
-    return tuple(refs)
-
-
-def _validated_evidence_refs(refs: Iterable[str]) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], bool]:
-    """Independently revalidate references immediately before serialization.
-
-    Extraction is not trusted on its own. A reference survives only when it has
-    a known reference shape and is unchanged by a second redaction pass — a
-    value the redaction policy would alter is credential material that must not
-    be emitted as a structured field. A full 40-character SHA stays usable
-    because extraction only accepts a hex run the source text explicitly
-    declared as a commit. Returns ``(safe_refs, dropped_any)``; ``dropped_any``
-    marks the event sensitive so the drop is visible rather than silent.
-    """
-    safe: list[str] = []
-    dropped = False
-    for ref in refs or ():
-        try:
-            token = str(ref).strip()
-            if not token:
-                continue
-            recognised = bool(_REF_ISSUE_SHAPE.match(token) or _REF_SHA_SHAPE.match(token))
-            if not recognised:
-                dropped = True
-                continue
-            if _redact(token) != token:
-                dropped = True
-                continue
-            if token not in safe:
-                safe.append(token)
-        except Exception:
-            # Fail closed: a reference that cannot be proven safe is dropped.
-            dropped = True
-            continue
-    return (tuple(safe), dropped)
-
-
-def _safe_session_id(value: Any) -> str | None:
-    """Return a session identifier only when it is safe to emit.
-
-    The value is authoritative source data — a session the record names for
-    itself — but it is still free text. It is dropped when redaction alters it
-    or when it is a bare secret-shaped hex run, so a credential parked in a
-    session field can never reach the payload or be echoed back by a filter.
-    """
-    if value is None:
-        return None
-    text = str(value).strip()
-    if not text:
-        return None
-    if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text):
-        return None
-    return text if _redact(text) == text else None
-
-
-def _safe_record_id(value: Any) -> str | None:
-    """Return a source record id only when it is a plain numeric identifier.
-
-    ``event_key`` is serialized verbatim and is the deterministic pagination
-    tiebreak, so an id is interpolated into it only when it has the shape both
-    real sources actually produce. A record whose identity cannot be trusted is
-    refused by the caller rather than keyed on.
-    """
-    if value is None or isinstance(value, bool):
-        return None
-    if isinstance(value, int):
-        return str(value)
-    text = str(value).strip()
-    return text if _RECORD_ID_SHAPE.match(text) else None
-
-
-def _safe_cp_event_type(value: Any) -> tuple[str, bool]:
-    """Validate a stored control-plane event type. Returns ``(type, unsafe)``.
-
-    The stored value is externally influenced — whichever producer wrote the
-    ``events`` row chose the string — and ``to_dict`` serializes it verbatim, so
-    it passes a boundary of its own instead of relying on the one ``message``
-    passes. A value survives only when it is an ordinary identifier, is not a
-    bare secret-shaped hex run, and is unchanged by a redaction pass. Anything
-    else fails closed to :data:`UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE`: the record stays visible as
-    an audit entry, but the value itself is never republished — not verbatim,
-    not partially sanitized, and not rewritten into some other valid-looking
-    type that would misdescribe what happened.
-    """
-    text = ("" if value is None else str(value)).strip()
-    if not text:
-        return ("", False)
-    if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text):
-        return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
-    if not _CP_EVENT_TYPE_SHAPE.match(text):
-        return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
-    if _redact(text) != text:
-        return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
-    return (text, False)
-
-
-def _safe_echo(value: Any) -> Any:
-    """Guard a scalar that is echoed back rather than derived from a record.
-
-    Query scope and filter values are caller-supplied and are reflected in the
-    response so an operator can see what was asked. Reflection is still
-    emission: a value redaction would alter, or a bare secret-shaped hex run, is
-    replaced by the placeholder instead of being echoed verbatim. Ordinary
-    scope and filter values pass through untouched.
-    """
-    if value is None or isinstance(value, (int, bool)):
-        return value
-    text = str(value)
-    if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text.strip()):
-        return console_redaction.REDACTED
-    return _redact(text)
-
-
-def adapt_cp_events(rows: Iterable[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
-    """Adapt control-plane ``events`` rows (joined to work_items) into events.
-
-    Each row is expected to carry ``event_id``, ``event_type``, ``message``,
-    ``created_at`` and the joined work-item ``kind``/``number``. Rows missing
-    an id or type are skipped so a partially written table never raises.
-    """
-    events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
-    for row in rows or []:
-        try:
-            event_id = _safe_record_id(row.get("event_id"))
-            raw_event_type = (row.get("event_type") or "").strip()
-            if event_id is None or not raw_event_type:
-                continue
-            # The stored type is source data, not a trusted constant: validate
-            # it before it is serialized, exactly as `message` below is redacted
-            # before it is serialized.
-            event_type, event_type_unsafe = _safe_cp_event_type(raw_event_type)
-            kind = row.get("kind")
-            number = row.get("number")
-            issue_no, pr_no = _kind_to_numbers(kind, number)
-            sensitive = event_type_unsafe or any(
-                hint in raw_event_type.lower() for hint in _SENSITIVE_EVENT_HINTS
-            )
-            events.append(
-                WorkflowEvent(
-                    source=SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE,
-                    event_type=event_type,
-                    event_key=f"cp:{event_id}",
-                    timestamp=_parse_ts(row.get("created_at")),
-                    issue_number=issue_no,
-                    pr_number=pr_no,
-                    # No session_id: the control-plane events table is
-                    # (event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)
-                    # and records no session. Inventing one from the work item
-                    # or the message text would be a guess, so this source
-                    # declares the session dimension unsupported instead
-                    # (_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT) and the query layer refuses a
-                    # session filter it cannot honestly answer.
-                    message=_redact(row.get("message")),
-                    correlation_id=_correlation_for(kind, number),
-                    sensitive=sensitive,
-                )
-            )
-        except Exception:
-            # A single malformed row must not sink the whole adaptation.
-            continue
-    return events
-
-
-def adapt_cth_comments(
-    comments: Iterable[dict[str, Any]],
-    *,
-    kind: str,
-    number: int,
-) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
-    """Adapt Gitea Canonical Thread Handoff (CTH) comments into events.
-
-    Only comments that parse as a CTH (``canonical_thread_handoff.parse_cth_comment``)
-    become events; ordinary comments are ignored. ``kind``/``number`` scope the
-    events to the issue or PR the comments belong to.
-    """
-    # Imported lazily so this module has no import-time dependency on the
-    # handoff parser when only the control-plane adapter is used.
-    from canonical_thread_handoff import is_known_cth_type, parse_cth_comment
-
-    # ``kind``/``number`` are interpolated into event_key and correlation_id, so
-    # they are normalised once here. A scope this adapter cannot express is
-    # refused outright rather than serialized into an identifier.
-    kind = (kind or "").strip().lower()
-    if kind not in ("issue", "pr"):
-        return []
-    try:
-        number = int(number)
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        return []
-
-    issue_no, pr_no = _kind_to_numbers(kind, number)
-    correlation = _correlation_for(kind, number)
-    events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
-    for comment in comments or []:
-        try:
-            body = comment.get("body") or ""
-            parsed = parse_cth_comment(body)
-            if not parsed:
-                continue
-            fields = parsed.get("fields") or {}
-            cth_type = parsed.get("cth_type") or ""
-            comment_id = _safe_record_id(comment.get("id"))
-            if comment_id is None:
-                continue
-            # The CTH heading is free text: the parser accepts whatever follows
-            # "## CTH:", and only the write and assess paths check it against
-            # the contract. Check it here too — an unrecognised heading is
-            # reported as such rather than serialized into event_type, so
-            # arbitrary, malformed, or secret-shaped heading content has no way
-            # through. Declared types are preserved exactly.
-            cth_type_known = is_known_cth_type(cth_type)
-            # Redaction runs first, and every derived value is taken from the
-            # redacted text — deriving evidence refs from the raw proof would
-            # re-emit exactly what redaction was about to remove.
-            decision = _redact(fields.get("decision"))
-            proof = _redact(fields.get("proof"))
-            next_action = _redact(fields.get("next action"))
-            refs, refs_dropped = _validated_evidence_refs(
-                _extract_evidence_refs(proof, decision)
-            )
-            events.append(
-                WorkflowEvent(
-                    source=SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF,
-                    event_type=(
-                        f"handoff:{cth_type.strip()}"
-                        if cth_type_known
-                        else UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE
-                    ),
-                    event_key=f"cth:{kind}:{number}:{comment_id}",
-                    timestamp=_parse_ts(comment.get("created_at")),
-                    actor=_redact((comment.get("user") or {}).get("login")),
-                    role=_redact(fields.get("next owner")),
-                    issue_number=issue_no,
-                    pr_number=pr_no,
-                    # A CTH names its own session when the producer records one;
-                    # it is read from that declared field, never inferred from
-                    # unrelated text.
-                    session_id=_safe_session_id(fields.get("session")),
-                    decision=decision,
-                    message=next_action or _redact(fields.get("status")),
-                    correlation_id=correlation,
-                    evidence_refs=refs,
-                    sensitive=refs_dropped or not cth_type_known,
-                )
-            )
-        except Exception:
-            continue
-    return events
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Read-only control-plane event source.                                       #
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-_CP_EVENTS_QUERY = """
-SELECT e.event_id   AS event_id,
-       e.event_type AS event_type,
-       e.message    AS message,
-       e.created_at AS created_at,
-       w.kind       AS kind,
-       w.number     AS number
-FROM events e
-JOIN work_items w ON e.work_item_id = w.work_item_id
-WHERE w.remote = ? AND w.org = ? AND w.repo = ?
-"""
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class SourceStatus:
-    """Fail-soft status for one timeline source.
-
-    ``supported_filters`` states which filter dimensions this source's records
-    can carry; ``unsupported_filters`` names the requested dimensions it cannot,
-    so an operator can see *why* a source contributed nothing rather than being
-    left to read an empty list as an absence of activity.
-    """
-
-    name: str
-    ok: bool
-    reason: str | None = None
-    count: int = 0
-    supported_filters: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-    unsupported_filters: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "name": self.name,
-            "ok": self.ok,
-            "reason": self.reason,
-            "count": self.count,
-            "supported_filters": list(self.supported_filters),
-            "unsupported_filters": list(self.unsupported_filters),
-        }
-
-
-def _cp_status(*, ok: bool, reason: str | None = None, count: int = 0) -> SourceStatus:
-    return SourceStatus(
-        SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE,
-        ok=ok,
-        # A failure reason is serialized like any other field and is often an
-        # exception string carrying a path or a transport error, so it crosses
-        # the redaction boundary too. Static reasons pass through unchanged.
-        reason=_redact(reason),
-        count=count,
-        supported_filters=_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT[SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE],
-    )
-
-
-def _handoff_status(*, ok: bool, reason: str | None = None, count: int = 0) -> SourceStatus:
-    return SourceStatus(
-        SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF,
-        ok=ok,
-        # Same boundary as the control-plane status: this reason can quote an
-        # error raised by a live authenticated fetch.
-        reason=_redact(reason),
-        count=count,
-        supported_filters=_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT[SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF],
-    )
-
-
-def read_cp_events(
-    *,
-    remote: str,
-    org: str,
-    repo: str,
-    db_path: str | None = None,
-) -> tuple[list[WorkflowEvent], SourceStatus]:
-    """Read scoped control-plane events read-only. Never creates the DB.
-
-    Opens the SQLite file through a ``mode=ro`` URI: a health/timeline read
-    must never create directories or run the schema migration that
-    ``ControlPlaneDB()`` performs on construction. A missing or unreadable DB
-    degrades to a status with a reason.
-    """
-    path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path()).strip()
-    conn: sqlite3.Connection | None = None
-    try:
-        conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True)
-        conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        cursor = conn.execute(_CP_EVENTS_QUERY, (remote, org, repo))
-        rows = [dict(r) for r in cursor.fetchall()]
-    except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
-        return ([], _cp_status(ok=False, reason=f"control-plane DB unavailable: {exc}"))
-    except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-        return ([], _cp_status(ok=False, reason=f"control-plane read failed: {exc}"))
-    finally:
-        if conn is not None:
-            conn.close()
-    events = adapt_cp_events(rows)
-    return (events, _cp_status(ok=True, count=len(events)))
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Filter, sort, paginate.                                                     #
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-
-def filter_events(
-    events: Iterable[WorkflowEvent],
-    *,
-    issue: int | None = None,
-    pr: int | None = None,
-    session: str | None = None,
-) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
-    """Filter events by issue number, PR number, and/or session id.
-
-    Filters are conjunctive. A filter that names a dimension an event does not
-    carry excludes that event (an issue filter excludes PR-only events).
-    """
-    out: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
-    for ev in events:
-        if issue is not None and ev.issue_number != issue:
-            continue
-        if pr is not None and ev.pr_number != pr:
-            continue
-        if session is not None and ev.session_id != session:
-            continue
-        out.append(ev)
-    return out
-
-
-def sort_events(events: Iterable[WorkflowEvent]) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
-    """Return events in stable timeline order (ascending)."""
-    return sorted(events, key=lambda ev: ev.sort_key())
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class TimelinePage:
-    """One page of the sorted, filtered timeline."""
-
-    events: tuple[WorkflowEvent, ...]
-    total: int
-    limit: int
-    offset: int
-
-    @property
-    def next_offset(self) -> int | None:
-        nxt = self.offset + len(self.events)
-        return nxt if nxt < self.total else None
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "events": [ev.to_dict() for ev in self.events],
-            "pagination": {
-                "total": self.total,
-                "limit": self.limit,
-                "offset": self.offset,
-                "returned": len(self.events),
-                "next_offset": self.next_offset,
-                "has_more": self.next_offset is not None,
-            },
-        }
-
-
-_MAX_LIMIT = 500
-_DEFAULT_LIMIT = 50
-
-
-def _coerce_bounds(limit: int | None, offset: int | None) -> tuple[int, int]:
-    try:
-        lim = int(limit) if limit is not None else _DEFAULT_LIMIT
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        lim = _DEFAULT_LIMIT
-    try:
-        off = int(offset) if offset is not None else 0
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        off = 0
-    lim = max(1, min(lim, _MAX_LIMIT))
-    off = max(0, off)
-    return (lim, off)
-
-
-def paginate(events: list[WorkflowEvent], *, limit: int | None, offset: int | None) -> TimelinePage:
-    lim, off = _coerce_bounds(limit, offset)
-    window = events[off : off + lim]
-    return TimelinePage(events=tuple(window), total=len(events), limit=lim, offset=off)
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Composition — load_timeline aggregates all sources, fail-soft.              #
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-# A comment source is a callable that, given (kind, number), returns the raw
-# Gitea comment list for that issue/PR. The route supplies a live fail-soft
-# fetcher; tests supply a fixture. When None, the handoff source is reported as
-# not-run (never silently empty-and-healthy).
-CommentSource = Callable[[str, int], list[dict[str, Any]]]
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class TimelineSnapshot:
-    """One answered timeline query.
-
-    ``ok`` is False when the query could not be answered as asked — currently
-    when a requested filter dimension no surviving source can carry was
-    supplied. The page is then empty *and* the snapshot says so, because an
-    ``ok`` empty page is a claim that no such activity exists.
-    """
-
-    schema_version: int
-    remote: str
-    org: str
-    repo: str
-    filters: dict[str, Any]
-    page: TimelinePage
-    sources: tuple[SourceStatus, ...]
-    ok: bool = True
-    error: dict[str, Any] | None = None
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "ok": self.ok,
-            "error": self.error,
-            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
-            # Scope and filters are echoed caller input, not derived record
-            # data. Reflecting a value is still emitting it, so both cross the
-            # same boundary; ordinary scope and filter values are unchanged.
-            "scope": {
-                "remote": _safe_echo(self.remote),
-                "org": _safe_echo(self.org),
-                "repo": _safe_echo(self.repo),
-            },
-            "filters": {key: _safe_echo(value) for key, value in self.filters.items()},
-            "sources": [s.to_dict() for s in self.sources],
-            **self.page.to_dict(),
-        }
-
-
-def _unanswerable_reasons(
-    statuses: Iterable[SourceStatus], unanswerable: Iterable[str]
-) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
-    """Explain, per source, why each unanswerable dimension went unanswered."""
-    out: list[dict[str, str]] = []
-    for status in statuses:
-        for dim in unanswerable:
-            if dim not in status.supported_filters:
-                reason = _SOURCE_FILTER_LIMITS.get(
-                    (status.name, dim), f"this source's records carry no {dim} identity"
-                )
-            elif not status.ok:
-                reason = (
-                    f"this source can carry {dim} but did not run: "
-                    f"{status.reason or 'unavailable'}"
-                )
-            else:
-                continue
-            out.append({"source": status.name, "filter": dim, "reason": reason})
-    return out
-
-
-def load_timeline(
-    *,
-    remote: str,
-    org: str,
-    repo: str,
-    issue: int | None = None,
-    pr: int | None = None,
-    session: str | None = None,
-    limit: int | None = None,
-    offset: int | None = None,
-    db_path: str | None = None,
-    comment_source: CommentSource | None = None,
-) -> TimelineSnapshot:
-    """Aggregate every timeline source into one filtered, paginated snapshot.
-
-    Sources are read independently and fail soft: an unavailable source
-    contributes a ``SourceStatus`` with ``ok=False`` and a reason, and never
-    collapses the whole timeline. The handoff source only runs when a specific
-    issue or PR is requested (a handoff comment belongs to one thread) and a
-    ``comment_source`` is available; otherwise it is reported as ``not run``
-    rather than as an empty-and-healthy source.
-
-    A filter dimension that no surviving source can carry — a ``session``
-    filter when the only source that ran is the control plane, whose events
-    record no session — is refused with ``ok=False`` and a structured error
-    instead of being answered with an empty page.
-    """
-    all_events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
-    statuses: list[SourceStatus] = []
-
-    cp_events, cp_status = read_cp_events(remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo, db_path=db_path)
-    all_events.extend(cp_events)
-    statuses.append(cp_status)
-
-    # Gitea handoff comments are thread-scoped: only fetch when the caller
-    # narrowed to one issue or PR, and only when a source was provided.
-    handoff_target: tuple[str, int] | None = None
-    if pr is not None:
-        handoff_target = ("pr", pr)
-    elif issue is not None:
-        handoff_target = ("issue", issue)
-
-    if handoff_target is None:
-        statuses.append(
-            _handoff_status(
-                ok=False,
-                reason="not run: handoff comments are thread-scoped; filter by issue or pr to include them",
-            )
-        )
-    elif comment_source is None:
-        statuses.append(
-            _handoff_status(
-                ok=False,
-                reason="not run: no comment source configured for this timeline read",
-            )
-        )
-    else:
-        kind, number = handoff_target
-        try:
-            comments = comment_source(kind, number) or []
-            handoff_events = adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind=kind, number=number)
-            all_events.extend(handoff_events)
-            statuses.append(_handoff_status(ok=True, count=len(handoff_events)))
-        except Exception as exc:  # fail soft: a fetch/parse error degrades this source only
-            statuses.append(_handoff_status(ok=False, reason=f"handoff source failed: {exc}"))
-
-    requested = tuple(
-        name
-        for name, value in ((FILTER_ISSUE, issue), (FILTER_PR, pr), (FILTER_SESSION, session))
-        if value is not None
-    )
-    statuses = [
-        replace(
-            status,
-            unsupported_filters=tuple(
-                dim for dim in requested if dim not in status.supported_filters
-            ),
-        )
-        for status in statuses
-    ]
-    filters = {"issue": issue, "pr": pr, "session": session}
-
-    # A dimension is answerable only if a source that actually ran can carry it.
-    # If none can, refuse: an empty page would assert "no such activity", which
-    # is a claim this timeline is not in a position to make.
-    answerable: set[str] = set()
-    for status in statuses:
-        if status.ok:
-            answerable.update(status.supported_filters)
-    unanswerable = tuple(dim for dim in requested if dim not in answerable)
-
-    if unanswerable:
-        return TimelineSnapshot(
-            schema_version=TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=org,
-            repo=repo,
-            filters=filters,
-            page=paginate([], limit=limit, offset=offset),
-            sources=tuple(statuses),
-            ok=False,
-            error={
-                "code": "filter_not_supported",
-                "unsupported_filters": list(unanswerable),
-                "detail": (
-                    "no timeline source that ran can answer "
-                    + ", ".join(f"'{dim}'" for dim in unanswerable)
-                    + "; the result is refused rather than returned empty"
-                ),
-                "sources": _unanswerable_reasons(statuses, unanswerable),
-            },
-        )
-
-    filtered = filter_events(all_events, issue=issue, pr=pr, session=session)
-    ordered = sort_events(filtered)
-    page = paginate(ordered, limit=limit, offset=offset)
-
-    return TimelineSnapshot(
-        schema_version=TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
-        remote=remote,
-        org=org,
-        repo=repo,
-        filters=filters,
-        page=page,
-        sources=tuple(statuses),
-    )
-
-
-def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: TimelineSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return snapshot.to_dict()