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15 changed files with 332 additions and 3453 deletions
+5 -176
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@@ -53,8 +53,6 @@ OUTCOME_CANDIDATE_SET_DRIFT = "candidate_set_drift"
SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION = "claimed_by_other_session"
# #776: controller-supplied pre-rank exclusion.
SKIP_EXCLUDED_BY_CONTROLLER = "excluded_by_controller"
# #844: epic / child-only implementation container (pre-rank).
SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER = "epic_or_child_only_container"
# Ownership verdicts for a live claim on a candidate (#765).
OWNERSHIP_OWN = "own"
@@ -132,39 +130,6 @@ ROLE_ACTIONS: dict[str, tuple[tuple[str, ...], tuple[str, ...]]] = {
}
# Body phrases that prove an issue is an implementation container, not a
# unit of direct author work (#844). Matched case-insensitively against the
# issue body. Title alone is never sufficient (ordinary issues may mention
# "epic" incidentally).
_CHILD_ONLY_BODY_MARKERS: tuple[str, ...] = (
"implementation is delivered via child issues only",
"implementation is delivered through child issues only",
"implementation is delivered via child issues",
"implementation is delivered through child issues",
"do not implement product features in this epic",
"do not implement product features in this epic issue itself",
"no product feature implementation is claimed complete solely on this epic",
"implementable child issues remain independently eligible",
"owns the product roadmap and linkage",
"this epic owns the product roadmap",
"coordination container",
"child-only container",
"implementation is delegated to child",
)
# Explicit epic / umbrella labels (structured evidence preferred over title).
_EPIC_LABELS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
{
"type:epic",
"epic",
"kind:epic",
"scope:epic",
"type:umbrella",
"umbrella",
}
)
@dataclass
class WorkCandidate:
"""One assignable Gitea issue or PR presented to the allocator."""
@@ -174,7 +139,6 @@ class WorkCandidate:
state: str = "open"
labels: tuple[str, ...] = ()
title: str = ""
body: str = ""
priority: int = 0
head_sha: str | None = None
# Routing signals (callers derive from Gitea / review feedback).
@@ -194,7 +158,6 @@ class WorkCandidate:
self.labels = tuple(
str(x).strip().lower() for x in (self.labels or ()) if str(x).strip()
)
self.body = str(self.body or "")
if self.kind not in WORK_KINDS:
raise InvalidWorkKindError(
f"candidate kind '{self.kind}' is not assignable; only "
@@ -208,7 +171,6 @@ class WorkCandidate:
"state": self.state,
"labels": list(self.labels),
"title": self.title,
"body": self.body,
"priority": self.priority,
"head_sha": self.head_sha,
"request_changes_current_head": self.request_changes_current_head,
@@ -222,51 +184,6 @@ class WorkCandidate:
}
def classify_epic_or_child_only_container(
c: WorkCandidate,
) -> tuple[bool, str | None]:
"""Return whether *c* is an epic / child-only implementation container (#844).
Exclusion uses structured evidence first (labels, body scope language).
A bare title containing the word "epic" is **not** enough — ordinary
implementable issues may mention epics incidentally. A title that is
explicitly prefixed ``Epic:`` only counts when the body also proves
child-only / no-direct-implementation scope (or an epic label is present).
PRs are never classified as containers here (they already have a head).
"""
if c.kind != "issue":
return False, None
labels = set(c.labels)
epic_label = sorted(labels & _EPIC_LABELS)
body_l = (c.body or "").lower()
title = (c.title or "").strip()
title_l = title.lower()
body_hits = [m for m in _CHILD_ONLY_BODY_MARKERS if m in body_l]
title_epic_prefix = title_l.startswith("epic:") or title_l.startswith("epic ")
if epic_label:
detail = f"label={epic_label[0]}"
if body_hits:
detail = f"{detail}; body_marker={body_hits[0]!r}"
return True, detail
if body_hits:
# Body proves child-only / umbrella scope. Title "Epic:" is corroborating
# but not required — containers without the word still exclude.
detail = f"body_marker={body_hits[0]!r}"
if title_epic_prefix:
detail = f"title_epic_prefix; {detail}"
return True, detail
# Title-only "Epic:" without body scope evidence is insufficient (#844 AC:
# eligibility does not rely solely on the word "Epic" in a title).
# Similarly, incidental "epic" mid-title without markers stays eligible.
return False, None
@dataclass
class SkipRecord:
kind: str
@@ -933,8 +850,7 @@ def allocate_next_work(
ownership_defects: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
controller_excluded: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
# #776 AC2 + #844: remove excluded numbers *and* epic/child-only containers
# *before* ranking / selection / lease so they never receive assignments.
# #776 AC2: remove excluded numbers *before* ranking / selection / lease.
rankable: list[WorkCandidate] = []
for c in candidates:
if int(c.number) in exclude_set:
@@ -1013,23 +929,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
},
}
continue
# #844: epics / child-only containers are never direct implement targets.
is_container, container_detail = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(c)
if is_container:
detail = container_detail or "epic or child-only container"
reason = (
f"{c.kind}#{c.number} {SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER}: "
f"{detail}; implementation is delegated to child issues"
)
skipped.append(
SkipRecord(
c.kind,
c.number,
reason,
SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER,
)
)
continue
rankable.append(c)
ordered = sort_candidates(rankable)
@@ -1216,12 +1115,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
"reasons": [
"dry-run only (apply=false); no assignment/lease created — "
"call again with apply=true to reserve via control-plane DB"
+ (
"; after apply, the required-role worker consumes via "
"gitea_adopt_workflow_lease (#843)"
if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE and expected_role != role_norm
else ""
)
],
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
@@ -1253,9 +1146,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
# Atomic reserve via #613 substrate.
ttl = lease_ttl_seconds if lease_ttl_seconds is not None else None
try:
cross_role_handoff = (
mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE and lease_role != role_norm
)
kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
"session_id": session_id,
"role": lease_role,
@@ -1267,8 +1157,7 @@ def allocate_next_work(
"expected_head_sha": selected.head_sha,
"allowed_actions": allowed,
"forbidden_actions": forbidden,
# #843: mark cross-role allocations as awaiting independent consume
"phase": "awaiting_handoff" if cross_role_handoff else "allocated",
"phase": "allocated",
}
if ttl is not None:
kwargs["lease_ttl_seconds"] = int(ttl)
@@ -1348,52 +1237,7 @@ def allocate_next_work(
"lease_role": lease_role,
"source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
}
consume_allocation = None
if cross_role_handoff and result.lease_id:
# Durable handoff marker so independent required-role workers can
# consume without sharing the controller session (#843).
handoff_prov = {
"cross_role_handoff": True,
"handoff_status": "pending",
"allocating_session_id": session_id,
"allocating_role": role_norm,
"required_role": expected_role,
"required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
"required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
"assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
"lease_id": result.lease_id,
"allocation_mode": mode,
"adopted_by_session_id": None,
}
try:
db.attach_lease_provenance(result.lease_id, handoff_prov)
except ControlPlaneError:
# Still return assignment evidence; consume path may be unavailable
handoff_prov["attach_failed"] = True
consume_allocation = {
"tool": "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease",
"lease_id": result.lease_id,
"assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
"required_role": expected_role,
"required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
"required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
"handoff_status": "pending",
"controller_session_required": False,
"instructions": (
f"From an independent {expected_role} session "
f"({selection['required_namespace']} / "
f"{selection['required_profile']}), call "
f"gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(lease_id={result.lease_id!r}) "
"to consume this controller allocation. The allocating "
"controller process does not need to remain alive. Wrong-role "
"and second-adoption attempts fail closed."
),
}
lease_proof["cross_role_handoff"] = True
lease_proof["handoff_status"] = "pending"
lease_proof["consume_tool"] = "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease"
out = {
return {
"success": True,
"outcome": OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
"apply": True,
@@ -1427,17 +1271,8 @@ def allocate_next_work(
"lease_role": lease_role,
"lease_proof": lease_proof,
"selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
"cross_role_handoff": bool(cross_role_handoff),
},
"next_valid_command": (
(
f"consume lease {result.lease_id} via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease "
f"as {expected_role}, then "
)
+ _next_command(lease_role, selected)
if cross_role_handoff
else _next_command(lease_role, selected)
),
"next_valid_command": _next_command(lease_role, selected),
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
"file_lock_only": False,
"comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -1452,14 +1287,9 @@ def allocate_next_work(
"downstream_note": (
"#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
"allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
"controller routes only under cross_role (#840); "
"cross-role assignments are consumable by independent "
"required-role workers via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease (#843)"
"controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
),
}
if consume_allocation is not None:
out["consume_allocation"] = consume_allocation
return out
def _next_command(role: str, c: WorkCandidate) -> str:
@@ -1511,7 +1341,6 @@ def candidate_from_dict(data: dict[str, Any]) -> WorkCandidate:
state=str(data.get("state") or "open"),
labels=tuple(data.get("labels") or ()),
title=str(data.get("title") or ""),
body=str(data.get("body") or ""),
priority=priority,
head_sha=data.get("head_sha"),
request_changes_current_head=bool(data.get("request_changes_current_head")),
+3 -169
View File
@@ -1637,13 +1637,11 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
provenance: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
lease_ttl_seconds: int = DEFAULT_LEASE_TTL_SECONDS,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Transfer or refresh a lease with provenance (#601 / #843).
"""Transfer or refresh a lease with provenance (#601).
* Same owner + active → refresh (owner-resume).
* Cross-role handoff pending + matching required role → atomic consume
(even while the allocating controller session still "owns" the lease).
* Expired/abandoned/released → create new assignment+lease with provenance.
* Active foreign (non-handoff) → raise ForeignLeaseError (never silent steal).
* Active foreign → raise ForeignLeaseError (never silent steal).
"""
now = _utc_now()
now_s = _ts(now)
@@ -1679,35 +1677,7 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
status = "expired"
owner = lease["session_id"]
# Parse durable provenance for cross-role handoff consume (#843).
lease_prov: dict[str, Any] = {}
if "provenance_json" in lease.keys() and lease["provenance_json"]:
try:
loaded = json.loads(lease["provenance_json"])
if isinstance(loaded, dict):
lease_prov = loaded
except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
lease_prov = {}
handoff_pending = bool(lease_prov.get("cross_role_handoff")) and (
str(lease_prov.get("handoff_status") or "pending").strip().lower()
== "pending"
)
already_adopted = bool(
(lease["adopted_by_session_id"] if "adopted_by_session_id" in lease.keys() else None)
or lease_prov.get("adopted_by_session_id")
)
required_role = str(
lease_prov.get("required_role") or lease["role"] or ""
).strip().lower()
adopter_role = (role or "").strip().lower()
cross_role_consume = (
handoff_pending
and not already_adopted
and status == "active"
and owner != adopter_session_id
)
if status == "active" and owner != adopter_session_id and not cross_role_consume:
if status == "active" and owner != adopter_session_id:
raise ForeignLeaseError(
f"cannot adopt active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by {owner}"
)
@@ -1791,142 +1761,6 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
"reasons": ["owner-resume: refreshed lease with provenance"],
}
# #843: controller→required-role handoff consume (atomic, same lease_id)
if cross_role_consume:
if not required_role:
raise ControlPlaneError(
f"cross-role handoff lease {lease_id} missing required_role"
)
if adopter_role != required_role:
raise ForeignLeaseError(
f"wrong role for cross-role handoff consume: "
f"required={required_role} adopter={adopter_role or 'none'} "
f"(fail closed)"
)
# CAS: only transfer if still owned by allocating session and unadopted
cols = self._lease_columns(conn)
adopted_col_null = (
"(adopted_by_session_id IS NULL OR adopted_by_session_id = '')"
if "adopted_by_session_id" in cols
else "1=1"
)
cas = conn.execute(
f"""
UPDATE leases
SET session_id = ?,
heartbeat_at = ?,
expires_at = ?,
phase = ?,
role = ?
WHERE lease_id = ?
AND status = 'active'
AND session_id = ?
AND {adopted_col_null}
""",
(
adopter_session_id,
now_s,
expires,
"adopted",
required_role,
lease_id,
owner,
),
)
if cas.rowcount != 1:
raise ForeignLeaseError(
f"cross-role handoff consume lost race for lease {lease_id} "
"(already adopted or no longer pending; fail closed)"
)
if "adopted_from_session_id" in cols:
conn.execute(
"""
UPDATE leases
SET adopted_from_session_id = ?, adopted_by_session_id = ?
WHERE lease_id = ?
""",
(owner, adopter_session_id, lease_id),
)
if "worktree_path" in cols and worktree_path:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE leases SET worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
(worktree_path, lease_id),
)
if "owner_pid" in cols and owner_pid is not None:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
(owner_pid, lease_id),
)
if "expected_head_sha" in cols and expected_head_sha:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE leases SET expected_head_sha = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
(expected_head_sha, lease_id),
)
# Merge handoff provenance + caller provenance
merged = dict(lease_prov)
merged.update(provenance or {})
merged["cross_role_handoff"] = True
merged["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
merged["adopted_from_session_id"] = owner
merged["adopted_by_session_id"] = adopter_session_id
merged["required_role"] = required_role
if "provenance_json" in cols:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE leases SET provenance_json = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
(json.dumps(merged), lease_id),
)
# Transfer active assignment ownership atomically
asn_cas = conn.execute(
"""
UPDATE assignments
SET session_id = ?, role = ?
WHERE lease_id = ? AND status = 'active' AND session_id = ?
""",
(adopter_session_id, required_role, lease_id, owner),
)
if asn_cas.rowcount < 1:
# Fail closed: assignment must move with the lease
raise ControlPlaneError(
f"cross-role handoff: no active assignment for lease {lease_id} "
f"owned by {owner}"
)
lease2 = conn.execute(
"SELECT * FROM leases WHERE lease_id = ?", (lease_id,)
).fetchone()
asn = conn.execute(
"""
SELECT * FROM assignments
WHERE lease_id = ? AND status = 'active'
ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1
""",
(lease_id,),
).fetchone()
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO events(work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)
VALUES (?, 'lease_adopted', ?, ?)
""",
(
lease["work_item_id"],
f"cross-role handoff: {adopter_session_id} consumed "
f"{lease_id} from {owner} as {required_role}",
now_s,
),
)
return {
"outcome": "adopted_cross_role_handoff",
"lease": dict(lease2) if lease2 else dict(lease),
"assignment": dict(asn) if asn else None,
"reasons": [
"cross-role handoff: independent required-role worker consumed "
"controller allocation without abandonment"
],
"adopted_by_session_id": adopter_session_id,
"adopted_from_session_id": owner,
"required_role": required_role,
"handoff_status": "adopted",
}
# Non-active: create new lease + assignment (transfer)
new_lease_id = f"lease-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]}"
new_asn_id = f"asn-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]}"
+1 -81
View File
@@ -52,8 +52,7 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
| Path | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `/` | Home / operator overview |
| `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`, `uptime_seconds`) |
| `/api/v1/system/health` | Structured read-only system health (#634) |
| `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`) |
| `/queue` | Live PR and issue queue dashboard (#429) |
| `/api/queue` | JSON queue export with pagination metadata |
| `/projects` | Project registry list with status and onboarding progress (#427, #635) |
@@ -79,85 +78,6 @@ Most routes are GET-only. POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE return `405` with
`read-only-mvp`, except `/audit` and `/api/audit` which accept POST for
local validator preview only (no Gitea mutations, no server-side storage).
## System health API (#634)
`GET /api/v1/system/health` is the structured, read-only health surface for
automated readiness checks. It is the first console API under the `/api/v1`
prefix; the unversioned MVP exports remain as compatibility aliases.
`/health` is unchanged for existing consumers — every MVP key is still present
— and now also carries `started_at`, `uptime_seconds`, and a
`system_health_api` pointer. It stays deliberately cheap and runs no dependency
probe, because answering readiness costs real work.
**Status codes.** `200` when ready, `503` when a required dependency failed or
was never probed. Automation can branch on the code without parsing the body.
**Query flags.** The Gitea check is a network call, so it is opt-in:
`GET /api/v1/system/health?deep=1` runs it and caches the result for
`WEBUI_HEALTH_PROBE_TTL_SECONDS` (default 15s) so dashboard polling does not
amplify into remote load. Without the flag that probe reports `skipped`.
**Dependencies.** `control_plane_db` and `repository` are required and drive
readiness. `gitea` is optional: when it fails the overall `status` degrades but
`readiness.ready` stays true, because local inventory is still serveable. Each
entry carries `status`, `detail`, `required`, and `latency_ms`.
Two honesty rules are worth knowing before reading the payload:
* `stale_runtime.mutation_safe` is true only when the runtime, checkout, and
remote-tracking commits are all known and equal. An unfetched remote is
reported as indeterminate, never as safe.
* `mcp_namespaces` entries are always `unproven`. A web process runs outside
the IDE-managed MCP client and cannot invoke a namespace tool, so per #543
only a `client_namespace` probe can prove that path.
Sample response (abridged, healthy):
```json
{
"status": "ok",
"service": "mcp-control-plane-webui",
"mode": "read-only",
"api": "/api/v1/system/health",
"timestamp": "2026-07-22T11:04:18.512034+00:00",
"readiness": { "ready": true, "complete": true, "reasons": [] },
"version": {
"git_sha": "620ed6e9a9550b8da2ceb82d9ab8744e8920490f",
"git_describe": "v1.1.0-898-g620ed6e",
"control_plane_schema_version": 4,
"python_version": "3.14.5",
"known": true
},
"process": { "started_at": "2026-07-22T10:58:02.114+00:00", "uptime_seconds": 376.4 },
"deep_probes_requested": false,
"dependencies": [
{
"name": "control_plane_db",
"kind": "sqlite",
"status": "ok",
"detail": "schema v4 readable",
"required": true,
"healthy": true,
"latency_ms": 1.482,
"metadata": { "schema_version": 4, "active_leases": 3 }
},
{ "name": "repository", "kind": "git", "status": "ok", "required": true, "healthy": true },
{ "name": "gitea", "kind": "http", "status": "skipped", "required": false, "healthy": false }
],
"mcp_namespaces": [
{ "namespace": "gitea-author", "required_tool": "gitea_whoami", "status": "unproven" }
],
"stale_runtime": { "stale": false, "determinable": true, "mutation_safe": true, "reasons": [] },
"probe_errors": []
}
```
No restart, reload, or process-kill control is exposed here: those are Phase 2
at the earliest, and #630 forbids process-kill recovery outright. Every probe
opens its subject read-only — the control-plane database is opened through a
`mode=ro` URI so a health check can never create or migrate a schema.
## Report audit (#431)
Paste an LLM final report at `/audit` or POST JSON to `/api/audit`. The UI
+106 -193
View File
@@ -11242,163 +11242,127 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
if dry_run:
report["dry_run"] = True
report["executed"] = False
# #851: surface planned lifecycle order so dry-run matches execute.
report["planned_execution_orders"] = {
str(entry.get("pr_number")): entry.get("planned_execution_order") or []
for entry in (report.get("entries") or [])
}
return {"success": True, "performed": False, **report}
verify_preflight_purity(
remote, task="reconcile_merged_cleanups", org=org, repo=repo
)
actions: list[dict] = []
project_root = _canonical_local_git_root()
def _ownership_records_for_branch(
head_branch: str, pr_num_int: int | None
) -> list[dict]:
ownership_bundle = _collect_branch_ownership_records(
remote=remote,
host=h,
org=o,
repo=r,
branch=head_branch,
pr_number=pr_num_int,
project_root=project_root,
auth=auth,
base_api=base,
)
ownership_records = list(ownership_bundle.get("records") or [])
if ownership_bundle.get("inventory_error"):
ownership_records.append(
{
"category": (
branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR
),
"status": "unknown",
"remote": remote,
"host": h,
"org": o,
"repo": r,
"branch": head_branch,
"reclaim_allowed": False,
"role": "inventory",
}
)
return ownership_records
def _attempt_owned_remote_delete(
*,
head_branch: str,
pr_num_int: int | None,
after_worktree_removal: bool = False,
) -> dict:
"""Fail-closed remote delete with live ownership reassessment (#851)."""
import urllib.parse
ownership_records = _ownership_records_for_branch(head_branch, pr_num_int)
ownership = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_active_branch_ownership(
remote=remote,
org=o,
repo=r,
branch=head_branch,
host=h,
records=ownership_records,
)
if ownership.get("block"):
return {
"action": "delete_remote_branch",
"branch": head_branch,
"success": False,
"performed": False,
"delete_acknowledged": False,
"verified_absent": False,
"blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership",
"reasons": ownership.get("reasons") or [],
"blocking_categories": ownership.get("blocking_categories") or [],
"after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
"ownership_reassessed": after_worktree_removal,
}
encoded = urllib.parse.quote(head_branch, safe="")
url = f"{base}/branches/{encoded}"
with _audited(
"delete_branch",
host=h,
remote=remote,
org=o,
repo=r,
target_branch=head_branch,
request_metadata={
"branch": head_branch,
"source": "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
"ownership_checked": True,
"after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
},
):
api_request("DELETE", url, auth)
readback = _probe_remote_branch(h, o, r, auth, head_branch)
readback_assessment = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_post_delete_readback(
readback
)
verified = bool(readback_assessment.get("verified_absent"))
return {
"action": "delete_remote_branch",
"branch": head_branch,
"success": bool(readback_assessment.get("ok")),
"performed": True,
"delete_acknowledged": True,
"verified_absent": verified,
"readback": readback_assessment.get("readback"),
"reasons": readback_assessment.get("reasons") or [],
"after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
"ownership_reassessed": after_worktree_removal,
}
for entry in report.get("entries") or []:
head_branch = entry.get("head_branch") or ""
remote_assessment = entry.get("remote_branch") or {}
local_assessment = entry.get("local_worktree") or {}
pr_num = entry.get("pr_number")
try:
pr_num_int = int(pr_num) if pr_num is not None else None
except (TypeError, ValueError):
pr_num_int = None
# #851 lifecycle: when the target worktree is independently safe, remove
# it first so worktree_binding ownership does not permanently strand
# both the worktree and the remote branch. Never skip worktree removal
# merely because remote delete would be blocked by that binding.
# Ownership protection for remote delete remains fail-closed below.
worktree_removed = False
if remote_assessment.get("safe_to_delete_remote"):
import urllib.parse
pr_num = entry.get("pr_number")
try:
pr_num_int = int(pr_num) if pr_num is not None else None
except (TypeError, ValueError):
pr_num_int = None
ownership_bundle = _collect_branch_ownership_records(
remote=remote,
host=h,
org=o,
repo=r,
branch=head_branch,
pr_number=pr_num_int,
project_root=_canonical_local_git_root(),
auth=auth,
base_api=base,
)
ownership_records = list(ownership_bundle.get("records") or [])
if ownership_bundle.get("inventory_error"):
ownership_records.append(
{
"category": (
branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR
),
"status": "unknown",
"remote": remote,
"host": h,
"org": o,
"repo": r,
"branch": head_branch,
"reclaim_allowed": False,
"role": "inventory",
}
)
ownership = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_active_branch_ownership(
remote=remote,
org=o,
repo=r,
branch=head_branch,
host=h,
records=ownership_records,
)
if ownership.get("block"):
actions.append(
{
"action": "delete_remote_branch",
"branch": head_branch,
"success": False,
"performed": False,
"delete_acknowledged": False,
"verified_absent": False,
"blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership",
"reasons": ownership.get("reasons") or [],
"blocking_categories": ownership.get(
"blocking_categories"
)
or [],
}
)
continue
encoded = urllib.parse.quote(head_branch, safe="")
url = f"{base}/branches/{encoded}"
with _audited(
"delete_branch",
host=h,
remote=remote,
org=o,
repo=r,
target_branch=head_branch,
request_metadata={
"branch": head_branch,
"source": "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
"ownership_checked": True,
},
):
api_request("DELETE", url, auth)
readback = _probe_remote_branch(h, o, r, auth, head_branch)
readback_assessment = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_post_delete_readback(
readback
)
verified = bool(readback_assessment.get("verified_absent"))
actions.append(
{
"action": "delete_remote_branch",
"branch": head_branch,
"success": bool(readback_assessment.get("ok")),
"performed": True,
"delete_acknowledged": True,
"verified_absent": verified,
"readback": readback_assessment.get("readback"),
"reasons": readback_assessment.get("reasons") or [],
}
)
if local_assessment.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"):
result = merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree(
project_root,
_canonical_local_git_root(),
head_branch,
worktree_path=local_assessment.get("worktree_path"),
)
actions.append({"action": "remove_local_worktree", **result})
# Idempotent resume: absent worktree is already gone.
msg = (result.get("message") or "").lower()
worktree_removed = bool(result.get("success")) or (
"not found" in msg
)
if remote_assessment.get("safe_to_delete_remote"):
actions.append(
_attempt_owned_remote_delete(
head_branch=head_branch,
pr_num_int=pr_num_int,
after_worktree_removal=worktree_removed,
)
)
for scratch in report.get("reviewer_scratch_entries") or []:
if not scratch.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"):
continue
result = merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_reviewer_scratch_worktree(
project_root, scratch.get("worktree_path") or ""
_canonical_local_git_root(), scratch.get("worktree_path") or ""
)
actions.append({"action": "remove_reviewer_scratch_worktree", **result})
@@ -19948,7 +19912,6 @@ def _allocator_candidates_from_gitea(
state="open",
labels=tuple(labels),
title=title,
body=body,
priority=20 if "status:ready" in labels else 1,
blocked=blocked,
dependency_unmet=dep_unmet,
@@ -21185,21 +21148,10 @@ def gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
remote: str = "dadeschools",
host: str | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Adopt a control-plane lease through the sanctioned path (#601 / #843).
"""Adopt a control-plane lease through the sanctioned path (#601).
Same-owner resume refreshes provenance. Foreign active leases are refused
unless the lease is a pending controller cross-role handoff and the caller
holds the required role (independent consume without sharing the
controller session). Expired leases may be reclaimed; provenance records
adopted_from/by. Terminal (abandoned/released) leases cannot be adopted.
#843 F1: the adopter role is derived authoritatively from the active
authenticated profile never from caller input. A supplied ``role`` that
does not exactly match the profile-derived role is rejected (no silent
accept or reinterpretation), and handoff provenance ``required_profile`` /
``required_namespace`` restrictions are validated against the same
authoritative caller context. Caller-supplied role/profile/namespace can
never grant authority.
Same-owner resume refreshes provenance. Foreign active leases are refused.
Expired leases may be reclaimed; provenance records adopted_from/by.
"""
read_block = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.read")
if read_block:
@@ -21208,64 +21160,25 @@ def gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
"reasons": read_block,
"permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.read"),
}
profile = get_profile()
profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip() or "session"
active_role = (_profile_role_kind(profile) or "").strip().lower()
if not active_role:
return {
"success": False,
"outcome": "blocked",
"mutation_performed": False,
"reasons": [
"active profile role could not be derived authoritatively; "
"refusing lease adoption (fail closed, #843)"
],
"lease_id": lease_id,
"authoritative_source": "control_plane_db",
"file_lock_only": False,
"comment_lease_only": False,
}
if role is not None and str(role).strip():
supplied_role = str(role).strip().lower()
if supplied_role != active_role:
return {
"success": False,
"outcome": "blocked",
"mutation_performed": False,
"profile_role_kind": active_role,
"supplied_role": supplied_role,
"reasons": [
f"caller-supplied role '{supplied_role}' does not match "
f"the authenticated profile-derived role '{active_role}'; "
"caller-supplied role/profile/namespace can never grant "
"authority (fail closed, #843)"
],
"lease_id": lease_id,
"authoritative_source": "control_plane_db",
"file_lock_only": False,
"comment_lease_only": False,
}
db, errs = _control_plane_db_or_error()
if db is None:
return {"success": False, "reasons": errs}
profile = get_profile()
profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip() or "session"
active_role = _profile_role_kind(profile) or "author"
sid = (session_id or "").strip() or (
f"{profile_name}-{os.getpid()}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
)
adopter_namespace = allocator_service.DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES.get(
active_role, f"gitea-{active_role}"
)
try:
return lease_lifecycle.adopt_lease(
db,
lease_id=lease_id,
adopter_session_id=sid,
role=active_role,
role=(role or active_role).strip() or "author",
worktree_path=worktree_path,
expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha,
owner_pid=os.getpid(),
operator_authorized=bool(operator_authorized),
adopter_profile_name=profile_name,
adopter_namespace=adopter_namespace,
)
except (lease_lifecycle.LeaseLifecycleError, control_plane_db.ControlPlaneError) as exc:
return {
+13 -209
View File
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ SAFE_RELEASE_OWNED = "release_owned"
SAFE_STALE_PROMPT = "stale_prompt_lease"
SAFE_UNKNOWN = "inspect_only"
SAFE_NO_AUTHORITY = "file_or_comment_not_authoritative"
SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE = "consume_cross_role_handoff"
LEASE_STATUS_ACTIVE = "active"
LEASE_STATUS_RELEASED = "released"
@@ -251,23 +250,6 @@ def decide_safe_next_action(
"same_owner": True,
"also_allowed": [SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED, SAFE_RELEASE_OWNED],
}
handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff({"lease": lease})
if handoff:
return {
"safe_next_action": SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE,
"reasons": [
f"controller allocation pending handoff (freshness={status}); "
"required-role worker may consume without abandon/reassign; "
f"required_role={handoff['required_role']}"
],
"block": False,
"same_owner": False,
"owner_session_id": owner,
"required_role": handoff["required_role"],
"cross_role_handoff": True,
"handoff_status": "pending",
"also_allowed": [SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED],
}
return {
"safe_next_action": SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED,
"reasons": [
@@ -290,24 +272,6 @@ def decide_safe_next_action(
}
if not same_owner and status == "active":
# #843: pending cross-role handoff is consumable by required role
handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff({"lease": lease})
if handoff:
return {
"safe_next_action": SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE,
"reasons": [
"controller cross-role allocation pending handoff; "
f"required_role={handoff['required_role']}; "
"consume via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease without "
"abandonment or sharing the controller session"
],
"block": False,
"same_owner": False,
"owner_session_id": owner,
"required_role": handoff["required_role"],
"cross_role_handoff": True,
"handoff_status": "pending",
}
return {
"safe_next_action": SAFE_WAIT_FOREIGN,
"reasons": [
@@ -476,84 +440,6 @@ def list_active_leases(
}
def parse_lease_provenance(lease_or_state: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Return durable lease provenance dict (empty when absent/unparseable)."""
if not lease_or_state:
return {}
if "provenance" in lease_or_state and isinstance(lease_or_state.get("provenance"), dict):
return dict(lease_or_state["provenance"])
raw = None
if "provenance_json" in lease_or_state:
raw = lease_or_state.get("provenance_json")
elif "lease" in lease_or_state and isinstance(lease_or_state.get("lease"), Mapping):
raw = lease_or_state["lease"].get("provenance_json")
if not raw:
return {}
if isinstance(raw, dict):
return dict(raw)
try:
loaded = json.loads(raw)
except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
return {}
return dict(loaded) if isinstance(loaded, dict) else {}
def is_pending_cross_role_handoff(
state: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Return handoff evidence when a controller allocation awaits consume (#843).
A pending handoff is identified by durable provenance written at
cross-role apply time not by title heuristics or session-id guessing.
"""
if not state:
return None
lease = state.get("lease") if isinstance(state.get("lease"), Mapping) else state
if not isinstance(lease, Mapping):
return None
status = str(lease.get("status") or "").strip().lower()
if status in (LEASE_STATUS_ABANDONED, LEASE_STATUS_RELEASED, LEASE_STATUS_EXPIRED):
return None
prov = parse_lease_provenance(state)
if not prov and isinstance(lease, Mapping):
prov = parse_lease_provenance(lease)
if not prov.get("cross_role_handoff"):
return None
handoff_status = str(prov.get("handoff_status") or "pending").strip().lower()
if handoff_status != "pending":
return None
adopted_by = (
lease.get("adopted_by_session_id")
or prov.get("adopted_by_session_id")
or ""
)
if str(adopted_by).strip():
return None
required_role = str(
prov.get("required_role") or lease.get("role") or ""
).strip().lower()
if not required_role:
return None
return {
"cross_role_handoff": True,
"handoff_status": "pending",
"required_role": required_role,
"allocating_session_id": str(
prov.get("allocating_session_id") or lease.get("session_id") or ""
),
"allocating_role": str(prov.get("allocating_role") or "controller"),
"lease_id": str(lease.get("lease_id") or ""),
"assignment_id": (
str(state["assignment"]["assignment_id"])
if isinstance(state.get("assignment"), Mapping)
and state["assignment"].get("assignment_id")
else None
),
"provenance": prov,
}
def adopt_lease(
db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB,
*,
@@ -564,17 +450,8 @@ def adopt_lease(
expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
owner_pid: int | None = None,
operator_authorized: bool = False,
adopter_profile_name: str | None = None,
adopter_namespace: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Sanctioned adopt path with provenance; never silent foreign steal.
#843 F1: for a pending cross-role handoff, ``role`` must be the
authoritative profile-derived role supplied by the MCP boundary never
caller-asserted authority. When the handoff provenance declares
``required_profile`` / ``required_namespace`` and the caller context is
provided, both are validated exactly; a mismatch fails closed.
"""
"""Sanctioned adopt path with provenance; never silent foreign steal."""
state = db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
if not state:
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
@@ -586,8 +463,11 @@ def adopt_lease(
owner = str(lease.get("session_id") or "")
same_owner = owner == str(adopter_session_id)
handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff(state)
adopter_role = (role or "").strip().lower()
if freshness["freshness"] == "active" and not same_owner:
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
f"refusing to steal active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by "
f"{owner} (fail closed)"
)
if freshness["freshness"] in ("abandoned", "released"):
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
@@ -595,64 +475,13 @@ def adopt_lease(
"(fail closed)"
)
if handoff and not same_owner:
# Terminal statuses already rejected above. Freshness may be
# active OR stale_dead_process (controller exited) — both are
# consumable without abandonment when handoff is still pending.
if freshness["freshness"] not in (
"active",
"stale_dead_process",
"stale_missing_worktree",
):
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
f"lease {lease_id} freshness={freshness['freshness']}; "
"terminal or non-active allocation cannot be handoff-consumed "
"(fail closed)"
)
required = handoff["required_role"]
if adopter_role != required:
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
f"wrong role for cross-role handoff consume of {lease_id}: "
f"required={required} adopter={adopter_role or 'none'} "
"(fail closed)"
)
# #843 F1: provenance profile/namespace restrictions are validated
# against the authoritative caller context when declared. Caller
# input can never widen authority; a mismatch fails closed.
handoff_prov = handoff.get("provenance") or {}
required_profile = str(
handoff_prov.get("required_profile") or ""
).strip()
if required_profile and adopter_profile_name is not None:
if str(adopter_profile_name).strip() != required_profile:
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
f"wrong profile for cross-role handoff consume of "
f"{lease_id}: required_profile={required_profile} "
f"adopter_profile={adopter_profile_name} (fail closed)"
)
required_namespace = str(
handoff_prov.get("required_namespace") or ""
).strip()
if required_namespace and adopter_namespace is not None:
if str(adopter_namespace).strip() != required_namespace:
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
f"wrong namespace for cross-role handoff consume of "
f"{lease_id}: required_namespace={required_namespace} "
f"adopter_namespace={adopter_namespace} (fail closed)"
)
reason = "cross-role-handoff-consume"
elif freshness["freshness"] == "active" and not same_owner:
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
f"refusing to steal active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by "
f"{owner} (fail closed)"
)
elif not same_owner and freshness["freshness"] in (
# Expired or stale: require abandon-style safety before ownership transfer
# when not same owner; same owner may reclaim.
if not same_owner and freshness["freshness"] in (
"expired",
"stale_dead_process",
"stale_missing_worktree",
):
# Expired or stale (non-handoff): require abandon-style safety before
# ownership transfer when not same owner; same owner may reclaim.
if not operator_authorized and freshness["freshness"] == "expired":
# Deterministic reclaim of expired foreign lease is allowed
# without operator flag (sanctioned expire reclaim).
@@ -663,9 +492,6 @@ def adopt_lease(
f"lease {lease_id} freshness={freshness['freshness']}; "
"use abandon with proof before foreign adopt (fail closed)"
)
reason = "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
else:
reason = "owner-resume-adopt" if same_owner else "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
provenance = build_adopt_provenance(
adopted_from_session_id=owner,
@@ -678,14 +504,10 @@ def adopt_lease(
worktree_path=worktree_path,
expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha or lease.get("expected_head_sha"),
prior_lease_id=lease_id,
reason=reason,
reason=(
"owner-resume-adopt" if same_owner else "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
),
)
if handoff and not same_owner:
provenance["cross_role_handoff"] = True
provenance["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
provenance["required_role"] = handoff["required_role"]
provenance["allocating_session_id"] = handoff["allocating_session_id"]
provenance["allocating_role"] = handoff["allocating_role"]
result = db.adopt_lease(
lease_id=lease_id,
@@ -696,7 +518,7 @@ def adopt_lease(
owner_pid=owner_pid if owner_pid is not None else os.getpid(),
provenance=provenance,
)
out = {
return {
"success": True,
"outcome": result.get("outcome"),
"same_owner": same_owner,
@@ -709,24 +531,6 @@ def adopt_lease(
"comment_lease_only": False,
"reasons": result.get("reasons") or [],
}
if handoff and not same_owner:
out["cross_role_handoff"] = True
out["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
out["required_role"] = handoff["required_role"]
out["adopted_by_session_id"] = adopter_session_id
out["adopted_from_session_id"] = owner
lease_row = result.get("lease") or {}
if isinstance(lease_row, Mapping):
out["read_after_write"] = {
"lease_id": lease_row.get("lease_id"),
"session_id": lease_row.get("session_id"),
"role": lease_row.get("role"),
"status": lease_row.get("status"),
"adopted_by_session_id": lease_row.get("adopted_by_session_id"),
"adopted_from_session_id": lease_row.get("adopted_from_session_id"),
"phase": lease_row.get("phase"),
}
return out
def release_lease(
-58
View File
@@ -566,10 +566,6 @@ def build_pr_cleanup_entry(
worktree_state=worktree_state,
active_lock=active_lock,
)
planned = plan_cleanup_execution_order(
remote_assessment=remote,
local_assessment=local,
)
return {
"pr_number": pr_number,
"issue_number": issue_number,
@@ -580,63 +576,9 @@ def build_pr_cleanup_entry(
"merged": merged,
"remote_branch": remote,
"local_worktree": local,
# #851: dry-run and execute share the same lifecycle order description.
"planned_execution_order": planned,
}
def plan_cleanup_execution_order(
*,
remote_assessment: dict[str, Any] | None,
local_assessment: dict[str, Any] | None,
) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Describe independent worktree-then-reassess-then-remote cleanup order (#851).
Remote ownership protection remains fail-closed at execute time. A worktree
that is independently safe to remove is never skipped merely because remote
deletion may be blocked by that same ``worktree_binding``.
"""
remote = remote_assessment or {}
local = local_assessment or {}
steps: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
worktree_safe = bool(local.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"))
remote_safe = bool(remote.get("safe_to_delete_remote"))
if worktree_safe:
steps.append(
{
"action": "remove_local_worktree",
"reason": "independently_safe_to_remove",
"phase": 1,
}
)
if remote_safe:
if worktree_safe:
steps.append(
{
"action": "reassess_branch_ownership",
"reason": "after_worktree_removal_clear_worktree_binding",
"phase": 2,
}
)
steps.append(
{
"action": "delete_remote_branch",
"reason": "only_if_independently_safe_after_reassessment",
"phase": 3,
}
)
else:
steps.append(
{
"action": "delete_remote_branch",
"reason": "safe_to_delete_and_no_independent_worktree_removal",
"phase": 1,
}
)
return steps
def build_reconciliation_report(
*,
project_root: str,
+51 -2
View File
@@ -228,25 +228,74 @@ def find_active_reviewer_lease(
return None
def _conflict_fix_chain_key(lease: dict) -> tuple | None:
"""Identity of the lease chain a conflict-fix marker belongs to (#842).
Keyed by PR number, profile, head_before, and branch. Returns None when any
required component (pr_number, profile, head_before) is missing or malformed.
"""
raw = lease.get("raw_fields") or {}
pr_number = lease.get("pr_number")
profile = (lease.get("profile") or "").strip().lower()
head_before = lease.get("head_before")
branch = (lease.get("branch") or raw.get("branch") or "").strip()
if not (pr_number and profile and head_before):
return None
return (pr_number, profile, head_before, branch)
def _conflict_fix_chain_matches(key1: tuple, key2: tuple) -> bool:
"""True when two conflict-fix chain keys refer to the same lease chain."""
pr1, profile1, head1, branch1 = key1
pr2, profile2, head2, branch2 = key2
if pr1 != pr2 or profile1 != profile2 or head1 != head2:
return False
if branch1 and branch2 and branch1 != branch2:
return False
return True
def _conflict_fix_chain_terminated_after(entries: list[dict], index: int) -> bool:
"""True when a later marker terminates the conflict-fix chain of ``entries[index]``.
Append-only newest-wins: a terminal marker (phase=released/blocked/done)
ends only its matching claim chain (#842).
"""
key = _conflict_fix_chain_key(entries[index])
if key is None:
return False
for later in entries[index + 1:]:
phase = (later.get("phase") or "").strip().lower()
if phase not in _TERMINAL_CONFLICT_FIX_PHASES:
continue
later_key = _conflict_fix_chain_key(later)
if later_key and _conflict_fix_chain_matches(key, later_key):
return True
return False
def find_active_conflict_fix_lease(
comments: list[dict],
*,
pr_number: int,
now: datetime | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Return the newest unexpired conflict-fix lease for *pr_number*, if any."""
"""Return the newest unexpired, non-terminated conflict-fix lease for *pr_number*, if any."""
now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
candidates = [
entry for entry in _comment_entries(comments, pr_number=pr_number)
if entry.get("lease_kind") == "conflict_fix"
]
for lease in reversed(candidates):
for index in range(len(candidates) - 1, -1, -1):
lease = candidates[index]
if _lease_expired(lease, now=now):
continue
phase = (lease.get("phase") or "").strip().lower()
if phase in _TERMINAL_CONFLICT_FIX_PHASES:
continue
if phase in _ACTIVE_CONFLICT_FIX_PHASES or phase:
if _conflict_fix_chain_terminated_after(candidates, index):
continue
return lease
return None
@@ -1,243 +0,0 @@
"""Allocator epic / child-only container pre-rank exclusion (#844).
Covers:
* Issue #631-shaped child-only epic is excluded before ranking.
* Implementable child issues remain eligible and can be selected.
* Ordinary issues that merely mention "epic" in title/body are not excluded.
* Excluded containers never receive assignments or workflow leases.
* Structured skip reason ``epic_or_child_only_container`` is reported.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import tempfile
import unittest
from allocator_service import (
OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER,
WorkCandidate,
allocate_next_work,
classify_epic_or_child_only_container,
)
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
REMOTE = "prgs"
ORG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
REPO = "Gitea-Tools"
# Minimal body mirroring issue #631 authoritative scope language.
_EPIC_631_BODY = """
## Scope (umbrella)
This epic owns the **product roadmap and linkage** for the Web Console.
Implementation is delivered via child issues only.
## Explicit non-goals
* Do not implement product features in this epic issue itself.
* No product feature implementation is claimed complete solely on this epic.
"""
_CHILD_BODY = """
## Problem
Operators need a workflow-event timeline model for Phase 1.
## Acceptance criteria
- [ ] Timeline model API exists
"""
def _issue(
number: int,
*,
title: str = "",
body: str = "",
labels: tuple[str, ...] = ("status:ready", "type:feature"),
priority: int = 20,
) -> WorkCandidate:
return WorkCandidate(
kind="issue",
number=number,
state="open",
labels=labels,
title=title or f"issue {number}",
body=body,
priority=priority,
)
class ClassifyEpicContainerTest(unittest.TestCase):
def test_631_shaped_body_and_title_is_container(self) -> None:
c = _issue(
631,
title="Epic: MCP Control Plane Web Console",
body=_EPIC_631_BODY,
)
is_c, detail = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(c)
self.assertTrue(is_c)
self.assertIsNotNone(detail)
self.assertIn("body_marker", detail or "")
def test_body_markers_without_epic_title(self) -> None:
c = _issue(
900,
title="Control plane roadmap tracker",
body="Implementation is delivered via child issues only.",
)
is_c, _ = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(c)
self.assertTrue(is_c)
def test_epic_label_alone_is_container(self) -> None:
c = _issue(
901,
title="Roadmap linkage",
body="Track children.",
labels=("status:ready", "type:epic"),
)
is_c, detail = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(c)
self.assertTrue(is_c)
self.assertIn("type:epic", detail or "")
def test_title_epic_prefix_alone_not_container(self) -> None:
"""Title-only 'Epic:' without body scope evidence stays eligible (#844)."""
c = _issue(
902,
title="Epic: something mentioned only in title",
body="Implement a concrete fix for the allocator skip list.",
)
is_c, detail = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(c)
self.assertFalse(is_c)
self.assertIsNone(detail)
def test_incidental_epic_word_not_container(self) -> None:
c = _issue(
903,
title="Document epic handoff conventions",
body=(
"Update the docs so implementable issues that mention an epic "
"remain independently executable."
),
)
is_c, _ = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(c)
self.assertFalse(is_c)
def test_prs_never_classified(self) -> None:
pr = WorkCandidate(
kind="pr",
number=10,
state="open",
title="Epic: fake",
body="Implementation is delivered via child issues only.",
head_sha="a" * 40,
priority=5,
)
is_c, _ = classify_epic_or_child_only_container(pr)
self.assertFalse(is_c)
class AllocateEpicContainerExclusionTest(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
def _alloc(self, candidates, **kwargs):
defaults = dict(
session_id="sess-844",
role="author",
remote=REMOTE,
org=ORG,
repo=REPO,
profile_name="prgs-author",
username="jcwalker3",
claims={},
apply=False,
)
defaults.update(kwargs)
return allocate_next_work(self.db, candidates=candidates, **defaults)
def test_631_shaped_epic_excluded_child_selected(self) -> None:
epic = _issue(
631,
title="Epic: MCP Control Plane Web Console",
body=_EPIC_631_BODY,
)
child = _issue(
637,
title="Web Console: Workflow-event timeline model (Phase 1)",
body=_CHILD_BODY,
)
res = self._alloc([epic, child], apply=False)
self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_PREVIEW)
self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 637)
skipped = {s["number"]: s for s in res["skipped"]}
self.assertIn(631, skipped)
self.assertEqual(
skipped[631]["reason_code"], SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER
)
self.assertIn(SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER, skipped[631]["reason"])
def test_container_cannot_receive_assignment_or_lease(self) -> None:
epic = _issue(
631,
title="Epic: MCP Control Plane Web Console",
body=_EPIC_631_BODY,
)
res = self._alloc([epic], apply=True)
self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
# Only container present → no safe work; never assigned_work.
self.assertNotEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
self.assertIsNone(res.get("assignment"))
self.assertIsNone(res.get("selected"))
skipped = {s["number"]: s for s in res["skipped"]}
self.assertEqual(
skipped[631]["reason_code"], SKIP_EPIC_OR_CHILD_ONLY_CONTAINER
)
# No lease row for the epic.
leases = self.db.list_active_leases(
remote=REMOTE, org=ORG, repo=REPO
) if hasattr(self.db, "list_active_leases") else []
# Prefer generic inventory if available.
if not leases and hasattr(self.db, "list_leases"):
leases = self.db.list_leases(remote=REMOTE, org=ORG, repo=REPO)
for lease in leases or []:
work_number = lease.get("work_number") if isinstance(lease, dict) else None
self.assertNotEqual(work_number, 631)
def test_incidental_epic_title_remains_eligible(self) -> None:
ordinary = _issue(
700,
title="Document epic handoff conventions",
body="Write runbook text about epic vs child issues.",
)
res = self._alloc([ordinary], apply=False)
self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 700)
self.assertEqual(res["skipped"], [])
def test_apply_selects_child_not_epic(self) -> None:
epic = _issue(
631,
title="Epic: MCP Control Plane Web Console",
body=_EPIC_631_BODY,
)
child = _issue(
637,
title="Web Console: Workflow-event timeline model (Phase 1)",
body=_CHILD_BODY,
)
res = self._alloc([epic, child], apply=True)
self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 637)
self.assertEqual(res["assignment"]["work_number"], 637)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
-372
View File
@@ -1266,378 +1266,6 @@ class TestSecondRemediationIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn("delete_acknowledged", delete_actions[0])
self.assertTrue(delete_actions[0].get("verified_absent"))
def test_issue_851_worktree_removed_when_remote_blocked_only_by_worktree_binding(self):
"""#851: remote blocked by worktree_binding must not skip safe worktree removal.
Lifecycle: remove clean owned worktree reassess ownership delete
remote only if independently safe. Unrelated entries stay untouched.
"""
from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
target_branch = "fix/issue-844-exclude-epic-containers"
foreign_branch = "fix/issue-999-unrelated-active"
worktree_path = "/tmp/branches/fix-issue-844-exclude-epic-containers"
ownership_calls = []
remove_calls = []
delete_api_calls = []
def fake_collect(**kwargs):
ownership_calls.append(dict(kwargs))
# Ownership is reassessed *after* independent worktree removal (#851).
# Target worktree is already gone → no worktree_binding remains.
# Foreign branch keeps an active author lease → remote delete blocked.
if kwargs.get("branch") == foreign_branch:
# Match session-bound org/repo + host used by the tool resolve path.
return {
"records": [
{
"category": guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
"status": "active",
"remote": kwargs.get("remote") or "prgs",
"host": kwargs.get("host") or "gitea.example.com",
"org": kwargs.get("org") or "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
"repo": kwargs.get("repo") or "Gitea-Tools",
"branch": foreign_branch,
"reclaim_allowed": False,
}
],
"inventory_error": False,
}
return {"records": [], "inventory_error": False}
def fake_remove(project_root, branch, worktree_path=None):
remove_calls.append(
{"branch": branch, "worktree_path": worktree_path}
)
return {
"success": True,
"performed": True,
"message": f"removed worktree {worktree_path}",
"worktree_path": worktree_path,
}
def fake_probe(h, o, r, auth, br):
return guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
404, not_found_scope=guard.NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH
)
def fake_api(method, url, auth, **kwargs):
if method == "DELETE":
delete_api_calls.append(url)
return {}
report = {
"entries": [
{
"pr_number": 848,
"head_branch": target_branch,
"remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
"local_worktree": {
"safe_to_remove_worktree": True,
"worktree_path": worktree_path,
},
},
{
"pr_number": 999,
"head_branch": foreign_branch,
"remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
"local_worktree": {
"safe_to_remove_worktree": False,
"worktree_path": None,
},
},
],
"reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
}
patch(
"mcp_server.get_profile",
return_value={
"profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
"role": "reconciler",
"allowed_operations": [
"gitea.read",
"gitea.branch.delete",
"gitea.pr.close",
],
"forbidden_operations": [],
},
).start()
patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
patch(
"mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
return_value=report,
).start()
patch(
"mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
return_value=[],
).start()
patch(
"mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
return_value=(True, []),
).start()
patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
patch(
"mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
side_effect=fake_collect,
).start()
patch("mcp_server._probe_remote_branch", side_effect=fake_probe).start()
patch(
"mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
side_effect=fake_remove,
).start()
self.mock_api.side_effect = fake_api
res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
dry_run=False,
execute_confirmed=True,
remote="prgs",
)
self.assertTrue(res.get("performed") or res.get("executed"))
actions = res.get("actions") or []
remove_actions = [
a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"
]
self.assertEqual(len(remove_actions), 1, actions)
self.assertTrue(remove_actions[0].get("success"))
self.assertEqual(remove_calls[0]["branch"], target_branch)
self.assertEqual(remove_calls[0]["worktree_path"], worktree_path)
# Target remote delete succeeds after worktree removal + reassessment.
target_deletes = [
a
for a in actions
if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
and a.get("branch") == target_branch
]
self.assertEqual(len(target_deletes), 1, actions)
self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("success"))
self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("after_worktree_removal"))
self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("ownership_reassessed"))
self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("verified_absent"))
# Foreign branch remains protected (author lease) and is not deleted.
foreign_deletes = [
a
for a in actions
if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
and a.get("branch") == foreign_branch
]
self.assertEqual(len(foreign_deletes), 1, actions)
self.assertFalse(foreign_deletes[0].get("success"))
self.assertEqual(
foreign_deletes[0].get("blocker_kind"), "active_branch_ownership"
)
self.assertIn(
guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
foreign_deletes[0].get("blocking_categories") or [],
)
# Only the target branch should hit the DELETE API.
self.assertEqual(len(delete_api_calls), 1)
# Ownership collected for target (post-removal) and foreign; worktree
# removal happened before target remote delete in the action log.
target_idx = next(
i
for i, a in enumerate(actions)
if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"
)
delete_idx = next(
i
for i, a in enumerate(actions)
if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
and a.get("branch") == target_branch
and a.get("success")
)
self.assertLess(target_idx, delete_idx)
def test_issue_851_dirty_worktree_not_removed_and_remote_stays_protected(self):
"""#851: dirty/foreign worktrees remain protected; no unsafe cleanup."""
from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
branch = "fix/issue-851-dirty"
remove_calls = []
def fake_collect(**kwargs):
return {
"records": [
{
"category": guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING,
"status": "active",
"remote": kwargs.get("remote") or "prgs",
"host": kwargs.get("host") or "gitea.example.com",
"org": kwargs.get("org") or "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
"repo": kwargs.get("repo") or "Gitea-Tools",
"branch": branch,
"reclaim_allowed": False,
}
],
"inventory_error": False,
}
report = {
"entries": [
{
"pr_number": 851,
"head_branch": branch,
"remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
"local_worktree": {
"safe_to_remove_worktree": False,
"worktree_path": "/tmp/dirty-wt",
},
}
],
"reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
}
patch(
"mcp_server.get_profile",
return_value={
"profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
"role": "reconciler",
"allowed_operations": [
"gitea.read",
"gitea.branch.delete",
],
"forbidden_operations": [],
},
).start()
patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
patch(
"mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
return_value=report,
).start()
patch(
"mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
return_value=[],
).start()
patch(
"mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
return_value=(True, []),
).start()
patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
patch(
"mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
side_effect=fake_collect,
).start()
patch(
"mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
side_effect=lambda *a, **k: remove_calls.append(k) or {
"success": True,
"performed": True,
},
).start()
self.mock_api.side_effect = lambda *a, **k: {}
res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
dry_run=False,
execute_confirmed=True,
remote="prgs",
)
actions = res.get("actions") or []
self.assertEqual(remove_calls, [])
self.assertFalse(
any(a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree" for a in actions)
)
deletes = [
a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
]
self.assertEqual(len(deletes), 1)
self.assertFalse(deletes[0].get("success"))
self.assertEqual(deletes[0].get("blocker_kind"), "active_branch_ownership")
self.assertIn(
guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING,
deletes[0].get("blocking_categories") or [],
)
def test_issue_851_idempotent_resume_when_worktree_already_absent(self):
"""#851: partial failures remain resumable and idempotent."""
from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
branch = "fix/issue-851-resume"
ownership_calls = []
def fake_collect(**kwargs):
ownership_calls.append(kwargs)
return {"records": [], "inventory_error": False}
def fake_remove(project_root, branch, worktree_path=None):
return {
"success": False,
"performed": False,
"message": f"worktree not found: {worktree_path}",
}
def fake_probe(h, o, r, auth, br):
return guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
404, not_found_scope=guard.NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH
)
report = {
"entries": [
{
"pr_number": 851,
"head_branch": branch,
"remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
"local_worktree": {
"safe_to_remove_worktree": True,
"worktree_path": "/tmp/already-gone",
},
}
],
"reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
}
patch(
"mcp_server.get_profile",
return_value={
"profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
"role": "reconciler",
"allowed_operations": [
"gitea.read",
"gitea.branch.delete",
],
"forbidden_operations": [],
},
).start()
patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
patch(
"mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
return_value=report,
).start()
patch(
"mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
return_value=[],
).start()
patch(
"mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
return_value=(True, []),
).start()
patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
patch(
"mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
side_effect=fake_collect,
).start()
patch("mcp_server._probe_remote_branch", side_effect=fake_probe).start()
patch(
"mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
side_effect=fake_remove,
).start()
self.mock_api.side_effect = lambda *a, **k: {}
res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
dry_run=False,
execute_confirmed=True,
remote="prgs",
)
actions = res.get("actions") or []
removes = [a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"]
deletes = [a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"]
self.assertEqual(len(removes), 1)
self.assertFalse(removes[0].get("success"))
self.assertEqual(len(deletes), 1)
self.assertTrue(deletes[0].get("success"))
self.assertTrue(deletes[0].get("after_worktree_removal"))
self.assertTrue(ownership_calls)
if __name__ == "__main__":
-682
View File
@@ -1,682 +0,0 @@
"""Cross-role allocation handoff consumable by independent workers (#843).
Regression coverage for the controllerrequired-role consume path:
* controller allocates author work; independent author adopts successfully
* author adoption succeeds after allocating controller process exits
* author adoption without sharing controller session identity
* wrong-role adoption rejected
* concurrent/second adoption rejected without state corruption
* terminal allocation adoption rejected
* successful adoption produces authoritative ownership evidence
* genuine abandoned-lease recovery remains valid
* process_work_queue / allocate results include consume identifiers
* same-role allocation behavior remains compatible
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import tempfile
import unittest
from datetime import timedelta
from unittest.mock import patch
from allocator_service import (
ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
ROLE_AUTHOR,
ROLE_CONTROLLER,
ROLE_REVIEWER,
WorkCandidate,
allocate_next_work,
)
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, ForeignLeaseError, _ts, _utc_now
import lease_lifecycle as ll
class CrossRoleHandoffTest(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
self.db.upsert_session(
session_id="ctrl-session",
role="controller",
profile="prgs-controller",
pid=99999999, # dead-looking pid
)
self.db.upsert_session(
session_id="author-worker",
role="author",
profile="prgs-author",
pid=os.getpid(),
)
self.db.upsert_session(
session_id="author-worker-2",
role="author",
profile="prgs-author",
pid=os.getpid(),
)
self.db.upsert_session(
session_id="reviewer-worker",
role="reviewer",
profile="prgs-reviewer",
pid=os.getpid(),
)
self.wt = self._tmp.name
def tearDown(self) -> None:
self._tmp.cleanup()
def _ready_issue(self, number: int = 843, title: str = "handoff target") -> WorkCandidate:
return WorkCandidate(
kind="issue",
number=number,
labels=("status:ready", "type:bug"),
title=title,
priority=20,
)
def _controller_allocate(self, number: int = 843, **kwargs):
defaults = dict(
db=self.db,
session_id="ctrl-session",
role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
remote="prgs",
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
repo="Gitea-Tools",
candidates=[self._ready_issue(number)],
apply=True,
profile_name="prgs-controller",
username="controller-user",
allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
)
defaults.update(kwargs)
return allocate_next_work(**defaults)
def test_controller_allocates_author_independent_author_adopts(self) -> None:
res = self._controller_allocate()
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
self.assertIn("consume_allocation", res)
consume = res["consume_allocation"]
self.assertEqual(consume["tool"], "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease")
self.assertEqual(consume["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
self.assertFalse(consume["controller_session_required"])
lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
self.assertEqual(consume["lease_id"], lid)
self.assertIn(lid, res["next_valid_command"])
adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
self.db,
lease_id=lid,
adopter_session_id="author-worker",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
self.assertTrue(adopted["success"])
self.assertEqual(adopted["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
raw = adopted["read_after_write"]
self.assertEqual(raw["session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(raw["status"], "active")
self.assertEqual(raw["phase"], "adopted")
# Authoritative re-read
state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "adopted")
def test_author_adoption_after_controller_process_exits(self) -> None:
res = self._controller_allocate(number=900)
lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
# Force owner_pid dead + freshness stale_dead_process
import sqlite3
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
try:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999 WHERE lease_id = ?",
(lid,),
)
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
fr = ll.classify_lease_freshness(
state["lease"], pid_checker=lambda _p: False
)
self.assertEqual(fr["freshness"], "stale_dead_process")
adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
self.db,
lease_id=lid,
adopter_session_id="author-worker",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
self.assertEqual(adopted["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
# No abandon required
state2 = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
self.assertEqual(state2["lease"]["status"], "active")
self.assertNotEqual(state2["lease"]["status"], "abandoned")
def test_adoption_without_sharing_controller_session_identity(self) -> None:
res = self._controller_allocate(number=901)
lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
self.db,
lease_id=lid,
adopter_session_id="author-worker",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
self.assertNotEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
self.assertFalse(adopted["same_owner"])
self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
def test_wrong_role_adoption_rejected(self) -> None:
res = self._controller_allocate(number=902)
lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError) as ctx:
ll.adopt_lease(
self.db,
lease_id=lid,
adopter_session_id="reviewer-worker",
role=ROLE_REVIEWER,
)
self.assertIn("wrong role", str(ctx.exception).lower())
# State unchanged
state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "ctrl-session")
self.assertIsNone(state["lease"].get("adopted_by_session_id") or None)
self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
def test_second_adoption_rejected_without_corruption(self) -> None:
res = self._controller_allocate(number=903)
lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
first = ll.adopt_lease(
self.db,
lease_id=lid,
adopter_session_id="author-worker",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError):
ll.adopt_lease(
self.db,
lease_id=lid,
adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["status"], "active")
def test_terminal_allocation_adoption_rejected(self) -> None:
res = self._controller_allocate(number=904)
lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
# Abandon as terminal
proof = ll.AbandonProof(
dead_process=True,
missing_worktree=True,
no_open_pr=True,
no_live_mutation_risk=True,
owner_pid=99999999,
worktree_path="/nonexistent/for-843",
)
# Attach dead pid / missing wt for abandon eligibility
import sqlite3
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
try:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999, worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
("/nonexistent/for-843", lid),
)
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
abandoned = ll.abandon_lease(
self.db,
lease_id=lid,
requester_session_id="author-worker",
proof=proof,
)
self.assertEqual(abandoned["outcome"], "abandoned")
with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError) as ctx:
ll.adopt_lease(
self.db,
lease_id=lid,
adopter_session_id="author-worker",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
)
self.assertIn("abandoned", str(ctx.exception).lower())
def test_successful_adoption_read_after_write_ownership(self) -> None:
res = self._controller_allocate(number=905)
lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
self.db,
lease_id=lid,
adopter_session_id="author-worker",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
raw = adopted["read_after_write"]
self.assertEqual(raw["lease_id"], lid)
self.assertEqual(raw["session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
# Re-fetch proves durable write
state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], raw["session_id"])
self.assertEqual(
state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], raw["adopted_by_session_id"]
)
def test_genuine_abandoned_recovery_still_valid(self) -> None:
"""Same-role author lease abandoned remains reclaimable via abandon path."""
same = allocate_next_work(
self.db,
session_id="author-worker",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
remote="prgs",
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
repo="Gitea-Tools",
candidates=[self._ready_issue(906, "same-role")],
apply=True,
profile_name="prgs-author",
username="author-user",
allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
)
self.assertEqual(same["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
lid = same["assignment"]["lease_id"]
import sqlite3
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
try:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999, worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
("/nonexistent/same-role", lid),
)
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
proof = ll.AbandonProof(
dead_process=True,
missing_worktree=True,
no_open_pr=True,
no_live_mutation_risk=True,
owner_pid=99999999,
worktree_path="/nonexistent/same-role",
)
abandoned = ll.abandon_lease(
self.db,
lease_id=lid,
requester_session_id="author-worker-2",
proof=proof,
)
self.assertEqual(abandoned["outcome"], "abandoned")
# Foreign author cannot handoff-consume an abandoned non-handoff lease
with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError):
ll.adopt_lease(
self.db,
lease_id=lid,
adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
)
# Reclaim path still works for expired/abandoned after force-expire
reclaimed = ll.reclaim_expired_lease(
self.db,
lease_id=lid,
session_id="author-worker-2",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
self.assertEqual(reclaimed["outcome"], "reclaimed")
self.assertEqual(reclaimed["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker-2")
def test_allocate_payload_includes_consume_identifiers(self) -> None:
res = self._controller_allocate(number=907)
self.assertIn("consume_allocation", res)
c = res["consume_allocation"]
for key in (
"tool",
"lease_id",
"assignment_id",
"required_role",
"required_profile",
"required_namespace",
"instructions",
"handoff_status",
):
self.assertIn(key, c)
self.assertEqual(c["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
self.assertEqual(c["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
self.assertIn("gitea_adopt_workflow_lease", c["instructions"])
self.assertTrue(res["lease_proof"]["cross_role_handoff"])
self.assertEqual(res["lease_proof"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
def test_same_role_allocation_remains_compatible(self) -> None:
res = allocate_next_work(
self.db,
session_id="author-worker",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
remote="prgs",
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
repo="Gitea-Tools",
candidates=[self._ready_issue(908)],
apply=True,
profile_name="prgs-author",
username="author-user",
)
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
self.assertNotIn("consume_allocation", res)
lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
# No cross-role handoff provenance
prov = state.get("provenance") or {}
self.assertFalse(prov.get("cross_role_handoff"))
# Owner resume still works
resume = ll.adopt_lease(
self.db,
lease_id=lid,
adopter_session_id="author-worker",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
self.assertTrue(resume["same_owner"])
self.assertEqual(resume["outcome"], "adopted_owner_resume")
def test_inspect_points_required_role_at_consume(self) -> None:
res = self._controller_allocate(number=909)
lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
decision = ll.inspect_lease(
self.db, lid, caller_session_id="author-worker"
)
self.assertEqual(
decision["safe_next_action"], ll.SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE
)
self.assertFalse(decision["block"])
self.assertEqual(decision["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
def test_db_cas_rejects_concurrent_second_consume(self) -> None:
res = self._controller_allocate(number=910)
lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
# First consume via DB layer directly
first = self.db.adopt_lease(
lease_id=lid,
adopter_session_id="author-worker",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
worktree_path=self.wt,
provenance={
"cross_role_handoff": True,
"handoff_status": "adopted",
"required_role": "author",
},
)
self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
# Second CAS must fail
with self.assertRaises(ForeignLeaseError):
self.db.adopt_lease(
lease_id=lid,
adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
worktree_path=self.wt,
provenance={
"cross_role_handoff": True,
"handoff_status": "pending",
"required_role": "author",
},
)
state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
class MCPBoundaryAdoptRoleBindingTest(unittest.TestCase):
"""#843 F1: MCP-boundary role binding for ``gitea_adopt_workflow_lease``.
The library-level wrong-role test calls ``lease_lifecycle.adopt_lease``
directly. These tests prove the MCP entry point derives the adopter role
authoritatively from the active authenticated profile and rejects any
caller-supplied role that disagrees, so a reviewer/merger profile cannot
consume an author handoff by passing ``role="author"``.
"""
AUTHOR_PROFILE = {
"profile_name": "prgs-author",
"role": "author",
"allowed_operations": [
"gitea.read",
"gitea.pr.create",
"gitea.branch.push",
],
"forbidden_operations": [],
}
REVIEWER_PROFILE = {
"profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
"role": "reviewer",
"allowed_operations": [
"gitea.read",
"gitea.pr.review",
"gitea.pr.approve",
"gitea.pr.request_changes",
],
"forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
}
MERGER_PROFILE = {
"profile_name": "prgs-merger",
"role": "merger",
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.merge"],
"forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
}
FOREIGN_AUTHOR_PROFILE = {
"profile_name": "dadeschools-author",
"role": "author",
"allowed_operations": [
"gitea.read",
"gitea.pr.create",
"gitea.branch.push",
],
"forbidden_operations": [],
}
def setUp(self) -> None:
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
self.db.upsert_session(
session_id="ctrl-session",
role="controller",
profile="prgs-controller",
pid=99999999,
)
self.db.upsert_session(
session_id="author-worker",
role="author",
profile="prgs-author",
pid=os.getpid(),
)
self.wt = self._tmp.name
def tearDown(self) -> None:
self._tmp.cleanup()
def _ready_issue(self, number: int) -> WorkCandidate:
return WorkCandidate(
kind="issue",
number=number,
labels=("status:ready", "type:bug"),
title="handoff target",
priority=20,
)
def _handoff_lease(self, number: int = 843) -> str:
res = allocate_next_work(
db=self.db,
session_id="ctrl-session",
role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
remote="prgs",
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
repo="Gitea-Tools",
candidates=[self._ready_issue(number)],
apply=True,
profile_name="prgs-controller",
username="controller-user",
allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
)
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
return res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
def _call_adopt_tool(self, profile: dict, **kwargs):
import gitea_mcp_server as mcp_server
with (
patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile),
patch.object(
mcp_server,
"_control_plane_db_or_error",
return_value=(self.db, []),
),
):
return mcp_server.gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
remote="prgs", **kwargs
)
def _assert_handoff_untouched(self, lease_id: str) -> None:
state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "ctrl-session")
self.assertIsNone(state["lease"].get("adopted_by_session_id") or None)
self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["status"], "active")
self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
def test_reviewer_profile_cannot_consume_author_handoff_via_role_author(
self,
) -> None:
lid = self._handoff_lease(920)
result = self._call_adopt_tool(
self.REVIEWER_PROFILE,
lease_id=lid,
session_id="reviewer-worker",
role="author",
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
self.assertFalse(result["success"])
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "reviewer")
self.assertEqual(result["supplied_role"], "author")
self.assertIn("does not match", result["reasons"][0])
self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
def test_merger_profile_cannot_consume_author_handoff_via_role_author(
self,
) -> None:
lid = self._handoff_lease(921)
result = self._call_adopt_tool(
self.MERGER_PROFILE,
lease_id=lid,
session_id="merger-worker",
role="author",
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
self.assertFalse(result["success"])
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "merger")
self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
def test_reviewer_profile_rejected_without_role_argument(self) -> None:
"""Even without a spoofed role, the profile-derived role binds."""
lid = self._handoff_lease(922)
result = self._call_adopt_tool(
self.REVIEWER_PROFILE,
lease_id=lid,
session_id="reviewer-worker",
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
self.assertFalse(result["success"])
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
self.assertIn("wrong role", result["reasons"][0].lower())
self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
def test_author_profile_mismatching_supplied_role_rejected(self) -> None:
lid = self._handoff_lease(923)
result = self._call_adopt_tool(
self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
lease_id=lid,
session_id="author-worker",
role="reviewer",
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
self.assertFalse(result["success"])
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "author")
self.assertEqual(result["supplied_role"], "reviewer")
self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
def test_foreign_profile_name_rejected_for_author_handoff(self) -> None:
"""Provenance required_profile binds even when the role matches."""
lid = self._handoff_lease(924)
result = self._call_adopt_tool(
self.FOREIGN_AUTHOR_PROFILE,
lease_id=lid,
session_id="foreign-author-worker",
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
self.assertFalse(result["success"])
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
self.assertIn("wrong profile", result["reasons"][0].lower())
self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
def test_author_profile_consumes_author_handoff(self) -> None:
lid = self._handoff_lease(925)
result = self._call_adopt_tool(
self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
lease_id=lid,
session_id="author-worker",
role="author",
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
self.assertTrue(result["success"])
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
self.assertEqual(result["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(result["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(
state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker"
)
self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "adopted")
def test_author_profile_consumes_author_handoff_without_role_argument(
self,
) -> None:
lid = self._handoff_lease(926)
result = self._call_adopt_tool(
self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
lease_id=lid,
session_id="author-worker",
worktree_path=self.wt,
)
self.assertTrue(result["success"])
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["role"], "author")
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
-53
View File
@@ -12,59 +12,6 @@ import merged_cleanup_reconcile as mcr # noqa: E402
class TestMergedCleanupAssessment(unittest.TestCase):
def test_issue_851_plan_order_worktree_then_reassess_then_remote(self):
"""#851 dry-run plan: remove worktree, reassess ownership, then remote."""
plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": True},
)
actions = [s["action"] for s in plan]
self.assertEqual(
actions,
[
"remove_local_worktree",
"reassess_branch_ownership",
"delete_remote_branch",
],
)
self.assertEqual(plan[0]["phase"], 1)
self.assertEqual(plan[-1]["phase"], 3)
self.assertIn("independently_safe", plan[0]["reason"])
self.assertIn("reassessment", plan[-1]["reason"])
def test_issue_851_plan_remote_only_when_worktree_not_safe(self):
plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": False},
)
self.assertEqual([s["action"] for s in plan], ["delete_remote_branch"])
self.assertNotIn("reassess_branch_ownership", [s["action"] for s in plan])
def test_issue_851_plan_worktree_only_when_remote_not_safe(self):
plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": False},
local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": True},
)
self.assertEqual([s["action"] for s in plan], ["remove_local_worktree"])
def test_issue_851_entry_includes_planned_execution_order(self):
entry = mcr.build_pr_cleanup_entry(
pr={
"number": 848,
"title": "Closes #844",
"body": "",
"merged_at": "2026-07-23T00:00:00Z",
"head": {"ref": "fix/issue-844-x", "sha": "a" * 40},
},
project_root="/tmp/not-a-real-root",
open_pr_heads=set(),
remote_branch_exists=True,
head_on_master=True,
delete_capability_allowed=True,
)
self.assertIn("planned_execution_order", entry)
self.assertIsInstance(entry["planned_execution_order"], list)
def test_extract_linked_issue_from_closes(self):
issue = mcr.extract_linked_issue(
"feat: cleanup (Closes #269)",
+153
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from pr_work_lease import ( # noqa: E402
assess_reviewer_mutation_blocked,
assess_reviewer_stale_head_final_report,
format_conflict_fix_lease_body,
find_active_conflict_fix_lease,
parse_conflict_fix_lease_comment,
parse_reviewer_lease_comment,
)
@@ -203,5 +204,157 @@ class TestFormatLease(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(parsed["pr_number"], 376)
class TestConflictFixLeaseLifecycle(unittest.TestCase):
def test_claim_followed_by_matching_release(self):
claim_body = _conflict_fix_body(phase="claimed", worktree="branches/fix-376")
expires = (NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
release_body = "\n".join([
CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
"pr: #376",
"branch: feat/fix-376",
"worktree: branches/fix-376",
"profile: prgs-author",
"phase: released",
f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
f"head_after: {HEAD_B}",
f"expires_at: {expires}",
])
comments = [{"body": claim_body}, {"body": release_body}]
lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
self.assertIsNone(lease)
def test_expired_claim_without_release(self):
past_expires = (NOW - timedelta(minutes=10)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
claim_body = "\n".join([
CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
"pr: #376",
"phase: claimed",
f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
f"expires_at: {past_expires}",
"profile: prgs-author",
])
comments = [{"body": claim_body}]
lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
self.assertIsNone(lease)
def test_mismatched_release_different_head(self):
claim_body = _conflict_fix_body(phase="claimed", worktree="branches/fix-376")
expires = (NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
release_body = "\n".join([
CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
"pr: #376",
"profile: prgs-author",
"phase: released",
f"head_before: {HEAD_B}",
f"expires_at: {expires}",
])
comments = [{"body": claim_body}, {"body": release_body}]
lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
self.assertIsNotNone(lease)
self.assertEqual(lease["phase"], "claimed")
def test_mismatched_release_different_branch(self):
claim_body = "\n".join([
CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
"pr: #376",
"branch: feat/branch-A",
"phase: claimed",
f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
f"expires_at: {(NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace('+00:00', 'Z')}",
"profile: prgs-author",
])
release_body = "\n".join([
CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
"pr: #376",
"branch: feat/branch-B",
"phase: released",
f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
f"expires_at: {(NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace('+00:00', 'Z')}",
"profile: prgs-author",
])
comments = [{"body": claim_body}, {"body": release_body}]
lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
self.assertIsNotNone(lease)
self.assertEqual(lease["phase"], "claimed")
def test_release_followed_by_newer_claim(self):
claim_1 = _conflict_fix_body(phase="claimed", worktree="branches/fix-376")
expires = (NOW + timedelta(minutes=60)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
release_1 = "\n".join([
CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
"pr: #376",
"profile: prgs-author",
"phase: released",
f"head_before: {HEAD_A}",
f"head_after: {HEAD_B}",
f"expires_at: {expires}",
])
claim_2 = "\n".join([
CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
"pr: #376",
"profile: prgs-author",
"phase: claimed",
f"head_before: {HEAD_B}",
f"expires_at: {expires}",
])
comments = [{"body": claim_1}, {"body": release_1}, {"body": claim_2}]
lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
self.assertIsNotNone(lease)
self.assertEqual(lease["head_before"], HEAD_B)
def test_malformed_or_ambiguous_markers(self):
malformed_release = "\n".join([
CONFLICT_FIX_LEASE_MARKER,
"pr: #376",
"phase: released",
# missing head_before and profile
])
claim_body = _conflict_fix_body(phase="claimed")
comments = [{"body": claim_body}, {"body": malformed_release}]
lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=376, now=NOW)
self.assertIsNotNone(lease)
def test_pr818_historical_sequence(self):
comment_14696 = "\n".join([
"<!-- mcp-conflict-fix-lease:v1 -->",
"pr: #818",
"branch: feat/issue-638-webui-app-shell-phase1",
"worktree: /Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/branches/issue-638-webui-app-shell-phase1",
"profile: prgs-author",
"session_id: unknown",
"phase: claimed",
"head_before: 08061b7b8aebdd099a37d1abf5dafcf38e4fd3fb",
"expires_at: 2026-07-23T07:12:13Z",
"reviewer_active: no",
])
comment_14730 = "\n".join([
"<!-- mcp-conflict-fix-lease:v1 -->",
"pr: #818",
"branch: feat/issue-638-webui-app-shell-phase1",
"worktree: /Users/jasonwalker/Development/Gitea-Tools/branches/issue-638-webui-app-shell-phase1",
"profile: prgs-author",
"session_id: prgs-author-61241-e5129c60",
"phase: released",
"head_before: 08061b7b8aebdd099a37d1abf5dafcf38e4fd3fb",
"head_after: 64b6eb5d5402663098de5ded3b0617cc3b3df98f",
"expires_at: 2026-07-23T06:05:00Z",
"reviewer_active: no",
])
comments = [{"body": comment_14696}, {"body": comment_14730}]
check_now = datetime(2026, 7, 23, 6, 30, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
lease = find_active_conflict_fix_lease(comments, pr_number=818, now=check_now)
self.assertIsNone(lease)
reviewer_gate = assess_reviewer_mutation_blocked(
pr_number=818,
comments=comments,
reviewed_head_sha="64b6eb5d5402663098de5ded3b0617cc3b3df98f",
live_head_sha="64b6eb5d5402663098de5ded3b0617cc3b3df98f",
mutation="approve",
now=check_now,
)
self.assertTrue(reviewer_gate["mutation_allowed"])
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
-499
View File
@@ -1,499 +0,0 @@
"""Tests for the read-only system-health API (#634).
Covers the acceptance criteria directly: a structured payload with readiness
and a dependency list (AC1), version and uptime when knowable (AC2), stale
runtime reported without a false mutation-safe claim (AC3), and the healthy /
degraded-dependency / redaction cases (AC4).
"""
import json
import os
import sqlite3
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from unittest import mock
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
import control_plane_db
from webui.app import create_app
from webui.deployment_boundary import scan_text_for_client_secrets
from webui.system_health import (
API_PATH,
STATUS_DEGRADED,
STATUS_DOWN,
STATUS_OK,
STATUS_SKIPPED,
DependencyProbe,
StaleRuntime,
assess_stale_runtime,
clear_probe_cache,
load_system_health,
namespace_summaries,
probe_control_plane_db,
probe_gitea,
process_uptime,
redact,
redact_url,
snapshot_to_dict,
)
def _probe(name, status, *, required=True, detail="detail", kind="test"):
return DependencyProbe(
name=name,
kind=kind,
status=status,
detail=detail,
required=required,
latency_ms=1.5,
metadata={},
)
_ALL_HEALTHY = (
_probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
_probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
_probe("gitea", STATUS_OK, required=False, kind="http"),
)
_CLEAN_PARITY = StaleRuntime(
daemon_head="abc123",
checkout_head="abc123",
remote_head="abc123",
stale=False,
determinable=True,
mutation_safe=True,
reasons=(),
)
class CleanParityMixin:
"""Pin parity for tests about aggregation rather than staleness.
Without this the assertions depend on the real checkout: a worktree whose
branch is ahead of its upstream is genuinely stale, which would degrade the
overall status and make these cases fail for an unrelated reason.
"""
def setUp(self):
super().setUp()
patcher = mock.patch(
"webui.system_health.assess_stale_runtime",
return_value=_CLEAN_PARITY,
)
patcher.start()
self.addCleanup(patcher.stop)
class TestDependencyAggregation(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
"""AC1 — readiness and dependency list derived from probe results."""
def test_all_healthy_is_ok_and_ready(self):
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_OK)
self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
self.assertTrue(snapshot.readiness_complete)
self.assertEqual(snapshot.readiness_reasons, ())
self.assertEqual(len(snapshot.dependencies), 3)
def test_required_dependency_down_blocks_readiness(self):
probes = (
_probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_DOWN, detail="file missing", kind="sqlite"),
_probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
_probe("gitea", STATUS_OK, required=False, kind="http"),
)
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DOWN)
self.assertFalse(snapshot.ready)
self.assertTrue(
any("control_plane_db" in reason for reason in snapshot.readiness_reasons)
)
def test_optional_dependency_down_degrades_but_stays_ready(self):
"""A failing optional probe must not claim the process itself is unready."""
probes = (
_probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
_probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
_probe("gitea", STATUS_DOWN, required=False, detail="timeout", kind="http"),
)
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
self.assertTrue(any("gitea" in reason for reason in snapshot.readiness_reasons))
def test_unrun_required_probe_leaves_readiness_incomplete(self):
"""Not probed is not the same as passing."""
probes = (
_probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
_probe("repository", STATUS_SKIPPED, detail="offline", kind="git"),
)
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
self.assertFalse(snapshot.ready)
self.assertFalse(snapshot.readiness_complete)
self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
def test_skipped_optional_probe_does_not_block_readiness(self):
probes = (
_probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
_probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
_probe("gitea", STATUS_SKIPPED, required=False, kind="http"),
)
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
self.assertTrue(snapshot.readiness_complete)
class TestVersionAndUptime(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
"""AC2 — version and uptime present when knowable."""
def test_uptime_and_start_time_present(self):
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
self.assertGreaterEqual(snapshot.uptime_seconds, 0.0)
self.assertIn("T", snapshot.started_at)
def test_process_uptime_helper_matches_shape(self):
started_at, uptime = process_uptime()
self.assertIn("T", started_at)
self.assertGreaterEqual(uptime, 0.0)
def test_version_reports_python_and_schema_version(self):
probes = (
DependencyProbe(
name="control_plane_db",
kind="sqlite",
status=STATUS_OK,
detail="ok",
required=True,
latency_ms=1.0,
metadata={"schema_version": control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION},
),
_probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
)
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
self.assertEqual(
snapshot.version.control_plane_schema_version,
control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION,
)
self.assertTrue(snapshot.version.python_version)
def test_version_known_flag_false_when_sha_unavailable(self):
with mock.patch("webui.system_health._git", return_value=None):
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
self.assertIsNone(snapshot.version.git_sha)
self.assertFalse(snapshot.version.known)
class TestStaleRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
"""AC3 — stale runtime reflected without a false mutation-safe claim."""
def test_matching_commits_are_mutation_safe(self):
assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
Path("/tmp"),
daemon_head="aaa",
git_reader=lambda *args: "aaa",
)
self.assertFalse(assessment.stale)
self.assertTrue(assessment.determinable)
self.assertTrue(assessment.mutation_safe)
def test_diverged_commits_are_stale_and_not_mutation_safe(self):
reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": "bbb"}
assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
Path("/tmp"),
daemon_head="aaa",
git_reader=lambda *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
)
self.assertTrue(assessment.stale)
self.assertFalse(assessment.mutation_safe)
self.assertTrue(assessment.reasons)
def test_unknown_remote_is_not_mutation_safe(self):
"""Indeterminate must never read as safe."""
reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": None}
assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
Path("/tmp"),
daemon_head="aaa",
git_reader=lambda *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
)
self.assertFalse(assessment.determinable)
self.assertFalse(assessment.mutation_safe)
self.assertFalse(assessment.stale)
self.assertTrue(
any("indeterminate" in reason for reason in assessment.reasons)
)
def test_unobservable_daemon_head_is_disclosed(self):
assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
Path("/tmp"),
git_reader=lambda *args: "aaa",
)
self.assertTrue(
any("not observable" in reason for reason in assessment.reasons)
)
def test_stale_runtime_degrades_overall_status(self):
reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": "bbb"}
# Pinned rather than inherited: this path uses the default git reader,
# so the assertion must hold whether or not the suite runs offline.
with mock.patch.dict(os.environ, {"WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE": ""}), mock.patch(
"webui.system_health._git",
side_effect=lambda repo, *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
):
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="aaa")
self.assertTrue(snapshot.stale_runtime.stale)
self.assertFalse(snapshot.stale_runtime.mutation_safe)
self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
class TestControlPlaneDbProbe(unittest.TestCase):
"""The required local dependency, probed read-only."""
def setUp(self):
self.tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.addCleanup(self.tmp.cleanup)
self.db_path = str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "control-plane.db")
def _build_db(self, schema_version):
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
conn.execute("CREATE TABLE schema_meta (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT)")
conn.execute("CREATE TABLE leases (lease_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, status TEXT)")
conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO schema_meta(key, value) VALUES ('schema_version', ?)",
(str(schema_version),),
)
conn.execute("INSERT INTO leases(lease_id, status) VALUES ('l1', 'active')")
conn.commit()
conn.close()
def test_missing_database_is_down(self):
probe = probe_control_plane_db(str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "absent.db"))
self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
self.assertTrue(probe.required)
self.assertIsNotNone(probe.latency_ms)
def test_matching_schema_is_ok(self):
self._build_db(control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION)
probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_OK)
self.assertEqual(
probe.metadata["schema_version"], control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION
)
self.assertEqual(probe.metadata["active_leases"], 1)
def test_mismatched_schema_is_degraded(self):
self._build_db(control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION + 99)
probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
def test_probe_does_not_create_a_database(self):
"""A health check must never initialise the substrate it inspects."""
absent = str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "never-created.db")
probe_control_plane_db(absent)
self.assertFalse(Path(absent).exists())
def test_unreadable_database_is_down_not_raised(self):
Path(self.db_path).write_text("this is not a sqlite database")
probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
"""AC4 — redaction. No credential-shaped text crosses the boundary."""
def test_redacts_token_assignment(self):
cleaned = redact("failed with token=ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ012345")
self.assertNotIn("ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ012345", cleaned)
self.assertIn("[redacted]", cleaned)
def test_redacts_authorization_header_text(self):
cleaned = redact("Authorization: Bearer abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456")
self.assertNotIn("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456", cleaned)
def test_redacts_long_opaque_strings(self):
cleaned = redact("value 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef here")
self.assertNotIn("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", cleaned)
def test_url_userinfo_and_query_are_stripped(self):
cleaned = redact_url("https://user:[email protected]/api/v1?token=xyz")
self.assertNotIn("secretpass", cleaned)
self.assertNotIn("token=xyz", cleaned)
self.assertEqual(cleaned, "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1")
def test_url_inside_free_text_is_redacted(self):
cleaned = redact("GET https://u:[email protected]/x?token=abc failed")
self.assertNotIn("u:p@", cleaned)
self.assertNotIn("token=abc", cleaned)
def test_gitea_probe_failure_detail_is_redacted(self):
boom = RuntimeError(
"connection refused for https://user:[email protected]/api/v1/version"
)
with mock.patch("webui.system_health.get_auth_header", return_value="token x"), \
mock.patch("webui.system_health.api_request", side_effect=boom):
probe = probe_gitea("gitea.example.com")
self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
self.assertNotIn("hunter2", probe.detail)
self.assertEqual(scan_text_for_client_secrets(probe.detail), [])
def test_credential_guard_refusal_is_a_status_not_a_crash(self):
with mock.patch(
"webui.system_health.get_auth_header",
side_effect=RuntimeError("daemon guard refused"),
):
probe = probe_gitea("gitea.example.com")
self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
self.assertFalse(probe.required)
class TestNamespaceSummaries(unittest.TestCase):
"""A web process cannot prove IDE namespace health, and must not claim to."""
def test_every_namespace_reports_unproven(self):
rows = namespace_summaries()
self.assertTrue(rows)
for row in rows:
with self.subTest(namespace=row["namespace"]):
self.assertEqual(row["status"], "unproven")
self.assertFalse(row["ide_namespace_proven"])
self.assertIn("client_namespace", row["reason"])
class TestSystemHealthRoutes(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
"""The HTTP surface: versioned path, status codes, read-only guard."""
def setUp(self):
super().setUp()
clear_probe_cache()
self.addCleanup(clear_probe_cache)
self.client = TestClient(create_app())
def _patch_snapshot(self, probes, daemon_head="abc123"):
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head=daemon_head)
patcher = mock.patch(
"webui.app.load_system_health",
return_value=snapshot,
)
patcher.start()
self.addCleanup(patcher.stop)
return snapshot
def test_versioned_route_is_registered(self):
self.assertEqual(API_PATH, "/api/v1/system/health")
self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
response = self.client.get(API_PATH)
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
def test_healthy_payload_shape(self):
self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
data = self.client.get(API_PATH).json()
self.assertEqual(data["status"], STATUS_OK)
self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["ready"])
self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["complete"])
self.assertEqual(data["api"], API_PATH)
self.assertEqual(len(data["dependencies"]), 3)
for key in ("version", "process", "stale_runtime", "mcp_namespaces"):
self.assertIn(key, data)
self.assertIn("uptime_seconds", data["process"])
self.assertIn("mutation_safe", data["stale_runtime"])
def test_degraded_dependency_returns_503(self):
probes = (
_probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_DOWN, detail="missing", kind="sqlite"),
_probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
)
self._patch_snapshot(probes)
response = self.client.get(API_PATH)
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 503)
data = response.json()
self.assertFalse(data["readiness"]["ready"])
self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["reasons"])
def test_dependency_entries_expose_status_and_latency(self):
self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
data = self.client.get(API_PATH).json()
names = {entry["name"] for entry in data["dependencies"]}
self.assertEqual(names, {"control_plane_db", "repository", "gitea"})
for entry in data["dependencies"]:
with self.subTest(dependency=entry["name"]):
self.assertIn("status", entry)
self.assertIn("required", entry)
self.assertIn("latency_ms", entry)
def test_response_body_carries_no_client_secrets(self):
self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
body = self.client.get(API_PATH).text
self.assertEqual(scan_text_for_client_secrets(body), [])
def test_deep_flag_is_forwarded(self):
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
with mock.patch(
"webui.app.load_system_health", return_value=snapshot
) as loader:
self.client.get(f"{API_PATH}?deep=1")
loader.assert_called_once_with(deep=True)
def test_shallow_is_the_default(self):
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
with mock.patch(
"webui.app.load_system_health", return_value=snapshot
) as loader:
self.client.get(API_PATH)
loader.assert_called_once_with(deep=False)
def test_route_rejects_mutation_methods(self):
for method in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"):
with self.subTest(method=method):
response = self.client.request(method, API_PATH)
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "read-only-mvp")
def test_default_shallow_call_skips_the_network_probe(self):
"""The expensive probe must not run unless it was asked for."""
with mock.patch("webui.system_health.probe_gitea") as probe:
snapshot = load_system_health(deep=False)
probe.assert_not_called()
gitea = next(p for p in snapshot.dependencies if p.name == "gitea")
self.assertEqual(gitea.status, STATUS_SKIPPED)
class TestHealthRouteBackwardCompatibility(unittest.TestCase):
"""`/health` is expanded additively; MVP consumers must keep working."""
def setUp(self):
self.client = TestClient(create_app())
def test_mvp_keys_are_unchanged(self):
data = self.client.get("/health").json()
self.assertEqual(data["status"], "ok")
self.assertEqual(data["service"], "mcp-control-plane-webui")
self.assertEqual(data["mode"], "read-only-mvp")
self.assertIn("timestamp", data)
self.assertEqual(data["deployment"]["mode"], "internal-operator-console")
def test_health_points_at_the_versioned_api(self):
data = self.client.get("/health").json()
self.assertEqual(data["system_health_api"], API_PATH)
self.assertIn("uptime_seconds", data)
self.assertIn("started_at", data)
def test_health_runs_no_dependency_probe(self):
"""Liveness must stay cheap: no probe, no snapshot assembly."""
with mock.patch("webui.app.load_system_health") as loader:
response = self.client.get("/health")
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
loader.assert_not_called()
class TestSnapshotSerialisation(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
def test_snapshot_dict_is_json_serialisable(self):
snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
encoded = json.dumps(snapshot_to_dict(snapshot))
self.assertIn("readiness", encoded)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
-34
View File
@@ -45,12 +45,6 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo
from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
from webui.system_health import (
API_PATH as SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
load_system_health,
process_uptime,
snapshot_to_dict as system_health_to_dict,
)
_READ_ONLY_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
_AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS = frozenset({"/audit", "/api/audit"})
@@ -84,43 +78,16 @@ async def home(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
async def health(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
"""Liveness only — deliberately cheap, runs no dependency probe (#634).
Every MVP key is retained so existing pollers keep working; the additions
are a pointer to the structured API and the in-memory process uptime.
Readiness lives at that API because answering it costs real probes.
"""
bind_host = _request.app.state.webui_bind_host
started_at, uptime_seconds = process_uptime()
return JSONResponse({
"status": "ok",
"service": "mcp-control-plane-webui",
"mode": "read-only-mvp",
"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
"deployment": deployment_snapshot(bind_host=bind_host),
"started_at": started_at,
"uptime_seconds": uptime_seconds,
"system_health_api": SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
})
def _truthy_flag(value: str | None) -> bool:
return (value or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
async def api_system_health(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
"""Structured read-only system health (#634).
`?deep=1` opts into the expensive network probe. The response status code
reflects readiness so automated checks can branch on it without parsing the
body: 200 when ready, 503 when a required dependency failed or never ran.
"""
deep = _truthy_flag(request.query_params.get("deep"))
snapshot = load_system_health(deep=deep)
payload = system_health_to_dict(snapshot)
return JSONResponse(payload, status_code=200 if snapshot.ready else 503)
async def queue(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
snapshot = load_queue_snapshot()
return HTMLResponse(render_page(title="Queue", body_html=render_queue_page(snapshot)))
@@ -432,7 +399,6 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
routes=[
Route("/", home, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/health", health, methods=["GET"]),
Route(SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH, api_system_health, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/queue", queue, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/queue", api_queue, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/projects", projects, methods=["GET"]),
-682
View File
@@ -1,682 +0,0 @@
"""Read-only system-health model for the operator console API (#634).
`/health` answers liveness only. Operators automating readiness checks need a
structured view of *why* the control plane is or is not usable: which
dependencies answered, how long they took, what version of the code is running,
and whether the runtime is stale relative to its remote.
Three rules shape this module.
* **Read-only.** Every probe opens its subject read-only. The control-plane
database is opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI so a health check can never
create or migrate a schema, and no probe writes, restarts, or reloads
anything restart controls are Phase 2, and #630 forbids process-kill
recovery outright.
* **Fail-soft.** A dependency that is unreachable is a *status*, not an
exception. Probes catch their own failures and report them as a degraded or
down entry carrying a reason.
* **Never claim more than was proven.** Readiness is derived only from probes
that actually ran, ``mutation_safe`` stays false unless the parity commits are
known and equal, and an MCP namespace is reported unproven because a web
process cannot exercise the IDE-managed client path (#543).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import re
import sqlite3
import subprocess
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Callable
from urllib.parse import urlsplit, urlunsplit
import control_plane_db
import mcp_namespace_health
from gitea_auth import api_request, get_auth_header, gitea_url
from webui.project_registry import load_registry
SERVICE_NAME = "mcp-control-plane-webui"
API_PATH = "/api/v1/system/health"
STATUS_OK = "ok"
STATUS_DEGRADED = "degraded"
STATUS_DOWN = "down"
STATUS_SKIPPED = "skipped"
STATUS_UNPROVEN = "unproven"
# Statuses that count as a healthy answer from a probe.
_HEALTHY_STATUSES = frozenset({STATUS_OK})
# Statuses meaning "this probe did not run", as opposed to "it ran and failed".
_NOT_RUN_STATUSES = frozenset({STATUS_SKIPPED})
_DEEP_PROBE_TTL_ENV = "WEBUI_HEALTH_PROBE_TTL_SECONDS"
_DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL = 15.0
_GITEA_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
_OFFLINE_ENV = "WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE"
# Credential-shaped material that must never reach the browser, mirroring the
# forbidden client patterns in webui/deployment_boundary.py.
_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)\b(token|password|passwd|secret|authorization|bearer)\b\s*[:=]?\s*\S+"
)
_LONG_OPAQUE_RE = re.compile(r"\b[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{32,}\b")
# Captured once at import so uptime measures this process, not the request.
_STARTED_AT = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
_STARTED_MONOTONIC = time.monotonic()
# TTL cache for the expensive (network) probe only.
_deep_cache: dict[str, tuple[float, "DependencyProbe"]] = {}
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class DependencyProbe:
"""One dependency check, fail-soft, with its own latency."""
name: str
kind: str
status: str
detail: str
required: bool
latency_ms: float | None = None
metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None
@property
def healthy(self) -> bool:
return self.status in _HEALTHY_STATUSES
@property
def ran(self) -> bool:
return self.status not in _NOT_RUN_STATUSES
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class VersionInfo:
git_sha: str | None
git_describe: str | None
control_plane_schema_version: int | None
python_version: str
known: bool
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class StaleRuntime:
"""Parity between the running code, the checkout, and the remote.
``mutation_safe`` is deliberately conservative: unknown is not safe.
"""
daemon_head: str | None
checkout_head: str | None
remote_head: str | None
stale: bool
determinable: bool
mutation_safe: bool
reasons: tuple[str, ...]
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SystemHealthSnapshot:
status: str
ready: bool
readiness_complete: bool
readiness_reasons: tuple[str, ...]
service: str
mode: str
version: VersionInfo
started_at: str
uptime_seconds: float
timestamp: str
deep_probes_requested: bool
dependencies: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...]
mcp_namespaces: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]
stale_runtime: StaleRuntime
probe_errors: tuple[str, ...] = ()
def process_uptime() -> tuple[str, float]:
"""Process start timestamp and uptime — in-memory, safe for `/health`."""
return _STARTED_AT.isoformat(), round(time.monotonic() - _STARTED_MONOTONIC, 3)
def _offline() -> bool:
return (os.environ.get(_OFFLINE_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes"}
def _repo_root() -> Path:
override = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_REPO_ROOT") or "").strip()
if override:
return Path(override).resolve()
return Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
def _deep_probe_ttl() -> float:
raw = (os.environ.get(_DEEP_PROBE_TTL_ENV) or "").strip()
if not raw:
return _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
try:
value = float(raw)
except ValueError:
return _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
return value if value >= 0 else _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
def redact(text: str) -> str:
"""Strip credential-shaped material from operator-visible probe text.
Probe details carry exception strings, and an exception raised by an HTTP
client can quote the request that failed. Redaction happens here, at the
boundary where those strings become part of a browser-bound payload.
"""
if not text:
return ""
cleaned = _redact_urls(text)
cleaned = _SECRET_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}=[redacted]", cleaned)
return _LONG_OPAQUE_RE.sub("[redacted]", cleaned)
def _redact_urls(text: str) -> str:
return re.sub(r"https?://\S+", lambda m: redact_url(m.group(0)), text)
def redact_url(url: str) -> str:
"""Reduce a URL to scheme://host/path — no userinfo, no query, no fragment."""
try:
parts = urlsplit(url)
except ValueError:
return "[redacted-url]"
if not parts.scheme or not parts.hostname:
return "[redacted-url]"
netloc = parts.hostname
if parts.port:
netloc = f"{netloc}:{parts.port}"
return urlunsplit((parts.scheme, netloc, parts.path, "", ""))
def _git(repo: Path, *args: str) -> str | None:
try:
completed = subprocess.run(
["git", "-C", str(repo), *args],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
check=False,
timeout=10,
)
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
return None
if completed.returncode != 0:
return None
return (completed.stdout or "").strip() or None
def _load_version(repo: Path, *, schema_version: int | None) -> VersionInfo:
import platform
git_sha = None if _offline() else _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
describe = None if _offline() else _git(repo, "describe", "--tags", "--always")
return VersionInfo(
git_sha=git_sha,
git_describe=describe,
control_plane_schema_version=schema_version,
python_version=platform.python_version(),
known=bool(git_sha),
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Dependency probes
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _elapsed_ms(started: float) -> float:
return round((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000, 3)
def probe_control_plane_db(db_path: str | None = None) -> DependencyProbe:
"""Read-only reachability check for the control-plane SQLite substrate.
Opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI on purpose: ``ControlPlaneDB.__init__``
creates directories and runs schema migrations, which a health check must
never do.
"""
path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path()).strip()
started = time.monotonic()
metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"path": path}
def _result(status: str, detail: str) -> DependencyProbe:
return DependencyProbe(
name="control_plane_db",
kind="sqlite",
status=status,
detail=detail,
required=True,
latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
metadata=metadata,
)
if not path or not os.path.exists(path):
return _result(STATUS_DOWN, "control-plane database file does not exist yet")
try:
conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=5)
try:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT value FROM schema_meta WHERE key = 'schema_version'"
).fetchone()
leases = conn.execute(
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM leases WHERE status = 'active'"
).fetchone()
finally:
conn.close()
except sqlite3.Error as exc:
return _result(STATUS_DOWN, redact(f"control-plane database unreadable: {exc}"))
schema_version = int(row[0]) if row and str(row[0]).isdigit() else None
metadata["schema_version"] = schema_version
metadata["active_leases"] = int(leases[0]) if leases else None
if schema_version is None:
return _result(
STATUS_DEGRADED, "control-plane database has no recorded schema version"
)
if schema_version != control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION:
return _result(
STATUS_DEGRADED,
f"control-plane schema version {schema_version} does not match the "
f"version this code expects ({control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION})",
)
return _result(STATUS_OK, f"schema v{schema_version} readable")
def probe_repository(repo: Path) -> DependencyProbe:
"""Local checkout reachability — required, cheap, no network."""
started = time.monotonic()
metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"repo_root": str(repo)}
if _offline():
return DependencyProbe(
name="repository",
kind="git",
status=STATUS_SKIPPED,
detail=f"{_OFFLINE_ENV} is set; git probe skipped",
required=True,
latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
metadata=metadata,
)
head = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
if not head:
return DependencyProbe(
name="repository",
kind="git",
status=STATUS_DOWN,
detail=f"HEAD could not be read at {repo}",
required=True,
latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
metadata=metadata,
)
branch = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD")
metadata["head"] = head
metadata["branch"] = branch
return DependencyProbe(
name="repository",
kind="git",
status=STATUS_OK,
detail=f"checkout readable at {branch or 'detached HEAD'}",
required=True,
latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
metadata=metadata,
)
def probe_gitea(host: str) -> DependencyProbe:
"""Live Gitea reachability. Expensive (network), so opt-in via ``deep``.
Optional by design: the console stays useful for local inventory when the
remote is unreachable, so a failure here degrades status without claiming
the process itself is unready.
"""
started = time.monotonic()
metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"host": host}
def _failure(status: str, detail: str) -> DependencyProbe:
return DependencyProbe(
name="gitea",
kind="http",
status=status,
detail=detail,
required=False,
latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
metadata=metadata,
)
if not host:
return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, "no Gitea host is configured in the registry")
try:
auth = get_auth_header(host)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — credential guards are a status here
return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, redact(f"credential lookup refused: {exc}"))
if not auth:
return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, f"no credentials available for {host}")
url = gitea_url(host, "/api/v1/version")
metadata["endpoint"] = redact_url(url)
try:
data = api_request("GET", url, auth, timeout=_GITEA_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — a down dependency is a status
return _failure(STATUS_DOWN, redact(f"Gitea probe failed: {exc}"))
if isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("version"):
metadata["gitea_version"] = str(data["version"])
return DependencyProbe(
name="gitea",
kind="http",
status=STATUS_OK,
detail=f"{host} reachable",
required=False,
latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
metadata=metadata,
)
def _skipped_gitea(host: str) -> DependencyProbe:
return DependencyProbe(
name="gitea",
kind="http",
status=STATUS_SKIPPED,
detail="network probe not requested; call with ?deep=1 to run it",
required=False,
latency_ms=None,
metadata={"host": host},
)
def namespace_summaries() -> tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]:
"""Declared MCP namespaces, each honestly reported as unproven.
The web process runs outside the IDE-managed MCP client, so it cannot
invoke a namespace tool. Per #543 only a ``client_namespace`` probe proves
that path, and inventing a healthy verdict here is exactly the false claim
the mutation gates exist to prevent.
"""
rows: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
for namespace, required_tool in sorted(
mcp_namespace_health.REQUIRED_NAMESPACE_TOOLS.items()
):
classification = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
namespace,
required_tool=required_tool,
probe_result=None,
probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_UNKNOWN,
)
rows.append(
{
"namespace": namespace,
"required_tool": required_tool,
"status": STATUS_UNPROVEN,
"ide_namespace_proven": bool(classification.get("ide_namespace_proven")),
"reason": (
"the web console cannot invoke the IDE-managed MCP client; "
"namespace health must be proven with a client_namespace "
"probe (#543)"
),
"error_type": classification.get("error_type"),
}
)
return tuple(rows)
def assess_stale_runtime(
repo: Path,
*,
daemon_head: str | None = None,
git_reader: Callable[..., str | None] | None = None,
) -> StaleRuntime:
"""Three-way parity view: running code, local checkout, remote-tracking ref.
``mutation_safe`` requires all three to be known and equal. Anything less
including "the remote ref was never fetched" is reported as not safe with
a reason, so an operator never reads an unproven green.
"""
reader = git_reader or (lambda *args: _git(repo, *args))
reasons: list[str] = []
# The offline switch suppresses real subprocess calls; an explicitly
# injected reader is already a substitute for them and is always used.
offline = _offline() and git_reader is None
checkout_head = None if offline else reader("rev-parse", "HEAD")
remote_head = None if offline else reader("rev-parse", "@{upstream}")
if offline:
reasons.append(f"{_OFFLINE_ENV} is set; parity commits were not read")
else:
if checkout_head is None:
reasons.append("local checkout HEAD could not be read")
if remote_head is None:
reasons.append(
"no remote-tracking commit is known for the current branch; "
"remote staleness is indeterminate (no fetch is performed here)"
)
effective_daemon = daemon_head if daemon_head is not None else checkout_head
if daemon_head is None:
reasons.append(
"the running MCP daemon's startup commit is not observable from the "
"web process; the checkout commit is reported in its place"
)
determinable = bool(checkout_head and remote_head and effective_daemon)
stale = bool(
determinable and len({checkout_head, remote_head, effective_daemon}) > 1
)
if stale:
reasons.append(
"runtime, checkout, and remote commits disagree; restart the MCP "
"server after updating the checkout before trusting capability gates"
)
return StaleRuntime(
daemon_head=effective_daemon,
checkout_head=checkout_head,
remote_head=remote_head,
stale=stale,
determinable=determinable,
mutation_safe=bool(determinable and not stale),
reasons=tuple(reasons),
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Snapshot assembly
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _default_host() -> str:
registry = load_registry()
if not registry.projects:
return ""
raw = registry.projects[0].remote_host
parts = urlsplit(raw.strip())
return parts.netloc or raw.strip().rstrip("/")
def _aggregate(
probes: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...],
) -> tuple[str, bool, bool, tuple[str, ...]]:
"""Fold probe results into overall status and readiness.
Required probes drive readiness; optional probes can only degrade status.
A probe that did not run leaves readiness incomplete rather than passing.
"""
reasons: list[str] = []
required = [probe for probe in probes if probe.required]
unrun_required = [probe for probe in required if not probe.ran]
failed_required = [probe for probe in required if probe.ran and not probe.healthy]
failed_optional = [
probe
for probe in probes
if not probe.required and probe.ran and not probe.healthy
]
for probe in unrun_required:
reasons.append(
f"required dependency '{probe.name}' was not probed: {probe.detail}"
)
for probe in failed_required:
reasons.append(
f"required dependency '{probe.name}' is {probe.status}: {probe.detail}"
)
for probe in failed_optional:
reasons.append(
f"optional dependency '{probe.name}' is {probe.status}: {probe.detail}"
)
readiness_complete = not unrun_required
ready = readiness_complete and not failed_required
if any(probe.status == STATUS_DOWN for probe in failed_required):
status = STATUS_DOWN
elif failed_required or failed_optional or unrun_required:
status = STATUS_DEGRADED
else:
status = STATUS_OK
return status, ready, readiness_complete, tuple(reasons)
def load_system_health(
*,
deep: bool = False,
host: str | None = None,
probes: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...] | None = None,
daemon_head: str | None = None,
use_cache: bool = True,
) -> SystemHealthSnapshot:
"""Assemble the read-only system-health snapshot.
``deep=True`` adds the network probe against Gitea; its result is cached for
a short TTL so repeated dashboard polls do not amplify into remote load.
"""
repo = _repo_root()
probe_errors: list[str] = []
if probes is None:
collected: list[DependencyProbe] = []
for probe_fn in (
lambda: probe_control_plane_db(),
lambda: probe_repository(repo),
):
try:
collected.append(probe_fn())
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — a probe must not 500 the API
probe_errors.append(redact(f"probe raised: {exc}"))
resolved_host = host if host is not None else _default_host()
if deep and not _offline():
collected.append(_cached_gitea_probe(resolved_host, use_cache=use_cache))
else:
collected.append(_skipped_gitea(resolved_host))
probes = tuple(collected)
status, ready, readiness_complete, reasons = _aggregate(probes)
stale = assess_stale_runtime(repo, daemon_head=daemon_head)
if stale.stale:
if status == STATUS_OK:
status = STATUS_DEGRADED
reasons = reasons + (
"runtime is stale relative to its remote-tracking commit",
)
db_probe = next((p for p in probes if p.name == "control_plane_db"), None)
schema_version = None
if db_probe and db_probe.metadata:
schema_version = db_probe.metadata.get("schema_version")
return SystemHealthSnapshot(
status=status,
ready=ready,
readiness_complete=readiness_complete,
readiness_reasons=reasons,
service=SERVICE_NAME,
mode="read-only",
version=_load_version(repo, schema_version=schema_version),
started_at=_STARTED_AT.isoformat(),
uptime_seconds=round(time.monotonic() - _STARTED_MONOTONIC, 3),
timestamp=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
deep_probes_requested=deep,
dependencies=probes,
mcp_namespaces=namespace_summaries(),
stale_runtime=stale,
probe_errors=tuple(probe_errors),
)
def _cached_gitea_probe(host: str, *, use_cache: bool = True) -> DependencyProbe:
ttl = _deep_probe_ttl()
now = time.monotonic()
if use_cache and ttl > 0:
cached = _deep_cache.get(host)
if cached and (now - cached[0]) < ttl:
return cached[1]
probe = probe_gitea(host)
if use_cache and ttl > 0:
_deep_cache[host] = (now, probe)
return probe
def clear_probe_cache() -> None:
"""Drop cached deep-probe results (tests and operator-forced refresh)."""
_deep_cache.clear()
def probe_to_dict(probe: DependencyProbe) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"name": probe.name,
"kind": probe.kind,
"status": probe.status,
"detail": probe.detail,
"required": probe.required,
"healthy": probe.healthy,
"latency_ms": probe.latency_ms,
"metadata": dict(probe.metadata or {}),
}
def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"status": snapshot.status,
"service": snapshot.service,
"mode": snapshot.mode,
"api": API_PATH,
"timestamp": snapshot.timestamp,
"readiness": {
"ready": snapshot.ready,
"complete": snapshot.readiness_complete,
"reasons": list(snapshot.readiness_reasons),
},
"version": {
"git_sha": snapshot.version.git_sha,
"git_describe": snapshot.version.git_describe,
"control_plane_schema_version": (
snapshot.version.control_plane_schema_version
),
"python_version": snapshot.version.python_version,
"known": snapshot.version.known,
},
"process": {
"started_at": snapshot.started_at,
"uptime_seconds": snapshot.uptime_seconds,
},
"deep_probes_requested": snapshot.deep_probes_requested,
"dependencies": [probe_to_dict(probe) for probe in snapshot.dependencies],
"mcp_namespaces": [dict(row) for row in snapshot.mcp_namespaces],
"stale_runtime": {
"daemon_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.daemon_head,
"checkout_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.checkout_head,
"remote_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.remote_head,
"stale": snapshot.stale_runtime.stale,
"determinable": snapshot.stale_runtime.determinable,
"mutation_safe": snapshot.stale_runtime.mutation_safe,
"reasons": list(snapshot.stale_runtime.reasons),
},
"probe_errors": list(snapshot.probe_errors),
}