Compare commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 sysadmin
|
a6a2243aad | ||
|
sysadmin
|
a0fffae576 |
@@ -39,27 +39,6 @@ GITEA_AUDIT_LOG=/path/to/gitea-mcp-audit.log
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# only — never the token value. Surfaced by gitea_get_profile.
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GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE=GITEA_TOKEN
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# ── Optional self-hosted Sentry observability (#606) ────────────────────────
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# Emits runtime errors, fail-closed workflow blockers, lease/terminal-lock/
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# stale-runtime collisions, and watchdog cron check-ins to a SELF-HOSTED Sentry
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# (https://sentry.prgs.cc/) — never Sentry Cloud. Gitea stays the source of
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# truth; Sentry is observe-only. OFF by default: with MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED unset
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# or SENTRY_DSN empty, nothing is initialised and no events are sent.
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#
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# Master gate. Truthy = 1/true/yes/on. Both this AND SENTRY_DSN are required.
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MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=0
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# DSN for the self-hosted project (create a `gitea-tools-mcp` project in
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# https://sentry.prgs.cc/ and copy its DSN). Never commit a real DSN.
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SENTRY_DSN=
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# Deployment environment tag (local/dev/prod). Defaults to "development".
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SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=development
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# Optional release identifier (e.g. a git SHA or version string).
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SENTRY_RELEASE=
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# Performance-trace sample rate, 0.0–1.0 (clamped). Default 0.0 (traces off).
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MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.0
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# Set to 1 to forward Python logs to Sentry as structured logs. Default off.
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MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS=0
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# Optional canonical runtime-profile config (#19). Instead of the fields above,
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# point every LLM launcher at ONE JSON file of named profiles and select one.
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# Secrets are referenced (keychain id / env var name), never inlined. See
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@@ -76,12 +55,3 @@ GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs
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# GITEA_MERGER_WORKTREE=/path/to/repo/branches/merge-pr456
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# GITEA_RECONCILER_WORKTREE=/path/to/repo/branches/reconcile-pr456
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# GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE=/path/to/repo/branches/session-override
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# Durable HMAC key for irrecoverable decision-lock provenance artifacts (#709 F4).
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# REQUIRED in production native MCP processes that mint or verify recovery
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# authorization (reconciler + merger must share the same key). Hex (preferred),
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# base64, or utf-8 literal (>=16 bytes). Never generate an ephemeral per-process
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# key — cross-process / post-restart verification would fail closed.
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# GITEA_IRRECOVERABLE_AUTH_HMAC_KEY=0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
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# Optional key version string bound into the signature (for rotation).
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# GITEA_IRRECOVERABLE_AUTH_HMAC_KEY_VERSION=v1
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@@ -1,610 +0,0 @@
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"""Controller-owned work allocator policy (#600).
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Builds on the #613 control-plane DB substrate (``ControlPlaneDB.assign_and_lease``).
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Workers must not self-select exclusive work under the standard multi-LLM
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workflow. They call ``gitea_allocate_next_work`` which:
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1. Inspects candidate Gitea issues/PRs (never raw monitoring incidents).
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2. Applies ADR routing policy (role, terminal path, leases, blocked, deps).
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3. Atomically assigns + leases the selected item in one DB transaction.
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This module is pure selection + substrate orchestration. Gitea I/O for live
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inventory lives in the MCP tool wrapper so tests can inject candidates.
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#612 remains downstream: bridge-created Gitea issues become candidates only
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after they exist as normal issues; this module never assigns incidents.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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import uuid
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from typing import Any, Sequence
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from control_plane_db import (
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ControlPlaneDB,
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ControlPlaneError,
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InvalidWorkKindError,
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LeaseRequiredError,
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WORK_KINDS,
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)
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# Outcomes required by #600 / ADR §5.
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OUTCOME_ASSIGNED = "assigned_work"
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OUTCOME_WAIT = "wait"
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OUTCOME_BLOCKED_TERMINAL = "blocked_by_terminal_path"
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OUTCOME_BLOCKED_LEASE = "blocked_by_active_lease"
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OUTCOME_NEEDS_CONTROLLER = "needs_controller"
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OUTCOME_NO_SAFE = "no_safe_work"
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OUTCOME_ROLE_INELIGIBLE = "role_ineligible"
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OUTCOME_PREVIEW = "preview" # dry-run only (apply=false)
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ROLE_AUTHOR = "author"
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ROLE_REVIEWER = "reviewer"
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ROLE_MERGER = "merger"
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ROLE_RECONCILER = "reconciler"
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ROLE_CONTROLLER = "controller"
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VALID_ROLES = frozenset(
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{ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER, ROLE_RECONCILER, ROLE_CONTROLLER}
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)
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# Default action matrices by role (mutation gate will re-check).
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ROLE_ACTIONS: dict[str, tuple[tuple[str, ...], tuple[str, ...]]] = {
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ROLE_AUTHOR: (
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("implement", "comment", "push", "create_pr"),
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("approve", "merge", "request_changes", "self_select_without_assignment"),
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),
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ROLE_REVIEWER: (
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("review", "comment", "approve", "request_changes"),
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("merge", "push", "create_pr", "self_select_without_assignment"),
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),
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ROLE_MERGER: (
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("merge", "comment"),
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("approve", "request_changes", "push", "create_pr", "self_select_without_assignment"),
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),
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ROLE_RECONCILER: (
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("comment", "diagnose", "cleanup"),
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("approve", "merge", "push", "create_pr", "self_select_without_assignment"),
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),
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ROLE_CONTROLLER: (
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("comment", "diagnose", "allocate"),
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("approve", "merge", "push", "create_pr"),
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),
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}
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@dataclass
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class WorkCandidate:
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"""One assignable Gitea issue or PR presented to the allocator."""
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kind: str # issue | pr
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number: int
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state: str = "open"
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labels: tuple[str, ...] = ()
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title: str = ""
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priority: int = 0
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head_sha: str | None = None
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# Routing signals (callers derive from Gitea / review feedback).
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request_changes_current_head: bool = False
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approval_on_current_head: bool = False
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approval_stale: bool = False
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approval_contaminated: bool = False
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mergeable: bool = False
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blocked: bool = False
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dependency_unmet: bool = False
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dependency_reason: str | None = None
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already_claimed_elsewhere: bool = False
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def __post_init__(self) -> None:
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self.kind = (self.kind or "").strip().lower()
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self.state = (self.state or "open").strip().lower()
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self.labels = tuple(
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str(x).strip().lower() for x in (self.labels or ()) if str(x).strip()
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)
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if self.kind not in WORK_KINDS:
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raise InvalidWorkKindError(
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f"candidate kind '{self.kind}' is not assignable; only "
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f"{sorted(WORK_KINDS)} (never raw incidents)"
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)
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def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
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return {
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"kind": self.kind,
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"number": self.number,
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"state": self.state,
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"labels": list(self.labels),
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"title": self.title,
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"priority": self.priority,
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"head_sha": self.head_sha,
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"request_changes_current_head": self.request_changes_current_head,
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"approval_on_current_head": self.approval_on_current_head,
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"approval_stale": self.approval_stale,
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"approval_contaminated": self.approval_contaminated,
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"mergeable": self.mergeable,
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"blocked": self.blocked,
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"dependency_unmet": self.dependency_unmet,
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"dependency_reason": self.dependency_reason,
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}
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@dataclass
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class SkipRecord:
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kind: str
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number: int
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reason: str
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def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
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return {"kind": self.kind, "number": self.number, "reason": self.reason}
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def normalize_role(role: str | None, *, profile_name: str | None = None) -> str:
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"""Map profile/role strings to a canonical allocator role."""
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raw = (role or "").strip().lower()
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if raw in VALID_ROLES:
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return raw
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prof = (profile_name or "").strip().lower()
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for token in VALID_ROLES:
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if token in prof or prof.endswith(f"-{token}"):
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return token
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if "author" in raw:
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return ROLE_AUTHOR
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if "review" in raw:
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return ROLE_REVIEWER
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if "merg" in raw:
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return ROLE_MERGER
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if "reconcil" in raw:
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return ROLE_RECONCILER
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if "control" in raw:
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return ROLE_CONTROLLER
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raise ControlPlaneError(
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f"unknown allocator role '{role}' (profile={profile_name!r}); "
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f"expected one of {sorted(VALID_ROLES)}"
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)
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def expected_role_for_candidate(c: WorkCandidate) -> str:
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"""ADR §5.3 routing: which role should take this work next."""
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if c.kind == "pr":
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if c.approval_contaminated:
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return ROLE_RECONCILER
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if c.request_changes_current_head:
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return ROLE_AUTHOR
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if c.approval_stale:
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return ROLE_REVIEWER
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if c.approval_on_current_head and c.mergeable:
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return ROLE_MERGER
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# Open PR without terminal verdict → reviewer
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return ROLE_REVIEWER
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# Issues: ready work → author by default; blocked stays controller/none
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labels = set(c.labels)
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if "status:blocked" in labels or c.blocked:
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return ROLE_CONTROLLER
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return ROLE_AUTHOR
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def role_actions(role: str) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], tuple[str, ...]]:
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return ROLE_ACTIONS.get(role, ROLE_ACTIONS[ROLE_AUTHOR])
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def classify_skip(
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c: WorkCandidate,
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*,
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role: str,
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terminal_pr: int | None,
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) -> str | None:
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"""Return skip reason, or None if candidate is selectable for *role*."""
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if c.state in ("merged", "closed"):
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return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} is {c.state}; never assign"
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if c.blocked or "status:blocked" in c.labels:
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return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} is blocked"
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if c.dependency_unmet:
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return (
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c.dependency_reason
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or f"{c.kind}#{c.number} has unmet dependencies"
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)
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if c.already_claimed_elsewhere:
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return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} already claimed elsewhere"
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if c.kind == "pr" and not (c.head_sha or "").strip():
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return f"pr#{c.number} missing head_sha pin"
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# Terminal path first: when an active terminal PR exists, only that PR
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# (or controller diagnosis) is assignable for review-path roles.
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if terminal_pr is not None and c.kind == "pr" and c.number != terminal_pr:
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if role in (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER):
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return (
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f"pr#{c.number} skipped: active terminal-review lock on "
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f"PR #{terminal_pr} must be resolved first"
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)
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expected = expected_role_for_candidate(c)
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if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
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# Controller may inspect anything but only assigns diagnosis targets
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# when contaminated / blocked.
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if expected == ROLE_RECONCILER or c.blocked:
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return None
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return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} does not require controller (expected {expected})"
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if role != expected:
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return (
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f"{c.kind}#{c.number} expects role '{expected}', active role is '{role}'"
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)
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# Ready-gate for issues: prefer status:ready when labels present.
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if c.kind == "issue" and c.labels:
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if "status:ready" not in c.labels and "status:in-progress" not in c.labels:
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# Allow unlabeled open issues; only skip explicit non-ready states.
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if any(l.startswith("status:") for l in c.labels):
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return f"issue#{c.number} not status:ready ({','.join(c.labels)})"
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return None
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def sort_candidates(candidates: Sequence[WorkCandidate]) -> list[WorkCandidate]:
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"""Higher priority first; then lower number (older issues) for stability."""
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return sorted(
|
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candidates,
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key=lambda c: (-int(c.priority), c.kind != "pr", int(c.number)),
|
||||
)
|
||||
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||||
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def allocate_next_work(
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db: ControlPlaneDB,
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*,
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session_id: str,
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role: str,
|
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remote: str,
|
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org: str,
|
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repo: str,
|
||||
candidates: Sequence[WorkCandidate],
|
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apply: bool = False,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
username: str | None = None,
|
||||
lease_ttl_seconds: int | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
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"""Select and optionally reserve the next work unit via control-plane DB.
|
||||
|
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*apply=False* (default): dry-run selection only — no lease/assignment.
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*apply=True*: atomic ``assign_and_lease`` for the selected candidate.
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|
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Never uses file locks or comment-only leases as the assignment source.
|
||||
"""
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||||
if db is None:
|
||||
return {
|
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"success": False,
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||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
"control-plane DB substrate unavailable (fail closed, #600/#613)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"skipped": [],
|
||||
"assignment": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
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"file_lock_only": False,
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||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
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||||
}
|
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|
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try:
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role_norm = normalize_role(role, profile_name=profile_name)
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except ControlPlaneError as exc:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_ROLE_INELIGIBLE,
|
||||
"reasons": [str(exc)],
|
||||
"skipped": [],
|
||||
"assignment": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
session_id = (session_id or "").strip() or f"alloc-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}"
|
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try:
|
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db.upsert_session(
|
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session_id=session_id,
|
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role=role_norm,
|
||||
profile=profile_name,
|
||||
pid=os.getpid(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — surface structured
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"failed to register session in control-plane DB: {exc} "
|
||||
"(fail closed, #613)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"skipped": [],
|
||||
"assignment": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Expire stale leases globally before selection.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
db.expire_stale_leases()
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
|
||||
"reasons": [f"lease expiry failed: {exc} (fail closed)"],
|
||||
"skipped": [],
|
||||
"assignment": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
terminal = None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
terminal = db.get_active_terminal_lock(remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
|
||||
"reasons": [f"terminal lock lookup failed: {exc} (fail closed)"],
|
||||
"skipped": [],
|
||||
"assignment": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
}
|
||||
terminal_pr = int(terminal["terminal_pr"]) if terminal else None
|
||||
|
||||
skipped: list[SkipRecord] = []
|
||||
ordered = sort_candidates(list(candidates))
|
||||
selected: WorkCandidate | None = None
|
||||
for c in ordered:
|
||||
reason = classify_skip(c, role=role_norm, terminal_pr=terminal_pr)
|
||||
if reason:
|
||||
skipped.append(SkipRecord(c.kind, c.number, reason))
|
||||
continue
|
||||
selected = c
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
if selected is None:
|
||||
# If terminal lock blocks all review work, surface that explicitly.
|
||||
if terminal_pr is not None and role_norm in (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER):
|
||||
outcome = OUTCOME_BLOCKED_TERMINAL
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
f"no safe work for role '{role_norm}': active terminal-review "
|
||||
f"lock on PR #{terminal_pr} (resolve terminal path first, #332/#600)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
else:
|
||||
outcome = OUTCOME_NO_SAFE
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
f"no safe assignable work for role '{role_norm}' "
|
||||
f"among {len(ordered)} candidates"
|
||||
]
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"outcome": outcome,
|
||||
"apply": bool(apply),
|
||||
"role": role_norm,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"username": username,
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"selected": None,
|
||||
"expected_role_next": None,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
|
||||
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
|
||||
"assignment": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
"downstream_note": (
|
||||
"#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
|
||||
"allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
expected_role = expected_role_for_candidate(selected)
|
||||
allowed, forbidden = role_actions(role_norm)
|
||||
selection = {
|
||||
"kind": selected.kind,
|
||||
"number": selected.number,
|
||||
"title": selected.title,
|
||||
"labels": list(selected.labels),
|
||||
"head_sha": selected.head_sha,
|
||||
"priority": selected.priority,
|
||||
"expected_role_next": expected_role,
|
||||
"reason_selected": (
|
||||
f"highest-priority candidate for role '{role_norm}' "
|
||||
f"(expected_role={expected_role})"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if not apply:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
|
||||
"apply": False,
|
||||
"role": role_norm,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"username": username,
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"selected": selection,
|
||||
"expected_role_next": expected_role,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
"dry-run only (apply=false); no assignment/lease created — "
|
||||
"call again with apply=true to reserve via control-plane DB"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
|
||||
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
|
||||
"assignment": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
"downstream_note": (
|
||||
"#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
|
||||
"allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Atomic reserve via #613 substrate.
|
||||
ttl = lease_ttl_seconds if lease_ttl_seconds is not None else None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"role": role_norm,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"kind": selected.kind,
|
||||
"number": selected.number,
|
||||
"expected_head_sha": selected.head_sha,
|
||||
"allowed_actions": allowed,
|
||||
"forbidden_actions": forbidden,
|
||||
"phase": "allocated",
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ttl is not None:
|
||||
kwargs["lease_ttl_seconds"] = int(ttl)
|
||||
result = db.assign_and_lease(**kwargs)
|
||||
except (InvalidWorkKindError, LeaseRequiredError, ControlPlaneError) as exc:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
|
||||
"apply": True,
|
||||
"role": role_norm,
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"selected": selection,
|
||||
"expected_role_next": expected_role,
|
||||
"reasons": [f"atomic assign+lease failed: {exc} (fail closed, #613)"],
|
||||
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
|
||||
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
|
||||
"assignment": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if result.outcome == "wait":
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_WAIT,
|
||||
"apply": True,
|
||||
"role": role_norm,
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"selected": selection,
|
||||
"expected_role_next": expected_role,
|
||||
"reasons": [result.reason or "foreign active lease"],
|
||||
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
|
||||
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
|
||||
"assignment": result.as_dict(),
|
||||
"owner_session_id": result.owner_session_id,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if result.outcome == "no_safe_work":
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
|
||||
"apply": True,
|
||||
"role": role_norm,
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"selected": selection,
|
||||
"expected_role_next": expected_role,
|
||||
"reasons": [result.reason or "no_safe_work"],
|
||||
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
|
||||
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
|
||||
"assignment": result.as_dict(),
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# assigned
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
|
||||
"apply": True,
|
||||
"role": role_norm,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"username": username,
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"selected": selection,
|
||||
"expected_role_next": expected_role,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
selection["reason_selected"],
|
||||
result.reason or "atomic assign+lease created",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
|
||||
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
|
||||
"assignment": result.as_dict(),
|
||||
"lease_proof": {
|
||||
"assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
|
||||
"lease_id": result.lease_id,
|
||||
"expires_at": result.expires_at,
|
||||
"expected_head_sha": result.expected_head_sha,
|
||||
"allowed_actions": list(result.allowed_actions),
|
||||
"forbidden_actions": list(result.forbidden_actions),
|
||||
"source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"next_valid_command": _next_command(role_norm, selected),
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
"downstream_note": (
|
||||
"#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
|
||||
"allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _next_command(role: str, c: WorkCandidate) -> str:
|
||||
if role == ROLE_AUTHOR and c.kind == "issue":
|
||||
return f"implement issue #{c.number} under a branches/ worktree; open PR when ready"
|
||||
if role == ROLE_AUTHOR and c.kind == "pr":
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"address REQUEST_CHANGES on PR #{c.number} at head "
|
||||
f"{(c.head_sha or '')[:12]} and push fixes"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if role == ROLE_REVIEWER:
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"review PR #{c.number} pinned at head {(c.head_sha or '')[:12]} "
|
||||
"via full reviewer workflow"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if role == ROLE_MERGER:
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"merge PR #{c.number} only with explicit operator MERGE "
|
||||
f"authorization at head {(c.head_sha or '')[:12]}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if role == ROLE_RECONCILER:
|
||||
return f"diagnose contested state for {c.kind}#{c.number}"
|
||||
return f"proceed on {c.kind}#{c.number} under role {role}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def candidate_from_dict(data: dict[str, Any]) -> WorkCandidate:
|
||||
"""Build a WorkCandidate from a plain dict (tests / MCP inventory)."""
|
||||
return WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind=str(data.get("kind") or "issue"),
|
||||
number=int(data["number"]),
|
||||
state=str(data.get("state") or "open"),
|
||||
labels=tuple(data.get("labels") or ()),
|
||||
title=str(data.get("title") or ""),
|
||||
priority=int(data.get("priority") or 0),
|
||||
head_sha=data.get("head_sha"),
|
||||
request_changes_current_head=bool(data.get("request_changes_current_head")),
|
||||
approval_on_current_head=bool(data.get("approval_on_current_head")),
|
||||
approval_stale=bool(data.get("approval_stale")),
|
||||
approval_contaminated=bool(data.get("approval_contaminated")),
|
||||
mergeable=bool(data.get("mergeable")),
|
||||
blocked=bool(data.get("blocked")),
|
||||
dependency_unmet=bool(data.get("dependency_unmet")),
|
||||
dependency_reason=data.get("dependency_reason"),
|
||||
already_claimed_elsewhere=bool(data.get("already_claimed_elsewhere")),
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -1,807 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Common anti-stomp preflight for every MCP mutation tool (#604).
|
||||
|
||||
Even with leases, mutation tools need a **shared** preflight that prevents
|
||||
stale sessions, wrong worktrees, wrong repos, old prompts, terminal locks,
|
||||
foreign leases, contaminated approvals, and root-checkout mutations from
|
||||
slipping through.
|
||||
|
||||
This module is the pure assessment core. Callers (MCP mutation entrypoints)
|
||||
gather live facts and pass them in — nothing here performs git, network, or
|
||||
durable-state I/O. Existing happy-path guards remain authoritative; this
|
||||
module composes them into one typed, fail-closed result.
|
||||
|
||||
Required checks (issue #604):
|
||||
|
||||
* repo/org verification
|
||||
* profile/role verification
|
||||
* root checkout clean and not used for mutation (when role requires branches/)
|
||||
* worktree under branches when required
|
||||
* active lease ownership (when lease is required for the mutation)
|
||||
* terminal lock status (when applicable)
|
||||
* expected head SHA (when pinned)
|
||||
* stale runtime status
|
||||
* workflow hash (when a workflow load is required)
|
||||
* source contamination status
|
||||
* no manual state/mtime/source-file bypass
|
||||
|
||||
Failure returns a typed blocker and an exact next action. There is **no**
|
||||
agent-facing bypass flag.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
import author_mutation_worktree
|
||||
import master_parity_gate
|
||||
import remote_repo_guard
|
||||
import root_checkout_guard
|
||||
import stable_branch_push_guard
|
||||
|
||||
# ── public constants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
# Typed blocker kinds returned in the structured result.
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO = "wrong_repo"
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE = "wrong_role"
|
||||
BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT = "root_checkout_mutation"
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE = "wrong_worktree"
|
||||
BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE = "foreign_lease"
|
||||
BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK = "terminal_lock"
|
||||
BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA = "head_sha_mismatch"
|
||||
BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME = "stale_runtime"
|
||||
BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH = "workflow_hash"
|
||||
BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION = "source_contamination"
|
||||
BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS = "manual_bypass"
|
||||
|
||||
BLOCKER_KINDS = frozenset({
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO,
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE,
|
||||
BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT,
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE,
|
||||
BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE,
|
||||
BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK,
|
||||
BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA,
|
||||
BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME,
|
||||
BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH,
|
||||
BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION,
|
||||
BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
# Mutation tasks that must invoke the shared anti-stomp preflight before
|
||||
# acting (issue #604 AC1). Every member must appear as a live task= kwarg
|
||||
# to verify_preflight_purity / _run_anti_stomp_preflight (or the review
|
||||
# anti_task map) in gitea_mcp_server.py. Inventory↔wiring tests fail if
|
||||
# a declared task is not wired.
|
||||
MUTATION_TASKS = frozenset({
|
||||
"create_issue",
|
||||
"comment_issue",
|
||||
"close_issue",
|
||||
"mark_issue",
|
||||
"lock_issue",
|
||||
"set_issue_labels",
|
||||
"create_label",
|
||||
"create_pr",
|
||||
"close_pr",
|
||||
"edit_pr",
|
||||
"commit_files",
|
||||
"gitea_commit_files",
|
||||
"delete_branch",
|
||||
"cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
|
||||
"cleanup_stale_claims",
|
||||
"reconcile_merged_cleanups",
|
||||
"reconcile_already_landed_pr",
|
||||
"reconcile_close_superseded_pr",
|
||||
"post_heartbeat",
|
||||
"acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
|
||||
"gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
|
||||
"adopt_merger_pr_lease",
|
||||
"review_pr",
|
||||
"submit_pr_review",
|
||||
"approve_pr",
|
||||
"request_changes_pr",
|
||||
"merge_pr",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
# Intentionally excluded from MUTATION_TASKS. Each has a dedicated
|
||||
# fail-closed gate that preserves decision-lock ownership, workflow-hash,
|
||||
# head-SHA, and repository consistency. Do not re-add without either
|
||||
# wiring shared preflight or updating this rationale (#604 Blocker B).
|
||||
DEDICATED_GATE_MUTATIONS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
"mark_final_review_decision": (
|
||||
"Local review-decision lock only. Enforced by session lock ownership, "
|
||||
"workflow-hash, expected head SHA, PR work lease, eligibility, and "
|
||||
"terminal-lock gates. No Gitea review POST; shared anti-stomp would "
|
||||
"duplicate without side-effect-ordering value."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"save_review_draft": (
|
||||
"Local session-state draft save with live PR head/base consistency "
|
||||
"checks. Not a Gitea review/merge mutation; dedicated head-SHA and "
|
||||
"worktree resolution gates apply."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"resume_review_draft": (
|
||||
"Live-state resume with terminal lock, lease ownership, head/base SHA, "
|
||||
"and parity checks. When submit=True, delegates to gitea_submit_pr_review "
|
||||
"which runs shared anti-stomp before the Gitea review POST."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock": (
|
||||
"Moot-lock cleanup with identity match, live PR merged/closed proof, "
|
||||
"and reviewer capability gate (#594). Distinct from shared anti-stomp."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock": (
|
||||
"Alias of cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock; dedicated #594 path."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"heartbeat_reviewer_pr_lease": (
|
||||
"Lease heartbeat posts via verify_preflight_purity(task='review_pr') "
|
||||
"plus in-session lease ownership checks; not a separate mutation class."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"release_reviewer_pr_lease": (
|
||||
"Lease release uses workspace binding + ownership checks; posts only "
|
||||
"when the session owns the active lease."
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Roles that must mutate from a branches/ worktree (not the control checkout).
|
||||
_BRANCHES_REQUIRED_ROLES = frozenset({"author"})
|
||||
|
||||
# Reviewer/merger mutations that require an owned lease + head pinning when
|
||||
# the caller supplies those facts.
|
||||
_LEASE_AWARE_TASKS = frozenset({
|
||||
"review_pr",
|
||||
"submit_pr_review",
|
||||
"approve_pr",
|
||||
"request_changes_pr",
|
||||
"merge_pr",
|
||||
"acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
|
||||
"gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
|
||||
"adopt_merger_pr_lease",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
_NEXT_ACTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO: (
|
||||
"Pass explicit org= and repo= matching the local git remote "
|
||||
"(e.g. org=Scaled-Tech-Consulting repo=Gitea-Tools) and retry."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE: (
|
||||
"Call gitea_resolve_task_capability, switch to the required "
|
||||
"namespace/profile, re-verify with gitea_whoami, then retry."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT: (
|
||||
"Leave the root control checkout on clean master; create or switch "
|
||||
"to a session-owned worktree under branches/ and retry the mutation "
|
||||
"with worktree_path set."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE: (
|
||||
"Create or bind a session-owned worktree under branches/, set "
|
||||
"worktree_path (or GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE), and retry."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE: (
|
||||
"Stop. Do not stomp a foreign lease. Wait for expiry, request "
|
||||
"takeover through the sanctioned path, or hand off to the owner."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK: (
|
||||
"Stop. A terminal review-decision lock is active for this head. "
|
||||
"Do not re-approve/merge; follow the #332/#620 recovery path."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA: (
|
||||
"Re-fetch the live PR head with gitea_view_pr, re-pin "
|
||||
"expected_head_sha to the current head, re-validate, then retry."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME: (
|
||||
"Restart the Gitea MCP server so it reloads master's capability "
|
||||
"gates, re-run gitea_whoami + gitea_resolve_task_capability, then retry."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH: (
|
||||
"Reload the canonical workflow via gitea_load_review_workflow, then "
|
||||
"rerun the full review-merge workflow from inventory (no approve/merge replay)."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION: (
|
||||
"Stop. Session is source-contaminated. Hand off to a reconciler for "
|
||||
"audit/clear; do not clear markers by deleting session-state files."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS: (
|
||||
"Stop. Manual state/mtime/source-file bypass is forbidden. Use "
|
||||
"sanctioned MCP tools only; never delete or rewrite session-state "
|
||||
"or lock files by hand."
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_mutation_task(task: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when *task* is in the #604 mutation set (normalized)."""
|
||||
name = (task or "").strip().lower().removeprefix("gitea_")
|
||||
if not name:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if name in MUTATION_TASKS:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
# Accept gitea_ prefixed membership for aliases already in the set.
|
||||
return f"gitea_{name}" in MUTATION_TASKS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def roles_compatible(active_role: str | None, required_role: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Whether *active_role* may perform a task that maps to *required_role*.
|
||||
|
||||
Exact match always passes. Reconcilers may run author-class mutations
|
||||
(comment/close/cleanup) that the capability map stamps as ``author`` —
|
||||
matching the long-standing reconciler exemption for control-checkout
|
||||
work. No other cross-role substitutions are allowed.
|
||||
|
||||
Capability-authorized multi-role tasks (e.g. reviewer holding
|
||||
``gitea.issue.comment`` for ``comment_issue``) are handled by
|
||||
:func:`authorization_compatible`, not by expanding this role matrix.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
active = (active_role or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
required = (required_role or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if not active or not required:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if active == required:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if active == "reconciler" and required in {"author", "reconciler"}:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def authorization_compatible(
|
||||
active_role: str | None,
|
||||
required_role: str | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
required_permission: str | None = None,
|
||||
allowed_operations: Any = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Whether the active session may run a task given role *and* capability.
|
||||
|
||||
Order:
|
||||
|
||||
1. :func:`roles_compatible` (exact role or narrow reconciler→author).
|
||||
2. Capability possession: when *required_permission* is non-empty and
|
||||
present in *allowed_operations*, allow even if the nominal task role
|
||||
differs (e.g. reviewer/merger with ``gitea.issue.comment`` on
|
||||
``comment_issue`` / ``mark_issue`` / ``set_issue_labels`` /
|
||||
``lock_issue``).
|
||||
|
||||
Fail closed otherwise. This is **not** a broad reviewer→author or
|
||||
merger→author role rewrite: without the specific permission the check
|
||||
still denies. Missing *allowed_operations* when a permission is required
|
||||
also fails closed (callers must supply the live profile op list).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if roles_compatible(active_role, required_role):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
perm = (required_permission or "").strip()
|
||||
if not perm:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if allowed_operations is None:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
ops = {str(o).strip() for o in allowed_operations if o is not None}
|
||||
except TypeError:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return perm in ops
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _blocker(
|
||||
kind: str,
|
||||
reasons: list[str],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
exact_next_action: str | None = None,
|
||||
detail: dict | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
if kind not in BLOCKER_KINDS:
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"unknown anti-stomp blocker kind: {kind!r}")
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"kind": kind,
|
||||
"reasons": list(reasons),
|
||||
"exact_next_action": exact_next_action or _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind],
|
||||
"detail": dict(detail or {}),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _allowed_result(checks: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"allowed": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"blockers": [],
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"exact_next_action": "proceed",
|
||||
"blocker_kind": None,
|
||||
"checks": checks,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _blocked_result(
|
||||
blockers: list[dict[str, Any]],
|
||||
checks: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
primary = blockers[0]
|
||||
all_reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
for b in blockers:
|
||||
for r in b.get("reasons") or []:
|
||||
if r not in all_reasons:
|
||||
all_reasons.append(r)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"allowed": False,
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"blockers": blockers,
|
||||
"reasons": all_reasons,
|
||||
"exact_next_action": primary["exact_next_action"],
|
||||
"blocker_kind": primary["kind"],
|
||||
"checks": checks,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_anti_stomp_preflight(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
task: str | None = None,
|
||||
# repo/org
|
||||
remote: str | None = None,
|
||||
resolved_org: str | None = None,
|
||||
resolved_repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
local_remote_url: str | None = None,
|
||||
org_explicit: bool = False,
|
||||
repo_explicit: bool = False,
|
||||
check_repo: bool = True,
|
||||
# profile/role + capability
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_role: str | None = None,
|
||||
required_role: str | None = None,
|
||||
required_permission: str | None = None,
|
||||
allowed_operations: Any = None,
|
||||
check_role: bool = True,
|
||||
# root checkout + worktree
|
||||
workspace_path: str | None = None,
|
||||
project_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
current_branch: str | None = None,
|
||||
root_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
root_porcelain: str | None = None,
|
||||
remote_master_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
check_root_checkout: bool = True,
|
||||
check_worktree: bool = True,
|
||||
# stale runtime (master parity)
|
||||
startup_head: str | None = None,
|
||||
current_code_head: str | None = None,
|
||||
check_stale_runtime: bool = True,
|
||||
# lease ownership
|
||||
lease_required: bool = False,
|
||||
foreign_lease: bool | None = None,
|
||||
lease_owner_session: str | None = None,
|
||||
active_session_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
lease_owner_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
active_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
lease_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
# terminal lock
|
||||
terminal_lock_blocks: bool | None = None,
|
||||
terminal_lock_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
# expected head SHA
|
||||
require_head_sha: bool = False,
|
||||
expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
live_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
# workflow hash
|
||||
workflow_hash_valid: bool | None = None,
|
||||
workflow_hash_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
# source contamination (stable-branch push / approval contamination)
|
||||
source_contaminated: bool | None = None,
|
||||
contamination_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
# manual bypass
|
||||
manual_bypass_attempted: bool = False,
|
||||
manual_bypass_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fail-closed common anti-stomp assessment (pure).
|
||||
|
||||
Only checks for which facts are supplied (or which are required by the
|
||||
mutation category) are evaluated. Unsupplied optional facts are recorded
|
||||
as ``skipped`` so callers can see coverage without inventing defaults.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns a structured dict with ``allowed``/``block``, typed ``blockers``,
|
||||
aggregated ``reasons``, ``exact_next_action``, and per-check ``checks``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
task_name = (task or "").strip()
|
||||
role = (profile_role or "").strip().lower() or None
|
||||
req_role = (required_role or "").strip().lower() or None
|
||||
req_perm = (required_permission or "").strip() or None
|
||||
checks: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"task": task_name or None,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"profile_role": role,
|
||||
"required_role": req_role,
|
||||
"required_permission": req_perm,
|
||||
}
|
||||
blockers: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
|
||||
# ── manual bypass (always first; never skippable when attempted) ─────────
|
||||
if manual_bypass_attempted:
|
||||
reasons = list(manual_bypass_reasons or [
|
||||
"manual state/mtime/source-file bypass attempt detected (fail closed)"
|
||||
])
|
||||
blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS, reasons))
|
||||
checks["manual_bypass"] = {"block": True, "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["manual_bypass"] = {"block": False, "skipped": False}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── repo/org ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if check_repo and resolved_org is not None and resolved_repo is not None:
|
||||
repo_assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
|
||||
remote=remote or "",
|
||||
resolved_org=resolved_org,
|
||||
resolved_repo=resolved_repo,
|
||||
local_remote_url=local_remote_url,
|
||||
org_explicit=org_explicit,
|
||||
repo_explicit=repo_explicit,
|
||||
)
|
||||
checks["repo"] = {
|
||||
"block": bool(repo_assessment.get("block")),
|
||||
"reasons": list(repo_assessment.get("reasons") or []),
|
||||
"resolved_org": resolved_org,
|
||||
"resolved_repo": resolved_repo,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if repo_assessment.get("block"):
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO,
|
||||
list(repo_assessment.get("reasons") or ["repo/org mismatch"]),
|
||||
detail={
|
||||
"resolved_org": resolved_org,
|
||||
"resolved_repo": resolved_repo,
|
||||
"local_remote_url": local_remote_url,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["repo"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── profile/role + capability ────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Role match OR possession of the task's required permission (Blocker A).
|
||||
# Reviewer/merger may run issue-comment-class tasks when they hold
|
||||
# gitea.issue.comment; unauthorized escalation without the permission
|
||||
# still fails closed.
|
||||
if check_role and req_role and role:
|
||||
authorized = authorization_compatible(
|
||||
role,
|
||||
req_role,
|
||||
required_permission=req_perm,
|
||||
allowed_operations=allowed_operations,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not authorized:
|
||||
perm_clause = (
|
||||
f", required_permission='{req_perm}'" if req_perm else ""
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
f"active profile role '{role}' is not authorized for task "
|
||||
f"'{task_name or '(unknown)'}' (required_role='{req_role}'"
|
||||
f"{perm_clause}; profile={profile_name or '(unknown)'})"
|
||||
]
|
||||
checks["role"] = {
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"required_permission": req_perm,
|
||||
"capability_authorized": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE,
|
||||
reasons,
|
||||
detail={
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"profile_role": role,
|
||||
"required_role": req_role,
|
||||
"required_permission": req_perm,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["role"] = {
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"required_permission": req_perm,
|
||||
"capability_authorized": bool(
|
||||
req_perm
|
||||
and allowed_operations is not None
|
||||
and req_perm in {
|
||||
str(o).strip() for o in (allowed_operations or [])
|
||||
if o is not None
|
||||
}
|
||||
and not roles_compatible(role, req_role)
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["role"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── stale runtime (master parity) ────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if check_stale_runtime and (
|
||||
startup_head is not None or current_code_head is not None
|
||||
):
|
||||
parity = master_parity_gate.assess_master_parity(
|
||||
{"startup_head": startup_head},
|
||||
current_code_head,
|
||||
)
|
||||
stale_reasons = master_parity_gate.parity_block_reasons(parity)
|
||||
checks["stale_runtime"] = {
|
||||
"block": bool(stale_reasons),
|
||||
"reasons": list(stale_reasons),
|
||||
"startup_head": startup_head,
|
||||
"current_code_head": current_code_head,
|
||||
"stale": bool(parity.get("stale")),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if stale_reasons:
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(
|
||||
BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME,
|
||||
list(stale_reasons),
|
||||
detail={
|
||||
"startup_head": startup_head,
|
||||
"current_code_head": current_code_head,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["stale_runtime"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── root checkout ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if (
|
||||
check_root_checkout
|
||||
and workspace_path is not None
|
||||
and project_root is not None
|
||||
and root_porcelain is not None
|
||||
):
|
||||
root_assessment = root_checkout_guard.assess_root_checkout_guard(
|
||||
workspace_path=workspace_path,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=project_root,
|
||||
current_branch=current_branch,
|
||||
head_sha=root_head_sha,
|
||||
porcelain_status=root_porcelain,
|
||||
remote_master_sha=remote_master_sha,
|
||||
resolved_role=req_role or role,
|
||||
actual_role=role,
|
||||
)
|
||||
checks["root_checkout"] = {
|
||||
"block": bool(root_assessment.get("block")),
|
||||
"reasons": list(root_assessment.get("reasons") or []),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if root_assessment.get("block"):
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(
|
||||
BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT,
|
||||
list(root_assessment.get("reasons") or [
|
||||
"control checkout is not clean master"
|
||||
]),
|
||||
detail={
|
||||
"workspace_path": workspace_path,
|
||||
"project_root": project_root,
|
||||
"current_branch": current_branch,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["root_checkout"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── worktree under branches (author) ─────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
worktree_role = role or req_role
|
||||
if (
|
||||
check_worktree
|
||||
and workspace_path is not None
|
||||
and project_root is not None
|
||||
and worktree_role in _BRANCHES_REQUIRED_ROLES
|
||||
):
|
||||
wt = author_mutation_worktree.assess_author_mutation_worktree(
|
||||
workspace_path=workspace_path,
|
||||
project_root=project_root,
|
||||
current_branch=current_branch,
|
||||
)
|
||||
checks["worktree"] = {
|
||||
"block": bool(wt.get("block")),
|
||||
"reasons": list(wt.get("reasons") or []),
|
||||
"under_branches": wt.get("under_branches"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if wt.get("block"):
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE,
|
||||
list(wt.get("reasons") or [
|
||||
"mutation worktree is not under branches/"
|
||||
]),
|
||||
detail={
|
||||
"workspace_path": workspace_path,
|
||||
"project_root": project_root,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["worktree"] = {
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"skipped": worktree_role not in _BRANCHES_REQUIRED_ROLES
|
||||
or workspace_path is None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── foreign lease ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
lease_needed = lease_required or (
|
||||
task_name.removeprefix("gitea_") in {
|
||||
t.removeprefix("gitea_") for t in _LEASE_AWARE_TASKS
|
||||
}
|
||||
and foreign_lease is not None
|
||||
)
|
||||
if lease_needed or foreign_lease is True:
|
||||
is_foreign = bool(foreign_lease)
|
||||
if foreign_lease is None and lease_required:
|
||||
# Ownership must be proven when lease_required; missing ownership
|
||||
# facts fail closed.
|
||||
owner_ok = (
|
||||
(not lease_owner_session and not active_session_id)
|
||||
or (
|
||||
lease_owner_session
|
||||
and active_session_id
|
||||
and lease_owner_session == active_session_id
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
identity_ok = (
|
||||
(not lease_owner_identity and not active_identity)
|
||||
or (
|
||||
lease_owner_identity
|
||||
and active_identity
|
||||
and lease_owner_identity == active_identity
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not owner_ok or not identity_ok:
|
||||
is_foreign = True
|
||||
reasons = list(lease_reasons or [])
|
||||
if is_foreign and not reasons:
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
"active lease is owned by a foreign session or identity "
|
||||
"(anti-stomp fail closed)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
checks["lease"] = {
|
||||
"block": is_foreign,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons if is_foreign else [],
|
||||
"lease_owner_session": lease_owner_session,
|
||||
"active_session_id": active_session_id,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if is_foreign:
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE, reasons)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["lease"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── terminal lock ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if terminal_lock_blocks is not None:
|
||||
reasons = list(terminal_lock_reasons or [])
|
||||
if terminal_lock_blocks and not reasons:
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
"terminal review-decision lock is active for this head "
|
||||
"(anti-stomp fail closed)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
checks["terminal_lock"] = {
|
||||
"block": bool(terminal_lock_blocks),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons if terminal_lock_blocks else [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if terminal_lock_blocks:
|
||||
blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK, reasons))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["terminal_lock"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── expected head SHA ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if require_head_sha or (
|
||||
expected_head_sha is not None and live_head_sha is not None
|
||||
):
|
||||
exp = (expected_head_sha or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
live = (live_head_sha or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
mismatch = False
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if require_head_sha and not exp:
|
||||
mismatch = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"expected_head_sha is required before this mutation "
|
||||
"(anti-stomp fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif exp and live and exp != live:
|
||||
mismatch = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"expected_head_sha '{exp}' does not match live PR head "
|
||||
f"'{live}' (anti-stomp fail closed; stale prompt data)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif require_head_sha and exp and not live:
|
||||
mismatch = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"live PR head SHA could not be determined to corroborate "
|
||||
"expected_head_sha (anti-stomp fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
checks["head_sha"] = {
|
||||
"block": mismatch,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"expected_head_sha": expected_head_sha,
|
||||
"live_head_sha": live_head_sha,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if mismatch:
|
||||
blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA, reasons))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["head_sha"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── workflow hash ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if workflow_hash_valid is not None:
|
||||
reasons = list(workflow_hash_reasons or [])
|
||||
if not workflow_hash_valid and not reasons:
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
"workflow load proof missing or hash stale "
|
||||
"(anti-stomp fail closed)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
checks["workflow_hash"] = {
|
||||
"block": not bool(workflow_hash_valid),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons if not workflow_hash_valid else [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not workflow_hash_valid:
|
||||
blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH, reasons))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["workflow_hash"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── source contamination ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if source_contaminated is not None:
|
||||
reasons = list(contamination_reasons or [])
|
||||
if source_contaminated and not reasons:
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
"session is source-contaminated (stable-branch push or "
|
||||
"contaminated approval path); anti-stomp fail closed"
|
||||
]
|
||||
checks["source_contamination"] = {
|
||||
"block": bool(source_contaminated),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons if source_contaminated else [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if source_contaminated:
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION, reasons)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["source_contamination"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
if blockers:
|
||||
return _blocked_result(blockers, checks)
|
||||
return _allowed_result(checks)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_anti_stomp_error(assessment: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Single RuntimeError message for MCP mutation gates."""
|
||||
kind = assessment.get("blocker_kind") or "unknown"
|
||||
reasons = "; ".join(
|
||||
assessment.get("reasons")
|
||||
or ["anti-stomp preflight blocked the mutation"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
next_action = assessment.get("exact_next_action") or "stop and diagnose"
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"Anti-stomp preflight (#604) blocked mutation "
|
||||
f"[{kind}]: {reasons}. "
|
||||
f"exact_next_action: {next_action}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def block_response(
|
||||
assessment: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
**extra_fields: Any,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Structured tool-return payload for a blocked mutation."""
|
||||
payload = {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"performed": False,
|
||||
"blocked": True,
|
||||
"anti_stomp": True,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": assessment.get("blocker_kind"),
|
||||
"blockers": list(assessment.get("blockers") or []),
|
||||
"reasons": list(assessment.get("reasons") or []),
|
||||
"exact_next_action": assessment.get("exact_next_action"),
|
||||
"checks": assessment.get("checks") or {},
|
||||
}
|
||||
payload.update(extra_fields)
|
||||
return payload
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def contamination_from_stable_marker(
|
||||
marker: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
task: str | None,
|
||||
actual_role: str | None,
|
||||
) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
|
||||
"""Derive source-contamination facts from a #671 durable marker."""
|
||||
if not marker:
|
||||
return False, []
|
||||
gate = stable_branch_push_guard.assess_contamination_gate(
|
||||
marker,
|
||||
task=task,
|
||||
actual_role=actual_role,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if gate.get("block"):
|
||||
return True, list(gate.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
return False, []
|
||||
@@ -7,19 +7,6 @@ from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
PROTECTED_BRANCHES = frozenset({"master", "main", "dev"})
|
||||
|
||||
# Evidence / preservation branches must never be removed by cleanup tools
|
||||
# (e.g. chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip).
|
||||
_PRESERVATION_MARKERS = ("preserve", "preservation", "evidence")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_preservation_or_evidence_branch(branch: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Return True when *branch* is a preservation/evidence ref that must stay."""
|
||||
if not branch:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
name = str(branch).lower()
|
||||
return any(marker in name for marker in _PRESERVATION_MARKERS)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_RAW_BRANCH_DELETE_PATTERNS = (
|
||||
re.compile(r"\bgit(?:\s+-C\s+\S+)?\s+branch\s+-[dD]\b[^\n\r]*", re.I),
|
||||
re.compile(r"\bgit(?:\s+-C\s+\S+)?\s+push\b[^\n\r]*\s--delete\b[^\n\r]*", re.I),
|
||||
@@ -85,11 +72,6 @@ def assess_merged_pr_branch_cleanup(
|
||||
reasons.append("PR head branch is missing")
|
||||
if head_branch in protected:
|
||||
reasons.append(f"branch '{head_branch}' is protected")
|
||||
if is_preservation_or_evidence_branch(head_branch):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"branch '{head_branch}' is a preservation/evidence branch and "
|
||||
"cannot be deleted through merged-PR cleanup"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if head_branch in open_pr_heads:
|
||||
reasons.append("an open PR still references this head branch")
|
||||
if head_on_target is False:
|
||||
@@ -114,490 +96,3 @@ def assess_merged_pr_branch_cleanup(
|
||||
"block_reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"recommended_action": "delete_remote_branch" if safe else "keep_remote_branch",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# #687 remediation: post-delete readback + active ownership protection
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
READBACK_NOT_FOUND = "not_found"
|
||||
READBACK_EXISTS = "exists"
|
||||
READBACK_AUTHENTICATION = "authentication_error"
|
||||
READBACK_AUTHORIZATION = "authorization_error"
|
||||
READBACK_TRANSPORT = "transport_error"
|
||||
READBACK_UNEXPECTED = "unexpected_response"
|
||||
READBACK_AMBIGUOUS_404 = "ambiguous_not_found"
|
||||
|
||||
# Scope of a 404: only branch-scoped absence may set verified_absent.
|
||||
NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH = "branch"
|
||||
NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_REPOSITORY = "repository"
|
||||
NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_HOST = "host"
|
||||
NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_UNKNOWN = "unknown"
|
||||
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION = "authentication"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION = "authorization"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_TRANSPORT = "transport"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_UNEXPECTED = "unexpected"
|
||||
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_SESSION = "author_session"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE = "author_lease"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_REVIEWER_LEASE = "reviewer_lease"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_MERGER_LEASE = "merger_lease"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_CONTROLLER_LEASE = "controller_lease"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_RECONCILER_LEASE = "reconciler_lease"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING = "worktree_binding"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR = "ownership_inventory_error"
|
||||
|
||||
_ROLE_TO_OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY = {
|
||||
"author": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
|
||||
"reviewer": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_REVIEWER_LEASE,
|
||||
"merger": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_MERGER_LEASE,
|
||||
"controller": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_CONTROLLER_LEASE,
|
||||
"reconciler": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_RECONCILER_LEASE,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_ACTIVE_OWNERSHIP_STATUSES = frozenset(
|
||||
{"active", "live", "claimed", "in_progress", "working", "pushing", "pushed"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
_TERMINAL_OWNERSHIP_STATUSES = frozenset(
|
||||
{"released", "abandoned", "done", "blocked", "terminal", "closed"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
_EXPIRED_STATUSES = frozenset({"expired"})
|
||||
_STALE_STATUSES = frozenset({"stale", "stale_dead_process", "stale_missing_worktree"})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _norm_str(value: Any) -> str:
|
||||
return str(value or "").strip()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def normalize_host(host: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Normalize a host identity for ownership matching (no credentials)."""
|
||||
text = _norm_str(host).lower()
|
||||
for prefix in ("https://", "http://"):
|
||||
if text.startswith(prefix):
|
||||
text = text[len(prefix) :]
|
||||
# Drop path/query if a full URL slipped through.
|
||||
text = text.split("/", 1)[0]
|
||||
text = text.split("?", 1)[0]
|
||||
return text.rstrip(".")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def ownership_category_for_role(role: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Map a role kind to a non-secret ownership category label."""
|
||||
key = _norm_str(role).lower()
|
||||
return _ROLE_TO_OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY.get(key, f"{key or 'unknown'}_lease")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_branch_readback_http_status(
|
||||
status_code: int | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
not_found_scope: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify a GET-branch HTTP status into a secret-free readback result.
|
||||
|
||||
R1: A bare/generic/repository/wrong-host 404 never yields
|
||||
``verified_absent=True``. Only an authoritative *branch-scoped* not-found
|
||||
(``not_found_scope='branch'``) may verify deletion.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if status_code == 404:
|
||||
scope = _norm_str(not_found_scope).lower() or NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_UNKNOWN
|
||||
if scope == NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_NOT_FOUND,
|
||||
"error_class": None,
|
||||
"verified_absent": True,
|
||||
"branch_present": False,
|
||||
"not_found_scope": NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
# repository / host / unknown / generic 404 — not verified absence
|
||||
reason = {
|
||||
NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_REPOSITORY: (
|
||||
"post-delete readback 404 is repository-scoped, not branch absence"
|
||||
),
|
||||
NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_HOST: (
|
||||
"post-delete readback 404 is host-scoped, not branch absence"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}.get(
|
||||
scope,
|
||||
"post-delete readback 404 is ambiguous (not branch-scoped); "
|
||||
"cannot verify absence",
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_AMBIGUOUS_404,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_UNEXPECTED,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"not_found_scope": scope,
|
||||
"reasons": [reason],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if status_code in (401, 407):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"reasons": ["post-delete branch readback authentication failed"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if status_code == 403:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_AUTHORIZATION,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"reasons": ["post-delete branch readback authorization failed"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if status_code is not None and 200 <= int(status_code) < 300:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_EXISTS,
|
||||
"error_class": None,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": True,
|
||||
"reasons": ["post-delete readback found branch still present"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if status_code is not None and int(status_code) >= 500:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"reasons": ["post-delete branch readback transport/upstream failure"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_UNEXPECTED,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_UNEXPECTED,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"reasons": ["post-delete branch readback returned an unexpected response"],
|
||||
"http_status": status_code,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _extract_http_status(exc: BaseException) -> int | None:
|
||||
"""Extract an HTTP status code from an exception chain (secret-free)."""
|
||||
seen: set[int] = set()
|
||||
current: BaseException | None = exc
|
||||
while current is not None and id(current) not in seen:
|
||||
seen.add(id(current))
|
||||
for attr in ("code", "status", "status_code"):
|
||||
value = getattr(current, attr, None)
|
||||
if isinstance(value, int) and 100 <= value <= 599:
|
||||
return value
|
||||
text = str(current) if current is not None else ""
|
||||
match = re.match(r"HTTP\s+(\d{3})\b", text)
|
||||
if match:
|
||||
return int(match.group(1))
|
||||
current = current.__cause__ or current.__context__
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_branch_readback_exception(
|
||||
exc: BaseException,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
not_found_scope: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify a GET-branch exception without leaking credentials or bodies.
|
||||
|
||||
R1: substring ``404`` / ``not found`` alone never becomes verified_absent.
|
||||
Callers must pass ``not_found_scope='branch'`` only after authoritative
|
||||
proof that the repository/host is still reachable and the 404 is branch-level.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
status_code = _extract_http_status(exc)
|
||||
if status_code is None:
|
||||
lower = str(exc).lower() if exc is not None else ""
|
||||
if any(
|
||||
token in lower
|
||||
for token in (
|
||||
"timed out",
|
||||
"timeout",
|
||||
"connection",
|
||||
"network",
|
||||
"temporarily unavailable",
|
||||
"name or service not known",
|
||||
"nodename nor servname",
|
||||
)
|
||||
):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
"post-delete branch readback transport/upstream failure"
|
||||
],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if "unauthorized" in lower:
|
||||
status_code = 401
|
||||
elif "forbidden" in lower:
|
||||
status_code = 403
|
||||
elif "404" in lower or "not found" in lower:
|
||||
# Ambiguous: do NOT treat as branch absence without scope proof.
|
||||
status_code = 404
|
||||
if not_found_scope is None:
|
||||
not_found_scope = NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_UNKNOWN
|
||||
|
||||
if status_code is not None:
|
||||
return classify_branch_readback_http_status(
|
||||
status_code, not_found_scope=not_found_scope
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_UNEXPECTED,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_UNEXPECTED,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"reasons": ["post-delete branch readback returned an unexpected response"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_post_delete_readback(readback: dict[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Decide whether DELETE success may be reported after branch readback.
|
||||
|
||||
Success requires authoritative branch-scoped not-found
|
||||
(``verified_absent=True``). DELETE HTTP success alone is never enough.
|
||||
Generic/repository/host 404 cannot verify absence (R1).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
payload = dict(readback or {})
|
||||
status = _norm_str(payload.get("status")) or READBACK_UNEXPECTED
|
||||
# Only explicit verified_absent flag counts — never infer from status alone
|
||||
# when status is a bare not_found without branch scope proof.
|
||||
verified = bool(payload.get("verified_absent")) is True
|
||||
if verified and status == READBACK_NOT_FOUND:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"ok": True,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"verified_absent": True,
|
||||
"readback": {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_NOT_FOUND,
|
||||
"verified_absent": True,
|
||||
"branch_present": False,
|
||||
"error_class": None,
|
||||
"not_found_scope": NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
reasons = list(payload.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
if not reasons:
|
||||
if status == READBACK_EXISTS:
|
||||
reasons = ["post-delete readback found branch still present"]
|
||||
elif status == READBACK_AUTHENTICATION:
|
||||
reasons = ["post-delete branch readback authentication failed"]
|
||||
elif status == READBACK_AUTHORIZATION:
|
||||
reasons = ["post-delete branch readback authorization failed"]
|
||||
elif status == READBACK_TRANSPORT:
|
||||
reasons = ["post-delete branch readback transport/upstream failure"]
|
||||
elif status == READBACK_AMBIGUOUS_404:
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
"post-delete readback 404 is not branch-scoped; "
|
||||
"cannot verify absence"
|
||||
]
|
||||
else:
|
||||
reasons = ["post-delete branch readback could not verify deletion"]
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"ok": False,
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"readback": {
|
||||
"status": status,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": payload.get("branch_present"),
|
||||
"error_class": payload.get("error_class"),
|
||||
"not_found_scope": payload.get("not_found_scope"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": "post_delete_readback_failed",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def cleanup_result_envelope(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
success: bool,
|
||||
performed: bool,
|
||||
delete_acknowledged: bool,
|
||||
verified_absent: bool,
|
||||
**extra: Any,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""R2: consistent top-level cleanup result fields on every return path."""
|
||||
out: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"success": bool(success),
|
||||
"performed": bool(performed),
|
||||
"delete_acknowledged": bool(delete_acknowledged),
|
||||
"verified_absent": bool(verified_absent),
|
||||
}
|
||||
out.update(extra)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _repo_matches(
|
||||
record: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
host: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Match ownership record to target remote/org/repo and normalized host."""
|
||||
if (
|
||||
_norm_str(record.get("remote")).lower() != _norm_str(remote).lower()
|
||||
or _norm_str(record.get("org")).lower() != _norm_str(org).lower()
|
||||
or _norm_str(record.get("repo")).lower() != _norm_str(repo).lower()
|
||||
):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
expected_host = normalize_host(host)
|
||||
record_host = normalize_host(record.get("host") or record.get("host_name"))
|
||||
# When both sides declare a host, they must agree after normalization.
|
||||
# A record host that disagrees with the expected host is out of scope.
|
||||
# Legacy records without host still match when remote/org/repo agree.
|
||||
if expected_host and record_host and expected_host != record_host:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _branch_matches(record: dict[str, Any], branch: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return _norm_str(record.get("branch")) == _norm_str(branch)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_ownership_record_activity(record: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify one ownership record as blocking or non-blocking.
|
||||
|
||||
Distinguishes active ownership from expired/released/terminal/stale records.
|
||||
Expired/stale records block unless reclaim_allowed is *explicitly* True
|
||||
(O2: never treat missing/unknown reclaim as auto-allowed).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
status = _norm_str(record.get("status")).lower()
|
||||
category = _norm_str(record.get("category")) or "unknown"
|
||||
reclaim_allowed = record.get("reclaim_allowed")
|
||||
|
||||
if category == OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"blocks": True,
|
||||
"status": status or "unknown",
|
||||
"category": category,
|
||||
"reason": "ownership inventory failed closed",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if status in _TERMINAL_OWNERSHIP_STATUSES:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"blocks": False,
|
||||
"status": status,
|
||||
"category": category,
|
||||
"reason": f"{category} ownership is terminal/released ({status})",
|
||||
}
|
||||
if status in _ACTIVE_OWNERSHIP_STATUSES:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"blocks": True,
|
||||
"status": status,
|
||||
"category": category,
|
||||
"reason": f"active {category} ownership still uses the target branch",
|
||||
}
|
||||
if status in _EXPIRED_STATUSES or status in _STALE_STATUSES:
|
||||
# O2: only explicit reclaim_allowed=True skips the block.
|
||||
if reclaim_allowed is True:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"blocks": False,
|
||||
"status": status,
|
||||
"category": category,
|
||||
"reason": (
|
||||
f"{category} ownership is {status} and reclaimable; "
|
||||
"does not block deletion"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"blocks": True,
|
||||
"status": status,
|
||||
"category": category,
|
||||
"reason": (
|
||||
f"{status} {category} ownership still protects the target "
|
||||
"branch (reclaim not proven; fail closed)"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Unknown status → fail closed
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"blocks": True,
|
||||
"status": status or "unknown",
|
||||
"category": category,
|
||||
"reason": (
|
||||
f"unclassified {category} ownership status "
|
||||
f"'{status or 'unknown'}'; fail closed"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_active_branch_ownership(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
branch: str,
|
||||
host: str | None = None,
|
||||
records: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Assess whether any active ownership still uses *branch* in *repo*.
|
||||
|
||||
Matching requires remote/org/repo/branch and, when provided, normalized
|
||||
host identity. Other repositories, hosts, or branches never false-block.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
target_branch = _norm_str(branch)
|
||||
expected_host = normalize_host(host)
|
||||
considered: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
blocking: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
ignored: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
|
||||
for raw in records or []:
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if not _repo_matches(
|
||||
raw, remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo, host=expected_host or None
|
||||
):
|
||||
ignored.append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"category": _norm_str(raw.get("category")) or "unknown",
|
||||
"reason": "different repository or host scope",
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if not _branch_matches(raw, target_branch):
|
||||
ignored.append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"category": _norm_str(raw.get("category")) or "unknown",
|
||||
"reason": "different branch",
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
activity = assess_ownership_record_activity(raw)
|
||||
entry = {
|
||||
"category": activity["category"],
|
||||
"status": activity["status"],
|
||||
"blocks": activity["blocks"],
|
||||
"reason": activity["reason"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
considered.append(entry)
|
||||
if activity["blocks"]:
|
||||
blocking.append(entry)
|
||||
|
||||
block = bool(blocking)
|
||||
categories = sorted({b["category"] for b in blocking})
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
(
|
||||
"active ownership protects branch "
|
||||
f"'{target_branch}': " + "; ".join(b["reason"] for b in blocking)
|
||||
)
|
||||
] if block else []
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"block": block,
|
||||
"safe_to_delete": not block,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"host": expected_host or None,
|
||||
"branch": target_branch,
|
||||
"blocking_categories": categories,
|
||||
"blocking": blocking,
|
||||
"considered": considered,
|
||||
"ignored_out_of_scope": ignored,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership" if block else None,
|
||||
"recommended_action": "keep_remote_branch" if block else "delete_remote_branch",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -386,27 +386,6 @@ def assess_canonical_comment(
|
||||
if not related or related.lower() in {"none", "n/a", "-"}:
|
||||
missing.append("RELATED_PRS")
|
||||
|
||||
# #695 AC7: untrusted / offline approval claims cannot certify merger handoff.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import review_quarantine as _rq
|
||||
|
||||
for claim_reason in _rq.assess_untrusted_canonical_approval_claim(text):
|
||||
extra.append(claim_reason)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Fail closed on import/runtime errors for approval-shaped claims only.
|
||||
lower = text.lower()
|
||||
if (
|
||||
"state:\napproved" in lower
|
||||
or "who_is_next:\nmerger" in lower
|
||||
or "merge_ready: true" in lower
|
||||
or "merge_ready:\ntrue" in lower
|
||||
or "ready-to-merge" in lower
|
||||
):
|
||||
extra.append(
|
||||
"canonical approval/merge-ready claim could not be verified "
|
||||
"for native review proof (#695 AC7; fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
allowed = not missing and not vague and not extra
|
||||
correction = ""
|
||||
if not allowed:
|
||||
|
||||
-1751
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Control-plane DB substrate (#613)
|
||||
|
||||
**Status:** Implemented (SQLite single-writer MVP)
|
||||
|
||||
**ADR:** [`mcp-allocator-control-plane-observability-adr.md`](mcp-allocator-control-plane-observability-adr.md)
|
||||
|
||||
**Module:** `control_plane_db.py`
|
||||
|
||||
## Architecture statement
|
||||
|
||||
> **DB coordinates, Gitea records, Sentry/GlitchTip observe; the bridge is the only path that turns observations into Gitea work.**
|
||||
|
||||
## What this ships
|
||||
|
||||
| Capability | Notes |
|
||||
|------------|--------|
|
||||
| Schema | `sessions`, `work_items`, `leases`, `assignments`, `terminal_locks`, `events`, `incident_links` |
|
||||
| Atomic assign+lease | `ControlPlaneDB.assign_and_lease` — one `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` transaction |
|
||||
| Mutation gate | `require_valid_assignment` — live lease + allowed action + non-terminal work + non-stale head |
|
||||
| Heartbeat / release / expire | Lease lifecycle helpers |
|
||||
| Terminal-lock index | Routing signal for #600 (terminal path first) |
|
||||
| `incident_links` | Provider-neutral link model for #612 — **not** assignable work; scope keys NULL-safe |
|
||||
|
||||
## Hard rules (enforced in code)
|
||||
|
||||
1. Assignable `work_items.kind` ∈ {`issue`, `pr`} only — **never** raw Sentry/GlitchTip incidents.
|
||||
2. Two concurrent sessions cannot both receive an active assignment on the same open work item (second gets `wait`).
|
||||
3. Merged/closed work items return `no_safe_work` at assign time, and `require_valid_assignment` fails closed if the work item becomes terminal later.
|
||||
4. Assignments pin `expected_head_sha`; mutations fail closed if the work item head drifts.
|
||||
5. SQLite path is the **single-writer MVP** (`GITEA_CONTROL_PLANE_DB`, default under `~/.cache/gitea-tools/control-plane/`). Multi-session multi-host production requires **Postgres** or a **single allocator daemon** (ADR §6).
|
||||
6. `incident_links` optional scope fields are stored as empty strings (never NULL) so UNIQUE is canonical across minimal upserts.
|
||||
7. Legacy `incident_links` migration collapses NULL-scope duplicates **only** when Gitea targets **and** all meaningful observation metadata agree (fingerprint, status, event_count, permalink, timestamps, linked PRs, etc.). Conflicting metadata fails closed — no silent discard.
|
||||
|
||||
## Dependency chain
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
#613 control-plane DB (this) → #600 allocator API → #612 incident bridge
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- **#600** must call this substrate (not file locks / comment-only leases alone) for completion.
|
||||
- **#612** must write `incident_links` here and create **Gitea issues**; the allocator assigns those issues, not raw incidents.
|
||||
|
||||
## Allocator API (#600)
|
||||
|
||||
Module: `allocator_service.py` · MCP tool: `gitea_allocate_next_work`
|
||||
|
||||
- Workers call `gitea_allocate_next_work(apply=false|true)` instead of self-selecting work.
|
||||
- `apply=false` returns a dry-run selection (`outcome=preview`) with skip reasons.
|
||||
- `apply=true` reserves via `ControlPlaneDB.assign_and_lease` (atomic assignment+lease).
|
||||
- Coordination source is **always** the control-plane DB — not file locks or comment-only leases.
|
||||
- Routing follows ADR §5.3 (REQUEST_CHANGES → author, terminal path first, foreign lease → wait).
|
||||
- Raw monitoring incidents are never candidates.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Lease lifecycle API (#601)
|
||||
|
||||
Module: `lease_lifecycle.py` · MCP tools: `gitea_*_workflow_lease(s)`
|
||||
|
||||
Active control-plane leases are **first-class workflow state**:
|
||||
|
||||
| Tool | Purpose |
|
||||
|------|---------|
|
||||
| `gitea_list_workflow_leases` | List active (or all) leases for a repo |
|
||||
| `gitea_inspect_workflow_lease` | Freshness + `safe_next_action` for one lease id |
|
||||
| `gitea_adopt_workflow_lease` | Owner-resume or sanctioned reclaim with provenance |
|
||||
| `gitea_release_workflow_lease` | Explicit owner release (audited) |
|
||||
| `gitea_expire_workflow_leases` | Deterministic expire of past-`expires_at` leases |
|
||||
| `gitea_abandon_workflow_lease` | Abandon with required proof |
|
||||
| `gitea_reclaim_expired_workflow_lease` | Expire + re-assign with provenance |
|
||||
|
||||
### Hard rules
|
||||
|
||||
1. Control-plane DB is the coordination authority — file locks / comment-only leases are not authoritative alone.
|
||||
2. Active foreign leases cannot be stolen; inspect returns `wait_foreign_active`.
|
||||
3. Abandon requires `(dead_process OR missing_worktree)` and `no_live_mutation_risk`; foreign abandon also needs `operator_authorized` or full dead+missing+no_open_pr proof.
|
||||
4. Adopt provenance always records `adopted_from_session_id`, `adopted_by_session_id`, work identity, optional head SHA, and worktree path.
|
||||
5. Reviewer→merger comment handoff (`gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease`) is unchanged and remains the Gitea-thread durability path.
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python3 -m pytest tests/test_lease_lifecycle.py tests/test_control_plane_db.py tests/test_allocator_service.py tests/test_merger_lease_adoption.py -q
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Incident bridge (#612)
|
||||
|
||||
Module: `incident_bridge.py` · MCP tools: `gitea_observability_*`
|
||||
|
||||
- Bridge converts Sentry/GlitchTip observations → **normal Gitea issues** + `incident_links`.
|
||||
- Phase-1: `gitea_observability_reconcile_incident(apply=false|true)` with JSON observation.
|
||||
- Dry-run performs **no** Gitea mutation and **no** DB write.
|
||||
- Apply reuses existing links or creates one Gitea issue; never invents `work_items.kind=incident`.
|
||||
- Config: `GITEA_OBSERVABILITY_PROJECTS_JSON` or `GITEA_OBSERVABILITY_PROJECTS_FILE`.
|
||||
- Provider tokens never appear in issue bodies, links, or tool results.
|
||||
- Allocator sees bridge work only after a Gitea issue exists.
|
||||
|
||||
## Non-goals (intentionally deferred)
|
||||
|
||||
- Full unsupervised watchdog auto-filing (prefer explicit reconcile first)
|
||||
- Assuming GlitchTip writeback API equals Sentry without verification
|
||||
- Gitea comment/label mirror writers for every assignment (optional later)
|
||||
|
||||
## Tests
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python3 -m pytest tests/test_control_plane_db.py -q
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -1,301 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ADR: MCP allocator, control-plane DB, and Sentry/GlitchTip incident bridge architecture
|
||||
|
||||
- **Status:** Accepted (implementation pending; blocks code for #600 / #612 / #613)
|
||||
- **Date:** 2026-07-09
|
||||
- **Tracking issues:**
|
||||
- [#613](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/613) — control-plane DB (first)
|
||||
- [#600](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/600) — allocator API (second)
|
||||
- [#612](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/612) — Sentry/GlitchTip incident bridge (third)
|
||||
- **Related:** existing GlitchTip contracts (`glitchtip-to-gitea-workflow-design.md`, `glitchtip-gitea-deduplication-linking-design.md`), trust boundaries (`tool-boundaries.md`, `safety-model.md`), current leases (`pr_work_lease.py`, `issue_lock_store.py`)
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Context
|
||||
|
||||
Multiple LLM sessions can independently inspect the Gitea queue and start the same issue or PR. Existing coordination (Gitea comment leases, local issue-lock files, labels) often detects collisions **after** work has started. Parallel issues #600, #612, and #613 each describe part of a fix; without one ADR they risk overlapping stores, wrong dependency order, and trust-boundary violations.
|
||||
|
||||
This ADR is the canonical architecture decision **before** implementing those issues.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Decision summary (core)
|
||||
|
||||
| Layer | Owns | Must not |
|
||||
|-------|------|----------|
|
||||
| **Control-plane DB** | Sessions, atomic assignment, leases, heartbeats, terminal-lock index, events, incident links | Bypass Gitea workflow gates or replace issue/PR history |
|
||||
| **Gitea** | Durable work record: issues, PRs, comments, labels, reviews, merges | Be the only concurrency lock under multi-session load |
|
||||
| **Sentry / GlitchTip** | Incidents, events, provider UI | Assign work, approve/merge/close, or mutate Gitea outside the bridge |
|
||||
| **Incident bridge** | Provider adapters, reconcile/create Gitea issues, link storage upsert, optional provider writeback | Hand raw provider incidents to the allocator as work items |
|
||||
|
||||
**One-liner:** **DB coordinates. Gitea records. Sentry/GlitchTip observe. The bridge is the only path that turns observations into Gitea work. The allocator assigns only Gitea issues/PRs, never raw monitoring incidents.**
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Dependency order
|
||||
|
||||
Implementation **must** follow:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
#613 control-plane DB → #600 allocator API → #612 incident bridge
|
||||
(atomic substrate) (routing policy) (feeds Gitea work)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Issue | Role | Depends on |
|
||||
|-------|------|------------|
|
||||
| **#613** | Durable coordination DB + lease/assignment transactions | — |
|
||||
| **#600** | `gitea_allocate_next_work` policy and tool surface | **#613** (hard) |
|
||||
| **#612** | Multi-project Sentry/GlitchTip → Gitea bridge | **#613** for `incident_links` index; **#600** before treating bridge-created issues as allocator feed in multi-worker prod |
|
||||
|
||||
**Hard rules:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Do **not** implement #600 on file locks / comment-only leases and call it done.
|
||||
2. Do **not** ship #612 as a second assignment system for raw incidents.
|
||||
3. Partial previews (read-only list tools, schema stubs) may land earlier if they do not claim “allocator complete” or “bridge complete.”
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Authority boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.1 Gitea (durable source of truth for work)
|
||||
|
||||
Gitea remains authoritative for:
|
||||
|
||||
- Issue and PR identity, titles, bodies, state (open/closed/merged)
|
||||
- Comments, reviews, approvals, REQUEST_CHANGES
|
||||
- Labels and workflow status labels (`status:ready`, `status:in-progress`, …)
|
||||
- Merges, closes, branch refs as recorded by Gitea/git hosting
|
||||
|
||||
Operators and auditors read **history** from Gitea.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.2 Control-plane DB (coordination / index)
|
||||
|
||||
The control-plane DB is authoritative for **live multi-session coordination**:
|
||||
|
||||
- Which session holds which assignment/lease
|
||||
- Heartbeat freshness and expiry
|
||||
- Terminal-lock index for routing
|
||||
- Event log of allocation/lease transitions
|
||||
- `incident_links` index (see §8)
|
||||
|
||||
It is **not** a substitute for Gitea history. When DB and Gitea disagree on durable work state (e.g. PR already merged), **Gitea wins**; the DB is reconciled.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.3 Sentry / GlitchTip (observe)
|
||||
|
||||
Providers own incident lifecycle and raw event data. They:
|
||||
|
||||
- Must **not** bypass Gitea gates
|
||||
- Must **not** assign LLM work
|
||||
- May receive **writeback** of resolution status only through the bridge, when configured and supported
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.4 Trust boundaries for credentials
|
||||
|
||||
Aligned with `docs/tool-boundaries.md` and `docs/safety-model.md`:
|
||||
|
||||
- **One MCP server process per trust boundary** remains the default.
|
||||
- Monitor API tokens (Sentry/GlitchTip) live in the **bridge/orchestrator boundary** (or a dedicated observability write/read profile), **not** blindly inside every Gitea MCP author/reviewer/merger process.
|
||||
- Gitea tokens stay on Gitea MCP profiles only.
|
||||
- Orchestrators compose services; they must not become a single credential pool that silently mixes Gitea write + monitor tokens into every worker.
|
||||
|
||||
Tool names such as `gitea_observability_*` may exist as a **namespace façade** only if the runtime still enforces separate credential scopes (e.g. bridge process vs pure Gitea mutation process).
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Allocator rules (#600 on top of #613)
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.1 Worker contract
|
||||
|
||||
- Workers **do not self-select** work under the standard multi-LLM workflow.
|
||||
- Workers call **`gitea_allocate_next_work`** (with `apply=true` only when taking work).
|
||||
- Mutations that claim exclusive work require a **valid assignment and lease** from the control-plane DB.
|
||||
- Return values include at least: role, issue/PR number, expected head SHA (when applicable), lease ID, expiry, allowed actions, forbidden actions — or a non-assignment outcome (`WAIT`, terminal-path block, no safe work, needs controller, etc.).
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.2 Atomic reserve
|
||||
|
||||
- **Assignment creation and lease creation happen in one DB transaction.**
|
||||
- Two concurrent sessions **must not** receive the same issue/PR as assigned work.
|
||||
- On contention: second session gets **WAIT** or **owner-resume**, never a duplicate lease.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.3 Routing policy
|
||||
|
||||
| Condition | Route |
|
||||
|-----------|--------|
|
||||
| Current-head **REQUEST_CHANGES** | **Author** (not reviewer/merger) |
|
||||
| **Stale** approval (approval not on current head) | **Reviewer** |
|
||||
| **Clean** approval on current head, mergeable | **Merger** |
|
||||
| Contested / contaminated approval | **Diagnosis / reconciler** (controller path) |
|
||||
| Active **foreign** lease | **WAIT** or **owner-resume** |
|
||||
| **Terminal-review** lock present | **Terminal-path resolution first** before downstream review work |
|
||||
| Merged / closed PR | **Never assign** |
|
||||
| Issue locked by sanctioned lease | **Never assign** to another worker unless lease cleanup/adoption is sanctioned |
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.4 Relationship to Gitea mirrors
|
||||
|
||||
After a successful assignment, the allocator (or sanctioned tooling) may update Gitea comments/labels so humans and audits see state. Those mirrors **are not** the sole lock source.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Control-plane DB topology (#613)
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.1 Preferred architecture (multi-daemon / Proxmox)
|
||||
|
||||
For true multi-session concurrency (multiple MCP daemons, multiple hosts, or Proxmox VMs):
|
||||
|
||||
**Prefer either:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Shared Postgres** used by all Gitea MCP profiles / allocator callers, **or**
|
||||
2. A **single allocator daemon** (sole writer to the coordination store) that all workers call over MCP/RPC.
|
||||
|
||||
Both satisfy: one transactional authority for “who has this work item.”
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.2 SQLite MVP
|
||||
|
||||
SQLite is acceptable **only** for a **single-writer MVP**:
|
||||
|
||||
- One process owns writes (allocator daemon or single co-located MCP server), **or**
|
||||
- Documented single-host single-daemon experiments with file locking and no multi-host claims.
|
||||
|
||||
SQLite is **not** sufficient to declare multi-session production readiness when four independent LLM sessions talk to four MCP processes without a shared writer.
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.3 Suggested entities (normative shape)
|
||||
|
||||
Minimum logical entities (names may vary; semantics must not):
|
||||
|
||||
1. **sessions** — session_id, role/profile, namespace, pid, started_at, last_heartbeat_at, status
|
||||
2. **work_items** — remote/org/repo, kind ∈ {`issue`, `pr`}, number, state, priority, current_head_sha, updated_at
|
||||
3. **leases** — lease_id, work_item_id, session_id, role, phase, expires_at, heartbeat_at, status
|
||||
4. **assignments** — assignment_id, work_item_id, session_id, allowed_action(s), expected_head_sha, status
|
||||
5. **terminal_locks** — repo/org, terminal_pr, review_id, decision, status, cleanup_state
|
||||
6. **events** — event_id, work_item_id, type, message, created_at
|
||||
7. **incident_links** — provider-neutral link model (see §8)
|
||||
|
||||
**Explicit non-kind:** do **not** use `work_items.kind = sentry_incident` (or glitchtip_incident) as an assignable work unit. Incidents become work only after the bridge creates/links a **Gitea issue**.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Lease migration (avoid split-brain)
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.1 Target state
|
||||
|
||||
- **Primary** for live coordination: **control-plane DB** leases and assignments.
|
||||
- **Gitea comment leases** (e.g. `<!-- mcp-review-lease:v1 -->`) and **local issue-lock files** become:
|
||||
- **mirrors** of DB state for human visibility / recovery, and/or
|
||||
- written **only** through the allocator (or sanctioned lease tools that update DB + mirror in one workflow).
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.2 Migration rules
|
||||
|
||||
1. New exclusive claims go through DB assignment+lease first.
|
||||
2. Comment lease / file lock writers that skip the DB are **deprecated** once #613+#600 land.
|
||||
3. Reconciler tooling heals: expired DB lease, orphan Gitea comment, orphan local file — fail closed when ambiguous.
|
||||
4. **Split-brain is a defect:** “DB free + Gitea comment leased” or “DB leased + Gitea free” must be detectable and reconcilable; production paths must not rely on two independent writers.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.3 Heartbeats
|
||||
|
||||
- Heartbeats update the **DB**.
|
||||
- Optional Gitea summaries must avoid comment spam (periodic summary or edit-in-place policy).
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Observability bridge (#612)
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.1 Role
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Scans configured Sentry and/or GlitchTip projects (multi-project mappings).
|
||||
2. Deduplicates against existing links / Gitea issues.
|
||||
3. Creates or updates **normal Gitea issues** (labels, sanitized body, provider URL).
|
||||
4. Upserts **one** canonical `incident_links` row.
|
||||
5. Optionally writes resolution status back to the provider when supported.
|
||||
6. Never approves, merges, closes, or otherwise bypasses Gitea workflow gates.
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.2 Allocator interaction
|
||||
|
||||
- The allocator sees observability work **only after** a Gitea issue exists (typically `status:ready` + observability labels).
|
||||
- **Do not assign raw Sentry/GlitchTip incidents** as work items.
|
||||
- Bridge AC “allocator can see linked issues” means: **as ordinary Gitea issues**, not a special incident queue.
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.3 Provider adapters and trust
|
||||
|
||||
- Separate **Sentry** and **GlitchTip** adapters; document API differences; do not assume writeback parity.
|
||||
- Self-hosted base URLs supported (e.g. `https://sentry.prgs.cc`).
|
||||
- Tokens from environment / secret store only.
|
||||
- Prefer phase-1 **explicit reconcile / dry-run** before unsupervised watchdog auto-filing, consistent with existing GlitchTip filing safety contracts.
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.4 Home of implementation
|
||||
|
||||
Filing/orchestration may live in:
|
||||
|
||||
- a control-plane / bridge package or profile, and/or
|
||||
- Gitea-Tools as operator-facing tools that **delegate** to that boundary,
|
||||
|
||||
but must not violate §4.4 credential isolation.
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Incident link storage (single source of truth)
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.1 Canonical model: `incident_links` (provider-neutral)
|
||||
|
||||
Prefer a **provider-neutral** model over Sentry-only `sentry_links`:
|
||||
|
||||
| Field (logical) | Purpose |
|
||||
|-----------------|---------|
|
||||
| provider | `sentry` \| `glitchtip` \| … |
|
||||
| provider_base_url | Self-hosted base |
|
||||
| provider_org / provider_project | Mapping key |
|
||||
| provider_issue_id / provider_short_id | Provider identity |
|
||||
| provider_permalink | Human URL |
|
||||
| fingerprint | Stable dedupe key when available |
|
||||
| gitea_org / gitea_repo / gitea_issue_number | Linked work |
|
||||
| linked_pr_numbers | Optional PR association |
|
||||
| first_seen / last_seen / event_count | Summary metrics (safe) |
|
||||
| status | link lifecycle |
|
||||
| release_resolved_at / last_sync_at | Sync bookkeeping |
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.2 Gitea as human mirror
|
||||
|
||||
- Issue body markers / structured comments (e.g. HTML comment metadata) remain the **human- and audit-visible mirror**.
|
||||
- They must stay consistent with `incident_links` but are **not** a second independent write path for inventing links without the bridge.
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.3 One truth
|
||||
|
||||
- **Do not** maintain two independent systems of record (e.g. full mapping only in #612 storage **and** a separate #613 `sentry_links` with different semantics).
|
||||
- #612 implementation **must** use the same `incident_links` model introduced under #613 (or a single agreed store both reference).
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Security and redaction
|
||||
|
||||
Mandatory for bridge payloads, Gitea issue bodies/comments, DB-stored event summaries, and logs:
|
||||
|
||||
- No API tokens, DSNs, passwords, cookies, auth headers
|
||||
- No keychain IDs, private config contents, raw session-state files, full prompt bodies
|
||||
- Sanitize stack locals and request data; store only safe tags/context
|
||||
- Logs must never print provider tokens or DSNs
|
||||
- Redaction tests are required for #612
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. Non-goals
|
||||
|
||||
- Replace Gitea as the durable workflow record
|
||||
- Let Sentry/GlitchTip assign work or mutate Gitea workflow state outside sanctioned tools
|
||||
- Let the bridge approve, merge, close, release, or bypass Gitea gates
|
||||
- Implement #600 on file locks / comments alone and call allocator complete
|
||||
- Treat raw monitoring incidents as `work_items` for the allocator
|
||||
- Put monitor tokens into every Gitea MCP worker process by default
|
||||
|
||||
## 12. Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
### Positive
|
||||
|
||||
- Clear implementation order and ownership
|
||||
- Multi-session safety becomes testable at the DB layer
|
||||
- Observability becomes assignable work without special-casing the allocator
|
||||
- Trust boundaries stay compatible with existing control-plane docs
|
||||
|
||||
### Costs / risks
|
||||
|
||||
- Migration from comment/file leases requires reconciler work
|
||||
- Shared Postgres or single allocator daemon is operational cost
|
||||
- Bridge must be careful not to spam Gitea issues (dedupe, caps, policy modes)
|
||||
|
||||
### Follow-ups (documentation only until implemented)
|
||||
|
||||
1. Update #600, #612, and #613 bodies to **link this ADR** and restate hard dependencies.
|
||||
2. Implement #613 schema + atomic assign/lease.
|
||||
3. Implement #600 against the DB.
|
||||
4. Implement #612 against `incident_links` + Gitea create/update.
|
||||
5. Deprecate dual writers for leases.
|
||||
|
||||
## 13. Acceptance criteria for *this* ADR
|
||||
|
||||
This document is accepted when:
|
||||
|
||||
1. It is merged into `docs/architecture/` on the default branch.
|
||||
2. #600 / #612 / #613 (or their PRs) reference this path as the architecture source of truth.
|
||||
3. No implementation PR for those issues claims completion without conforming to §§2–11.
|
||||
|
||||
## 14. Document history
|
||||
|
||||
| Date | Change |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| 2026-07-09 | Initial ADR: dependency order, authority model, topology, lease migration, bridge, `incident_links`, security, non-goals |
|
||||
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ authenticated capability set. Each profile defines the following fields:
|
||||
| `authenticated_username` | string | The Gitea login this profile authenticates as (verified at runtime via `gitea_whoami`, not trusted from config). |
|
||||
| `allowed_operations` | list | Operation categories this profile may perform. |
|
||||
| `forbidden_operations` | list | Operation categories this profile must never perform. |
|
||||
| `allowed_repositories` | list | Optional. Canonical `owner/repository` slugs this profile may bind to. An authorization boundary, not the binding itself — see [Repository scope](#repository-scope-714). |
|
||||
| `token_source_name` | string | The *name* of the secret source (e.g. env var name or secret key). **Never the token value.** |
|
||||
| `audit_label` | string | Short label attached to audit records for actions by this profile. |
|
||||
| `can_approve_prs` | bool | May submit an approving PR review. |
|
||||
@@ -58,47 +57,6 @@ authenticated capability set. Each profile defines the following fields:
|
||||
name), never the token itself. Token values are never part of a profile object,
|
||||
never logged, never returned by a tool, and never committed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Repository scope (#714)
|
||||
|
||||
`allowed_repositories` declares the canonical `owner/repository` slugs a profile
|
||||
may operate on:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
"prgs-author": {
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It is an **authorization boundary, not the session binding**. The binding is
|
||||
derived and enforced like this:
|
||||
|
||||
1. The session repository is derived from the **verified, workspace-aligned git
|
||||
remote** — never from a caller-supplied `org`/`repo` argument, and never from
|
||||
the `REMOTES` table (whose entries are default *targets*: `prgs` defaults to
|
||||
`Timesheet`, which is not this project).
|
||||
2. That workspace-derived slug is validated against `allowed_repositories`.
|
||||
3. The session binds immutably to that one canonical `owner/repository`. The
|
||||
organization is derived from the slug; there is no independent,
|
||||
caller-controlled organization value.
|
||||
4. If a profile authorizes several repositories, the verified workspace still
|
||||
selects exactly one. A session never binds to the whole list and never
|
||||
switches between entries.
|
||||
|
||||
Fail-closed rules:
|
||||
|
||||
- Activation is rejected when the workspace repository is absent from the
|
||||
allowlist.
|
||||
- A mutation is rejected when no verified workspace repository can be
|
||||
established.
|
||||
- A tool-level `org`/`repo` override that disagrees with the binding is rejected
|
||||
before the mutation runs.
|
||||
- A mutation request can never establish, complete, or replace the binding.
|
||||
|
||||
The field is **config-only**: no environment variable can widen or forge it. It
|
||||
is optional — a profile that omits it keeps the previous behaviour, so existing
|
||||
static-profile namespaces stay functional until an operator provisions the
|
||||
scope. Provisioning it is what activates enforcement for that profile.
|
||||
|
||||
## Example profiles
|
||||
|
||||
The following are the reference profiles. Booleans express intended capability
|
||||
@@ -280,43 +238,11 @@ narrow operation set:
|
||||
- `gitea.issue.comment`
|
||||
- `gitea.issue.close`
|
||||
- `gitea.pr.close`
|
||||
- `gitea.branch.delete` (merged-branch cleanup only — see below)
|
||||
|
||||
Forbidden on reconciler profiles: `gitea.pr.approve`, `gitea.pr.merge`,
|
||||
`gitea.pr.review`, `gitea.pr.create`, `gitea.branch.push`, and
|
||||
`gitea.repo.commit`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Merged-branch cleanup ownership (`gitea.branch.delete`)
|
||||
|
||||
The reconciler is the repository-supported owner of merged-PR source-branch
|
||||
cleanup: `task_capability_map` maps `cleanup_merged_pr_branch` (and
|
||||
`reconciliation_cleanup`) to role `reconciler` with permission
|
||||
`gitea.branch.delete`. Post-merge branch lifecycle is reconciliation work —
|
||||
it happens after the author, reviewer, and merger roles have completed, and
|
||||
it must not be reachable from those roles.
|
||||
|
||||
Least-privilege constraints:
|
||||
|
||||
- `gitea.branch.delete` is granted **only** to reconciler profiles. Author,
|
||||
reviewer, and merger profiles must never hold it; `gitea_delete_branch`
|
||||
and `gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch` fail closed on any profile without
|
||||
the permission.
|
||||
- Even with the permission, reconciler deletion is only supported through the
|
||||
guarded `gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch` path (#514 / #687): the PR must be
|
||||
merged, the head an ancestor of the target, the branch not protected
|
||||
(`master`/`main`/`dev`), the branch not a preservation/evidence ref (e.g.
|
||||
`chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip`), no open PR may still use the
|
||||
head, and an explicit `CLEANUP MERGED PR <n> BRANCH <branch>` confirmation is
|
||||
required. Raw `gitea_delete_branch` is **denied** to reconciler even when
|
||||
`gitea.branch.delete` is present.
|
||||
- Raw `git branch -d` / `git push --delete` cleanup remains blocked by
|
||||
`branch_cleanup_guard` and the final-report validator regardless of
|
||||
profile permissions.
|
||||
- `gitea.branch.delete` has no short alias in `GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES`;
|
||||
write it fully qualified in `allowed_operations`. Migration must emit
|
||||
canonical names such as `gitea.pr.close` (never bare `pr.close` /
|
||||
`issue.close`, which the production normalizer rejects or drops).
|
||||
|
||||
Launch a static `gitea-reconciler` MCP namespace with
|
||||
`GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler`. Profile shape is validated by
|
||||
`reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile` (#304). Use the
|
||||
@@ -325,159 +251,6 @@ Launch a static `gitea-reconciler` MCP namespace with
|
||||
fresh target-branch fetch, recorded target SHA, and ancestor proof. PRs whose
|
||||
heads are not already landed cannot be closed through this path.
|
||||
|
||||
### Operational runbook: grant reconciler `gitea.branch.delete` (#687)
|
||||
|
||||
Merging a code PR that updates `migrate_profiles.py` / `reconciler_profile.py`
|
||||
**does not** change the live operator profile on disk. Apply the profile
|
||||
change deliberately, then reconnect the client-managed namespace.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Approved migration / profile-update command** (from the repo root, using
|
||||
the project venv if present):
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Dry-run first (default): validates v2 output, writes nothing
|
||||
python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json
|
||||
|
||||
# Apply: creates backup then writes migrated v2 config
|
||||
python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json -w
|
||||
# Optional explicit paths:
|
||||
# python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json \
|
||||
# -o ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json \
|
||||
# --backup ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json.bak -w
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If the live file is already v2, edit the reconciler identity’s
|
||||
`allowed_operations` / `forbidden_operations` under
|
||||
`environments.<env>.services.gitea.identities.reconciler` (or the
|
||||
`prgs-reconciler` alias target) so allowed includes the canonical set
|
||||
below — then re-validate with a load of the config (see step 3).
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Inspect the generated (or edited) profile** — confirm the reconciler
|
||||
identity, for example:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python3 - <<'PY'
|
||||
import json
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
cfg = json.loads(Path.home().joinpath(".config/gitea-tools/profiles.json").read_text())
|
||||
# v2 environments shape:
|
||||
ident = cfg["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]["identities"]["reconciler"]
|
||||
print("role:", ident.get("role"))
|
||||
print("allowed:", ident.get("allowed_operations"))
|
||||
print("forbidden:", ident.get("forbidden_operations"))
|
||||
PY
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Validate canonical operation names and least privilege**
|
||||
|
||||
Expected canonical **allowed** (defaults after migration):
|
||||
|
||||
- `gitea.read`
|
||||
- `gitea.pr.close` (required)
|
||||
- `gitea.pr.comment`
|
||||
- `gitea.issue.comment`
|
||||
- `gitea.issue.close`
|
||||
- `gitea.branch.delete` (recommended; cleanup only)
|
||||
|
||||
Expected **forbidden** includes at least: `gitea.pr.approve`,
|
||||
`gitea.pr.merge`, `gitea.pr.review`, `gitea.pr.create`,
|
||||
`gitea.branch.push`, `gitea.repo.commit`.
|
||||
|
||||
No shorthand (`pr.close`, `issue.close`, `pr.comment`) may remain.
|
||||
Validate with the production loader:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python3 - <<'PY'
|
||||
import gitea_config, reconciler_profile
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
path = str(Path.home() / ".config/gitea-tools/profiles.json")
|
||||
gitea_config.load_config(path) # fails closed on invalid config
|
||||
# Or assess the reconciler lists directly after extracting them:
|
||||
# print(reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile(allowed, forbidden))
|
||||
PY
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Merging PR #688 (or any code PR) does not update the live profile.**
|
||||
Code changes only the migration helper, schema, docs, and tests. The
|
||||
operator must still run `migrate_profiles.py -w` or an equivalent
|
||||
authorized edit of `~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json`.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Supported apply method:** `python3 migrate_profiles.py … -w` (backup
|
||||
created automatically) **or** operator-authorized edit of the live
|
||||
profiles file after backup. Unsupported: silent mtime tricks, manual
|
||||
process kill to “reload”, or undocumented env overrides.
|
||||
|
||||
6. **Backup and validation:** `-w` copies the input to
|
||||
`<input_path>.bak` (or `--backup PATH`) before writing. Re-run
|
||||
`load_config` / `assess_reconciler_profile` after write. Keep the
|
||||
`.bak` until live whoami/capability checks pass.
|
||||
|
||||
7. **Client-managed namespace reconnect/reload:** reconnect or reload the
|
||||
IDE MCP client so `gitea-reconciler` restarts from current `master` and
|
||||
the updated `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler` config. Do not hand-launch
|
||||
`mcp_server.py` / `gitea_mcp_server.py` with ad hoc `GITEA_*` env
|
||||
(see #686 / #630).
|
||||
|
||||
8. **Live reverification** (through the client-managed `gitea-reconciler`
|
||||
namespace only):
|
||||
|
||||
- `gitea_whoami` → identity + profile `prgs-reconciler`
|
||||
- `gitea_assess_master_parity` → `stale=false`, `restart_required=false`
|
||||
- `gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="cleanup_merged_pr_branch")` →
|
||||
`allowed_in_current_session=true` only when permission and role match
|
||||
- `gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="delete_branch")` →
|
||||
**not** allowed for reconciler (role denial must be enforced)
|
||||
|
||||
9. **Guarded cleanup usage** (example for a merged PR whose source branch
|
||||
remains on the remote):
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
|
||||
pr_number=<N>,
|
||||
branch=<exact PR head branch>,
|
||||
confirmation="CLEANUP MERGED PR <N> BRANCH <exact PR head branch>",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
worktree_path="<path under branches/>",
|
||||
)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The tool refuses unmerged PRs, protected branches, preservation/evidence
|
||||
branches, open-PR heads, mismatched branch names, and wrong confirmation.
|
||||
|
||||
10. **Prohibitions**
|
||||
|
||||
- No raw `git push --delete`, `git branch -d` / `-D`, or delete refspecs
|
||||
- No arbitrary `gitea_delete_branch` from reconciler
|
||||
- No unsupported profile switching mid-run without full re-preflight
|
||||
- No ad hoc hand-edits of live profiles **unless** operator-authorized,
|
||||
backed up, and revalidated as above
|
||||
|
||||
Canonical migrated reconciler example:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.close",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.close",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Identity and fail-closed rules
|
||||
|
||||
Before **any** mutating action, a workflow must know both:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ one.
|
||||
| `status:blocked` | Issue is blocked |
|
||||
| `status:needs-review` | Issue work needs review |
|
||||
| `status:pr-open` | A linked PR is open |
|
||||
| `status:changes-requested` | Reviewer requested changes on the linked PR |
|
||||
| `status:approved` | Linked PR is approved |
|
||||
| `status:merged` | Linked PR is merged |
|
||||
| `status:reconcile` | Issue needs reconciliation |
|
||||
@@ -47,72 +46,6 @@ one.
|
||||
| `status:duplicate` | Issue is a duplicate |
|
||||
| `status:wontfix` | Issue will not be fixed |
|
||||
|
||||
## Role Ownership Labels (#603)
|
||||
|
||||
A single `role:*` label shows which workflow role currently owns the item. It is
|
||||
advisory visibility only — the control-plane lease (#601) is the source of truth
|
||||
for mutation authority. Only one `role:*` label is active at a time; tooling
|
||||
replaces it on handoff via `transition_role_labels`.
|
||||
|
||||
| Label | Use |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| `role:author` | Author currently owns the item |
|
||||
| `role:reviewer` | Reviewer currently owns the item |
|
||||
| `role:merger` | Merger currently owns the item |
|
||||
|
||||
## Hazard Labels (#603)
|
||||
|
||||
Hazard labels are orthogonal warning flags. Unlike `status:*` and `role:*`,
|
||||
**more than one hazard may be active at once**, and a hazard never substitutes
|
||||
for a live lease / PR-state check. Add/remove with `add_hazard_label` /
|
||||
`clear_hazard_label`.
|
||||
|
||||
| Label | Use |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| `hazard:stale-lease` | A stale or expired lease references this item |
|
||||
| `hazard:workflow-contaminated` | Session/workflow state is contaminated; do not mutate |
|
||||
| `hazard:conflicted` | Linked PR has merge conflicts |
|
||||
| `hazard:root-mutation` | Work was mutated in the project root checkout |
|
||||
| `hazard:manual-state` | Session or lease state was edited manually |
|
||||
| `hazard:terminal-blocker` | A terminal review/merge lock blocks progress (#332/#602) |
|
||||
|
||||
Any item that carries `status:blocked` or any `hazard:*` flag must also have a
|
||||
blocking-reason / next-action comment (`requires_blocking_reason`).
|
||||
|
||||
## `state:*` → canonical mapping (#603 migration)
|
||||
|
||||
Issue #603 proposed a parallel `state:*` vocabulary. To avoid a conflicting
|
||||
second lifecycle prefix, those requested states are folded into the existing
|
||||
canonical labels rather than introduced as `state:*`. `state:*` is **not** a
|
||||
supported prefix; use the canonical label on the right.
|
||||
|
||||
| Requested `state:*` | Canonical label |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| `state:needs-triage` | `status:triage` |
|
||||
| `state:claimed` | `status:claimed` |
|
||||
| `state:authoring` | `status:in-progress` |
|
||||
| `state:needs-review` | `status:needs-review` |
|
||||
| `state:reviewing` | `status:needs-review` |
|
||||
| `state:changes-requested` | `status:changes-requested` |
|
||||
| `state:approved` | `status:approved` |
|
||||
| `state:merge-ready` | `status:approved` |
|
||||
| `state:merged` | `status:merged` |
|
||||
| `state:blocked` | `status:blocked` |
|
||||
| `state:terminal-blocker` | `hazard:terminal-blocker` |
|
||||
| `state:abandoned` | `status:wontfix` |
|
||||
|
||||
The transition helpers accept these names as synonyms (e.g.
|
||||
`canonical_status_label("authoring")` → `status:in-progress`), so callers may use
|
||||
the #603 wording while a single canonical status stays active.
|
||||
|
||||
## Allocator Cross-Check (#603)
|
||||
|
||||
Labels are advisory queue hints. The work allocator (#600/#613) uses labels as
|
||||
one signal but **cross-checks live leases and PR state** and never trusts labels
|
||||
alone. Discussion issues (`type:discussion`) are excluded from implementation
|
||||
queues (`is_implementation_candidate`) unless a controller explicitly selects
|
||||
them.
|
||||
|
||||
## Transition Rules
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested lifecycle:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,92 +1,23 @@
|
||||
# MCP daemon import and native-transport guard (#558 / #695)
|
||||
# MCP daemon import and keychain guard (#558)
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
During deadlock debugging and the PR #694 incident (#695), agents imported
|
||||
`gitea_mcp_server` or ran credential helpers from a raw shell / offline helper,
|
||||
bypassing native MCP transport, preflight purity, and role gates. Contaminated
|
||||
formal reviews then looked identical to native approvals.
|
||||
During deadlock debugging, agents imported `gitea_mcp_server` / ran credential
|
||||
helpers from a raw shell, bypassing preflight purity and role gates.
|
||||
|
||||
## Rule
|
||||
|
||||
Mutation auth, keychain fill, and controller quarantine require a **production
|
||||
native MCP transport runtime** established only by:
|
||||
|
||||
1. the **resolved absolute path** of the canonical entrypoint
|
||||
(`mcp_server.py` / `gitea_mcp_server.py` next to `mcp_daemon_guard.py`), and
|
||||
2. a live **transport bind** (`bind_native_mcp_transport(transport="stdio")`)
|
||||
immediately before `mcp.run`.
|
||||
|
||||
Basename-only trust (a renamed file called `mcp_server.py`), caller-controlled
|
||||
flags (there is **no** `allow_test_bootstrap`), environment variables, stack
|
||||
frame spoofing, or import-only launch are insufficient.
|
||||
Mutation auth and keychain fill require a **sanctioned MCP daemon** process.
|
||||
|
||||
| Context | Allowed |
|
||||
|---------|---------|
|
||||
| Official IDE-native MCP: resolved canonical entrypoint marks + binds stdio, holds process-local runtime token | yes |
|
||||
| pytest (hermetic unit tests) via `is_pytest_runtime()` | yes for unit gates |
|
||||
| `install_test_native_runtime()` under pytest (test-mode record) | unit-test transport gates only — **never** production Gitea mutations |
|
||||
| `allow_test_bootstrap=True` (removed; must not exist) | **no** |
|
||||
| Renamed runner basename `mcp_server.py` outside package root | **no** |
|
||||
| Import/launch of real entrypoint without transport bind | **no** |
|
||||
| `GITEA_MCP_SANCTIONED_DAEMON=1` alone (no process-local native runtime) | **no** (#695) |
|
||||
| `GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT=1` in LLM sessions | **no** — never set; never authorizes mutations (#695 AC1 / PR #701) |
|
||||
| Override `GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR` mid-session | **no** — production bind pins state root; redirect cannot forge independent decision locks (#695 AC2 / PR #701) |
|
||||
| `GITEA_ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI=1` in LLM sessions | **no** — human operator only |
|
||||
| bare `python -c 'import gitea_mcp_server; …'` or offline runners | **no** |
|
||||
| keychain fill outside native/pytest | **no** |
|
||||
|
||||
Native runtime is **process-local**: a random token bound to the daemon PID and
|
||||
transport phase. It is never reconstructed from environment variables,
|
||||
session-state files, caller-controlled flags, or importing internals in a
|
||||
fresh Python process.
|
||||
|
||||
## Contaminated review quarantine (#695 AC8)
|
||||
|
||||
Controller/reconciler/merger profiles may call
|
||||
`gitea_quarantine_contaminated_review` with explicit confirmation:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
QUARANTINE CONTAMINATED REVIEW <review_id> PR <pr_number>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Quarantine records are durable under the MCP session-state root and are
|
||||
**honored** by:
|
||||
|
||||
- `gitea_get_pr_review_feedback` (quarantined approvals do not authorize merge)
|
||||
- `gitea_check_pr_eligibility` action=`merge`
|
||||
- `gitea_merge_pr` (mutation)
|
||||
- merger lease adoption paths that read `approval_at_current_head`
|
||||
|
||||
Forensic Gitea reviews and historical comments are **never deleted**.
|
||||
|
||||
## STOP after native MCP failure (AC10)
|
||||
|
||||
If the native MCP namespace dies (EOF, capability disconnect, session death):
|
||||
|
||||
1. **STOP.** State BLOCKED + DIAGNOSE.
|
||||
2. Do **not** import `gitea_mcp_server` from a standalone process.
|
||||
3. Do **not** run `offline_mcp_helper.py`, `offline_mcp_runner.py`,
|
||||
`run_quarantine.py`, or any offline mutation helper.
|
||||
4. Do **not** set direct-import, keychain-bypass, or raw-token environment
|
||||
variables.
|
||||
5. Reconnect / restart the official MCP daemon; resume only via native tools.
|
||||
|
||||
Any further native MCP failure is a hard stop. Do not construct another fallback.
|
||||
|
||||
## Canonical approval claims (AC7)
|
||||
|
||||
Comments that claim `approved` / `ready-to-merge` / `WHO_IS_NEXT: merger` /
|
||||
`MERGE_READY: true` must include:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF: transport=native_mcp; …
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Claims that cite offline/import helpers are rejected even if a proof line is
|
||||
present.
|
||||
| Official MCP entrypoint (`mcp_server.py` / `gitea_mcp_server` `__main__`) sets `GITEA_MCP_SANCTIONED_DAEMON=1` | yes |
|
||||
| pytest | yes |
|
||||
| `GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT=1` (operator/tests only) | yes |
|
||||
| bare `python -c 'import gitea_auth; get_auth_header(...)'` | **no** |
|
||||
| keychain fill without daemon | **no** unless `GITEA_ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI=1` |
|
||||
|
||||
## Operator note
|
||||
|
||||
LLM sessions must never set allow-direct-import, allow-keychain-cli, or raw
|
||||
token overrides. Those are human-only escape hatches outside agent workflows.
|
||||
LLM sessions must never set the allow-direct-import or allow-keychain-cli
|
||||
overrides. Those are human-only escape hatches.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Self-hosted Sentry observability for the Gitea MCP server (#606)
|
||||
|
||||
Optional, **off-by-default** instrumentation that reports MCP runtime errors,
|
||||
fail-closed workflow blockers, lease / terminal-lock / stale-runtime
|
||||
collisions, and recurring watchdog check-ins to a **self-hosted** Sentry at
|
||||
`https://sentry.prgs.cc/`.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Gitea remains the source of truth.** Sentry is observe-only. It never
|
||||
> approves, merges, closes, or otherwise mutates Gitea workflow state, and it
|
||||
> never bypasses leases, #332, workflow roles, or the MCP gates. Sentry alerts
|
||||
> may only feed the *sanctioned* Gitea issue/comment path via the #612 incident
|
||||
> bridge — never a direct write.
|
||||
|
||||
Implemented by [`sentry_observability.py`](../../sentry_observability.py).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Create the Sentry project
|
||||
|
||||
1. Sign in to the self-hosted Sentry at **`https://sentry.prgs.cc/`** (this is
|
||||
**not** Sentry Cloud — do not use `*.ingest.sentry.io`).
|
||||
2. Create a new **Python** project named **`gitea-tools-mcp`**.
|
||||
3. Open **Settings → Projects → gitea-tools-mcp → Client Keys (DSN)** and copy
|
||||
the DSN. It looks like `https://<publickey>@sentry.prgs.cc/<project-id>`.
|
||||
4. **Never commit the DSN.** It is a runtime secret supplied via env var only.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Configure the environment
|
||||
|
||||
All configuration is env-var driven (see [`.env.example`](../../.env.example)):
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Purpose | Default |
|
||||
|----------|---------|---------|
|
||||
| `MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED` | Master gate (`1/true/yes/on`). Required. | off |
|
||||
| `SENTRY_DSN` | Self-hosted DSN. Required. | *(empty)* |
|
||||
| `SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT` | `local` / `dev` / `prod` tag. | `development` |
|
||||
| `SENTRY_RELEASE` | Release id (git SHA or version). | *(none)* |
|
||||
| `MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE` | Perf-trace sample rate `0.0–1.0` (clamped). | `0.0` |
|
||||
| `MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS` | Forward Python logs as structured logs. | off |
|
||||
|
||||
**The feature stays completely off unless `MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED` is truthy *and*
|
||||
`SENTRY_DSN` is non-empty.** With either missing, `init_sentry()` is a no-op,
|
||||
the SDK is never initialised, and no events are sent — existing tool behaviour
|
||||
and API-call patterns are unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
### Per-environment examples
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# local (quiet: capture errors/blockers, no traces)
|
||||
export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=1
|
||||
export SENTRY_DSN="https://<key>@sentry.prgs.cc/<id>"
|
||||
export SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=local
|
||||
|
||||
# dev (light tracing + logs)
|
||||
export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=1
|
||||
export SENTRY_DSN="https://<key>@sentry.prgs.cc/<id>"
|
||||
export SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=dev
|
||||
export MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.2
|
||||
export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS=1
|
||||
|
||||
# prod (errors/blockers + low-rate tracing, release-tagged)
|
||||
export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=1
|
||||
export SENTRY_DSN="https://<key>@sentry.prgs.cc/<id>"
|
||||
export SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=prod
|
||||
export SENTRY_RELEASE="$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)"
|
||||
export MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.05
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The optional SDK is pinned in [`requirements.txt`](../../requirements.txt)
|
||||
(`sentry-sdk==2.20.0`). It is imported lazily: if the package is absent, the
|
||||
module still imports and every entry point is a safe no-op.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. What is instrumented
|
||||
|
||||
| Signal | Where | Notes |
|
||||
|--------|-------|-------|
|
||||
| Startup init | `gitea_mcp_server.py` `__main__`, before `mcp.run` | Prints a redaction-safe status line to stderr. |
|
||||
| Failing mutations (exceptions) | `_audited(...)` context manager | `capture_exception` with scrubbed tags. |
|
||||
| Fail-closed blockers / failed mutations | `_audit_pr_result(...)` (BLOCKED/FAILED) | Structured `capture_workflow_blocker` event incl. the canonical next action when available (criterion 7). |
|
||||
| Allocator watchdog check-ins | `gitea_allocate_next_work` tool | `allocator_health`, `stale_lease_scan`, `terminal_lock_scan`. |
|
||||
| Namespace-health check-in | `gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_health` tool | `namespace_health`. |
|
||||
|
||||
All capture paths are **best-effort / fail open**: a Sentry outage or capture
|
||||
error never breaks an MCP tool success path.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Cron / watchdog monitors
|
||||
|
||||
`sentry_observability.MONITOR_SLUGS` defines stable check-in slugs:
|
||||
|
||||
| Registry key | Sentry monitor slug | Wired at |
|
||||
|--------------|--------------------|----------|
|
||||
| `stale_lease_scan` | `gitea-mcp-stale-lease-scan` | allocator run (global lease expiry) |
|
||||
| `terminal_lock_scan` | `gitea-mcp-terminal-lock-scan` | allocator run (terminal-lock lookup) |
|
||||
| `allocator_health` | `gitea-mcp-allocator-health` | allocator run |
|
||||
| `namespace_health` | `gitea-mcp-namespace-health` | namespace-health probe |
|
||||
| `dashboard_freshness` | `gitea-mcp-dashboard-freshness` | call `monitor_checkin("dashboard_freshness", ...)` from the dashboard refresh job (#605) |
|
||||
| `reconciler_cleanup` | `gitea-mcp-reconciler-cleanup` | call `monitor_checkin("reconciler_cleanup", ...)` from the reconciler cleanup entrypoint |
|
||||
|
||||
Create matching Cron monitors in Sentry with those slugs. Emit an
|
||||
`in_progress` check-in at job start and `ok`/`error` at completion via
|
||||
`sentry_observability.monitor_checkin(slug_key, status)`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Redaction guarantees (fail closed)
|
||||
|
||||
Redaction fails *closed*: if a field cannot be proven safe it is dropped rather
|
||||
than sent. The `before_send` (and `before_send_log`) hook `scrub_event`
|
||||
recursively redacts every outgoing event; on any error it drops the event
|
||||
entirely. Guarantees, proven by `tests/test_sentry_observability.py`:
|
||||
|
||||
- **No** tokens, passwords, keychain IDs, DSNs, cookies, or `user:pass@host`.
|
||||
- **No** raw session-state or full prompt/comment bodies — `session_id` is only
|
||||
ever surfaced as a 12-char `session_id_hash`.
|
||||
- **No** private config contents or raw credential headers.
|
||||
- **No** full local filesystem paths — a worktree path collapses to a coarse
|
||||
`worktree_category` (`author` / `reviewer` / `merger` / `reconciler` /
|
||||
`branches` / `root` / `other`).
|
||||
- Only the allowlisted tag keys in `ALLOWED_TAG_KEYS` are ever attached.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Coexistence with GlitchTip / the #612 incident bridge
|
||||
|
||||
This is the **outbound** path (MCP → Sentry SDK). It complements — it does not
|
||||
replace — the **inbound** [`incident_bridge.py`](../../incident_bridge.py)
|
||||
(#612), which turns Sentry/GlitchTip *observations* into durable Gitea issues
|
||||
and `incident_links` rows.
|
||||
|
||||
- Prefer **one** observability path per environment. Point the MCP server's
|
||||
`SENTRY_DSN` at the same self-hosted `gitea-tools-mcp` project that the #612
|
||||
bridge reconciles from, so an MCP-reported error and its Gitea issue line up.
|
||||
- GlitchTip is Sentry-protocol compatible; if an existing GlitchTip DSN is in
|
||||
use, either migrate it to `https://sentry.prgs.cc/` or document the split
|
||||
(MCP → Sentry, legacy → GlitchTip) explicitly for operators.
|
||||
- The bridge remains the **only** sanctioned route from an alert back into
|
||||
Gitea workflow state.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Non-goals
|
||||
|
||||
- Sentry must **not** become the workflow source of truth.
|
||||
- Sentry must **not** approve, merge, close, or mutate Gitea workflow state.
|
||||
- Sentry must **not** bypass leases, #332, workflow roles, or the MCP gates.
|
||||
@@ -134,22 +134,16 @@ _TARGET_BRANCH_SHA_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"target branch sha\s*:\s*[0-9a-f]{40}",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# #698: structured proof is rendered in several equivalent shapes —
|
||||
# `workflow_hash: abc...`, `workflow_hash=abc...`, or JSON
|
||||
# `"workflow_hash": "abc..."`. Recognize all of them; demanding one exact
|
||||
# punctuation style rejects legitimate structured workflow-load proof.
|
||||
_WORKFLOW_LOAD_HELPER_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"workflow[-_ ]load[-_ ]helper[-_ ]result\s*[:=]",
|
||||
r"workflow[- ]load helper result\s*:",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_WORKFLOW_LOAD_HASH_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"workflow[-_ ]load[-_ ]helper[-_ ]result[\s\S]{0,400}?"
|
||||
r"workflow[_ ]hash\"?\s*[:=]\s*\"?[0-9a-f]{12}",
|
||||
r"workflow[- ]load helper result[\s\S]{0,400}?workflow[_ ]hash\s*:\s*[0-9a-f]{12}",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_WORKFLOW_LOAD_BOUNDARY_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"workflow[-_ ]load[-_ ]helper[-_ ]result[\s\S]{0,400}?"
|
||||
r"boundary[_ ]status\"?\s*[:=]\s*\"?(?:clean|violation)",
|
||||
r"workflow[- ]load helper result[\s\S]{0,400}?boundary[_ ]status\s*:\s*(?:clean|violation)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_WORKFLOW_FILE_VIEW_NARRATIVE_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
@@ -250,59 +244,6 @@ def _normalize_task_kind(task_kind: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
return _TASK_KIND_ALIASES.get(raw, raw)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _iter_action_entries(action_log: list | None) -> list[dict]:
|
||||
"""Yield only structured (dict) action-log entries (#698).
|
||||
|
||||
Callers must never crash on malformed entries (strings, numbers, null)
|
||||
that reach the validator from LLM-composed or partially parsed logs;
|
||||
:func:`sanitize_action_log` reports them separately.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return [e for e in (action_log or []) if isinstance(e, dict)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sanitize_action_log(
|
||||
action_log: list | None,
|
||||
) -> tuple[list[dict], list[dict[str, str]]]:
|
||||
"""Split an action log into structured entries and sanitized findings (#698).
|
||||
|
||||
Malformed entries become clear, sanitized ``warning`` findings — the
|
||||
offending value's content is never echoed back (only its position and
|
||||
type), so secrets or garbage in a broken log cannot leak into validation
|
||||
errors, and validation itself proceeds without secondary exceptions.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if action_log is None:
|
||||
return [], []
|
||||
if not isinstance(action_log, (list, tuple)):
|
||||
return [], [
|
||||
validator_finding(
|
||||
"shared.action_log_malformed",
|
||||
"downgrade",
|
||||
"Action log",
|
||||
"action_log is not a list of structured entries "
|
||||
f"(got {type(action_log).__name__}); it was ignored",
|
||||
"pass action_log as a list of dict entries",
|
||||
)
|
||||
]
|
||||
entries: list[dict] = []
|
||||
findings: list[dict[str, str]] = []
|
||||
for index, entry in enumerate(action_log):
|
||||
if isinstance(entry, dict):
|
||||
entries.append(entry)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
findings.append(
|
||||
validator_finding(
|
||||
"shared.action_log_malformed",
|
||||
"downgrade",
|
||||
"Action log",
|
||||
f"action_log entry {index} is not a structured mapping "
|
||||
f"(got {type(entry).__name__}); the entry was ignored",
|
||||
"repair the malformed action_log entry or drop it before "
|
||||
"revalidating",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
return entries, findings
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def validator_finding(
|
||||
rule_id: str,
|
||||
severity: str,
|
||||
@@ -480,7 +421,7 @@ def _rule_shared_canonical_comment_post_claim(
|
||||
rejected_in_report = bool(_CANONICAL_VALIDATION_REJECTED_RE.search(text))
|
||||
rejected_in_log = False
|
||||
if action_log:
|
||||
for entry in _iter_action_entries(action_log):
|
||||
for entry in action_log:
|
||||
validation = entry.get("canonical_comment_validation") or {}
|
||||
if validation.get("allowed") is False:
|
||||
rejected_in_log = True
|
||||
@@ -534,13 +475,9 @@ def _rule_reviewer_vague_mutations_none(
|
||||
action_log: list[dict] | None = None,
|
||||
mutations_observed: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
|
||||
# #698: infer review mutations only from authoritative evidence — an
|
||||
# entry proves a mutation only when it affirmatively records
|
||||
# performed=true and was not gated. Read-only diagnostics and pre-API
|
||||
# rejections (entries without a performed flag) are not mutations.
|
||||
performed = any(
|
||||
e.get("performed") is True and not e.get("gated_rejected")
|
||||
for e in _iter_action_entries(action_log)
|
||||
e.get("performed") is not False and not e.get("gated_rejected")
|
||||
for e in (action_log or [])
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not (mutations_observed or performed):
|
||||
return []
|
||||
@@ -599,7 +536,7 @@ def _rule_reviewer_git_fetch_readonly(
|
||||
text = report_text or ""
|
||||
fetch_observed = any(
|
||||
_GIT_FETCH_RE.search(str(e.get("command") or e.get("action") or ""))
|
||||
for e in _iter_action_entries(action_log)
|
||||
for e in (action_log or [])
|
||||
) or _GIT_FETCH_RE.search(text)
|
||||
if not fetch_observed:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
@@ -1040,7 +977,7 @@ def _rule_reviewer_target_branch_freshness(
|
||||
fields = _handoff_fields(text)
|
||||
fetch_reported = bool(_GIT_FETCH_RE.search(text)) or any(
|
||||
_GIT_FETCH_RE.search(str(e.get("command") or e.get("action") or ""))
|
||||
for e in _iter_action_entries(action_log)
|
||||
for e in (action_log or [])
|
||||
)
|
||||
target_sha_reported = bool(_TARGET_BRANCH_SHA_RE.search(text)) or any(
|
||||
"target branch" in key and "sha" in key and _FULL_SHA_RE.search(value)
|
||||
@@ -1798,12 +1735,6 @@ def assess_final_report_validator(
|
||||
checks: dict[str, Any] = {}
|
||||
findings: list[dict[str, str]] = []
|
||||
|
||||
# #698: malformed action_log data must never crash validation with a
|
||||
# secondary exception; malformed entries surface as sanitized findings.
|
||||
sanitized_action_log, action_log_findings = sanitize_action_log(action_log)
|
||||
action_log = sanitized_action_log
|
||||
findings.extend(action_log_findings)
|
||||
|
||||
if normalized_kind == "issue_filing" and issue_filing_lock is not None:
|
||||
checks["issue_filing"] = assess_issue_filing_final_report(
|
||||
report_text,
|
||||
@@ -1832,23 +1763,7 @@ def assess_final_report_validator(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for rule in _RULES_BY_TASK.get(normalized_kind, ()):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
findings.extend(
|
||||
_call_rule(rule, report_text, normalized_kind, rule_kwargs)
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # #698: fail closed with a sanitized error
|
||||
findings.append(
|
||||
validator_finding(
|
||||
"shared.validator_rule_error",
|
||||
"block",
|
||||
"Validator",
|
||||
f"validator rule '{getattr(rule, '__name__', 'unknown')}' "
|
||||
f"failed with {type(exc).__name__} (details withheld; "
|
||||
"sanitized)",
|
||||
"file a validator defect with the rule name; do not "
|
||||
"bypass final-report validation",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
findings.extend(_call_rule(rule, report_text, normalized_kind, rule_kwargs))
|
||||
|
||||
grade, blocked, downgraded = _aggregate_grade(findings)
|
||||
reasons = [f"{f['rule_id']}: {f['reason']}" for f in findings]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@
|
||||
"execution_profile": "example-author",
|
||||
"audit_label": "example-author",
|
||||
"auth": { "type": "keychain", "id": "example-gitea-author-token" },
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["read", "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr", "comment", "issue.comment"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": ["approve", "request_changes", "merge"]
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
+24
-257
@@ -20,15 +20,14 @@ from dotenv import dotenv_values, load_dotenv
|
||||
|
||||
import gitea_config
|
||||
|
||||
PROJECT_ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
|
||||
|
||||
# Load standard .env if present
|
||||
load_dotenv(os.path.join(PROJECT_ROOT, ".env"))
|
||||
load_dotenv()
|
||||
|
||||
# Dictionary to store configurations parsed dynamically from .env.* files
|
||||
DYNAMIC_CONFIGS = {}
|
||||
|
||||
# Scan all files starting with .env in the project root to load multiple configurations
|
||||
PROJECT_ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
|
||||
for env_path in glob.glob(os.path.join(PROJECT_ROOT, ".env*")):
|
||||
# Skip directories and the example template
|
||||
if os.path.basename(env_path) == ".env.example":
|
||||
@@ -182,51 +181,11 @@ def get_auth_header(host):
|
||||
|
||||
def resolve_remote(args):
|
||||
"""Given parsed argparse args with --remote/--host/--org/--repo,
|
||||
return (host, org, repo) with overrides applied.
|
||||
|
||||
#714 / #530: when the caller omits org and/or repo, prefer the
|
||||
workspace-aligned git remote over REMOTES defaults (e.g. bare
|
||||
``--remote prgs`` must not force Timesheet when the checkout is
|
||||
Gitea-Tools). Explicit --org/--repo always win.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return (host, org, repo) with overrides applied."""
|
||||
profile = REMOTES[args.remote]
|
||||
host = args.host or profile["host"]
|
||||
org_explicit = getattr(args, "org", None) is not None
|
||||
repo_explicit = getattr(args, "repo", None) is not None
|
||||
org = args.org if org_explicit else profile["org"]
|
||||
repo = args.repo if repo_explicit else profile["repo"]
|
||||
if not org_explicit or not repo_explicit:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import remote_repo_guard
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
# Prefer the named remote URL when present; fall back to origin.
|
||||
url = None
|
||||
for remote_name in (args.remote, "origin"):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
proc = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "remote", "get-url", remote_name],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
timeout=5,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if proc.returncode == 0 and (proc.stdout or "").strip():
|
||||
url = proc.stdout.strip()
|
||||
break
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
# Allow tests to inject a deterministic remote URL without Git.
|
||||
env_url = os.environ.get("GITEA_TEST_WORKSPACE_REMOTE_URL")
|
||||
if env_url:
|
||||
url = env_url
|
||||
parsed = remote_repo_guard.parse_org_repo_from_remote_url(url)
|
||||
if parsed:
|
||||
if not org_explicit:
|
||||
org = parsed[0]
|
||||
if not repo_explicit:
|
||||
repo = parsed[1]
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
org = args.org or profile["org"]
|
||||
repo = args.repo or profile["repo"]
|
||||
return host, org, repo
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -283,192 +242,6 @@ def _redact(text):
|
||||
return str(text)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Classified client failures (#699) ─────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Subclasses of RuntimeError preserve existing ``except RuntimeError`` call
|
||||
# sites. Exception *messages* are fixed constants only — HTTP response bodies,
|
||||
# Keychain material, and arbitrary exception text are never stored on the
|
||||
# exception or re-emitted to tool results / daemon logs.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Fixed messages (must match mcp_tool_error_boundary.FIXED_MESSAGES keys used here).
|
||||
_MSG_AUTH_INVALID = "Gitea authentication failed: invalid or revoked credentials"
|
||||
_MSG_AUTH_FAILED = "Gitea authentication failed"
|
||||
_MSG_AUTHZ_SCOPE = "Gitea authorization failed: insufficient token scope"
|
||||
_MSG_AUTHZ_DENIED = "Gitea authorization failed: access denied"
|
||||
_MSG_NETWORK = "Network error contacting Gitea"
|
||||
_MSG_CONFIG = "Gitea configuration or credential resolution failed"
|
||||
_MSG_UPSTREAM = "Gitea upstream unavailable"
|
||||
_MSG_HTTP = "Gitea HTTP request failed"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GiteaClientError(RuntimeError):
|
||||
"""Base for known Gitea client failures with stable reason_code metadata."""
|
||||
|
||||
reason_code = "client_error"
|
||||
error_class = "client"
|
||||
http_status = None
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
|
||||
if reason_code is not None:
|
||||
self.reason_code = reason_code
|
||||
if http_status is not None:
|
||||
self.http_status = http_status
|
||||
# Message is always a fixed constant; callers cannot inject bodies.
|
||||
fixed = message if message is not None else _MSG_HTTP
|
||||
super().__init__(fixed)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GiteaAuthError(GiteaClientError):
|
||||
"""Authentication failure (invalid/revoked credentials → typically HTTP 401)."""
|
||||
|
||||
reason_code = "auth_invalid_token"
|
||||
error_class = "authentication"
|
||||
http_status = 401
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
|
||||
super().__init__(
|
||||
message if message is not None else _MSG_AUTH_INVALID,
|
||||
reason_code=reason_code or "auth_invalid_token",
|
||||
http_status=http_status if http_status is not None else 401,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GiteaAuthzError(GiteaClientError):
|
||||
"""Authorization failure (HTTP 403 — scope deficiency or access denied)."""
|
||||
|
||||
reason_code = "authz_denied"
|
||||
error_class = "authorization"
|
||||
http_status = 403
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
|
||||
code = reason_code or "authz_denied"
|
||||
if code == "authz_insufficient_scope":
|
||||
fixed = _MSG_AUTHZ_SCOPE
|
||||
else:
|
||||
fixed = _MSG_AUTHZ_DENIED
|
||||
code = "authz_denied"
|
||||
super().__init__(
|
||||
message if message is not None else fixed,
|
||||
reason_code=code,
|
||||
http_status=http_status if http_status is not None else 403,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GiteaNetworkError(GiteaClientError):
|
||||
"""Transport / DNS / timeout failure contacting Gitea."""
|
||||
|
||||
reason_code = "network_error"
|
||||
error_class = "network"
|
||||
http_status = None
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
|
||||
super().__init__(
|
||||
message if message is not None else _MSG_NETWORK,
|
||||
reason_code=reason_code or "network_error",
|
||||
http_status=http_status,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GiteaConfigError(GiteaClientError):
|
||||
"""Local configuration / credential resolution failure (not HTTP auth)."""
|
||||
|
||||
reason_code = "config_error"
|
||||
error_class = "configuration"
|
||||
http_status = None
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
|
||||
super().__init__(
|
||||
message if message is not None else _MSG_CONFIG,
|
||||
reason_code=reason_code or "config_error",
|
||||
http_status=http_status,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GiteaHttpError(GiteaClientError):
|
||||
"""Non-auth HTTP failure with fixed message (no response body)."""
|
||||
|
||||
reason_code = "http_error"
|
||||
error_class = "client"
|
||||
http_status = None
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
|
||||
code = reason_code or "http_error"
|
||||
if code == "upstream_unavailable":
|
||||
fixed = _MSG_UPSTREAM
|
||||
else:
|
||||
fixed = _MSG_HTTP
|
||||
code = "http_error"
|
||||
super().__init__(
|
||||
message if message is not None else fixed,
|
||||
reason_code=code,
|
||||
http_status=http_status,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _looks_like_insufficient_scope(detail: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Internal: inspect redacted body *only* to refine 403 reason_code.
|
||||
|
||||
The body is never stored on the exception or returned to callers.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
lower = (detail or "").lower()
|
||||
markers = (
|
||||
"insufficient scope",
|
||||
"required scope",
|
||||
"does not have at least one of required scope",
|
||||
"token does not have",
|
||||
"missing scope",
|
||||
"scope(s)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
return any(m in lower for m in markers)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_http_status(code: int, *, body_hint: str = "") -> tuple[type, str, int]:
|
||||
"""Central HTTP status → (exception_class, reason_code, http_status).
|
||||
|
||||
Every HTTP 403 becomes authorization-class. Body text is used only as a
|
||||
local hint for scope vs denied reason_code and is never returned.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if code == 401:
|
||||
return (GiteaAuthError, "auth_invalid_token", 401)
|
||||
if code == 403:
|
||||
if _looks_like_insufficient_scope(body_hint or ""):
|
||||
return (GiteaAuthzError, "authz_insufficient_scope", 403)
|
||||
return (GiteaAuthzError, "authz_denied", 403)
|
||||
if code in (502, 503, 504):
|
||||
return (GiteaHttpError, "upstream_unavailable", code)
|
||||
return (GiteaHttpError, "http_error", code)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def raise_for_http_status(code: int, body: str = "") -> None:
|
||||
"""Raise a typed client error for *code* without embedding *body*.
|
||||
|
||||
*body* may be inspected only to choose scope vs denied for 403; it is
|
||||
never placed on the exception message.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# Redact before any inspection; discard after classification.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
hint = _redact(body or "").strip()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
hint = ""
|
||||
exc_cls, reason, status = classify_http_status(code, body_hint=hint)
|
||||
# Explicitly construct without passing body/hint into message.
|
||||
if exc_cls is GiteaAuthError:
|
||||
raise GiteaAuthError(reason_code=reason, http_status=status)
|
||||
if exc_cls is GiteaAuthzError:
|
||||
raise GiteaAuthzError(reason_code=reason, http_status=status)
|
||||
if reason == "upstream_unavailable":
|
||||
raise GiteaHttpError(
|
||||
reason_code="upstream_unavailable",
|
||||
http_status=status,
|
||||
)
|
||||
raise GiteaHttpError(reason_code="http_error", http_status=status)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _raise_http_error(code: int, detail: str = "") -> None:
|
||||
"""Backward-compatible alias — *detail* is never embedded in the error."""
|
||||
raise_for_http_status(code, detail)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _add_query(url, **params):
|
||||
"""Return *url* with the given query parameters added or overridden.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -541,24 +314,23 @@ def api_request(method, url, auth_header, payload=None, *,
|
||||
"""Make an authenticated JSON request to the Gitea API.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns parsed JSON on success (or ``None`` for an empty body), and raises
|
||||
a classified client error on failure.
|
||||
``RuntimeError`` on failure.
|
||||
|
||||
On HTTP 429 the request is retried up to *max_retries* times: honoring a
|
||||
valid ``Retry-After`` header (seconds or HTTP-date) when present, otherwise
|
||||
using capped jittered exponential backoff. Successful responses are
|
||||
unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
Failures raise typed exceptions with **fixed messages only** (#699). HTTP
|
||||
response bodies are read solely for local 403 reason refinement and are
|
||||
never stored on exceptions or returned to callers:
|
||||
All failures are converted to a ``RuntimeError`` with a clear, secret
|
||||
-redacted message (no raw stack traces or credential material):
|
||||
|
||||
- HTTP 401 → :class:`GiteaAuthError` (``auth_invalid_token``)
|
||||
- HTTP 403 → :class:`GiteaAuthzError` (scope or denied)
|
||||
- 502/503/504 → :class:`GiteaHttpError` (``upstream_unavailable``)
|
||||
- Other non-429 HTTP → :class:`GiteaHttpError` (``http_error``)
|
||||
- Timeouts / DNS / ``URLError`` → :class:`GiteaNetworkError`
|
||||
- Malformed success JSON → plain ``RuntimeError`` (programming/protocol;
|
||||
not reclassified as authentication)
|
||||
- Non-429 HTTP errors surface the status code and a redacted response body.
|
||||
502/503/504 upstream errors get an explicit "Gitea upstream unavailable"
|
||||
message.
|
||||
- Timeouts and network/DNS failures (``URLError`` / ``TimeoutError``) surface
|
||||
a generic "network error contacting Gitea" message.
|
||||
- A malformed (non-JSON) success body surfaces a "malformed JSON response"
|
||||
message rather than a raw decode error.
|
||||
|
||||
The ``*_func`` parameters and ``timeout`` are injection points for
|
||||
deterministic testing.
|
||||
@@ -596,23 +368,22 @@ def api_request(method, url, auth_header, payload=None, *,
|
||||
error_body = e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
error_body = ""
|
||||
# Classify from status (+ local body hint). Body is not embedded.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
raise_for_http_status(e.code, error_body)
|
||||
except GiteaClientError:
|
||||
raise
|
||||
# Defensive: raise_for_http_status always raises.
|
||||
raise GiteaHttpError(http_status=e.code) from e # pragma: no cover
|
||||
detail = _redact(error_body).strip()
|
||||
if e.code in (502, 503, 504):
|
||||
msg = f"HTTP {e.code}: Gitea upstream unavailable"
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(f"{msg}: {detail}" if detail else msg) from e
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {e.code}: {detail}") from e
|
||||
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as e:
|
||||
# Fixed message only — do not embed URLError reason (may leak paths).
|
||||
raise GiteaNetworkError(reason_code="network_error") from e
|
||||
reason = getattr(e, "reason", e)
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(
|
||||
f"network error contacting Gitea: {_redact(reason)}"
|
||||
) from e
|
||||
|
||||
if not body:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return json.loads(body)
|
||||
except ValueError as e:
|
||||
# Programming/protocol failure — not authentication.
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("malformed JSON response from Gitea") from e
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -798,10 +569,6 @@ def get_profile():
|
||||
"profile_name": name,
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ops,
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": forbidden,
|
||||
# #714 repository authorization boundary. Config-only on purpose: an
|
||||
# environment variable must never widen or forge the set of
|
||||
# repositories a session may bind to.
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": _json_list("allowed_repositories"),
|
||||
"audit_label": audit_label,
|
||||
"token_source_name": token_source,
|
||||
"auth_source_type": auth_type,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -475,33 +475,6 @@ def _require_enabled(kind, name, obj):
|
||||
return enabled
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_REPO_SCOPE_RE = re.compile(r"^[^/\s]+/[^/\s]+$")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_allowed_repositories(name, raw):
|
||||
"""Validate the optional per-profile repository authorization scope (#714).
|
||||
|
||||
``allowed_repositories`` is an authorization boundary of canonical
|
||||
``owner/repository`` slugs. It is not the session binding: the verified
|
||||
workspace repository selects exactly one entry at bind time. Absent means
|
||||
"no repository scope configured" and is allowed, so existing profiles keep
|
||||
working until an operator provisions the field.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if raw is None:
|
||||
return
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, list):
|
||||
raise ConfigError(
|
||||
f"profile '{name}' allowed_repositories must be a list of "
|
||||
"'owner/repository' strings"
|
||||
)
|
||||
for entry in raw:
|
||||
if not isinstance(entry, str) or not _REPO_SCOPE_RE.match(entry.strip()):
|
||||
raise ConfigError(
|
||||
f"profile '{name}' allowed_repositories entry {entry!r} is not "
|
||||
"a canonical 'owner/repository' slug"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _reject_inline_secrets(kind, name, obj):
|
||||
for key in _INLINE_SECRET_KEYS:
|
||||
if key in obj:
|
||||
@@ -576,7 +549,6 @@ def _load_v2_contexts(data, path):
|
||||
forbidden = raw.get("forbidden_operations") or []
|
||||
if not isinstance(allowed, list) or not isinstance(forbidden, list):
|
||||
raise ConfigError(f"profile '{name}' operation fields must be lists")
|
||||
_validate_allowed_repositories(name, raw.get("allowed_repositories"))
|
||||
allowed_n = {_normalize_op("gitea", op, name) for op in allowed}
|
||||
forbidden_n = {_normalize_op("gitea", op, name) for op in forbidden}
|
||||
# Reviewer-identity deadlock rule (#100/#103) applies here unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
+503
-7335
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -1,788 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Observability incident bridge (#612).
|
||||
|
||||
Converts Sentry/GlitchTip **observations** into durable **Gitea issues** and
|
||||
``incident_links`` rows on the #613 control-plane DB.
|
||||
|
||||
Hard rules (ADR):
|
||||
* Gitea owns work; providers own incidents; the bridge only links them.
|
||||
* Raw monitoring incidents are **never** assignable ``work_items``.
|
||||
* The #600 allocator sees bridge work only as normal Gitea issues.
|
||||
* Phase-1 prefers dry-run / explicit reconcile; apply creates/links issues.
|
||||
* No tokens, DSNs, cookies, or other secrets in bodies, DB, or logs.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
||||
from typing import Any, Callable, Sequence
|
||||
|
||||
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, ControlPlaneError, WORK_KINDS, _norm_scope
|
||||
|
||||
PROVIDERS = frozenset({"sentry", "glitchtip"})
|
||||
|
||||
OUTCOME_PREVIEW = "preview"
|
||||
OUTCOME_LINKED = "linked_existing"
|
||||
OUTCOME_CREATED = "created_issue"
|
||||
OUTCOME_UPDATED = "updated_link"
|
||||
OUTCOME_BLOCKED = "blocked"
|
||||
OUTCOME_NO_ACTION = "no_safe_action"
|
||||
|
||||
# Patterns scrubbed from any bridge-facing text (bodies, titles, tags, logs).
|
||||
_SECRET_PATTERNS: tuple[re.Pattern[str], ...] = (
|
||||
re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?i)\b(api[_-]?token|token|secret|password|passwd)\s*[:=]\s*\S+"
|
||||
),
|
||||
re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?i)\bAuthorization\s*[:=]\s*(?:Bearer\s+)?[A-Za-z0-9._\-+=/]{8,}"
|
||||
),
|
||||
re.compile(r"(?i)\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-]{8,}"),
|
||||
re.compile(r"(?i)\bBasic\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{8,}"),
|
||||
re.compile(r"(?i)\b(dsn|sentry_dsn|glitchtip_dsn)\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
|
||||
re.compile(r"https?://[^/\s]+:[^@/\s]+@"), # user:pass@host
|
||||
re.compile(r"(?i)\b(keychain[_-]?id|private[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
|
||||
re.compile(r"(?i)cookie\s*[:=]\s*[^\s;]+"),
|
||||
re.compile(r"(?i)\bsession[_-]?id\s*[:=]\s*\S+"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
_SENSITIVE_TAG_KEYS = frozenset(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"authorization",
|
||||
"cookie",
|
||||
"set-cookie",
|
||||
"password",
|
||||
"passwd",
|
||||
"secret",
|
||||
"token",
|
||||
"api_key",
|
||||
"apikey",
|
||||
"dsn",
|
||||
"sentry_dsn",
|
||||
"access_token",
|
||||
"refresh_token",
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
DEFAULT_LABELS = (
|
||||
"type:bug",
|
||||
"observability",
|
||||
"status:ready",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||
class ProjectMapping:
|
||||
"""Maps a monitoring project to a Gitea repository."""
|
||||
|
||||
name: str
|
||||
provider: str
|
||||
monitor_base_url: str
|
||||
monitor_org: str
|
||||
monitor_project: str
|
||||
gitea_org: str
|
||||
gitea_repo: str
|
||||
default_labels: tuple[str, ...] = DEFAULT_LABELS
|
||||
environment_filters: tuple[str, ...] = ()
|
||||
severity_threshold: str | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
|
||||
prov = (self.provider or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if prov not in PROVIDERS:
|
||||
raise ControlPlaneError(
|
||||
f"unknown provider '{self.provider}'; expected one of {sorted(PROVIDERS)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
object.__setattr__(self, "provider", prov)
|
||||
object.__setattr__(self, "monitor_base_url", (self.monitor_base_url or "").rstrip("/"))
|
||||
object.__setattr__(self, "monitor_org", (self.monitor_org or "").strip())
|
||||
object.__setattr__(self, "monitor_project", (self.monitor_project or "").strip())
|
||||
object.__setattr__(self, "gitea_org", (self.gitea_org or "").strip())
|
||||
object.__setattr__(self, "gitea_repo", (self.gitea_repo or "").strip())
|
||||
object.__setattr__(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
"default_labels",
|
||||
tuple(str(x).strip() for x in (self.default_labels or DEFAULT_LABELS) if str(x).strip()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"name": self.name,
|
||||
"provider": self.provider,
|
||||
"monitor_base_url": self.monitor_base_url,
|
||||
"monitor_org": self.monitor_org,
|
||||
"monitor_project": self.monitor_project,
|
||||
"gitea_org": self.gitea_org,
|
||||
"gitea_repo": self.gitea_repo,
|
||||
"default_labels": list(self.default_labels),
|
||||
"environment_filters": list(self.environment_filters),
|
||||
"severity_threshold": self.severity_threshold,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
def matches_observation(self, obs: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
|
||||
if (obs.get("provider") or "").strip().lower() != self.provider:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
base = (obs.get("provider_base_url") or obs.get("monitor_base_url") or "").rstrip("/")
|
||||
if base and self.monitor_base_url and base != self.monitor_base_url:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
org = (obs.get("provider_org") or obs.get("monitor_org") or "").strip()
|
||||
if org and self.monitor_org and org != self.monitor_org:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
project = (obs.get("provider_project") or obs.get("monitor_project") or "").strip()
|
||||
if project and self.monitor_project and project != self.monitor_project:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class NormalizedIncident:
|
||||
provider: str
|
||||
provider_base_url: str
|
||||
provider_org: str
|
||||
provider_project: str
|
||||
provider_issue_id: str
|
||||
provider_short_id: str | None = None
|
||||
provider_permalink: str | None = None
|
||||
fingerprint: str | None = None
|
||||
first_seen: str | None = None
|
||||
last_seen: str | None = None
|
||||
event_count: int | None = None
|
||||
status: str = "open"
|
||||
environment: str | None = None
|
||||
severity: str | None = None
|
||||
culprit: str | None = None
|
||||
title: str = ""
|
||||
summary: str = ""
|
||||
tags: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
|
||||
gitea_org: str = ""
|
||||
gitea_repo: str = ""
|
||||
default_labels: tuple[str, ...] = DEFAULT_LABELS
|
||||
|
||||
def provider_key(self) -> tuple[str, str, str, str, str]:
|
||||
return (
|
||||
self.provider,
|
||||
_norm_scope(self.provider_base_url),
|
||||
_norm_scope(self.provider_org),
|
||||
_norm_scope(self.provider_project),
|
||||
str(self.provider_issue_id),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"provider": self.provider,
|
||||
"provider_base_url": self.provider_base_url,
|
||||
"provider_org": self.provider_org,
|
||||
"provider_project": self.provider_project,
|
||||
"provider_issue_id": self.provider_issue_id,
|
||||
"provider_short_id": self.provider_short_id,
|
||||
"provider_permalink": self.provider_permalink,
|
||||
"fingerprint": self.fingerprint,
|
||||
"first_seen": self.first_seen,
|
||||
"last_seen": self.last_seen,
|
||||
"event_count": self.event_count,
|
||||
"status": self.status,
|
||||
"environment": self.environment,
|
||||
"severity": self.severity,
|
||||
"culprit": self.culprit,
|
||||
"title": self.title,
|
||||
"summary": self.summary,
|
||||
"tags": dict(self.tags),
|
||||
"gitea_org": self.gitea_org,
|
||||
"gitea_repo": self.gitea_repo,
|
||||
"default_labels": list(self.default_labels),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def redact_text(value: Any) -> str:
|
||||
"""Redact secret-like material from a string (fail closed to empty)."""
|
||||
if value is None:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
text = str(value)
|
||||
for pat in _SECRET_PATTERNS:
|
||||
text = pat.sub("[REDACTED]", text)
|
||||
return text
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sanitize_tags(tags: Any) -> dict[str, str]:
|
||||
if not isinstance(tags, dict):
|
||||
return {}
|
||||
out: dict[str, str] = {}
|
||||
for k, v in tags.items():
|
||||
key = str(k).strip().lower()
|
||||
if not key or key in _SENSITIVE_TAG_KEYS:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if any(s in key for s in ("token", "secret", "password", "cookie", "auth", "dsn")):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
val = redact_text(v)
|
||||
if "[REDACTED]" in val:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if len(val) > 200:
|
||||
val = val[:200] + "…"
|
||||
out[key] = val
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def project_mapping_from_dict(data: dict[str, Any]) -> ProjectMapping:
|
||||
labels = data.get("default_labels") or DEFAULT_LABELS
|
||||
envs = data.get("environment_filters") or ()
|
||||
return ProjectMapping(
|
||||
name=str(data.get("name") or data.get("monitor_project") or "unnamed"),
|
||||
provider=str(data.get("provider") or ""),
|
||||
monitor_base_url=str(data.get("monitor_base_url") or data.get("provider_base_url") or ""),
|
||||
monitor_org=str(data.get("monitor_org") or data.get("provider_org") or ""),
|
||||
monitor_project=str(data.get("monitor_project") or data.get("provider_project") or ""),
|
||||
gitea_org=str(data.get("gitea_org") or ""),
|
||||
gitea_repo=str(data.get("gitea_repo") or ""),
|
||||
default_labels=tuple(labels),
|
||||
environment_filters=tuple(envs),
|
||||
severity_threshold=data.get("severity_threshold"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def load_project_mappings(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
config_path: str | None = None,
|
||||
mappings_json: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> list[ProjectMapping]:
|
||||
"""Load project mappings from JSON env, file, or explicit JSON string.
|
||||
|
||||
Env: ``GITEA_OBSERVABILITY_PROJECTS_JSON`` or path
|
||||
``GITEA_OBSERVABILITY_PROJECTS_FILE``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
raw: Any = None
|
||||
if mappings_json:
|
||||
raw = json.loads(mappings_json)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
env_json = (os.environ.get("GITEA_OBSERVABILITY_PROJECTS_JSON") or "").strip()
|
||||
path = (
|
||||
(config_path or "").strip()
|
||||
or (os.environ.get("GITEA_OBSERVABILITY_PROJECTS_FILE") or "").strip()
|
||||
)
|
||||
if env_json:
|
||||
raw = json.loads(env_json)
|
||||
elif path and os.path.isfile(path):
|
||||
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
raw = json.load(fh)
|
||||
if raw is None:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
if isinstance(raw, dict) and "projects" in raw:
|
||||
raw = raw["projects"]
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, list):
|
||||
raise ControlPlaneError("observability project mappings must be a list")
|
||||
return [project_mapping_from_dict(item) for item in raw if isinstance(item, dict)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def resolve_mapping(
|
||||
observation: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
mappings: Sequence[ProjectMapping],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
explicit: ProjectMapping | None = None,
|
||||
) -> ProjectMapping | None:
|
||||
if explicit is not None:
|
||||
return explicit
|
||||
matches = [m for m in mappings if m.matches_observation(observation)]
|
||||
if len(matches) == 1:
|
||||
return matches[0]
|
||||
if len(matches) > 1:
|
||||
raise ControlPlaneError(
|
||||
"ambiguous project mapping for observation: "
|
||||
+ ", ".join(m.name for m in matches)
|
||||
+ " (fail closed, #612)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Fallback: observation itself may carry gitea targets
|
||||
g_org = (observation.get("gitea_org") or "").strip()
|
||||
g_repo = (observation.get("gitea_repo") or "").strip()
|
||||
provider = (observation.get("provider") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if g_org and g_repo and provider in PROVIDERS:
|
||||
return ProjectMapping(
|
||||
name=f"inline-{provider}",
|
||||
provider=provider,
|
||||
monitor_base_url=str(
|
||||
observation.get("provider_base_url")
|
||||
or observation.get("monitor_base_url")
|
||||
or ""
|
||||
),
|
||||
monitor_org=str(
|
||||
observation.get("provider_org") or observation.get("monitor_org") or ""
|
||||
),
|
||||
monitor_project=str(
|
||||
observation.get("provider_project")
|
||||
or observation.get("monitor_project")
|
||||
or ""
|
||||
),
|
||||
gitea_org=g_org,
|
||||
gitea_repo=g_repo,
|
||||
default_labels=tuple(observation.get("default_labels") or DEFAULT_LABELS),
|
||||
)
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def normalize_incident(
|
||||
observation: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
mapping: ProjectMapping,
|
||||
) -> NormalizedIncident:
|
||||
"""Normalize + sanitize a raw provider observation (fail closed)."""
|
||||
if not isinstance(observation, dict):
|
||||
raise ControlPlaneError("observation must be a dict (fail closed, #612)")
|
||||
|
||||
provider = (observation.get("provider") or mapping.provider or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if provider not in PROVIDERS:
|
||||
raise ControlPlaneError(
|
||||
f"unknown provider '{provider}'; expected {sorted(PROVIDERS)} (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if provider != mapping.provider:
|
||||
raise ControlPlaneError(
|
||||
f"observation provider '{provider}' does not match mapping "
|
||||
f"'{mapping.provider}' (fail closed, #612)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
issue_id = observation.get("provider_issue_id") or observation.get("id")
|
||||
if issue_id is None or str(issue_id).strip() == "":
|
||||
raise ControlPlaneError(
|
||||
"observation missing provider_issue_id (fail closed, #612)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
base = (
|
||||
observation.get("provider_base_url")
|
||||
or observation.get("monitor_base_url")
|
||||
or mapping.monitor_base_url
|
||||
or ""
|
||||
)
|
||||
org = (
|
||||
observation.get("provider_org")
|
||||
or observation.get("monitor_org")
|
||||
or mapping.monitor_org
|
||||
or ""
|
||||
)
|
||||
project = (
|
||||
observation.get("provider_project")
|
||||
or observation.get("monitor_project")
|
||||
or mapping.monitor_project
|
||||
or ""
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
title = redact_text(
|
||||
observation.get("title")
|
||||
or observation.get("culprit")
|
||||
or f"{provider} incident {issue_id}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
meta = observation.get("metadata")
|
||||
meta_value = meta.get("value") if isinstance(meta, dict) else None
|
||||
raw_sum = (
|
||||
observation.get("summary")
|
||||
or observation.get("message")
|
||||
or meta_value
|
||||
or title
|
||||
)
|
||||
summary = redact_text(raw_sum)
|
||||
|
||||
permalink = observation.get("provider_permalink") or observation.get("permalink")
|
||||
if permalink:
|
||||
permalink = redact_text(permalink)
|
||||
if "[REDACTED]" in permalink:
|
||||
permalink = None
|
||||
|
||||
tags = sanitize_tags(observation.get("tags") or {})
|
||||
event_count = observation.get("event_count") or observation.get("count")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
event_count_i = int(event_count) if event_count is not None else None
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
event_count_i = None
|
||||
|
||||
return NormalizedIncident(
|
||||
provider=provider,
|
||||
provider_base_url=str(base).rstrip("/"),
|
||||
provider_org=str(org).strip(),
|
||||
provider_project=str(project).strip(),
|
||||
provider_issue_id=str(issue_id).strip(),
|
||||
provider_short_id=redact_text(observation.get("provider_short_id") or observation.get("shortId") or "")
|
||||
or None,
|
||||
provider_permalink=permalink,
|
||||
fingerprint=redact_text(observation.get("fingerprint") or "") or None,
|
||||
first_seen=str(observation.get("first_seen") or observation.get("firstSeen") or "")
|
||||
or None,
|
||||
last_seen=str(observation.get("last_seen") or observation.get("lastSeen") or "")
|
||||
or None,
|
||||
event_count=event_count_i,
|
||||
status=str(observation.get("status") or "open").strip().lower() or "open",
|
||||
environment=redact_text(observation.get("environment") or "") or None,
|
||||
severity=redact_text(observation.get("severity") or observation.get("level") or "")
|
||||
or None,
|
||||
culprit=redact_text(observation.get("culprit") or "") or None,
|
||||
title=title[:200],
|
||||
summary=summary[:2000],
|
||||
tags=tags,
|
||||
gitea_org=mapping.gitea_org,
|
||||
gitea_repo=mapping.gitea_repo,
|
||||
default_labels=mapping.default_labels,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_gitea_issue_title(inc: NormalizedIncident) -> str:
|
||||
env = f" [{inc.environment}]" if inc.environment else ""
|
||||
sev = f" ({inc.severity})" if inc.severity else ""
|
||||
return redact_text(f"[obs:{inc.provider}]{env}{sev} {inc.title}")[:180]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_gitea_issue_body(inc: NormalizedIncident) -> str:
|
||||
"""Sanitized durable issue body (no secrets)."""
|
||||
lines = [
|
||||
"## Observability incident (bridge #612)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"<!-- mcp-incident-bridge:v1 -->",
|
||||
f"<!-- provider={inc.provider} issue_id={inc.provider_issue_id} -->",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"- **provider:** `{inc.provider}`",
|
||||
f"- **provider_issue_id:** `{inc.provider_issue_id}`",
|
||||
]
|
||||
if inc.provider_short_id:
|
||||
lines.append(f"- **provider_short_id:** `{inc.provider_short_id}`")
|
||||
if inc.provider_permalink:
|
||||
lines.append(f"- **provider_url:** {inc.provider_permalink}")
|
||||
lines.extend(
|
||||
[
|
||||
f"- **provider_org/project:** `{inc.provider_org}` / `{inc.provider_project}`",
|
||||
f"- **base_url:** `{inc.provider_base_url}`",
|
||||
f"- **fingerprint:** `{inc.fingerprint or ''}`",
|
||||
f"- **first_seen:** `{inc.first_seen or ''}`",
|
||||
f"- **last_seen:** `{inc.last_seen or ''}`",
|
||||
f"- **event_count:** `{inc.event_count if inc.event_count is not None else ''}`",
|
||||
f"- **environment:** `{inc.environment or ''}`",
|
||||
f"- **severity:** `{inc.severity or ''}`",
|
||||
f"- **culprit:** `{inc.culprit or ''}`",
|
||||
f"- **status:** `{inc.status}`",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"### Summary",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
redact_text(inc.summary) or "(no summary)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"### Safe tags",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
]
|
||||
)
|
||||
if inc.tags:
|
||||
for k, v in sorted(inc.tags.items()):
|
||||
lines.append(f"- `{k}`: `{v}`")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
lines.append("- (none)")
|
||||
lines.extend(
|
||||
[
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"### Canonical next action",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"Author: investigate and fix under normal Gitea workflow. "
|
||||
"Allocator may select this issue as ordinary Gitea work "
|
||||
"(never as a raw provider incident).",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"### Bridge notes",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"- Raw Sentry/GlitchTip incidents are **not** assignable work items.",
|
||||
"- Gitea remains the durable work record; DB stores `incident_links` only.",
|
||||
"- Provider tokens must never appear in this issue.",
|
||||
]
|
||||
)
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _link_conflict(existing: dict[str, Any], inc: NormalizedIncident) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Fail closed if existing link targets a different Gitea issue/repo."""
|
||||
eg_org = str(existing.get("gitea_org") or "")
|
||||
eg_repo = str(existing.get("gitea_repo") or "")
|
||||
eg_num = existing.get("gitea_issue_number")
|
||||
if eg_org and eg_org != inc.gitea_org:
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"existing link points to org '{eg_org}', mapping wants "
|
||||
f"'{inc.gitea_org}' (fail closed, #612)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if eg_repo and eg_repo != inc.gitea_repo:
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"existing link points to repo '{eg_repo}', mapping wants "
|
||||
f"'{inc.gitea_repo}' (fail closed, #612)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
# fingerprint conflict when both present and disagree
|
||||
ef = (existing.get("fingerprint") or "").strip()
|
||||
nf = (inc.fingerprint or "").strip()
|
||||
if ef and nf and ef != nf:
|
||||
# Same provider issue id with different fingerprints is ambiguous.
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"fingerprint conflict for provider issue {inc.provider_issue_id}: "
|
||||
f"link has '{ef}', observation has '{nf}' (fail closed, #612)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
CreateIssueFn = Callable[[str, str, list[str], str, str], dict[str, Any]]
|
||||
# create_issue_fn(title, body, labels, gitea_org, gitea_repo) -> {"number": int, ...}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def reconcile_incident(
|
||||
db: ControlPlaneDB | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
observation: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
mappings: Sequence[ProjectMapping] | None = None,
|
||||
mapping: ProjectMapping | None = None,
|
||||
apply: bool = False,
|
||||
create_issue_fn: CreateIssueFn | None = None,
|
||||
force_gitea_issue_number: int | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Reconcile one observation into incident_links + optional Gitea issue.
|
||||
|
||||
*apply=False* (default): preview only — no DB mutation, no Gitea mutation.
|
||||
*apply=True*: upsert link; create Gitea issue when none linked (requires
|
||||
``create_issue_fn``) or use ``force_gitea_issue_number`` for explicit link.
|
||||
|
||||
Never creates control-plane ``work_items`` for raw incidents.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
base: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"apply": bool(apply),
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_ACTION,
|
||||
"performed": False,
|
||||
"gitea_mutated": False,
|
||||
"db_mutated": False,
|
||||
"raw_incident_assignable": False,
|
||||
"work_item_kind_would_be": None,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"skipped": None,
|
||||
"incident": None,
|
||||
"existing_link": None,
|
||||
"gitea_issue": None,
|
||||
"action": None,
|
||||
"mapping": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db.incident_links",
|
||||
"durable_work_system": "gitea_issues",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if db is None:
|
||||
base["reasons"] = [
|
||||
"control-plane DB substrate unavailable (fail closed, #613/#612)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
base["outcome"] = OUTCOME_BLOCKED
|
||||
return base
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
maps = list(mappings or [])
|
||||
resolved = resolve_mapping(observation, maps, explicit=mapping)
|
||||
if resolved is None:
|
||||
base["outcome"] = OUTCOME_BLOCKED
|
||||
base["reasons"] = [
|
||||
"no project mapping for observation (fail closed, #612); "
|
||||
"configure GITEA_OBSERVABILITY_PROJECTS_JSON or pass mapping"
|
||||
]
|
||||
return base
|
||||
base["mapping"] = resolved.as_dict()
|
||||
inc = normalize_incident(observation, resolved)
|
||||
base["incident"] = inc.as_dict()
|
||||
except (ControlPlaneError, json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
|
||||
base["outcome"] = OUTCOME_BLOCKED
|
||||
base["reasons"] = [str(exc)]
|
||||
return base
|
||||
|
||||
# Environment filter (optional)
|
||||
if resolved.environment_filters and inc.environment:
|
||||
allowed = {e.lower() for e in resolved.environment_filters}
|
||||
if inc.environment.lower() not in allowed:
|
||||
base["outcome"] = OUTCOME_NO_ACTION
|
||||
base["reasons"] = [
|
||||
f"environment '{inc.environment}' not in filters "
|
||||
f"{sorted(allowed)}; skip (policy)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
base["success"] = True
|
||||
base["action"] = "skip_environment_filter"
|
||||
return base
|
||||
|
||||
existing = db.get_incident_link_by_provider(
|
||||
provider=inc.provider,
|
||||
provider_issue_id=inc.provider_issue_id,
|
||||
provider_base_url=inc.provider_base_url,
|
||||
provider_org=inc.provider_org,
|
||||
provider_project=inc.provider_project,
|
||||
)
|
||||
base["existing_link"] = existing
|
||||
|
||||
if existing:
|
||||
conflict = _link_conflict(existing, inc)
|
||||
if conflict:
|
||||
base["outcome"] = OUTCOME_BLOCKED
|
||||
base["reasons"] = [conflict]
|
||||
return base
|
||||
|
||||
title = build_gitea_issue_title(inc)
|
||||
body = build_gitea_issue_body(inc)
|
||||
labels = list(inc.default_labels)
|
||||
if inc.provider and f"{inc.provider}" not in labels:
|
||||
labels.append(inc.provider)
|
||||
if "observability" not in labels:
|
||||
labels.append("observability")
|
||||
|
||||
preview_issue = {
|
||||
"title": title,
|
||||
"body_preview": body[:500] + ("…" if len(body) > 500 else ""),
|
||||
"labels": labels,
|
||||
"gitea_org": inc.gitea_org,
|
||||
"gitea_repo": inc.gitea_repo,
|
||||
"would_create": existing is None and force_gitea_issue_number is None,
|
||||
"would_reuse_issue": int(existing["gitea_issue_number"])
|
||||
if existing
|
||||
else force_gitea_issue_number,
|
||||
}
|
||||
base["gitea_issue_preview"] = preview_issue
|
||||
|
||||
if not apply:
|
||||
base["success"] = True
|
||||
base["outcome"] = OUTCOME_PREVIEW
|
||||
base["action"] = (
|
||||
"preview_reuse_link" if existing else "preview_create_issue"
|
||||
)
|
||||
base["reasons"] = [
|
||||
"dry-run only (apply=false); no Gitea mutation and no DB write — "
|
||||
"call again with apply=true to create/link"
|
||||
]
|
||||
if existing:
|
||||
base["gitea_issue"] = {
|
||||
"number": existing.get("gitea_issue_number"),
|
||||
"org": existing.get("gitea_org"),
|
||||
"repo": existing.get("gitea_repo"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Prove we never treat this as work_item kind incident
|
||||
base["raw_incident_assignable"] = False
|
||||
base["work_item_kind_would_be"] = "issue" # only after Gitea issue exists
|
||||
return base
|
||||
|
||||
# --- apply path ---
|
||||
issue_number: int | None = None
|
||||
created = False
|
||||
if existing:
|
||||
issue_number = int(existing["gitea_issue_number"])
|
||||
action = "updated_existing_link"
|
||||
outcome = OUTCOME_UPDATED
|
||||
elif force_gitea_issue_number is not None:
|
||||
issue_number = int(force_gitea_issue_number)
|
||||
action = "link_explicit_issue"
|
||||
outcome = OUTCOME_LINKED
|
||||
else:
|
||||
if create_issue_fn is None:
|
||||
base["outcome"] = OUTCOME_BLOCKED
|
||||
base["reasons"] = [
|
||||
"apply=true requires create_issue_fn when no existing link "
|
||||
"(fail closed, #612)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
return base
|
||||
try:
|
||||
created_res = create_issue_fn(
|
||||
title, body, labels, inc.gitea_org, inc.gitea_repo
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
base["outcome"] = OUTCOME_BLOCKED
|
||||
base["reasons"] = [
|
||||
f"Gitea issue creation failed: {redact_text(exc)} (fail closed)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
return base
|
||||
number = created_res.get("number") if isinstance(created_res, dict) else None
|
||||
if number is None:
|
||||
base["outcome"] = OUTCOME_BLOCKED
|
||||
base["reasons"] = [
|
||||
"Gitea issue creation returned no issue number (fail closed, #612)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
base["create_result"] = created_res
|
||||
return base
|
||||
issue_number = int(number)
|
||||
created = True
|
||||
action = "created_gitea_issue"
|
||||
outcome = OUTCOME_CREATED
|
||||
base["gitea_mutated"] = True
|
||||
base["create_result"] = {
|
||||
k: created_res.get(k)
|
||||
for k in ("number", "success", "performed", "reasons")
|
||||
if isinstance(created_res, dict)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assert issue_number is not None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
link = db.upsert_incident_link(
|
||||
provider=inc.provider,
|
||||
provider_issue_id=inc.provider_issue_id,
|
||||
gitea_org=inc.gitea_org,
|
||||
gitea_repo=inc.gitea_repo,
|
||||
gitea_issue_number=issue_number,
|
||||
provider_base_url=inc.provider_base_url,
|
||||
provider_org=inc.provider_org,
|
||||
provider_project=inc.provider_project,
|
||||
provider_short_id=inc.provider_short_id,
|
||||
provider_permalink=inc.provider_permalink,
|
||||
fingerprint=inc.fingerprint,
|
||||
first_seen=inc.first_seen,
|
||||
last_seen=inc.last_seen,
|
||||
event_count=inc.event_count,
|
||||
status=inc.status if not created else "open",
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
base["outcome"] = OUTCOME_BLOCKED
|
||||
base["reasons"] = [
|
||||
f"incident_links upsert failed: {redact_text(exc)} (fail closed, #613)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
base["gitea_issue"] = {
|
||||
"number": issue_number,
|
||||
"org": inc.gitea_org,
|
||||
"repo": inc.gitea_repo,
|
||||
"created": created,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return base
|
||||
|
||||
base["success"] = True
|
||||
base["performed"] = True
|
||||
base["db_mutated"] = True
|
||||
base["outcome"] = outcome
|
||||
base["action"] = action
|
||||
base["gitea_issue"] = {
|
||||
"number": issue_number,
|
||||
"org": inc.gitea_org,
|
||||
"repo": inc.gitea_repo,
|
||||
"created": created,
|
||||
}
|
||||
base["link"] = {
|
||||
k: link.get(k)
|
||||
for k in (
|
||||
"link_id",
|
||||
"provider",
|
||||
"provider_issue_id",
|
||||
"gitea_org",
|
||||
"gitea_repo",
|
||||
"gitea_issue_number",
|
||||
"fingerprint",
|
||||
"event_count",
|
||||
"status",
|
||||
"last_sync_at",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
base["reasons"] = [
|
||||
(
|
||||
f"reused Gitea issue #{issue_number} for provider "
|
||||
f"{inc.provider}:{inc.provider_issue_id}"
|
||||
if not created
|
||||
else f"created Gitea issue #{issue_number} and stored incident_links row"
|
||||
),
|
||||
"raw provider incident is not an assignable work_item "
|
||||
f"(WORK_KINDS={sorted(WORK_KINDS)})",
|
||||
]
|
||||
base["raw_incident_assignable"] = False
|
||||
base["work_item_kind_would_be"] = "issue"
|
||||
base["allocator_visible_as"] = {
|
||||
"kind": "issue",
|
||||
"number": issue_number,
|
||||
"org": inc.gitea_org,
|
||||
"repo": inc.gitea_repo,
|
||||
"note": "allocator selects normal Gitea issues only (#600/#612)",
|
||||
}
|
||||
return base
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assert_not_raw_incident_work_item(kind: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Guard used by tests / callers: incidents must not enter WORK_KINDS."""
|
||||
k = (kind or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if k not in WORK_KINDS:
|
||||
if k in ("sentry_incident", "glitchtip_incident", "incident", "observation"):
|
||||
raise ControlPlaneError(
|
||||
f"kind '{k}' is not assignable; bridge must create Gitea issues first (#612)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
raise ControlPlaneError(f"kind '{k}' is not assignable")
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -375,64 +375,6 @@ def _same_realpath(left: str | None, right: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
return left == right
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_expired_lock_reclaim(
|
||||
existing_lock: dict[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
now: datetime | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Decide whether an expired/stale author issue lock may be reclaimed (#601).
|
||||
|
||||
Required proof (any reclaim of non-live lock):
|
||||
* lease not live (expired or dead pid)
|
||||
* owner process dead OR worktree missing
|
||||
* no force-delete of live foreign ownership
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not existing_lock:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reclaim_allowed": True,
|
||||
"reasons": ["no existing lock"],
|
||||
"freshness": assess_lock_freshness(None, now=now),
|
||||
}
|
||||
freshness = assess_lock_freshness(existing_lock, now=now)
|
||||
if freshness.get("live"):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reclaim_allowed": False,
|
||||
"reasons": ["lock is still live; cannot reclaim (fail closed)"],
|
||||
"freshness": freshness,
|
||||
}
|
||||
pid = existing_lock.get("session_pid")
|
||||
if pid is None:
|
||||
pid = existing_lock.get("pid")
|
||||
dead = not is_process_alive(pid) if pid is not None else True
|
||||
wt = str(existing_lock.get("worktree_path") or "")
|
||||
missing_wt = (not wt) or (not os.path.isdir(os.path.realpath(wt)))
|
||||
if not (dead or missing_wt):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reclaim_allowed": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
"expired/stale lock still has live owner pid and present worktree; "
|
||||
"recovery review required (fail closed)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"freshness": freshness,
|
||||
"owner_pid_dead": dead,
|
||||
"worktree_missing": missing_wt,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reclaim_allowed": True,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
"non-live lock with dead process and/or missing worktree; "
|
||||
"sanctioned reclaim allowed"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"freshness": freshness,
|
||||
"owner_pid_dead": dead,
|
||||
"worktree_missing": missing_wt,
|
||||
"prior_branch": existing_lock.get("branch_name"),
|
||||
"prior_worktree": existing_lock.get("worktree_path"),
|
||||
"prior_pid": pid,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
|
||||
existing_lock: dict[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
@@ -463,11 +405,6 @@ def assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
|
||||
and _same_realpath(str(existing_worktree or ""), worktree_path)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if is_lease_expired(existing_lock, now=now):
|
||||
reclaim = assess_expired_lock_reclaim(existing_lock, now=now)
|
||||
if reclaim.get("reclaim_allowed"):
|
||||
# #601: expired + dead pid / missing worktree may be reclaimed
|
||||
# through the normal lock path (sanctioned overwrite).
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"Issue #{issue_number} has an expired {operation_type} lease on "
|
||||
f"branch '{existing_branch}' from worktree '{existing_worktree}'. "
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-187
@@ -34,11 +34,6 @@ STATUS_LABEL_SPECS: tuple[LabelSpec, ...] = (
|
||||
LabelSpec("status:blocked", "b60205", "Issue is blocked"),
|
||||
LabelSpec("status:needs-review", "0052cc", "Issue work needs review"),
|
||||
LabelSpec("status:pr-open", "1d76db", "A linked PR is open"),
|
||||
LabelSpec(
|
||||
"status:changes-requested",
|
||||
"e11d21",
|
||||
"Reviewer requested changes on the linked PR",
|
||||
),
|
||||
LabelSpec("status:approved", "0e8a16", "Linked PR is approved"),
|
||||
LabelSpec("status:merged", "5319e7", "Linked PR is merged"),
|
||||
LabelSpec("status:reconcile", "d93f0b", "Issue needs reconciliation"),
|
||||
@@ -70,42 +65,8 @@ VALIDATION_LABEL_SPECS: tuple[LabelSpec, ...] = (
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Lifecycle role-ownership labels (#603): which workflow role currently owns the
|
||||
# item. Advisory visibility only — the control-plane lease (#601) remains the
|
||||
# source of truth for mutation authority. Only one role:* label is active at a
|
||||
# time, mirroring the single-active-status invariant.
|
||||
ROLE_LABEL_SPECS: tuple[LabelSpec, ...] = (
|
||||
LabelSpec("role:author", "1d76db", "Author currently owns the item"),
|
||||
LabelSpec("role:reviewer", "5319e7", "Reviewer currently owns the item"),
|
||||
LabelSpec("role:merger", "0e8a16", "Merger currently owns the item"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Lifecycle hazard labels (#603): orthogonal warning flags surfacing dangerous
|
||||
# coordination conditions. Unlike status/role, multiple hazard:* labels may be
|
||||
# active at once, and they never substitute for live lease / PR state checks.
|
||||
HAZARD_LABEL_SPECS: tuple[LabelSpec, ...] = (
|
||||
LabelSpec("hazard:stale-lease", "d93f0b", "A stale or expired lease references this item"),
|
||||
LabelSpec(
|
||||
"hazard:workflow-contaminated",
|
||||
"b60205",
|
||||
"Session/workflow state is contaminated and must not mutate",
|
||||
),
|
||||
LabelSpec("hazard:conflicted", "e11d21", "Linked PR has merge conflicts"),
|
||||
LabelSpec("hazard:root-mutation", "b60205", "Work was mutated in the project root checkout"),
|
||||
LabelSpec("hazard:manual-state", "d93f0b", "Session or lease state was edited manually"),
|
||||
LabelSpec(
|
||||
"hazard:terminal-blocker",
|
||||
"000000",
|
||||
"A terminal review/merge lock blocks progress (#332/#602)",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
CANONICAL_LABEL_SPECS: tuple[LabelSpec, ...] = (
|
||||
TYPE_LABEL_SPECS
|
||||
+ STATUS_LABEL_SPECS
|
||||
+ VALIDATION_LABEL_SPECS
|
||||
+ ROLE_LABEL_SPECS
|
||||
+ HAZARD_LABEL_SPECS
|
||||
TYPE_LABEL_SPECS + STATUS_LABEL_SPECS + VALIDATION_LABEL_SPECS
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
TYPE_LABELS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(spec.name for spec in TYPE_LABEL_SPECS)
|
||||
@@ -113,8 +74,6 @@ STATUS_LABELS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(spec.name for spec in STATUS_LABEL_SPE
|
||||
VALIDATION_LABELS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
|
||||
spec.name for spec in VALIDATION_LABEL_SPECS
|
||||
)
|
||||
ROLE_LABELS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(spec.name for spec in ROLE_LABEL_SPECS)
|
||||
HAZARD_LABELS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(spec.name for spec in HAZARD_LABEL_SPECS)
|
||||
CANONICAL_LABELS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
|
||||
spec.name for spec in CANONICAL_LABEL_SPECS
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -132,15 +91,9 @@ STATUS_TRANSITIONS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
"blocked": "status:blocked",
|
||||
"needs_review": "status:needs-review",
|
||||
"needs-review": "status:needs-review",
|
||||
"reviewing": "status:needs-review",
|
||||
"pr_open": "status:pr-open",
|
||||
"pr-open": "status:pr-open",
|
||||
"changes_requested": "status:changes-requested",
|
||||
"changes-requested": "status:changes-requested",
|
||||
"changes": "status:changes-requested",
|
||||
"approved": "status:approved",
|
||||
"merge_ready": "status:approved",
|
||||
"merge-ready": "status:approved",
|
||||
"merge": "status:reconcile",
|
||||
"merged": "status:reconcile",
|
||||
"reconcile": "status:reconcile",
|
||||
@@ -148,37 +101,6 @@ STATUS_TRANSITIONS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
"complete": "status:done",
|
||||
"duplicate": "status:duplicate",
|
||||
"wontfix": "status:wontfix",
|
||||
"abandoned": "status:wontfix",
|
||||
# #603 requested state:* synonyms folded into the canonical status vocabulary
|
||||
"needs_triage": "status:triage",
|
||||
"needs-triage": "status:triage",
|
||||
"authoring": "status:in-progress",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# #603: single-active role ownership. Maps role kinds / role:* labels to the
|
||||
# canonical role label. Mirrors STATUS_TRANSITIONS for the role dimension.
|
||||
ROLE_TRANSITIONS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
"author": "role:author",
|
||||
"reviewer": "role:reviewer",
|
||||
"merger": "role:merger",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# #603: hazard flag synonyms. Hazards are additive (not single-active), so this
|
||||
# only normalizes names; it does not drive replacement.
|
||||
HAZARD_TRANSITIONS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
"stale_lease": "hazard:stale-lease",
|
||||
"stale-lease": "hazard:stale-lease",
|
||||
"workflow_contaminated": "hazard:workflow-contaminated",
|
||||
"workflow-contaminated": "hazard:workflow-contaminated",
|
||||
"contaminated": "hazard:workflow-contaminated",
|
||||
"conflicted": "hazard:conflicted",
|
||||
"conflict": "hazard:conflicted",
|
||||
"root_mutation": "hazard:root-mutation",
|
||||
"root-mutation": "hazard:root-mutation",
|
||||
"manual_state": "hazard:manual-state",
|
||||
"manual-state": "hazard:manual-state",
|
||||
"terminal_blocker": "hazard:terminal-blocker",
|
||||
"terminal-blocker": "hazard:terminal-blocker",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -233,100 +155,6 @@ def transition_status_labels(
|
||||
return kept
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def role_labels(labels: Iterable[str | Mapping[str, object]] | Mapping[str, object]) -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [name for name in label_names(labels) if name.startswith("role:")]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def hazard_labels(labels: Iterable[str | Mapping[str, object]] | Mapping[str, object]) -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [name for name in label_names(labels) if name.startswith("hazard:")]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def canonical_role_label(role_or_transition: str) -> str:
|
||||
role = role_or_transition.strip()
|
||||
if role in ROLE_LABELS:
|
||||
return role
|
||||
normalized = role.lower().replace(" ", "-")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return ROLE_TRANSITIONS[normalized]
|
||||
except KeyError as exc:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"unknown workflow role or transition '{role_or_transition}'"
|
||||
) from exc
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def transition_role_labels(
|
||||
existing_labels: Iterable[str | Mapping[str, object]] | Mapping[str, object],
|
||||
role_or_transition: str,
|
||||
) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Replace all active role labels with the requested canonical role."""
|
||||
new_role = canonical_role_label(role_or_transition)
|
||||
kept = [name for name in label_names(existing_labels) if not name.startswith("role:")]
|
||||
if new_role not in kept:
|
||||
kept.append(new_role)
|
||||
return kept
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def canonical_hazard_label(hazard: str) -> str:
|
||||
name = hazard.strip()
|
||||
if name in HAZARD_LABELS:
|
||||
return name
|
||||
normalized = name.lower().replace(" ", "-")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return HAZARD_TRANSITIONS[normalized]
|
||||
except KeyError as exc:
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"unknown workflow hazard '{hazard}'") from exc
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def add_hazard_label(
|
||||
existing_labels: Iterable[str | Mapping[str, object]] | Mapping[str, object],
|
||||
hazard: str,
|
||||
) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Add a hazard flag without disturbing status/role/type labels (additive)."""
|
||||
new_hazard = canonical_hazard_label(hazard)
|
||||
kept = label_names(existing_labels)
|
||||
if new_hazard not in kept:
|
||||
kept.append(new_hazard)
|
||||
return kept
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def clear_hazard_label(
|
||||
existing_labels: Iterable[str | Mapping[str, object]] | Mapping[str, object],
|
||||
hazard: str,
|
||||
) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Remove a single hazard flag, leaving all other labels intact."""
|
||||
target = canonical_hazard_label(hazard)
|
||||
return [name for name in label_names(existing_labels) if name != target]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_discussion(labels: Iterable[str | Mapping[str, object]] | Mapping[str, object]) -> bool:
|
||||
return "type:discussion" in type_labels(labels)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_implementation_candidate(
|
||||
labels: Iterable[str | Mapping[str, object]] | Mapping[str, object],
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Whether an item may enter an implementation queue on labels alone.
|
||||
|
||||
Discussion issues are excluded (#603 AC3) unless a controller explicitly
|
||||
selects them; the allocator still cross-checks live lease/PR state and never
|
||||
trusts labels alone (#603 AC2).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return not is_discussion(labels)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def requires_blocking_reason(
|
||||
labels: Iterable[str | Mapping[str, object]] | Mapping[str, object],
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Whether the item must carry a blocking-reason / next-action comment (AC4).
|
||||
|
||||
True when blocked or when any hazard flag is present.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
names = label_names(labels)
|
||||
if "status:blocked" in names:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return any(name.startswith("hazard:") for name in names)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def labels_for_new_issue(
|
||||
issue_type: str | None = None,
|
||||
initial_status: str | None = None,
|
||||
@@ -360,8 +188,6 @@ def assess_issue_labels(
|
||||
names = label_names(labels)
|
||||
found_types = type_labels(names)
|
||||
found_statuses = status_labels(names)
|
||||
found_roles = role_labels(names)
|
||||
found_hazards = hazard_labels(names)
|
||||
errors: list[str] = []
|
||||
warnings: list[str] = []
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -376,10 +202,6 @@ def assess_issue_labels(
|
||||
"issue has multiple active status:* labels: "
|
||||
+ ", ".join(found_statuses)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if len(found_roles) > 1:
|
||||
errors.append(
|
||||
"issue has multiple active role:* labels: " + ", ".join(found_roles)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
for name in found_types:
|
||||
if name not in TYPE_LABELS:
|
||||
@@ -387,20 +209,12 @@ def assess_issue_labels(
|
||||
for name in found_statuses:
|
||||
if name not in STATUS_LABELS:
|
||||
warnings.append(f"unknown status label '{name}'")
|
||||
for name in found_roles:
|
||||
if name not in ROLE_LABELS:
|
||||
warnings.append(f"unknown role label '{name}'")
|
||||
for name in found_hazards:
|
||||
if name not in HAZARD_LABELS:
|
||||
warnings.append(f"unknown hazard label '{name}'")
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"valid": not errors,
|
||||
"labels": names,
|
||||
"type_labels": found_types,
|
||||
"status_labels": found_statuses,
|
||||
"role_labels": found_roles,
|
||||
"hazard_labels": found_hazards,
|
||||
"errors": errors,
|
||||
"warnings": warnings,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,723 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""First-class control-plane lease lifecycle (#601).
|
||||
|
||||
Active leases are queryable workflow state. Canonical operations:
|
||||
|
||||
* list / inspect
|
||||
* adopt (with provenance)
|
||||
* release (explicit, recorded)
|
||||
* expire / reclaim
|
||||
* abandon (requires proof: dead process and/or missing worktree, etc.)
|
||||
|
||||
Authority model:
|
||||
|
||||
* Control-plane DB is the coordination source for assignment/lease.
|
||||
* File locks and comment-only leases are **not** authoritative alone.
|
||||
* Reviewer/merger comment leases (``reviewer_pr_lease`` / merger adoption)
|
||||
remain for Gitea-thread durability; they must not bypass DB assignment when
|
||||
the control-plane path is in use.
|
||||
|
||||
Fail closed on ambiguous ownership, active foreign leases, mismatched
|
||||
worktree, stale head, missing capability, and unsafe cleanup.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
||||
from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
|
||||
|
||||
import control_plane_db as cpd
|
||||
|
||||
# Outcomes / safe next actions (stable vocabulary for tools + tests).
|
||||
SAFE_OWNER_RESUME = "owner_resume"
|
||||
SAFE_WAIT_FOREIGN = "wait_foreign_active"
|
||||
SAFE_RECLAIM_EXPIRED = "reclaim_expired"
|
||||
SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED = "abandon_allowed"
|
||||
SAFE_RELEASE_OWNED = "release_owned"
|
||||
SAFE_STALE_PROMPT = "stale_prompt_lease"
|
||||
SAFE_UNKNOWN = "inspect_only"
|
||||
SAFE_NO_AUTHORITY = "file_or_comment_not_authoritative"
|
||||
|
||||
LEASE_STATUS_ACTIVE = "active"
|
||||
LEASE_STATUS_RELEASED = "released"
|
||||
LEASE_STATUS_EXPIRED = "expired"
|
||||
LEASE_STATUS_ABANDONED = "abandoned"
|
||||
|
||||
AUTHORITATIVE_SOURCE = "control_plane_db"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class LeaseLifecycleError(RuntimeError):
|
||||
"""Fail-closed lifecycle policy error."""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||
class AbandonProof:
|
||||
"""Required evidence to abandon a non-owned or expired lease safely."""
|
||||
|
||||
dead_process: bool = False
|
||||
missing_worktree: bool = False
|
||||
same_owner: bool = False
|
||||
no_open_pr: bool = False
|
||||
no_live_mutation_risk: bool = False
|
||||
operator_authorized: bool = False
|
||||
worktree_path: str | None = None
|
||||
owner_pid: int | None = None
|
||||
notes: str = ""
|
||||
|
||||
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"dead_process": self.dead_process,
|
||||
"missing_worktree": self.missing_worktree,
|
||||
"same_owner": self.same_owner,
|
||||
"no_open_pr": self.no_open_pr,
|
||||
"no_live_mutation_risk": self.no_live_mutation_risk,
|
||||
"operator_authorized": self.operator_authorized,
|
||||
"worktree_path": self.worktree_path,
|
||||
"owner_pid": self.owner_pid,
|
||||
"notes": self.notes,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
def is_sufficient(self) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Abandon requires process death or missing worktree + no mutation risk.
|
||||
|
||||
Foreign active leases additionally need operator_authorized unless the
|
||||
owner process is dead and the worktree is missing.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not self.no_live_mutation_risk:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if not (self.dead_process or self.missing_worktree):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if self.same_owner:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
# Foreign abandon: operator flag OR (dead + missing worktree + no risk)
|
||||
if self.operator_authorized:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return bool(self.dead_process and self.missing_worktree and self.no_open_pr)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_process_alive(pid: int | None) -> bool:
|
||||
if pid is None:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
pid_i = int(pid)
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if pid_i <= 0:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
os.kill(pid_i, 0)
|
||||
return True
|
||||
except ProcessLookupError:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
except PermissionError:
|
||||
# Exists but not owned by us — treat as alive (fail closed).
|
||||
return True
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def worktree_exists(path: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
if not path:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return os.path.isdir(os.path.realpath(path))
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _utc_now() -> datetime:
|
||||
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _parse_ts(value: str | None) -> datetime | None:
|
||||
return cpd._parse_ts(value)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_lease_freshness(
|
||||
lease: Mapping[str, Any],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
now: datetime | None = None,
|
||||
pid_checker: Callable[[int | None], bool] = is_process_alive,
|
||||
worktree_checker: Callable[[str | None], bool] = worktree_exists,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify a control-plane lease row for workflow tooling."""
|
||||
moment = now or _utc_now()
|
||||
status = (lease.get("status") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
expires = _parse_ts(lease.get("expires_at"))
|
||||
owner_pid = lease.get("owner_pid")
|
||||
if owner_pid is None:
|
||||
owner_pid = lease.get("session_pid")
|
||||
wt = lease.get("worktree_path")
|
||||
pid_alive = pid_checker(owner_pid) if owner_pid is not None else None
|
||||
wt_present = worktree_checker(wt) if wt else None
|
||||
expired_by_time = bool(expires and expires <= moment)
|
||||
|
||||
if status == LEASE_STATUS_ABANDONED:
|
||||
freshness = "abandoned"
|
||||
elif status == LEASE_STATUS_RELEASED:
|
||||
freshness = "released"
|
||||
elif status == LEASE_STATUS_EXPIRED or expired_by_time:
|
||||
freshness = "expired"
|
||||
elif status != LEASE_STATUS_ACTIVE:
|
||||
freshness = status or "unknown"
|
||||
elif pid_alive is False:
|
||||
freshness = "stale_dead_process"
|
||||
elif wt is not None and wt_present is False:
|
||||
freshness = "stale_missing_worktree"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
freshness = "active"
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"freshness": freshness,
|
||||
"status": status,
|
||||
"expired_by_time": expired_by_time,
|
||||
"owner_pid": owner_pid,
|
||||
"owner_pid_alive": pid_alive,
|
||||
"worktree_path": wt,
|
||||
"worktree_present": wt_present,
|
||||
"expires_at": lease.get("expires_at"),
|
||||
"authoritative_source": AUTHORITATIVE_SOURCE,
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def decide_safe_next_action(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
lease: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
caller_session_id: str,
|
||||
freshness: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
caller_worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Return safe_next_action + reasons for a caller inspecting a lease."""
|
||||
if not lease:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"safe_next_action": SAFE_STALE_PROMPT,
|
||||
"reasons": ["lease not found in control-plane DB (stale prompt id?)"],
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
fr = freshness or classify_lease_freshness(lease)
|
||||
owner = str(lease.get("session_id") or "")
|
||||
same_owner = owner == str(caller_session_id)
|
||||
status = fr.get("freshness")
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
|
||||
# Worktree mismatch for owner resume
|
||||
lease_wt = lease.get("worktree_path")
|
||||
if (
|
||||
same_owner
|
||||
and lease_wt
|
||||
and caller_worktree
|
||||
and os.path.realpath(str(lease_wt)) != os.path.realpath(str(caller_worktree))
|
||||
):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"safe_next_action": SAFE_UNKNOWN,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"worktree mismatch: lease has {lease_wt!r}, caller has "
|
||||
f"{caller_worktree!r} (fail closed)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"same_owner": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if status in ("abandoned", "released"):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"safe_next_action": SAFE_STALE_PROMPT,
|
||||
"reasons": [f"lease status is {status}; do not adopt blindly"],
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"same_owner": same_owner,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if status == "expired" or fr.get("expired_by_time"):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"safe_next_action": SAFE_RECLAIM_EXPIRED,
|
||||
"reasons": ["lease expired; reclaim via expire+assign or adopt reclaim path"],
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"same_owner": same_owner,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if status in ("stale_dead_process", "stale_missing_worktree"):
|
||||
if same_owner:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"safe_next_action": SAFE_OWNER_RESUME,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"caller owns lease with freshness={status}; rebind via "
|
||||
"adopt/owner-resume or abandon with proof"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"same_owner": True,
|
||||
"also_allowed": [SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED, SAFE_RELEASE_OWNED],
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"safe_next_action": SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"lease freshness={status}; abandon with required proof then reassign"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"same_owner": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if same_owner and status == "active":
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"safe_next_action": SAFE_OWNER_RESUME,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
"caller owns active lease; resume via heartbeat/assign owner-resume "
|
||||
"or release explicitly"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"same_owner": True,
|
||||
"also_allowed": [SAFE_RELEASE_OWNED],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if not same_owner and status == "active":
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"safe_next_action": SAFE_WAIT_FOREIGN,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"foreign active lease held by session {owner}; "
|
||||
"do not steal (fail closed)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"same_owner": False,
|
||||
"owner_session_id": owner,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"safe_next_action": SAFE_UNKNOWN,
|
||||
"reasons": [f"unclassified freshness={status}"],
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"same_owner": same_owner,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def non_db_lease_authority_report(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
file_lock_present: bool = False,
|
||||
comment_lease_present: bool = False,
|
||||
db_lease_present: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""File/comment leases alone are not coordination authority (#601 / #600)."""
|
||||
authoritative = bool(db_lease_present)
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if file_lock_present and not db_lease_present:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"file lock present but control-plane DB lease absent — "
|
||||
"file lock is not authoritative alone"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if comment_lease_present and not db_lease_present:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"comment-only lease present but control-plane DB lease absent — "
|
||||
"comment lease is not authoritative alone"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if authoritative:
|
||||
reasons.append("control-plane DB lease is the coordination authority")
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"authoritative_source": AUTHORITATIVE_SOURCE if authoritative else None,
|
||||
"db_lease_present": db_lease_present,
|
||||
"file_lock_present": file_lock_present,
|
||||
"comment_lease_present": comment_lease_present,
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
SAFE_UNKNOWN if authoritative else SAFE_NO_AUTHORITY
|
||||
),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"file_lock_only": bool(file_lock_present and not db_lease_present),
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": bool(comment_lease_present and not db_lease_present),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_adopt_provenance(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
adopted_from_session_id: str,
|
||||
adopted_by_session_id: str,
|
||||
work_kind: str,
|
||||
work_number: int,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
worktree_path: str | None,
|
||||
expected_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
prior_lease_id: str | None,
|
||||
reason: str,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"adopted_from_session_id": adopted_from_session_id,
|
||||
"adopted_by_session_id": adopted_by_session_id,
|
||||
"work_kind": work_kind,
|
||||
"work_number": int(work_number),
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"worktree_path": worktree_path,
|
||||
"expected_head_sha": expected_head_sha,
|
||||
"prior_lease_id": prior_lease_id,
|
||||
"reason": reason,
|
||||
"recorded_at": cpd._ts(),
|
||||
"source": "lease_lifecycle.adopt",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def inspect_lease(
|
||||
db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB,
|
||||
lease_id: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
caller_session_id: str,
|
||||
caller_worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Full first-class lease workflow state for one lease id."""
|
||||
state = db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
|
||||
if not state:
|
||||
decision = decide_safe_next_action(
|
||||
lease=None, caller_session_id=caller_session_id
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"found": False,
|
||||
"lease_id": lease_id,
|
||||
"lease": None,
|
||||
"freshness": None,
|
||||
**decision,
|
||||
"authoritative_source": AUTHORITATIVE_SOURCE,
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
lease = state["lease"]
|
||||
freshness = classify_lease_freshness(lease)
|
||||
decision = decide_safe_next_action(
|
||||
lease=lease,
|
||||
caller_session_id=caller_session_id,
|
||||
freshness=freshness,
|
||||
caller_worktree=caller_worktree,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"found": True,
|
||||
"lease_id": lease_id,
|
||||
"lease": lease,
|
||||
"assignment": state.get("assignment"),
|
||||
"work_item": state.get("work_item"),
|
||||
"session": state.get("session"),
|
||||
"freshness": freshness,
|
||||
"provenance": state.get("provenance"),
|
||||
**decision,
|
||||
"authoritative_source": AUTHORITATIVE_SOURCE,
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def list_active_leases(
|
||||
db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
role: str | None = None,
|
||||
include_non_active: bool = False,
|
||||
limit: int = 100,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
statuses = None if include_non_active else (LEASE_STATUS_ACTIVE,)
|
||||
rows = db.list_leases(
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
role=role,
|
||||
statuses=statuses,
|
||||
limit=limit,
|
||||
)
|
||||
enriched = []
|
||||
for row in rows:
|
||||
fr = classify_lease_freshness(row)
|
||||
enriched.append({**row, "freshness": fr})
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"count": len(enriched),
|
||||
"leases": enriched,
|
||||
"authoritative_source": AUTHORITATIVE_SOURCE,
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
"include_non_active": include_non_active,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def adopt_lease(
|
||||
db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
lease_id: str,
|
||||
adopter_session_id: str,
|
||||
role: str,
|
||||
worktree_path: str | None = None,
|
||||
expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
owner_pid: int | None = None,
|
||||
operator_authorized: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Sanctioned adopt path with provenance; never silent foreign steal."""
|
||||
state = db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
|
||||
if not state:
|
||||
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
|
||||
f"unknown lease_id {lease_id}; stale prompt id (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
lease = state["lease"]
|
||||
work = state["work_item"]
|
||||
freshness = classify_lease_freshness(lease)
|
||||
owner = str(lease.get("session_id") or "")
|
||||
same_owner = owner == str(adopter_session_id)
|
||||
|
||||
if freshness["freshness"] == "active" and not same_owner:
|
||||
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
|
||||
f"refusing to steal active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by "
|
||||
f"{owner} (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if freshness["freshness"] in ("abandoned", "released"):
|
||||
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
|
||||
f"lease {lease_id} is {freshness['freshness']}; cannot adopt "
|
||||
"(fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Expired or stale: require abandon-style safety before ownership transfer
|
||||
# when not same owner; same owner may reclaim.
|
||||
if not same_owner and freshness["freshness"] in (
|
||||
"expired",
|
||||
"stale_dead_process",
|
||||
"stale_missing_worktree",
|
||||
):
|
||||
if not operator_authorized and freshness["freshness"] == "expired":
|
||||
# Deterministic reclaim of expired foreign lease is allowed
|
||||
# without operator flag (sanctioned expire reclaim).
|
||||
pass
|
||||
elif freshness["freshness"] != "expired" and not operator_authorized:
|
||||
# stale active-looking requires abandon proof path
|
||||
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
|
||||
f"lease {lease_id} freshness={freshness['freshness']}; "
|
||||
"use abandon with proof before foreign adopt (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
provenance = build_adopt_provenance(
|
||||
adopted_from_session_id=owner,
|
||||
adopted_by_session_id=adopter_session_id,
|
||||
work_kind=str(work.get("kind")),
|
||||
work_number=int(work.get("number")),
|
||||
remote=str(work.get("remote")),
|
||||
org=str(work.get("org")),
|
||||
repo=str(work.get("repo")),
|
||||
worktree_path=worktree_path,
|
||||
expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha or lease.get("expected_head_sha"),
|
||||
prior_lease_id=lease_id,
|
||||
reason=(
|
||||
"owner-resume-adopt" if same_owner else "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
result = db.adopt_lease(
|
||||
lease_id=lease_id,
|
||||
adopter_session_id=adopter_session_id,
|
||||
role=role,
|
||||
worktree_path=worktree_path,
|
||||
expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha,
|
||||
owner_pid=owner_pid if owner_pid is not None else os.getpid(),
|
||||
provenance=provenance,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"outcome": result.get("outcome"),
|
||||
"same_owner": same_owner,
|
||||
"prior_lease_id": lease_id,
|
||||
"lease": result.get("lease"),
|
||||
"assignment": result.get("assignment"),
|
||||
"provenance": provenance,
|
||||
"authoritative_source": AUTHORITATIVE_SOURCE,
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
"reasons": result.get("reasons") or [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def release_lease(
|
||||
db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
lease_id: str,
|
||||
session_id: str,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
proof = db.release_lease_recorded(lease_id=lease_id, session_id=session_id)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"outcome": "released",
|
||||
"lease_id": lease_id,
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"release_proof": proof,
|
||||
"authoritative_source": AUTHORITATIVE_SOURCE,
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def expire_leases(db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
n = db.expire_stale_leases()
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"outcome": "expired",
|
||||
"expired_count": int(n),
|
||||
"authoritative_source": AUTHORITATIVE_SOURCE,
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def reclaim_expired_lease(
|
||||
db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
lease_id: str,
|
||||
session_id: str,
|
||||
role: str,
|
||||
worktree_path: str | None = None,
|
||||
expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Expire-if-needed then assign to *session_id* for the same work item."""
|
||||
state = db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
|
||||
if not state:
|
||||
raise LeaseLifecycleError(f"unknown lease_id {lease_id}")
|
||||
lease = state["lease"]
|
||||
work = state["work_item"]
|
||||
freshness = classify_lease_freshness(lease)
|
||||
if freshness["freshness"] == "active":
|
||||
if lease.get("session_id") != session_id:
|
||||
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
|
||||
f"cannot reclaim active foreign lease {lease_id} (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
# owner resume
|
||||
return adopt_lease(
|
||||
db,
|
||||
lease_id=lease_id,
|
||||
adopter_session_id=session_id,
|
||||
role=role,
|
||||
worktree_path=worktree_path,
|
||||
expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if freshness["freshness"] not in (
|
||||
"expired",
|
||||
"stale_dead_process",
|
||||
"stale_missing_worktree",
|
||||
"abandoned",
|
||||
"released",
|
||||
):
|
||||
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
|
||||
f"lease {lease_id} freshness={freshness['freshness']} not reclaimable"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Ensure expired marker is applied
|
||||
db.expire_stale_leases()
|
||||
# If still active due to clock skew / non-time stale, force expire this lease
|
||||
refreshed = db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
|
||||
if refreshed and refreshed["lease"].get("status") == "active":
|
||||
db.force_expire_lease(lease_id, reason="reclaim_expired_lease")
|
||||
|
||||
head = expected_head_sha or work.get("current_head_sha")
|
||||
assigned = db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id=session_id,
|
||||
role=role,
|
||||
remote=str(work["remote"]),
|
||||
org=str(work["org"]),
|
||||
repo=str(work["repo"]),
|
||||
kind=str(work["kind"]),
|
||||
number=int(work["number"]),
|
||||
expected_head_sha=head,
|
||||
phase="reclaimed",
|
||||
worktree_path=worktree_path,
|
||||
owner_pid=os.getpid(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
if assigned.outcome != "assigned":
|
||||
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
|
||||
f"reclaim assign failed: {assigned.outcome} — {assigned.reason}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
provenance = build_adopt_provenance(
|
||||
adopted_from_session_id=str(lease.get("session_id")),
|
||||
adopted_by_session_id=session_id,
|
||||
work_kind=str(work["kind"]),
|
||||
work_number=int(work["number"]),
|
||||
remote=str(work["remote"]),
|
||||
org=str(work["org"]),
|
||||
repo=str(work["repo"]),
|
||||
worktree_path=worktree_path,
|
||||
expected_head_sha=head,
|
||||
prior_lease_id=lease_id,
|
||||
reason="reclaim_expired",
|
||||
)
|
||||
db.attach_lease_provenance(assigned.lease_id, provenance)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"outcome": "reclaimed",
|
||||
"prior_lease_id": lease_id,
|
||||
"assignment": assigned.as_dict(),
|
||||
"provenance": provenance,
|
||||
"authoritative_source": AUTHORITATIVE_SOURCE,
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def abandon_lease(
|
||||
db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
lease_id: str,
|
||||
requester_session_id: str,
|
||||
proof: AbandonProof,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
state = db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
|
||||
if not state:
|
||||
raise LeaseLifecycleError(f"unknown lease_id {lease_id}")
|
||||
lease = state["lease"]
|
||||
owner = str(lease.get("session_id") or "")
|
||||
same_owner = owner == str(requester_session_id)
|
||||
|
||||
# Enrich proof with live checks when not provided
|
||||
owner_pid = proof.owner_pid
|
||||
if owner_pid is None:
|
||||
owner_pid = lease.get("owner_pid")
|
||||
wt = proof.worktree_path if proof.worktree_path is not None else lease.get(
|
||||
"worktree_path"
|
||||
)
|
||||
dead = proof.dead_process or (
|
||||
owner_pid is not None and not is_process_alive(owner_pid)
|
||||
)
|
||||
missing_wt = proof.missing_worktree or (
|
||||
bool(wt) and not worktree_exists(str(wt))
|
||||
)
|
||||
enriched = AbandonProof(
|
||||
dead_process=bool(dead),
|
||||
missing_worktree=bool(missing_wt),
|
||||
same_owner=same_owner or proof.same_owner,
|
||||
no_open_pr=proof.no_open_pr,
|
||||
no_live_mutation_risk=proof.no_live_mutation_risk,
|
||||
operator_authorized=proof.operator_authorized,
|
||||
worktree_path=str(wt) if wt else None,
|
||||
owner_pid=int(owner_pid) if owner_pid is not None else None,
|
||||
notes=proof.notes,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not enriched.is_sufficient():
|
||||
raise LeaseLifecycleError(
|
||||
"abandon proof insufficient: need (dead_process or missing_worktree) "
|
||||
"and no_live_mutation_risk; foreign abandon also needs "
|
||||
"operator_authorized or (dead+missing_worktree+no_open_pr). "
|
||||
f"proof={enriched.as_dict()}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Active foreign with live process + present worktree: never abandon without
|
||||
# operator (already covered by is_sufficient).
|
||||
result = db.abandon_lease(
|
||||
lease_id=lease_id,
|
||||
requester_session_id=requester_session_id,
|
||||
proof=enriched.as_dict(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"outcome": "abandoned",
|
||||
"lease_id": lease_id,
|
||||
"requester_session_id": requester_session_id,
|
||||
"prior_owner_session_id": owner,
|
||||
"abandon_proof": enriched.as_dict(),
|
||||
"audit": result,
|
||||
"authoritative_source": AUTHORITATIVE_SOURCE,
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
+4
-12
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ venv_python = os.path.join(PROJECT_ROOT, "venv", "bin", "python3")
|
||||
if os.path.exists(venv_python) and sys.executable != venv_python:
|
||||
os.execv(venv_python, [venv_python] + sys.argv)
|
||||
|
||||
from gitea_auth import get_auth_header, api_request, api_get_all, repo_api_url
|
||||
from gitea_auth import get_auth_header, api_request, repo_api_url
|
||||
import issue_workflow_labels
|
||||
|
||||
HOST = "gitea.dadeschools.net"
|
||||
@@ -82,17 +82,9 @@ def api(method, path, auth, payload=None):
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _labels_by_name(auth):
|
||||
"""Return {label name: id} for the repo's existing labels (all pages, #627)."""
|
||||
existing = api_get_all(f"{BASE_URL}/labels", auth) or []
|
||||
name_to_id = {}
|
||||
for lb in existing:
|
||||
if not isinstance(lb, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
name = lb.get("name")
|
||||
lid = lb.get("id")
|
||||
if name and lid is not None and name not in name_to_id:
|
||||
name_to_id[name] = lid
|
||||
return name_to_id
|
||||
"""Return {label name: id} for the repo's existing labels."""
|
||||
existing = api("GET", "/labels?limit=100", auth) or []
|
||||
return {lb["name"]: lb["id"] for lb in existing}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def create_labels(auth, dry=False):
|
||||
|
||||
+5
-5
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ if os.path.exists(venv_python) and sys.executable != venv_python:
|
||||
|
||||
from gitea_auth import (
|
||||
get_auth_header, resolve_remote, add_remote_args,
|
||||
api_request, api_get_all, repo_api_url,
|
||||
api_request, repo_api_url,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
LABEL_NAME = "status:in-progress"
|
||||
@@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ def main(argv=None):
|
||||
base = repo_api_url(host, org, repo)
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
# Paginated inventory (#627): Gitea caps single pages at 50.
|
||||
labels = api_get_all(f"{base}/labels", auth) or []
|
||||
# Find the label ID
|
||||
labels = api_request("GET", f"{base}/labels?limit=100", auth)
|
||||
label_id = None
|
||||
for lb in labels:
|
||||
if lb.get("name") == LABEL_NAME:
|
||||
label_id = lb.get("id")
|
||||
if lb["name"] == LABEL_NAME:
|
||||
label_id = lb["id"]
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
if label_id is None:
|
||||
|
||||
+31
-464
@@ -1,439 +1,62 @@
|
||||
"""Sanctioned MCP daemon guards for imports and credential access (#558 / #695).
|
||||
"""Sanctioned MCP daemon guards for imports and credential access (#558).
|
||||
|
||||
Direct ``import gitea_mcp_server`` from a shell bypasses native MCP transport.
|
||||
#558 introduced a daemon marker; #695 hardens it so:
|
||||
Direct ``import gitea_mcp_server`` / ``import gitea_auth`` from a shell, plus
|
||||
raw keychain dumps, bypass preflight purity and role gates. Mutation helpers
|
||||
and keychain fallbacks therefore require an explicit sanctioned runtime.
|
||||
|
||||
- Environment variables alone cannot reconstruct a native session
|
||||
(``GITEA_MCP_SANCTIONED_DAEMON=1`` / ``GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT=1`` are
|
||||
insufficient for mutation gates).
|
||||
- A process-local runtime record is established only by the resolved canonical
|
||||
entrypoint path (not basename) **and** the actual native MCP transport
|
||||
lifecycle (``bind_native_mcp_transport`` before ``mcp.run``). Merely
|
||||
importing or launching the entrypoint offline does not grant mutation
|
||||
authority.
|
||||
- Public caller-controlled flags (including any former
|
||||
``allow_test_bootstrap``) never establish trusted mutation provenance.
|
||||
- Offline scripts that import internals fail closed on mutations.
|
||||
- Pytest remains allowed for hermetic unit tests via ``is_pytest_runtime()``.
|
||||
A separate test-only seam may establish a **test-mode** native record for
|
||||
unit tests of transport gates; that record cannot authorize production
|
||||
Gitea mutation endpoints.
|
||||
Sanctioned contexts (any one):
|
||||
- ``GITEA_MCP_SANCTIONED_DAEMON=1`` (set by the official MCP entrypoint)
|
||||
- pytest (``PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST`` present)
|
||||
- explicit operator opt-in ``GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT=1`` (tests/tools only)
|
||||
|
||||
Manual deletion of session-state files is never a recovery path.
|
||||
Credential keychain fill additionally allows:
|
||||
- ``GITEA_ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI=1`` for operator-only non-MCP scripts that must
|
||||
use git-credential (never the default for LLM shells).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import inspect
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import secrets
|
||||
import time
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_SANCTIONED_DAEMON"
|
||||
ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV = "GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT"
|
||||
ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI_ENV = "GITEA_ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI"
|
||||
# Test-only: force provenance failure even under pytest (#695 regressions).
|
||||
FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV = "GITEA_TEST_FORCE_UNSANCTIONED"
|
||||
|
||||
# Process-local native runtime (never persisted, never read from env alone).
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME: dict[str, Any] | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
# Production transport identifiers accepted by bind_native_mcp_transport.
|
||||
_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS = frozenset({"stdio"})
|
||||
_RUNTIME_MODE_PRODUCTION = "production"
|
||||
_RUNTIME_MODE_TEST = "test"
|
||||
_PHASE_ENTRYPOINT_CLAIMED = "entrypoint_claimed"
|
||||
_PHASE_TRANSPORT_BOUND = "transport_bound"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default session-state root (mirrors mcp_session_state; kept local to avoid
|
||||
# import cycles). Used only to pin authority at transport bind (#695 AC2).
|
||||
_DEFAULT_SESSION_STATE_DIR = os.path.expanduser("~/.cache/gitea-tools/session-state")
|
||||
SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class UnsanctionedRuntimeError(RuntimeError):
|
||||
"""Raised when mutation/credential code runs outside a native MCP daemon."""
|
||||
"""Raised when mutation/credential code runs outside a sanctioned MCP daemon."""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_pytest_runtime() -> bool:
|
||||
if (os.environ.get(FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV) or "").strip() in {
|
||||
"1",
|
||||
"true",
|
||||
"yes",
|
||||
}:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
if "pytest" in sys.modules:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return bool((os.environ.get("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST") or "").strip())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _package_root() -> Path:
|
||||
"""Directory that contains the canonical MCP entrypoint modules."""
|
||||
return Path(__file__).resolve().parent
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def canonical_entrypoint_paths() -> frozenset[str]:
|
||||
"""Resolved absolute paths of official entrypoints (not basenames)."""
|
||||
root = _package_root()
|
||||
return frozenset(
|
||||
{
|
||||
str((root / "mcp_server.py").resolve()),
|
||||
str((root / "gitea_mcp_server.py").resolve()),
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _resolve_path(path: str | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
if not path:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return str(Path(path).resolve())
|
||||
except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _caller_official_entrypoint_path() -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Return the resolved canonical entrypoint path in the call stack, or None.
|
||||
|
||||
Basename-only matches (e.g. an attacker file named ``mcp_server.py``
|
||||
elsewhere) are rejected. The path must equal one of
|
||||
:func:`canonical_entrypoint_paths`.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
canonical = canonical_entrypoint_paths()
|
||||
for frame in inspect.stack()[1:20]:
|
||||
resolved = _resolve_path(frame.filename)
|
||||
if resolved and resolved in canonical:
|
||||
return resolved
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _caller_is_official_entrypoint() -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when invoked from a resolved canonical entrypoint path (#695)."""
|
||||
return _caller_official_entrypoint_path() is not None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _new_runtime_token() -> tuple[str, str]:
|
||||
token = secrets.token_hex(32)
|
||||
fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
|
||||
return token, fingerprint
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def mark_sanctioned_daemon() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Claim the official entrypoint for this process (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
This alone does **not** authorize mutations. Callers must subsequently
|
||||
bind the native MCP transport via :func:`bind_native_mcp_transport`.
|
||||
|
||||
Only a stack frame whose **resolved absolute path** is the canonical
|
||||
``mcp_server.py`` or ``gitea_mcp_server.py`` next to this module may
|
||||
claim the entrypoint. Basename spoofing is rejected.
|
||||
|
||||
There is no public ``allow_test_bootstrap`` argument: caller-controlled
|
||||
flags must never establish trusted mutation provenance. Hermetic tests
|
||||
use :func:`install_test_native_runtime` (pytest-only, test mode).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
global _NATIVE_RUNTIME
|
||||
if is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
# Under pytest, production mark is a no-op for transport authority.
|
||||
# Tests that need a native-transport record use install_test_native_runtime.
|
||||
return native_runtime_status()
|
||||
|
||||
entrypoint_path = _caller_official_entrypoint_path()
|
||||
if entrypoint_path is None:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"mark_sanctioned_daemon rejected: not called from the resolved "
|
||||
"canonical MCP entrypoint path (#695). Basename-only names "
|
||||
"(e.g. a renamed runner called mcp_server.py) are insufficient. "
|
||||
"Offline import / standalone scripts cannot reconstruct native "
|
||||
"transport. Stop after native MCP failure; do not run offline "
|
||||
"mutation helpers."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
token, fingerprint = _new_runtime_token()
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME = {
|
||||
"token": token,
|
||||
"token_fingerprint": fingerprint,
|
||||
"pid": os.getpid(),
|
||||
"started_at": time.time(),
|
||||
"entrypoint": "mcp_server",
|
||||
"entrypoint_path": entrypoint_path,
|
||||
"phase": _PHASE_ENTRYPOINT_CLAIMED,
|
||||
"transport": None,
|
||||
"mode": _RUNTIME_MODE_PRODUCTION,
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Legacy signal for older probes; alone does not authorize mutations.
|
||||
os.environ[SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
return native_runtime_status()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bind_native_mcp_transport(*, transport: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Bind the live native MCP transport lifecycle (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
Must be called from the resolved canonical entrypoint immediately before
|
||||
the real MCP server transport loop (e.g. ``mcp.run(transport=\"stdio\")``).
|
||||
Requires a prior successful :func:`mark_sanctioned_daemon` claim in this
|
||||
process. Import-only or offline launch without this bind leaves
|
||||
:func:`is_native_mcp_transport` false.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
global _NATIVE_RUNTIME
|
||||
transport_name = (transport or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if transport_name not in _PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
f"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: transport {transport!r} is "
|
||||
f"not a production MCP transport (#695). Allowed: "
|
||||
f"{sorted(_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS)}."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
entrypoint_path = _caller_official_entrypoint_path()
|
||||
if entrypoint_path is None:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: not called from the resolved "
|
||||
"canonical MCP entrypoint path (#695)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if _NATIVE_RUNTIME is None or int(_NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("pid") or -1) != os.getpid():
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: no entrypoint claim in this "
|
||||
"process (#695). Call mark_sanctioned_daemon() from the official "
|
||||
"entrypoint first."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if _NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("mode") != _RUNTIME_MODE_PRODUCTION:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: runtime mode is not "
|
||||
"production (#695)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
claimed = (_NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("entrypoint_path") or "").strip()
|
||||
if claimed and claimed != entrypoint_path:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: entrypoint path mismatch "
|
||||
"between mark and bind (#695)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Pin session-state root for this server lifetime (#695 AC2 / PR #701).
|
||||
# Changing GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR after bind must not manufacture a
|
||||
# second authority domain for decision locks / workflow proofs.
|
||||
raw_state = (os.environ.get(SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV) or "").strip()
|
||||
if not raw_state:
|
||||
raw_state = _DEFAULT_SESSION_STATE_DIR
|
||||
try:
|
||||
pinned_state = str(Path(raw_state).resolve())
|
||||
except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
|
||||
pinned_state = raw_state
|
||||
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME["phase"] = _PHASE_TRANSPORT_BOUND
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME["transport"] = transport_name
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME["entrypoint_path"] = entrypoint_path
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME["bound_at"] = time.time()
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME["session_state_dir"] = pinned_state
|
||||
os.environ[SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
return native_runtime_status()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def install_test_native_runtime() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Pytest-only seam for hermetic native-transport unit tests (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
Establishes a **test-mode** process-local record so unit tests can exercise
|
||||
gates that require ``is_native_mcp_transport()``. This record:
|
||||
|
||||
- is rejected outside pytest (including a fresh offline interpreter);
|
||||
- never uses production mode;
|
||||
- cannot authorize production Gitea mutation endpoints
|
||||
(:func:`assert_production_mutation_runtime` / production path of
|
||||
:func:`assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime` when not under pytest).
|
||||
|
||||
There is no public caller-controlled flag that forges production native
|
||||
transport.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
global _NATIVE_RUNTIME
|
||||
if not is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"install_test_native_runtime rejected: test-mode native runtime "
|
||||
"is only available under pytest (#695). allow_test_bootstrap and "
|
||||
"similar caller-controlled flags do not exist and cannot authorize "
|
||||
"a fresh offline interpreter."
|
||||
)
|
||||
token, fingerprint = _new_runtime_token()
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME = {
|
||||
"token": token,
|
||||
"token_fingerprint": fingerprint,
|
||||
"pid": os.getpid(),
|
||||
"started_at": time.time(),
|
||||
"entrypoint": "test_bootstrap",
|
||||
"entrypoint_path": None,
|
||||
"phase": _PHASE_TRANSPORT_BOUND,
|
||||
"transport": "test",
|
||||
"mode": _RUNTIME_MODE_TEST,
|
||||
"bound_at": time.time(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
return native_runtime_status()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def clear_native_runtime_for_tests() -> None:
|
||||
"""Test helper: drop native runtime (does not clear env)."""
|
||||
global _NATIVE_RUNTIME
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def pinned_session_state_dir() -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Session-state root pinned for this production transport lifetime (#695 AC2).
|
||||
|
||||
When production native transport is bound, durable session proofs must use
|
||||
this directory only. Env overrides of ``GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR`` after
|
||||
bind are ignored so redirected dirs (e.g. ``.mcp_session_701``) cannot
|
||||
manufacture independent decision-lock authority (PR #701 recurrence).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not is_production_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
return None
|
||||
pinned = (_NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}).get("session_state_dir")
|
||||
text = (str(pinned) if pinned is not None else "").strip()
|
||||
return text or None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def direct_import_env_enabled() -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when the legacy direct-import opt-in env is set (never authorizes)."""
|
||||
return (os.environ.get(ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {
|
||||
"1",
|
||||
"true",
|
||||
"yes",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assert_no_direct_import_bypass(context: str = "mutation") -> None:
|
||||
"""Fail closed when GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT is used for mutations (#695 AC1).
|
||||
|
||||
The env flag is never a sanctioned recovery path for LLM/agent sessions.
|
||||
Under pytest hermetic tests this is a no-op so unit tests can set the flag
|
||||
to prove it does not grant authority.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
return
|
||||
if not direct_import_env_enabled():
|
||||
return
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
f"{ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV} does not authorize {context} (#695 AC1). "
|
||||
"Direct import of gitea_mcp_server mutation tools is forbidden. "
|
||||
"Stop after native MCP failure; reconnect the official MCP daemon. "
|
||||
"Do not set direct-import flags, offline runners, or redirected "
|
||||
f"{SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV} directories to reconstruct gates."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_native_mcp_transport() -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when this process holds a transport-bound native runtime (#695)."""
|
||||
if (os.environ.get(FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV) or "").strip() in {
|
||||
"1",
|
||||
"true",
|
||||
"yes",
|
||||
}:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if _NATIVE_RUNTIME is None:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if int(_NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("pid") or -1) != os.getpid():
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if not (_NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("token") or "").strip():
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if _NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("phase") != _PHASE_TRANSPORT_BOUND:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if not (_NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("transport") or "").strip():
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_production_native_mcp_transport() -> bool:
|
||||
"""True only for production-mode, transport-bound native runtime."""
|
||||
if not is_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return (_NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}).get("mode") == _RUNTIME_MODE_PRODUCTION
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_sanctioned_mcp_daemon() -> bool:
|
||||
"""Backward-compatible name; #695 requires native transport, not env alone."""
|
||||
if is_production_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
if (os.environ.get(SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV) or "").strip() in {"1", "true", "yes"}:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if (os.environ.get(ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV) or "").strip() in {"1", "true", "yes"}:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
return True
|
||||
# Explicit direct-import override is for non-LLM operator/test tools only.
|
||||
# It is deliberately ignored when a native runtime is expected for mutations
|
||||
# under LLM sessions (tests use pytest path). Env alone never grants native.
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assert_production_mutation_runtime(context: str = "mutation") -> None:
|
||||
"""Fail closed unless production native MCP transport is bound (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
Test-mode bootstrap records and pytest-only hermetic allowances do **not**
|
||||
satisfy this gate. Use for production Gitea mutation endpoints that must
|
||||
never be reachable via test bootstrap.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if is_production_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
return
|
||||
mode = (_NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}).get("mode")
|
||||
if mode == _RUNTIME_MODE_TEST:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
f"Test-mode native runtime cannot authorize production {context} "
|
||||
"(#695). install_test_native_runtime / former allow_test_bootstrap "
|
||||
"must never reach real Gitea mutation endpoints."
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime(context)
|
||||
def mark_sanctioned_daemon() -> None:
|
||||
"""Call from the official MCP server entrypoint before serving tools."""
|
||||
os.environ[SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime(context: str = "mutation") -> None:
|
||||
"""Fail closed when mutation code runs outside native MCP transport (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
Under pytest, hermetic unit tests are allowed (profile/permission tests).
|
||||
Outside pytest, requires production-mode transport-bound native runtime.
|
||||
Test-mode records do not authorize non-pytest production mutations.
|
||||
``GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT`` never authorizes mutations (#695 AC1).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
"""Fail closed when server mutation code is used outside the MCP daemon."""
|
||||
if is_sanctioned_mcp_daemon():
|
||||
return
|
||||
# AC1: direct-import env is never a mutation recovery path (PR #701).
|
||||
assert_no_direct_import_bypass(context)
|
||||
if is_production_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
return
|
||||
mode = (_NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}).get("mode")
|
||||
if mode == _RUNTIME_MODE_TEST:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
f"Test-mode native runtime cannot authorize production {context} "
|
||||
"(#695). Test bootstrap cannot reach production mutation endpoints."
|
||||
)
|
||||
env_spoof = (os.environ.get(SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV) or "").strip() in {
|
||||
"1",
|
||||
"true",
|
||||
"yes",
|
||||
}
|
||||
extra = ""
|
||||
if env_spoof:
|
||||
extra = (
|
||||
f" Note: {SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV} alone is not sufficient (#695); "
|
||||
"native transport requires the official MCP entrypoint and a live "
|
||||
"transport bind."
|
||||
)
|
||||
phase = (_NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}).get("phase")
|
||||
if phase == _PHASE_ENTRYPOINT_CLAIMED:
|
||||
extra = (
|
||||
(extra + " ") if extra else " "
|
||||
) + (
|
||||
"Entrypoint was claimed but native MCP transport was never bound "
|
||||
"(#695); offline launch/import of the real entrypoint does not "
|
||||
"grant mutation authority."
|
||||
)
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
f"Unsanctioned / non-native runtime blocked {context} (#695). "
|
||||
"Do not import gitea_mcp_server or call mutation helpers from a raw "
|
||||
"shell, offline runner, or ad-hoc script after native MCP failure. "
|
||||
"Stop and reconnect the official MCP daemon (mcp_server.py) over "
|
||||
"native transport. "
|
||||
f"Do not set {ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV}, override "
|
||||
f"{SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV}, or use raw token env vars in LLM "
|
||||
f"sessions.{extra}"
|
||||
f"Unsanctioned runtime blocked {context} (#558). "
|
||||
"Do not import gitea_mcp_server / call mutation helpers from a raw "
|
||||
"shell or ad-hoc script. Use the official MCP daemon entrypoint "
|
||||
f"(sets {SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV}=1), or run under pytest. "
|
||||
f"Operator-only override: {ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV}=1 (not for LLM sessions)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -441,77 +64,21 @@ def assert_keychain_access_allowed() -> None:
|
||||
"""Fail closed for git-credential keychain fill outside sanctioned contexts."""
|
||||
if is_sanctioned_mcp_daemon():
|
||||
return
|
||||
# Operator-only keychain CLI remains available outside LLM mutation path.
|
||||
if (os.environ.get(ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI_ENV) or "").strip() in {"1", "true", "yes"}:
|
||||
if not is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
# Still block pure env spoof of SANCTIONED_DAEMON for keychain when
|
||||
# FORCE is set for tests.
|
||||
if (os.environ.get(FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV) or "").strip() in {
|
||||
"1",
|
||||
"true",
|
||||
"yes",
|
||||
}:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
else:
|
||||
return
|
||||
return
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"Unsanctioned keychain/credential fill blocked (#558/#695). "
|
||||
"Unsanctioned keychain/credential fill blocked (#558). "
|
||||
"Token extraction via git-credential is only allowed inside the "
|
||||
f"official native MCP daemon or with explicit operator opt-in "
|
||||
f"{ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI_ENV}=1 (never for offline mutation runners)."
|
||||
f"official MCP daemon ({SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV}=1), pytest, or with "
|
||||
f"explicit operator opt-in {ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI_ENV}=1."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def native_runtime_status() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""LLM-safe native runtime status (no raw token)."""
|
||||
rt = _NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}
|
||||
def runtime_status() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"native_mcp_transport": is_native_mcp_transport(),
|
||||
"production_native_mcp_transport": is_production_native_mcp_transport(),
|
||||
"sanctioned_daemon": is_sanctioned_mcp_daemon(),
|
||||
"pytest": is_pytest_runtime(),
|
||||
"pid": rt.get("pid"),
|
||||
"token_fingerprint": rt.get("token_fingerprint"),
|
||||
"started_at": rt.get("started_at"),
|
||||
"entrypoint": rt.get("entrypoint"),
|
||||
"entrypoint_path": rt.get("entrypoint_path"),
|
||||
"phase": rt.get("phase"),
|
||||
"transport": rt.get("transport"),
|
||||
"mode": rt.get("mode"),
|
||||
"session_state_dir": pinned_session_state_dir() or rt.get("session_state_dir"),
|
||||
"session_state_dir_pinned": pinned_session_state_dir() is not None,
|
||||
"direct_import_env_set": direct_import_env_enabled(),
|
||||
"env_sanctioned_alone_insufficient": True,
|
||||
"sanctioned_env": SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV,
|
||||
"allow_direct_import_env": ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV,
|
||||
"session_state_dir_env": SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV,
|
||||
"allow_keychain_cli_env": ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI_ENV,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def runtime_status() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Backward-compatible status payload."""
|
||||
status = native_runtime_status()
|
||||
status["sanctioned_daemon"] = is_sanctioned_mcp_daemon()
|
||||
return status
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def mutation_provenance_fields() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fields to attach to live mutation / review audit records (#695 AC6)."""
|
||||
st = native_runtime_status()
|
||||
transport = "native_mcp" if st["native_mcp_transport"] else "untrusted"
|
||||
if st.get("mode") == _RUNTIME_MODE_TEST and st["native_mcp_transport"]:
|
||||
transport = "test_native_mcp"
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"transport": transport,
|
||||
"native_mcp_transport": bool(st["native_mcp_transport"]),
|
||||
"production_native_mcp_transport": bool(
|
||||
st.get("production_native_mcp_transport")
|
||||
),
|
||||
"native_runtime_pid": st.get("pid"),
|
||||
"native_token_fingerprint": st.get("token_fingerprint"),
|
||||
"entrypoint": st.get("entrypoint"),
|
||||
"phase": st.get("phase"),
|
||||
"mode": st.get("mode"),
|
||||
"session_state_dir": st.get("session_state_dir"),
|
||||
"session_state_dir_pinned": bool(st.get("session_state_dir_pinned")),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
AUTHORIZED_CLEANUP_TOOLS = frozenset({
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease",
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease",
|
||||
"gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups",
|
||||
"gitea_delete_branch",
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
|
||||
|
||||
+3
-9
@@ -6,10 +6,6 @@ Runs over stdio. All tools authenticate via macOS keychain (git credential fill)
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
if "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST" not in os.environ:
|
||||
sys.stderr = open("/tmp/mcp_server_stderr.log", "a", buffering=1)
|
||||
sys.stderr.write(f"\n--- MCP SERVER STARTUP (PID {os.getpid()}) ---\n")
|
||||
|
||||
from role_session_router import (
|
||||
python_bytes_have_conflict_markers,
|
||||
skip_python_scan_walk_root,
|
||||
@@ -41,17 +37,15 @@ def check_conflict_markers():
|
||||
|
||||
check_conflict_markers()
|
||||
|
||||
# #558 / #695: claim the official entrypoint before loading mutation modules.
|
||||
# This alone does NOT authorize mutations — gitea_mcp_server binds the live
|
||||
# native MCP transport (stdio) immediately before mcp.run. Import-only or
|
||||
# offline launch without that bind fails closed on mutations.
|
||||
# #558: official entrypoint marks the process as the sanctioned MCP daemon
|
||||
# before loading mutation modules (blocks raw shell import bypasses).
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.mark_sanctioned_daemon()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Guard import failures must not hide conflict-marker infra_stop above;
|
||||
# gitea_mcp_server main also marks + binds when run as __main__.
|
||||
# gitea_mcp_server main also marks sanctioned when run as __main__.
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
# Execute the actual server logic via exec in this namespace.
|
||||
|
||||
+8
-463
@@ -31,48 +31,7 @@ DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS = 4.0
|
||||
KIND_WORKFLOW_LOAD = "review_workflow_load"
|
||||
KIND_DECISION_LOCK = "review_decision_lock"
|
||||
KIND_REVIEW_DRAFT = "review_draft"
|
||||
# Durable marker set when a worker session attempts a direct stable-branch push
|
||||
# or a root-checkout local commit (#671). Keyed per profile identity like the
|
||||
# other session proofs; a contaminated session fails closed on gated mutations
|
||||
# until a reconciler audits and clears it.
|
||||
KIND_STABLE_BRANCH_CONTAMINATION = "stable_branch_contamination"
|
||||
# Durable shadow of the in-memory reviewer session lease (#702). Written on
|
||||
# every sanctioned record/heartbeat and removed on sanctioned clear, so a
|
||||
# daemon that dies without teardown leaves provable orphan evidence (owner
|
||||
# pid + session id) for the guarded lease-cleanup path. Never a substitute
|
||||
# for the in-session lease: mutation gates ignore it.
|
||||
KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE = "reviewer_session_lease"
|
||||
# Durable audit record written whenever the daemon's sanctioned stale-binding
|
||||
# recovery clears an inherited GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE binding (#702).
|
||||
KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY = "stale_binding_recovery"
|
||||
# #709: archive prior terminal decision ledgers instead of silent overwrite.
|
||||
KIND_DECISION_LOCK_ARCHIVE = "review_decision_lock_archive"
|
||||
# #709: post-merge cleanup/audit reconciliation-required durable record.
|
||||
KIND_POST_MERGE_DECISION_RECOVERY = "post_merge_decision_recovery"
|
||||
# #709: truthful record when historical terminal evidence is irrecoverably gone.
|
||||
KIND_IRRECOVERABLE_DECISION_PROVENANCE = "irrecoverable_decision_provenance"
|
||||
# #709 F1: server-side non-forgeable authorization artifact for recovery.
|
||||
KIND_IRRECOVERABLE_PROVENANCE_AUTH = "irrecoverable_provenance_authorization"
|
||||
|
||||
# Kinds that must survive the default session-state TTL (forensic / recovery).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# KIND_DECISION_LOCK is recovery-critical (#720): terminal review provenance is
|
||||
# not disposable cache. A generic four-hour TTL must not drop old-head evidence
|
||||
# or make ``fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed`` unreachable. Same-head / same-
|
||||
# run #332 protections still apply once the ledger is loadable. Other session
|
||||
# kinds (workflow load, drafts, etc.) remain TTL-bound.
|
||||
RECOVERY_CRITICAL_KINDS = frozenset(
|
||||
{
|
||||
KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
KIND_DECISION_LOCK_ARCHIVE,
|
||||
KIND_POST_MERGE_DECISION_RECOVERY,
|
||||
KIND_IRRECOVERABLE_DECISION_PROVENANCE,
|
||||
KIND_IRRECOVERABLE_PROVENANCE_AUTH,
|
||||
# #702 crash-orphan evidence (must outlive TTL; F4)
|
||||
KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE,
|
||||
KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY,
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_SAFE_SEGMENT_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._+-]+")
|
||||
@@ -80,34 +39,6 @@ SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK_ENV = "GITEA_SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def default_state_dir() -> str:
|
||||
"""Resolve the durable session-state root.
|
||||
|
||||
When production native MCP transport is bound (#695 AC2), the directory
|
||||
pinned at transport bind is authoritative: later overrides of
|
||||
``GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR`` cannot manufacture a second authority
|
||||
domain (PR #701 recurrence: ``.mcp_session_701`` evasion of cross-PR
|
||||
decision locks).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
|
||||
pinned = mcp_daemon_guard.pinned_session_state_dir()
|
||||
if pinned:
|
||||
return pinned
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Fail open to env/default only when guard is unavailable (e.g. partial
|
||||
# import during bootstrap). Mutation gates still fail closed separately.
|
||||
pass
|
||||
raw = (os.environ.get(STATE_DIR_ENV) or DEFAULT_STATE_DIR).strip()
|
||||
return raw or DEFAULT_STATE_DIR
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def env_session_state_dir_unpinned() -> str:
|
||||
"""Raw env/default session-state dir ignoring production transport pin.
|
||||
|
||||
Intended for diagnostics and tests that assert pin behavior — not for
|
||||
mutation-sensitive durable proofs under a bound native daemon.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
raw = (os.environ.get(STATE_DIR_ENV) or DEFAULT_STATE_DIR).strip()
|
||||
return raw or DEFAULT_STATE_DIR
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +81,6 @@ def state_key(
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
instance_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
"""Build durable filename key.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -158,20 +88,17 @@ def state_key(
|
||||
so the primary key is kind + profile identity. Remote/org/repo are stored
|
||||
inside the payload and validated on load (#559), which lets a later daemon
|
||||
process recover state without already knowing the remote argument.
|
||||
|
||||
*instance_id* extends the key for kinds where one-per-profile collides —
|
||||
concurrent same-profile sessions each own their reviewer-lease shadow
|
||||
(#702 F5), keyed by their lease session id so a later heartbeat can never
|
||||
overwrite or misattribute another session's crash evidence.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# Keep remote/org/repo parameters for API stability / future kinds; they are
|
||||
# intentionally not part of the filename for session-scoped proofs.
|
||||
_ = (remote, org, repo)
|
||||
parts = [kind, profile_identity or "unknown-profile"]
|
||||
instance = (instance_id or "").strip()
|
||||
if instance:
|
||||
parts.append(instance)
|
||||
return "-".join(_sanitize_segment(part) for part in parts)
|
||||
return "-".join(
|
||||
_sanitize_segment(part)
|
||||
for part in (
|
||||
kind,
|
||||
profile_identity or "unknown-profile",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def state_file_path(
|
||||
@@ -182,7 +109,6 @@ def state_file_path(
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
instance_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
root = (state_dir or default_state_dir()).strip()
|
||||
name = state_key(
|
||||
@@ -191,7 +117,6 @@ def state_file_path(
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile_identity,
|
||||
instance_id=instance_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return os.path.join(root, f"{name}.json")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -270,16 +195,6 @@ def _write_json(path: str, data: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_recovery_critical_record(record: dict[str, Any] | None, kind: str | None = None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when a durable record must outlive the generic session-state TTL."""
|
||||
if not record and not kind:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
record_kind = ((record or {}).get("kind") or kind or "").strip()
|
||||
if record_kind in RECOVERY_CRITICAL_KINDS:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return bool((record or {}).get("recovery_critical"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def identity_match_reasons(
|
||||
record: dict[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
@@ -322,9 +237,7 @@ def identity_match_reasons(
|
||||
reasons.append("session state missing recorded_at timestamp (fail closed)")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
age = _now_utc() - recorded_at
|
||||
kind = (record.get("kind") or "").strip()
|
||||
ttl_exempt = is_recovery_critical_record(record, kind=kind)
|
||||
if age > timedelta(hours=ttl_hours()) and not ttl_exempt:
|
||||
if age > timedelta(hours=ttl_hours()):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"session state expired after {ttl_hours():g}h (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -333,113 +246,6 @@ def identity_match_reasons(
|
||||
return reasons
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def inspect_state_envelope(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
kind: str,
|
||||
remote: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Read-only disk inspection for assessment when TTL would otherwise hide state (#720).
|
||||
|
||||
Does **not** apply identity/TTL rejection to the returned presence flags.
|
||||
Callers use this to distinguish:
|
||||
* no file on disk
|
||||
* file present but TTL would reject a non-critical kind
|
||||
* recovery-critical ledger (e.g. KIND_DECISION_LOCK) still loadable
|
||||
Never mutates files. Never returns secrets.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
profile = current_profile_identity(profile_identity=profile_identity)
|
||||
path = state_file_path(
|
||||
kind=kind,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
state_dir=state_dir,
|
||||
)
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"kind": kind,
|
||||
"profile_identity": profile,
|
||||
"path_basename": os.path.basename(path),
|
||||
"on_disk": False,
|
||||
"has_payload": False,
|
||||
"recorded_at": None,
|
||||
"updated_at": None,
|
||||
"age_hours": None,
|
||||
"ttl_hours": ttl_hours(),
|
||||
"age_exceeds_default_ttl": False,
|
||||
"recovery_critical": kind in RECOVERY_CRITICAL_KINDS,
|
||||
"ttl_exempt": kind in RECOVERY_CRITICAL_KINDS,
|
||||
"would_ttl_reject": False,
|
||||
"identity_reasons": [],
|
||||
"summary": "no session-state file on disk",
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not path or not os.path.exists(path):
|
||||
return result
|
||||
result["on_disk"] = True
|
||||
envelope = _read_json(path)
|
||||
if not envelope:
|
||||
result["summary"] = "session-state file present but unreadable or empty"
|
||||
return result
|
||||
payload = envelope.get("payload")
|
||||
merged: dict[str, Any] = dict(payload) if isinstance(payload, dict) else {}
|
||||
result["has_payload"] = isinstance(payload, dict)
|
||||
for key in (
|
||||
"kind",
|
||||
"remote",
|
||||
"org",
|
||||
"repo",
|
||||
"profile_identity",
|
||||
"session_profile_lock",
|
||||
"recorded_at",
|
||||
"updated_at",
|
||||
"writer_pid",
|
||||
"recovery_critical",
|
||||
):
|
||||
if key in envelope and key not in merged:
|
||||
merged[key] = envelope[key]
|
||||
if not merged.get("kind"):
|
||||
merged["kind"] = kind
|
||||
recorded_at = _parse_iso(merged.get("recorded_at") or merged.get("updated_at"))
|
||||
result["recorded_at"] = merged.get("recorded_at") or merged.get("updated_at")
|
||||
result["updated_at"] = merged.get("updated_at") or merged.get("recorded_at")
|
||||
if recorded_at is not None:
|
||||
age = _now_utc() - recorded_at
|
||||
age_hours = age.total_seconds() / 3600.0
|
||||
result["age_hours"] = age_hours
|
||||
result["age_exceeds_default_ttl"] = age > timedelta(hours=ttl_hours())
|
||||
ttl_exempt = is_recovery_critical_record(merged, kind=kind)
|
||||
result["recovery_critical"] = ttl_exempt
|
||||
result["ttl_exempt"] = ttl_exempt
|
||||
identity_reasons = identity_match_reasons(
|
||||
merged,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["identity_reasons"] = list(identity_reasons)
|
||||
result["would_ttl_reject"] = any("expired" in r for r in identity_reasons)
|
||||
if result["has_payload"] and ttl_exempt:
|
||||
result["summary"] = (
|
||||
"recovery-critical session-state present on disk and TTL-exempt; "
|
||||
"load via load_state for full payload"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif result["has_payload"] and result["would_ttl_reject"]:
|
||||
result["summary"] = (
|
||||
"session-state file present on disk but generic TTL would reject load "
|
||||
f"(age_hours={result.get('age_hours')!r}, ttl={ttl_hours():g}h)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif result["has_payload"]:
|
||||
result["summary"] = "session-state file present and within TTL / identity gates"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
result["summary"] = "session-state file present without a dict payload"
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def load_state(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
kind: str,
|
||||
@@ -448,7 +254,6 @@ def load_state(
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
instance_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Load durable state payload when identity checks pass."""
|
||||
profile = current_profile_identity(profile_identity=profile_identity)
|
||||
@@ -459,7 +264,6 @@ def load_state(
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
state_dir=state_dir,
|
||||
instance_id=instance_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
lock_path = f"{path}.lock"
|
||||
with _exclusive_file_lock(lock_path):
|
||||
@@ -505,7 +309,6 @@ def save_state(
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
instance_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Persist or clear durable state for the given session identity key."""
|
||||
profile = current_profile_identity(
|
||||
@@ -518,11 +321,6 @@ def save_state(
|
||||
key_remote = remote if remote is not None else (payload or {}).get("remote")
|
||||
key_org = org if org is not None else (payload or {}).get("org")
|
||||
key_repo = repo if repo is not None else (payload or {}).get("repo")
|
||||
key_instance = (
|
||||
(instance_id or "").strip()
|
||||
or str((payload or {}).get("instance_id") or "").strip()
|
||||
or None
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
root = _ensure_state_dir(state_dir)
|
||||
path = state_file_path(
|
||||
@@ -532,7 +330,6 @@ def save_state(
|
||||
repo=key_repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
state_dir=root,
|
||||
instance_id=key_instance,
|
||||
)
|
||||
lock_path = f"{path}.lock"
|
||||
with _exclusive_file_lock(lock_path):
|
||||
@@ -560,28 +357,6 @@ def save_state(
|
||||
body["org"] = key_org
|
||||
if key_repo is not None:
|
||||
body["repo"] = key_repo
|
||||
# Stamp session-state authority used for this write (#695 AC2 / AC6).
|
||||
body.setdefault("session_state_dir", root)
|
||||
if key_instance:
|
||||
body["instance_id"] = key_instance
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
|
||||
prov = mcp_daemon_guard.mutation_provenance_fields()
|
||||
body.setdefault(
|
||||
"native_token_fingerprint", prov.get("native_token_fingerprint")
|
||||
)
|
||||
body.setdefault(
|
||||
"native_mcp_transport", bool(prov.get("native_mcp_transport"))
|
||||
)
|
||||
body.setdefault(
|
||||
"production_native_mcp_transport",
|
||||
bool(prov.get("production_native_mcp_transport")),
|
||||
)
|
||||
body.setdefault("transport", prov.get("transport"))
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
body.setdefault("native_mcp_transport", False)
|
||||
body.setdefault("transport", "untrusted")
|
||||
|
||||
envelope = {
|
||||
"kind": kind,
|
||||
@@ -593,12 +368,8 @@ def save_state(
|
||||
"recorded_at": body["recorded_at"],
|
||||
"updated_at": body["updated_at"],
|
||||
"writer_pid": body["writer_pid"],
|
||||
"session_state_dir": body.get("session_state_dir"),
|
||||
"transport": body.get("transport"),
|
||||
"payload": body,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if key_instance:
|
||||
envelope["instance_id"] = key_instance
|
||||
_write_json(path, envelope)
|
||||
return dict(body)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -611,7 +382,6 @@ def clear_state(
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
instance_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
save_state(
|
||||
kind=kind,
|
||||
@@ -621,229 +391,4 @@ def clear_state(
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile_identity,
|
||||
state_dir=state_dir,
|
||||
instance_id=instance_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def list_states(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
kind: str,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
|
||||
"""Enumerate durable records of *kind* across all instance keys.
|
||||
|
||||
Crash recovery cannot know which session id left a shadow behind, so it
|
||||
must be able to enumerate every record of a kind (#702 F5). Identity
|
||||
checks (profile / TTL policy) apply per record exactly as in
|
||||
:func:`load_state`; records that fail closed are omitted.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
root = (state_dir or default_state_dir()).strip()
|
||||
if not root or not os.path.isdir(root):
|
||||
return []
|
||||
profile = current_profile_identity(profile_identity=profile_identity)
|
||||
results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
try:
|
||||
names = sorted(os.listdir(root))
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
for name in names:
|
||||
if not name.endswith(".json") or name.startswith("."):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
envelope = _read_json(os.path.join(root, name))
|
||||
if not envelope or envelope.get("kind") != kind:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
payload = envelope.get("payload")
|
||||
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
merged = dict(payload)
|
||||
for key in (
|
||||
"kind",
|
||||
"remote",
|
||||
"org",
|
||||
"repo",
|
||||
"profile_identity",
|
||||
"session_profile_lock",
|
||||
"recorded_at",
|
||||
"updated_at",
|
||||
"writer_pid",
|
||||
):
|
||||
if key in envelope and key not in merged:
|
||||
merged[key] = envelope[key]
|
||||
if identity_match_reasons(merged, profile_identity=profile):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
results.append(merged)
|
||||
return results
|
||||
|
||||
def list_decision_lock_profile_identities(
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Return profile identities that have a durable review_decision_lock file (#709).
|
||||
|
||||
Filename form: ``review_decision_lock-<profile>.json`` (see ``state_key``).
|
||||
Does not validate TTL or identity — callers must load via ``load_state``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
root = (state_dir or default_state_dir()).strip()
|
||||
if not root or not os.path.isdir(root):
|
||||
return []
|
||||
prefix = f"{_sanitize_segment(KIND_DECISION_LOCK)}-"
|
||||
suffix = ".json"
|
||||
found: list[str] = []
|
||||
try:
|
||||
names = os.listdir(root)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
for name in names:
|
||||
if not name.startswith(prefix) or not name.endswith(suffix):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if name.endswith(".lock"):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
mid = name[len(prefix) : -len(suffix)]
|
||||
if mid:
|
||||
found.append(mid)
|
||||
return sorted(set(found))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def load_state_for_profile(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
kind: str,
|
||||
profile_identity: str,
|
||||
remote: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
skip_identity_match: bool = False,
|
||||
enforce_repo_scope: bool = True,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Load durable state for an explicit profile identity (#709 cross-profile).
|
||||
|
||||
When *skip_identity_match* is True, still requires the file's recorded
|
||||
profile_identity to equal the requested profile (anti-stomp), but does not
|
||||
require the *active* session identity to match — needed so a merger can
|
||||
inspect a reviewer lock after merge.
|
||||
|
||||
#709 F3: remote/org/repo filter reasons are **enforced** (not merely
|
||||
computed). When *enforce_repo_scope* is True (default) and the caller
|
||||
supplies remote/org/repo, mismatches fail closed with ``None``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# #709 F3: refuse traversal / malformed profile identities.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from irrecoverable_provenance import assess_profile_path_identity
|
||||
|
||||
path_gate = assess_profile_path_identity(profile_identity)
|
||||
if not path_gate.get("valid"):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Module may be mid-import in edge bootstraps; fall through to
|
||||
# conservative checks below.
|
||||
raw = str(profile_identity or "")
|
||||
if ".." in raw or "/" in raw or "\\" in raw or "\x00" in raw:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
profile = current_profile_identity(profile_identity=profile_identity)
|
||||
root = _ensure_state_dir(state_dir)
|
||||
# Refuse symlink escape of the state root (#709 F3).
|
||||
try:
|
||||
real_root = os.path.realpath(root)
|
||||
path = state_file_path(
|
||||
kind=kind,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
state_dir=root,
|
||||
)
|
||||
real_path = os.path.realpath(path) if os.path.exists(path) else path
|
||||
if os.path.exists(path) and not str(real_path).startswith(
|
||||
str(real_root) + os.sep
|
||||
) and str(real_path) != str(real_root):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
path = state_file_path(
|
||||
kind=kind,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
state_dir=root,
|
||||
)
|
||||
lock_path = f"{path}.lock"
|
||||
with _exclusive_file_lock(lock_path):
|
||||
envelope = _read_json(path)
|
||||
if not envelope:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
payload = envelope.get("payload")
|
||||
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
merged = dict(payload)
|
||||
for key in (
|
||||
"kind",
|
||||
"remote",
|
||||
"org",
|
||||
"repo",
|
||||
"profile_identity",
|
||||
"session_profile_lock",
|
||||
"recorded_at",
|
||||
"updated_at",
|
||||
"writer_pid",
|
||||
):
|
||||
if key in envelope and key not in merged:
|
||||
merged[key] = envelope[key]
|
||||
stored = (merged.get("profile_identity") or "").strip()
|
||||
if stored and stored != profile:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if skip_identity_match:
|
||||
# Enforce remote/org/repo when caller provides them (#709 F3).
|
||||
# Drop only *active session* profile-identity mismatches; keep
|
||||
# expiry, spoof, and repository-scope reasons.
|
||||
scope_remote = remote if enforce_repo_scope else None
|
||||
scope_org = org if enforce_repo_scope else None
|
||||
scope_repo = repo if enforce_repo_scope else None
|
||||
reasons = identity_match_reasons(
|
||||
merged,
|
||||
remote=scope_remote,
|
||||
org=scope_org,
|
||||
repo=scope_repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=stored or profile,
|
||||
)
|
||||
filtered = [
|
||||
r
|
||||
for r in reasons
|
||||
if "profile identity mismatch" not in r
|
||||
or (stored and stored != profile)
|
||||
]
|
||||
# When caller requested a specific remote/org/repo, also fail if the
|
||||
# stored record lacks those identity fields entirely (legacy incomplete).
|
||||
if enforce_repo_scope:
|
||||
for field, want in (
|
||||
("remote", remote),
|
||||
("org", org),
|
||||
("repo", repo),
|
||||
):
|
||||
want_s = (want or "").strip()
|
||||
if not want_s:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
have = (str(merged.get(field) or "")).strip()
|
||||
if not have:
|
||||
filtered.append(
|
||||
f"session state {field} missing on durable record "
|
||||
f"(expected={want_s!r}; fail closed, #709 F3)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif have != want_s:
|
||||
# identity_match_reasons already adds mismatch; ensure kept
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if filtered:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return merged
|
||||
reasons = identity_match_reasons(
|
||||
merged,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if reasons:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return merged
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,634 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""MCP tool-boundary error mapping for known Gitea client failures (#699).
|
||||
|
||||
Known authentication / authorization / network / configuration failures leave
|
||||
the tool boundary as a sanitized structured ``CallToolResult`` with
|
||||
``isError=True``. Stdio transport remains connected.
|
||||
|
||||
Design constraints (reviewer-ratified, #699 / PR #701):
|
||||
|
||||
1. **No secret material** in tool results or daemon logs. Messages are fixed
|
||||
constants keyed by ``reason_code``; HTTP bodies / exception text never
|
||||
surface. Sanitization failure fails closed to ``internal_error``.
|
||||
2. **Narrow boundary** wraps the original FastMCP ``Tool.run`` success path;
|
||||
re-raises framework control-flow exceptions (``UrlElicitationRequiredError``);
|
||||
maps only typed client failures. Installation is idempotent.
|
||||
3. **No RuntimeError substring heuristics.** Only explicit typed
|
||||
authentication / authorization / network / configuration exceptions
|
||||
receive those labels.
|
||||
4. **HTTP classification** lives in ``gitea_auth.classify_http_status``;
|
||||
every 403 is authorization-class.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger("gitea_mcp.tool_error_boundary")
|
||||
|
||||
# Stable reason codes (#699).
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_FAILED = "auth_failed"
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN = "auth_invalid_token"
|
||||
REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE = "authz_insufficient_scope"
|
||||
REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED = "authz_denied"
|
||||
REASON_NETWORK_ERROR = "network_error"
|
||||
REASON_CONFIG_ERROR = "config_error"
|
||||
REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR = "internal_error"
|
||||
REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE = "upstream_unavailable"
|
||||
REASON_HTTP_ERROR = "http_error"
|
||||
# Typed structured errors for previously-opaque raw mutation failures.
|
||||
REASON_PREFLIGHT_ORDER = "preflight_order_violation"
|
||||
REASON_MALFORMED_RESPONSE = "malformed_response"
|
||||
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION = "authentication"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION = "authorization"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK = "network"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION = "configuration"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL = "internal"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_UPSTREAM = "upstream"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_PRECONDITION = "precondition"
|
||||
|
||||
# Fixed, secret-free operator messages. Never interpolate HTTP bodies,
|
||||
# Keychain contents, tokens, or arbitrary exception text.
|
||||
FIXED_MESSAGES: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_FAILED: "Gitea authentication failed",
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN: (
|
||||
"Gitea authentication failed: invalid or revoked credentials"
|
||||
),
|
||||
REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE: (
|
||||
"Gitea authorization failed: insufficient token scope"
|
||||
),
|
||||
REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED: "Gitea authorization failed: access denied",
|
||||
REASON_NETWORK_ERROR: "Network error contacting Gitea",
|
||||
REASON_CONFIG_ERROR: "Gitea configuration or credential resolution failed",
|
||||
REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR: "Internal tool error",
|
||||
REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE: "Gitea upstream unavailable",
|
||||
REASON_HTTP_ERROR: "Gitea HTTP request failed",
|
||||
REASON_PREFLIGHT_ORDER: (
|
||||
"Mutation blocked: pre-flight order violation (fail closed)"
|
||||
),
|
||||
REASON_MALFORMED_RESPONSE: "Malformed response from Gitea",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Error class for a self-declared safe reason code (``gitea_reason_code``).
|
||||
_REASON_ERROR_CLASS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_FAILED: ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN: ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE: ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
|
||||
REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED: ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
|
||||
REASON_NETWORK_ERROR: ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK,
|
||||
REASON_CONFIG_ERROR: ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
|
||||
REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE: ERROR_CLASS_UPSTREAM,
|
||||
REASON_HTTP_ERROR: ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
REASON_PREFLIGHT_ORDER: ERROR_CLASS_PRECONDITION,
|
||||
REASON_MALFORMED_RESPONSE: ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR: ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Bounds for the safe diagnostic fields added to the ``internal_error`` path.
|
||||
_DETAIL_LIMIT = 200
|
||||
_CLASS_LIMIT = 120
|
||||
_STAGE_LIMIT = 64
|
||||
|
||||
# Absolute-path prefixes stripped from diagnostic detail (never leak layout).
|
||||
_ABS_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"/(?:Users|home|private|var|tmp|opt|etc|root)/[^\s'\"]*")
|
||||
_DETAIL_SECRET_PREFIXES = ("token ", "Basic ", "Bearer ", "Authorization: ")
|
||||
_SECRET_KEY = (
|
||||
r"token|password|passwd|secret|authorization|api[_-]?key|"
|
||||
r"access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|session|cookie"
|
||||
)
|
||||
_SECRET_JSON_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r'"(' + _SECRET_KEY + r')"\s*:\s*"[^"]*"', re.IGNORECASE
|
||||
)
|
||||
_SECRET_KV_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"\b(" + _SECRET_KEY + r")\s*=\s*[^\s&\"']+", re.IGNORECASE
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
_MUTATION_STAGE_ATTR = "_gitea_mutation_stage"
|
||||
_SELF_DECLARED_REASON_ATTR = "gitea_reason_code"
|
||||
|
||||
_INSTALL_FLAG = "_gitea_auth_boundary_installed"
|
||||
_ORIGINAL_ATTR = "_gitea_auth_boundary_original"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_str(exc: BaseException) -> str:
|
||||
"""``str(exc)`` that never raises (a poisoned ``__str__`` must not escape)."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return str(exc)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_exception_class(exc: BaseException) -> str:
|
||||
"""Fully-qualified type identifier for *exc* — never instance/message text."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
t = type(exc)
|
||||
mod = getattr(t, "__module__", "") or ""
|
||||
name = getattr(t, "__qualname__", None) or getattr(t, "__name__", "") or ""
|
||||
ident = f"{mod}.{name}" if mod else name
|
||||
return ident[:_CLASS_LIMIT]
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return "unknown"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _redact_detail(text: Any, limit: int = _DETAIL_LIMIT) -> str:
|
||||
"""Strictly redact free-form exception text for safe diagnostics.
|
||||
|
||||
Removes token/Authorization credentials, raw URLs and hostnames (via the
|
||||
shared audit redactor), and absolute filesystem paths, then collapses
|
||||
whitespace and truncates. Never raises; on any failure returns "".
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
out = str(text)
|
||||
# Drop credential-prefixed runs (token/Basic/Bearer/Authorization).
|
||||
for prefix in _DETAIL_SECRET_PREFIXES:
|
||||
idx = 0
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
i = out.find(prefix, idx)
|
||||
if i == -1:
|
||||
break
|
||||
j = i + len(prefix)
|
||||
while j < len(out) and not out[j].isspace():
|
||||
j += 1
|
||||
out = out[:i] + prefix + "[REDACTED]" + out[j:]
|
||||
idx = i + len(prefix) + len("[REDACTED]")
|
||||
# Secret VALUES carried in JSON ("key":"value") or kv (key=value) form,
|
||||
# even short ones (e.g. a password), keyed by a sensitive field name.
|
||||
out = _SECRET_JSON_RE.sub(r'"\1":"[REDACTED]"', out)
|
||||
out = _SECRET_KV_RE.sub(r"\1=[REDACTED]", out)
|
||||
# URLs / query secrets / hostnames.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import gitea_audit
|
||||
|
||||
out = gitea_audit.redact_urls(out)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
# Absolute filesystem paths (workspace layout is not for LLM output).
|
||||
out = _ABS_PATH_RE.sub("[PATH]", out)
|
||||
# Any bare hostname the URL redactor missed (defence in depth).
|
||||
out = re.sub(r"\b[\w.-]+\.(?:cc|net|com|org|io|dev|local)\b", "[HOST]", out)
|
||||
out = " ".join(out.split())
|
||||
return out[:limit]
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_mutation_stage(exc: BaseException) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Return the bounded, redacted mutation stage tagged on *exc* (or None)."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
raw = getattr(exc, _MUTATION_STAGE_ATTR, None)
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return _redact_detail(raw, limit=_STAGE_LIMIT) or None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def fixed_message(reason_code: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Return the fixed sanitized message for *reason_code* (fail closed)."""
|
||||
return FIXED_MESSAGES.get(reason_code, FIXED_MESSAGES[REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_profile_name() -> str | None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from gitea_auth import get_profile
|
||||
|
||||
name = (get_profile() or {}).get("profile_name")
|
||||
if name is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
text = str(name).strip()
|
||||
# Profile names are non-secret identifiers; still bound length.
|
||||
return text[:80] if text else None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _is_framework_control_flow(exc: BaseException) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True for exceptions the MCP framework must re-raise unchanged."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from mcp.shared.exceptions import UrlElicitationRequiredError
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, UrlElicitationRequiredError):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
# BaseException subclasses that must never become tool isError payloads.
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, (KeyboardInterrupt, SystemExit, GeneratorExit)):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_known_client_failure(exc: BaseException) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True only for explicit typed Gitea client / config failures.
|
||||
|
||||
Never true for arbitrary ``RuntimeError`` (reviewer finding #3).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import gitea_auth
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(
|
||||
exc,
|
||||
(
|
||||
gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError,
|
||||
gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError,
|
||||
gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError,
|
||||
gitea_auth.GiteaConfigError,
|
||||
gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError,
|
||||
),
|
||||
):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import gitea_config
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_config.ConfigError):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_exception(exc: BaseException) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Return structured classification with **fixed** messages only.
|
||||
|
||||
Only typed authentication / authorization / network / configuration
|
||||
failures receive those labels. Unexpected programming failures are
|
||||
``internal_error``. HTTP bodies and exception text are never copied
|
||||
into ``message``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return _classify_exception_impl(exc)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Fail closed: sanitization / classification failure must not leak.
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
"http_status": None,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _self_declared_classification(exc: BaseException) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Honor a safe ``gitea_reason_code`` attribute set by server-side raisers.
|
||||
|
||||
Converts a raw exception that self-declares a **known** reason code into a
|
||||
typed structured error (fixed message) instead of an opaque internal_error.
|
||||
Unknown / non-string / secret values are ignored (fail closed to internal).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reason = getattr(exc, _SELF_DECLARED_REASON_ATTR, None)
|
||||
if not isinstance(reason, str) or reason not in FIXED_MESSAGES:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if reason == REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": reason,
|
||||
"error_class": _REASON_ERROR_CLASS.get(reason, ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL),
|
||||
"http_status": None,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(reason),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _classify_exception_impl(exc: BaseException) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
import gitea_auth
|
||||
|
||||
declared = _self_declared_classification(exc)
|
||||
if declared is not None:
|
||||
return declared
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError):
|
||||
code = getattr(exc, "reason_code", None) or REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN
|
||||
if code not in (
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_FAILED,
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN,
|
||||
):
|
||||
code = REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": code,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None) or 401,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(code),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError):
|
||||
code = getattr(exc, "reason_code", None) or REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED
|
||||
if code not in (REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED, REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE):
|
||||
code = REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": code,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
|
||||
"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None) or 403,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(code),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_NETWORK_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK,
|
||||
"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None),
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_NETWORK_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaConfigError):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_CONFIG_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
|
||||
"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None),
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_CONFIG_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError):
|
||||
code = getattr(exc, "reason_code", None) or REASON_HTTP_ERROR
|
||||
if code == REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE:
|
||||
error_class = ERROR_CLASS_UPSTREAM
|
||||
else:
|
||||
error_class = ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL
|
||||
code = REASON_HTTP_ERROR
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": code,
|
||||
"error_class": error_class,
|
||||
"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None),
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(code),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import gitea_config
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_config.ConfigError):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_CONFIG_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
|
||||
"http_status": None,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_CONFIG_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
# Unwrap FastMCP ToolError cause when the original was a typed failure.
|
||||
cause = getattr(exc, "__cause__", None)
|
||||
if cause is not None and cause is not exc and is_known_client_failure(cause):
|
||||
return _classify_exception_impl(cause)
|
||||
|
||||
# No message-substring authentication heuristics (reviewer finding #3).
|
||||
# Unexpected failure → internal_error, now carrying SAFE diagnostics so the
|
||||
# failure is actionable: a type identifier + strictly-redacted detail +
|
||||
# optional mutation-stage tag. The operator ``message`` stays the fixed
|
||||
# constant; none of these fields carry secrets/bodies/paths/env.
|
||||
result = {
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
"http_status": None,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
"exception_class": _safe_exception_class(exc),
|
||||
"detail": _redact_detail(_safe_str(exc)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
stage = _safe_mutation_stage(exc)
|
||||
if stage:
|
||||
result["mutation_stage"] = stage
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_structured_error_payload(
|
||||
classification: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
tool_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""LLM-safe structured payload — fixed message + typed metadata only."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
reason = str(classification.get("reason_code") or REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR)
|
||||
message = fixed_message(reason)
|
||||
# Refuse to emit any classification message that is not the fixed constant.
|
||||
if classification.get("message") != message:
|
||||
message = fixed_message(reason)
|
||||
payload: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"isError": True,
|
||||
"reason_code": reason if reason in FIXED_MESSAGES else REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": classification.get("error_class") or ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
"message": message,
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
"retryable": classification.get("error_class")
|
||||
in {
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK,
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
status = classification.get("http_status")
|
||||
if isinstance(status, int):
|
||||
payload["http_status"] = status
|
||||
if tool_name and isinstance(tool_name, str):
|
||||
# Tool names are identifiers, not secrets; bound length.
|
||||
payload["tool"] = tool_name[:120]
|
||||
if profile_name and isinstance(profile_name, str):
|
||||
payload["profile"] = profile_name[:80]
|
||||
# Safe diagnostics — internal_error path only. These make an otherwise
|
||||
# opaque crash actionable without leaking secrets. Re-derived here from
|
||||
# the fixed message gate above; typed reasons never carry them.
|
||||
if payload["reason_code"] == REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR:
|
||||
exc_cls = classification.get("exception_class")
|
||||
if isinstance(exc_cls, str) and exc_cls:
|
||||
payload["exception_class"] = exc_cls[:_CLASS_LIMIT]
|
||||
detail = classification.get("detail")
|
||||
if isinstance(detail, str):
|
||||
payload["detail"] = _redact_detail(detail)
|
||||
stage = classification.get("mutation_stage")
|
||||
if isinstance(stage, str) and stage:
|
||||
payload["mutation_stage"] = stage[:_STAGE_LIMIT]
|
||||
return payload
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"isError": True,
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
"retryable": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def log_sanitized_daemon_reason(
|
||||
classification: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
tool_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
stream=None,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
"""Daemon log: reason codes only — never exception text or response bodies."""
|
||||
stream = stream if stream is not None else sys.stderr
|
||||
try:
|
||||
reason = classification.get("reason_code") or REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR
|
||||
error_class = classification.get("error_class") or ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL
|
||||
# Only emit known tokens; never classification['message'] from callers
|
||||
# that might have been poisoned.
|
||||
if reason not in FIXED_MESSAGES:
|
||||
reason = REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR
|
||||
error_class = ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL
|
||||
parts = [
|
||||
"mcp_tool_error",
|
||||
f"reason_code={reason}",
|
||||
f"error_class={error_class}",
|
||||
]
|
||||
if tool_name and isinstance(tool_name, str):
|
||||
parts.append(f"tool={tool_name[:120]}")
|
||||
status = classification.get("http_status")
|
||||
if isinstance(status, int):
|
||||
parts.append(f"http_status={status}")
|
||||
# Safe diagnostics — internal_error path ONLY. Typed reasons still emit
|
||||
# no detail= (secrets lived there). class/detail/stage are re-redacted
|
||||
# here as defence in depth.
|
||||
if reason == REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR:
|
||||
exc_cls = classification.get("exception_class")
|
||||
if isinstance(exc_cls, str) and exc_cls:
|
||||
parts.append(f"exception_class={exc_cls[:_CLASS_LIMIT]}")
|
||||
stage = classification.get("mutation_stage")
|
||||
if isinstance(stage, str) and stage:
|
||||
parts.append(
|
||||
f"mutation_stage={_redact_detail(stage, limit=_STAGE_LIMIT)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
detail = classification.get("detail")
|
||||
if isinstance(detail, str) and detail:
|
||||
parts.append(f"detail={_redact_detail(detail)}")
|
||||
line = " ".join(parts)
|
||||
stream.write(line + "\n")
|
||||
if hasattr(stream, "flush"):
|
||||
stream.flush()
|
||||
logger.warning(line)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Fail closed: never fall back to logging the exception.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
stream.write(
|
||||
"mcp_tool_error reason_code=internal_error "
|
||||
"error_class=internal\n"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if hasattr(stream, "flush"):
|
||||
stream.flush()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def to_call_tool_result(
|
||||
exc: BaseException,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
tool_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
log: bool = True,
|
||||
) -> Any:
|
||||
"""Build a FastMCP ``CallToolResult`` with ``isError=True`` for *exc*."""
|
||||
from mcp.types import CallToolResult, TextContent
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
classification = classify_exception(exc)
|
||||
if log:
|
||||
log_sanitized_daemon_reason(classification, tool_name=tool_name)
|
||||
payload = build_structured_error_payload(
|
||||
classification, tool_name=tool_name, profile_name=profile_name
|
||||
)
|
||||
text = json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
|
||||
return CallToolResult(
|
||||
content=[TextContent(type="text", text=text)],
|
||||
structuredContent=payload,
|
||||
isError=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Absolute fail-closed path — no exception text.
|
||||
fallback = {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"isError": True,
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
"retryable": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return CallToolResult(
|
||||
content=[
|
||||
TextContent(
|
||||
type="text",
|
||||
text=json.dumps(fallback, indent=2, sort_keys=True),
|
||||
)
|
||||
],
|
||||
structuredContent=fallback,
|
||||
isError=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def install_tool_run_boundary(Tool) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Install a **narrow** error boundary around FastMCP ``Tool.run``.
|
||||
|
||||
Strategy (preserves framework semantics):
|
||||
|
||||
* Call the **original** ``Tool.run`` for the success path (async, return
|
||||
types, convert_result, protocol behavior unchanged).
|
||||
* Re-raise ``UrlElicitationRequiredError`` and other control-flow
|
||||
exceptions without mapping to ``internal_error``.
|
||||
* Map typed Gitea client failures (and ToolError whose ``__cause__`` is
|
||||
typed) to structured ``CallToolResult(isError=True)``.
|
||||
* Map remaining unexpected tool failures to fixed ``internal_error``
|
||||
isError results (transport survival) without secret-bearing text.
|
||||
* Idempotent: second install is a no-op and returns ``False``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if getattr(Tool.run, _INSTALL_FLAG, False):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
from mcp.server.fastmcp.exceptions import ToolError
|
||||
from mcp.shared.exceptions import UrlElicitationRequiredError
|
||||
|
||||
original_run = Tool.run
|
||||
|
||||
async def run_boundary(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
arguments: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
context=None,
|
||||
convert_result: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> Any:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return await original_run(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
arguments,
|
||||
context=context,
|
||||
convert_result=convert_result,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except UrlElicitationRequiredError:
|
||||
# Framework control-flow — must not become internal_error.
|
||||
raise
|
||||
except BaseException as exc:
|
||||
if _is_framework_control_flow(exc):
|
||||
raise
|
||||
if not isinstance(exc, Exception):
|
||||
raise
|
||||
|
||||
# Prefer typed cause under FastMCP ToolError wrappers.
|
||||
target: BaseException = exc
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, ToolError) and exc.__cause__ is not None:
|
||||
target = exc.__cause__
|
||||
|
||||
# Known client failures → structured isError with reason codes.
|
||||
# Unexpected failures → fixed internal_error isError (no secrets).
|
||||
profile_name = _safe_profile_name()
|
||||
return to_call_tool_result(
|
||||
target,
|
||||
tool_name=getattr(self, "name", None),
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
setattr(run_boundary, _INSTALL_FLAG, True)
|
||||
setattr(run_boundary, _ORIGINAL_ATTR, original_run)
|
||||
Tool.run = run_boundary # type: ignore[method-assign]
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def boundary_is_installed(Tool) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when the #699 boundary is active on *Tool.run*."""
|
||||
return bool(getattr(Tool.run, _INSTALL_FLAG, False))
|
||||
+9
-43
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
|
||||
"""Merge approval must pin the current PR head SHA (#471 / #695).
|
||||
"""Merge approval must pin the current PR head SHA (#471).
|
||||
|
||||
Formal APPROVED reviews that predate the live PR head must not satisfy
|
||||
``gitea_merge_pr`` eligibility. Contaminated / quarantined approvals (#695)
|
||||
must not authorize merge either. Pure assessment helpers are isolated here
|
||||
``gitea_merge_pr`` eligibility. Pure assessment helpers are isolated here
|
||||
for hermetic unit tests apart from MCP HTTP calls.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +12,6 @@ def assess_merge_approval_head(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
current_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
latest_by_reviewer: dict,
|
||||
quarantined_review_ids: set | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Return whether a visible approval applies to the live PR head.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,43 +19,18 @@ def assess_merge_approval_head(
|
||||
current_head_sha: Current PR head commit SHA.
|
||||
latest_by_reviewer: Map of reviewer login → review entry dicts with
|
||||
``verdict``, ``dismissed``, and ``reviewed_head_sha`` keys.
|
||||
Optional ``review_id`` / ``id`` used for quarantine checks (#695).
|
||||
quarantined_review_ids: Optional set of review IDs that must not count
|
||||
toward merge authorization (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
dict with ``approval_at_current_head``, ``latest_approved_head_sha``,
|
||||
and ``stale_approval_block_reason`` (set when merge must fail closed).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
current = (current_head_sha or "").strip()
|
||||
blocked_ids = {int(x) for x in (quarantined_review_ids or set()) if x is not None}
|
||||
|
||||
def _rid(entry: dict):
|
||||
raw = entry.get("review_id", entry.get("id"))
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return int(raw) if raw is not None else None
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
approved_entries = []
|
||||
quarantined_at_head = []
|
||||
for entry in (latest_by_reviewer or {}).values():
|
||||
if (entry.get("verdict") or "").upper() != "APPROVED":
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if entry.get("dismissed"):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
rid = _rid(entry)
|
||||
head = (entry.get("reviewed_head_sha") or "").strip()
|
||||
if rid is not None and rid in blocked_ids:
|
||||
if current and head == current:
|
||||
quarantined_at_head.append(entry)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if entry.get("quarantined"):
|
||||
if current and head == current:
|
||||
quarantined_at_head.append(entry)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
approved_entries.append(entry)
|
||||
|
||||
approved_entries = [
|
||||
entry
|
||||
for entry in (latest_by_reviewer or {}).values()
|
||||
if (entry.get("verdict") or "").upper() == "APPROVED"
|
||||
and not entry.get("dismissed")
|
||||
]
|
||||
at_current = any(
|
||||
(entry.get("reviewed_head_sha") or "").strip() == current
|
||||
for entry in approved_entries
|
||||
@@ -74,13 +47,7 @@ def assess_merge_approval_head(
|
||||
)[-1]
|
||||
latest_approved = (latest_entry.get("reviewed_head_sha") or "").strip() or None
|
||||
reason = None
|
||||
if quarantined_at_head and not at_current:
|
||||
reason = (
|
||||
"contaminated/quarantined approval at current head is void for "
|
||||
"merge authorization (#695); required next action: fresh native "
|
||||
"MCP re-review after controller quarantine evidence is recorded"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif approved_entries and not at_current:
|
||||
if approved_entries and not at_current:
|
||||
reason = (
|
||||
f"stale approval: approved SHA '{latest_approved}' does not match "
|
||||
f"current live PR head SHA '{current or '(unknown)'}' (fail closed); "
|
||||
@@ -91,5 +58,4 @@ def assess_merge_approval_head(
|
||||
"approval_at_current_head": at_current,
|
||||
"latest_approved_head_sha": latest_approved,
|
||||
"stale_approval_block_reason": reason,
|
||||
"quarantined_approvals_at_current_head": len(quarantined_at_head),
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -18,13 +18,11 @@ DEFAULT_ADOPTION_REASON = "merger-handoff-approved-head"
|
||||
|
||||
SOURCE_ADOPT = "gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease"
|
||||
SOURCE_ACQUIRE = "gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease"
|
||||
SOURCE_ACQUIRE_MERGER = "gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease"
|
||||
SOURCE_HEARTBEAT = "gitea_heartbeat_reviewer_pr_lease"
|
||||
|
||||
SANCTIONED_PROVENANCE_SOURCES = frozenset({
|
||||
SOURCE_ADOPT,
|
||||
SOURCE_ACQUIRE,
|
||||
SOURCE_ACQUIRE_MERGER,
|
||||
SOURCE_HEARTBEAT,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -211,10 +209,8 @@ _SANCTIONED_LEASE_EVIDENCE_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?is)\b("
|
||||
r"gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease|"
|
||||
r"gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease|"
|
||||
r"gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease|"
|
||||
r"lease_proof_source\s*[:=]\s*gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease|"
|
||||
r"lease_proof_source\s*[:=]\s*gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease|"
|
||||
r"lease_proof_source\s*[:=]\s*gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease|"
|
||||
r"lease_proof_kind\s*[:=]\s*sanctioned_adoption|"
|
||||
r"lease_proof_kind\s*[:=]\s*sanctioned_acquire|"
|
||||
r"adoption_comment_id\s*[:=]|"
|
||||
|
||||
+7
-126
@@ -20,114 +20,12 @@ if PROJECT_ROOT not in sys.path:
|
||||
import gitea_config
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Defaults emit *canonical* operation names only. Shorthand that is not in
|
||||
# gitea_config.GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES (e.g. ``pr.close``, ``issue.close``)
|
||||
# is silently dropped by the production loader and must never appear here.
|
||||
AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.create",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
]
|
||||
AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.request_changes",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
]
|
||||
AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = ["read", "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr", "comment"]
|
||||
AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = ["approve", "request_changes", "merge"]
|
||||
REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.request_changes",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"read", "review", "comment", "approve", "request_changes", "merge"
|
||||
]
|
||||
REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = [
|
||||
"gitea.branch.create",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
]
|
||||
# Required reconciler ops (read + pr.close) plus recommended comment/close and
|
||||
# branch.delete for guarded merged-PR cleanup. All names must normalize via
|
||||
# gitea_config.normalize_operation without being dropped.
|
||||
RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.close",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.close",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
]
|
||||
RECONCILER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
# Migration-only expansions for common shorthands that are *not* in
|
||||
# GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES. Emitted output is always the canonical form so a
|
||||
# second canonicalize pass is a no-op (idempotent).
|
||||
_MIGRATION_ONLY_ALIASES = {
|
||||
"pr.close": "gitea.pr.close",
|
||||
"pr.comment": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"issue.close": "gitea.issue.close",
|
||||
"branch.delete": "gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Reconciler required ops that must survive migration (from reconciler_profile).
|
||||
RECONCILER_REQUIRED_CANONICAL = ("gitea.read", "gitea.pr.close")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def canonicalize_operation(op: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Return a canonical operation name accepted by the production loader.
|
||||
|
||||
Fail closed on unknown/ambiguous spellings so required permissions cannot
|
||||
be silently dropped by ``check_operation`` later.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(op, str) or not op.strip():
|
||||
raise ValueError("operation must be a non-empty string (fail closed)")
|
||||
op = op.strip()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return gitea_config.normalize_operation(op)
|
||||
except gitea_config.ConfigError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if op in _MIGRATION_ONLY_ALIASES:
|
||||
return _MIGRATION_ONLY_ALIASES[op]
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"operation {op!r} cannot be canonicalized for migration "
|
||||
"(unknown/ambiguous; fail closed — production loader would drop it)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def canonicalize_operations(ops, *, context: str = "operations") -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Canonicalize a list of operations; preserve order, drop duplicates."""
|
||||
if not isinstance(ops, list):
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"{context} must be a list (fail closed)")
|
||||
out: list[str] = []
|
||||
seen: set[str] = set()
|
||||
for entry in ops:
|
||||
canon = canonicalize_operation(entry)
|
||||
if canon not in seen:
|
||||
seen.add(canon)
|
||||
out.append(canon)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _assert_reconciler_required_survive(allowed: list[str], profile_name: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Fail visibly when migration would leave a reconciler without required ops."""
|
||||
missing = [op for op in RECONCILER_REQUIRED_CANONICAL if op not in set(allowed)]
|
||||
if missing:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"Profile '{profile_name}' (reconciler) is missing required "
|
||||
f"operation(s) after migration: {missing}. Refusing to emit a "
|
||||
"profile that would silently fail pr.close / read (fail closed)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = ["branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def infer_role(name, execution_profile):
|
||||
@@ -192,11 +90,9 @@ def migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data):
|
||||
ident_name = "reviewer"
|
||||
elif role == "author":
|
||||
ident_name = "author"
|
||||
elif role == "reconciler":
|
||||
ident_name = "reconciler"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
role = prof.get("role")
|
||||
if role not in (None, "author", "reviewer", "reconciler"):
|
||||
if role not in (None, "author", "reviewer"):
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"Profile '{name}' has unsupported role {role!r}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -228,35 +124,20 @@ def migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data):
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"Profile '{name}' operation fields must be lists"
|
||||
)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
identity_data["allowed_operations"] = canonicalize_operations(
|
||||
allowed, context=f"profile '{name}' allowed_operations"
|
||||
)
|
||||
identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = canonicalize_operations(
|
||||
forbidden, context=f"profile '{name}' forbidden_operations"
|
||||
)
|
||||
except ValueError as exc:
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"Profile '{name}': {exc}") from exc
|
||||
identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(allowed)
|
||||
identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(forbidden)
|
||||
elif role == "author":
|
||||
identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
|
||||
identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
|
||||
elif role == "reviewer":
|
||||
identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
|
||||
identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
|
||||
elif role == "reconciler":
|
||||
identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
|
||||
identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(RECONCILER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"Profile '{name}' has no explicit operation lists and no "
|
||||
"unambiguous author/reviewer role marker (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if role == "reconciler":
|
||||
_assert_reconciler_required_survive(
|
||||
identity_data["allowed_operations"], name
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Nest inside environments/services structure
|
||||
env = environments.setdefault(env_name, {})
|
||||
services = env.setdefault("services", {})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -56,46 +56,23 @@ def resolve_namespace_workspace(
|
||||
env: dict[str, str] | os._Environ | None = None,
|
||||
session_lease_worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
demotions: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
verify_paths: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> tuple[str, str]:
|
||||
"""Return ``(resolved_path, binding_source)`` for *role_kind*.
|
||||
|
||||
With *verify_paths*, env-sourced candidates whose path no longer exists
|
||||
are demoted (#702): a binding to a deleted worktree can never name a
|
||||
valid task workspace, so resolution falls through to the next candidate.
|
||||
Explicit arguments are never demoted — a caller-declared path must fail
|
||||
loudly downstream rather than silently rebind. Demotion notes are
|
||||
appended to *demotions* when provided. Runtime-context and mutation
|
||||
guards resolve through :func:`resolve_namespace_mutation_context`, which
|
||||
always verifies.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""Return ``(resolved_path, binding_source)`` for *role_kind*."""
|
||||
env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
|
||||
role = normalize_role_kind(role_kind, profile_name=profile_name)
|
||||
role_env_key = ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS[role]
|
||||
|
||||
for candidate, source, env_sourced in (
|
||||
(worktree_path, "worktree_path argument", False),
|
||||
(worktree, "worktree argument", False),
|
||||
(_env_value(env_map, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV),
|
||||
f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV} environment variable", True),
|
||||
(_env_value(env_map, role_env_key),
|
||||
f"{role_env_key} environment variable", True),
|
||||
for candidate, source in (
|
||||
(worktree_path, "worktree_path argument"),
|
||||
(worktree, "worktree argument"),
|
||||
(_env_value(env_map, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV), f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV} environment variable"),
|
||||
(_env_value(env_map, role_env_key), f"{role_env_key} environment variable"),
|
||||
(session_lease_worktree if role in {"reviewer", "merger"} else None,
|
||||
"reviewer PR lease worktree", False),
|
||||
"reviewer PR lease worktree"),
|
||||
):
|
||||
text = (candidate or "").strip()
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
real = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(text))
|
||||
if verify_paths and env_sourced and not os.path.isdir(real):
|
||||
if demotions is not None:
|
||||
demotions.append(
|
||||
f"{source} '{real}' demoted: path no longer exists "
|
||||
"(stale binding, #702)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
return real, source
|
||||
if text:
|
||||
return os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(text)), source
|
||||
|
||||
return os.path.realpath(process_project_root), "MCP server process root (default)"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -111,7 +88,6 @@ def resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Shared workspace resolution for runtime_context and mutation guards."""
|
||||
demotions: list[str] = []
|
||||
workspace, binding_source = resolve_namespace_workspace(
|
||||
role_kind=role_kind,
|
||||
worktree_path=worktree_path,
|
||||
@@ -120,8 +96,6 @@ def resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
|
||||
env=env,
|
||||
session_lease_worktree=session_lease_worktree,
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
demotions=demotions,
|
||||
verify_paths=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
process_root = os.path.realpath(process_project_root)
|
||||
role = normalize_role_kind(role_kind, profile_name=profile_name)
|
||||
@@ -137,7 +111,7 @@ def resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
|
||||
"workspace_path": workspace,
|
||||
"workspace_binding_source": binding_source,
|
||||
"workspace_role_kind": role,
|
||||
"ignored_bindings": demotions + (pollution.get("ignored_bindings") or []),
|
||||
"ignored_bindings": pollution.get("ignored_bindings") or [],
|
||||
"process_project_root": process_root,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": canonical_root,
|
||||
"roots_aligned": canonical_root == process_root,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -86,22 +86,6 @@ _WRONG_BRANCH_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"deleted branch (?:does not match|!=|differs from) (?:merged )?pr head",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# #698: canonical reviewer lease lifecycle operations are NOT post-merge
|
||||
# cleanup. Releasing a reviewer PR lease (or posting its terminal
|
||||
# phase=released marker) happens after every review — merged or not — and
|
||||
# must never trigger the post-merge branch/worktree cleanup checklist.
|
||||
_LEASE_LIFECYCLE_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?:gitea_release_reviewer_pr_lease|gitea_abandon_workflow_lease|"
|
||||
r"release[d]? (?:the )?(?:reviewer|workflow) (?:pr )?lease|"
|
||||
r"reviewer (?:pr )?lease release[d]?|"
|
||||
r"lease (?:marker|comment).{0,40}phase\s*[:=]\s*released|"
|
||||
r"phase\s*[:=]\s*released)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_CLEANUP_MUTATIONS_VALUE_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"cleanup mutations\s*:\s*([^\n]+)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _claims_remote_delete(text: str) -> bool:
|
||||
@@ -220,19 +204,16 @@ def assess_post_merge_cleanup_proof(
|
||||
for field in _worktree_cleanup_fields_present(text)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if (remote_delete or worktree_remove) and not (remote_delete or worktree_remove):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
if not remote_delete and not worktree_remove:
|
||||
value_match = _CLEANUP_MUTATIONS_VALUE_RE.search(text)
|
||||
value = (value_match.group(1).strip() if value_match else "")
|
||||
value_lower = value.lower()
|
||||
substantive = bool(value) and value_lower not in {
|
||||
"none", "n/a", "not applicable",
|
||||
}
|
||||
# #698: reviewer lease release / terminal lease markers are lease
|
||||
# lifecycle, not post-merge cleanup — no checklist owed.
|
||||
lease_lifecycle_only = substantive and bool(
|
||||
_LEASE_LIFECYCLE_RE.search(value)
|
||||
cleanup_mutations = re.search(
|
||||
r"cleanup mutations\s*:\s*(?!none\b)\S",
|
||||
text,
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if substantive and not lease_lifecycle_only:
|
||||
if cleanup_mutations:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"cleanup mutations reported without post-merge cleanup proof checklist"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,648 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""PR synchronization and conflict-remediation lifecycle (#PR-SYNC).
|
||||
|
||||
Pure assessment helpers for:
|
||||
|
||||
* ``gitea_assess_pr_sync_status`` — recommend the next sanctioned action for an
|
||||
open PR when the base branch advances, approvals go stale, or conflicts appear.
|
||||
* ``gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge`` preflight — author-only, fail-closed pin
|
||||
of both PR head and live base head; never rebase/force-push.
|
||||
|
||||
All recommendation logic is hermetic (no network) so unit tests cover every
|
||||
acceptance path without Gitea credentials.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
_FULL_SHA = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||||
|
||||
# Recommended next actions (controller / skill vocabulary).
|
||||
ACTION_MERGE_NOW = "merge_now"
|
||||
ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE = "update_branch_by_merge"
|
||||
ACTION_AUTHOR_CONFLICT_REMEDIATION = "author_conflict_remediation"
|
||||
ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED = "fresh_review_required"
|
||||
ACTION_BLOCKED = "blocked"
|
||||
|
||||
_VALID_ACTIONS = frozenset({
|
||||
ACTION_MERGE_NOW,
|
||||
ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE,
|
||||
ACTION_AUTHOR_CONFLICT_REMEDIATION,
|
||||
ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED,
|
||||
ACTION_BLOCKED,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
# Author-only mutation; reviewer/merger must never update author branches.
|
||||
_AUTHOR_UPDATE_ROLES = frozenset({"author"})
|
||||
_DENIED_UPDATE_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "mixed", "limited"})
|
||||
|
||||
# Allowed Gitea update style — merge only (never rebase).
|
||||
UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE = "merge"
|
||||
_FORBIDDEN_UPDATE_STYLES = frozenset({"rebase", "rebase-merge", "squash", "force"})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _normalize_sha(value: str | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
text = (value or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return text if _FULL_SHA.match(text) else None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _normalize_role(role: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
return (role or "").strip().lower() or "unknown"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_pr_sync_status(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
host: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
pr_state: str | None = None,
|
||||
source_branch: str | None = None,
|
||||
pr_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
base_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
commits_behind: int | None = None,
|
||||
mergeable: bool | None = None,
|
||||
has_conflicts: bool | None = None,
|
||||
branch_protection_requires_current_base: bool | None = None,
|
||||
approval_at_current_head: bool | None = None,
|
||||
checks_status: str | None = None,
|
||||
active_author_lock: bool | None = None,
|
||||
active_reviewer_lease: bool | None = None,
|
||||
active_merger_lease: bool | None = None,
|
||||
prepared_verdict_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
checks_required: bool = True,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Recommend the next sanctioned PR lifecycle action.
|
||||
|
||||
Decision order (fail closed):
|
||||
|
||||
1. Incomplete identity / open state / head SHAs → ``blocked``
|
||||
2. Conflicts (or mergeable false with conflict signal) →
|
||||
``author_conflict_remediation``
|
||||
3. Head changed after approval / prepared verdict for former head →
|
||||
``fresh_review_required`` (unless conflicts already routed author work)
|
||||
4. Behind live base + branch protection requires current base +
|
||||
auto-mergeable → ``update_branch_by_merge``
|
||||
5. Approval at current head + mergeable + checks ok (+ update not
|
||||
required) → ``merge_now``
|
||||
6. Otherwise ``blocked`` with structured reasons
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
pr_head = _normalize_sha(pr_head_sha)
|
||||
base_head = _normalize_sha(base_head_sha)
|
||||
prepared_head = _normalize_sha(prepared_verdict_head_sha)
|
||||
state = (pr_state or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
checks = (checks_status or "unknown").strip().lower()
|
||||
behind = commits_behind if isinstance(commits_behind, int) and commits_behind >= 0 else None
|
||||
requires_current = bool(branch_protection_requires_current_base)
|
||||
approval_ok = bool(approval_at_current_head)
|
||||
|
||||
# Derive conflict when caller only supplies mergeable=False.
|
||||
if has_conflicts is None and mergeable is False:
|
||||
has_conflicts = True
|
||||
conflicts = bool(has_conflicts) if has_conflicts is not None else None
|
||||
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"host": (host or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
"org": (org or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
"repo": (repo or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
"pr_number": pr_number,
|
||||
"pr_state": state or None,
|
||||
"source_branch": (source_branch or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
"pr_head_sha": pr_head,
|
||||
"base_head_sha": base_head,
|
||||
"commits_behind": behind,
|
||||
"mergeable": mergeable,
|
||||
"has_conflicts": conflicts,
|
||||
"branch_protection_requires_current_base": requires_current,
|
||||
"approval_at_current_head": approval_ok if approval_at_current_head is not None else None,
|
||||
"checks_status": checks,
|
||||
"active_locks_and_leases": {
|
||||
"author_lock": bool(active_author_lock) if active_author_lock is not None else None,
|
||||
"reviewer_lease": bool(active_reviewer_lease) if active_reviewer_lease is not None else None,
|
||||
"merger_lease": bool(active_merger_lease) if active_merger_lease is not None else None,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"prepared_verdict_head_sha": prepared_head,
|
||||
"recommended_next_action": ACTION_BLOCKED,
|
||||
"approval_valid_for_merge": False,
|
||||
"stale_approval": False,
|
||||
"stale_prepared_verdict": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"performed": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if not isinstance(pr_number, int) or pr_number <= 0:
|
||||
reasons.append("pr_number must be a positive integer (fail closed)")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if state and state not in ("open",):
|
||||
reasons.append(f"PR is not open (state={state}); cannot synchronize or merge")
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
if not state:
|
||||
reasons.append("PR state missing (fail closed)")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if pr_head is None:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"exact PR head SHA missing or not a full 40-char hex SHA (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if base_head is None:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"exact live base head SHA missing or not a full 40-char hex SHA (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if behind is None:
|
||||
reasons.append("commits_behind missing or invalid (fail closed)")
|
||||
if mergeable is None:
|
||||
reasons.append("mergeable signal missing (fail closed)")
|
||||
if approval_at_current_head is None:
|
||||
reasons.append("approval_at_current_head missing (fail closed)")
|
||||
if branch_protection_requires_current_base is None:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"branch_protection_requires_current_base missing (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if reasons:
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# Stale prepared verdict / approval across heads.
|
||||
stale_prepared = bool(prepared_head and prepared_head != pr_head)
|
||||
result["stale_prepared_verdict"] = stale_prepared
|
||||
stale_approval = not approval_ok
|
||||
result["stale_approval"] = stale_approval
|
||||
result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = bool(approval_ok and not stale_prepared)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Conflicts: author remediation in dedicated worktree ──────────────
|
||||
if conflicts is True or mergeable is False:
|
||||
if conflicts is True or mergeable is False:
|
||||
# Distinguish pure non-mergeable without explicit conflict flag
|
||||
# still routes author remediation (Gitea cannot auto-update).
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"PR #{pr_number} has conflicts or is not mergeable at head "
|
||||
f"{pr_head}; route author conflict remediation in the existing "
|
||||
"issue/PR worktree under branches/ (never force-push or rebase)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if stale_approval:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"any approval at a former head is invalid; after remediation "
|
||||
"require a fresh independent review at the new exact head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_AUTHOR_CONFLICT_REMEDIATION
|
||||
result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = False
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Stale approval / prepared verdict at former head ─────────────────
|
||||
if not approval_ok or stale_prepared:
|
||||
if behind and behind > 0 and requires_current and mergeable is True:
|
||||
# Must update first; update will also invalidate approval.
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"PR is {behind} commit(s) behind live base and branch protection "
|
||||
"requires current base; automatic merge-from-base is available"
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"approval is not valid at the current head (or prepared verdict "
|
||||
"is head-scoped to a former SHA); after update require fresh review"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE
|
||||
result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = False
|
||||
return result
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"approval is not valid at the exact current PR head "
|
||||
f"({pr_head}); never reuse a former-head approval for merge"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if stale_prepared:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"prepared verdict pinned to former head {prepared_head} cannot "
|
||||
f"authorize review/merge at current head {pr_head}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if active_reviewer_lease:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"active reviewer lease must be released or superseded for the "
|
||||
"new head before a fresh independent review"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if active_merger_lease:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"active merger lease cannot cross heads; release or re-acquire "
|
||||
"at the new exact head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED
|
||||
result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = False
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Outdated + protection requires current base, auto-updatable ──────
|
||||
if behind and behind > 0 and requires_current:
|
||||
if mergeable is True and conflicts is not True:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"PR is {behind} commit(s) behind live base {base_head}; "
|
||||
"branch protection requires the PR branch to contain current base; "
|
||||
"Gitea can merge base into the PR branch without conflicts"
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"route author-only update_branch_by_merge; never rebase or force-push; "
|
||||
"new head invalidates prior approval and requires fresh independent review"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE
|
||||
# Approval today is at old head that will change — not mergeable yet
|
||||
# for final merge until re-reviewed, but assess marks update path.
|
||||
result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = False
|
||||
result["stale_approval"] = True # will become stale after update
|
||||
return result
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"update required by branch protection but automatic merge is not available"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Checks gate for merge_now ────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if checks_required and checks not in ("success", "passed", "ok", "none", "skipped", "not_required"):
|
||||
if checks in ("pending", "running", "queued"):
|
||||
reasons.append(f"required checks are not finished (status={checks})")
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
if checks in ("failure", "failed", "error", "cancelled"):
|
||||
reasons.append(f"required checks failed (status={checks})")
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
# unknown — fail closed when checks_required
|
||||
if checks == "unknown":
|
||||
reasons.append("checks status unknown (fail closed)")
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Ready to merge without update ────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Includes: current with approval; outdated when update is NOT required.
|
||||
if approval_ok and mergeable is True and conflicts is not True:
|
||||
if behind and behind > 0 and not requires_current:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"PR is {behind} commit(s) behind live base but branch protection "
|
||||
"does not require the latest base; preserve the approved head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"PR has a valid approval at the exact current head, is conflict-free "
|
||||
"and mergeable; do not update the branch unnecessarily"
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons.append("route directly to the sanctioned merger workflow (merge_now)")
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_MERGE_NOW
|
||||
result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = True
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
reasons.append("no sanctioned next action matched the observed PR state (fail closed)")
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_update_pr_branch_preflight(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
role_kind: str | None,
|
||||
expected_pr_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
live_pr_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
expected_base_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
live_base_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
has_conflicts: bool | None = None,
|
||||
mergeable: bool | None = None,
|
||||
style: str | None = UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE,
|
||||
has_author_lock: bool | None = None,
|
||||
worktree_path: str | None = None,
|
||||
worktree_owns_source_branch: bool | None = None,
|
||||
control_checkout_clean: bool | None = None,
|
||||
master_parity_ok: bool | None = None,
|
||||
force_push: bool = False,
|
||||
rebase: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Author-only preflight for update-by-merge; fail closed on any race.
|
||||
|
||||
When conflicts exist, returns a structured author-remediation handoff and
|
||||
sets ``mutation_allowed=False`` so no partial remote update is performed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
role = _normalize_role(role_kind)
|
||||
exp_pr = _normalize_sha(expected_pr_head_sha)
|
||||
live_pr = _normalize_sha(live_pr_head_sha)
|
||||
exp_base = _normalize_sha(expected_base_head_sha)
|
||||
live_base = _normalize_sha(live_base_head_sha)
|
||||
style_norm = (style or "").strip().lower() or UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE
|
||||
|
||||
conflicts = has_conflicts
|
||||
if conflicts is None and mergeable is False:
|
||||
conflicts = True
|
||||
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"mutation_allowed": False,
|
||||
"performed": False,
|
||||
"style": style_norm,
|
||||
"role_kind": role,
|
||||
"expected_pr_head_sha": exp_pr,
|
||||
"live_pr_head_sha": live_pr,
|
||||
"expected_base_head_sha": exp_base,
|
||||
"live_base_head_sha": live_base,
|
||||
"head_race": False,
|
||||
"base_race": False,
|
||||
"has_conflicts": conflicts,
|
||||
"author_remediation_handoff": False,
|
||||
"approval_invalidated_for_former_head": False,
|
||||
"force_push": bool(force_push),
|
||||
"rebase": bool(rebase),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Role gate — author only.
|
||||
if role not in _AUTHOR_UPDATE_ROLES:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"role '{role}' cannot update an author PR branch "
|
||||
"(author-only; reviewer/merger denial)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if force_push:
|
||||
reasons.append("force-push is forbidden for PR branch update (fail closed)")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
if rebase or style_norm in _FORBIDDEN_UPDATE_STYLES:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"update style '{style_norm}' forbidden; only style=merge is allowed "
|
||||
"(never rebase)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
if style_norm != UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"unknown update style '{style_norm}'; expected '{UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if not exp_pr or not live_pr:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"expected and live PR head SHAs must be full 40-char hex (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not exp_base or not live_base:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"expected and live base head SHAs must be full 40-char hex (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if reasons:
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if exp_pr != live_pr:
|
||||
result["head_race"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"PR head race: expected {exp_pr} but live is {live_pr} "
|
||||
"(fail closed; no partial mutation)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
if exp_base != live_base:
|
||||
result["base_race"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"base head race: expected {exp_base} but live is {live_base} "
|
||||
"(fail closed; no partial mutation)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if has_author_lock is not True:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"existing issue/PR lock required before update_branch_by_merge (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
wt = (worktree_path or "").strip()
|
||||
if not wt:
|
||||
reasons.append("existing PR worktree path required under branches/ (fail closed)")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
norm = wt.replace("\\", "/")
|
||||
if "/branches/" not in norm and not norm.startswith("branches/"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"worktree_path '{wt}' must be under branches/ (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if worktree_owns_source_branch is False:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"worktree does not own the PR source branch (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if control_checkout_clean is False:
|
||||
reasons.append("control checkout is not clean (fail closed)")
|
||||
if master_parity_ok is False:
|
||||
reasons.append("runtime/master parity failed (fail closed)")
|
||||
|
||||
if conflicts is True:
|
||||
result["author_remediation_handoff"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"conflicts present: return structured author-remediation handoff "
|
||||
"without creating a partial remote update"
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"resolve conflicts explicitly in the existing dedicated worktree, "
|
||||
"run focused and regression tests, commit/push via sanctioned author "
|
||||
"workflow, then route the new exact head to independent review"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if mergeable is False and conflicts is not False:
|
||||
result["author_remediation_handoff"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"PR is not mergeable; refuse automatic update and hand off to "
|
||||
"author conflict remediation (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if reasons:
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
result["mutation_allowed"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"preflight passed: author may merge live base into the PR branch via "
|
||||
"native MCP update (style=merge only)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_post_update_head_transition(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
former_pr_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
new_pr_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
former_approval_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
former_reviewer_lease_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
former_merger_lease_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
prepared_verdict_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""After a successful update-by-merge, invalidate cross-head artifacts.
|
||||
|
||||
The new head never inherits approval, reviewer/merger leases, or prepared
|
||||
verdicts from the former head.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
former = _normalize_sha(former_pr_head_sha)
|
||||
new = _normalize_sha(new_pr_head_sha)
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"former_pr_head_sha": former,
|
||||
"new_pr_head_sha": new,
|
||||
"head_changed": bool(former and new and former != new),
|
||||
"approval_invalidated": False,
|
||||
"reviewer_lease_superseded": False,
|
||||
"merger_lease_superseded": False,
|
||||
"prepared_verdict_invalidated": False,
|
||||
"recommended_next_action": ACTION_BLOCKED,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if not former or not new:
|
||||
reasons.append("former and new PR head SHAs required (fail closed)")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
if former == new:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"PR head unchanged after update; unexpected for merge-from-base"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
result["head_changed"] = True
|
||||
# Approval at former head is always void at new head.
|
||||
former_approval = _normalize_sha(former_approval_head_sha) or former
|
||||
if former_approval != new:
|
||||
result["approval_invalidated"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"approval for former head {former_approval} is invalid at new head "
|
||||
f"{new}; never preserve approval across a head change"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
rev_lease = _normalize_sha(former_reviewer_lease_head_sha)
|
||||
if rev_lease and rev_lease != new:
|
||||
result["reviewer_lease_superseded"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"reviewer lease for head {rev_lease} cannot cross to {new}; "
|
||||
"release or supersede before fresh review"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif rev_lease is None:
|
||||
# Unknown lease head still must not authorize at new head.
|
||||
result["reviewer_lease_superseded"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"any reviewer lease scoped to the former head is superseded at the new head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
mer_lease = _normalize_sha(former_merger_lease_head_sha)
|
||||
if mer_lease and mer_lease != new:
|
||||
result["merger_lease_superseded"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"merger lease for head {mer_lease} cannot cross to {new}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
result["merger_lease_superseded"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"any merger lease scoped to the former head is superseded at the new head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
prepared = _normalize_sha(prepared_verdict_head_sha)
|
||||
if prepared and prepared != new:
|
||||
result["prepared_verdict_invalidated"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"prepared verdict for head {prepared} cannot authorize the new head {new}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif prepared is None:
|
||||
result["prepared_verdict_invalidated"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"prepared verdicts associated with the former head are invalidated"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"route the new exact head to independent review "
|
||||
f"({ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_sequential_queue_step(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
just_merged: bool,
|
||||
master_refreshed: bool,
|
||||
next_pr_number: int | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Controller sequential processing: reassess only after merge + master refresh."""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if just_merged and not master_refreshed:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"master must be refreshed after each merge before reassessing the next PR "
|
||||
"(do not update every PR simultaneously)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reassess_allowed": False,
|
||||
"process_next": False,
|
||||
"next_pr_number": next_pr_number,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not just_merged:
|
||||
reasons.append("no merge completed; sequential step does not advance")
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reassess_allowed": False,
|
||||
"process_next": False,
|
||||
"next_pr_number": next_pr_number,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if next_pr_number:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"merge completed and live master refreshed; reassess the next PR "
|
||||
f"#{next_pr_number}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"merge completed and live master refreshed; reassess the next PR"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reassess_allowed": True,
|
||||
"process_next": True,
|
||||
"next_pr_number": next_pr_number,
|
||||
"post_merge_cleanup_handoff": True,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def merge_approval_usable_at_head(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
current_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
approved_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Stale approval cannot authorize merge (head-scoped only)."""
|
||||
current = _normalize_sha(current_head_sha)
|
||||
approved = _normalize_sha(approved_head_sha)
|
||||
ok = bool(current and approved and current == approved)
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if not ok:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"stale approval: approved head '{approved or '(none)'}' does not "
|
||||
f"match current head '{current or '(none)'}'; cannot authorize merge"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"approval_usable": ok,
|
||||
"current_head_sha": current,
|
||||
"approved_head_sha": approved,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def lease_usable_at_head(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
lease_kind: str,
|
||||
lease_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
current_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Reviewer/merger leases cannot cross heads."""
|
||||
current = _normalize_sha(current_head_sha)
|
||||
lease_head = _normalize_sha(lease_head_sha)
|
||||
kind = (lease_kind or "").strip().lower() or "unknown"
|
||||
ok = bool(current and lease_head and current == lease_head)
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if not ok:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"stale {kind} lease: lease head '{lease_head or '(none)'}' cannot "
|
||||
f"authorize work at current head '{current or '(none)'}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"lease_usable": ok,
|
||||
"lease_kind": kind,
|
||||
"lease_head_sha": lease_head,
|
||||
"current_head_sha": current,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
+6
-67
@@ -403,37 +403,10 @@ _REVIEWER_ACTIVE_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"whether any reviewer was active\s*:\s*(yes|no|true|false)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# #698 phase detection for phase-specific head proofs.
|
||||
_NO_REVIEWED_HEAD_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?:reviewed head sha|candidate head sha)\s*:\s*none\b",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_VERDICT_RECORDED_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"review decision\s*:\s*(?:approve[d]?|request[_ ]changes)\b"
|
||||
r"|review_status\s*:\s*(?:approved|request_changes)\b"
|
||||
r"|terminal review mutation\s*:\s*(?!none\b)\S",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_MERGE_ATTEMPTED_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"merge result\s*:\s*(?:merged|success|performed|failed|attempted)\b"
|
||||
r"|merge mutations\s*:\s*(?!none\b|not applicable\b)\S",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_VALIDATION_STARTED_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"validation\s*:\s*(?!none\b|not run\b|not applicable\b|not started\b)"
|
||||
r"[^\n]*(?:pass|fail|ran|executed|\d+\s+passed)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_reviewer_stale_head_final_report(report_text: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Final-report proof for reviewed vs live head SHAs (#399 AC 6).
|
||||
|
||||
#698: head proofs are phase-specific. A legitimately blocked run that
|
||||
never began validation (no reviewed head, no formal verdict, no merge)
|
||||
owes none of them; approval-time and merge-time live-head proofs are
|
||||
owed only once the corresponding phase actually begins.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""Final-report proof for reviewed vs live head SHAs (#399 AC 6)."""
|
||||
text = report_text or ""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
reviewed = _normalize_sha(_REVIEWED_HEAD_RE.search(text).group(1) if _REVIEWED_HEAD_RE.search(text) else None)
|
||||
@@ -449,49 +422,15 @@ def assess_reviewer_stale_head_final_report(report_text: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
)
|
||||
push_during = _PUSH_DURING_VALIDATION_RE.search(text)
|
||||
|
||||
# Phase detection from the report's own claims.
|
||||
no_head_stated = bool(_NO_REVIEWED_HEAD_RE.search(text))
|
||||
verdict_recorded = bool(_VERDICT_RECORDED_RE.search(text))
|
||||
merge_attempted = bool(_MERGE_ATTEMPTED_RE.search(text))
|
||||
validation_started = bool(reviewed) or bool(_VALIDATION_STARTED_RE.search(text))
|
||||
blocked_before_validation = (
|
||||
no_head_stated
|
||||
and not reviewed
|
||||
and not verdict_recorded
|
||||
and not merge_attempted
|
||||
and not validation_started
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if blocked_before_validation:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"reviewed_head_sha": None,
|
||||
"live_head_sha_before_approval": None,
|
||||
"live_head_sha_before_merge": None,
|
||||
"push_during_validation": (
|
||||
push_during.group(1).lower() if push_during else None
|
||||
),
|
||||
"phase": "blocked_before_validation",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if not reviewed and not no_head_stated:
|
||||
# The head must always be STATED — either a SHA or an explicit
|
||||
# 'none'. Silence is not a phase claim and fails closed.
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"reviewed head SHA not stated in final report "
|
||||
"(state the SHA or an explicit 'none')"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif not reviewed and (validation_started or verdict_recorded or merge_attempted):
|
||||
if not reviewed:
|
||||
reasons.append("reviewed head SHA not stated in final report")
|
||||
if verdict_recorded and not live_approval:
|
||||
if not live_approval:
|
||||
reasons.append("final live head SHA before approval not stated")
|
||||
if merge_attempted and not live_merge:
|
||||
if not live_merge:
|
||||
reasons.append("final live head SHA before merge not stated")
|
||||
if validation_started and not push_during:
|
||||
if not push_during:
|
||||
reasons.append("whether push occurred during validation not stated")
|
||||
if reviewed and live_approval and reviewed != live_approval:
|
||||
elif reviewed and live_approval and reviewed != live_approval:
|
||||
reasons.append("live head before approval differs from reviewed head SHA")
|
||||
elif reviewed and live_merge and reviewed != live_merge:
|
||||
reasons.append("live head before merge differs from reviewed head SHA")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,11 +18,6 @@ RECONCILER_RECOMMENDED_OPERATIONS = (
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.close",
|
||||
# Merged-branch cleanup is reconciler-owned (task_capability_map maps
|
||||
# cleanup_merged_pr_branch -> reconciler). The permission is only
|
||||
# exercisable through the guarded gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path
|
||||
# (#514): merged proof, protected-branch refusal, explicit confirmation.
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
RECONCILER_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS = (
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ python-multipart==0.0.32
|
||||
referencing==0.37.0
|
||||
rich==15.0.0
|
||||
rpds-py==2026.5.1
|
||||
sentry-sdk==2.20.0
|
||||
shellingham==1.5.4
|
||||
sse-starlette==3.4.5
|
||||
starlette==1.3.1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -25,13 +25,8 @@ _REVIEWED_HEAD_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?:pinned reviewed head|reviewed head sha)\s*:\s*([0-9a-f]{7,40})",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# #698: validation pass proof appears in several legitimate shapes —
|
||||
# "Validation: pass", "Validation: focused 50 passed; full 2665 passed",
|
||||
# or structured "validation_status: pass". Accept pass evidence anywhere in
|
||||
# the Validation field's value, not only as its first token.
|
||||
_VALIDATION_PASS_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"validation(?:_status)?\s*:[^\n]{0,300}?"
|
||||
r"(?:\bpass(?:ed)?\b|\bstrong\b|\bok\b|\bgreen\b|\d+\s+passed)",
|
||||
r"validation\s*:\s*(?:pass|passed|strong|ok|green)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_MERGED_CLAIM_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
|
||||
+9
-36
@@ -858,16 +858,9 @@ _WALKTHROUGH_ARTIFACT_RE = re.compile(r"walkthrough\.md", re.I)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _performed_file_mutations(action_log: list[dict] | None) -> list[dict]:
|
||||
"""Return performed local file mutations, excluding gated rejections.
|
||||
|
||||
Non-dict entries (malformed JSON, LLM mistakes) are ignored instead of
|
||||
raising ``AttributeError`` (#698): a malformed ledger entry can never be
|
||||
authoritative mutation evidence.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""Return performed local file mutations, excluding gated rejections."""
|
||||
performed: list[dict] = []
|
||||
for entry in action_log or []:
|
||||
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if entry.get("gated_rejected") or entry.get("performed") is False:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
action = (entry.get("action") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
@@ -2235,31 +2228,24 @@ HANDOFF_REVIEW_MUTATION_FIELDS = (
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
HANDOFF_ROLE_FIELDS = {
|
||||
# #698: the review/merger required-field sets must stay aligned with the
|
||||
# canonical schema (skills/llm-project-workflow/schemas/
|
||||
# review-merge-final-report.md). The schema explicitly FORBIDS the legacy
|
||||
# fields 'Pinned reviewed head', 'Scratch worktree used', and 'Workspace
|
||||
# mutations' — a validator must never demand a field the schema bans.
|
||||
"review": (
|
||||
("Selected PR", ("selected pr",)),
|
||||
("Reviewer eligibility", ("reviewer eligibility", "eligibility")),
|
||||
("Reviewed head SHA", ("reviewed head sha", "candidate head sha")),
|
||||
("Review worktree path", ("review worktree path", "worktree path",
|
||||
"starting worktree path")),
|
||||
("Review worktree dirty", ("review worktree dirty", "worktree dirty",
|
||||
"whether worktree was dirty")),
|
||||
("Pinned reviewed head", ("pinned reviewed head", "pinned head")),
|
||||
("Worktree path", ("worktree path", "starting worktree path")),
|
||||
("Worktree dirty", ("worktree dirty", "whether worktree was dirty")),
|
||||
("Scratch worktree used", ("scratch worktree used", "scratch clone used",
|
||||
"scratch worktree")),
|
||||
("Unrelated local mutations", ("unrelated local mutations",
|
||||
"unrelated files modified",
|
||||
"file edits by reviewer")),
|
||||
"unrelated files modified")),
|
||||
("Review decision", ("review decision", "decision")),
|
||||
("Merge result", ("merge result",)),
|
||||
("Linked issue status", ("linked issue status", "linked issue")),
|
||||
("Cleanup status", ("cleanup status", "cleanup")),
|
||||
("Safe next action", ("safe next action", "next")),
|
||||
) + HANDOFF_REVIEW_MUTATION_FIELDS,
|
||||
"merger": (
|
||||
("Selected PR", ("selected pr",)),
|
||||
("Reviewed head SHA", ("reviewed head sha", "candidate head sha")),
|
||||
("Pinned reviewed head", ("pinned reviewed head", "pinned head")),
|
||||
("Active profile", ("active profile",)),
|
||||
("Role kind", ("role kind",)),
|
||||
("Merge capability source", ("merge capability source",)),
|
||||
@@ -2447,22 +2433,9 @@ def assess_controller_handoff(report_text, role=None, local_edits=False):
|
||||
# Issue #320: reviewer and merger handoffs use the precise mutation categories
|
||||
# in HANDOFF_REVIEW_MUTATION_FIELDS instead of the legacy ambiguous
|
||||
# "Workspace mutations" field, which is rejected below.
|
||||
# Issue #698: the canonical review-merge schema has no 'Mutations',
|
||||
# 'Next', 'Issue/PR', 'Branch/SHA', or 'Files changed' fields — their
|
||||
# content lives in the precise mutation categories, 'Safe next
|
||||
# action', 'Selected PR'/'Linked issue', head-SHA fields, and 'Files
|
||||
# reviewed'. Requiring the legacy names rejects canonical reports.
|
||||
_non_canonical_for_review = {
|
||||
"Workspace mutations",
|
||||
"Mutations",
|
||||
"Next",
|
||||
"Issue/PR",
|
||||
"Branch/SHA",
|
||||
"Files changed",
|
||||
}
|
||||
required = [
|
||||
field for field in required
|
||||
if field[0] not in _non_canonical_for_review
|
||||
if field[0] != "Workspace mutations"
|
||||
]
|
||||
if any(label.startswith("workspace mutations") for label in labels):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,351 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Controller quarantine of contaminated formal reviews (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
Quarantine records are durable under the MCP session-state root and are only
|
||||
writable when the caller holds a **native** MCP transport runtime. Untrusted
|
||||
local scripts that import this module cannot establish a valid quarantine
|
||||
(writes fail closed). Live server-side gates (eligibility, merge, feedback)
|
||||
honor quarantine by review_id + PR + head.
|
||||
|
||||
Forensic evidence (Gitea review objects, lease comments) is never deleted.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
import mcp_session_state
|
||||
|
||||
KIND_QUARANTINE = "review_quarantine"
|
||||
CONFIRMATION_PREFIX = "QUARANTINE CONTAMINATED REVIEW"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _now() -> str:
|
||||
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def quarantine_state_path(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
review_id: int,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
# Dedicated subdir under session state root (mode 0o700).
|
||||
root = os.path.join(mcp_session_state.default_state_dir(), "quarantine")
|
||||
os.makedirs(root, mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
# Explicit multi-segment key so remote/org/repo/pr/review cannot collide.
|
||||
segs = [
|
||||
KIND_QUARANTINE,
|
||||
mcp_session_state._sanitize_segment(remote),
|
||||
mcp_session_state._sanitize_segment(org),
|
||||
mcp_session_state._sanitize_segment(repo),
|
||||
f"pr{int(pr_number)}",
|
||||
f"rev{int(review_id)}",
|
||||
]
|
||||
return os.path.join(root, "-".join(segs) + ".json")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_quarantine_record(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
review_id: int,
|
||||
reviewed_head_sha: str,
|
||||
reason: str,
|
||||
actor_username: str | None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None,
|
||||
incident_issue: int | None = None,
|
||||
forensic_comment_ids: list[int] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
provenance = mcp_daemon_guard.mutation_provenance_fields()
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"kind": KIND_QUARANTINE,
|
||||
"issue_ref": "#695",
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"pr_number": int(pr_number),
|
||||
"review_id": int(review_id),
|
||||
"reviewed_head_sha": (reviewed_head_sha or "").strip().lower(),
|
||||
"reason": (reason or "").strip(),
|
||||
"actor_username": actor_username,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"incident_issue": incident_issue,
|
||||
"forensic_comment_ids": list(forensic_comment_ids or []),
|
||||
"created_at": _now(),
|
||||
"native_provenance": provenance,
|
||||
"merge_authorization": "void",
|
||||
"retain_forensic_evidence": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_quarantine_write(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
confirmation: str,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
review_id: int,
|
||||
reason: str,
|
||||
native_required: bool = True,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Pure assessment of whether a quarantine write may proceed."""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
expected = f"{CONFIRMATION_PREFIX} {int(review_id)} PR {int(pr_number)}"
|
||||
if (confirmation or "").strip() != expected:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"confirmation must equal exactly '{expected}' (fail closed, #695)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not (reason or "").strip():
|
||||
reasons.append("quarantine reason is required (fail closed, #695)")
|
||||
if native_required and not mcp_daemon_guard.is_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
if not mcp_daemon_guard.is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"quarantine write requires native MCP transport; untrusted "
|
||||
"local code cannot create quarantine records (#695)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"allowed": not reasons,
|
||||
"expected_confirmation": expected,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def write_quarantine_record(record: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Persist quarantine record; fail closed outside native/pytest runtime."""
|
||||
if not mcp_daemon_guard.is_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
if not mcp_daemon_guard.is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
raise mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"quarantine write blocked: non-native runtime (#695)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
path = quarantine_state_path(
|
||||
remote=str(record["remote"]),
|
||||
org=str(record["org"]),
|
||||
repo=str(record["repo"]),
|
||||
pr_number=int(record["pr_number"]),
|
||||
review_id=int(record["review_id"]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Refuse overwriting with weaker provenance from untrusted caller by
|
||||
# requiring native fields present.
|
||||
if not (record.get("native_provenance") or {}).get("native_mcp_transport"):
|
||||
if not mcp_daemon_guard.is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
raise mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"quarantine record missing native provenance (#695)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
tmp = path + ".tmp"
|
||||
data = json.dumps(record, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
|
||||
with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
fh.write(data)
|
||||
fh.flush()
|
||||
os.fsync(fh.fileno())
|
||||
os.replace(tmp, path)
|
||||
os.chmod(path, 0o600)
|
||||
return {"path": path, "written": True, "record": record}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def load_quarantine_record(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
review_id: int,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
path = quarantine_state_path(
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
pr_number=pr_number,
|
||||
review_id=review_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not os.path.isfile(path):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
data = json.load(fh)
|
||||
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if not isinstance(data, dict):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return data
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_review_quarantined(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
review_id: int | None,
|
||||
reviewed_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Whether a formal review is quarantined for merge authorization (#695)."""
|
||||
if review_id is None:
|
||||
return {"quarantined": False, "record": None, "reasons": []}
|
||||
rec = load_quarantine_record(
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
pr_number=pr_number,
|
||||
review_id=int(review_id),
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not rec:
|
||||
return {"quarantined": False, "record": None, "reasons": []}
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
f"formal review_id {review_id} on PR #{pr_number} is quarantined "
|
||||
f"(#695; incident issue {rec.get('incident_issue')}); "
|
||||
"merge authorization is void; forensic evidence retained"
|
||||
]
|
||||
want_head = (reviewed_head_sha or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
rec_head = (rec.get("reviewed_head_sha") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if want_head and rec_head and want_head != rec_head:
|
||||
# Still quarantined by review_id; note head mismatch for operators.
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"quarantine head {rec_head[:12]}… differs from assessed head "
|
||||
f"{want_head[:12]}… (still void by review_id)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {"quarantined": True, "record": rec, "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def filter_approvals_for_merge(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
current_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
reviews: list[dict],
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Split reviews into merge-usable vs quarantined contaminated approvals."""
|
||||
current = (current_head_sha or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
usable: list[dict] = []
|
||||
quarantined: list[dict] = []
|
||||
for rev in reviews or []:
|
||||
if not isinstance(rev, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
verdict = (rev.get("verdict") or rev.get("state") or "").upper()
|
||||
if verdict not in {"APPROVED", "APPROVE"}:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if rev.get("dismissed"):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
rid = rev.get("review_id") or rev.get("id")
|
||||
head = (
|
||||
rev.get("reviewed_head_sha")
|
||||
or rev.get("commit_id")
|
||||
or rev.get("head_sha")
|
||||
or ""
|
||||
).strip().lower()
|
||||
q = is_review_quarantined(
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
pr_number=pr_number,
|
||||
review_id=int(rid) if rid is not None else None,
|
||||
reviewed_head_sha=head or current,
|
||||
)
|
||||
entry = {**rev, "review_id": rid, "reviewed_head_sha": head}
|
||||
if q["quarantined"]:
|
||||
entry["quarantined"] = True
|
||||
entry["quarantine_reasons"] = q["reasons"]
|
||||
quarantined.append(entry)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
entry["quarantined"] = False
|
||||
usable.append(entry)
|
||||
usable_at_head = [
|
||||
e
|
||||
for e in usable
|
||||
if current and (e.get("reviewed_head_sha") or "") == current
|
||||
]
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"usable_approvals": usable,
|
||||
"usable_approvals_at_current_head": usable_at_head,
|
||||
"quarantined_approvals": quarantined,
|
||||
"approval_visible_for_merge": bool(usable_at_head),
|
||||
"has_quarantined_approval_at_head": any(
|
||||
current
|
||||
and (e.get("reviewed_head_sha") or "") == current
|
||||
for e in quarantined
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_quarantine_audit_comment(record: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Append-only forensic audit comment body (does not delete evidence)."""
|
||||
lines = [
|
||||
"## Contaminated formal review quarantine (#695)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"Status: **QUARANTINED — merge authorization VOID**",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"- review_id: `{record.get('review_id')}`",
|
||||
f"- pr: `#{record.get('pr_number')}`",
|
||||
f"- reviewed_head_sha: `{record.get('reviewed_head_sha')}`",
|
||||
f"- actor: `{record.get('actor_username')}`",
|
||||
f"- profile: `{record.get('profile_name')}`",
|
||||
f"- incident_issue: `#{record.get('incident_issue')}`",
|
||||
f"- reason: {record.get('reason')}",
|
||||
f"- created_at: `{record.get('created_at')}`",
|
||||
f"- native_transport: "
|
||||
f"`{(record.get('native_provenance') or {}).get('native_mcp_transport')}`",
|
||||
f"- native_token_fingerprint: "
|
||||
f"`{(record.get('native_provenance') or {}).get('native_token_fingerprint')}`",
|
||||
f"- forensic_comment_ids retained: "
|
||||
f"`{record.get('forensic_comment_ids')}`",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"This record does **not** delete Gitea reviews or historical comments. "
|
||||
"Fresh native-MCP re-review is required before merge.",
|
||||
]
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_untrusted_canonical_approval_claim(body: str) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Reasons to reject canonical comments that claim approved/merge-ready.
|
||||
|
||||
Used when the comment asserts approval without native review proof (#695 AC7).
|
||||
False "official workflow" claims that cite offline/import paths are always
|
||||
rejected even when a NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF line is present.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
text = body or ""
|
||||
lower = text.lower()
|
||||
claims_approved = (
|
||||
"state:\napproved" in lower
|
||||
or "state: approved" in lower
|
||||
or "who_is_next:\nmerger" in lower
|
||||
or "who_is_next: merger" in lower
|
||||
or "merge_ready: true" in lower
|
||||
or "merge_ready:\ntrue" in lower
|
||||
or "ready-to-merge" in lower
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not claims_approved:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
# Reject explicit offline/import "official workflow" spoofing (#695 AC9).
|
||||
offline_spoof = (
|
||||
"offline_mcp" in lower
|
||||
or "offline import" in lower
|
||||
or "direct import" in lower
|
||||
or "import gitea_mcp_server" in lower
|
||||
or "run_quarantine.py" in lower
|
||||
or "offline_mcp_helper" in lower
|
||||
or "offline_mcp_runner" in lower
|
||||
)
|
||||
has_proof = (
|
||||
"NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF:" in text
|
||||
or "native_review_proof:" in lower
|
||||
)
|
||||
if offline_spoof:
|
||||
return [
|
||||
"canonical approval claim cites offline/import/helper path; "
|
||||
"NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF rejected (#695 AC7/AC9); stop after native "
|
||||
"MCP failure — do not construct offline mutation fallbacks"
|
||||
]
|
||||
if has_proof:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
return [
|
||||
"canonical comment claims approved/merge-ready state without "
|
||||
"NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF from a native MCP review mutation (#695 AC7); "
|
||||
"contaminated or untrusted approvals cannot certify merger handoff"
|
||||
]
|
||||
+43
-892
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -27,20 +27,6 @@ _READONLY_REVIEWER_GIT = re.compile(
|
||||
_GIT_INVOCATION = re.compile(r"\bgit\b", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# #673: Canonical pattern for identifying review worktrees under branches/.
|
||||
REVIEW_WORKTREE_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"branches/(?:review-pr\d+[\w/-]*|merge-simulation-pr\d+|review-[\w-]+)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_review_worktree_path(path: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when the path belongs to a reviewer or simulation worktree."""
|
||||
normalized = (path or "").replace("\\", "/")
|
||||
return bool(REVIEW_WORKTREE_RE.search(normalized))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def parse_dirty_tracked_files(porcelain: str) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Return tracked paths with local modifications from ``git status --porcelain``.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@ from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
from reviewer_worktree import REVIEW_WORKTREE_RE
|
||||
|
||||
_SESSION_OWNED_RE = REVIEW_WORKTREE_RE
|
||||
_SESSION_OWNED_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"branches/(?:review-pr\d+[\w/-]*|review-[\w-]+)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_WORKTREE_PATH_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?:review worktree path|worktree path|session-owned worktree)\s*:\s*(\S+)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ AUTHOR_TASKS = frozenset({
|
||||
"create_pr",
|
||||
"comment_pr",
|
||||
"address_pr_change_requests",
|
||||
"delete_branch",
|
||||
"work_issue",
|
||||
"work-issue",
|
||||
"reconcile_landed_pr",
|
||||
@@ -83,10 +84,6 @@ AUTHOR_TASKS = frozenset({
|
||||
|
||||
RECONCILER_TASKS = frozenset({
|
||||
"cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
|
||||
# #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned (gitea.branch.delete is granted
|
||||
# only to the reconciler profile). Raw gitea_delete_branch redirects here to
|
||||
# the guarded gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path (#514/#687).
|
||||
"delete_branch",
|
||||
"reconcile_already_landed_pr",
|
||||
"reconcile_already_landed",
|
||||
"reconcile-landed-pr",
|
||||
@@ -102,8 +99,7 @@ TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE = {
|
||||
"create_pr": "author",
|
||||
"comment_pr": "author",
|
||||
"address_pr_change_requests": "author",
|
||||
# #729: reconciler-owned; see RECONCILER_TASKS and task_capability_map.
|
||||
"delete_branch": "reconciler",
|
||||
"delete_branch": "author",
|
||||
"review_pr": "reviewer",
|
||||
"merge_pr": "merger",
|
||||
"blind_pr_queue_review": "reviewer",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,535 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Optional self-hosted Sentry observability for the Gitea MCP server (#606).
|
||||
|
||||
Adds env-var-gated Sentry SDK instrumentation so runtime errors, fail-closed
|
||||
workflow blockers, lease/terminal-lock/stale-runtime collisions, and recurring
|
||||
watchdog check-ins are visible in a *self-hosted* Sentry at
|
||||
``https://sentry.prgs.cc/`` — never Sentry Cloud, and never as the workflow
|
||||
source of truth (Gitea stays canonical).
|
||||
|
||||
Design constraints (mirror ``gitea_audit`` and the #612 incident bridge):
|
||||
|
||||
- **Off by default.** With ``MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED`` false/unset *or* ``SENTRY_DSN``
|
||||
empty, ``init_sentry`` is a no-op and no events are ever sent — existing tool
|
||||
behaviour and API-call patterns are unchanged (acceptance criterion 1).
|
||||
- **Fail *open* for observability.** A Sentry outage, a missing ``sentry_sdk``
|
||||
package, or any capture error must never break an MCP tool success path. Every
|
||||
public entry point swallows its own exceptions.
|
||||
- **Fail *closed* for redaction.** If a field cannot be proven safe it is dropped
|
||||
rather than sent. Tokens, passwords, keychain IDs, DSNs, private config, raw
|
||||
session-state, full prompt bodies, and full filesystem paths never leave here.
|
||||
- **No hard dependency.** ``sentry_sdk`` is imported lazily; the module is fully
|
||||
importable and testable without it installed.
|
||||
|
||||
Sentry is observe-only: it must not approve, merge, close, or otherwise mutate
|
||||
Gitea workflow state, nor bypass leases, #332, or MCP gates. Alerts may only feed
|
||||
the sanctioned Gitea issue/comment path via the #612 incident bridge.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
# Reuse the most comprehensive existing scrubber so redaction stays consistent
|
||||
# with the #612 incident bridge (tokens, DSNs, cookies, bearer/basic, keychain
|
||||
# ids, session ids, user:pass@host).
|
||||
from incident_bridge import redact_text as _redact_text
|
||||
|
||||
# Second, complementary scrubber: catches bare ``token <value>`` /
|
||||
# ``Bearer <value>`` / ``Basic <value>`` prefixes and raw URLs that the
|
||||
# incident-bridge delimiter patterns miss.
|
||||
from gitea_audit import _redact_str as _redact_prefixes
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Optional SDK (lazy, never a hard dependency) ────────────────────────────
|
||||
try: # pragma: no cover - trivial import guard
|
||||
import sentry_sdk # type: ignore
|
||||
except Exception: # pragma: no cover - absence is a supported state
|
||||
sentry_sdk = None # type: ignore
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Env var names (single source of truth) ──────────────────────────────────
|
||||
ENV_ENABLED = "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED"
|
||||
ENV_DSN = "SENTRY_DSN"
|
||||
ENV_ENVIRONMENT = "SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT"
|
||||
ENV_RELEASE = "SENTRY_RELEASE"
|
||||
ENV_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE = "MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE"
|
||||
ENV_ENABLE_LOGS = "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS"
|
||||
|
||||
_TRUTHY = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
|
||||
|
||||
REDACTED = "[REDACTED]"
|
||||
REDACTED_PATH = "[REDACTED_PATH]"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Cron / watchdog monitor slugs (acceptance criterion 6) ──────────────────
|
||||
# Stable slugs for the recurring/watchdog jobs #606 wants check-ins for. The
|
||||
# slug is the durable monitor identity in Sentry; the wiring call sites pass one
|
||||
# of these keys (or an explicit slug) to ``monitor_checkin``.
|
||||
MONITOR_SLUGS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
"stale_lease_scan": "gitea-mcp-stale-lease-scan",
|
||||
"terminal_lock_scan": "gitea-mcp-terminal-lock-scan",
|
||||
"allocator_health": "gitea-mcp-allocator-health",
|
||||
"namespace_health": "gitea-mcp-namespace-health",
|
||||
"dashboard_freshness": "gitea-mcp-dashboard-freshness",
|
||||
"reconciler_cleanup": "gitea-mcp-reconciler-cleanup",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_CHECKIN_STATUSES = frozenset({"in_progress", "ok", "error"})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Tag allowlist (issue "Suggested Sentry tags/context") ───────────────────
|
||||
# Only these keys are ever attached as Sentry tags. Anything else is dropped so
|
||||
# a caller cannot accidentally leak a sensitive value through a tag.
|
||||
ALLOWED_TAG_KEYS = frozenset({
|
||||
"role",
|
||||
"profile",
|
||||
"namespace",
|
||||
"repo",
|
||||
"org",
|
||||
"issue_number",
|
||||
"pr_number",
|
||||
"blocker_type",
|
||||
"workflow_hash",
|
||||
"session_id_hash", # hash only — never the raw session id
|
||||
"pid",
|
||||
"worktree_category", # category, never the full sensitive path
|
||||
"lease_comment_id",
|
||||
"expected_head_sha",
|
||||
"current_head_sha",
|
||||
"terminal_lock_state",
|
||||
"capability",
|
||||
"mutation_tool",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
# Absolute-path shapes that must never be sent verbatim (macOS/Linux + temp).
|
||||
_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"(?:/private)?/(?:Users|home|tmp|var|opt|Volumes)/[^\s\"']*")
|
||||
|
||||
# ``extra`` keys whose *full* contents are forbidden by the redaction rules
|
||||
# (raw session-state, full prompt/comment bodies, private config blobs, raw
|
||||
# headers).
|
||||
_FORBIDDEN_EXTRA_KEYS = frozenset({
|
||||
"prompt",
|
||||
"prompt_body",
|
||||
"next_prompt",
|
||||
"body",
|
||||
"raw_body",
|
||||
"session_state",
|
||||
"session_state_contents",
|
||||
"config",
|
||||
"config_contents",
|
||||
"private_config",
|
||||
"headers",
|
||||
"authorization",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Configuration ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||
class SentryConfig:
|
||||
"""Immutable snapshot of the Sentry env configuration."""
|
||||
|
||||
enabled: bool = False
|
||||
dsn: str | None = None
|
||||
environment: str = "development"
|
||||
release: str | None = None
|
||||
traces_sample_rate: float = 0.0
|
||||
enable_logs: bool = False
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def active(self) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True only when the operator both opted in *and* supplied a DSN.
|
||||
|
||||
This is the single gate that keeps the feature off by default: enabling
|
||||
the flag without a DSN (or vice versa) sends nothing.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return bool(self.enabled and self.dsn)
|
||||
|
||||
def safe_summary(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Operator-facing status with **no** DSN value (only presence)."""
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"enabled": self.enabled,
|
||||
"dsn_present": bool(self.dsn),
|
||||
"environment": self.environment,
|
||||
"release": self.release,
|
||||
"traces_sample_rate": self.traces_sample_rate,
|
||||
"enable_logs": self.enable_logs,
|
||||
"active": self.active,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _env_bool(name: str, env: dict[str, str]) -> bool:
|
||||
return (env.get(name) or "").strip().lower() in _TRUTHY
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _env_float(name: str, default: float, env: dict[str, str]) -> float:
|
||||
raw = (env.get(name) or "").strip()
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
return default
|
||||
try:
|
||||
val = float(raw)
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return default
|
||||
# Clamp to Sentry's valid [0.0, 1.0] sample-rate range.
|
||||
if val < 0.0:
|
||||
return 0.0
|
||||
if val > 1.0:
|
||||
return 1.0
|
||||
return val
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def load_config(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> SentryConfig:
|
||||
"""Build a :class:`SentryConfig` from the environment (read at call time)."""
|
||||
env = dict(os.environ if env is None else env)
|
||||
dsn = (env.get(ENV_DSN) or "").strip() or None
|
||||
return SentryConfig(
|
||||
enabled=_env_bool(ENV_ENABLED, env),
|
||||
dsn=dsn,
|
||||
environment=(env.get(ENV_ENVIRONMENT) or "").strip() or "development",
|
||||
release=(env.get(ENV_RELEASE) or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
traces_sample_rate=_env_float(ENV_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE, 0.0, env),
|
||||
enable_logs=_env_bool(ENV_ENABLE_LOGS, env),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sdk_available() -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when the optional ``sentry_sdk`` package is importable."""
|
||||
return sentry_sdk is not None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Redaction (fail closed) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
def sanitize_path(value: Any) -> str:
|
||||
"""Reduce a filesystem path to a non-sensitive *category* token.
|
||||
|
||||
Full local paths must never be sent. We keep only a coarse worktree
|
||||
category derived from the path shape (author/reviewer/merger/reconciler/
|
||||
branches/root/other).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
text = "" if value is None else str(value)
|
||||
low = text.lower()
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return "unknown"
|
||||
# Order matters: more specific role markers before the generic "branches".
|
||||
if "reconcile" in low:
|
||||
return "reconciler"
|
||||
if "review" in low:
|
||||
return "reviewer"
|
||||
if "merge" in low or "merger" in low:
|
||||
return "merger"
|
||||
if "author" in low or re.search(r"/branches/(?:feat|fix|docs|chore|issue)", low):
|
||||
return "author"
|
||||
if "/branches/" in low:
|
||||
return "branches"
|
||||
if low.rstrip("/").endswith("gitea-tools"):
|
||||
return "root"
|
||||
return "other"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def redact_value(value: Any) -> Any:
|
||||
"""Recursively redact a JSON-able value: secret text, absolute paths, and
|
||||
known-sensitive dict keys are removed. Fail closed — any error drops the
|
||||
value entirely rather than risk leaking it."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if isinstance(value, dict):
|
||||
out: dict[str, Any] = {}
|
||||
for k, v in value.items():
|
||||
key = str(k)
|
||||
low = key.lower()
|
||||
if low in _FORBIDDEN_EXTRA_KEYS or any(
|
||||
s in low
|
||||
for s in ("token", "secret", "password", "cookie", "auth", "dsn", "keychain")
|
||||
):
|
||||
out[key] = REDACTED
|
||||
continue
|
||||
out[key] = redact_value(v)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
|
||||
return [redact_value(v) for v in value]
|
||||
if isinstance(value, str):
|
||||
scrubbed = _redact_text(value)
|
||||
scrubbed = _redact_prefixes(scrubbed)
|
||||
scrubbed = _PATH_RE.sub(REDACTED_PATH, scrubbed)
|
||||
return scrubbed
|
||||
return value
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return REDACTED
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def hash_session_id(session_id: Any) -> str:
|
||||
"""Short, stable, non-reversible fingerprint of a session id."""
|
||||
digest = hashlib.sha256(str(session_id).encode("utf-8", "replace")).hexdigest()
|
||||
return digest[:12]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_tags(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, str]:
|
||||
"""Return a scrubbed, allowlisted tag dict.
|
||||
|
||||
``session_id`` is accepted but only ever surfaced as ``session_id_hash``.
|
||||
``worktree_path`` collapses to ``worktree_category``. Any non-allowlisted
|
||||
key, or a value that still contains redacted material after scrubbing, is
|
||||
dropped.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
raw: dict[str, Any] = dict(kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
# Hash the session id — never emit it raw.
|
||||
session_id = raw.pop("session_id", None)
|
||||
if session_id and "session_id_hash" not in raw:
|
||||
raw["session_id_hash"] = hash_session_id(session_id)
|
||||
|
||||
# A full worktree path collapses to a category tag.
|
||||
wt = raw.pop("worktree_path", None)
|
||||
if wt and "worktree_category" not in raw:
|
||||
raw["worktree_category"] = sanitize_path(wt)
|
||||
|
||||
out: dict[str, str] = {}
|
||||
for key, val in raw.items():
|
||||
if key not in ALLOWED_TAG_KEYS:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if val is None:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
scrubbed = redact_value(val)
|
||||
text = str(scrubbed)
|
||||
if not text or REDACTED in text or REDACTED_PATH in text:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if len(text) > 200:
|
||||
text = text[:200] + "…"
|
||||
out[key] = text
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def scrub_event(event: Any, hint: Any = None) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Sentry ``before_send`` / ``before_send_log`` hook.
|
||||
|
||||
Recursively redacts the outgoing event. On *any* failure it returns ``None``
|
||||
so the event is dropped rather than sent unscrubbed (fail closed for
|
||||
redaction).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if not isinstance(event, dict):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
scrubbed = redact_value(event)
|
||||
# Drop server_name if it leaked a hostname/path; PID is kept via tags.
|
||||
scrubbed.pop("server_name", None)
|
||||
return scrubbed
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Event builders (pure, independently testable) ───────────────────────────
|
||||
def build_blocker_event(
|
||||
blocker_type: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
message: str | None = None,
|
||||
next_action: str | None = None,
|
||||
level: str = "warning",
|
||||
tags: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
extra: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Build a redacted, structured Sentry event for a workflow blocker.
|
||||
|
||||
``next_action`` maps the issue's "canonical next action when available"
|
||||
requirement (acceptance criterion 7).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
merged_tags = dict(tags or {})
|
||||
merged_tags.setdefault("blocker_type", blocker_type)
|
||||
safe_tags = build_tags(**merged_tags)
|
||||
|
||||
safe_extra = redact_value(dict(extra or {}))
|
||||
if next_action:
|
||||
# A short canonical next action is allowed (it is not a full prompt).
|
||||
safe_extra["canonical_next_action"] = redact_value(str(next_action)[:500])
|
||||
|
||||
event: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"message": redact_value(message or blocker_type),
|
||||
"level": level if level in ("debug", "info", "warning", "error", "fatal") else "warning",
|
||||
"logger": "gitea-mcp.workflow",
|
||||
"tags": safe_tags,
|
||||
"extra": safe_extra,
|
||||
"fingerprint": ["workflow-blocker", blocker_type],
|
||||
}
|
||||
return event
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_checkin_payload(
|
||||
monitor: str,
|
||||
status: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
check_in_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
duration: float | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Build a Sentry cron check-in payload for one of :data:`MONITOR_SLUGS`.
|
||||
|
||||
``monitor`` may be a registry key (e.g. ``"stale_lease_scan"``) or an
|
||||
explicit slug. Raises ``ValueError`` on an unknown status so callers cannot
|
||||
silently send a malformed check-in.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if status not in _CHECKIN_STATUSES:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"invalid check-in status {status!r}; expected one of {sorted(_CHECKIN_STATUSES)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
slug = MONITOR_SLUGS.get(monitor, monitor)
|
||||
payload: dict[str, Any] = {"monitor_slug": slug, "status": status}
|
||||
if check_in_id:
|
||||
payload["check_in_id"] = str(check_in_id)
|
||||
if duration is not None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
payload["duration"] = float(duration)
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return payload
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Runtime init + capture (fail open) ──────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
_STATE: dict[str, Any] = {"initialized": False, "config": None}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_initialized() -> bool:
|
||||
return bool(_STATE.get("initialized"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def active_config() -> SentryConfig | None:
|
||||
return _STATE.get("config")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def reset_for_tests() -> None:
|
||||
"""Clear module init state. Test-only helper (never called in production)."""
|
||||
_STATE["initialized"] = False
|
||||
_STATE["config"] = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def init_sentry(config: SentryConfig | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Initialise the Sentry SDK if (and only if) enabled + DSN + SDK present.
|
||||
|
||||
Idempotent and never raises. Returns an operator-safe status dict (no DSN
|
||||
value). Behaviour is unchanged when the feature is off.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
cfg = config or load_config()
|
||||
status: dict[str, Any] = {"initialized": False, **cfg.safe_summary()}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if not cfg.active:
|
||||
status["reason"] = "disabled (MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED false or SENTRY_DSN empty)"
|
||||
_STATE["config"] = cfg
|
||||
return status
|
||||
if not sdk_available():
|
||||
status["reason"] = "sentry_sdk not installed"
|
||||
_STATE["config"] = cfg
|
||||
return status
|
||||
|
||||
init_kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"dsn": cfg.dsn,
|
||||
"environment": cfg.environment,
|
||||
"release": cfg.release,
|
||||
"traces_sample_rate": cfg.traces_sample_rate,
|
||||
"before_send": scrub_event,
|
||||
"send_default_pii": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if cfg.enable_logs:
|
||||
# sentry-sdk 2.x captures Python logs as structured logs when the
|
||||
# experimental logs feature is enabled; scrub those too.
|
||||
init_kwargs["_experiments"] = {
|
||||
"enable_logs": True,
|
||||
"before_send_log": scrub_event,
|
||||
}
|
||||
sentry_sdk.init(**init_kwargs) # type: ignore[union-attr]
|
||||
_STATE["initialized"] = True
|
||||
_STATE["config"] = cfg
|
||||
status["initialized"] = True
|
||||
status["reason"] = "sentry initialised"
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # fail open: observability must not block startup
|
||||
status["reason"] = f"init failed (ignored): {type(exc).__name__}"
|
||||
_STATE["initialized"] = False
|
||||
return status
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _set_scope_tags(scope: Any, tags: dict[str, str]) -> None:
|
||||
for key, val in tags.items():
|
||||
try:
|
||||
scope.set_tag(key, val)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def capture_workflow_blocker(
|
||||
blocker_type: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
message: str | None = None,
|
||||
next_action: str | None = None,
|
||||
level: str = "warning",
|
||||
tags: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
extra: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Capture a fail-closed workflow blocker as a structured Sentry event.
|
||||
|
||||
Always returns the redacted event dict (so callers/tests can inspect it),
|
||||
and sends it to Sentry only when initialised. Fail open.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
event = build_blocker_event(
|
||||
blocker_type,
|
||||
message=message,
|
||||
next_action=next_action,
|
||||
level=level,
|
||||
tags=tags,
|
||||
extra=extra,
|
||||
)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if is_initialized() and sdk_available():
|
||||
sentry_sdk.capture_event(event) # type: ignore[union-attr]
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return event
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def capture_exception(
|
||||
exc: BaseException,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
tags: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
extra: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Capture a runtime exception with scrubbed tags. Fail open.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns True only when the event was handed to an initialised SDK.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if not (is_initialized() and sdk_available()):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
safe_tags = build_tags(**(tags or {}))
|
||||
safe_extra = redact_value(dict(extra or {}))
|
||||
with sentry_sdk.push_scope() as scope: # type: ignore[union-attr]
|
||||
_set_scope_tags(scope, safe_tags)
|
||||
for key, val in safe_extra.items():
|
||||
try:
|
||||
scope.set_extra(key, val)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
sentry_sdk.capture_exception(exc) # type: ignore[union-attr]
|
||||
return True
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def monitor_checkin(
|
||||
monitor: str,
|
||||
status: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
check_in_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
duration: float | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Send a Sentry cron check-in for a watchdog job. Fail open.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns the payload (for inspection/tests), or ``None`` if the status was
|
||||
invalid. Only transmits when initialised.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
payload = build_checkin_payload(
|
||||
monitor, status, check_in_id=check_in_id, duration=duration
|
||||
)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if is_initialized() and sdk_available() and hasattr(sentry_sdk, "capture_checkin"):
|
||||
sentry_sdk.capture_checkin(**payload) # type: ignore[union-attr]
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return payload
|
||||
@@ -1,595 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Session-immutable MCP mutation context (#714).
|
||||
|
||||
Pins profile, remote, host, repository, identity, and role for the life of an
|
||||
MCP process (or until an explicit ``gitea_activate_profile`` re-bind).
|
||||
|
||||
Capability resolution and mutation gates must evaluate only the active
|
||||
profile for the requested remote. Silent cross-host / cross-profile
|
||||
substitution is forbidden.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import threading
|
||||
import urllib.parse
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass
|
||||
from typing import Any, Mapping
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
|
||||
class _SessionContext:
|
||||
"""One atomic, immutable process-session binding."""
|
||||
|
||||
profile_name: str | None
|
||||
remote: str | None
|
||||
host: str | None
|
||||
identity: str | None
|
||||
repository: str | None
|
||||
org: str | None
|
||||
role_kind: str | None
|
||||
expected_username: str | None
|
||||
source: str
|
||||
pid: int
|
||||
|
||||
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"profile_name": self.profile_name,
|
||||
"remote": self.remote,
|
||||
"host": self.host,
|
||||
"identity": self.identity,
|
||||
"repository": self.repository,
|
||||
"org": self.org,
|
||||
"role_kind": self.role_kind,
|
||||
"expected_username": self.expected_username,
|
||||
"source": self.source,
|
||||
"pid": self.pid,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Process-local only — never a shared file (same rationale as mutation authority).
|
||||
# The frozen value prevents partial mutation, while the lock makes first-bind and
|
||||
# sanctioned rebind atomic across concurrent MCP calls.
|
||||
_SESSION_CONTEXT: _SessionContext | None = None
|
||||
_SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK = threading.RLock()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _reset_session_context_for_testing() -> None:
|
||||
"""Reset at a pytest test boundary; unavailable to production callers.
|
||||
|
||||
Production sessions transition only through process startup/PID change or
|
||||
the explicit profile-activation rebind. Keeping this helper private and
|
||||
requiring pytest's per-test marker prevents it from becoming an MCP/runtime
|
||||
bypass.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST" not in os.environ:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("session context reset is restricted to pytest boundaries")
|
||||
global _SESSION_CONTEXT
|
||||
with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
|
||||
_SESSION_CONTEXT = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_session_context() -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Return a detached snapshot of the bound context, or None if unbound."""
|
||||
with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
|
||||
if _SESSION_CONTEXT is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return _SESSION_CONTEXT.as_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def profile_host(profile: dict | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Hostname from profile base_url, lowercased, or None."""
|
||||
if not profile:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
base = (profile.get("base_url") or "").strip()
|
||||
if not base:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(base)
|
||||
host = (parsed.netloc or parsed.path or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
return host or None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def remote_host(remote: str | None, remotes: dict | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Hostname for a known remote key."""
|
||||
if not remote or not remotes:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
entry = remotes.get(remote) or {}
|
||||
return (entry.get("host") or "").strip().lower() or None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def profile_matches_remote(
|
||||
profile: dict | None,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
remotes: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
contexts: dict | None = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when *profile* is bound to the same host/context as *remote*."""
|
||||
if not profile or not remote:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
r_host = remote_host(remote, remotes)
|
||||
p_host = profile_host(profile)
|
||||
if r_host and p_host:
|
||||
return r_host == p_host
|
||||
# Fall back to context name heuristics when base_url missing.
|
||||
ctx = (profile.get("context") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if not ctx or not contexts:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
ctx_data = contexts.get(ctx) or {}
|
||||
gitea = ctx_data.get("gitea") or {}
|
||||
base = (gitea.get("base_url") or "").strip()
|
||||
if not base or not r_host:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(base)
|
||||
c_host = (parsed.netloc or parsed.path or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return bool(c_host) and c_host == r_host
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bind_session_context(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
profile_name: str,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
host: str | None,
|
||||
identity: str | None,
|
||||
repository: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
role_kind: str | None = None,
|
||||
expected_username: str | None = None,
|
||||
source: str = "bind",
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Atomically bind/re-bind context (the explicit activation path)."""
|
||||
with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
|
||||
return _bind_session_context_unlocked(
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
host=host,
|
||||
identity=identity,
|
||||
repository=repository,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
role_kind=role_kind,
|
||||
expected_username=expected_username,
|
||||
source=source,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _bind_session_context_unlocked(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
profile_name: str,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
host: str | None,
|
||||
identity: str | None,
|
||||
repository: str | None,
|
||||
org: str | None,
|
||||
role_kind: str | None,
|
||||
expected_username: str | None,
|
||||
source: str,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Store a complete immutable context while the caller holds the lock."""
|
||||
global _SESSION_CONTEXT
|
||||
_SESSION_CONTEXT = _SessionContext(
|
||||
profile_name=(profile_name or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
remote=(remote or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
host=(host or "").strip().lower() or None,
|
||||
identity=(identity or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
repository=(repository or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
org=(org or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
role_kind=(role_kind or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
expected_username=(expected_username or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
source=source,
|
||||
pid=os.getpid(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _SESSION_CONTEXT.as_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def seed_session_context_if_unbound(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
profile_name: str,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
host: str | None,
|
||||
identity: str | None,
|
||||
repository: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
role_kind: str | None = None,
|
||||
expected_username: str | None = None,
|
||||
source: str = "seed",
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Atomically bind only when this process has no current context.
|
||||
|
||||
A changed environment or an interleaved call is not a session boundary and
|
||||
therefore cannot replace an established binding. A newly started/forked
|
||||
process is recognized by PID; explicit ``gitea_activate_profile`` uses
|
||||
:func:`bind_session_context` as its sanctioned logical-session transition.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
|
||||
if _SESSION_CONTEXT is None or _SESSION_CONTEXT.pid != os.getpid():
|
||||
return _bind_session_context_unlocked(
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
host=host,
|
||||
identity=identity,
|
||||
repository=repository,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
role_kind=role_kind,
|
||||
expected_username=expected_username,
|
||||
source=source,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _SESSION_CONTEXT.as_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_session_context(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
host: str | None = None,
|
||||
identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
repository: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
expected_username: str | None = None,
|
||||
require_bound: bool = False,
|
||||
require_complete: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Compare live values against the bound session context.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns ``proven`` / ``block`` / ``reasons``. When unbound and
|
||||
``require_bound`` is false, does not block (caller may seed). When
|
||||
unbound and ``require_bound`` is true, fails closed. ``require_complete``
|
||||
additionally fails closed when the binding carries no verified
|
||||
repository/organization identity, so a mutation can never run against an
|
||||
unknown repository (#714).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
|
||||
bound = _SESSION_CONTEXT
|
||||
ctx = bound.as_dict() if bound is not None else None
|
||||
if ctx is None or ctx.get("pid") != os.getpid():
|
||||
if require_bound:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"session mutation context is unbound; call gitea_whoami or "
|
||||
"gitea_activate_profile before mutating (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _assessment(False, reasons, ctx)
|
||||
return _assessment(True, reasons, ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
if require_complete and not (ctx.get("repository") and ctx.get("org")):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"session repository/organization identity is unverified "
|
||||
f"(repository={ctx.get('repository')!r}, org={ctx.get('org')!r}); "
|
||||
"a mutation cannot proceed without a verified workspace "
|
||||
"repository (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _assessment(False, reasons, ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
live_profile = (profile_name or "").strip() or None
|
||||
live_remote = (remote or "").strip() or None
|
||||
live_host = (host or "").strip().lower() or None
|
||||
live_identity = (identity or "").strip() or None
|
||||
live_repo = (repository or "").strip() or None
|
||||
live_org = (org or "").strip() or None
|
||||
|
||||
if ctx.get("profile_name") and live_profile and live_profile != ctx.get("profile_name"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"profile drift: live '{live_profile}' != bound "
|
||||
f"'{ctx.get('profile_name')}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if ctx.get("remote") and live_remote and live_remote != ctx.get("remote"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"remote drift: live '{live_remote}' != bound "
|
||||
f"'{ctx.get('remote')}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if ctx.get("host") and live_host and live_host != ctx.get("host"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"host drift: live '{live_host}' != bound "
|
||||
f"'{ctx.get('host')}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if (
|
||||
ctx.get("identity")
|
||||
and live_identity
|
||||
and live_identity != ctx.get("identity")
|
||||
):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"identity drift: live '{live_identity}' != bound "
|
||||
f"'{ctx.get('identity')}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if ctx.get("repository") and live_repo and live_repo != ctx.get("repository"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"repository drift: live '{live_repo}' != bound "
|
||||
f"'{ctx.get('repository')}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if ctx.get("org") and live_org and live_org != ctx.get("org"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"org drift: live '{live_org}' != bound "
|
||||
f"'{ctx.get('org')}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
expected = expected_username or ctx.get("expected_username")
|
||||
if expected and live_identity and live_identity != expected:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"identity mismatch: authenticated '{live_identity}' != "
|
||||
f"profile expected '{expected}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return _assessment(not reasons, reasons, ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_identity_match(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
authenticated: str | None,
|
||||
expected_username: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fail closed when profile declares a username that does not match live auth."""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
auth = (authenticated or "").strip() or None
|
||||
expected = (expected_username or "").strip() or None
|
||||
if expected and auth and auth != expected:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"identity mismatch: authenticated '{auth}' != "
|
||||
f"profile expected '{expected}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": not reasons,
|
||||
"block": bool(reasons),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"authenticated": auth,
|
||||
"expected_username": expected,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_REPO_SLUG_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(?P<org>[^/\s]+)\s*/\s*(?P<repo>[^/\s]+?)(?:\.git)?\s*$")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def parse_repository_slug(slug: str | None) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
|
||||
"""Split a canonical ``owner/repository`` slug, or None when unparseable."""
|
||||
match = _REPO_SLUG_RE.match(slug or "")
|
||||
if not match:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return match.group("org"), match.group("repo")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_repository_slug(org: str | None, repo: str | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""``owner/repository`` from parts, or None when either side is missing."""
|
||||
left = (org or "").strip()
|
||||
right = (repo or "").strip()
|
||||
if not left or not right:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return f"{left}/{right}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def declared_allowed_repositories(
|
||||
profile: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
strict: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Canonical ``owner/repository`` authorization boundary declared by *profile*.
|
||||
|
||||
This list is an authorization boundary, never the session binding itself:
|
||||
the verified workspace selects exactly one entry (see
|
||||
:func:`assess_repository_scope`).
|
||||
|
||||
When *strict* is true (mutation path), missing profile, non-list values, or
|
||||
any malformed entry raise ``ValueError`` instead of silently collapsing to
|
||||
an empty scope (which would fail open). Read-only diagnostics may use
|
||||
strict=False.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not profile:
|
||||
if strict:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
"profile unresolved; cannot declare allowed_repositories "
|
||||
"(fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return []
|
||||
raw = profile.get("allowed_repositories")
|
||||
if raw is None:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, (list, tuple)):
|
||||
if strict:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
"allowed_repositories must be a list of owner/repository slugs "
|
||||
"(fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return []
|
||||
slugs: list[str] = []
|
||||
errors: list[str] = []
|
||||
for entry in raw:
|
||||
if not isinstance(entry, str):
|
||||
errors.append(f"non-string allowed_repositories entry {entry!r}")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
parsed = parse_repository_slug(entry)
|
||||
if not parsed:
|
||||
errors.append(
|
||||
f"malformed allowed_repositories entry {entry!r} "
|
||||
"(expected owner/repository)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
slugs.append(f"{parsed[0]}/{parsed[1]}")
|
||||
if strict and errors:
|
||||
raise ValueError("; ".join(errors) + " (fail closed)")
|
||||
return slugs
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_repository_scope(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
workspace_slug: str | None,
|
||||
allowed: list[str] | None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
require_scope: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Authorize the verified workspace repository against the profile allowlist.
|
||||
|
||||
The workspace-derived slug is the only candidate: a profile that authorizes
|
||||
several repositories still binds to the single verified one, and never to
|
||||
the list as a whole.
|
||||
|
||||
*require_scope* (mutation path): missing/empty allowlist fails closed. The
|
||||
workspace remote cannot self-authorize without a configured boundary.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
scope = list(allowed or [])
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
name = profile_name or "(active profile)"
|
||||
if not scope:
|
||||
if require_scope:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"mutation denied: profile '{name}' has no non-empty "
|
||||
"allowed_repositories authorization boundary (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": False,
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"scope_enforced": True,
|
||||
"workspace_slug": workspace_slug,
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"scope_enforced": False,
|
||||
"workspace_slug": workspace_slug,
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not workspace_slug:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"no verified workspace repository could be established for profile "
|
||||
f"'{name}'; repository scope cannot be authorized (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif workspace_slug.lower() not in {entry.lower() for entry in scope}:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"repository scope denial: workspace repository '{workspace_slug}' "
|
||||
f"is not authorized by profile '{name}' allowed_repositories "
|
||||
f"{sorted(scope)} (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": not reasons,
|
||||
"block": bool(reasons),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"scope_enforced": True,
|
||||
"workspace_slug": workspace_slug,
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": sorted(scope),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_repository_override(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
requested_org: str | None,
|
||||
requested_repo: str | None,
|
||||
bound_org: str | None,
|
||||
bound_repo: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Caller-supplied org/repo must agree with the immutable binding.
|
||||
|
||||
A mutation request is never allowed to establish, complete, or replace the
|
||||
binding — it may only be checked against it.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
req_org = (requested_org or "").strip() or None
|
||||
req_repo = (requested_repo or "").strip() or None
|
||||
if req_repo and bound_repo and req_repo.lower() != bound_repo.lower():
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"repository override denial: request targets '{req_repo}' but the "
|
||||
f"session is bound to '{bound_repo}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if req_org and bound_org and req_org.lower() != bound_org.lower():
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"organization override denial: request targets '{req_org}' but the "
|
||||
f"session is bound to '{bound_org}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {"proven": not reasons, "block": bool(reasons), "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def filter_profiles_for_remote(
|
||||
config: dict | None,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
remotes: dict | None,
|
||||
) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Profile names whose host/context matches *remote* (enabled only)."""
|
||||
if not config or not remote:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
profiles = config.get("profiles") or {}
|
||||
contexts = config.get("contexts") or {}
|
||||
names: list[str] = []
|
||||
for name, data in profiles.items():
|
||||
if not isinstance(data, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if not data.get("enabled", True):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if profile_matches_remote(data, remote, remotes, contexts=contexts):
|
||||
names.append(name)
|
||||
return sorted(names)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def profile_allowed_for_remote(
|
||||
profile: dict | None,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
remotes: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
contexts: dict | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Assess whether the active profile may serve *remote*."""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if not profile:
|
||||
reasons.append("active profile unresolved (fail closed)")
|
||||
return {"proven": False, "block": True, "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
if not remote:
|
||||
return {"proven": True, "block": False, "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
# Legacy env-only profiles have no configured base URL or v2 context. Their
|
||||
# first call may establish the process remote/host pin; after that,
|
||||
# assess_session_context rejects any drift. Configured v2 profiles still
|
||||
# require positive host/context alignment here.
|
||||
if not profile_host(profile) and not (profile.get("context") or "").strip():
|
||||
return {"proven": True, "block": False, "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
if not profile_matches_remote(profile, remote, remotes, contexts=contexts):
|
||||
p_name = profile.get("profile_name") or profile.get("name") or "(unknown)"
|
||||
p_host = profile_host(profile) or "(none)"
|
||||
r_host = remote_host(remote, remotes) or "(none)"
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"cross-host profile denial: profile '{p_name}' (host '{p_host}') "
|
||||
f"cannot serve remote '{remote}' (host '{r_host}') (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {"proven": not reasons, "block": bool(reasons), "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def mutation_context_audit_fields(
|
||||
ctx: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fields to include in pre-mutation audit records."""
|
||||
data = ctx if ctx is not None else get_session_context()
|
||||
if not data:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"session_context_bound": False,
|
||||
"session_profile": None,
|
||||
"session_remote": None,
|
||||
"session_host": None,
|
||||
"session_identity": None,
|
||||
"session_repository": None,
|
||||
"session_org": None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"session_context_bound": True,
|
||||
"session_profile": data.get("profile_name"),
|
||||
"session_remote": data.get("remote"),
|
||||
"session_host": data.get("host"),
|
||||
"session_identity": data.get("identity"),
|
||||
"session_repository": data.get("repository"),
|
||||
"session_org": data.get("org"),
|
||||
"session_role_kind": data.get("role_kind"),
|
||||
"session_context_source": data.get("source"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _assessment(
|
||||
proven: bool, reasons: list[str], ctx: Mapping[str, Any] | None
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": proven,
|
||||
"block": not proven,
|
||||
"reasons": list(reasons),
|
||||
"bound_context": dict(ctx) if ctx else None,
|
||||
"audit": mutation_context_audit_fields(ctx),
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -32,15 +32,6 @@ workflow file.
|
||||
mutation.
|
||||
- A nearby capability does not count.
|
||||
- Do not self-review or self-merge.
|
||||
- **Never push a stable branch directly.** Worker sessions (author/reviewer/merger)
|
||||
must never run `git push <remote> master` — or `main`/`dev`/other stable refs,
|
||||
including refspecs (`HEAD:master`), `--force`, `--delete`, or `--dry-run` no-op
|
||||
probes — and must never commit on the root/control checkout outside an issue
|
||||
feature branch. Stable-branch updates land ONLY through sanctioned Gitea merge
|
||||
tooling (`gitea_merge_pr`) or an explicitly authorized reconciler path. A
|
||||
detected attempt marks the session workflow-contaminated (#671) and fails
|
||||
closed on review/merge/close/completion until a reconciler audits and clears
|
||||
it. `git fetch` / `git pull --ff-only` and feature-branch pushes stay allowed.
|
||||
- Do not mix modes in one run.
|
||||
- **BLOCKED + DIAGNOSE default rule (required):** If any required workflow step, skill, tool, capability, preflight, instruction, profile, worktree binding, or terminal/MCP operation cannot be performed or loaded (including the canonical ones listed in this skill and its loaded workflow), immediately enter `BLOCKED + DIAGNOSE`. Stop before any git or Gitea mutation. Diagnose using the standard template in [`templates/blocked-diagnose-report.md`](templates/blocked-diagnose-report.md). Attempt *only* safe non-mutating recovery. Report using the template. Do not continue, use fallbacks, or treat the missing requirement as harmless.
|
||||
- If the required workflow cannot be loaded, stop and produce a recovery handoff
|
||||
@@ -57,11 +48,6 @@ workflow file.
|
||||
- wrong profile or role for the requested operation
|
||||
- dirty or misbound worktree (root checkout or non-branches/ path)
|
||||
- root checkout mutation risk
|
||||
- stable-branch push contamination (#671): a direct `git push <remote> master`
|
||||
(or `main`/`dev`) equivalent, or a root/control-checkout commit not on an issue
|
||||
feature branch, marks the session workflow-contaminated; review/merge/close/
|
||||
completion mutations then fail closed until a reconciler audits and clears it
|
||||
(`gitea_audit_stable_branch_contamination action=clear`, reconciler-only)
|
||||
- mutation guard failure (e.g. branches-only guard)
|
||||
- missing required MCP tool/schema or operation
|
||||
- stale or inconsistent runtime state (e.g. lease vs actual, dirty state disagreement)
|
||||
@@ -132,42 +118,6 @@ The main project checkout is a stable control checkout on `master`, `main`, or
|
||||
If `cwd` is not inside `branches/`, stop before any file edit, test write,
|
||||
commit, merge, rebase, or cleanup. The main checkout is orchestration-only.
|
||||
|
||||
## Stable Branch Push Protection (#671)
|
||||
|
||||
Worker sessions must **never** publish a stable branch directly. This is the
|
||||
prevention hardening for the #670 incident (a bare direct-to-master commit
|
||||
`2fa97c26` and a PR #654 merger `git push prgs master` attempt).
|
||||
|
||||
**Forbidden for author/reviewer/merger sessions:**
|
||||
|
||||
- `git push <remote> master` (and `main`, `dev`, `develop`, `development`),
|
||||
including refspecs (`HEAD:master`, `+refs/heads/x:refs/heads/master`),
|
||||
`--force`, `--delete` / `:master`, and `--dry-run`/`-n` no-op probes (a
|
||||
dry-run still proves intent and contaminates the session).
|
||||
- Local commits on the root/control checkout that are not carried by an issue
|
||||
feature branch under `branches/`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Allowed (never blocked):**
|
||||
|
||||
- `git fetch` and `git pull --ff-only` of master into the control checkout when
|
||||
authorized for sync.
|
||||
- Feature-branch pushes to non-stable refs (`git push <remote> fix/issue-N-...`).
|
||||
- Sanctioned merges via `gitea_merge_pr` / the Gitea API merge endpoint — the
|
||||
**only** way stable branches advance.
|
||||
|
||||
**What happens on a detected attempt:** the session is marked
|
||||
workflow-contaminated (durable `stable_branch_contamination` marker, redacted
|
||||
command summary + session id + remote + ref). While contaminated, all
|
||||
review / merge / close / issue-completion mutations fail closed. `comment_issue`
|
||||
and `lock_issue` remain allowed so the contaminated worker can post the durable
|
||||
audit comment and hand off. Contamination **cannot be self-cleared** — only a
|
||||
reconciler audit (`gitea_audit_stable_branch_contamination action=clear`) may
|
||||
clear it.
|
||||
|
||||
Tooling: call `gitea_record_stable_branch_push_attempt` to classify/record a
|
||||
proposed push before running it; `gitea_audit_stable_branch_contamination` to
|
||||
inspect or (reconciler-only) clear the marker.
|
||||
|
||||
## Shell Spawn Hard-Stop Rule
|
||||
|
||||
`exit_code: -1` with empty stdout/stderr means the shell failed to spawn — not a
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,34 +33,22 @@ Steps:
|
||||
*If the current identity does not match the required role (or is the PR author), STOP. Relaunch/switch to the correct profile first.*
|
||||
2. Verify authenticated identity + active profile.
|
||||
3. Confirm PR #<pr>: author (not you), state open, mergeable, review approved. Check if PR body uses `Closes #N` or `Fixes #N`; if it uses `Implements #N` or `Refs #N`, manual closing will be needed in step 29.
|
||||
4. **PR sync assess (required):** call `gitea_assess_pr_sync_status` with
|
||||
explicit `remote`/`org`/`repo`. Route on `recommended_next_action`:
|
||||
- `merge_now` → continue merger path (do **not** update the branch)
|
||||
- `update_branch_by_merge` → STOP; hand off to **author** for
|
||||
`gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge` (pins expected PR head + base head)
|
||||
- `author_conflict_remediation` → STOP; author worktree conflict fix
|
||||
- `fresh_review_required` → STOP; independent re-review at current head
|
||||
- `blocked` → STOP and diagnose
|
||||
Never merge on a former-head approval after update/remediation.
|
||||
5. Capability evidence (#179): cite the exact gitea_resolve_task_capability
|
||||
4. Capability evidence (#179): cite the exact gitea_resolve_task_capability
|
||||
output (or runtime context) proving merge_pr is allowed — a bare
|
||||
"capability checks passed" claim is downgraded.
|
||||
6. Final live-state recheck (#179), immediately before the merge mutation —
|
||||
5. Final live-state recheck (#179), immediately before the merge mutation —
|
||||
re-read the live PR and prove:
|
||||
- PR still open
|
||||
- live head SHA still equals the pinned/reviewed head SHA
|
||||
- base branch unchanged
|
||||
- no undismissed REQUEST_CHANGES / blocking review state remains
|
||||
If any recheck fails → STOP, re-pin, re-validate.
|
||||
7. If any gate fails → STOP and report.
|
||||
8. Merge with explicit confirmation (e.g. confirmation="MERGE PR <pr>"),
|
||||
6. If any gate fails → STOP and report.
|
||||
7. Merge with explicit confirmation (e.g. confirmation="MERGE PR <pr>"),
|
||||
pinning the reviewed head SHA (expected_head_sha) and, where supported,
|
||||
the changed-file set.
|
||||
9. Confirm remote master now contains the merge commit (or the expected changes if squash merged).
|
||||
8. Confirm remote master now contains the merge commit (or the expected changes if squash merged).
|
||||
*Note: Gitea PR "closed" state is NOT equivalent to "merged". Do not assume a closed PR succeeded without verifying the actual landed changes.*
|
||||
10. **Sequential queue:** after merge, refresh live `master`, run post-merge
|
||||
cleanup handoff, then reassess the **next** PR (do not batch-update all
|
||||
open PRs).
|
||||
|
||||
Post-merge cleanup (#517): merger sessions must NOT perform ad hoc cleanup.
|
||||
- Record merge mutations separately from cleanup mutations in the controller handoff.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ before any PR mutation. Final report schema:
|
||||
|
||||
**BLOCKED + DIAGNOSE (universal default):** If at any point you cannot perform a required step (skill not available, terminal broken, capability missing, wrong profile, guard blocks, worktree misbound, instructions unavailable, preflight fails, etc.), STOP. Clearly state BLOCKED. Use the standard [`../templates/blocked-diagnose-report.md`](../templates/blocked-diagnose-report.md) template. Only safe non-mutating recovery. Report using the template. Do not continue or use any fallback (temp scripts, direct API, etc.) unless controller authorizes. All blocker classes listed in llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md must trigger this.
|
||||
|
||||
**Native MCP failure is a hard stop (#695):** If the native MCP namespace dies (EOF, capability disconnect, session death), STOP. Do **not** import `gitea_mcp_server` from a standalone process, do **not** run offline helpers (`offline_mcp_helper.py`, `offline_mcp_runner.py`, `run_quarantine.py`), and do **not** set direct-import / keychain-bypass / raw-token environment variables. Reconnect the official MCP daemon only. Contaminated approvals must be controller-quarantined; they never authorize merge.
|
||||
|
||||
**Default task prompt:**
|
||||
|
||||
> Review the next eligible open PR in this project. Merge it only if every
|
||||
@@ -950,53 +948,9 @@ Final reports must state:
|
||||
* final live head SHA before merge
|
||||
* whether any push occurred during validation
|
||||
|
||||
## 26D. PR synchronization and conflict-remediation lifecycle
|
||||
|
||||
**Do not treat “approved” as the final readiness state.** For every approved
|
||||
open PR, call `gitea_assess_pr_sync_status` (native MCP only) and route by
|
||||
`recommended_next_action`:
|
||||
|
||||
| Action | Meaning | Next role / tools |
|
||||
|--------|---------|-------------------|
|
||||
| `merge_now` | Valid approval at exact current head; conflict-free; update not required; checks ok | Merger: sanctioned merge workflow only — **do not** update the branch |
|
||||
| `update_branch_by_merge` | Behind live base; protection requires current base; Gitea can merge base without conflicts | **Author only:** `gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge` with pinned `expected_pr_head_sha` + `expected_base_head_sha` |
|
||||
| `author_conflict_remediation` | Conflicts / not auto-updatable | **Author only:** existing `branches/` worktree, issue lock, merge master, resolve, test, push; never force-push/rebase |
|
||||
| `fresh_review_required` | Head changed after approval, or update/remediation produced a new head | Independent reviewer at the **new exact head**; old approvals/leases/verdicts are void |
|
||||
| `blocked` | Other gate (checks, incomplete facts, closed PR, …) | Diagnose; do not merge or update |
|
||||
|
||||
### Hard rules
|
||||
|
||||
* Pin both expected PR head and expected base head for every update. Either
|
||||
race → fail closed with no partial mutation.
|
||||
* Never rebase or force-push author branches.
|
||||
* Never update an author branch from a reviewer or merger profile.
|
||||
* Never preserve approval, reviewer lease, merger lease, or prepared verdict
|
||||
across a head change.
|
||||
* Process PRs **sequentially**: synchronize/remediate one → review new head →
|
||||
merge → refresh live `master` → reassess the next PR. Do not update every
|
||||
open PR at once (each merge restales the rest).
|
||||
* Conflict remediation only in the existing dedicated issue/PR worktree under
|
||||
`branches/`. Do not delete that worktree until the updated PR is merged and
|
||||
cleanup eligibility is proven.
|
||||
* Post-merge: canonical cleanup handoff to reconciler (section 28).
|
||||
|
||||
### After `gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge` succeeds
|
||||
|
||||
1. Treat former-head approval as invalidated.
|
||||
2. Release/supersede obsolete reviewer and merger leases.
|
||||
3. Route `recommended_next_action=fresh_review_required` at the new head.
|
||||
4. Independent re-review, then merger lease/adopt + merge at the new head only.
|
||||
|
||||
All Gitea reads/mutations use native MCP. Never substitute direct API, curl,
|
||||
tea/gh, Web UI mutation by an LLM, database changes, raw Git push, or token
|
||||
access.
|
||||
|
||||
## 27. Merge rules
|
||||
|
||||
Before merge, call `gitea_assess_pr_sync_status` when the PR is approved/open
|
||||
and may be behind base. Only proceed with merge when
|
||||
`recommended_next_action` is `merge_now` and approval remains at the current
|
||||
head. Then rerun fresh live checks:
|
||||
Before merge, rerun fresh live checks:
|
||||
|
||||
* whoami
|
||||
* active profile/runtime
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ before any issue implementation mutation. Final report schema:
|
||||
|
||||
**BLOCKED + DIAGNOSE (universal default):** If at any point you cannot perform a required step (skill not available, terminal broken, capability missing, wrong profile, guard blocks, worktree misbound, instructions unavailable, preflight fails, etc.), STOP. Clearly state BLOCKED. Use the standard [`../templates/blocked-diagnose-report.md`](../templates/blocked-diagnose-report.md) template. Only safe non-mutating recovery. Report using the template. Do not continue or use any fallback (temp scripts, direct API, etc.) unless controller authorizes. All blocker classes listed in llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md must trigger this.
|
||||
|
||||
**Native MCP failure is a hard stop (#695):** Do not import MCP server internals, run offline mutation helpers, or set credential-bypass env vars after a native transport failure. Reconnect the official daemon only.
|
||||
|
||||
**Default task prompt:**
|
||||
|
||||
> Find the next eligible issue in this project, work on it only if all gates
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,478 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Fail-closed guard against direct pushes to stable branches (#671).
|
||||
|
||||
MCP workflow sessions must never publish to a stable branch (``master``,
|
||||
``main``, ``dev``, ...) directly. Stable-branch updates land only through
|
||||
sanctioned Gitea merge tooling or an explicitly authorized reconciler path.
|
||||
|
||||
Incident origin (#670): a bare direct-to-master commit ``2fa97c26`` landed on
|
||||
``prgs/master`` without PR/review provenance, and a PR #654 merger run
|
||||
attempted ``git push prgs master`` (audited as a no-op, but the *intent* is the
|
||||
hazard). Partial protections already existed (``author_proofs.PROTECTED_BRANCHES``,
|
||||
``root_checkout_guard``, branch-push proofs) but did not detect shell push
|
||||
equivalents, mark the session contaminated after such an attempt, or fail
|
||||
closed on subsequent review/merge/close/completion mutations.
|
||||
|
||||
This module is the detection + contamination-policy core. Like
|
||||
``author_proofs`` and ``root_checkout_guard`` it is **pure**: callers gather
|
||||
the raw facts (the proposed command line, git state, the durable contamination
|
||||
marker) and pass them in, so the same logic serves prompts, MCP gates, and
|
||||
tests. Nothing here performs git or network calls or reads durable state; the
|
||||
server wires these helpers to ``mcp_session_state`` and ``verify_preflight_purity``.
|
||||
|
||||
Design rules honoured (from the #671 acceptance criteria):
|
||||
|
||||
* Detect ``git push <remote> master`` shell equivalents, including refspecs
|
||||
(``HEAD:master``, ``+refs/heads/x:refs/heads/master``), ``--force``,
|
||||
``--dry-run``/no-op intent, and delete refspecs (``:master``).
|
||||
* Never false-block a feature-branch push (``git push prgs fix/issue-671-...``).
|
||||
* Never treat ``git fetch`` / ``git pull --ff-only`` as a push.
|
||||
* Never treat sanctioned ``gitea_merge_pr`` / Gitea API merge as a push.
|
||||
* Fail closed on ambiguous targets that *may* resolve to a stable branch, but
|
||||
surface ambiguity as its own signal rather than silently blocking feature work.
|
||||
* Contamination must not be clearable by the same worker session — only a
|
||||
reconciler (audit) role may clear or bypass the gate.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from typing import Any, Iterable
|
||||
|
||||
from author_proofs import PROTECTED_BRANCHES
|
||||
|
||||
# Single source of truth for the stable branch set: the same protected set the
|
||||
# author branch-identity proofs already enforce (#177), so the two guards can
|
||||
# never drift apart.
|
||||
STABLE_BRANCHES = PROTECTED_BRANCHES
|
||||
|
||||
# Mutations that must fail closed once the session is contaminated by a direct
|
||||
# stable-branch push attempt (#671 AC4: review, merge, close, completion).
|
||||
# ``comment_issue`` / ``lock_issue`` / ``create_issue`` are deliberately NOT
|
||||
# gated so a contaminated worker can still post the durable audit comment and
|
||||
# hand off. Only a reconciler (audit) role bypasses this set.
|
||||
CONTAMINATION_GATED_TASKS = frozenset({
|
||||
"create_pr",
|
||||
"commit_files",
|
||||
"gitea_commit_files",
|
||||
"close_pr",
|
||||
"close_issue",
|
||||
"review_pr",
|
||||
"approve_pr",
|
||||
"request_changes_pr",
|
||||
"submit_pr_review",
|
||||
"merge_pr",
|
||||
"delete_branch",
|
||||
"complete_issue",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
CONTAMINATION_KIND = "stable_branch_push"
|
||||
|
||||
REMEDIATION = (
|
||||
"Direct stable-branch publication is forbidden for worker sessions. Stop, "
|
||||
"leave the stable branch untouched, and route the change through sanctioned "
|
||||
"Gitea merge tooling (gitea_merge_pr) or an explicitly authorized reconciler "
|
||||
"audit. This session is workflow-contaminated until a reconciler audits it."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── command tokenising ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
# Split a compound command line into individual simple commands on shell
|
||||
# separators so ``a && git push prgs master`` is analysed segment by segment.
|
||||
_SEGMENT_SPLIT_RE = re.compile(r"(?:\|\||&&|\||;|\n)")
|
||||
|
||||
_GIT_PUSH_RE = re.compile(r"\bgit\b[\w\s\-]*?\bpush\b", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||||
_GIT_FETCH_RE = re.compile(r"\bgit\b[\w\s\-]*?\b(?:fetch|pull)\b", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||||
|
||||
# Flags that take a value argument in ``git push`` (so the following token is
|
||||
# consumed as the flag's value, not a refspec).
|
||||
_VALUE_FLAGS = frozenset({
|
||||
"--repo",
|
||||
"-o",
|
||||
"--push-option",
|
||||
"--receive-pack",
|
||||
"--exec",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
_FORCE_FLAGS = frozenset({"-f", "--force"})
|
||||
_DRY_RUN_FLAGS = frozenset({"-n", "--dry-run"})
|
||||
_DELETE_FLAGS = frozenset({"-d", "--delete"})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _clean(value: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
return (value or "").strip()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _strip_ref_prefix(ref: str) -> str:
|
||||
ref = ref.strip()
|
||||
for prefix in ("refs/heads/", "heads/"):
|
||||
if ref.startswith(prefix):
|
||||
return ref[len(prefix):]
|
||||
return ref
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_stable_ref(ref: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when ``ref`` names a configured stable branch."""
|
||||
name = _strip_ref_prefix(_clean(ref))
|
||||
return bool(name) and name in STABLE_BRANCHES
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── redaction ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
_URL_USERINFO_RE = re.compile(r"(https?://)[^/\s:@]+(?::[^/\s@]+)?@", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||||
_SECRET_ASSIGN_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"\b((?:GITEA_)?(?:TOKEN|PASSWORD|PASS|PAT|SECRET|API_KEY|AUTH))\s*=\s*\S+",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_BEARER_RE = re.compile(r"\b(Bearer|token)\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-]{8,}", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def redact_command(command: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Strip credentials/URLs from a command line before logging it (#671).
|
||||
|
||||
Redacts URL userinfo (``https://user:tok@host`` → ``https://***@host``),
|
||||
``TOKEN=...`` style assignments, and bearer/token headers. Leaves the
|
||||
structural parts (``git push <remote> master``) intact for audit value.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
text = _clean(command)
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
text = _URL_USERINFO_RE.sub(r"\1***@", text)
|
||||
text = _SECRET_ASSIGN_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}=***", text)
|
||||
text = _BEARER_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)} ***", text)
|
||||
return text
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── push classification ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
def _analyse_push_segment(segment: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify one ``git push ...`` command segment."""
|
||||
tokens = segment.split()
|
||||
# Drop everything up to and including the ``push`` verb.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
push_idx = next(
|
||||
i for i, tok in enumerate(tokens)
|
||||
if tok.lower() == "push"
|
||||
)
|
||||
except StopIteration:
|
||||
push_idx = -1
|
||||
args = tokens[push_idx + 1:] if push_idx >= 0 else []
|
||||
|
||||
is_force = False
|
||||
is_dry_run = False
|
||||
is_delete = False
|
||||
positionals: list[str] = []
|
||||
|
||||
skip_next = False
|
||||
for tok in args:
|
||||
if skip_next:
|
||||
skip_next = False
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if tok in _FORCE_FLAGS or tok.startswith("--force-with-lease") or tok.startswith("--force-if-includes"):
|
||||
is_force = True
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if tok in _DRY_RUN_FLAGS:
|
||||
is_dry_run = True
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if tok in _DELETE_FLAGS:
|
||||
is_delete = True
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if tok in _VALUE_FLAGS:
|
||||
skip_next = True
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if tok.startswith("--") and "=" in tok:
|
||||
# e.g. --repo=... : self-contained, not a refspec.
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if tok.startswith("-"):
|
||||
# Unknown/combined short flag; ignore for ref detection.
|
||||
continue
|
||||
positionals.append(tok)
|
||||
|
||||
# First positional after push is the remote (when any positional exists);
|
||||
# the rest are refspecs / branch names.
|
||||
remote = positionals[0] if positionals else None
|
||||
refspecs = positionals[1:]
|
||||
|
||||
stable_refs: list[str] = []
|
||||
force_to_stable = False
|
||||
delete_stable = False
|
||||
for spec in refspecs:
|
||||
force_spec = spec.startswith("+")
|
||||
body = spec[1:] if force_spec else spec
|
||||
if ":" in body:
|
||||
src, _, dst = body.partition(":")
|
||||
dest = dst
|
||||
if src == "" and dst:
|
||||
# ``:master`` — delete refspec.
|
||||
is_delete = True
|
||||
else:
|
||||
dest = body
|
||||
if is_stable_ref(dest):
|
||||
stable_refs.append(_strip_ref_prefix(dest))
|
||||
if force_spec or is_force:
|
||||
force_to_stable = True
|
||||
if is_delete:
|
||||
delete_stable = True
|
||||
|
||||
targets_stable = bool(stable_refs)
|
||||
# Ambiguous: ``git push <remote>`` (or bare ``git push``) with no refspec —
|
||||
# resolves to the current branch's upstream, which we cannot see from the
|
||||
# command alone. Flag it, but do not assert stable (would false-block
|
||||
# feature-branch pushes).
|
||||
ambiguous = not refspecs
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"is_git_push": True,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"refspecs": refspecs,
|
||||
"targets_stable": targets_stable,
|
||||
"stable_refs": stable_refs,
|
||||
"is_force": is_force or force_to_stable,
|
||||
"is_dry_run": is_dry_run,
|
||||
"is_delete": is_delete or delete_stable,
|
||||
"ambiguous_target": ambiguous,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_push_command(command: str | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify a shell command line for direct stable-branch push intent (#671).
|
||||
|
||||
Returns a dict describing whether the command is a ``git push`` targeting a
|
||||
stable branch. Fetch/pull are never pushes. A sanctioned Gitea merge (which
|
||||
is not a ``git push`` at all) classifies as non-push. Dry-run and no-op
|
||||
pushes still count as *intent* and are reported as contamination
|
||||
(``proves_intent``) so a ``--dry-run`` cannot be used to probe the gate.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
text = _clean(command)
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"command": text,
|
||||
"redacted_command": redact_command(text),
|
||||
"is_git_push": False,
|
||||
"is_fetch_or_pull": False,
|
||||
"targets_stable": False,
|
||||
"stable_refs": [],
|
||||
"is_force": False,
|
||||
"is_dry_run": False,
|
||||
"is_delete": False,
|
||||
"ambiguous_target": False,
|
||||
"contamination": False,
|
||||
"proves_intent": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
stable_refs: list[str] = []
|
||||
saw_push = False
|
||||
for segment in _SEGMENT_SPLIT_RE.split(text):
|
||||
seg = segment.strip()
|
||||
if not seg:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if _GIT_FETCH_RE.search(seg) and not _GIT_PUSH_RE.search(seg):
|
||||
result["is_fetch_or_pull"] = True
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if not _GIT_PUSH_RE.search(seg):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
saw_push = True
|
||||
analysis = _analyse_push_segment(seg)
|
||||
result["is_git_push"] = True
|
||||
result["is_force"] = result["is_force"] or analysis["is_force"]
|
||||
result["is_dry_run"] = result["is_dry_run"] or analysis["is_dry_run"]
|
||||
result["is_delete"] = result["is_delete"] or analysis["is_delete"]
|
||||
result["ambiguous_target"] = result["ambiguous_target"] or analysis["ambiguous_target"]
|
||||
stable_refs.extend(analysis["stable_refs"])
|
||||
|
||||
result["stable_refs"] = sorted(set(stable_refs))
|
||||
result["targets_stable"] = bool(stable_refs)
|
||||
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if result["targets_stable"]:
|
||||
refs = ", ".join(result["stable_refs"])
|
||||
verb = "delete" if result["is_delete"] else ("force-push" if result["is_force"] else "push")
|
||||
qualifier = " (dry-run/no-op still proves intent)" if result["is_dry_run"] else ""
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"direct stable-branch {verb} detected targeting: {refs}{qualifier}; "
|
||||
"worker sessions must never publish stable branches directly"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["contamination"] = True
|
||||
result["proves_intent"] = True
|
||||
elif saw_push and result["ambiguous_target"]:
|
||||
# Bare ``git push`` with no refspec: ambiguous. Report, but do not
|
||||
# contaminate on the command alone — the root-checkout / branch-state
|
||||
# detector resolves whether the current branch is stable.
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"ambiguous 'git push' with no refspec: resolve the current branch "
|
||||
"before pushing; if it is a stable branch this is forbidden"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
result["reasons"] = reasons
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def detect_stable_push(commands: str | Iterable[str] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify one command or an iterable of commands; contamination if any hit."""
|
||||
if commands is None:
|
||||
return classify_push_command(None)
|
||||
if isinstance(commands, str):
|
||||
return classify_push_command(commands)
|
||||
worst: dict[str, Any] | None = None
|
||||
for cmd in commands:
|
||||
res = classify_push_command(cmd)
|
||||
if res["contamination"]:
|
||||
return res
|
||||
if worst is None or (res["is_git_push"] and not worst["is_git_push"]):
|
||||
worst = res
|
||||
return worst or classify_push_command(None)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── root/control checkout local-commit detection ──────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_root_checkout_local_commit(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
current_branch: str | None,
|
||||
head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
remote_master_sha: str | None,
|
||||
is_under_branches: bool,
|
||||
ahead_count: int | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Detect a local commit on the root/control checkout not on a feature branch.
|
||||
|
||||
#671 AC2. An isolated ``branches/...`` worktree is exempt (that is where
|
||||
feature work belongs). On the control checkout, a commit is illegitimate
|
||||
when the checkout sits on a stable branch (or detached) and its HEAD has
|
||||
advanced past the tracking ``prgs/master`` — i.e. a commit was made that is
|
||||
not carried by an issue feature branch/PR.
|
||||
|
||||
Positive evidence only: missing state reports ``unknown`` rather than
|
||||
asserting contamination, but an unreadable *branch* on the control checkout
|
||||
(detached HEAD) with an advanced HEAD is still flagged.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
branch = _clean(current_branch)
|
||||
head = _clean(head_sha).lower()
|
||||
master = _clean(remote_master_sha).lower()
|
||||
|
||||
if is_under_branches:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"contamination": False,
|
||||
"unknown": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"detail": "isolated branches/ worktree — feature commits are expected here",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
unknown = False
|
||||
|
||||
on_stable = (not branch) or (branch in STABLE_BRANCHES)
|
||||
if not on_stable:
|
||||
# Control checkout is on some non-stable branch: out of scope for this
|
||||
# detector (root_checkout_guard #475 handles that contamination class).
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"contamination": False,
|
||||
"unknown": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"detail": f"control checkout on non-stable branch '{branch}' — not this detector's class",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
advanced = False
|
||||
if ahead_count is not None and ahead_count > 0:
|
||||
advanced = True
|
||||
if head and master and head != master:
|
||||
advanced = True
|
||||
if (not head or not master) and ahead_count is None:
|
||||
unknown = True
|
||||
|
||||
if advanced:
|
||||
where = f"branch '{branch}'" if branch else "detached HEAD"
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"control checkout ({where}) has local commits not on an issue "
|
||||
"feature branch (HEAD advanced past prgs/master); worker sessions "
|
||||
"must commit only on issue branches under branches/"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"contamination": bool(reasons),
|
||||
"unknown": unknown and not reasons,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"current_branch": branch or None,
|
||||
"head_sha": head or None,
|
||||
"remote_master_sha": master or None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── contamination record + gate ───────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
def build_contamination_record(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
reason_class: str,
|
||||
command_redacted: str | None = None,
|
||||
session_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
remote: str | None = None,
|
||||
ref: str | None = None,
|
||||
role: str | None = None,
|
||||
detail: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Build the durable contamination marker payload (redacted, audit-safe).
|
||||
|
||||
``reason_class`` is one of ``stable_branch_push`` / ``root_checkout_commit``.
|
||||
The command is stored already-redacted; callers pass the raw line through
|
||||
:func:`redact_command` (or this builder redacts a raw ``command`` for them).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"kind": CONTAMINATION_KIND,
|
||||
"reason_class": _clean(reason_class) or "stable_branch_push",
|
||||
"command_summary": redact_command(command_redacted),
|
||||
"session_id": _clean(session_id) or None,
|
||||
"remote": _clean(remote) or None,
|
||||
"ref": _clean(ref) or None,
|
||||
"role": _clean(role) or None,
|
||||
"detail": _clean(detail) or None,
|
||||
"cleared_by_reconciler": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_contamination_gate(
|
||||
marker: dict[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
task: str | None,
|
||||
actual_role: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fail closed on gated mutations while a contamination marker is live (#671 AC4).
|
||||
|
||||
* No marker → allowed.
|
||||
* Reconciler (audit) role → allowed (the sanctioned path to inspect/clear).
|
||||
* Marker present + ``task`` in :data:`CONTAMINATION_GATED_TASKS` → blocked.
|
||||
* Marker present + non-gated task (e.g. ``comment_issue``) → allowed, so the
|
||||
worker can still post the durable audit/handoff comment.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not marker or marker.get("cleared_by_reconciler"):
|
||||
return {"block": False, "reasons": [], "task": task}
|
||||
|
||||
role = _clean(actual_role).lower()
|
||||
if role == "reconciler":
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"task": task,
|
||||
"detail": "reconciler audit path is exempt from the contamination gate",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
task_name = _clean(task)
|
||||
if task_name and task_name in CONTAMINATION_GATED_TASKS:
|
||||
summary = marker.get("command_summary") or marker.get("detail") or "(no summary)"
|
||||
reason_class = marker.get("reason_class") or "stable_branch_push"
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"session is workflow-contaminated ({reason_class}): {summary}. "
|
||||
f"'{task_name}' is blocked until a reconciler audits and clears "
|
||||
"the contamination. " + REMEDIATION
|
||||
],
|
||||
"task": task_name,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return {"block": False, "reasons": [], "task": task_name or None}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_contamination_gate_error(gate: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Single RuntimeError message for MCP mutation gates."""
|
||||
reasons = "; ".join(gate.get("reasons") or ["session workflow-contaminated"])
|
||||
return f"Stable-branch contamination gate (#671): {reasons}"
|
||||
@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Sanctioned recovery for stale env-bound task workspace bindings (#702).
|
||||
|
||||
When the MCP daemon dies from an unhandled exception it never runs teardown,
|
||||
and the auto-reconnected daemon inherits ``GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE`` from its
|
||||
parent environment. That inherited value can permanently bind the fresh
|
||||
session to a prior task's worktree (the PR #701 / ``review-pr-654`` incident).
|
||||
|
||||
This module classifies the active env binding against live session evidence
|
||||
and produces a fail-closed recovery plan. Only two situations permit the
|
||||
daemon to clear the binding on its own:
|
||||
|
||||
- the bound path no longer exists on disk (``provably_stale_missing_path``)
|
||||
- the binding was inherited at daemon boot and a *sanctioned* in-session
|
||||
reviewer/merger lease later bound a different worktree
|
||||
(``superseded_by_session_lease``)
|
||||
|
||||
Everything else is surfaced (``unverified_inherited``) and left for the
|
||||
managed reconnect path — never cleared silently, never rebound to a guessed
|
||||
worktree.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV = "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"
|
||||
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_UNBOUND = "unbound"
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED = "corroborated"
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED = "unverified_inherited"
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH = "provably_stale_missing_path"
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE = "superseded_by_session_lease"
|
||||
|
||||
CLASSIFICATIONS = frozenset({
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_UNBOUND,
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED,
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED,
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
# Roles whose task workspace is owned by a lease lifecycle, so an inherited
|
||||
# generic binding without a corroborating lease is suspect.
|
||||
LEASE_BOUND_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger"})
|
||||
|
||||
RECOVERY_ACTION_NONE = "none"
|
||||
RECOVERY_ACTION_CLEAR_ENV = "clear_env"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _norm(path: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
text = (path or "").strip()
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
return os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(text))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def snapshot_boot_bindings(
|
||||
env: dict[str, str] | os._Environ | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Capture worktree env bindings present when the daemon booted.
|
||||
|
||||
A value present in this snapshot was inherited from the parent
|
||||
environment, not established by any sanctioned tool in this daemon's
|
||||
lifetime.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"active_worktree": (env_map.get(ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV) or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_active_worktree_binding(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
active_value: str | None,
|
||||
role_env_value: str | None = None,
|
||||
session_lease_worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
boot_inherited: bool,
|
||||
path_exists: bool | None,
|
||||
role_kind: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify the GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE binding against live evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
Fail closed: unknown evidence never yields a clear-eligible class.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
active = _norm(active_value)
|
||||
if not active:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_UNBOUND,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": False,
|
||||
"active_worktree": None,
|
||||
"reasons": ["no GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE binding present"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role = (role_kind or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
role_env = _norm(role_env_value)
|
||||
lease_wt = _norm(session_lease_worktree)
|
||||
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"active_worktree": active,
|
||||
"boot_inherited": bool(boot_inherited),
|
||||
"role_kind": role or None,
|
||||
"session_lease_worktree": lease_wt or None,
|
||||
"role_env_worktree": role_env or None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if path_exists is False:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"bound worktree '{active}' no longer exists on disk; the binding "
|
||||
"cannot name a valid task workspace"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": True,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if lease_wt and lease_wt == active:
|
||||
reasons.append("binding matches the sanctioned in-session lease worktree")
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if lease_wt and lease_wt != active and boot_inherited:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"boot-inherited binding disagrees with the sanctioned in-session "
|
||||
f"lease worktree '{lease_wt}'; the lease is live authority"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": True,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if lease_wt and lease_wt != active and not boot_inherited:
|
||||
# Set after boot by tooling; disagreement is surfaced, never auto-cleared.
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"post-boot binding disagrees with the in-session lease worktree; "
|
||||
"surfacing only (fail closed, no automatic clear)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if role_env and role_env == active:
|
||||
reasons.append("binding matches the role-specific worktree env binding")
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if boot_inherited and role in LEASE_BOUND_ROLES and not lease_wt:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"binding was inherited at daemon boot, no sanctioned in-session "
|
||||
f"lease corroborates it, and the {role} role binds workspaces "
|
||||
"through the lease lifecycle; treat as unverified until a fresh "
|
||||
"lease or managed reconnect re-establishes the workspace"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
reasons.append("no contradicting evidence; binding treated as corroborated")
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def plan_recovery(classification_result: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Turn a classification into an explicit, fail-closed recovery plan."""
|
||||
classification = classification_result.get("classification")
|
||||
clear_eligible = bool(classification_result.get("clear_eligible"))
|
||||
reasons = list(classification_result.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
|
||||
if classification not in CLASSIFICATIONS:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"action": RECOVERY_ACTION_NONE,
|
||||
"clear_allowed": False,
|
||||
"classification": classification,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons + ["unknown classification (fail closed)"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if clear_eligible and classification in {
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE,
|
||||
}:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"action": RECOVERY_ACTION_CLEAR_ENV,
|
||||
"clear_allowed": True,
|
||||
"classification": classification,
|
||||
"active_worktree": classification_result.get("active_worktree"),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
exact_next_action = None
|
||||
if classification == CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED:
|
||||
exact_next_action = (
|
||||
"managed recovery required: reconnect the MCP namespace through "
|
||||
"the managed client configuration (or start a fresh session) so "
|
||||
"the daemon boots without the inherited GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE, or "
|
||||
"corroborate the binding by acquiring a lease for that worktree; "
|
||||
"do not clear or rewrite the environment manually"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"action": RECOVERY_ACTION_NONE,
|
||||
"clear_allowed": False,
|
||||
"classification": classification,
|
||||
"active_worktree": classification_result.get("active_worktree"),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
**({"exact_next_action": exact_next_action} if exact_next_action else {}),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def apply_recovery(
|
||||
plan: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
env: dict[str, str] | os._Environ | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Apply a clear-eligible plan by removing the stale env binding.
|
||||
|
||||
This is the sanctioned in-daemon mechanism (#702 AC2); callers must
|
||||
persist the returned record for audit. Refuses anything but an explicit
|
||||
``clear_env`` plan.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
|
||||
if not plan.get("clear_allowed") or plan.get("action") != RECOVERY_ACTION_CLEAR_ENV:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"performed": False,
|
||||
"action": RECOVERY_ACTION_NONE,
|
||||
"reasons": ["recovery plan does not authorize clearing (fail closed)"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
cleared_value = (env_map.get(ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV) or "").strip() or None
|
||||
env_map.pop(ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV, None)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"performed": True,
|
||||
"action": RECOVERY_ACTION_CLEAR_ENV,
|
||||
"cleared_env": ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV,
|
||||
"cleared_value": cleared_value,
|
||||
"classification": plan.get("classification"),
|
||||
"reasons": list(plan.get("reasons") or []),
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
"""Stale / moot #332 review-decision lock detection and cleanup policy (#594/#620/#693).
|
||||
"""Stale / moot #332 review-decision lock detection and cleanup policy (#594).
|
||||
|
||||
#332 correctly hard-stops a reviewer session after a terminal live review
|
||||
mutation. After #559 those locks are durable on disk, so they can outlive the
|
||||
@@ -6,17 +6,6 @@ work they protect: when the referenced PR is already merged or closed, no
|
||||
same-PR merge sequence remains, yet the durable ledger still blocks unrelated
|
||||
new terminal reviews.
|
||||
|
||||
#620 scopes the terminal boundary by **reviewed head SHA**: a prior
|
||||
REQUEST_CHANGES (or APPROVE) on head A must not block a fresh formal decision
|
||||
on head B of the **same open PR**. Same-head duplicates remain fail-closed.
|
||||
Open-PR lock *cleanup* remains forbidden unless the PR is truly merged/closed
|
||||
(#594); new-head re-review is allowed without deleting the durable lock.
|
||||
|
||||
#693 scopes the terminal boundary by **PR number**: a terminal on open PR A
|
||||
must not block a fresh formal decision on open PR B on the same durable
|
||||
profile lock (cross-PR isolation). Correction authorization is scoped to the
|
||||
named prior review's PR/head and cannot unlock a different PR.
|
||||
|
||||
This module is pure policy (no Gitea I/O). The MCP tool
|
||||
``gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock`` fetches live PR state, calls these
|
||||
helpers, and only then clears durable state when cleanup is allowed.
|
||||
@@ -34,45 +23,6 @@ from typing import Any
|
||||
TERMINAL_REVIEW_ACTIONS = frozenset({"approve", "request_changes"})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def normalize_head_sha(value: Any) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Normalize a git SHA for equality comparison; None if empty/invalid."""
|
||||
if value is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
text = str(value).strip().lower()
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return text
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def heads_equal(a: Any, b: Any) -> bool:
|
||||
na = normalize_head_sha(a)
|
||||
nb = normalize_head_sha(b)
|
||||
if not na or not nb:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return na == nb
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def mutation_head_sha(mutation: dict | None, lock: dict | None = None) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Head SHA that bounds a live mutation (#620).
|
||||
|
||||
Prefers fields recorded on the mutation itself. For *legacy* mutations
|
||||
that predate head-scoping, falls back to the lock's
|
||||
``ready_expected_head_sha`` only when that ready binding is for the same
|
||||
PR number (the frozen durable PR #619-style ledger).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(mutation, dict):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
for key in ("head_sha", "expected_head_sha", "reviewed_head_sha"):
|
||||
head = normalize_head_sha(mutation.get(key))
|
||||
if head:
|
||||
return head
|
||||
if not isinstance(lock, dict):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if lock.get("ready_pr_number") != mutation.get("pr_number"):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return normalize_head_sha(lock.get("ready_expected_head_sha"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def last_terminal_mutation(lock: dict | None) -> dict | None:
|
||||
"""Return the last terminal live mutation on *lock*, or None."""
|
||||
if not lock:
|
||||
@@ -85,170 +35,18 @@ def last_terminal_mutation(lock: dict | None) -> dict | None:
|
||||
return terminals[-1] if terminals else None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def correction_applies(
|
||||
lock: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int | None = None,
|
||||
expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when operator correction is active and scoped to the target (#693).
|
||||
|
||||
Global ``correction_authorized`` alone is not enough: correction must name
|
||||
the same PR (and head when recorded) as the decision being re-opened.
|
||||
Missing scope fields on legacy locks fail closed (do not apply).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not lock or not lock.get("correction_authorized"):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
corr_pr = lock.get("correction_pr_number")
|
||||
if corr_pr is None:
|
||||
# Legacy unscoped correction — refuse as generic unlock (#693).
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if pr_number is not None and int(corr_pr) != int(pr_number):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
corr_head = normalize_head_sha(lock.get("correction_head_sha"))
|
||||
target = normalize_head_sha(expected_head_sha)
|
||||
if corr_head and target and not heads_equal(corr_head, target):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
|
||||
lock: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
expected_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when prior live mutations block a new decision for PR+head (#620/#693).
|
||||
|
||||
Historical terminals on a **different head of the same PR** do not block.
|
||||
Terminals on a **different PR** do not block (#693 cross-PR isolation).
|
||||
Same PR + same head (or same PR without a comparable head SHA) blocks
|
||||
unless a scoped correction applies.
|
||||
|
||||
Head resolution uses ``mutation_head_sha(m, lock)`` so pre-#620 ledgers
|
||||
that only stored ``ready_expected_head_sha`` still compare correctly
|
||||
(PR #619-style).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not lock:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if correction_applies(
|
||||
lock, pr_number=pr_number, expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha
|
||||
):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
prior = list(lock.get("live_mutations") or [])
|
||||
if not prior:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
target = normalize_head_sha(expected_head_sha)
|
||||
for m in prior:
|
||||
if not isinstance(m, dict):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
m_pr = m.get("pr_number")
|
||||
if m_pr is None:
|
||||
return True # fail closed — unscoped mutation
|
||||
if int(m_pr) != int(pr_number):
|
||||
# #693: foreign-PR history on the shared durable lock does not block.
|
||||
continue
|
||||
m_head = mutation_head_sha(m, lock)
|
||||
if (
|
||||
target
|
||||
and m_head
|
||||
and not heads_equal(m_head, target)
|
||||
):
|
||||
# Same open PR, different reviewed head — historical boundary only.
|
||||
continue
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def terminal_boundary_allows_fresh_decision(
|
||||
lock: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
expected_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
operation: str,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Whether #332 hard-stop should yield for a new PR+head boundary (#620/#693).
|
||||
|
||||
For ``mark_ready`` / ``review`` / ``resume``:
|
||||
|
||||
* **same PR, different head** — allowed (#620)
|
||||
* **different PR than last terminal** — allowed (#693 cross-PR isolation)
|
||||
* **same PR, same head** — not allowed (unless scoped correction)
|
||||
|
||||
Merge is never reopened by head change or cross-PR isolation (approved
|
||||
head merge path is separate).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if operation not in ("mark_ready", "review", "resume"):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if not lock:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if correction_applies(
|
||||
lock, pr_number=pr_number, expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha
|
||||
):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
last = last_terminal_mutation(lock)
|
||||
if last is None:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
last_pr = last.get("pr_number")
|
||||
if last_pr is None:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if int(last_pr) != int(pr_number):
|
||||
# #693: last terminal belongs to another PR — do not hard-stop this PR.
|
||||
return True
|
||||
locked_head = mutation_head_sha(last, lock)
|
||||
target = normalize_head_sha(expected_head_sha)
|
||||
if not locked_head or not target:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return not heads_equal(locked_head, target)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def backfill_terminal_heads_from_ready(lock: dict) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Stamp head_sha onto legacy terminal mutations before overwriting ready_*.
|
||||
|
||||
Called when marking a fresh decision on a new head so historical rows keep
|
||||
their original boundary after ``ready_expected_head_sha`` advances (#620).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(lock, dict):
|
||||
return lock
|
||||
ready_pr = lock.get("ready_pr_number")
|
||||
ready_head = normalize_head_sha(lock.get("ready_expected_head_sha"))
|
||||
if ready_pr is None or not ready_head:
|
||||
return lock
|
||||
mutations = list(lock.get("live_mutations") or [])
|
||||
changed = False
|
||||
for m in mutations:
|
||||
if not isinstance(m, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if m.get("action") not in TERMINAL_REVIEW_ACTIONS:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if m.get("pr_number") != ready_pr:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if mutation_head_sha(m):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
m["head_sha"] = ready_head
|
||||
changed = True
|
||||
if changed:
|
||||
lock["live_mutations"] = mutations
|
||||
return lock
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_pr_live_state(pr_live: dict | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Normalize a Gitea PR payload into merge/closed flags."""
|
||||
pr = pr_live or {}
|
||||
merged = bool(pr.get("merged") or pr.get("merged_at"))
|
||||
state = (pr.get("state") or "").strip().lower() or None
|
||||
closed = state == "closed"
|
||||
head = pr.get("head") if isinstance(pr.get("head"), dict) else {}
|
||||
head_sha = normalize_head_sha(
|
||||
pr.get("head_sha") or pr.get("head_commit_sha") or head.get("sha")
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"pr_state": state,
|
||||
"pr_merged": merged,
|
||||
"pr_merged_or_closed": merged or closed,
|
||||
"merge_commit_sha": pr.get("merge_commit_sha")
|
||||
or pr.get("merged_commit_sha"),
|
||||
"current_pr_head_sha": head_sha,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -258,7 +56,6 @@ def lock_summary(lock: dict | None) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
last = last_terminal_mutation(lock)
|
||||
mutations = list(lock.get("live_mutations") or [])
|
||||
last_head = mutation_head_sha(last, lock) if last else None
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"task": lock.get("task"),
|
||||
"remote": lock.get("remote"),
|
||||
@@ -270,21 +67,16 @@ def lock_summary(lock: dict | None) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"session_profile": lock.get("session_profile"),
|
||||
"ready_pr_number": lock.get("ready_pr_number"),
|
||||
"ready_action": lock.get("ready_action"),
|
||||
"ready_expected_head_sha": normalize_head_sha(
|
||||
lock.get("ready_expected_head_sha")
|
||||
),
|
||||
"live_mutations_count": len(mutations),
|
||||
"last_terminal": (
|
||||
{
|
||||
"pr_number": last.get("pr_number"),
|
||||
"action": last.get("action"),
|
||||
"review_id": last.get("review_id"),
|
||||
"head_sha": last_head,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if last
|
||||
else None
|
||||
),
|
||||
"locked_head_sha": last_head,
|
||||
"correction_authorized": bool(lock.get("correction_authorized")),
|
||||
"updated_at": lock.get("updated_at") or lock.get("recorded_at"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -296,16 +88,13 @@ def assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
pr_live: dict | None = None,
|
||||
pr_lookup_error: str | None = None,
|
||||
active_profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
current_pr_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Assess whether a durable review-decision lock is stale/moot (#594/#620).
|
||||
"""Assess whether a durable review-decision lock is stale/moot (#594).
|
||||
|
||||
*pr_live* must be the live Gitea payload for the **last terminal
|
||||
mutation's PR**. When no lock / no terminal mutation exists, cleanup is
|
||||
not applicable. When the PR is still open (or lookup fails), cleanup is
|
||||
forbidden (#594). Open PR + different live head reports
|
||||
``stale_by_head`` / ``fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed`` (#620)
|
||||
without enabling cleanup.
|
||||
forbidden and #332 hard-stop remains in force.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
summary = lock_summary(lock)
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
@@ -313,10 +102,6 @@ def assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
"lock_summary": summary,
|
||||
"last_terminal_pr": None,
|
||||
"last_terminal_action": None,
|
||||
"locked_head_sha": None,
|
||||
"current_pr_head_sha": normalize_head_sha(current_pr_head_sha),
|
||||
"stale_by_head": False,
|
||||
"fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed": False,
|
||||
"is_moot": False,
|
||||
"cleanup_allowed": False,
|
||||
"profile_match": True,
|
||||
@@ -356,10 +141,8 @@ def assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
|
||||
pr_number = last.get("pr_number")
|
||||
action = last.get("action")
|
||||
locked_head = mutation_head_sha(last, lock)
|
||||
result["last_terminal_pr"] = pr_number
|
||||
result["last_terminal_action"] = action
|
||||
result["locked_head_sha"] = locked_head
|
||||
|
||||
if pr_number is None:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
@@ -382,46 +165,25 @@ def assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
live = classify_pr_live_state(pr_live)
|
||||
current_head = normalize_head_sha(
|
||||
current_pr_head_sha or live.get("current_pr_head_sha")
|
||||
)
|
||||
result.update(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"pr_state": live["pr_state"],
|
||||
"pr_merged": live["pr_merged"],
|
||||
"pr_merged_or_closed": live["pr_merged_or_closed"],
|
||||
"merge_commit_sha": live["merge_commit_sha"],
|
||||
"current_pr_head_sha": current_head,
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if not live["pr_merged_or_closed"]:
|
||||
stale_by_head = bool(
|
||||
locked_head and current_head and not heads_equal(locked_head, current_head)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"terminal review mutation on open PR #{pr_number} is still active "
|
||||
f"({action}); #332 hard-stop remains — cleanup forbidden (#594)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["stale_by_head"] = stale_by_head
|
||||
# Fresh formal decision is allowed on the new head without cleanup (#620).
|
||||
result["fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed"] = stale_by_head
|
||||
if stale_by_head:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"terminal {action} on PR #{pr_number} is bound to head "
|
||||
f"{locked_head[:12]}…; live head is {current_head[:12]}… — "
|
||||
"fresh formal review on current head is allowed without "
|
||||
"cleanup (fail closed for cleanup, #620); #332 same-head "
|
||||
"duplicate protection remains"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"terminal review mutation on open PR #{pr_number} is still active "
|
||||
f"({action}); #332 hard-stop remains — cleanup forbidden (#594)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# Merged or closed: lock is moot. Same-PR merge continuation is impossible.
|
||||
result["is_moot"] = True
|
||||
result["cleanup_allowed"] = True
|
||||
result["stale_by_head"] = False
|
||||
result["fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed"] = False
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"terminal mutation ({action} on PR #{pr_number}) is moot: PR is "
|
||||
f"{'merged' if live['pr_merged'] else 'closed'}; canonical cleanup allowed (#594)"
|
||||
@@ -488,646 +250,3 @@ def format_cleanup_audit_comment(audit: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"This path only clears a lock when the referenced PR is merged/closed.",
|
||||
]
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- #693 classification / recovery / correction audit -----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
# Deterministic classification labels for diagnostics and recovery routing.
|
||||
CLASS_NO_LOCK = "no_lock"
|
||||
CLASS_READY_FOR_TARGET = "ready_for_target"
|
||||
CLASS_IN_PROGRESS_SAME_HEAD = "in_progress_same_head"
|
||||
CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD = "terminal_active_same_head"
|
||||
CLASS_STALE_SUPERSEDED_HEAD = "stale_superseded_head"
|
||||
CLASS_FOREIGN_PR_TERMINAL = "foreign_pr_terminal"
|
||||
CLASS_MOOT_MERGED_CLOSED = "moot_merged_closed"
|
||||
CLASS_CORRECTION_ACTIVE = "correction_active"
|
||||
CLASS_SESSION_OR_PROFILE_MISMATCH = "session_or_profile_mismatch"
|
||||
CLASS_AMBIGUOUS = "ambiguous"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
lock: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
target_pr_number: int | None = None,
|
||||
target_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
pr_live: dict | None = None,
|
||||
pr_lookup_error: str | None = None,
|
||||
active_profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
session_blockers: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Deterministic review-decision-lock classification (#693).
|
||||
|
||||
Returns classification, exact next_action, owner/evidence fields, and
|
||||
whether mark_final / cleanup / correction are appropriate.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
summary = lock_summary(lock)
|
||||
target_head = normalize_head_sha(target_head_sha)
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"classification": CLASS_NO_LOCK,
|
||||
"has_lock": lock is not None,
|
||||
"lock_summary": summary,
|
||||
"target_pr_number": target_pr_number,
|
||||
"target_head_sha": target_head,
|
||||
"last_terminal_pr": None,
|
||||
"last_terminal_action": None,
|
||||
"locked_head_sha": None,
|
||||
"owner_profile_identity": (summary or {}).get("profile_identity"),
|
||||
"session_profile": (summary or {}).get("session_profile"),
|
||||
"updated_at": (summary or {}).get("updated_at"),
|
||||
"correction_authorized": bool((lock or {}).get("correction_authorized")),
|
||||
"correction_pr_number": (lock or {}).get("correction_pr_number"),
|
||||
"correction_head_sha": normalize_head_sha(
|
||||
(lock or {}).get("correction_head_sha")
|
||||
),
|
||||
"mark_final_allowed": True,
|
||||
"cleanup_allowed": False,
|
||||
"correction_eligible": False,
|
||||
"next_action": "gitea_resolve_task_capability(task='review_pr') then mark_final",
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"evidence": {},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if lock is None:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append("no review decision lock present")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
session_blockers = list(session_blockers or [])
|
||||
if session_blockers:
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_SESSION_OR_PROFILE_MISMATCH
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
"reconnect matching prgs-reviewer session or wait for lock TTL; "
|
||||
"do not use gitea_authorize_review_correction as unlock; "
|
||||
"do not delete session-state files"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].extend(session_blockers)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
stored = (
|
||||
(lock.get("profile_identity") or lock.get("session_profile_lock") or "")
|
||||
.strip()
|
||||
)
|
||||
active = (active_profile_identity or "").strip()
|
||||
if active and stored and active != stored:
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_SESSION_OR_PROFILE_MISMATCH
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
f"switch to profile '{stored}' or wait for moot cleanup; "
|
||||
"do not use correction authorization as a generic unlock"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"lock profile '{stored}' does not match active '{active}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
last = last_terminal_mutation(lock)
|
||||
if last is None:
|
||||
ready_pr = lock.get("ready_pr_number")
|
||||
ready_head = normalize_head_sha(lock.get("ready_expected_head_sha"))
|
||||
if (
|
||||
target_pr_number is not None
|
||||
and ready_pr == target_pr_number
|
||||
and ready_head
|
||||
and target_head
|
||||
and heads_equal(ready_head, target_head)
|
||||
and lock.get("final_review_decision_ready")
|
||||
):
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_IN_PROGRESS_SAME_HEAD
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = True # idempotent re-mark
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
"gitea_submit_pr_review with final_review_decision_ready=true "
|
||||
"for the ready PR/head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
"final decision already marked ready for this PR/head (idempotent)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_READY_FOR_TARGET
|
||||
result["next_action"] = "gitea_mark_final_review_decision then submit"
|
||||
result["reasons"].append("no terminal live mutations; mark_final allowed")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
last_pr = last.get("pr_number")
|
||||
last_action = last.get("action")
|
||||
locked_head = mutation_head_sha(last, lock)
|
||||
result["last_terminal_pr"] = last_pr
|
||||
result["last_terminal_action"] = last_action
|
||||
result["locked_head_sha"] = locked_head
|
||||
result["evidence"] = {
|
||||
"last_review_id": last.get("review_id"),
|
||||
"live_mutations_count": len(lock.get("live_mutations") or []),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if correction_applies(
|
||||
lock, pr_number=target_pr_number, expected_head_sha=target_head
|
||||
):
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_CORRECTION_ACTIVE
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = True
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
"gitea_mark_final_review_decision for the correction-scoped PR/head, "
|
||||
"then submit once"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"scoped correction active for PR #{lock.get('correction_pr_number')}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# Live state of last terminal PR when provided.
|
||||
live = None
|
||||
if pr_lookup_error:
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_AMBIGUOUS
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
"retry diagnosis after live PR state is available; "
|
||||
"fail closed under ambiguous evidence"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(f"live PR lookup failed: {pr_lookup_error}")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
if pr_live is not None:
|
||||
live = classify_pr_live_state(pr_live)
|
||||
result["evidence"]["last_terminal_pr_state"] = live.get("pr_state")
|
||||
result["evidence"]["last_terminal_pr_merged"] = live.get("pr_merged")
|
||||
if live.get("pr_merged_or_closed"):
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_MOOT_MERGED_CLOSED
|
||||
result["cleanup_allowed"] = True
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = target_pr_number is not None and (
|
||||
int(last_pr) != int(target_pr_number)
|
||||
if last_pr is not None and target_pr_number is not None
|
||||
else True
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock(apply=true, "
|
||||
f"expected_terminal_pr={last_pr}) then mark_final on the target PR"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"terminal on PR #{last_pr} is moot (merged/closed); cleanup allowed"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if target_pr_number is None:
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_AMBIGUOUS
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
|
||||
result["next_action"] = "re-run diagnosis with target_pr_number"
|
||||
result["reasons"].append("target_pr_number required for open-PR classification")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if last_pr is not None and int(last_pr) != int(target_pr_number):
|
||||
# Cross-PR isolation: foreign terminal is history, not a block.
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_FOREIGN_PR_TERMINAL
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = True
|
||||
result["correction_eligible"] = False # must not use correction to "unlock"
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
f"gitea_mark_final_review_decision(pr_number={target_pr_number}, ...) "
|
||||
f"— foreign terminal on PR #{last_pr} does not block (#693); "
|
||||
"do not call gitea_authorize_review_correction for cross-PR unlock"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"last terminal is {last_action} on foreign open/closed PR #{last_pr}; "
|
||||
f"target PR #{target_pr_number} is isolated (#693)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# Same PR as target.
|
||||
if (
|
||||
locked_head
|
||||
and target_head
|
||||
and not heads_equal(locked_head, target_head)
|
||||
):
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_STALE_SUPERSEDED_HEAD
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = True
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
f"gitea_mark_final_review_decision with expected_head_sha="
|
||||
f"{target_head} (#620 same-PR new head)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"terminal {last_action} on head {locked_head[:12]}…; target head "
|
||||
f"{target_head[:12]}… — fresh formal review allowed without cleanup"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# Same PR + same head (or missing head comparison) — active terminal.
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
|
||||
result["correction_eligible"] = True
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
"if the prior verdict was mistaken: gitea_authorize_review_correction "
|
||||
f"with prior_review_id={last.get('review_id')}, "
|
||||
f"prior_review_state={last_action}, target_pr_number={target_pr_number}, "
|
||||
"operator_authorized=true, then re-mark once; "
|
||||
"if the prior verdict is correct: stop and hand off (do not duplicate)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"terminal {last_action} already recorded for PR #{target_pr_number} "
|
||||
f"at this head; same-head duplicate blocked (#332/#620)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_precise_mark_final_failure(
|
||||
classification: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""One precise recovery instruction + durable issue handoff payload (#693 AC4/8)."""
|
||||
cls = classification.get("classification")
|
||||
next_action = classification.get("next_action") or (
|
||||
"stop and create a durable Gitea issue with lock evidence"
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons = list(classification.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
reasons.append(f"exact_next_action: {next_action}")
|
||||
handoff = {
|
||||
"required": cls
|
||||
in (
|
||||
CLASS_AMBIGUOUS,
|
||||
CLASS_SESSION_OR_PROFILE_MISMATCH,
|
||||
CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD,
|
||||
)
|
||||
and not classification.get("mark_final_allowed"),
|
||||
"title_hint": (
|
||||
"Review-decision-lock recovery failed during formal review"
|
||||
),
|
||||
"classification": cls,
|
||||
"exact_next_action": next_action,
|
||||
"owner_profile_identity": classification.get("owner_profile_identity"),
|
||||
"last_terminal_pr": classification.get("last_terminal_pr"),
|
||||
"last_terminal_action": classification.get("last_terminal_action"),
|
||||
"locked_head_sha": classification.get("locked_head_sha"),
|
||||
"target_pr_number": classification.get("target_pr_number"),
|
||||
"target_head_sha": classification.get("target_head_sha"),
|
||||
"evidence": classification.get("evidence") or {},
|
||||
"instruction": (
|
||||
"If recovery cannot complete with the exact_next_action above, "
|
||||
"create or update a durable Gitea issue with this payload and stop; "
|
||||
"do not delete session-state files; do not misuse correction as unlock."
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"classification": cls,
|
||||
"exact_next_action": next_action,
|
||||
"durable_issue_handoff": handoff,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_correction_audit_record(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
prior_review_id: int | None,
|
||||
prior_review_state: str | None,
|
||||
target_pr_number: int | None,
|
||||
target_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
reason: str | None,
|
||||
actor_username: str | None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None,
|
||||
authorized: bool,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Structured durable audit for review-correction authorization (#693)."""
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"event": "review_correction_authorization",
|
||||
"issue_ref": "#693",
|
||||
"authorized": bool(authorized),
|
||||
"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
|
||||
"actor_username": actor_username,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"prior_review_id": prior_review_id,
|
||||
"prior_review_state": prior_review_state,
|
||||
"target_pr_number": target_pr_number,
|
||||
"target_head_sha": normalize_head_sha(target_head_sha),
|
||||
"reason": reason,
|
||||
"scope": "same_pr_head_only",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_correction_audit_comment(audit: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Markdown body for a thread-visible correction authorization audit."""
|
||||
status = "AUTHORIZED" if audit.get("authorized") else "DENIED"
|
||||
lines = [
|
||||
"## Review correction authorization audit (#693)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"Status: **{status}**",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"- actor: `{audit.get('actor_username')}`",
|
||||
f"- profile: `{audit.get('profile_name')}`",
|
||||
f"- timestamp: `{audit.get('timestamp')}`",
|
||||
f"- prior_review_id: `{audit.get('prior_review_id')}`",
|
||||
f"- prior_review_state: `{audit.get('prior_review_state')}`",
|
||||
f"- target_pr: `#{audit.get('target_pr_number')}`",
|
||||
f"- target_head_sha: `{audit.get('target_head_sha')}`",
|
||||
f"- reason: {audit.get('reason')}",
|
||||
f"- scope: `{audit.get('scope')}` (cannot unlock a different PR)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"This is **not** a generic decision-lock unlock. Cross-PR recovery "
|
||||
"uses isolation (#693) or moot cleanup (#594), never correction.",
|
||||
]
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_open_pr_decision_lock_recovery(
|
||||
lock: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
target_pr_number: int,
|
||||
target_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
last_terminal_pr_live: dict | None = None,
|
||||
pr_lookup_error: str | None = None,
|
||||
active_profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
session_blockers: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
controller_recovery_authorized: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Assess guarded recovery for decision locks affecting an open target PR (#693).
|
||||
|
||||
Recovery here means *workflow recovery routing*, not necessarily lock wipe.
|
||||
Foreign-PR terminals are recoverable by isolation (mark_final allowed).
|
||||
Moot terminals use #594 cleanup. Same-head active terminals refuse wipe.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
classification = classify_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
lock,
|
||||
target_pr_number=target_pr_number,
|
||||
target_head_sha=target_head_sha,
|
||||
pr_live=last_terminal_pr_live,
|
||||
pr_lookup_error=pr_lookup_error,
|
||||
active_profile_identity=active_profile_identity,
|
||||
session_blockers=session_blockers,
|
||||
)
|
||||
cls = classification["classification"]
|
||||
recovery_allowed = False
|
||||
recovery_mode = None
|
||||
if cls == CLASS_FOREIGN_PR_TERMINAL:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = True
|
||||
recovery_mode = "cross_pr_isolation"
|
||||
elif cls == CLASS_STALE_SUPERSEDED_HEAD:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = True
|
||||
recovery_mode = "same_pr_new_head"
|
||||
elif cls == CLASS_MOOT_MERGED_CLOSED:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = True
|
||||
recovery_mode = "moot_cleanup"
|
||||
elif cls == CLASS_READY_FOR_TARGET:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = True
|
||||
recovery_mode = "none_required"
|
||||
elif cls == CLASS_CORRECTION_ACTIVE:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = True
|
||||
recovery_mode = "scoped_correction"
|
||||
elif cls == CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = False
|
||||
recovery_mode = "correction_only_if_mistake"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = False
|
||||
recovery_mode = "fail_closed"
|
||||
|
||||
if recovery_mode == "moot_cleanup" and not controller_recovery_authorized:
|
||||
# Cleanup still needs apply + capability; assess reports path.
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
**classification,
|
||||
"recovery_allowed": recovery_allowed,
|
||||
"recovery_mode": recovery_mode,
|
||||
"controller_recovery_authorized": bool(controller_recovery_authorized),
|
||||
"manual_file_delete_forbidden": True,
|
||||
"correction_as_generic_unlock_forbidden": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# #709 cross-profile cleanup, overwrite protection, recovery provenance
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def has_unresolved_terminal_evidence(lock: dict | None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when *lock* still carries a terminal live mutation ledger."""
|
||||
return last_terminal_mutation(lock) is not None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_init_overwrite(
|
||||
existing_lock: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
force: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Whether init_review_decision_lock may replace an existing durable lock (#709 AC2).
|
||||
|
||||
Unresolved terminal evidence must never be silently replaced by an empty
|
||||
initialized lock. *force* does not authorize destruction of terminal
|
||||
ledgers — only explicit cleanup / archive transitions may remove them.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"overwrite_allowed": True,
|
||||
"has_existing": existing_lock is not None,
|
||||
"has_unresolved_terminal": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"last_terminal_pr": None,
|
||||
"last_terminal_action": None,
|
||||
"existing_profile_identity": None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if existing_lock is None:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append("no existing lock; empty init allowed")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
result["existing_profile_identity"] = (
|
||||
existing_lock.get("profile_identity")
|
||||
or existing_lock.get("session_profile_lock")
|
||||
or existing_lock.get("session_profile")
|
||||
)
|
||||
last = last_terminal_mutation(existing_lock)
|
||||
if last is None:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
"existing lock has no terminal mutations; re-init allowed"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
result["has_unresolved_terminal"] = True
|
||||
result["overwrite_allowed"] = False
|
||||
result["last_terminal_pr"] = last.get("pr_number")
|
||||
result["last_terminal_action"] = last.get("action")
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
"refuse empty re-init: unresolved terminal decision-lock evidence "
|
||||
f"present ({last.get('action')} on PR #{last.get('pr_number')}); "
|
||||
"use gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock when moot, or archive "
|
||||
f"via sanctioned recovery — force={force!r} does not authorize overwrite "
|
||||
"(#709 AC2)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def lock_targets_merged_pr_approval(
|
||||
lock: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when *lock*'s last terminal mutation is approve of *pr_number*.
|
||||
|
||||
When *expected_head_sha* is provided, a **recorded** terminal head must
|
||||
match. Legacy same-repo approve locks with no recorded head do **not**
|
||||
match (fail closed, #709 F3 residual / review 435) — callers must use the
|
||||
strict secondary path that refuses no-head clears.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
last = last_terminal_mutation(lock)
|
||||
if last is None:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if last.get("action") != "approve":
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if last.get("pr_number") != pr_number:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if expected_head_sha:
|
||||
want = normalize_head_sha(expected_head_sha)
|
||||
if not want:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
locked = mutation_head_sha(last, lock)
|
||||
# Require recorded-head match; unrecorded head is not a match (#709 F3).
|
||||
if not locked or not heads_equal(locked, want):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_post_merge_recovery_record(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
merge_commit_sha: str | None,
|
||||
target_profile_identity: str | None,
|
||||
failed_step: str,
|
||||
error: str | None,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
org: str | None,
|
||||
repo: str | None,
|
||||
actor_username: str | None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Durable recovery-required payload after irreversible merge (#709 AC3)."""
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"event": "post_merge_decision_lock_recovery_required",
|
||||
"status": "recovery_required",
|
||||
"issue_ref": "#709",
|
||||
"recovery_critical": True,
|
||||
"applied": False, # never claim historical cleanup succeeded
|
||||
"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
|
||||
"pr_number": pr_number,
|
||||
"head_sha": normalize_head_sha(head_sha),
|
||||
"merge_commit_sha": merge_commit_sha,
|
||||
"target_profile_identity": target_profile_identity,
|
||||
"failed_step": failed_step,
|
||||
"error": error,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"actor_username": actor_username,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"required_recovery_action": (
|
||||
"retry cross-profile decision-lock cleanup and audit publication "
|
||||
"for the merged PR; if terminal evidence is gone, use "
|
||||
"gitea_record_irrecoverable_decision_lock_provenance"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_irrecoverable_provenance_record(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
org: str | None,
|
||||
repo: str | None,
|
||||
actor_username: str | None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None,
|
||||
reason: str,
|
||||
incident_ref: str | None = None,
|
||||
# Deprecated kwargs retained only so stale call sites fail closed:
|
||||
operator_authorized: bool | None = None,
|
||||
# Required for merger-acceptable records (#709 F1):
|
||||
authorization: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
incident_issue: int | None = None,
|
||||
incident_comment_id: int | None = None,
|
||||
destroyed_subject: str | None = None,
|
||||
historical_provenance_subject: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Truthful absence-of-proof record (#709 AC5). Never sets applied=True.
|
||||
|
||||
Caller-supplied ``operator_authorized`` is **ignored** as authorization
|
||||
evidence (review 434 F1). Prefer
|
||||
:func:`irrecoverable_provenance.build_irrecoverable_provenance_record`
|
||||
with a verified server-side authorization artifact.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# Explicitly ignore deprecated self-assertable Boolean.
|
||||
_ = operator_authorized
|
||||
if authorization is not None and incident_issue is not None and incident_comment_id is not None:
|
||||
from irrecoverable_provenance import (
|
||||
build_irrecoverable_provenance_record as _build,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return _build(
|
||||
pr_number=int(pr_number),
|
||||
head_sha=str(head_sha or ""),
|
||||
remote=str(remote or ""),
|
||||
org=str(org or ""),
|
||||
repo=str(repo or ""),
|
||||
actor_username=actor_username,
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
reason=reason,
|
||||
incident_issue=int(incident_issue),
|
||||
incident_comment_id=int(incident_comment_id),
|
||||
authorization=authorization,
|
||||
destroyed_subject=destroyed_subject,
|
||||
historical_provenance_subject=historical_provenance_subject
|
||||
or destroyed_subject,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Fail-closed skeleton when no server authorization is supplied: never
|
||||
# sets merger_may_accept True (even if operator_authorized was True).
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"event": "irrecoverable_decision_lock_provenance",
|
||||
"status": "provenance_irrecoverable",
|
||||
"record_type": "irrecoverable_decision_provenance",
|
||||
"operator_recovery_required": True,
|
||||
"issue_ref": "#709",
|
||||
"recovery_critical": True,
|
||||
"applied": False,
|
||||
"historical_cleanup_proven": False,
|
||||
"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
|
||||
"pr_number": pr_number,
|
||||
"head_sha": normalize_head_sha(head_sha),
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"actor_username": actor_username,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"reason": reason,
|
||||
"incident_ref": incident_ref,
|
||||
"incident_issue": incident_issue,
|
||||
"incident_comment_id": incident_comment_id,
|
||||
"authorization_verified": False,
|
||||
"merger_may_accept": False,
|
||||
"acceptance_rule": (
|
||||
"Merger may accept this record only when a server-side "
|
||||
"authorization artifact verifies for remote/org/repo/PR/exact "
|
||||
"head/incident, the record is durable and read back, and normal "
|
||||
"merge gates still pass. Caller Booleans never authorize. This "
|
||||
"does not prove historical cleanup."
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_irrecoverable_audit_comment(record: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Markdown body for irrecoverable provenance audit (no applied=true claim)."""
|
||||
from irrecoverable_provenance import (
|
||||
format_irrecoverable_audit_comment as _fmt,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return _fmt(record)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_post_merge_recovery_comment(record: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Markdown body for post-merge recovery-required audit."""
|
||||
lines = [
|
||||
"## Post-merge decision-lock recovery required (#709)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"Status: **RECOVERY_REQUIRED** (merge is irreversible; cleanup/audit incomplete)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"- actor: `{record.get('actor_username')}`",
|
||||
f"- profile: `{record.get('profile_name')}`",
|
||||
f"- timestamp: `{record.get('timestamp')}`",
|
||||
f"- PR: `#{record.get('pr_number')}`",
|
||||
f"- head_sha: `{record.get('head_sha')}`",
|
||||
f"- merge_commit_sha: `{record.get('merge_commit_sha')}`",
|
||||
f"- target_profile_identity: `{record.get('target_profile_identity')}`",
|
||||
f"- failed_step: `{record.get('failed_step')}`",
|
||||
f"- error: `{record.get('error')}`",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"Required action: {record.get('required_recovery_action')}",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"applied=false — do not treat this as successful cleanup evidence.",
|
||||
]
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-218
@@ -60,90 +60,19 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.close",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# Non-closing PR metadata edits (title/body/base). Closing uses close_pr.
|
||||
"edit_pr": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_edit_pr": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"address_pr_change_requests": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# PR synchronization lifecycle: assess is read-only (any role with gitea.read);
|
||||
# update-by-merge is author-only and mutates the PR head via Gitea API.
|
||||
"assess_pr_sync_status": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_assess_pr_sync_status": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"update_pr_branch_by_merge": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"review_pr": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"submit_pr_review": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"merge_pr": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"acquire_reviewer_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #695 AC8: controller quarantine of contaminated formal reviews.
|
||||
# Apply path posts an append-only forensic audit comment (pr.comment).
|
||||
"quarantine_contaminated_review": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_quarantine_contaminated_review": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"adopt_merger_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"acquire_merger_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #691: guarded non-owner cleanup of obsolete comment-backed reviewer leases.
|
||||
# Apply path posts lease release + audit comments (gitea.pr.comment).
|
||||
"cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
@@ -178,58 +107,9 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #693: read-only classification of durable decision locks (incl. open PRs).
|
||||
"diagnose_review_decision_lock": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_diagnose_review_decision_lock": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"authorize_review_correction": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_authorize_review_correction": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #709: truthful absence-of-proof recovery (server-side auth + record + consume).
|
||||
# Dedicated mutation capability — gitea.read is insufficient (review 434 F1).
|
||||
"issue_irrecoverable_provenance_authorization": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.decision_lock.irrecoverable_recovery",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_issue_irrecoverable_provenance_authorization": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.decision_lock.irrecoverable_recovery",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"record_irrecoverable_decision_lock_provenance": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.decision_lock.irrecoverable_recovery",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_record_irrecoverable_decision_lock_provenance": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.decision_lock.irrecoverable_recovery",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"consume_irrecoverable_decision_lock_provenance": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_consume_irrecoverable_decision_lock_provenance": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned. gitea.branch.delete is granted
|
||||
# only to the reconciler profile, so the resolver must classify this task as
|
||||
# reconciler (previously "author", which no delete-capable profile held).
|
||||
# Raw gitea_delete_branch still redirects reconciler to the guarded
|
||||
# gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path (#514/#687); author/reviewer/merger
|
||||
# stay denied by both the permission gate and this role gate.
|
||||
"delete_branch": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"cleanup_merged_pr_branch": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
@@ -259,103 +139,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #600: controller-owned allocator — any authenticated profile may call;
|
||||
# routing enforces role match to selected work. Uses control-plane DB (#613).
|
||||
"allocate_next_work": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_allocate_next_work": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
# #601 first-class lease lifecycle — inspect/list need read; mutations gate on
|
||||
# ownership in the control-plane DB (not a separate Gitea write permission).
|
||||
"list_workflow_leases": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_list_workflow_leases": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"inspect_workflow_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_inspect_workflow_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"adopt_workflow_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_adopt_workflow_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"release_workflow_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_release_workflow_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"expire_workflow_leases": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_expire_workflow_leases": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"abandon_workflow_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_abandon_workflow_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"reclaim_expired_workflow_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_reclaim_expired_workflow_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #612 incident bridge — reconcile uses create_issue for apply;
|
||||
# dry-run needs read only. Tools gate apply paths themselves.
|
||||
"observability_reconcile_incident": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_observability_reconcile_incident": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"observability_list_projects": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_observability_list_projects": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"observability_link_issue": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_observability_link_issue": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
"reconcile_landed_pr": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ def main():
|
||||
servers[name],
|
||||
required_tool=REQUIRED_NAMESPACE_TOOLS.get(name),
|
||||
config_path=config_path,
|
||||
probe_source="offline_spawn",
|
||||
):
|
||||
failed = True
|
||||
else:
|
||||
|
||||
+16
-82
@@ -26,24 +26,7 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
|
||||
Pin ``default_state_dir`` / ``DEFAULT_STATE_DIR`` to a per-test temp dir
|
||||
so durable load/save never touches host state even after env clears.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import session_context_binding as session_ctx
|
||||
|
||||
# Each pytest item is an independent logical MCP session. Reset both before
|
||||
# and after the item; the post-yield reset is in a finally block so an
|
||||
# assertion, exception, or unittest teardown failure cannot pollute the
|
||||
# next item. Production code has no automatic per-call reset path.
|
||||
session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
|
||||
for env_key in [
|
||||
"GITEA_SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK",
|
||||
"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE",
|
||||
"GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE",
|
||||
"GITEA_REVIEWER_WORKTREE",
|
||||
"GITEA_MERGER_WORKTREE",
|
||||
"GITEA_RECONCILER_WORKTREE",
|
||||
]:
|
||||
monkeypatch.delenv(env_key, raising=False)
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.delenv("GITEA_SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK", raising=False)
|
||||
# Isolate durable session-state files so tests never share host cache (#559).
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -66,17 +49,6 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
|
||||
_fallback: str = state_dir,
|
||||
_env_key: str = mcp_session_state.STATE_DIR_ENV,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
# #695 AC2: when production native transport has pinned a session
|
||||
# state root, that pin is authoritative even under test isolation
|
||||
# (PR #701 redirected-state regression).
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
|
||||
pinned = mcp_daemon_guard.pinned_session_state_dir()
|
||||
if pinned:
|
||||
return pinned
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
raw = (os.environ.get(_env_key) or "").strip()
|
||||
return raw or _fallback
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -88,31 +60,11 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_server
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
yield
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
_state_tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
_state_tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
yield
|
||||
return
|
||||
import gitea_config
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(gitea_config, "_active_profile_override", None)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_MUTATION_AUTHORITY", None)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_IDENTITY_CACHE", {})
|
||||
# #714: clear both module namespaces. mcp_server.py execs gitea_mcp_server.py
|
||||
# into its own globals, so `import gitea_mcp_server` is a separate module
|
||||
# object with its own identity caches; leaving it dirty leaks login across
|
||||
# tests that import the implementation module directly.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import gitea_mcp_server as _gitea_impl
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(_gitea_impl, "_IDENTITY_CACHE", {})
|
||||
if hasattr(_gitea_impl, "_ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE"):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(_gitea_impl, "_ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE", {})
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if hasattr(mcp_server, "_ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE"):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE", {})
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK", None)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_LIVE_NAMESPACE_HEALTH", {})
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_preflight_whoami_called", False)
|
||||
@@ -141,37 +93,19 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
|
||||
capability_stop_terminal.clear()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
yield
|
||||
try:
|
||||
yield
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import capability_stop_terminal
|
||||
capability_stop_terminal.clear()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import review_workflow_load
|
||||
review_workflow_load._REVIEW_WORKFLOW_LOAD = None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
try:
|
||||
mcp_server._REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK = None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
|
||||
session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
_state_tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# #714: deterministic workspace remotes only (no host git dependency).
|
||||
import pytest
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
|
||||
def _deterministic_workspace_remotes():
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import install_deterministic_remote_urls
|
||||
install_deterministic_remote_urls()
|
||||
import capability_stop_terminal
|
||||
capability_stop_terminal.clear()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
yield
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import review_workflow_load
|
||||
review_workflow_load._REVIEW_WORKFLOW_LOAD = None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
try:
|
||||
mcp_server._REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK = None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
_state_tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,483 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Centralized config-backed mutation fixture for #714.
|
||||
|
||||
Mutation tests must opt into this helper explicitly. It never grants
|
||||
mutation authority via environment variables alone.
|
||||
|
||||
Design rules:
|
||||
- temporary v2 configuration with non-empty ``allowed_repositories``
|
||||
- profile-scoped operations (not every mutation op for every test)
|
||||
- deterministic workspace remotes (no host Git dependency)
|
||||
- one canonical repository per profile by default
|
||||
- isolated state + cleanup in ``finally``
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
from contextlib import contextmanager
|
||||
from copy import deepcopy
|
||||
from typing import Iterable, Sequence
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
PRGS_SLUG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
PRGS_URL = f"https://gitea.prgs.cc/{PRGS_SLUG}.git"
|
||||
MDCPS_SLUG = "913443/eAgenda"
|
||||
MDCPS_URL = f"https://gitea.dadeschools.net/{MDCPS_SLUG}.git"
|
||||
EXAMPLE_SLUG = "Example-Org/Example-Repo"
|
||||
EXAMPLE_URL = f"https://gitea.example.com/{EXAMPLE_SLUG}.git"
|
||||
TIMESHEET_SLUG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _author_ops() -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.close",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _author_forbidden() -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.request_changes",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _reviewer_ops() -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _merger_ops() -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _profile(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
name: str,
|
||||
context: str,
|
||||
role: str,
|
||||
base_url: str,
|
||||
auth_env: str,
|
||||
allowed_operations: Sequence[str],
|
||||
forbidden_operations: Sequence[str],
|
||||
allowed_repositories: Sequence[str],
|
||||
username: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
body = {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"context": context,
|
||||
"role": role,
|
||||
"base_url": base_url,
|
||||
"auth": {"type": "env", "name": auth_env},
|
||||
"allowed_operations": list(allowed_operations),
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": list(forbidden_operations),
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": list(allowed_repositories),
|
||||
"execution_profile": name,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if username:
|
||||
body["username"] = username
|
||||
return body
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_dual_remote_config(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
allowed_operations: Iterable[str] | None = None,
|
||||
allowed_repositories_prgs: Sequence[str] | None = None,
|
||||
allowed_repositories_mdcps: Sequence[str] | None = None,
|
||||
extra_profiles: dict | None = None,
|
||||
include_example_repo: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Build a minimal dual-host v2 config.
|
||||
|
||||
Each profile authorizes only its host-canonical repository by default.
|
||||
``include_example_repo`` adds Example-Org/Example-Repo when a test patches
|
||||
REMOTES to that synthetic unit-test identity.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
ops = list(allowed_operations or _author_ops())
|
||||
forb = _author_forbidden()
|
||||
prgs_repos = list(allowed_repositories_prgs or [PRGS_SLUG])
|
||||
mdcps_repos = list(allowed_repositories_mdcps or [MDCPS_SLUG])
|
||||
if include_example_repo:
|
||||
for repos in (prgs_repos, mdcps_repos):
|
||||
if EXAMPLE_SLUG not in repos:
|
||||
repos.append(EXAMPLE_SLUG)
|
||||
|
||||
profiles = {
|
||||
"test-author-prgs": _profile(
|
||||
name="test-author-prgs",
|
||||
context="prgs",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
base_url="https://gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
auth_env="GITEA_TOKEN_TEST",
|
||||
allowed_operations=ops,
|
||||
forbidden_operations=forb,
|
||||
allowed_repositories=prgs_repos,
|
||||
),
|
||||
"test-author-dadeschools": _profile(
|
||||
name="test-author-dadeschools",
|
||||
context="mdcps",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
base_url="https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
auth_env="GITEA_TOKEN_TEST",
|
||||
allowed_operations=ops,
|
||||
forbidden_operations=forb,
|
||||
allowed_repositories=mdcps_repos,
|
||||
),
|
||||
"test-reviewer-prgs": _profile(
|
||||
name="test-reviewer-prgs",
|
||||
context="prgs",
|
||||
role="reviewer",
|
||||
base_url="https://gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
auth_env="GITEA_TOKEN_TEST",
|
||||
allowed_operations=_reviewer_ops(),
|
||||
forbidden_operations=[
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
],
|
||||
allowed_repositories=prgs_repos,
|
||||
),
|
||||
"test-merger-prgs": _profile(
|
||||
name="test-merger-prgs",
|
||||
context="prgs",
|
||||
role="merger",
|
||||
base_url="https://gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
auth_env="GITEA_TOKEN_TEST",
|
||||
allowed_operations=_merger_ops(),
|
||||
forbidden_operations=[
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
],
|
||||
allowed_repositories=prgs_repos,
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if extra_profiles:
|
||||
profiles.update(deepcopy(extra_profiles))
|
||||
|
||||
# Legacy aliases used by older tests — same host scope as the base profile.
|
||||
for alias, base in (
|
||||
("gitea-author", "test-author-prgs"),
|
||||
("author-test", "test-author-dadeschools"),
|
||||
("author", "test-author-dadeschools"),
|
||||
("full-author", "test-author-dadeschools"),
|
||||
("test-author", "test-author-dadeschools"),
|
||||
("prgs-author", "test-author-prgs"),
|
||||
("gitea-reviewer", "test-reviewer-prgs"),
|
||||
("prgs-reviewer", "test-reviewer-prgs"),
|
||||
("gitea-merger", "test-merger-prgs"),
|
||||
("prgs-merger", "test-merger-prgs"),
|
||||
):
|
||||
if alias not in profiles and base in profiles:
|
||||
clone = deepcopy(profiles[base])
|
||||
clone["execution_profile"] = alias
|
||||
profiles[alias] = clone
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"version": 2,
|
||||
"rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": True},
|
||||
"contexts": {
|
||||
"prgs": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"mdcps": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"gitea": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"profiles": profiles,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_v2_config(**kwargs):
|
||||
"""Back-compat alias."""
|
||||
return build_dual_remote_config(
|
||||
allowed_operations=kwargs.get("allowed_operations"),
|
||||
extra_profiles=kwargs.get("extra_profiles"),
|
||||
include_example_repo=bool(kwargs.get("include_example_repo")),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def inject_allowed_repositories(
|
||||
config: dict,
|
||||
repos: Sequence[str],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
profiles: Sequence[str] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Return a deep copy of *config* with allowlists set on selected profiles."""
|
||||
out = deepcopy(config)
|
||||
targets = set(profiles) if profiles is not None else set(out.get("profiles") or {})
|
||||
for name, prof in (out.get("profiles") or {}).items():
|
||||
if name in targets:
|
||||
prof["allowed_repositories"] = list(repos)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def ensure_all_profiles_have_scope(
|
||||
config: dict,
|
||||
default_repos: Sequence[str],
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Add non-empty allowed_repositories to every profile that lacks one."""
|
||||
out = deepcopy(config)
|
||||
for _name, prof in (out.get("profiles") or {}).items():
|
||||
raw = prof.get("allowed_repositories")
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, (list, tuple)) or not raw:
|
||||
prof["allowed_repositories"] = list(default_repos)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@contextmanager
|
||||
def mutation_profile_env(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
profile_name: str = "test-author-dadeschools",
|
||||
allowed_operations: Iterable[str] | None = None,
|
||||
allowed_repositories: Sequence[str] | None = None,
|
||||
workspace_urls: dict | None = None,
|
||||
clear_env: bool = False,
|
||||
extra_env: dict | None = None,
|
||||
extra_profiles: dict | None = None,
|
||||
include_example_repo: bool = False,
|
||||
config: dict | None = None,
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Context manager: config-backed mutation authority + deterministic remotes."""
|
||||
import gitea_config
|
||||
import gitea_mcp_server as srv
|
||||
import session_context_binding as session_ctx
|
||||
|
||||
if config is None:
|
||||
prgs_repos = None
|
||||
mdcps_repos = None
|
||||
if allowed_repositories is not None:
|
||||
# Caller-specified single allowlist applied to both host profiles.
|
||||
prgs_repos = list(allowed_repositories)
|
||||
mdcps_repos = list(allowed_repositories)
|
||||
cfg = build_dual_remote_config(
|
||||
allowed_operations=allowed_operations,
|
||||
allowed_repositories_prgs=prgs_repos,
|
||||
allowed_repositories_mdcps=mdcps_repos,
|
||||
extra_profiles=extra_profiles,
|
||||
include_example_repo=include_example_repo,
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
cfg = deepcopy(config)
|
||||
if allowed_repositories is not None:
|
||||
cfg = ensure_all_profiles_have_scope(cfg, list(allowed_repositories))
|
||||
|
||||
urls = (
|
||||
{"prgs": PRGS_URL, "dadeschools": MDCPS_URL}
|
||||
if workspace_urls is None
|
||||
else dict(workspace_urls)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gitea-mut-cfg-")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
cfg_path = os.path.join(tmp.name, "profiles.json")
|
||||
with open(cfg_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
json.dump(cfg, fh)
|
||||
env = {
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": cfg_path,
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile_name,
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_TEST": "test-token",
|
||||
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST": os.environ.get(
|
||||
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", "mutation_profile_env"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if extra_env:
|
||||
env.update(extra_env)
|
||||
|
||||
def _remote_url(name: str):
|
||||
if name in urls:
|
||||
return urls[name]
|
||||
# Prefer live REMOTES (tests often patch Example-Org).
|
||||
try:
|
||||
entry = srv.REMOTES.get(name) or {}
|
||||
host = entry.get("host")
|
||||
org = entry.get("org")
|
||||
repo = entry.get("repo")
|
||||
if host and org and repo:
|
||||
if (
|
||||
name == "prgs"
|
||||
and org == "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
|
||||
and repo == "Timesheet"
|
||||
):
|
||||
return PRGS_URL
|
||||
if name == "dadeschools" and repo == "Timesheet":
|
||||
return MDCPS_URL
|
||||
return f"https://{host}/{org}/{repo}.git"
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
payload = {
|
||||
"env": env,
|
||||
"config_path": cfg_path,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"urls": urls,
|
||||
"config": cfg,
|
||||
}
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=clear_env):
|
||||
os.environ.setdefault(
|
||||
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST",
|
||||
env.get("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", "mutation_profile_env"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=_remote_url):
|
||||
mcp_srv = None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_server as mcp_srv # type: ignore
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
mcp_srv = None
|
||||
if mcp_srv is not None:
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_srv, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=_remote_url
|
||||
):
|
||||
yield payload
|
||||
else:
|
||||
yield payload
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
|
||||
tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Process-lifetime shared config for mass-migrating env-only mutation tests.
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_PATH = None
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_DIR = None
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def shared_mutation_config_path(*, include_example_repo: bool = False) -> str:
|
||||
"""Write (once) a dual-remote mutation config and return its path."""
|
||||
global _SHARED_CFG_PATH, _SHARED_CFG_DIR, _SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH
|
||||
import atexit
|
||||
import shutil
|
||||
|
||||
if include_example_repo:
|
||||
if _SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH and os.path.isfile(
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH
|
||||
):
|
||||
return _SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH
|
||||
if _SHARED_CFG_DIR is None:
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_DIR = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-shared-mut-cfg-")
|
||||
atexit.register(lambda: shutil.rmtree(_SHARED_CFG_DIR, ignore_errors=True))
|
||||
path = os.path.join(_SHARED_CFG_DIR, "profiles-with-example.json")
|
||||
with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
json.dump(build_dual_remote_config(include_example_repo=True), fh)
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH = path
|
||||
return path
|
||||
|
||||
if _SHARED_CFG_PATH and os.path.isfile(_SHARED_CFG_PATH):
|
||||
return _SHARED_CFG_PATH
|
||||
if _SHARED_CFG_DIR is None:
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_DIR = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-shared-mut-cfg-")
|
||||
atexit.register(lambda: shutil.rmtree(_SHARED_CFG_DIR, ignore_errors=True))
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_PATH = os.path.join(_SHARED_CFG_DIR, "profiles.json")
|
||||
with open(_SHARED_CFG_PATH, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
json.dump(build_dual_remote_config(), fh)
|
||||
return _SHARED_CFG_PATH
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def shared_mutation_env(
|
||||
profile_name: str = "test-author-dadeschools",
|
||||
*,
|
||||
include_example_repo: bool = False,
|
||||
**extra,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Env dict for mutation tests: config-backed + optional extras.
|
||||
|
||||
Always carries ``PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST`` so ``patch.dict(..., clear=True)``
|
||||
does not strip the pytest marker and trip the #695 native-transport wall.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
env = {
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": shared_mutation_config_path(
|
||||
include_example_repo=include_example_repo
|
||||
),
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile_name,
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_TEST": "test-token",
|
||||
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST": os.environ.get(
|
||||
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", "mutation_profile_env"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
env.update(extra)
|
||||
# Callers must not be able to drop the pytest marker by accident.
|
||||
env.setdefault(
|
||||
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST",
|
||||
os.environ.get("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", "mutation_profile_env"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
return env
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def install_deterministic_remote_urls() -> None:
|
||||
"""Patch server modules so workspace remotes are deterministic.
|
||||
|
||||
Prefer live ``REMOTES`` entries (so tests that patch Example-Org keep
|
||||
workspace alignment). Map the historical prgs→Timesheet default to
|
||||
Gitea-Tools so session binding matches the control repository under test.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import gitea_mcp_server as srv
|
||||
|
||||
def _url(name: str):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
entry = srv.REMOTES.get(name) or {}
|
||||
host = entry.get("host")
|
||||
org = entry.get("org")
|
||||
repo = entry.get("repo")
|
||||
if host and org and repo:
|
||||
if (
|
||||
name == "prgs"
|
||||
and org == "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
|
||||
and repo == "Timesheet"
|
||||
):
|
||||
return PRGS_URL
|
||||
if name == "dadeschools" and repo == "Timesheet":
|
||||
# Prefer mdcps eAgenda canonical for dual-config tests.
|
||||
return MDCPS_URL
|
||||
return f"https://{host}/{org}/{repo}.git"
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if name == "prgs":
|
||||
return PRGS_URL
|
||||
if name == "dadeschools":
|
||||
return MDCPS_URL
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
srv._local_git_remote_url = _url # type: ignore[method-assign]
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_server as mcp_srv
|
||||
|
||||
mcp_srv._local_git_remote_url = _url # type: ignore[method-assign]
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import sys as _sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path as _Path
|
||||
_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env # noqa: E402
|
||||
"""Tests for agent temp artifact detection and preflight warnings (#261)."""
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
@@ -69,9 +65,11 @@ class TestPreflightWarnings(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
# Issue-write tools are profile-gated (#69); gitea_lock_issue requires
|
||||
# gitea.issue.comment (see task_capability_map), so the gate must be
|
||||
# seeded exactly like tests/test_mcp_server.py::TestIssueLocking (#359).
|
||||
ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = shared_mutation_env(
|
||||
"test-author-prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = {
|
||||
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": (
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create,gitea.issue.close,gitea.issue.comment"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssueLockArtifactWarning(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,366 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Tests for controller-owned allocator (#600) on control-plane DB (#613)."""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import threading
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor, as_completed
|
||||
|
||||
from allocator_service import (
|
||||
OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
|
||||
OUTCOME_BLOCKED_TERMINAL,
|
||||
OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
|
||||
OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
|
||||
OUTCOME_WAIT,
|
||||
WorkCandidate,
|
||||
allocate_next_work,
|
||||
candidate_from_dict,
|
||||
classify_skip,
|
||||
expected_role_for_candidate,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, InvalidWorkKindError
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AllocatorServiceTest(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
|
||||
self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
def _alloc(self, **kwargs):
|
||||
defaults = dict(
|
||||
db=self.db,
|
||||
session_id="s-test",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="org",
|
||||
repo="repo",
|
||||
candidates=[],
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-author",
|
||||
username="jcwalker3",
|
||||
)
|
||||
defaults.update(kwargs)
|
||||
return allocate_next_work(**defaults)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_selects_ready_issue_for_author(self) -> None:
|
||||
cands = [
|
||||
WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=612,
|
||||
labels=("status:ready",),
|
||||
title="bridge",
|
||||
dependency_unmet=True,
|
||||
dependency_reason="downstream of #600",
|
||||
),
|
||||
WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=600,
|
||||
labels=("status:ready", "type:feature"),
|
||||
title="allocator",
|
||||
priority=50,
|
||||
),
|
||||
WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=601,
|
||||
labels=("status:blocked",),
|
||||
title="blocked",
|
||||
blocked=True,
|
||||
),
|
||||
]
|
||||
res = self._alloc(candidates=cands, apply=False)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_PREVIEW)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 600)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["kind"], "issue")
|
||||
# When 600 is highest priority valid work, lower-priority blocked/dep
|
||||
# candidates are not visited. Prove they are skipped when they sort first.
|
||||
res2 = self._alloc(
|
||||
candidates=[
|
||||
WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=612,
|
||||
labels=("status:ready",),
|
||||
priority=99,
|
||||
dependency_unmet=True,
|
||||
dependency_reason="downstream of #600",
|
||||
),
|
||||
WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=601,
|
||||
labels=("status:blocked",),
|
||||
priority=98,
|
||||
blocked=True,
|
||||
),
|
||||
WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=600,
|
||||
labels=("status:ready",),
|
||||
priority=1,
|
||||
),
|
||||
],
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
skipped_nums = {s["number"] for s in res2["skipped"]}
|
||||
self.assertIn(612, skipped_nums)
|
||||
self.assertIn(601, skipped_nums)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res2["selected"]["number"], 600)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(res["assignment"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["file_lock_only"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["comment_lease_only"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_atomic_assign_and_lease_on_apply(self) -> None:
|
||||
cands = [
|
||||
WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=600,
|
||||
labels=("status:ready",),
|
||||
priority=10,
|
||||
)
|
||||
]
|
||||
res = self._alloc(candidates=cands, apply=True, session_id="s-a")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
|
||||
asn = res["assignment"]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(asn["outcome"], "assigned")
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(asn["assignment_id"])
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(asn["lease_id"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(asn["work_number"], 600)
|
||||
self.assertIn("implement", asn["allowed_actions"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("merge", asn["forbidden_actions"])
|
||||
proof = res["lease_proof"]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(proof["source"], "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_concurrent_allocators_no_double_assign(self) -> None:
|
||||
cand = WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=100,
|
||||
head_sha="a" * 40,
|
||||
priority=10,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Seed work item so both race the same target
|
||||
self.db.upsert_work_item(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="org",
|
||||
repo="repo",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=100,
|
||||
current_head_sha="a" * 40,
|
||||
)
|
||||
results = []
|
||||
lock = threading.Lock()
|
||||
|
||||
def worker(sid: str):
|
||||
r = allocate_next_work(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
session_id=sid,
|
||||
role="reviewer",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="org",
|
||||
repo="repo",
|
||||
candidates=[cand],
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with lock:
|
||||
results.append(r)
|
||||
|
||||
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as pool:
|
||||
futs = [pool.submit(worker, f"s-{i}") for i in range(2)]
|
||||
for f in as_completed(futs):
|
||||
f.result()
|
||||
|
||||
outcomes = [r["outcome"] for r in results]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(outcomes.count(OUTCOME_ASSIGNED), 1, outcomes)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(outcomes.count(OUTCOME_WAIT), 1, outcomes)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_blocked_and_dependency_skipped(self) -> None:
|
||||
cands = [
|
||||
WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, blocked=True, labels=("status:blocked",)),
|
||||
WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=612,
|
||||
labels=("status:ready",),
|
||||
dependency_unmet=True,
|
||||
dependency_reason="downstream of #600",
|
||||
),
|
||||
]
|
||||
res = self._alloc(candidates=cands, apply=True, role="author")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_NO_SAFE)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(res["selected"])
|
||||
reasons = " ".join(s["reason"] for s in res["skipped"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("blocked", reasons.lower())
|
||||
self.assertIn("600", reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_already_leased_returns_wait(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="owner", role="author")
|
||||
self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="owner",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="org",
|
||||
repo="repo",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=50,
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = self._alloc(
|
||||
session_id="other",
|
||||
candidates=[
|
||||
WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=50, labels=("status:ready",))
|
||||
],
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_WAIT)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["owner_session_id"], "owner")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_role_ineligible_skipped(self) -> None:
|
||||
# PR with current-head REQUEST_CHANGES expects author, not reviewer.
|
||||
cand = WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=9,
|
||||
head_sha="b" * 40,
|
||||
request_changes_current_head=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(expected_role_for_candidate(cand), "author")
|
||||
res = self._alloc(
|
||||
role="reviewer",
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
candidates=[cand],
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_NO_SAFE)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("expects role" in s["reason"] for s in res["skipped"]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_terminal_lock_blocks_downstream_reviewer_prs(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.db.set_terminal_lock(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="org",
|
||||
repo="repo",
|
||||
terminal_pr=10,
|
||||
decision="request_changes",
|
||||
status="active",
|
||||
)
|
||||
cands = [
|
||||
WorkCandidate(kind="pr", number=11, head_sha="c" * 40, priority=5),
|
||||
WorkCandidate(kind="pr", number=10, head_sha="d" * 40, priority=1),
|
||||
]
|
||||
res = self._alloc(
|
||||
role="reviewer",
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
candidates=cands,
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Terminal PR #10 is selectable; #11 skipped for terminal path.
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 10)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any(
|
||||
s["number"] == 11 and "terminal-review lock" in s["reason"]
|
||||
for s in res["skipped"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_terminal_lock_blocks_all_when_only_downstream(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.db.set_terminal_lock(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="org",
|
||||
repo="repo",
|
||||
terminal_pr=10,
|
||||
decision="request_changes",
|
||||
status="active",
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = self._alloc(
|
||||
role="reviewer",
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
candidates=[
|
||||
WorkCandidate(kind="pr", number=99, head_sha="e" * 40),
|
||||
],
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_BLOCKED_TERMINAL)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_work_structured(self) -> None:
|
||||
res = self._alloc(candidates=[], apply=True)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_NO_SAFE)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(res["selected"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_rejects_incident_kind(self) -> None:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(InvalidWorkKindError):
|
||||
WorkCandidate(kind="sentry_incident", number=1)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_612_downstream_marker_in_result(self) -> None:
|
||||
res = self._alloc(
|
||||
candidates=[
|
||||
WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=600, labels=("status:ready",))
|
||||
],
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn("612", res.get("downstream_note", ""))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_substrate_not_file_or_comment_lease(self) -> None:
|
||||
res = self._alloc(
|
||||
candidates=[
|
||||
WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
|
||||
],
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["substrate"], "control_plane_db")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["file_lock_only"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["comment_lease_only"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
res["lease_proof"]["source"], "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_candidate_from_dict(self) -> None:
|
||||
c = candidate_from_dict(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"kind": "pr",
|
||||
"number": 7,
|
||||
"head_sha": "f" * 40,
|
||||
"approval_on_current_head": True,
|
||||
"mergeable": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(expected_role_for_candidate(c), "merger")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_merger_gets_clean_approval(self) -> None:
|
||||
c = WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=3,
|
||||
head_sha="1" * 40,
|
||||
approval_on_current_head=True,
|
||||
mergeable=True,
|
||||
priority=100,
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = self._alloc(
|
||||
role="merger",
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-merger",
|
||||
candidates=[c],
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
session_id="merger-1",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["assignment"]["work_number"], 3)
|
||||
self.assertIn("merge", res["assignment"]["allowed_actions"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_db_unavailable_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
res = allocate_next_work(
|
||||
None, # type: ignore[arg-type]
|
||||
session_id="x",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
candidates=[],
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("unavailable", res["reasons"][0].lower())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -79,46 +79,41 @@ class TestApiRequestFailures(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_timeout_converted_to_runtimeerror(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = TimeoutError("timed out")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
# Fixed message only (#699) — still a RuntimeError subclass.
|
||||
self.assertIsInstance(ctx.exception, RuntimeError)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Network error contacting Gitea")
|
||||
self.assertIn("network error contacting Gitea", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_dns_network_failure_converted(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = urllib.error.URLError("Name or service not known")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Network error contacting Gitea")
|
||||
self.assertIn("network error contacting Gitea", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_502_upstream_message(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(502, "bad gateway")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
msg = str(ctx.exception)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(msg, "Gitea upstream unavailable")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.reason_code, "upstream_unavailable")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.http_status, 502)
|
||||
self.assertIn("HTTP 502", msg)
|
||||
self.assertIn("upstream unavailable", msg)
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_503_upstream_message(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(503, "")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Gitea upstream unavailable")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.http_status, 503)
|
||||
self.assertIn("HTTP 503", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
self.assertIn("upstream unavailable", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_malformed_error_payload_does_not_crash(self, mock_open):
|
||||
# Non-JSON garbage error body must still yield a clean typed error
|
||||
# with a fixed message (no body echo — #699).
|
||||
# Non-JSON garbage error body must still yield a clean RuntimeError.
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(500, "<html>garbage</html>")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Gitea HTTP request failed")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("<html>", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
self.assertIn("HTTP 500", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_malformed_success_json_raises_clean_error(self, mock_open):
|
||||
@@ -131,17 +126,16 @@ class TestApiRequestFailures(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_no_secret_leak_in_error_body(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(
|
||||
400, "failed: token supersecret123 rejected")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
msg = str(ctx.exception)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("supersecret123", msg)
|
||||
# Fixed message — body never appears (stronger than redaction).
|
||||
self.assertEqual(msg, "Gitea HTTP request failed")
|
||||
self.assertIn(gitea_audit.REDACTED, msg)
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_auth_header_never_in_error(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(400, "bad request")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(FAKE_AUTH, str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import sys as _sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path as _Path
|
||||
_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env # noqa: E402
|
||||
"""Regression tests for gitea_assess_conflict_fix_push structured failures (#519)."""
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
|
||||
+21
-55
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import sys as _sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path as _Path
|
||||
_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env # noqa: E402
|
||||
"""Tests for Gitea MCP mutating-action audit logging (issue #18).
|
||||
|
||||
Covers the pure audit module (redaction, event building, sink writes) and the
|
||||
@@ -165,23 +161,11 @@ class _AuditWiringBase(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
self._dir.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
def _env(self, **extra):
|
||||
# Default: prgs-aligned author with create/close (remote=prgs tests).
|
||||
# Callers override GITEA_MCP_PROFILE for merger/reviewer paths.
|
||||
profile = extra.pop("GITEA_MCP_PROFILE", None) or extra.pop(
|
||||
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME", None
|
||||
) or "test-author-prgs"
|
||||
env = shared_mutation_env(
|
||||
profile,
|
||||
GITEA_AUDIT_LOG=self.audit_path,
|
||||
GITEA_TOKEN_TEST="test-token",
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Strip legacy env-only authority knobs if callers still pass them;
|
||||
# config-backed profiles own operations and repositories (#714).
|
||||
extra.pop("GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS", None)
|
||||
extra.pop("GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS", None)
|
||||
extra.pop("GITEA_PROFILE_NAME", None)
|
||||
env = {"GITEA_AUDIT_LOG": self.audit_path,
|
||||
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
|
||||
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": (
|
||||
"read,merge,gitea.issue.create,gitea.issue.close")}
|
||||
env.update(extra)
|
||||
env["GITEA_MCP_PROFILE"] = profile
|
||||
return env
|
||||
|
||||
def _records(self):
|
||||
@@ -212,7 +196,7 @@ class TestSimpleToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
|
||||
rec = recs[0]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rec["action"], "create_issue")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rec["result"], "succeeded")
|
||||
self.assertIn(rec["profile_name"], ("gitea-author", "test-author-prgs", "prgs-author"))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rec["profile_name"], "gitea-author")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rec["authenticated_username"], "author-bot")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rec["issue_number"], 11)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rec["request_metadata"]["title"], "Add thing")
|
||||
@@ -255,11 +239,10 @@ class TestSimpleToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
|
||||
def test_disabled_writes_nothing_and_no_extra_call(self, _auth, _get_all, mock_api, _role):
|
||||
# No GITEA_AUDIT_LOG -> audit is a no-op: one create POST, no file.
|
||||
mock_api.return_value = {"number": 1, "html_url": "http://x/1"}
|
||||
with patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ,
|
||||
shared_mutation_env("test-author-prgs"),
|
||||
clear=True,
|
||||
):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, {
|
||||
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
|
||||
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
}, clear=True):
|
||||
gitea_create_issue(title="x", remote="prgs")
|
||||
issue_posts = [
|
||||
c for c in mock_api.call_args_list if c.args[0] == "POST"
|
||||
@@ -346,20 +329,17 @@ class TestGatedToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
def test_merge_success_audited(self, _auth, mock_api):
|
||||
# user, pr, eligibility feedback pr+reviews (#695), gate-7 feedback
|
||||
# pr+reviews, merge POST, readback.
|
||||
approval = [{
|
||||
"id": 1, "user": {"login": "reviewer-bot"}, "state": "APPROVED",
|
||||
"commit_id": "abc123", "submitted_at": "2026-07-06T10:00:00Z",
|
||||
"dismissed": False,
|
||||
}]
|
||||
# user, pr, feedback pr+reviews, merge POST, readback.
|
||||
mock_api.side_effect = [
|
||||
{"login": "merger-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot"),
|
||||
self._pr("author-bot"), approval, # eligibility merge feedback
|
||||
self._pr("author-bot"), approval, # gate 7 feedback
|
||||
self._pr("author-bot"),
|
||||
[{"id": 1, "user": {"login": "reviewer-bot"}, "state": "APPROVED",
|
||||
"commit_id": "abc123", "submitted_at": "2026-07-06T10:00:00Z",
|
||||
"dismissed": False}],
|
||||
{}, {"merged_commit_sha": "c1"},
|
||||
]
|
||||
env = self._env(GITEA_MCP_PROFILE="test-merger-prgs")
|
||||
env = self._env(GITEA_PROFILE_NAME="gitea-merger",
|
||||
GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS="read,merge")
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
|
||||
r = gitea_merge_pr(pr_number=8, confirmation="MERGE PR 8",
|
||||
@@ -378,7 +358,8 @@ class TestGatedToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
|
||||
def test_merge_blocked_audited(self, _auth, mock_api):
|
||||
# Self-author merge is blocked; must still be recorded as blocked.
|
||||
mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, self._pr("jcwalker3")]
|
||||
env = self._env(GITEA_MCP_PROFILE="test-merger-prgs")
|
||||
env = self._env(GITEA_PROFILE_NAME="gitea-merger",
|
||||
GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS="read,merge")
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
|
||||
r = gitea_merge_pr(pr_number=8, confirmation="MERGE PR 8", remote="prgs")
|
||||
@@ -400,23 +381,11 @@ class TestGatedToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
|
||||
[{"id": 7, "user": {"login": "reviewer-bot"}, "state": "APPROVED",
|
||||
"submitted_at": "2026-07-06T10:00:00Z", "dismissed": False}],
|
||||
]
|
||||
env = self._env(GITEA_MCP_PROFILE="test-reviewer-prgs")
|
||||
env = self._env(GITEA_PROFILE_NAME="gitea-reviewer",
|
||||
GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS="read,review,approve")
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
|
||||
import session_context_binding as _sc
|
||||
from tests.test_mcp_server import (
|
||||
_init_reviewer_session,
|
||||
_install_owned_reviewer_lease,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from mcp_server import gitea_mark_final_review_decision
|
||||
|
||||
# Rebind after profile env is applied so durable session state
|
||||
# matches the active reviewer profile (#714 / #695).
|
||||
_sc._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
_init_reviewer_session("prgs")
|
||||
lease = _install_owned_reviewer_lease(8)
|
||||
lease.start()
|
||||
self.addCleanup(lease.stop)
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
|
||||
gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
|
||||
8, "approve", expected_head_sha="abc123", remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -425,10 +394,7 @@ class TestGatedToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
|
||||
body="LGTM", remote="prgs",
|
||||
final_review_decision_ready=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
r["performed"],
|
||||
msg=f"submit_pr_review blocked: {r}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(r["performed"])
|
||||
recs = self._records()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(recs), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(recs[0]["action"], "submit_pr_review")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,15 +26,8 @@ from review_proofs import assess_audit_reconciliation_report as proofs_assess
|
||||
from task_capability_map import required_permission, required_role
|
||||
|
||||
DELETE_PROFILE = {
|
||||
# #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned.
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-reconciler-delete",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-author-delete",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.branch.delete"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
"audit_label": "prgs-author-delete",
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -239,7 +232,7 @@ class TestMcpGates(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_profile", return_value=DELETE_PROFILE)
|
||||
def test_delete_branch_blocked_in_audit_phase(self, _profile):
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="reconciler")
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="author")
|
||||
result = mcp_server.gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/dup", remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["audit_phase"], PHASE_AUDIT)
|
||||
@@ -279,7 +272,7 @@ class TestMcpGates(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
after_state="gone",
|
||||
)
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="reconciler")
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="author")
|
||||
self.mock_api.return_value = {}
|
||||
result = mcp_server.gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/dup", remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["success"])
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -82,14 +82,13 @@ class TestPreflightIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
control_root = "/repo/Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
with mock.patch.object(mcp_server, "PROJECT_ROOT", control_root):
|
||||
with mock.patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard"):
|
||||
with mock.patch("gitea_auth.get_profile", return_value={"profile_name": "gitea-author"}):
|
||||
with mock.patch.dict(
|
||||
"os.environ",
|
||||
{"GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN": ""},
|
||||
clear=False,
|
||||
):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity()
|
||||
with mock.patch.dict(
|
||||
"os.environ",
|
||||
{"GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN": ""},
|
||||
clear=False,
|
||||
):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity()
|
||||
self.assertIn("Branches-only mutation guard", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_verify_preflight_allows_branches_worktree(self):
|
||||
|
||||
+27
-1112
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -94,7 +94,6 @@ REVIEW_STATUS: approved / approval_at_current_head
|
||||
MERGE_READY: true
|
||||
BLOCKERS: none
|
||||
VALIDATION: pytest passed; reviewer approved at head {FULL_SHA}
|
||||
NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF: transport=native_mcp; entrypoint=mcp_server; token_fingerprint=testharmless
|
||||
LAST_UPDATED_BY: prgs-reviewer
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.repo.commit"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create"],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "commit-author",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
"pr-only-author": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
@@ -40,7 +39,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.create"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": ["gitea.repo.commit"],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "pr-only-author",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
"reviewer-profile": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
@@ -53,7 +51,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "reviewer-profile",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "full-author",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
"reviewer-no-commit": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
@@ -50,7 +49,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "reviewer-no-commit",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "full-author",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -228,7 +227,6 @@ class TestCommitPayloads(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
|
||||
def test_commit_files_traversal_blocked(self, _auth, mock_api):
|
||||
mock_api.return_value = {"login": "author-user"}
|
||||
# Remove active lock file to ensure it fails on traversal/invalid locks
|
||||
os.remove(self.lock_file_path)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -250,7 +248,6 @@ class TestCommitPayloads(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
|
||||
def test_commit_files_outside_scope_blocked(self, _auth, mock_api):
|
||||
mock_api.return_value = {"login": "author-user"}
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("full-author"), clear=True):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as ctx:
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_commit_files(
|
||||
@@ -269,7 +266,6 @@ class TestCommitPayloads(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
|
||||
def test_commit_files_multiple_sources_blocked(self, _auth, mock_api):
|
||||
mock_api.return_value = {"login": "author-user"}
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("full-author"), clear=True):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as ctx:
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_commit_files(
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import sys as _sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path as _Path
|
||||
_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env # noqa: E402
|
||||
"""Tests for canonical JSON runtime-profile configuration (gitea_config) and
|
||||
its integration into gitea_auth.get_profile / get_auth_header.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,824 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Tests for control-plane DB substrate (#613)."""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import threading
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor, as_completed
|
||||
from datetime import timedelta
|
||||
|
||||
from control_plane_db import (
|
||||
ControlPlaneDB,
|
||||
InvalidWorkKindError,
|
||||
LeaseRequiredError,
|
||||
WORK_KINDS,
|
||||
_ts,
|
||||
_utc_now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ControlPlaneDBTest(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
|
||||
self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_schema_and_architecture_meta(self) -> None:
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
|
||||
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
rows = dict(conn.execute("SELECT key, value FROM schema_meta").fetchall())
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
conn.close()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rows["schema_version"], "3")
|
||||
self.assertIn("DB coordinates", rows["architecture"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("bridge", rows["architecture"].lower())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_rejects_raw_incident_as_work_kind(self) -> None:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(InvalidWorkKindError):
|
||||
self.db.upsert_work_item(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="org",
|
||||
repo="repo",
|
||||
kind="sentry_incident",
|
||||
number=1,
|
||||
)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(InvalidWorkKindError):
|
||||
self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="org",
|
||||
repo="repo",
|
||||
kind="glitchtip_incident",
|
||||
number=9,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(WORK_KINDS, frozenset({"issue", "pr"}))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_atomic_assign_and_lease_fields(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s-a", role="author", profile="prgs-author")
|
||||
result = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s-a",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=613,
|
||||
expected_head_sha="abc123",
|
||||
allowed_actions=("implement", "comment"),
|
||||
forbidden_actions=("approve", "merge"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.outcome, "assigned")
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(result.assignment_id)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(result.lease_id)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.role, "author")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.work_kind, "issue")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.work_number, 613)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.expected_head_sha, "abc123")
|
||||
self.assertIn("implement", result.allowed_actions)
|
||||
self.assertIn("merge", result.forbidden_actions)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(result.expires_at)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_second_session_waits_on_foreign_lease(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s2", role="author")
|
||||
first = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=100,
|
||||
expected_head_sha="deadbeef",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(first.outcome, "assigned")
|
||||
second = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s2",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=100,
|
||||
expected_head_sha="deadbeef",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(second.outcome, "wait")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(second.owner_session_id, "s1")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_owner_resume_refreshes_lease(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="reviewer")
|
||||
a = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
role="reviewer",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=50,
|
||||
expected_head_sha="head-50",
|
||||
)
|
||||
b = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
role="reviewer",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=50,
|
||||
expected_head_sha="head-50",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(b.outcome, "assigned")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(b.lease_id, a.lease_id)
|
||||
self.assertIn("owner-resume", b.reason)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_require_valid_assignment_gates_mutations(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
|
||||
self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=7,
|
||||
allowed_actions=("implement",),
|
||||
forbidden_actions=("merge",),
|
||||
)
|
||||
proof = self.db.require_valid_assignment(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=7,
|
||||
action="implement",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(proof["session_id"], "s1")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError):
|
||||
self.db.require_valid_assignment(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=7,
|
||||
action="merge",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError):
|
||||
self.db.require_valid_assignment(
|
||||
session_id="s-other",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=7,
|
||||
action="implement",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_expired_lease_allows_reassign(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s2", role="author")
|
||||
past = _utc_now() - timedelta(hours=1)
|
||||
# Create lease already expired by using negative TTL edge via direct assign then expire
|
||||
assigned = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=3,
|
||||
lease_ttl_seconds=1,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(assigned.outcome, "assigned")
|
||||
# Force expiry in DB
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
|
||||
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
conn.execute(
|
||||
"UPDATE leases SET expires_at = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
|
||||
(_ts(past), assigned.lease_id),
|
||||
)
|
||||
conn.commit()
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
conn.close()
|
||||
n = self.db.expire_stale_leases()
|
||||
self.assertGreaterEqual(n, 1)
|
||||
second = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s2",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=3,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(second.outcome, "assigned")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(second.session_id, "s2")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_merged_work_never_assigned(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="merger")
|
||||
self.db.upsert_work_item(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=99,
|
||||
state="merged",
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
role="merger",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=99,
|
||||
expected_head_sha="merged-head",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.outcome, "no_safe_work")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_four_concurrent_sessions_unique_assignments(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""Four concurrent assigners on four different issues — all succeed uniquely.
|
||||
|
||||
Also two concurrent assigners on the *same* issue: at most one assigned.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
for i in range(4):
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id=f"sess-{i}", role="author")
|
||||
|
||||
def claim_unique(i: int):
|
||||
return self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id=f"sess-{i}",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=1000 + i,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=4) as pool:
|
||||
results = [f.result() for f in as_completed([pool.submit(claim_unique, i) for i in range(4)])]
|
||||
self.assertEqual({r.outcome for r in results}, {"assigned"})
|
||||
numbers = sorted(r.work_number for r in results)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(numbers, [1000, 1001, 1002, 1003])
|
||||
|
||||
# Contention on one item
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="c1", role="author")
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="c2", role="author")
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="c3", role="author")
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="c4", role="author")
|
||||
barrier = threading.Barrier(4)
|
||||
outcomes: list[str] = []
|
||||
lock = threading.Lock()
|
||||
|
||||
def contend(sid: str) -> None:
|
||||
barrier.wait()
|
||||
res = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id=sid,
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=7777,
|
||||
)
|
||||
with lock:
|
||||
outcomes.append(res.outcome)
|
||||
|
||||
threads = [threading.Thread(target=contend, args=(f"c{i}",)) for i in range(1, 5)]
|
||||
for t in threads:
|
||||
t.start()
|
||||
for t in threads:
|
||||
t.join()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(outcomes.count("assigned"), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(outcomes.count("wait"), 3)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_terminal_lock_index(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.db.set_terminal_lock(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
terminal_pr=332,
|
||||
review_id="rev-1",
|
||||
decision="approve",
|
||||
)
|
||||
row = self.db.get_active_terminal_lock(remote="prgs", org="o", repo="r")
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(row)
|
||||
assert row is not None
|
||||
self.assertEqual(row["terminal_pr"], 332)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(row["status"], "active")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_incident_links_not_work_items(self) -> None:
|
||||
link = self.db.upsert_incident_link(
|
||||
provider="sentry",
|
||||
provider_base_url="https://sentry.prgs.cc",
|
||||
provider_org="prgs",
|
||||
provider_project="gitea-tools-mcp",
|
||||
provider_issue_id="12345",
|
||||
gitea_org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
gitea_repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
gitea_issue_number=9001,
|
||||
fingerprint="fp-1",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(link["gitea_issue_number"], 9001)
|
||||
found = self.db.get_incident_link_for_gitea_issue(
|
||||
gitea_org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
gitea_repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
gitea_issue_number=9001,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(found)
|
||||
# Linking does not create a work_item of incident kind
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(InvalidWorkKindError):
|
||||
self.db.upsert_work_item(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
kind="sentry",
|
||||
number=12345,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_heartbeat_and_release(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
|
||||
a = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=1,
|
||||
)
|
||||
hb = self.db.heartbeat_lease(a.lease_id, session_id="s1")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(hb["lease_id"], a.lease_id)
|
||||
self.db.release_lease(a.lease_id, session_id="s1")
|
||||
# After release another session can claim
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s2", role="author")
|
||||
b = self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s2",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=1,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(b.outcome, "assigned")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(b.session_id, "s2")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_require_valid_assignment_rejects_stale_head(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""Assignment must not authorize mutations after work-item head drifts."""
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
|
||||
self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=42,
|
||||
expected_head_sha="head-v1",
|
||||
allowed_actions=("implement",),
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Head drifts after assignment
|
||||
self.db.upsert_work_item(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=42,
|
||||
current_head_sha="head-v2",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError) as ctx:
|
||||
self.db.require_valid_assignment(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=42,
|
||||
action="implement",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn("stale head", str(ctx.exception).lower())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_require_valid_assignment_rejects_terminal_state(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""Assignment must not authorize mutations after work item is merged/closed."""
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
|
||||
self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=55,
|
||||
expected_head_sha="abc",
|
||||
allowed_actions=("implement",),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.db.upsert_work_item(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=55,
|
||||
state="merged",
|
||||
current_head_sha="abc",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError) as ctx:
|
||||
self.db.require_valid_assignment(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=55,
|
||||
action="implement",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn("terminal", str(ctx.exception).lower())
|
||||
|
||||
self.db.upsert_work_item(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=56,
|
||||
state="open",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=56,
|
||||
allowed_actions=("implement",),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.db.upsert_work_item(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=56,
|
||||
state="closed",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError):
|
||||
self.db.require_valid_assignment(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=56,
|
||||
action="implement",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_pr_assignment_requires_expected_head_sha(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""PR assign and mutation must fail closed without a head pin."""
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError) as ctx:
|
||||
self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id="s1",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=88,
|
||||
expected_head_sha=None,
|
||||
allowed_actions=("implement",),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn("expected_head_sha", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
# Legacy path: force an unpinned PR assignment into the DB, then
|
||||
# populate head and prove mutation is still rejected.
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
|
||||
self.db.upsert_work_item(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=89,
|
||||
current_head_sha=None,
|
||||
)
|
||||
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
wid = conn.execute(
|
||||
"SELECT work_item_id FROM work_items WHERE kind='pr' AND number=89"
|
||||
).fetchone()[0]
|
||||
conn.execute(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
INSERT INTO sessions(session_id, role, started_at, last_heartbeat_at, status)
|
||||
VALUES ('legacy', 'author', '2020-01-01T00:00:00Z', '2020-01-01T00:00:00Z', 'active')
|
||||
"""
|
||||
)
|
||||
conn.execute(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
INSERT INTO leases(
|
||||
lease_id, work_item_id, session_id, role, phase,
|
||||
expires_at, heartbeat_at, status
|
||||
) VALUES (
|
||||
'lease-legacy', ?, 'legacy', 'author', 'claimed',
|
||||
'2099-01-01T00:00:00Z', '2020-01-01T00:00:00Z', 'active'
|
||||
)
|
||||
""",
|
||||
(wid,),
|
||||
)
|
||||
conn.execute(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
INSERT INTO assignments(
|
||||
assignment_id, work_item_id, session_id, lease_id,
|
||||
allowed_actions, forbidden_actions, expected_head_sha,
|
||||
role, status, created_at
|
||||
) VALUES (
|
||||
'asn-legacy', ?, 'legacy', 'lease-legacy',
|
||||
'["implement"]', '["merge"]', NULL,
|
||||
'author', 'active', '2020-01-01T00:00:00Z'
|
||||
)
|
||||
""",
|
||||
(wid,),
|
||||
)
|
||||
conn.commit()
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
conn.close()
|
||||
self.db.upsert_work_item(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=89,
|
||||
current_head_sha="populated-head",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError) as ctx2:
|
||||
self.db.require_valid_assignment(
|
||||
session_id="legacy",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="pr",
|
||||
number=89,
|
||||
action="implement",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn("expected_head_sha pin", str(ctx2.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_migrate_duplicate_null_scope_incident_links(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""Legacy NULL-scope duplicates must migrate without UNIQUE crash."""
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
|
||||
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, ControlPlaneError
|
||||
|
||||
# Build a v1-like table with nullable scope columns and insert dups
|
||||
# that collapse under normalization, then open ControlPlaneDB on it.
|
||||
path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "legacy_dups.sqlite3")
|
||||
conn = sqlite3.connect(path)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
conn.executescript(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
CREATE TABLE schema_meta (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT NOT NULL);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE incident_links (
|
||||
link_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||||
provider TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
provider_base_url TEXT,
|
||||
provider_org TEXT,
|
||||
provider_project TEXT,
|
||||
provider_issue_id TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
provider_short_id TEXT,
|
||||
provider_permalink TEXT,
|
||||
fingerprint TEXT,
|
||||
gitea_org TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
gitea_repo TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
gitea_issue_number INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||||
linked_pr_numbers TEXT,
|
||||
first_seen TEXT,
|
||||
last_seen TEXT,
|
||||
event_count INTEGER,
|
||||
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'open',
|
||||
release_resolved_at TEXT,
|
||||
last_sync_at TEXT,
|
||||
UNIQUE (
|
||||
provider, provider_base_url, provider_org,
|
||||
provider_project, provider_issue_id
|
||||
)
|
||||
);
|
||||
INSERT INTO incident_links(
|
||||
provider, provider_base_url, provider_org, provider_project,
|
||||
provider_issue_id, gitea_org, gitea_repo, gitea_issue_number, status
|
||||
) VALUES
|
||||
('sentry', NULL, NULL, NULL, 'dup-1', 'org', 'repo', 10, 'open'),
|
||||
('sentry', NULL, NULL, NULL, 'dup-1', 'org', 'repo', 10, 'open');
|
||||
"""
|
||||
)
|
||||
# SQLite allows two NULL-scope rows with same provider/issue under UNIQUE.
|
||||
n = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM incident_links").fetchone()[0]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(n, 2)
|
||||
conn.commit()
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
conn.close()
|
||||
|
||||
db = ControlPlaneDB(path)
|
||||
conn2 = sqlite3.connect(path)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
n2 = conn2.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM incident_links").fetchone()[0]
|
||||
rows = conn2.execute(
|
||||
"SELECT provider_base_url, provider_org, provider_project, gitea_issue_number "
|
||||
"FROM incident_links"
|
||||
).fetchall()
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
conn2.close()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(n2, 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rows[0][0], "")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rows[0][1], "")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rows[0][2], "")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rows[0][3], 10)
|
||||
# Touch to silence unused import in type checkers if needed
|
||||
self.assertTrue(issubclass(ControlPlaneError, Exception))
|
||||
del db
|
||||
|
||||
def test_migrate_conflicting_duplicate_incident_links_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""Conflicting Gitea targets for the same provider key must fail closed."""
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, ControlPlaneError
|
||||
|
||||
path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "legacy_conflict.sqlite3")
|
||||
conn = sqlite3.connect(path)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
conn.executescript(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
CREATE TABLE incident_links (
|
||||
link_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||||
provider TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
provider_base_url TEXT,
|
||||
provider_org TEXT,
|
||||
provider_project TEXT,
|
||||
provider_issue_id TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
gitea_org TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
gitea_repo TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
gitea_issue_number INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||||
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'open',
|
||||
UNIQUE (
|
||||
provider, provider_base_url, provider_org,
|
||||
provider_project, provider_issue_id
|
||||
)
|
||||
);
|
||||
INSERT INTO incident_links(
|
||||
provider, provider_base_url, provider_org, provider_project,
|
||||
provider_issue_id, gitea_org, gitea_repo, gitea_issue_number
|
||||
) VALUES
|
||||
('sentry', NULL, NULL, NULL, 'dup-c', 'org', 'repo', 1),
|
||||
('sentry', NULL, NULL, NULL, 'dup-c', 'org', 'repo', 2);
|
||||
"""
|
||||
)
|
||||
conn.commit()
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
conn.close()
|
||||
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ControlPlaneError) as ctx:
|
||||
ControlPlaneDB(path)
|
||||
self.assertIn("conflicting", str(ctx.exception).lower())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_migrate_conflicting_observation_metadata_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""Same provider key + same Gitea target but differing obs metadata must fail closed.
|
||||
|
||||
Regression for silent data loss: migration used to keep lowest link_id and
|
||||
delete peers after comparing only Gitea targets (#619 RC3).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, ControlPlaneError
|
||||
|
||||
path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "legacy_meta_conflict.sqlite3")
|
||||
conn = sqlite3.connect(path)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
conn.executescript(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
CREATE TABLE schema_meta (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT NOT NULL);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE incident_links (
|
||||
link_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
|
||||
provider TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
provider_base_url TEXT,
|
||||
provider_org TEXT,
|
||||
provider_project TEXT,
|
||||
provider_issue_id TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
provider_short_id TEXT,
|
||||
provider_permalink TEXT,
|
||||
fingerprint TEXT,
|
||||
gitea_org TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
gitea_repo TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
gitea_issue_number INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||||
linked_pr_numbers TEXT,
|
||||
first_seen TEXT,
|
||||
last_seen TEXT,
|
||||
event_count INTEGER,
|
||||
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'open',
|
||||
release_resolved_at TEXT,
|
||||
last_sync_at TEXT,
|
||||
UNIQUE (
|
||||
provider, provider_base_url, provider_org,
|
||||
provider_project, provider_issue_id
|
||||
)
|
||||
);
|
||||
INSERT INTO incident_links(
|
||||
provider, provider_base_url, provider_org, provider_project,
|
||||
provider_issue_id, provider_permalink, fingerprint,
|
||||
gitea_org, gitea_repo, gitea_issue_number,
|
||||
event_count, status, first_seen, last_seen
|
||||
) VALUES
|
||||
(
|
||||
'sentry', NULL, NULL, NULL, 'dup-meta',
|
||||
'https://sentry.example/issues/1', 'fingerprint-A',
|
||||
'org', 'repo', 42,
|
||||
1, 'open', '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z', '2026-01-01T01:00:00Z'
|
||||
),
|
||||
(
|
||||
'sentry', NULL, NULL, NULL, 'dup-meta',
|
||||
'https://sentry.example/issues/1', 'fingerprint-B',
|
||||
'org', 'repo', 42,
|
||||
99, 'resolved', '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z', '2026-01-02T00:00:00Z'
|
||||
);
|
||||
"""
|
||||
)
|
||||
n = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM incident_links").fetchone()[0]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(n, 2)
|
||||
conn.commit()
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
conn.close()
|
||||
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ControlPlaneError) as ctx:
|
||||
ControlPlaneDB(path)
|
||||
msg = str(ctx.exception).lower()
|
||||
self.assertIn("conflicting", msg)
|
||||
self.assertIn("observation metadata", msg)
|
||||
|
||||
# Rows must still be present — migration must not delete before failing.
|
||||
conn2 = sqlite3.connect(path)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
remaining = conn2.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM incident_links").fetchone()[0]
|
||||
fps = {
|
||||
r[0]
|
||||
for r in conn2.execute(
|
||||
"SELECT fingerprint FROM incident_links ORDER BY link_id"
|
||||
).fetchall()
|
||||
}
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
conn2.close()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(remaining, 2)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(fps, {"fingerprint-A", "fingerprint-B"})
|
||||
|
||||
def test_incident_links_minimal_upsert_is_canonical(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""Repeated minimal upserts must update one row (NULL-safe uniqueness)."""
|
||||
a = self.db.upsert_incident_link(
|
||||
provider="sentry",
|
||||
provider_issue_id="inc-1",
|
||||
gitea_org="org",
|
||||
gitea_repo="repo",
|
||||
gitea_issue_number=1,
|
||||
)
|
||||
b = self.db.upsert_incident_link(
|
||||
provider="sentry",
|
||||
provider_issue_id="inc-1",
|
||||
gitea_org="org",
|
||||
gitea_repo="repo",
|
||||
gitea_issue_number=2,
|
||||
# omit optional scope fields again
|
||||
)
|
||||
c = self.db.upsert_incident_link(
|
||||
provider="sentry",
|
||||
provider_issue_id="inc-1",
|
||||
gitea_org="org",
|
||||
gitea_repo="repo",
|
||||
gitea_issue_number=3,
|
||||
provider_base_url=None,
|
||||
provider_org="",
|
||||
provider_project=" ",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(a["link_id"], b["link_id"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(b["link_id"], c["link_id"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(c["gitea_issue_number"], 3)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(c["provider_base_url"], "")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(c["provider_org"], "")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(c["provider_project"], "")
|
||||
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
|
||||
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
n = conn.execute(
|
||||
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM incident_links WHERE provider_issue_id = ?",
|
||||
("inc-1",),
|
||||
).fetchone()[0]
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
conn.close()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(n, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import os
|
||||
"""Tests for create_issue.py.
|
||||
|
||||
Every test mocks auth functions so no real network calls or keychain
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +12,7 @@ import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
import contextlib
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock, patch
|
||||
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
|
||||
|
||||
# The module under test lives in the repo root, not a package.
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
@@ -93,26 +92,6 @@ class TestRemoteResolution(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
@unittest.skipIf(_SKIP, _REASON)
|
||||
class TestAPIPayload(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""#714: omitted --org/--repo uses workspace-bound repo (Gitea-Tools),
|
||||
not the historical REMOTES Timesheet default. Intentional security-policy
|
||||
migration of legacy omitted-target assertions.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._ws_env = patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ,
|
||||
{
|
||||
"GITEA_TEST_WORKSPACE_REMOTE_URL": (
|
||||
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
|
||||
)
|
||||
},
|
||||
clear=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._ws_env.start()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
self._ws_env.stop()
|
||||
|
||||
"""Ensure the JSON payload sent to Gitea is correct."""
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("create_issue.get_credentials", return_value=FAKE_CREDS)
|
||||
@@ -163,7 +142,7 @@ class TestAPIPayload(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
url = mock_api.call_args[0][1]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
url,
|
||||
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/api/v1/repos/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues",
|
||||
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/api/v1/repos/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet/issues",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,11 +11,7 @@ import gitea_mcp_server as srv
|
||||
|
||||
FAKE_AUTH = {"Authorization": "token test-token"}
|
||||
# Stable control checkout (parent of branches/), not the MCP server worktree root.
|
||||
current_file_path = Path(__file__).resolve()
|
||||
if "branches" in current_file_path.parts:
|
||||
CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT = str(current_file_path.parents[3])
|
||||
else:
|
||||
CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT = str(current_file_path.parents[1])
|
||||
CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3])
|
||||
PROJECT_ROOT = srv.PROJECT_ROOT
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -57,23 +53,9 @@ class TestCreateIssueWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
# Without worktree_path/env hints, workspace resolves to PROJECT_ROOT. When that
|
||||
# path is the stable control checkout (not under branches/), mutation must fail.
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_create_issue(title="Test issue", body="body text")
|
||||
except RuntimeError as exc:
|
||||
self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(exc))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
# #683: production guards return typed blockers at entrypoints
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("performed"))
|
||||
blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or []) + " " + str(
|
||||
res.get("blocker_kind") or ""
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
"stable control checkout" in blob
|
||||
or "missing_issue_worktree" in blob
|
||||
or "control checkout" in blob.lower()
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("exact_next_action"))
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
srv.gitea_create_issue(title="Test issue", body="body text")
|
||||
self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
@@ -119,17 +101,11 @@ class TestCreateIssueWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_create_issue(
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
srv.gitea_create_issue(
|
||||
title="Test issue", body="body", worktree_path=missing_path
|
||||
)
|
||||
except RuntimeError as exc:
|
||||
self.assertIn("does not exist", str(exc))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
|
||||
blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
self.assertIn("does not exist", blob)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("exact_next_action") or res.get("reasons"))
|
||||
self.assertIn("does not exist (fail closed)", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
@@ -162,20 +138,11 @@ class TestCreateIssueWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
|
||||
with patch("gitea_mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain", return_value=""):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_create_issue(
|
||||
title="Test issue",
|
||||
body="body",
|
||||
worktree_path=wrong_repo_path,
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
srv.gitea_create_issue(
|
||||
title="Test issue", body="body", worktree_path=wrong_repo_path
|
||||
)
|
||||
except RuntimeError as exc:
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
"does not belong to the target repository", str(exc)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
|
||||
blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
self.assertIn("does not belong to the target repository", blob)
|
||||
self.assertIn("does not belong to the target repository", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-23
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import os
|
||||
"""Tests for create_pr.py.
|
||||
|
||||
Every test mocks `get_credentials` and `urllib.request.urlopen` so no real
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +8,7 @@ import json
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
import contextlib
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock, patch
|
||||
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
import create_pr # noqa: E402
|
||||
@@ -75,26 +74,6 @@ class TestRemoteResolution(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
# API payload
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
class TestAPIPayload(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""#714: omitted --org/--repo uses workspace-bound repo (Gitea-Tools),
|
||||
not the historical REMOTES Timesheet default. Intentional security-policy
|
||||
migration of legacy omitted-target assertions.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._ws_env = patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ,
|
||||
{
|
||||
"GITEA_TEST_WORKSPACE_REMOTE_URL": (
|
||||
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
|
||||
)
|
||||
},
|
||||
clear=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._ws_env.start()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
self._ws_env.stop()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("create_pr.get_credentials", return_value=FAKE_CREDS)
|
||||
def test_payload_fields(self, _cred):
|
||||
@@ -134,7 +113,7 @@ class TestAPIPayload(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
url = MockReq.call_args[0][0]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
url,
|
||||
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/api/v1/repos/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/pulls",
|
||||
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/api/v1/repos/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet/pulls",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,15 +1,9 @@
|
||||
"""Tests for gitea_delete_branch capability + role gate (Issue #408, #729).
|
||||
"""Tests for gitea_delete_branch capability gate (Issue #408).
|
||||
|
||||
``gitea_delete_branch`` requires the exact ``gitea.branch.delete`` operation:
|
||||
without it the delete fails closed (no preflight, no auth lookup, no API call,
|
||||
structured permission report).
|
||||
|
||||
#729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned. ``gitea.branch.delete`` is granted only
|
||||
to the reconciler profile, so the resolver classifies delete_branch as a
|
||||
reconciler task. Raw ``gitea_delete_branch`` still redirects the reconciler to
|
||||
the guarded ``gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch`` path (#514/#687); author,
|
||||
reviewer, and merger remain denied by the permission gate and/or the required
|
||||
role gate.
|
||||
structured permission report). With it, deletion proceeds through existing
|
||||
preflight and audit unchanged.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
@@ -22,8 +16,6 @@ sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.par
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_server
|
||||
from mcp_server import gitea_delete_branch
|
||||
import task_capability_map
|
||||
import role_session_router
|
||||
|
||||
FAKE_AUTH = "token fake"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -46,22 +38,6 @@ AUTHOR_WITH_DELETE = {
|
||||
"audit_label": "prgs-author-deleter",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned. The reconciler holds
|
||||
# gitea.branch.delete but raw gitea_delete_branch redirects it to the guarded
|
||||
# gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path (#514/#687).
|
||||
RECONCILER_WITH_DELETE = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read", "gitea.issue.comment", "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"audit_label": "prgs-reconciler",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
CONFIG = {
|
||||
"version": 2,
|
||||
"contexts": {
|
||||
@@ -105,20 +81,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "reviewer-profile",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #729: reconciler is the only delete-capable role.
|
||||
"reconciler-profile": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"context": "ctx",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"username": "reconciler-user",
|
||||
"auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_RECONCILER"},
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read", "gitea.issue.comment", "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.pr.merge"],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "reconciler-profile",
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -159,9 +121,6 @@ class TestDeleteBranchToolGate(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def _set_profile(self, profile):
|
||||
patch("mcp_server.get_profile", return_value=profile).start()
|
||||
|
||||
def _delete_calls(self):
|
||||
return [c for c in self.mock_api.call_args_list if c.args[0] == "DELETE"]
|
||||
|
||||
def test_blocked_without_delete_capability(self):
|
||||
self._set_profile(AUTHOR_NO_DELETE)
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/branch", remote="prgs")
|
||||
@@ -176,53 +135,33 @@ class TestDeleteBranchToolGate(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
self.mock_api.assert_not_called()
|
||||
self.mock_auth.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_author_with_delete_perm_denied_by_role_gate(self):
|
||||
"""#729: even an author holding gitea.branch.delete is denied — the
|
||||
required role is now reconciler. Fail closed, no API DELETE."""
|
||||
def test_allowed_delete_proceeds(self):
|
||||
self._set_profile(AUTHOR_WITH_DELETE)
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="author")
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/branch", remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["active_role_kind"], "author")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["reasons"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reviewer_with_delete_perm_denied_by_role_gate(self):
|
||||
"""A reviewer that somehow holds the permission is still denied."""
|
||||
reviewer_with_delete = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read", "gitea.pr.review", "gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
"audit_label": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
}
|
||||
self._set_profile(reviewer_with_delete)
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="reviewer")
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/branch", remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["active_role_kind"], "reviewer")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reconciler_performs_raw_delete(self):
|
||||
"""#729: the reconciler is the delete-capable role and performs the raw
|
||||
deletion (no audit phase active here); the API DELETE is issued."""
|
||||
self._set_profile(RECONCILER_WITH_DELETE)
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check(
|
||||
"capability", resolved_role="reconciler")
|
||||
self.mock_api.return_value = {}
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/branch", remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("deleted", res["message"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(self._delete_calls())
|
||||
delete_calls = [
|
||||
c for c in self.mock_api.call_args_list if c.args[0] == "DELETE"
|
||||
]
|
||||
self.assertTrue(delete_calls)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_allowed_delete_audited_with_capability_proof(self):
|
||||
self._set_profile(AUTHOR_WITH_DELETE)
|
||||
patch("gitea_audit.audit_enabled", return_value=True).start()
|
||||
mock_write = patch("gitea_audit.write_event").start()
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="author")
|
||||
self.mock_api.return_value = {}
|
||||
gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/branch", remote="prgs")
|
||||
mock_write.assert_called()
|
||||
event = mock_write.call_args[0][0]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(event["action"], "delete_branch")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
event["request_metadata"]["required_permission"],
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestDeleteBranchResolverParity(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@@ -255,89 +194,24 @@ class TestDeleteBranchResolverParity(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile,
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_AUTHOR": "author-pass",
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_REVIEWER": "reviewer-pass",
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_RECONCILER": "reconciler-pass",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
def _delete_calls(self):
|
||||
return [c for c in self.mock_api.call_args_list if c.args[0] == "DELETE"]
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reconciler_resolver_allows_delete_branch(self):
|
||||
"""#729: resolve(delete_branch) on the reconciler profile is allowed and
|
||||
classified as a reconciler task."""
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("reconciler-profile"), clear=True):
|
||||
resolve = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="delete_branch", remote="prgs")
|
||||
# Deterministic role-map outcomes (avoid runtime-staleness-dependent
|
||||
# allowed_in_current_session, which folds in reconnect state).
|
||||
self.assertEqual(resolve["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
resolve["required_operation_permission"], "gitea.branch.delete")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(resolve["active_profile_permission_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(resolve["configured"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("reconciler-profile", resolve["matching_configured_profile"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(resolve["active_role_kind"], "reconciler")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_author_resolver_denies_delete_branch(self):
|
||||
"""#729: an author session cannot resolve delete_branch — required role
|
||||
is reconciler and the author lacks the permission."""
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("author-no-delete"), clear=True):
|
||||
resolve = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="delete_branch", remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(resolve["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(resolve["allowed_in_current_session"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reviewer_resolver_denial_blocks_raw_tool(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("reviewer-profile"), clear=True):
|
||||
resolve = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="delete_branch", remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(resolve["allowed_in_current_session"])
|
||||
patch("mcp_server.get_profile", return_value={
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.review"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": ["gitea.branch.delete"],
|
||||
}).start()
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/branch", remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
res["permission_report"]["missing_permission"],
|
||||
resolve["required_operation_permission"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestDeleteBranchRoleMapParity(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""#729: both single-source-of-truth maps must classify delete_branch as
|
||||
reconciler and stay in agreement."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_task_capability_map_role_reconciler(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
task_capability_map.required_role("delete_branch"), "reconciler")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
task_capability_map.required_permission("delete_branch"),
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_router_required_role_reconciler(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
role_session_router.TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE["delete_branch"],
|
||||
"reconciler",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
role_session_router.required_role_for_task("delete_branch"),
|
||||
"reconciler",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_router_set_membership_moved(self):
|
||||
self.assertIn("delete_branch", role_session_router.RECONCILER_TASKS)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("delete_branch", role_session_router.AUTHOR_TASKS)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_maps_agree(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
task_capability_map.required_role("delete_branch"),
|
||||
role_session_router.TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE["delete_branch"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
delete_calls = [
|
||||
c for c in self.mock_api.call_args_list if c.args[0] == "DELETE"
|
||||
]
|
||||
self.assertFalse(delete_calls)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,404 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Head-scoped #332 review-decision locks (#620).
|
||||
|
||||
Proves:
|
||||
* REQUEST_CHANGES on head A does not block mark_ready/submit on head B
|
||||
* APPROVE on head B is allowed after RC on head A (same open PR)
|
||||
* same-head duplicate terminal remains blocked
|
||||
* open-PR cleanup remains forbidden; assessment reports stale_by_head
|
||||
* historical mutations keep their head_sha (preserved ledger)
|
||||
* PR #619-style: old RC at 036b78e…, current head 2429d9d…, approve allowed
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_server
|
||||
import stale_review_decision_lock as srdl
|
||||
|
||||
HEAD_A = "036b78e31ea5d036452b3a52e0e086b01e0c763f"
|
||||
HEAD_B = "2429d9d2e826e519eb8eb4ade45987c00838aefb"
|
||||
HEAD_C = "c" * 40
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _lock(mutations=None, correction=False, ready_pr=None, ready_head=None, ready_action=None):
|
||||
mutations = list(mutations or [])
|
||||
corr_pr = None
|
||||
if correction and mutations:
|
||||
corr_pr = mutations[-1].get("pr_number")
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"task": "review_pr",
|
||||
"remote": "prgs",
|
||||
"org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
"repo": "Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
"session_pid": os.getpid(),
|
||||
"session_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"session_profile_lock": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"profile_identity": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"final_review_decision_ready": False,
|
||||
"ready_pr_number": ready_pr,
|
||||
"ready_action": ready_action,
|
||||
"ready_expected_head_sha": ready_head,
|
||||
"ready_remote": "prgs" if ready_pr else None,
|
||||
"ready_org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting" if ready_pr else None,
|
||||
"ready_repo": "Gitea-Tools" if ready_pr else None,
|
||||
"live_mutations": mutations,
|
||||
"correction_authorized": correction,
|
||||
"correction_reason": "test" if correction else None,
|
||||
"correction_pr_number": corr_pr,
|
||||
"correction_head_sha": None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
RC_619_LEGACY = {
|
||||
"pr_number": 619,
|
||||
"action": "request_changes",
|
||||
"review_id": 410,
|
||||
"review_state": "request_changes",
|
||||
# no head_sha — pre-#620 durable ledger shape
|
||||
}
|
||||
RC_619_HEAD_A = {
|
||||
"pr_number": 619,
|
||||
"action": "request_changes",
|
||||
"review_id": 410,
|
||||
"review_state": "request_changes",
|
||||
"head_sha": HEAD_A,
|
||||
}
|
||||
APPROVE_619_HEAD_B = {
|
||||
"pr_number": 619,
|
||||
"action": "approve",
|
||||
"review_id": 411,
|
||||
"review_state": "approve",
|
||||
"head_sha": HEAD_B,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _seed(mutations=None, **kwargs):
|
||||
import review_workflow_load
|
||||
|
||||
review_workflow_load.record_review_workflow_load(mcp_server.PROJECT_ROOT)
|
||||
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(_lock(mutations, **kwargs))
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _open_pr(pr_number=619, head=HEAD_B):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"number": pr_number,
|
||||
"state": "open",
|
||||
"merged": False,
|
||||
"merged_at": None,
|
||||
"head": {"sha": head},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _no_lease():
|
||||
return {"block": False, "reasons": [], "mutation_allowed": True}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _feedback(blocking=False, stale=False, success=True):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": success,
|
||||
"has_blocking_change_requests": blocking,
|
||||
"review_feedback_stale": stale,
|
||||
"current_head_sha": HEAD_B,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestPureHeadScopeHelpers(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_mutation_head_prefers_recorded_sha(self):
|
||||
m = {"pr_number": 1, "head_sha": HEAD_A}
|
||||
self.assertEqual(srdl.mutation_head_sha(m), HEAD_A)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_legacy_mutation_uses_ready_expected_for_same_pr(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock(
|
||||
[RC_619_LEGACY],
|
||||
ready_pr=619,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(srdl.mutation_head_sha(RC_619_LEGACY, lock), HEAD_A)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_legacy_mutation_ignores_ready_for_other_pr(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock([RC_619_LEGACY], ready_pr=1, ready_head=HEAD_A)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(srdl.mutation_head_sha(RC_619_LEGACY, lock))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_prior_blocks_same_head_not_other_head(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock([RC_619_HEAD_A])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
srdl.prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
|
||||
lock, pr_number=619, expected_head_sha=HEAD_A
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
srdl.prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
|
||||
lock, pr_number=619, expected_head_sha=HEAD_B
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_backfill_stamps_legacy_terminals(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock(
|
||||
[dict(RC_619_LEGACY)],
|
||||
ready_pr=619,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
srdl.backfill_terminal_heads_from_ready(lock)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(lock["live_mutations"][0]["head_sha"], HEAD_A)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestHardStopHeadScope(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(None)
|
||||
mcp_server.review_workflow_load.clear_review_workflow_load()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_rc_head_a_allows_mark_ready_head_b(self):
|
||||
_seed(
|
||||
[RC_619_HEAD_A],
|
||||
ready_pr=619,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
|
||||
619, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=HEAD_B
|
||||
),
|
||||
[],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_rc_head_a_blocks_mark_ready_same_head(self):
|
||||
_seed(
|
||||
[RC_619_HEAD_A],
|
||||
ready_pr=619,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons = mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
|
||||
619, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=HEAD_A
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(reasons)
|
||||
self.assertIn("#332", reasons[0])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_rc_head_a_allows_other_pr_via_cross_pr_isolation(self):
|
||||
"""#693: foreign-PR terminal must not hard-stop mark_ready on another PR."""
|
||||
_seed([RC_619_HEAD_A], ready_pr=619, ready_head=HEAD_A)
|
||||
reasons = mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
|
||||
700, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=HEAD_B
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(reasons, [])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_legacy_619_ledger_allows_new_head(self):
|
||||
"""PR #619-style durable lock without mutation head_sha."""
|
||||
_seed(
|
||||
[RC_619_LEGACY],
|
||||
ready_pr=619,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
|
||||
619, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=HEAD_B
|
||||
),
|
||||
[],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestMarkFinalAndRecord(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(None)
|
||||
mcp_server.review_workflow_load.clear_review_workflow_load()
|
||||
|
||||
def _mark(self, pr, action, head, feedback=None):
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server._list_pr_lease_comments", return_value=[]), patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server._pr_work_lease_reviewer_block", return_value=_no_lease()
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"gitea_get_pr_review_feedback",
|
||||
return_value=feedback or _feedback(blocking=False, stale=True),
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"gitea_check_pr_eligibility",
|
||||
return_value={"eligible": True, "head_sha": head},
|
||||
):
|
||||
return mcp_server.gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
|
||||
pr_number=pr,
|
||||
action=action,
|
||||
expected_head_sha=head,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_rc_then_rc_on_new_head(self):
|
||||
_seed(
|
||||
[RC_619_HEAD_A],
|
||||
ready_pr=619,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Prior RC at head A is unresolved but head moved → feedback stale.
|
||||
res = self._mark(
|
||||
619,
|
||||
"request_changes",
|
||||
HEAD_B,
|
||||
feedback=_feedback(blocking=True, stale=True),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("marked_ready"), res)
|
||||
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
|
||||
# Historical head A preserved on mutation after backfill.
|
||||
heads = {
|
||||
m.get("head_sha")
|
||||
for m in lock["live_mutations"]
|
||||
if m.get("action") == "request_changes"
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.assertIn(HEAD_A, heads)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(lock["ready_expected_head_sha"], HEAD_B)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_rc_then_approve_on_new_head(self):
|
||||
_seed(
|
||||
[RC_619_HEAD_A],
|
||||
ready_pr=619,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = self._mark(619, "approve", HEAD_B)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("marked_ready"), res)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("head_scoped"))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_same_head_rc_still_blocked_by_hard_stop(self):
|
||||
_seed(
|
||||
[RC_619_HEAD_A],
|
||||
ready_pr=619,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = self._mark(619, "approve", HEAD_A)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("marked_ready"))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("#332" in r for r in res.get("reasons") or []))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_pr619_style_legacy_lock_approve_on_current_head(self):
|
||||
_seed(
|
||||
[RC_619_LEGACY],
|
||||
ready_pr=619,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = self._mark(619, "approve", HEAD_B)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("marked_ready"), res)
|
||||
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
|
||||
# Backfill should have stamped HEAD_A onto the legacy mutation.
|
||||
self.assertEqual(lock["live_mutations"][0].get("head_sha"), HEAD_A)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(lock["ready_expected_head_sha"], HEAD_B)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_record_live_mutation_stores_head(self):
|
||||
_seed(ready_pr=619, ready_head=HEAD_B, ready_action="approve")
|
||||
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
|
||||
lock["final_review_decision_ready"] = True
|
||||
lock["ready_pr_number"] = 619
|
||||
lock["ready_expected_head_sha"] = HEAD_B
|
||||
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(lock)
|
||||
mcp_server.record_live_review_mutation(619, "approve", review_id=99)
|
||||
stored = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()["live_mutations"][-1]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(stored["head_sha"], HEAD_B)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(stored["pr_number"], 619)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_submit_gate_allows_new_head_after_prior_terminal(self):
|
||||
"""check_review_decision_gate must not block different-head submit."""
|
||||
mutations = [RC_619_HEAD_A]
|
||||
_seed(
|
||||
mutations,
|
||||
ready_pr=619,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
ready_action="approve",
|
||||
)
|
||||
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
|
||||
lock["final_review_decision_ready"] = True
|
||||
lock["ready_pr_number"] = 619
|
||||
lock["ready_action"] = "approve"
|
||||
lock["ready_expected_head_sha"] = HEAD_B
|
||||
lock["ready_remote"] = "prgs"
|
||||
lock["ready_org"] = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
|
||||
lock["ready_repo"] = "Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(lock)
|
||||
reasons = mcp_server.check_review_decision_gate(
|
||||
619,
|
||||
"approve",
|
||||
final_review_decision_ready=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(reasons, [], reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_submit_gate_blocks_same_head_duplicate(self):
|
||||
mutations = [RC_619_HEAD_A]
|
||||
_seed(
|
||||
mutations,
|
||||
ready_pr=619,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
|
||||
lock["final_review_decision_ready"] = True
|
||||
lock["ready_pr_number"] = 619
|
||||
lock["ready_action"] = "request_changes"
|
||||
lock["ready_expected_head_sha"] = HEAD_A
|
||||
lock["ready_remote"] = "prgs"
|
||||
lock["ready_org"] = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
|
||||
lock["ready_repo"] = "Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(lock)
|
||||
reasons = mcp_server.check_review_decision_gate(
|
||||
619,
|
||||
"request_changes",
|
||||
final_review_decision_ready=True,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestAssessmentOpenPrHead(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_open_pr_stale_by_head_no_cleanup(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock(
|
||||
[RC_619_HEAD_A],
|
||||
ready_pr=619,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
a = srdl.assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
lock, pr_live=_open_pr(619, HEAD_B)
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(a["has_lock"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(a["is_moot"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(a["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(a["stale_by_head"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(a["fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(a["locked_head_sha"], HEAD_A)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(a["current_pr_head_sha"], HEAD_B)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_open_pr_same_head_no_fresh(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock([RC_619_HEAD_A], ready_pr=619, ready_head=HEAD_A)
|
||||
a = srdl.assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
lock, pr_live=_open_pr(619, HEAD_A)
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(a["stale_by_head"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(a["fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(a["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_historical_mutation_preserved_in_summary(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock(
|
||||
[RC_619_HEAD_A, APPROVE_619_HEAD_B],
|
||||
ready_pr=619,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
ready_action="approve",
|
||||
)
|
||||
summary = srdl.lock_summary(lock)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(summary["live_mutations_count"], 2)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(summary["last_terminal"]["head_sha"], HEAD_B)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(summary["locked_head_sha"], HEAD_B)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,345 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Tests for observability incident bridge (#612) on #613 substrate."""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
|
||||
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, InvalidWorkKindError, WORK_KINDS
|
||||
from incident_bridge import (
|
||||
OUTCOME_BLOCKED,
|
||||
OUTCOME_CREATED,
|
||||
OUTCOME_LINKED,
|
||||
OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
|
||||
OUTCOME_UPDATED,
|
||||
ProjectMapping,
|
||||
assert_not_raw_incident_work_item,
|
||||
build_gitea_issue_body,
|
||||
load_project_mappings,
|
||||
normalize_incident,
|
||||
project_mapping_from_dict,
|
||||
reconcile_incident,
|
||||
redact_text,
|
||||
sanitize_tags,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _mapping(**kwargs) -> ProjectMapping:
|
||||
base = dict(
|
||||
name="gitea-tools-mcp",
|
||||
provider="sentry",
|
||||
monitor_base_url="https://sentry.prgs.cc",
|
||||
monitor_org="prgs",
|
||||
monitor_project="gitea-tools-mcp",
|
||||
gitea_org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
gitea_repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
default_labels=("type:bug", "observability", "sentry", "status:ready"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
base.update(kwargs)
|
||||
return ProjectMapping(**base)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _obs(**kwargs) -> dict:
|
||||
base = dict(
|
||||
provider="sentry",
|
||||
provider_base_url="https://sentry.prgs.cc",
|
||||
provider_org="prgs",
|
||||
provider_project="gitea-tools-mcp",
|
||||
provider_issue_id="ISSUE-100",
|
||||
provider_short_id="GITEA-TOOLS-1A",
|
||||
provider_permalink="https://sentry.prgs.cc/organizations/prgs/issues/100/",
|
||||
fingerprint="fp-abc",
|
||||
title="TypeError: boom",
|
||||
summary="TypeError: boom in handle_request",
|
||||
first_seen="2026-07-01T00:00:00Z",
|
||||
last_seen="2026-07-10T00:00:00Z",
|
||||
event_count=3,
|
||||
environment="production",
|
||||
severity="error",
|
||||
culprit="handle_request",
|
||||
tags={"runtime": "python", "release": "1.2.3"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
base.update(kwargs)
|
||||
return base
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class IncidentBridgeTest(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
|
||||
self.mapping = _mapping()
|
||||
self.created: list[dict] = []
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
def _create_issue(self, title, body, labels, g_org, g_repo):
|
||||
n = 9000 + len(self.created)
|
||||
rec = {
|
||||
"number": n,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"performed": True,
|
||||
"title": title,
|
||||
"body": body,
|
||||
"labels": labels,
|
||||
"org": g_org,
|
||||
"repo": g_repo,
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.created.append(rec)
|
||||
return rec
|
||||
|
||||
def test_redact_secrets(self) -> None:
|
||||
dirty = "token=supersecret123 Authorization: Bearer abcdefghijklmnop"
|
||||
clean = redact_text(dirty)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("supersecret", clean)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("abcdefghijklmnop", clean)
|
||||
self.assertIn("[REDACTED]", clean)
|
||||
tags = sanitize_tags(
|
||||
{"token": "x", "runtime": "py", "password": "nope", "release": "1.0"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(tags, {"runtime": "py", "release": "1.0"})
|
||||
|
||||
def test_body_contains_no_secrets(self) -> None:
|
||||
inc = normalize_incident(
|
||||
_obs(
|
||||
summary="fail password=hunter2 token: abc",
|
||||
tags={"cookie": "sid=1", "runtime": "py"},
|
||||
),
|
||||
self.mapping,
|
||||
)
|
||||
body = build_gitea_issue_body(inc)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("hunter2", body)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("sid=1", body)
|
||||
self.assertIn("provider_issue_id", body)
|
||||
self.assertIn("not** assignable", body.lower())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_preview_no_mutation(self) -> None:
|
||||
res = reconcile_incident(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
observation=_obs(),
|
||||
mapping=self.mapping,
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
create_issue_fn=self._create_issue,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_PREVIEW)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["gitea_mutated"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["db_mutated"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["raw_incident_assignable"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(self.created), 0)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(
|
||||
self.db.get_incident_link_by_provider(
|
||||
provider="sentry",
|
||||
provider_issue_id="ISSUE-100",
|
||||
provider_base_url="https://sentry.prgs.cc",
|
||||
provider_org="prgs",
|
||||
provider_project="gitea-tools-mcp",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_apply_creates_issue_and_link(self) -> None:
|
||||
res = reconcile_incident(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
observation=_obs(),
|
||||
mapping=self.mapping,
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
create_issue_fn=self._create_issue,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_CREATED)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["gitea_mutated"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["db_mutated"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(self.created), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["gitea_issue"]["number"], self.created[0]["number"])
|
||||
link = self.db.get_incident_link_by_provider(
|
||||
provider="sentry",
|
||||
provider_issue_id="ISSUE-100",
|
||||
provider_base_url="https://sentry.prgs.cc",
|
||||
provider_org="prgs",
|
||||
provider_project="gitea-tools-mcp",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(link)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(int(link["gitea_issue_number"]), self.created[0]["number"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["allocator_visible_as"]["kind"], "issue")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_duplicate_observation_reuses_issue(self) -> None:
|
||||
first = reconcile_incident(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
observation=_obs(),
|
||||
mapping=self.mapping,
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
create_issue_fn=self._create_issue,
|
||||
)
|
||||
second = reconcile_incident(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
observation=_obs(event_count=9, last_seen="2026-07-11T00:00:00Z"),
|
||||
mapping=self.mapping,
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
create_issue_fn=self._create_issue,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], OUTCOME_CREATED)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(second["outcome"], OUTCOME_UPDATED)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(self.created), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
second["gitea_issue"]["number"], first["gitea_issue"]["number"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
link = self.db.get_incident_link_by_provider(
|
||||
provider="sentry",
|
||||
provider_issue_id="ISSUE-100",
|
||||
provider_base_url="https://sentry.prgs.cc",
|
||||
provider_org="prgs",
|
||||
provider_project="gitea-tools-mcp",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(int(link["event_count"]), 9)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_explicit_link_existing_issue(self) -> None:
|
||||
res = reconcile_incident(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
observation=_obs(provider_issue_id="ISSUE-200"),
|
||||
mapping=self.mapping,
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
force_gitea_issue_number=555,
|
||||
create_issue_fn=self._create_issue,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_LINKED)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(self.created), 0)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["gitea_issue"]["number"], 555)
|
||||
link = self.db.get_incident_link_for_gitea_issue(
|
||||
gitea_org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
gitea_repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
gitea_issue_number=555,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(link)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_fingerprint_conflict_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
reconcile_incident(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
observation=_obs(fingerprint="fp-a"),
|
||||
mapping=self.mapping,
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
create_issue_fn=self._create_issue,
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = reconcile_incident(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
observation=_obs(fingerprint="fp-b"),
|
||||
mapping=self.mapping,
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
create_issue_fn=self._create_issue,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_BLOCKED)
|
||||
self.assertIn("fingerprint conflict", res["reasons"][0].lower())
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(self.created), 1)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_ambiguous_mapping_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
maps = [
|
||||
_mapping(name="a", monitor_project="gitea-tools-mcp"),
|
||||
_mapping(name="b", monitor_project="gitea-tools-mcp"),
|
||||
]
|
||||
res = reconcile_incident(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
observation=_obs(),
|
||||
mappings=maps,
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_BLOCKED)
|
||||
self.assertIn("ambiguous", res["reasons"][0].lower())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_missing_provider_issue_id_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
res = reconcile_incident(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
observation=_obs(provider_issue_id=""),
|
||||
mapping=self.mapping,
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_BLOCKED)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_raw_incident_not_work_kind(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("sentry_incident", WORK_KINDS)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(InvalidWorkKindError):
|
||||
self.db.upsert_work_item(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="o",
|
||||
repo="r",
|
||||
kind="sentry_incident",
|
||||
number=1,
|
||||
)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(Exception):
|
||||
assert_not_raw_incident_work_item("glitchtip_incident")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_db_unavailable(self) -> None:
|
||||
res = reconcile_incident(
|
||||
None,
|
||||
observation=_obs(),
|
||||
mapping=self.mapping,
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
create_issue_fn=self._create_issue,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_BLOCKED)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_structured_skip_reason_environment(self) -> None:
|
||||
m = _mapping(environment_filters=("staging",))
|
||||
res = reconcile_incident(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
observation=_obs(environment="production"),
|
||||
mapping=m,
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
create_issue_fn=self._create_issue,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["action"], "skip_environment_filter")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(self.created), 0)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_load_mappings_json(self) -> None:
|
||||
payload = json.dumps(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"projects": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "gt",
|
||||
"provider": "glitchtip",
|
||||
"monitor_base_url": "https://glitchtip.example",
|
||||
"monitor_org": "org",
|
||||
"monitor_project": "proj",
|
||||
"gitea_org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
"gitea_repo": "Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
maps = load_project_mappings(mappings_json=payload)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(maps), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(maps[0].provider, "glitchtip")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_glitchtip_provider_accepted(self) -> None:
|
||||
m = _mapping(provider="glitchtip", monitor_base_url="https://glitchtip.example")
|
||||
res = reconcile_incident(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
observation=_obs(
|
||||
provider="glitchtip",
|
||||
provider_base_url="https://glitchtip.example",
|
||||
),
|
||||
mapping=m,
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
create_issue_fn=self._create_issue,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_CREATED)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["incident"]["provider"], "glitchtip")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_allocator_only_sees_issue_kind(self) -> None:
|
||||
res = reconcile_incident(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
observation=_obs(),
|
||||
mapping=self.mapping,
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
create_issue_fn=self._create_issue,
|
||||
)
|
||||
vis = res["allocator_visible_as"]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(vis["kind"], "issue")
|
||||
self.assertIn(vis["kind"], WORK_KINDS)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["raw_incident_assignable"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -25,11 +25,7 @@ import gitea_mcp_server as srv # noqa: E402
|
||||
import root_checkout_guard as rcg # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
FAKE_AUTH = "token test"
|
||||
current_file_path = Path(__file__).resolve()
|
||||
if "branches" in current_file_path.parts:
|
||||
CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT = str(current_file_path.parents[3])
|
||||
else:
|
||||
CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT = str(current_file_path.parents[1])
|
||||
CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3])
|
||||
MASTER_SHA = "a" * 40
|
||||
OTHER_SHA = "b" * 40
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -267,19 +263,10 @@ class TestReconcilerCommentThroughCanonicalPath(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=False):
|
||||
os.environ.pop("GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE", None)
|
||||
os.environ.pop("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", None)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
|
||||
srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
|
||||
515, "author note", remote="prgs"
|
||||
)
|
||||
except RuntimeError:
|
||||
pass # legacy raise path
|
||||
else:
|
||||
# #683: typed blocker at mutation entrypoint
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("performed"))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
res.get("blocker_kind") or res.get("reasons")
|
||||
)
|
||||
mock_api.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,472 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""#683: block unattributed root WIP; pytest cannot disable production guards.
|
||||
|
||||
Regression coverage required by issue #683:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Session locked to issue A blocks unrelated target issue B until B is selected.
|
||||
2. Diagnostic source edit on the root checkout is blocked.
|
||||
3. Same legitimate edit succeeds after issue ownership + isolated worktree bind.
|
||||
4. Running under pytest does not deactivate production guards when force-on.
|
||||
5. Dirty tracked Python files remain visible to porcelain consumers.
|
||||
6. Monkeypatching one helper cannot silently turn the full guard path into a no-op.
|
||||
7. Real mutation entrypoint proves production guards run before side effects.
|
||||
8. Same-issue edits in a valid isolated worktree remain unaffected.
|
||||
9. Blocker includes stable reason + exact recovery action.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import textwrap
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
|
||||
import gitea_mcp_server as mcp_server # noqa: E402
|
||||
import issue_lock_worktree # noqa: E402
|
||||
import workflow_scope_guard as wsg # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
CONTROL_ROOT = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)
|
||||
if "branches" in Path(__file__).resolve().parts:
|
||||
# Running from a worktree under branches/ — parent of branches is control.
|
||||
parts = Path(__file__).resolve().parts
|
||||
idx = parts.index("branches")
|
||||
CONTROL_ROOT = str(Path(*parts[:idx])) if idx > 0 else CONTROL_ROOT
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestProductionGuardsForceOn(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
for key in (
|
||||
wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV,
|
||||
"GITEA_TEST_FORCE_DIRTY",
|
||||
"GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN",
|
||||
"GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE",
|
||||
"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE",
|
||||
):
|
||||
os.environ.pop(key, None)
|
||||
wsg.clear_workflow_failure_ledger()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_force_on_under_pytest_keeps_production_active(self):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(wsg.production_guards_active(in_test_mode=False))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(wsg.production_guards_active(in_test_mode=True))
|
||||
os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
self.assertTrue(wsg.production_guards_active(in_test_mode=True))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(wsg.production_guards_forced())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_early_return_in_verify_role_mutation_workspace_source(self):
|
||||
src = Path(mcp_server.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
# Rejected 300a4ca pattern must not exist.
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(
|
||||
"if _preflight_in_test_mode():\n return _resolve_preflight_workspace_path",
|
||||
src,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Docstring contract for #683.
|
||||
self.assertIn("#683", src)
|
||||
self.assertIn("must NOT early-return solely because pytest", src)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestPorcelainIntegrity(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_read_worktree_git_state_surfaces_dirty_py(self):
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||
# Use a real git repo so porcelain is truthful.
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
|
||||
subprocess.run(["git", "init"], cwd=tmp, check=True, capture_output=True)
|
||||
subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "config", "user.email", "[email protected]"],
|
||||
cwd=tmp,
|
||||
check=True,
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "config", "user.name", "t"],
|
||||
cwd=tmp,
|
||||
check=True,
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
py_path = Path(tmp) / "sample_mod.py"
|
||||
py_path.write_text("x = 1\n", encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
subprocess.run(["git", "add", "sample_mod.py"], cwd=tmp, check=True)
|
||||
subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "commit", "-m", "init"],
|
||||
cwd=tmp,
|
||||
check=True,
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
py_path.write_text("x = 2\n", encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
state = issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state(tmp)
|
||||
porcelain = state.get("porcelain_status") or ""
|
||||
self.assertIn("sample_mod.py", porcelain)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any(line.strip().endswith(".py") for line in porcelain.splitlines()))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_production_reader_source_rejects_pytest_py_filter(self):
|
||||
src = Path(issue_lock_worktree.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
findings = wsg.assert_no_pytest_porcelain_filter(src)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(findings, [])
|
||||
# Negative: the rejected 300a4ca pattern is detected.
|
||||
rejected = textwrap.dedent(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
porcelain = status_res.stdout or ""
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
if "pytest" in sys.modules or "unittest" in sys.modules:
|
||||
porcelain = "\\n".join(
|
||||
line for line in porcelain.splitlines()
|
||||
if not line.strip().endswith(".py")
|
||||
)
|
||||
"""
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(wsg.assert_no_pytest_porcelain_filter(rejected))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssueScopeOwnership(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_out_of_scope_issue_blocked_until_selected(self):
|
||||
result = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
|
||||
locked_issue_number=100,
|
||||
target_issue_number=200,
|
||||
branch_name="fix/issue-100-example",
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["block"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE)
|
||||
self.assertIn("exact_next_action", result)
|
||||
self.assertIn("owning issue", result["exact_next_action"].lower())
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_same_issue_scope_allowed(self):
|
||||
result = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
|
||||
locked_issue_number=100,
|
||||
target_issue_number=100,
|
||||
branch_name="fix/issue-100-example",
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["block"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["exact_next_action"], "proceed")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_missing_lock_when_required(self):
|
||||
result = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
|
||||
locked_issue_number=None,
|
||||
target_issue_number=None,
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
require_lock_for_author=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["block"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_branch_issue_mismatch(self):
|
||||
result = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
|
||||
locked_issue_number=50,
|
||||
branch_name="fix/issue-99-other",
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["block"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestRootDiagnosticEdit(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_dirty_root_source_blocked(self):
|
||||
result = wsg.assess_root_source_mutation(
|
||||
workspace_path=CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
porcelain_status=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n M tests/test_x.py\n",
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["block"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT)
|
||||
self.assertIn("gitea_mcp_server.py", result["dirty_source_files"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("exact_next_action", result)
|
||||
self.assertIn("branches/", result["exact_next_action"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_isolated_worktree_same_issue_unaffected(self):
|
||||
wt = f"{CONTROL_ROOT}/branches/issue-100-example"
|
||||
result = wsg.assess_root_source_mutation(
|
||||
workspace_path=wt,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
porcelain_status=" M helper.py\n",
|
||||
current_branch="fix/issue-100-example",
|
||||
locked_issue_number=100,
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["block"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["under_branches"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_legitimate_after_ownership_and_worktree(self):
|
||||
wt = f"{CONTROL_ROOT}/branches/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening"
|
||||
composed = wsg.assess_production_mutation_guards(
|
||||
workspace_path=wt,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
porcelain_status=" M workflow_scope_guard.py\n",
|
||||
current_branch="fix/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening",
|
||||
locked_issue_number=683,
|
||||
target_issue_number=683,
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
require_author_lock=True,
|
||||
in_test_mode=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Force-on required for production path under pytest.
|
||||
os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
try:
|
||||
composed = wsg.assess_production_mutation_guards(
|
||||
workspace_path=wt,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
porcelain_status=" M workflow_scope_guard.py\n",
|
||||
current_branch="fix/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening",
|
||||
locked_issue_number=683,
|
||||
target_issue_number=683,
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
require_author_lock=True,
|
||||
in_test_mode=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(composed["block"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(composed.get("skipped"))
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
os.environ.pop(wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV, None)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestTypedBlockerResponse(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_block_response_has_stable_kind_and_next_action(self):
|
||||
assessment = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
|
||||
locked_issue_number=1,
|
||||
target_issue_number=2,
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
)
|
||||
resp = wsg.block_response(assessment)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(resp["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(resp["performed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(resp["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE)
|
||||
self.assertIsInstance(resp["exact_next_action"], str)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(resp["exact_next_action"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(resp["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_production_guard_error_roundtrip(self):
|
||||
err = wsg.ProductionGuardError(
|
||||
"blocked",
|
||||
blocker_kind=wsg.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT,
|
||||
reasons=["dirty root"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
resp = wsg.block_response(err, issue_number=683)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(resp["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(resp["issue_number"], 683)
|
||||
self.assertIn("exact_next_action", resp)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestDurableFailureRecording(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
wsg.clear_workflow_failure_ledger()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
wsg.clear_workflow_failure_ledger()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_record_before_source_mutation(self):
|
||||
pending = wsg.assess_durable_failure_recorded(
|
||||
require_record=True, pending_source_mutation=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(pending["block"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(pending["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_UNRECORDED_FAILURE)
|
||||
|
||||
wsg.record_workflow_failure(
|
||||
kind="transport_eof",
|
||||
detail="EOF during review session (#584 cluster)",
|
||||
issue_number=683,
|
||||
task="comment_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
after = wsg.assess_durable_failure_recorded(
|
||||
require_record=True, pending_source_mutation=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(after["block"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(wsg.workflow_failure_ledger()), 1)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestMonkeypatchCannotNoopFullPath(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
os.environ.pop(wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV, None)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_patching_branches_only_still_blocks_dirty_root_scope(self):
|
||||
"""Monkeypatching branches-only must not silence root diagnostic block."""
|
||||
os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "_enforce_branches_only_author_mutation", lambda *a, **k: None
|
||||
):
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard", lambda *a, **k: None
|
||||
):
|
||||
# Even if both legacy helpers are patched, issue-scope composition
|
||||
# still sees dirty root source via assess_production_mutation_guards.
|
||||
assessment = wsg.assess_production_mutation_guards(
|
||||
workspace_path=CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
porcelain_status=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n",
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
in_test_mode=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
assessment["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestRealEntrypointProductionGuard(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Real mutation entrypoint: production guard before side effects (#683)."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
for key in ("GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE", "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"):
|
||||
os.environ.pop(key, None)
|
||||
self._orig_whoami = mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called
|
||||
self._orig_cap = mcp_server._preflight_capability_called
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = False
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = False
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_resolved_role = None
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_resolved_task = None
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
os.environ.pop(wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV, None)
|
||||
for key in ("GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE", "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"):
|
||||
os.environ.pop(key, None)
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = self._orig_whoami
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = self._orig_cap
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_resolved_role = None
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_resolved_task = None
|
||||
|
||||
def test_comment_issue_blocks_dirty_root_before_api(self):
|
||||
api_mock = MagicMock()
|
||||
with patch.object(mcp_server, "api_request", api_mock), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"_actual_profile_role",
|
||||
return_value="author",
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"_effective_workspace_role",
|
||||
return_value="author",
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"get_profile",
|
||||
return_value={
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-author",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
issue_lock_worktree,
|
||||
"read_worktree_git_state",
|
||||
side_effect=lambda path, **kw: {
|
||||
"current_branch": "master",
|
||||
"porcelain_status": (
|
||||
" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n"
|
||||
if os.path.realpath(path) == os.path.realpath(CONTROL_ROOT)
|
||||
or path == CONTROL_ROOT
|
||||
else ""
|
||||
),
|
||||
"head_sha": "a" * 40,
|
||||
"base_equivalent": True,
|
||||
},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"_resolve_namespace_mutation_context",
|
||||
return_value={
|
||||
"workspace_path": CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
"process_project_root": CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
"workspace_role_kind": "author",
|
||||
"workspace_binding_source": "process root",
|
||||
"ignored_bindings": [],
|
||||
},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"_resolve_author_mutation_context",
|
||||
return_value={
|
||||
"workspace_path": CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
"process_project_root": CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
"roots_aligned": True,
|
||||
},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"_session_locked_issue_number",
|
||||
return_value=None,
|
||||
):
|
||||
result = mcp_server.gitea_create_issue_comment(
|
||||
issue_number=683,
|
||||
body="diagnostic note",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
worktree_path=CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
api_mock.assert_not_called()
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result.get("success"))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result.get("performed"))
|
||||
self.assertIn(result.get("blocker_kind"), wsg.BLOCKER_KINDS)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result.get("exact_next_action"))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result.get("reasons"))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_comment_issue_succeeds_structure_after_worktree_bind(self):
|
||||
"""Same-issue isolated worktree is not blocked by root diagnostic path."""
|
||||
wt = f"{CONTROL_ROOT}/branches/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening"
|
||||
os.environ["GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE"] = wt
|
||||
assessment = wsg.assess_production_mutation_guards(
|
||||
workspace_path=wt,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
|
||||
porcelain_status=" M workflow_scope_guard.py\n",
|
||||
current_branch="fix/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening",
|
||||
locked_issue_number=683,
|
||||
target_issue_number=683,
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
require_author_lock=True,
|
||||
in_test_mode=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(assessment["block"], assessment)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestVerifyPreflightForceOn(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
os.environ.pop(wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV, None)
|
||||
for key in ("GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE", "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"):
|
||||
os.environ.pop(key, None)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_force_on_runs_production_guards_under_pytest(self):
|
||||
os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
called = {"root": 0, "branches": 0, "scope": 0}
|
||||
|
||||
def _root(*a, **k):
|
||||
called["root"] += 1
|
||||
|
||||
def _branches(*a, **k):
|
||||
called["branches"] += 1
|
||||
|
||||
def _scope(*a, **k):
|
||||
called["scope"] += 1
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard", _root), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "_enforce_branches_only_author_mutation", _branches
|
||||
), patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_issue_scope_guard", _scope):
|
||||
# No whoami/capability — purity-order skipped; production still runs.
|
||||
mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="comment_issue")
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertEqual(called["root"], 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(called["branches"], 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(called["scope"], 1)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_without_force_on_pytest_skips_production_only_for_unit_isolation(self):
|
||||
called = {"root": 0}
|
||||
|
||||
def _root(*a, **k):
|
||||
called["root"] += 1
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard", _root), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "_enforce_branches_only_author_mutation", lambda *a, **k: None
|
||||
), patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_issue_scope_guard", lambda *a, **k: None):
|
||||
mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="comment_issue")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(called["root"], 0)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,430 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""#685: gitea_resolve_task_capability must be side-effect free.
|
||||
|
||||
Stale-runtime detection remains fail-closed, but the resolver must never:
|
||||
* touch mcp_config.json (or any MCP client config)
|
||||
* spawn recovery threads
|
||||
* call os._exit / terminate the serving process
|
||||
* claim that an auto-restart was triggered
|
||||
|
||||
Recovery is owned by the IDE/client reconnect path only.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import threading
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from datetime import datetime
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
|
||||
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)
|
||||
if ROOT not in sys.path:
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, ROOT)
|
||||
|
||||
import gitea_mcp_server as mcp_server
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
ROLE_PROFILES = (
|
||||
("create_issue", "prgs-author", "author"),
|
||||
("review_pr", "prgs-reviewer", "reviewer"),
|
||||
("merge_pr", "prgs-merger", "merger"),
|
||||
("reconciliation_cleanup", "prgs-reconciler", "reconciler"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _stale_self_ps_mocks(profile: str = "prgs-author"):
|
||||
"""Build subprocess mocks: self PID is stale vs code mtime."""
|
||||
mock_getpid = MagicMock(return_value=12345)
|
||||
mock_exists = MagicMock(return_value=True)
|
||||
code_time = datetime(2026, 7, 8, 14, 0, 0)
|
||||
mock_getmtime = MagicMock(return_value=code_time.timestamp())
|
||||
|
||||
ps_output = (
|
||||
" PID LSTART COMMAND\n"
|
||||
"12345 Wed Jul 8 13:00:00 2026 /path/to/python mcp_server.py\n"
|
||||
)
|
||||
mock_run_ps = MagicMock()
|
||||
mock_run_ps.stdout = ps_output
|
||||
|
||||
mock_run_env = MagicMock()
|
||||
mock_run_env.stdout = f"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE={profile}"
|
||||
|
||||
mock_run_git = MagicMock()
|
||||
mock_run_git.stdout = "SAME"
|
||||
|
||||
def side_effect(args, **kwargs):
|
||||
if args[0] == "ps" and "eww" in args:
|
||||
return mock_run_env
|
||||
if args[0] == "ps":
|
||||
return mock_run_ps
|
||||
if args[0] == "git":
|
||||
return mock_run_git
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"Unexpected subprocess args: {args}")
|
||||
|
||||
mock_run = MagicMock(side_effect=side_effect)
|
||||
return mock_getpid, mock_exists, mock_getmtime, mock_run
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssue685DiagnosticsNoSideEffects(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
mcp_server._process_boot_head_sha = None
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
mcp_server._process_boot_head_sha = None
|
||||
|
||||
@patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_FORCE_MCP_RUNTIME_CHECK": "1"}, clear=False)
|
||||
@patch("subprocess.run")
|
||||
@patch("os.path.getmtime")
|
||||
@patch("os.path.exists")
|
||||
@patch("os.getpid")
|
||||
@patch("os.utime")
|
||||
@patch("threading.Thread")
|
||||
@patch("os._exit")
|
||||
def test_stale_self_does_not_touch_config_or_exit(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
mock_exit,
|
||||
mock_thread,
|
||||
mock_utime,
|
||||
mock_getpid,
|
||||
mock_exists,
|
||||
mock_getmtime,
|
||||
mock_run,
|
||||
):
|
||||
mock_getpid.return_value = 12345
|
||||
mock_exists.return_value = True
|
||||
mock_getmtime.return_value = datetime(2026, 7, 8, 14, 0, 0).timestamp()
|
||||
mock_run.side_effect = _stale_self_ps_mocks("prgs-author")[3].side_effect
|
||||
|
||||
before_threads = threading.active_count()
|
||||
reasons = mcp_server._check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics(
|
||||
"create_issue", ["prgs-author"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
after_threads = threading.active_count()
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("stale-runtime" in r and "active Gitea MCP server process is stale" in r
|
||||
for r in reasons),
|
||||
reasons,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Must not claim auto-restart / config touch
|
||||
blob = " ".join(reasons)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("Auto-restart has been triggered", blob)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("touched mcp_config", blob)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("will cleanly exit", blob)
|
||||
|
||||
mock_utime.assert_not_called()
|
||||
mock_thread.assert_not_called()
|
||||
mock_exit.assert_not_called()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(before_threads, after_threads)
|
||||
|
||||
@patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_FORCE_MCP_RUNTIME_CHECK": "1"}, clear=False)
|
||||
@patch("subprocess.run")
|
||||
@patch("os.path.getmtime")
|
||||
@patch("os.path.exists")
|
||||
@patch("os.getpid")
|
||||
@patch("os.utime")
|
||||
def test_repeated_stale_calls_do_not_trigger_restart_loop(
|
||||
self, mock_utime, mock_getpid, mock_exists, mock_getmtime, mock_run
|
||||
):
|
||||
mock_getpid.return_value = 12345
|
||||
mock_exists.return_value = True
|
||||
mock_getmtime.return_value = datetime(2026, 7, 8, 14, 0, 0).timestamp()
|
||||
mock_run.side_effect = _stale_self_ps_mocks("prgs-author")[3].side_effect
|
||||
|
||||
for _ in range(5):
|
||||
reasons = mcp_server._check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics(
|
||||
"create_issue", ["prgs-author"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("stale-runtime" in r for r in reasons))
|
||||
|
||||
mock_utime.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_trigger_mcp_auto_restart_removed(self):
|
||||
"""#685 AC: auto-restart helper is removed (unreachable from read-only)."""
|
||||
self.assertFalse(hasattr(mcp_server, "_trigger_mcp_auto_restart"))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(hasattr(mcp_server, "_restart_triggered"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssue685ResolverTypedBlocker(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
mcp_server._process_boot_head_sha = None
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
mcp_server._process_boot_head_sha = None
|
||||
if hasattr(mcp_server, "capability_stop_terminal"):
|
||||
mcp_server.capability_stop_terminal.clear()
|
||||
|
||||
def _resolve_with_stale_runtime(self, task: str, profile_name: str, role: str):
|
||||
allowed = [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.close",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.request_changes",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.close",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
]
|
||||
profile = {
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"role": role,
|
||||
"allowed_operations": allowed,
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
config = {
|
||||
"profiles": {
|
||||
profile_name: {
|
||||
"role": role,
|
||||
"allowed_operations": allowed,
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
mock_getpid, mock_exists, mock_getmtime, mock_run = _stale_self_ps_mocks(
|
||||
profile_name
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ,
|
||||
{
|
||||
"GITEA_FORCE_MCP_RUNTIME_CHECK": "1",
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile_name,
|
||||
},
|
||||
clear=False,
|
||||
), patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_config, "load_config", return_value=config
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="test-user"
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "_ensure_matching_profile", return_value=None
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "record_preflight_check", return_value=None
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "record_mutation_authority", return_value=None
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "init_review_decision_lock", return_value=None
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"subprocess.run", mock_run
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"os.path.getmtime", mock_getmtime
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"os.path.exists", mock_exists
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"os.getpid", mock_getpid
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"os.utime"
|
||||
) as mock_utime, patch(
|
||||
"threading.Thread"
|
||||
) as mock_thread, patch(
|
||||
"os._exit"
|
||||
) as mock_exit:
|
||||
result = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task=task, remote="prgs")
|
||||
return result, mock_utime, mock_thread, mock_exit
|
||||
|
||||
def test_stale_returns_typed_blocker_fields(self):
|
||||
result, mock_utime, mock_thread, mock_exit = self._resolve_with_stale_runtime(
|
||||
"create_issue", "prgs-author", "author"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result.get("restart_required"), result)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result.get("stop_required"), result)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.get("blocker_kind"), "runtime_reconnect_required")
|
||||
self.assertIs(result.get("mutation_performed"), False)
|
||||
action = result.get("exact_safe_next_action") or ""
|
||||
self.assertIn("reconnect", action.lower())
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("None; ready for operations", action)
|
||||
reason = result.get("reason") or ""
|
||||
self.assertIn("stale-runtime", reason)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("Auto-restart has been triggered", reason)
|
||||
mock_utime.assert_not_called()
|
||||
mock_thread.assert_not_called()
|
||||
mock_exit.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_all_four_role_profiles_get_same_side_effect_free_contract(self):
|
||||
for task, profile, role in ROLE_PROFILES:
|
||||
with self.subTest(task=task, profile=profile):
|
||||
# Skip tasks that may be unknown on this branch
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import task_capability_map as tcm
|
||||
|
||||
tcm.required_permission(task)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
self.skipTest(f"task {task} not in capability map")
|
||||
|
||||
result, mock_utime, mock_thread, mock_exit = (
|
||||
self._resolve_with_stale_runtime(task, profile, role)
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
result.get("restart_required") or result.get("stop_required"),
|
||||
result,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
result.get("blocker_kind"), "runtime_reconnect_required", result
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIs(result.get("mutation_performed"), False, result)
|
||||
mock_utime.assert_not_called()
|
||||
mock_thread.assert_not_called()
|
||||
mock_exit.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_config_mtime_and_contents_unchanged(self):
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||
cfg = os.path.join(tmp, "mcp_config.json")
|
||||
original = '{"servers": {"gitea-author": {}}}'
|
||||
with open(cfg, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
fh.write(original)
|
||||
mtime_before = os.path.getmtime(cfg)
|
||||
|
||||
result, mock_utime, mock_thread, mock_exit = self._resolve_with_stale_runtime(
|
||||
"create_issue", "prgs-author", "author"
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Force-path also must not use real utime when diagnostics runs
|
||||
with open(cfg, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
after = fh.read()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(after, original)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(os.path.getmtime(cfg), mtime_before)
|
||||
mock_utime.assert_not_called()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result.get("restart_required"), result)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssue685MutationGatesStillFailClosed(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_parity_stale_still_reports_restart_required(self):
|
||||
"""Mutation-facing parity gate remains fail-closed when heads differ."""
|
||||
import master_parity_gate as mpg
|
||||
|
||||
out = mpg.assess_master_parity(
|
||||
{"startup_head": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"},
|
||||
"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(out.get("in_parity"))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(out.get("restart_required") or out.get("stale"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssue685DocstringReadOnlyContract(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_resolve_docstring_declares_side_effect_free(self):
|
||||
doc = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability.__doc__ or ""
|
||||
lower = doc.lower()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
"side-effect" in lower or "read-only" in lower or "does not mutate" in lower,
|
||||
doc,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("auto-restart", lower)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("os._exit", lower)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssue685MergeCoexistenceWithMasterAnnotations(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""After merging master: #685 reconnect blocker + #702 report-only binding."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
mcp_server._process_boot_head_sha = None
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
mcp_server._process_boot_head_sha = None
|
||||
if hasattr(mcp_server, "capability_stop_terminal"):
|
||||
mcp_server.capability_stop_terminal.clear()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_resolve_uses_report_only_stale_binding_assessment(self):
|
||||
"""Capability resolve must call stale-binding assess with auto_recover=False."""
|
||||
allowed = [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
]
|
||||
profile = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-author",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": allowed,
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
config = {
|
||||
"profiles": {
|
||||
"prgs-author": {
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": allowed,
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
mock_getpid, mock_exists, mock_getmtime, mock_run = _stale_self_ps_mocks(
|
||||
"prgs-author"
|
||||
)
|
||||
fake_binding = {
|
||||
"classification": "missing_path",
|
||||
"active_worktree": "/tmp/gone",
|
||||
"reasons": ["path missing"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ,
|
||||
{
|
||||
"GITEA_FORCE_MCP_RUNTIME_CHECK": "1",
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
clear=False,
|
||||
), patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_config, "load_config", return_value=config
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="test-user"
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "_ensure_matching_profile", return_value=None
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "record_preflight_check", return_value=None
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "record_mutation_authority", return_value=None
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "init_review_decision_lock", return_value=None
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"_assess_stale_active_binding",
|
||||
return_value=fake_binding,
|
||||
) as mock_assess, patch(
|
||||
"subprocess.run", mock_run
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"os.path.getmtime", mock_getmtime
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"os.path.exists", mock_exists
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"os.getpid", mock_getpid
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"os.utime"
|
||||
) as mock_utime, patch(
|
||||
"threading.Thread"
|
||||
) as mock_thread, patch(
|
||||
"os._exit"
|
||||
) as mock_exit:
|
||||
result = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="create_issue", remote="prgs"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
mock_assess.assert_called()
|
||||
# Every call must be report-only (no env clear / session-state write).
|
||||
for call in mock_assess.call_args_list:
|
||||
self.assertFalse(call.kwargs.get("auto_recover", True))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
result.get("blocker_kind"), "runtime_reconnect_required", result
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.get("stale_binding_recovery"), fake_binding, result)
|
||||
self.assertIs(result.get("mutation_performed"), False, result)
|
||||
mock_utime.assert_not_called()
|
||||
mock_thread.assert_not_called()
|
||||
mock_exit.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,616 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Guarded cleanup for obsolete comment-backed reviewer leases (#691).
|
||||
|
||||
Reproduces PR #688 lease comment 10749 class of defect: completed
|
||||
REQUEST_CHANGES on head A, author pushes head B, foreign lease remains
|
||||
pinned to A (and after expiry still has no non-owner cleanup path that
|
||||
diagnosis can prescribe beyond indefinite wait).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
|
||||
import merger_lease_adoption as mla # noqa: E402
|
||||
import reviewer_pr_lease as leases # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
# PR #688 / comment 10749 reproduction fixtures
|
||||
HEAD_A = "c7a444eb4b41cf916fdbd20a4999ffd78af496d0"
|
||||
HEAD_B = "4a6357800364718a27a36ebc73578d4b929ff4aa"
|
||||
SESSION_FOREIGN = "25883-7d4c6e6ebd53"
|
||||
COMMENT_10749 = 10749
|
||||
REPO = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
PR = 688
|
||||
ISSUE = 687
|
||||
EXPIRES_10749 = "2026-07-13T04:23:00Z"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _utc(dt: datetime) -> datetime:
|
||||
return dt if dt.tzinfo else dt.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _lease_comment(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int = PR,
|
||||
session_id: str = SESSION_FOREIGN,
|
||||
phase: str = "claimed",
|
||||
candidate_head: str = HEAD_A,
|
||||
comment_id: int = COMMENT_10749,
|
||||
last_activity: datetime | None = None,
|
||||
expires_at: datetime | None = None,
|
||||
worktree: str = "branches/review-pr688-feat-issue-687-reconciler-branch-delete",
|
||||
repo: str = REPO,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
now = last_activity or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
body = leases.format_lease_body(
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
pr_number=pr_number,
|
||||
issue_number=ISSUE,
|
||||
reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
|
||||
profile="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
session_id=session_id,
|
||||
worktree=worktree,
|
||||
phase=phase,
|
||||
candidate_head=candidate_head,
|
||||
target_branch="master",
|
||||
target_branch_sha="b" * 40,
|
||||
last_activity=now,
|
||||
expires_at=expires_at,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"id": comment_id,
|
||||
"body": body,
|
||||
"user": {"login": "sysadmin"},
|
||||
"author": "sysadmin",
|
||||
"created_at": now.isoformat(),
|
||||
"updated_at": now.isoformat(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _reviews_for_head(head: str, verdict: str = "REQUEST_CHANGES") -> list[dict]:
|
||||
return [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"verdict": verdict,
|
||||
"reviewed_head_sha": head,
|
||||
"dismissed": False,
|
||||
"reviewer": "sysadmin",
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _assess(
|
||||
comments,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
current_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
formal_reviews=None,
|
||||
controller=True,
|
||||
worktree_exists=True,
|
||||
worktree_clean=True,
|
||||
owner_process_alive=False,
|
||||
requesting_session="fresh-controller",
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
confirmation=None,
|
||||
**kwargs,
|
||||
):
|
||||
return leases.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
|
||||
comments,
|
||||
pr_number=PR,
|
||||
current_head_sha=current_head,
|
||||
formal_reviews=formal_reviews if formal_reviews is not None else _reviews_for_head(HEAD_A),
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
expected_repo=REPO,
|
||||
requesting_session_id=requesting_session,
|
||||
controller_recovery_authorized=controller,
|
||||
worktree_exists=worktree_exists,
|
||||
worktree_clean=worktree_clean,
|
||||
worktree_has_unpreserved_work=not worktree_clean if worktree_exists else False,
|
||||
owner_process_alive=owner_process_alive,
|
||||
owner_pid_observed=kwargs.get("owner_pid_observed"),
|
||||
requesting_pid=kwargs.get("requesting_pid", 99999),
|
||||
current_head_review_in_progress=kwargs.get(
|
||||
"current_head_review_in_progress", False
|
||||
),
|
||||
expected_lease_comment_id=kwargs.get("expected_lease_comment_id"),
|
||||
expected_session_id=kwargs.get("expected_session_id"),
|
||||
expected_leased_head=kwargs.get("expected_leased_head"),
|
||||
confirmation=confirmation
|
||||
if confirmation is not None
|
||||
else (leases.cleanup_confirmation_for_pr(PR) if apply else ""),
|
||||
apply=apply,
|
||||
now=kwargs.get("now"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssue691SupersededHeadCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
leases.clear_session_lease()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_1_request_changes_then_push_expired_cleanup_succeeds(self):
|
||||
"""Completed REQUEST_CHANGES on A, push B, lease A expires → cleanup OK."""
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(
|
||||
last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=2),
|
||||
expires_at=expires,
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = _assess(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A, "REQUEST_CHANGES"),
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"], result["reasons"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "foreign_expired_superseded_head")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
result["exact_next_action"], leases.NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn("phase: released", result["release_body"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("obsolete-superseded-or-expired-lease", result["release_body"])
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(result["audit_comment_body"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["cleanup_tool"], leases.CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE_TOOL)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_2_approve_then_push_cleanup_policy(self):
|
||||
"""Completed APPROVE on A, push B → cleanup eligible (completed superseded)."""
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 1, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc) # not yet expired
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(
|
||||
last_activity=now - timedelta(minutes=10),
|
||||
expires_at=expires,
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = _assess(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A, "APPROVED"),
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"], result["reasons"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "foreign_completed_superseded_head")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_3_active_current_head_cleanup_denied(self):
|
||||
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(
|
||||
candidate_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
last_activity=now - timedelta(minutes=5),
|
||||
expires_at=now + timedelta(hours=2),
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = _assess(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
current_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_B, "REQUEST_CHANGES"),
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "foreign_active_current_head")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_4_foreign_owner_recent_progress_denied(self):
|
||||
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(
|
||||
candidate_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
last_activity=now - timedelta(minutes=2),
|
||||
expires_at=now + timedelta(hours=2),
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = _assess(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
current_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
formal_reviews=[],
|
||||
owner_process_alive=True,
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("recent authenticated progress" in r for r in result["reasons"])
|
||||
or any("current PR head" in r for r in result["reasons"])
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_5_owner_absent_worktree_dirty_denied(self):
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(
|
||||
candidate_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1),
|
||||
expires_at=expires,
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = _assess(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
current_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
formal_reviews=[],
|
||||
worktree_clean=False,
|
||||
owner_process_alive=False,
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("dirty" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_6_owner_absent_worktree_clean_orphan_ok(self):
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(
|
||||
candidate_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1),
|
||||
expires_at=expires,
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = _assess(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
current_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
formal_reviews=[],
|
||||
worktree_clean=True,
|
||||
owner_process_alive=False,
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"], result["reasons"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "orphaned_owner_missing")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_7_pid_reuse_not_ownership(self):
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
|
||||
result = _assess(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
owner_pid_observed=4242,
|
||||
requesting_pid=4242,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("PID equality" in r or "NOT ownership" in r for r in result["reasons"])
|
||||
or result["owner_session_evidence"]["pid_is_not_ownership_proof"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Still eligible via superseded+terminal+expired despite matching PID.
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"], result["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_8_comment_backed_no_db_lease_id(self):
|
||||
"""Cleanup uses comment ledger only — no control-plane lease_id required."""
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
|
||||
# Explicitly no lease_id field anywhere.
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("lease_id", claim)
|
||||
result = _assess([claim], now=now)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"], result["reasons"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["active_lease"]["comment_id"], COMMENT_10749)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(result["active_lease"].get("lease_id"))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_9_cleanup_posts_durable_audit_bodies(self):
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
|
||||
result = _assess([claim], now=now, apply=True)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("#691", result["audit_comment_body"])
|
||||
self.assertIn(str(COMMENT_10749), result["audit_comment_body"])
|
||||
self.assertIn(HEAD_A, result["audit_comment_body"])
|
||||
self.assertIn(HEAD_B, result["audit_comment_body"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_10_fresh_acquire_after_cleanup_marker(self):
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(
|
||||
expires_at=expires,
|
||||
last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1),
|
||||
comment_id=COMMENT_10749,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assessed = _assess([claim], now=now, apply=True)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(assessed["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
release = {
|
||||
"id": 99999,
|
||||
"body": assessed["release_body"],
|
||||
"user": {"login": "sysadmin"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Newest terminal marker ends active lease.
|
||||
active = leases.find_active_reviewer_lease(
|
||||
[claim, release], pr_number=PR, now=now
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(active)
|
||||
acq = leases.assess_acquire_lease(
|
||||
[claim, release],
|
||||
pr_number=PR,
|
||||
reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
|
||||
profile="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
session_id="fresh-reviewer-1",
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
issue_number=ISSUE,
|
||||
worktree="branches/review-pr-688-fresh",
|
||||
candidate_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
target_branch="master",
|
||||
target_branch_sha="b" * 40,
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(acq["acquire_allowed"], acq["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_11_no_validation_state_transfer(self):
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
|
||||
result = _assess([claim], now=now, apply=True)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
# Release body keeps old candidate_head (no repoint).
|
||||
self.assertIn(f"candidate_head: {HEAD_A}", result["release_body"])
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(HEAD_B, result["release_body"].split("candidate_head:")[1].split("\n")[0])
|
||||
self.assertIn("did not transfer validation", result["audit_comment_body"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("did not repoint", result["audit_comment_body"])
|
||||
# Session lease must remain unset by assessment (tool never seeds).
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(leases.get_session_lease())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_12_repeated_cleanup_idempotent(self):
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
|
||||
first = _assess([claim], now=now, apply=True)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(first["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
release = {"id": 100001, "body": first["release_body"], "user": {"login": "x"}}
|
||||
second = _assess([claim, release], now=now, apply=True)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(second["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(second["classification"], "no_lease")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_13_malformed_expiry_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment()
|
||||
# Corrupt expires_at in the body.
|
||||
claim["body"] = claim["body"].replace(
|
||||
claim["body"].split("expires_at:")[1].split("\n")[0].strip(),
|
||||
"not-a-timestamp",
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = _assess([claim], formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["expires_parseable"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("expires_at" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_14_wrong_identity_evidence_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
|
||||
bad_repo = _assess(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
# force repo mismatch via expected_repo
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Patch via direct call with wrong expected_repo
|
||||
bad = leases.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
pr_number=PR,
|
||||
current_head_sha=HEAD_B,
|
||||
formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A),
|
||||
expected_repo="Other-Org/Other-Repo",
|
||||
requesting_session_id="fresh",
|
||||
controller_recovery_authorized=True,
|
||||
worktree_exists=True,
|
||||
worktree_clean=True,
|
||||
owner_process_alive=False,
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(bad["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("repository identity" in r for r in bad["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
bad_pr = leases.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
pr_number=999,
|
||||
current_head_sha=HEAD_B,
|
||||
formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A),
|
||||
expected_repo=REPO,
|
||||
requesting_session_id="fresh",
|
||||
controller_recovery_authorized=True,
|
||||
worktree_exists=True,
|
||||
worktree_clean=True,
|
||||
owner_process_alive=False,
|
||||
expected_lease_comment_id=COMMENT_10749,
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(bad_pr["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
bad_head = _assess(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
expected_leased_head="0" * 40,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(bad_head["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
bad_session = _assess(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
expected_session_id="wrong-session",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(bad_session["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_15_current_head_active_cannot_be_displaced(self):
|
||||
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(
|
||||
candidate_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
last_activity=now - timedelta(minutes=1),
|
||||
expires_at=now + timedelta(hours=2),
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = _assess(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
current_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_B),
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
current_head_review_in_progress=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
# Acquire also blocked by foreign active lease.
|
||||
acq = leases.assess_acquire_lease(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
pr_number=PR,
|
||||
reviewer_identity="other",
|
||||
profile="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
session_id="thief",
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
issue_number=ISSUE,
|
||||
worktree="branches/steal",
|
||||
candidate_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
target_branch="master",
|
||||
target_branch_sha="b" * 40,
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(acq["acquire_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_regression_pr688_comment_10749_after_expiry(self):
|
||||
"""Exact 10749 reproduction after recorded expires_at 2026-07-13T04:23:00Z."""
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 30, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime.fromisoformat(EXPIRES_10749.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(
|
||||
session_id=SESSION_FOREIGN,
|
||||
candidate_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
comment_id=COMMENT_10749,
|
||||
last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=2),
|
||||
expires_at=expires,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Diagnosis must not prescribe indefinite wait-only for this case.
|
||||
diag = leases.diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
pr_number=PR,
|
||||
current_session_id="fresh-reviewer",
|
||||
current_reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
|
||||
current_head_sha=HEAD_B,
|
||||
formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A, "REQUEST_CHANGES"),
|
||||
worktree_exists=True,
|
||||
worktree_clean=True,
|
||||
owner_process_alive=False,
|
||||
instructed_session_id=SESSION_FOREIGN,
|
||||
instructed_comment_id=COMMENT_10749,
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(diag["classification"], "foreign_expired_superseded_head")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
diag["next_action"], leases.NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(diag["cleanup_tool"], leases.CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE_TOOL)
|
||||
self.assertIn("CLEANUP OBSOLETE REVIEWER LEASE 688", diag["required_confirmation"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(diag["mutation_eligibility"], "cleanup_only")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(diag["mutation_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
# Assessment still returns the lease as active/stale class of block for acquire
|
||||
# when unexpired path... here it's expired so find_active is None; acquire free
|
||||
# only after cleanup if somehow still active. With expired, find_active is None:
|
||||
active = leases.find_active_reviewer_lease([claim], pr_number=PR, now=now)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(active)
|
||||
|
||||
# But superseded unexpired still blocks acquire and diagnosis points to cleanup:
|
||||
unexpired_now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 1, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim2 = _lease_comment(
|
||||
session_id=SESSION_FOREIGN,
|
||||
candidate_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
comment_id=COMMENT_10749,
|
||||
last_activity=unexpired_now - timedelta(minutes=45),
|
||||
expires_at=expires,
|
||||
)
|
||||
active2 = leases.find_active_reviewer_lease(
|
||||
[claim2], pr_number=PR, now=unexpired_now
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(active2)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(active2["freshness"], "stale_warning")
|
||||
diag2 = leases.diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
|
||||
[claim2],
|
||||
pr_number=PR,
|
||||
current_session_id="fresh-reviewer",
|
||||
current_reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
|
||||
current_head_sha=HEAD_B,
|
||||
formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A, "REQUEST_CHANGES"),
|
||||
worktree_exists=True,
|
||||
worktree_clean=True,
|
||||
now=unexpired_now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(diag2["classification"], "foreign_completed_superseded_head")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
diag2["next_action"], leases.NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE
|
||||
)
|
||||
acq = leases.assess_acquire_lease(
|
||||
[claim2],
|
||||
pr_number=PR,
|
||||
reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
|
||||
profile="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
session_id="fresh-reviewer",
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
issue_number=ISSUE,
|
||||
worktree="branches/review-pr-688-new",
|
||||
candidate_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
target_branch="master",
|
||||
target_branch_sha="b" * 40,
|
||||
now=unexpired_now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(acq["acquire_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_missing_controller_auth_denied(self):
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
|
||||
result = _assess([claim], controller=False, now=now)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_wrong_confirmation_denied_on_apply(self):
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
|
||||
result = _assess(
|
||||
[claim], now=now, apply=True, confirmation="MERGE PR 688"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("confirmation" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_owner_session_must_use_owner_release(self):
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
|
||||
result = _assess(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
requesting_session=SESSION_FOREIGN,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("owns the lease" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_superseded_without_terminal_review_denied(self):
|
||||
# Pre-expiry the missing terminal review is ambiguous (fail closed);
|
||||
# post-expiry with unknown owner evidence it is a crash-orphan (#702)
|
||||
# that still fails closed until owner-process exit is proven.
|
||||
now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
|
||||
result = _assess(
|
||||
[claim], formal_reviews=[], now=now, owner_process_alive=None
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
result["classification"], "orphaned_expired_superseded_head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
fresh_expires = now + timedelta(minutes=60)
|
||||
fresh = _lease_comment(
|
||||
expires_at=fresh_expires, last_activity=now - timedelta(minutes=5)
|
||||
)
|
||||
pre_expiry = _assess([fresh], formal_reviews=[], now=now)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(pre_expiry["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
pre_expiry["classification"], "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssue691DiagnoseClassifications(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
leases.clear_session_lease()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_foreign_active_current_head_still_wait(self):
|
||||
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
claim = _lease_comment(
|
||||
candidate_head=HEAD_B,
|
||||
last_activity=now - timedelta(minutes=5),
|
||||
expires_at=now + timedelta(hours=1),
|
||||
)
|
||||
claim["id"] = 1
|
||||
result = leases.diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
|
||||
[claim],
|
||||
pr_number=PR,
|
||||
current_session_id="other",
|
||||
current_reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
|
||||
current_head_sha=HEAD_B,
|
||||
formal_reviews=[],
|
||||
now=now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "foreign_active_current_head")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["next_action"], leases.NEXT_ACTION_WAIT)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["mutation_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,427 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Review-decision-lock recovery / cross-PR isolation (#693).
|
||||
|
||||
Reproduces the PR #688 → PR #692 formal-review sequence:
|
||||
|
||||
* durable lock holds REQUEST_CHANGES on open PR #688 @ head A (review_id 425)
|
||||
* reviewer leases PR #692 @ head B (6d86db…)
|
||||
* mark_final for #692 must succeed without correction unlock
|
||||
* cleanup of open #688 terminal remains forbidden (#594)
|
||||
* authorize_review_correction for #688 cannot unlock #692
|
||||
* eventual #692 APPROVE is unique and head-bound (review_id 426)
|
||||
* mark_final is idempotent for same PR/action/head
|
||||
* diagnosis returns one exact next_action + durable handoff payload
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_server
|
||||
import review_workflow_load
|
||||
import stale_review_decision_lock as srdl
|
||||
|
||||
# PR #688 / #692 incident fixtures (sanitized reconstruction from issue #693)
|
||||
HEAD_688 = "c7a444eb4b41cf916fdbd20a4999ffd78af496d0"
|
||||
HEAD_692 = "6d86db793bbdfaed16bd54d93171f1dd66f234ca"
|
||||
PR_A = 688
|
||||
PR_B = 692
|
||||
REVIEW_ID_A = 425
|
||||
REVIEW_ID_B = 426
|
||||
|
||||
RC_688 = {
|
||||
"pr_number": PR_A,
|
||||
"action": "request_changes",
|
||||
"review_id": REVIEW_ID_A,
|
||||
"review_state": "request_changes",
|
||||
"head_sha": HEAD_688,
|
||||
}
|
||||
APPROVE_692 = {
|
||||
"pr_number": PR_B,
|
||||
"action": "approve",
|
||||
"review_id": REVIEW_ID_B,
|
||||
"review_state": "approve",
|
||||
"head_sha": HEAD_692,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _lock(mutations=None, **kwargs):
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
||||
|
||||
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
|
||||
base = {
|
||||
"task": "review_pr",
|
||||
"remote": "prgs",
|
||||
"org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
"repo": "Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
"session_pid": os.getpid(),
|
||||
"session_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"session_profile_lock": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"profile_identity": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"final_review_decision_ready": False,
|
||||
"ready_pr_number": None,
|
||||
"ready_action": None,
|
||||
"ready_expected_head_sha": None,
|
||||
"ready_remote": None,
|
||||
"ready_org": None,
|
||||
"ready_repo": None,
|
||||
"live_mutations": list(mutations or []),
|
||||
"correction_authorized": False,
|
||||
"correction_reason": None,
|
||||
"correction_pr_number": None,
|
||||
"correction_head_sha": None,
|
||||
"updated_at": now,
|
||||
"recorded_at": now,
|
||||
"writer_pid": os.getpid(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
base.update(kwargs)
|
||||
# Ensure TTL fields stay fresh unless the caller is testing expiry.
|
||||
if "recorded_at" not in kwargs:
|
||||
base["recorded_at"] = now
|
||||
if "updated_at" not in kwargs:
|
||||
base["updated_at"] = now
|
||||
return base
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
REVIEWER_ENV = {
|
||||
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": (
|
||||
"gitea.read,gitea.pr.review,gitea.pr.approve,"
|
||||
"gitea.pr.request_changes,gitea.pr.comment"
|
||||
),
|
||||
"GITEA_SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
REVIEWER_PROFILE = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.request_changes",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.merge"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _seed(mutations=None, **kwargs):
|
||||
review_workflow_load.record_review_workflow_load(mcp_server.PROJECT_ROOT)
|
||||
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(_lock(mutations, **kwargs))
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _no_lease():
|
||||
return {"block": False, "reasons": [], "mutation_allowed": True}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _open_pr(number, head):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"number": number,
|
||||
"state": "open",
|
||||
"merged": False,
|
||||
"merged_at": None,
|
||||
"head": {"sha": head},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestCrossPrIsolationPure(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_foreign_terminal_does_not_block_mark_boundary(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock([RC_688])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
srdl.prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
|
||||
lock, pr_number=PR_B, expected_head_sha=HEAD_692
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
srdl.prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
|
||||
lock, pr_number=PR_A, expected_head_sha=HEAD_688
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_terminal_boundary_allows_fresh_decision_on_other_pr(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock([RC_688])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
srdl.terminal_boundary_allows_fresh_decision(
|
||||
lock,
|
||||
pr_number=PR_B,
|
||||
expected_head_sha=HEAD_692,
|
||||
operation="mark_ready",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
srdl.terminal_boundary_allows_fresh_decision(
|
||||
lock,
|
||||
pr_number=PR_A,
|
||||
expected_head_sha=HEAD_688,
|
||||
operation="mark_ready",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unscoped_correction_does_not_apply(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock([RC_688], correction_authorized=True, correction_reason="x")
|
||||
# Missing correction_pr_number → fail closed (#693)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
srdl.correction_applies(lock, pr_number=PR_A, expected_head_sha=HEAD_688)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_scoped_correction_only_for_named_pr(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock(
|
||||
[RC_688],
|
||||
correction_authorized=True,
|
||||
correction_reason="mistake",
|
||||
correction_pr_number=PR_A,
|
||||
correction_head_sha=HEAD_688,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
srdl.correction_applies(lock, pr_number=PR_A, expected_head_sha=HEAD_688)
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
srdl.correction_applies(lock, pr_number=PR_B, expected_head_sha=HEAD_692)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestClassification(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_foreign_pr_terminal_classification(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock([RC_688])
|
||||
c = srdl.classify_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
lock,
|
||||
target_pr_number=PR_B,
|
||||
target_head_sha=HEAD_692,
|
||||
pr_live=_open_pr(PR_A, HEAD_688),
|
||||
active_profile_identity="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(c["classification"], srdl.CLASS_FOREIGN_PR_TERMINAL)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(c["mark_final_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(c["correction_eligible"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("do not call gitea_authorize_review_correction", c["next_action"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_same_head_terminal_classification(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock([RC_688])
|
||||
c = srdl.classify_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
lock,
|
||||
target_pr_number=PR_A,
|
||||
target_head_sha=HEAD_688,
|
||||
pr_live=_open_pr(PR_A, HEAD_688),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(c["classification"], srdl.CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(c["mark_final_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(c["correction_eligible"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_precise_failure_includes_durable_handoff(self):
|
||||
lock = _lock([RC_688])
|
||||
c = srdl.classify_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
lock, target_pr_number=PR_A, target_head_sha=HEAD_688
|
||||
)
|
||||
fail = srdl.build_precise_mark_final_failure(c)
|
||||
self.assertIn("exact_next_action", fail)
|
||||
self.assertIn("durable_issue_handoff", fail)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(fail["durable_issue_handoff"]["required"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestPr692Sequence(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._env = patch.dict(os.environ, REVIEWER_ENV, clear=False)
|
||||
self._env.start()
|
||||
self._prof = patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=REVIEWER_PROFILE
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._prof.start()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
self._prof.stop()
|
||||
self._env.stop()
|
||||
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(None)
|
||||
review_workflow_load.clear_review_workflow_load()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mark_final_692_succeeds_with_open_688_terminal(self):
|
||||
_seed([RC_688], writer_pid=25883, session_pid=60615)
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server._list_pr_lease_comments", return_value=[]), patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server._pr_work_lease_reviewer_block", return_value=_no_lease()
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"gitea_check_pr_eligibility",
|
||||
return_value={"head_sha": HEAD_692, "eligible": True},
|
||||
):
|
||||
result = mcp_server.gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
|
||||
pr_number=PR_B,
|
||||
action="approve",
|
||||
expected_head_sha=HEAD_692,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["marked_ready"], result.get("reasons"))
|
||||
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(lock["ready_pr_number"], PR_B)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
srdl.normalize_head_sha(lock["ready_expected_head_sha"]), HEAD_692
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Foreign terminal history preserved (non-destructive isolation).
|
||||
self.assertEqual(lock["live_mutations"][0]["pr_number"], PR_A)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mark_final_idempotent_same_binding(self):
|
||||
_seed(
|
||||
[RC_688],
|
||||
final_review_decision_ready=True,
|
||||
ready_pr_number=PR_B,
|
||||
ready_action="approve",
|
||||
ready_expected_head_sha=HEAD_692,
|
||||
ready_remote="prgs",
|
||||
ready_org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
ready_repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server._list_pr_lease_comments", return_value=[]), patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server._pr_work_lease_reviewer_block", return_value=_no_lease()
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"gitea_check_pr_eligibility",
|
||||
return_value={"head_sha": HEAD_692, "eligible": True},
|
||||
):
|
||||
result = mcp_server.gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
|
||||
pr_number=PR_B,
|
||||
action="approve",
|
||||
expected_head_sha=HEAD_692,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["marked_ready"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result.get("idempotent"))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_cleanup_still_forbidden_while_688_open(self):
|
||||
_seed([RC_688])
|
||||
assessment = srdl.assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock(),
|
||||
pr_live=_open_pr(PR_A, HEAD_688),
|
||||
active_profile_identity="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(assessment["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(assessment["is_moot"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_correction_cannot_unlock_different_pr(self):
|
||||
_seed([RC_688])
|
||||
r = mcp_server.gitea_authorize_review_correction(
|
||||
prior_review_id=REVIEW_ID_A,
|
||||
prior_review_state="request_changes",
|
||||
reason="try unlock 692",
|
||||
operator_authorized=True,
|
||||
target_pr_number=PR_B,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
post_audit_comment=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(r["authorized"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("different PR" in x for x in r["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_scoped_correction_for_same_pr_posts_audit(self):
|
||||
_seed([RC_688])
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server._authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server._auth", return_value="Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
|
||||
), patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"id": 99901}):
|
||||
r = mcp_server.gitea_authorize_review_correction(
|
||||
prior_review_id=REVIEW_ID_A,
|
||||
prior_review_state="request_changes",
|
||||
reason="mistaken RC wording",
|
||||
operator_authorized=True,
|
||||
target_pr_number=PR_A,
|
||||
expected_head_sha=HEAD_688,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
post_audit_comment=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(r["authorized"], r.get("reasons"))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(r.get("correction_pr_number"), PR_A)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
r.get("audit_comment_id"),
|
||||
99901,
|
||||
r.get("audit_comment_skipped") or r.get("audit_comment_error") or r,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_diagnose_foreign_terminal_next_action(self):
|
||||
_seed([RC_688])
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server._authenticated_username", return_value="sysadmin"
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server._auth", return_value="Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
|
||||
), patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value=_open_pr(PR_A, HEAD_688)):
|
||||
d = mcp_server.gitea_diagnose_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
target_pr_number=PR_B,
|
||||
expected_head_sha=HEAD_692,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(d["success"], d.get("reasons"))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(d["classification"], srdl.CLASS_FOREIGN_PR_TERMINAL)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(d["mark_final_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("mark_final", d["exact_next_action"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(d["correction_as_generic_unlock_forbidden"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_approval_ledger_unique_and_bound_after_sequence(self):
|
||||
"""After mark_final + record mutation, ledger binds unique approve to 692 head."""
|
||||
_seed([RC_688])
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server._list_pr_lease_comments", return_value=[]), patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server._pr_work_lease_reviewer_block", return_value=_no_lease()
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"gitea_check_pr_eligibility",
|
||||
return_value={"head_sha": HEAD_692, "eligible": True},
|
||||
):
|
||||
marked = mcp_server.gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
|
||||
pr_number=PR_B,
|
||||
action="approve",
|
||||
expected_head_sha=HEAD_692,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(marked["marked_ready"])
|
||||
mcp_server.record_live_review_mutation(PR_B, "approve", REVIEW_ID_B)
|
||||
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
|
||||
terminals = [
|
||||
m
|
||||
for m in lock["live_mutations"]
|
||||
if m.get("action") in srdl.TERMINAL_REVIEW_ACTIONS
|
||||
and m.get("pr_number") == PR_B
|
||||
]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(terminals), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(terminals[0]["review_id"], REVIEW_ID_B)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
srdl.normalize_head_sha(terminals[0].get("head_sha")), HEAD_692
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Same-head duplicate still blocked.
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
srdl.prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
|
||||
lock, pr_number=PR_B, expected_head_sha=HEAD_692
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestSessionRestartWriterPid(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(None)
|
||||
review_workflow_load.clear_review_workflow_load()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_writer_pid_change_does_not_inherit_foreign_block(self):
|
||||
# session_pid 60615 origin, writer later 25883 — still foreign isolation.
|
||||
_seed([RC_688], session_pid=60615, writer_pid=25883)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
|
||||
PR_B, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=HEAD_692
|
||||
),
|
||||
[],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,848 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Regression tests for Issue #695 — second incident (PR #694 / review 427).
|
||||
|
||||
Reproduces offline import, env-only runtime spoof, exposed-token invocation,
|
||||
direct imports, basename entrypoint spoof, allow_test_bootstrap forgery,
|
||||
standalone quarantine attempts, and false “official workflow” canonical claims.
|
||||
Gates must fail closed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import textwrap
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
import merge_approval_gate
|
||||
import review_quarantine
|
||||
import canonical_comment_validator as ccv
|
||||
|
||||
HEAD_694 = "1844e298809373be19a526fd39b7d8b0669eb5bd"
|
||||
HEAD_OTHER = "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"
|
||||
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _run_offline_snippet(snippet: str, *, env_extra: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
|
||||
"""Execute snippet in a fresh interpreter (no pytest modules)."""
|
||||
env = os.environ.copy()
|
||||
env.pop("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", None)
|
||||
env.pop(mcp_daemon_guard.FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV, None)
|
||||
env["PYTHONPATH"] = str(REPO_ROOT) + os.pathsep + env.get("PYTHONPATH", "")
|
||||
if env_extra:
|
||||
env.update(env_extra)
|
||||
return subprocess.run(
|
||||
[sys.executable, "-c", snippet],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
cwd=str(REPO_ROOT),
|
||||
env=env,
|
||||
timeout=30,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestNativeTransportBinding(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
os.environ.pop(mcp_daemon_guard.FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV, None)
|
||||
os.environ.pop(mcp_daemon_guard.SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV, None)
|
||||
os.environ.pop(mcp_daemon_guard.ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV, None)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_env_alone_does_not_establish_native_transport(self):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_daemon_guard.SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_daemon_guard.ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_daemon_guard.FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mcp_daemon_guard.is_native_mcp_transport())
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime("offline_import")
|
||||
msg = str(ctx.exception)
|
||||
self.assertIn("#695", msg)
|
||||
# FORCE disables pytest allowance; direct-import env is rejected first
|
||||
# (AC1). Without ALLOW_DIRECT, env-alone also yields "not sufficient".
|
||||
lowered = msg.lower()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
"direct" in lowered
|
||||
or "not sufficient" in lowered
|
||||
or "allow_direct" in lowered
|
||||
or "gitea_allow_direct" in lowered,
|
||||
msg,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_direct_import_mark_rejected_outside_entrypoint(self):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_daemon_guard.FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.mark_sanctioned_daemon()
|
||||
self.assertIn("canonical", str(ctx.exception).lower())
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mcp_daemon_guard.is_native_mcp_transport())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_locally_generated_runtime_key_without_entrypoint_rejected(self):
|
||||
"""Spoofing process-local fields via mark outside entrypoint fails."""
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_daemon_guard.FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.mark_sanctioned_daemon()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_test_native_runtime_for_hermetic_tests_not_production(self):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
st = mcp_daemon_guard.install_test_native_runtime()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(st["native_mcp_transport"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(mcp_daemon_guard.is_native_mcp_transport())
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mcp_daemon_guard.is_production_native_mcp_transport())
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime("test-bootstrap")
|
||||
fields = mcp_daemon_guard.mutation_provenance_fields()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(fields["transport"], "test_native_mcp")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(fields["native_mcp_transport"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(fields["production_native_mcp_transport"])
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(fields["native_token_fingerprint"])
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.assert_production_mutation_runtime("prod-endpoint")
|
||||
self.assertIn("Test-mode", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_allow_test_bootstrap_parameter_on_mark(self):
|
||||
import inspect
|
||||
|
||||
sig = inspect.signature(mcp_daemon_guard.mark_sanctioned_daemon)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("allow_test_bootstrap", sig.parameters)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_exposed_token_env_never_grants_native(self):
|
||||
"""Raw / exposed token env vars must never reconstruct native transport."""
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_daemon_guard.FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
for key in (
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN",
|
||||
"GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN",
|
||||
"GITHUB_TOKEN",
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_TOKEN",
|
||||
"GITEA_RAW_TOKEN",
|
||||
):
|
||||
os.environ[key] = "exposed-token-value-must-not-authorize"
|
||||
try:
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mcp_daemon_guard.is_native_mcp_transport())
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime("exposed-token")
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
for key in (
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN",
|
||||
"GITEA_ACCESS_TOKEN",
|
||||
"GITHUB_TOKEN",
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_TOKEN",
|
||||
"GITEA_RAW_TOKEN",
|
||||
):
|
||||
os.environ.pop(key, None)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestAC9BypassRegressions(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC9: empirically reproduced offline bypasses must fail closed (#695)."""
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
os.environ.pop(mcp_daemon_guard.FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV, None)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_allow_test_bootstrap_cannot_authorize_fresh_offline_interpreter(self):
|
||||
"""Finding 1: former allow_test_bootstrap forge is gone and rejected offline."""
|
||||
snippet = textwrap.dedent(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import inspect
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard as g
|
||||
sig = inspect.signature(g.mark_sanctioned_daemon)
|
||||
assert "allow_test_bootstrap" not in sig.parameters, "bootstrap flag must not exist"
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.mark_sanctioned_daemon(allow_test_bootstrap=True)
|
||||
except TypeError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise SystemExit("mark_sanctioned_daemon accepted allow_test_bootstrap")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.install_test_native_runtime()
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError as exc:
|
||||
assert "pytest" in str(exc).lower() or "#695" in str(exc)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise SystemExit("install_test_native_runtime authorized offline interpreter")
|
||||
assert g.is_native_mcp_transport() is False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime("offline-bootstrap")
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise SystemExit("mutation runtime authorized after offline bootstrap attempt")
|
||||
print("OK")
|
||||
"""
|
||||
)
|
||||
proc = _run_offline_snippet(snippet)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(proc.returncode, 0, proc.stdout + proc.stderr)
|
||||
self.assertIn("OK", proc.stdout)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_renamed_runner_named_mcp_server_py_rejected(self):
|
||||
"""Finding 2: basename-only entrypoint trust is insufficient."""
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||
attacker = Path(tmp) / "mcp_server.py"
|
||||
attacker.write_text(
|
||||
textwrap.dedent(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard as g
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.mark_sanctioned_daemon()
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError as exc:
|
||||
print("REJECTED:" + str(exc))
|
||||
raise SystemExit(0)
|
||||
print("AUTHORIZED")
|
||||
raise SystemExit(1)
|
||||
"""
|
||||
),
|
||||
encoding="utf-8",
|
||||
)
|
||||
env = os.environ.copy()
|
||||
env.pop("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", None)
|
||||
env["PYTHONPATH"] = str(REPO_ROOT) + os.pathsep + env.get("PYTHONPATH", "")
|
||||
proc = subprocess.run(
|
||||
[sys.executable, str(attacker)],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
cwd=tmp,
|
||||
env=env,
|
||||
timeout=30,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(proc.returncode, 0, proc.stdout + proc.stderr)
|
||||
self.assertIn("REJECTED:", proc.stdout)
|
||||
self.assertIn("canonical", proc.stdout.lower())
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("AUTHORIZED", proc.stdout)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_direct_launch_import_canonical_entrypoint_without_transport_rejected(self):
|
||||
"""Merely importing/launching real entrypoint offline must not authorize."""
|
||||
snippet = textwrap.dedent(
|
||||
f"""
|
||||
import importlib.util
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard as g
|
||||
# Simulate claim-only phase (no transport bind).
|
||||
g.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
# Direct mark from non-entrypoint must fail.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.mark_sanctioned_daemon()
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
assert g.is_native_mcp_transport() is False
|
||||
# Even if someone forges entrypoint_claimed without transport bind:
|
||||
g._NATIVE_RUNTIME = {{
|
||||
"token": "x" * 64,
|
||||
"token_fingerprint": "deadbeefdeadbeef",
|
||||
"pid": __import__("os").getpid(),
|
||||
"started_at": 0,
|
||||
"entrypoint": "mcp_server",
|
||||
"entrypoint_path": {str(REPO_ROOT / "mcp_server.py")!r},
|
||||
"phase": "entrypoint_claimed",
|
||||
"transport": None,
|
||||
"mode": "production",
|
||||
}}
|
||||
assert g.is_native_mcp_transport() is False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime("import-only")
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError as exc:
|
||||
assert "transport" in str(exc).lower() or "entrypoint" in str(exc).lower() or "#695" in str(exc)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise SystemExit("import-only claim authorized mutation")
|
||||
print("OK")
|
||||
"""
|
||||
)
|
||||
proc = _run_offline_snippet(snippet)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(proc.returncode, 0, proc.stdout + proc.stderr)
|
||||
self.assertIn("OK", proc.stdout)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_spoofed_pytest_env_stack_path_rejected(self):
|
||||
"""Spoofed pytest/env/call-stack/path evidence must not authorize offline."""
|
||||
snippet = textwrap.dedent(
|
||||
f"""
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard as g
|
||||
os.environ["PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST"] = "spoofed::test"
|
||||
os.environ[g.SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
os.environ[g.ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
# Fresh interpreter has no pytest module; PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST alone
|
||||
# might still trip is_pytest_runtime — force-unsanctioned is not set.
|
||||
# But install_test_native_runtime requires real pytest path; if
|
||||
# PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST alone grants is_pytest_runtime, production
|
||||
# mutation still requires production transport outside true pytest.
|
||||
if g.is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
# Env-only pytest spoof: test install may succeed, but production
|
||||
# mutation gate must still reject test mode.
|
||||
g.install_test_native_runtime()
|
||||
assert g.is_production_native_mcp_transport() is False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.assert_production_mutation_runtime("spoofed-pytest")
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise SystemExit("production mutation accepted test-mode under spoofed pytest env")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.install_test_native_runtime()
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise SystemExit("test install without pytest evidence")
|
||||
# Basename path spoof via inspect is covered elsewhere; env alone:
|
||||
g.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
os.environ.pop("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", None)
|
||||
assert g.is_native_mcp_transport() is False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime("env-path-spoof")
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise SystemExit("env/path spoof authorized mutation")
|
||||
print("OK")
|
||||
"""
|
||||
)
|
||||
proc = _run_offline_snippet(snippet)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(proc.returncode, 0, proc.stdout + proc.stderr)
|
||||
self.assertIn("OK", proc.stdout)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_test_bootstrap_cannot_reach_production_mutation_endpoints(self):
|
||||
"""Under pytest, test-mode runtime cannot satisfy production mutation gate."""
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.install_test_native_runtime()
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.assert_production_mutation_runtime(
|
||||
"gitea_quarantine_contaminated_review"
|
||||
)
|
||||
msg = str(ctx.exception)
|
||||
self.assertIn("Test-mode", msg)
|
||||
self.assertIn("#695", msg)
|
||||
|
||||
# Offline: install_test_native_runtime must not authorize production mutations.
|
||||
snippet = textwrap.dedent(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard as g
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.install_test_native_runtime()
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
assert g.is_production_native_mcp_transport() is False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.assert_production_mutation_runtime("gitea_quarantine_contaminated_review")
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise SystemExit("production mutation authorized offline")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime("gitea_mutation")
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise SystemExit("sanctioned mutation authorized offline")
|
||||
print("OK")
|
||||
"""
|
||||
)
|
||||
proc = _run_offline_snippet(snippet)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(proc.returncode, 0, proc.stdout + proc.stderr)
|
||||
self.assertIn("OK", proc.stdout)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_legitimate_native_transport_bind_succeeds(self):
|
||||
"""Canonical entrypoint path + stdio bind establishes production native."""
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
# Simulate production path under force-unsanctioned (no pytest allowance)
|
||||
# by calling internal claim/bind with patched caller path.
|
||||
canonical = str((REPO_ROOT / "mcp_server.py").resolve())
|
||||
|
||||
def _fake_caller():
|
||||
return canonical
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard, "_caller_official_entrypoint_path", side_effect=_fake_caller
|
||||
):
|
||||
# Force non-pytest path for mark/bind logic.
|
||||
with patch.object(mcp_daemon_guard, "is_pytest_runtime", return_value=False):
|
||||
st1 = mcp_daemon_guard.mark_sanctioned_daemon()
|
||||
self.assertFalse(st1["native_mcp_transport"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(st1["phase"], "entrypoint_claimed")
|
||||
st2 = mcp_daemon_guard.bind_native_mcp_transport(transport="stdio")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(st2["native_mcp_transport"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(st2["production_native_mcp_transport"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(st2["transport"], "stdio")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(st2["mode"], "production")
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime("native-ide")
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.assert_production_mutation_runtime("native-ide")
|
||||
fields = mcp_daemon_guard.mutation_provenance_fields()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(fields["transport"], "native_mcp")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(fields["production_native_mcp_transport"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_canonical_entrypoint_paths_are_resolved_absolute(self):
|
||||
paths = mcp_daemon_guard.canonical_entrypoint_paths()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any(p.endswith("mcp_server.py") for p in paths))
|
||||
for p in paths:
|
||||
self.assertTrue(os.path.isabs(p), p)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(p, str(Path(p).resolve()))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestQuarantineWriteNativeOnly(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
os.environ.pop(mcp_daemon_guard.FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV, None)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_standalone_quarantine_write_blocked_when_unsanctioned(self):
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_daemon_guard.FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
assessment = review_quarantine.assess_quarantine_write(
|
||||
confirmation="QUARANTINE CONTAMINATED REVIEW 427 PR 694",
|
||||
pr_number=694,
|
||||
review_id=427,
|
||||
reason="contaminated offline approval",
|
||||
native_required=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("native MCP transport" in r for r in assessment["reasons"])
|
||||
)
|
||||
record = review_quarantine.build_quarantine_record(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
pr_number=694,
|
||||
review_id=427,
|
||||
reviewed_head_sha=HEAD_694,
|
||||
reason="contaminated",
|
||||
actor_username="sysadmin",
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-merger",
|
||||
incident_issue=695,
|
||||
forensic_comment_ids=[10883, 10886],
|
||||
)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
# Force non-pytest and non-native for write path.
|
||||
with patch.object(mcp_daemon_guard, "is_pytest_runtime", return_value=False):
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard, "is_native_mcp_transport", return_value=False
|
||||
):
|
||||
review_quarantine.write_quarantine_record(record)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_confirmation_must_match_exactly(self):
|
||||
assessment = review_quarantine.assess_quarantine_write(
|
||||
confirmation="quarantine 427",
|
||||
pr_number=694,
|
||||
review_id=427,
|
||||
reason="x",
|
||||
native_required=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("confirmation must equal exactly", assessment["reasons"][0])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_quarantine_honored_by_merge_approval_gate(self):
|
||||
"""Contaminated review 427 at head must not authorize merge (#695)."""
|
||||
result = merge_approval_gate.assess_merge_approval_head(
|
||||
current_head_sha=HEAD_694,
|
||||
latest_by_reviewer={
|
||||
"sysadmin": {
|
||||
"verdict": "APPROVED",
|
||||
"dismissed": False,
|
||||
"reviewed_head_sha": HEAD_694,
|
||||
"review_id": 427,
|
||||
"submitted_at": "2026-07-13T07:20:00Z",
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
quarantined_review_ids={427},
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["approval_at_current_head"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("quarantined", result["stale_approval_block_reason"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["quarantined_approvals_at_current_head"], 1)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_filter_approvals_for_merge_splits_quarantined(self):
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"review_quarantine.mcp_session_state.default_state_dir",
|
||||
return_value=self._tmp.name,
|
||||
):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.install_test_native_runtime()
|
||||
record = review_quarantine.build_quarantine_record(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="org",
|
||||
repo="repo",
|
||||
pr_number=694,
|
||||
review_id=427,
|
||||
reviewed_head_sha=HEAD_694,
|
||||
reason="offline import contaminated approval",
|
||||
actor_username="sysadmin",
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-merger",
|
||||
incident_issue=695,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Force native provenance bit for write path under test bootstrap.
|
||||
record["native_provenance"] = {
|
||||
**record["native_provenance"],
|
||||
"native_mcp_transport": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
review_quarantine.write_quarantine_record(record)
|
||||
filtered = review_quarantine.filter_approvals_for_merge(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="org",
|
||||
repo="repo",
|
||||
pr_number=694,
|
||||
current_head_sha=HEAD_694,
|
||||
reviews=[
|
||||
{
|
||||
"verdict": "APPROVED",
|
||||
"review_id": 427,
|
||||
"reviewed_head_sha": HEAD_694,
|
||||
"reviewer": "sysadmin",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"verdict": "APPROVED",
|
||||
"review_id": 999,
|
||||
"reviewed_head_sha": HEAD_694,
|
||||
"reviewer": "fresh-reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(filtered["has_quarantined_approval_at_head"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(filtered["quarantined_approvals"]), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(filtered["quarantined_approvals"][0]["review_id"], 427)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(filtered["usable_approvals_at_current_head"]), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
filtered["usable_approvals_at_current_head"][0]["review_id"], 999
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(filtered["approval_visible_for_merge"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestCanonicalHandoffValidation(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_false_official_workflow_offline_claim_rejected(self):
|
||||
body = f"""## Canonical PR State
|
||||
|
||||
STATE: approved
|
||||
WHO_IS_NEXT: merger
|
||||
NEXT_ACTION: Merge PR #694 immediately after offline helper success
|
||||
NEXT_PROMPT:
|
||||
```text
|
||||
Merger: land PR #694; offline_mcp_runner completed official workflow.
|
||||
```
|
||||
WHAT_HAPPENED: offline import of gitea_mcp_server submitted APPROVED review 427
|
||||
WHY: claimed official workflow via direct import after native EOF
|
||||
ISSUE: #693
|
||||
HEAD_SHA: {HEAD_694}
|
||||
REVIEW_STATUS: approved / approval_at_current_head
|
||||
MERGE_READY: true
|
||||
BLOCKERS: none
|
||||
VALIDATION: offline_mcp_helper.py + offline_mcp_runner.py; import gitea_mcp_server
|
||||
NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF: transport=offline_mcp; spoofed
|
||||
LAST_UPDATED_BY: contaminated-session
|
||||
"""
|
||||
result = ccv.assess_canonical_comment(body, context="pr_comment")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
|
||||
joined = " ".join(result.get("extra_reasons") or [])
|
||||
self.assertIn("#695", joined)
|
||||
self.assertIn("offline", joined.lower())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_merge_ready_without_native_proof_rejected(self):
|
||||
body = f"""## Canonical PR State
|
||||
|
||||
STATE: ready-to-merge
|
||||
WHO_IS_NEXT: merger
|
||||
NEXT_ACTION: Merge PR after confirming approval_at_current_head
|
||||
NEXT_PROMPT:
|
||||
```text
|
||||
Merge PR #694 for issue #693 after live mergeable check passes.
|
||||
```
|
||||
WHAT_HAPPENED: Reviewer approved at current head
|
||||
WHY: All gates passed and head SHA is current
|
||||
ISSUE: #693
|
||||
HEAD_SHA: {HEAD_694}
|
||||
REVIEW_STATUS: approved / approval_at_current_head
|
||||
MERGE_READY: true
|
||||
BLOCKERS: none
|
||||
VALIDATION: pytest passed; reviewer approved at head {HEAD_694}
|
||||
LAST_UPDATED_BY: prgs-reviewer
|
||||
"""
|
||||
result = ccv.assess_canonical_comment(body, context="pr_comment")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
|
||||
joined = " ".join(result.get("extra_reasons") or [])
|
||||
self.assertIn("NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF", joined)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_merge_ready_with_native_proof_allowed(self):
|
||||
body = f"""## Canonical PR State
|
||||
|
||||
STATE: ready-to-merge
|
||||
WHO_IS_NEXT: merger
|
||||
NEXT_ACTION: Merge PR after confirming approval_at_current_head
|
||||
NEXT_PROMPT:
|
||||
```text
|
||||
Merge PR #500 for issue #496 after live mergeable check passes.
|
||||
```
|
||||
WHAT_HAPPENED: Reviewer approved at current head via native MCP
|
||||
WHY: All gates passed and head SHA is current
|
||||
ISSUE: #496
|
||||
HEAD_SHA: {HEAD_694}
|
||||
REVIEW_STATUS: approved / approval_at_current_head
|
||||
MERGE_READY: true
|
||||
BLOCKERS: none
|
||||
VALIDATION: pytest passed; reviewer approved at head {HEAD_694}
|
||||
NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF: transport=native_mcp; entrypoint=mcp_server; token_fingerprint=abc123
|
||||
LAST_UPDATED_BY: prgs-reviewer
|
||||
"""
|
||||
result = ccv.assess_canonical_comment(body, context="pr_comment")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["allowed"], result)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestFeedbackQuarantineIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""gitea_get_pr_review_feedback must void quarantined review 427 at head."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.install_test_native_runtime()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_feedback_excludes_quarantined_approval_from_merge_auth(self):
|
||||
import mcp_server
|
||||
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"review_quarantine.mcp_session_state.default_state_dir",
|
||||
return_value=self._tmp.name,
|
||||
):
|
||||
record = review_quarantine.build_quarantine_record(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
pr_number=694,
|
||||
review_id=427,
|
||||
reviewed_head_sha=HEAD_694,
|
||||
reason="contaminated offline approval (incident #695)",
|
||||
actor_username="controller",
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-merger",
|
||||
incident_issue=695,
|
||||
forensic_comment_ids=[10883, 10886],
|
||||
)
|
||||
record["native_provenance"]["native_mcp_transport"] = True
|
||||
review_quarantine.write_quarantine_record(record)
|
||||
|
||||
def _api(method, url, auth=None, payload=None):
|
||||
if url.endswith("/pulls/694") and method == "GET":
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"number": 694,
|
||||
"state": "open",
|
||||
"head": {"sha": HEAD_694},
|
||||
"user": {"login": "jcwalker3"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
if url.endswith("/reviews"):
|
||||
return [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": 427,
|
||||
"user": {"login": "sysadmin"},
|
||||
"state": "APPROVED",
|
||||
"body": "contaminated",
|
||||
"submitted_at": "2026-07-13T07:20:00Z",
|
||||
"commit_id": HEAD_694,
|
||||
"dismissed": False,
|
||||
"stale": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
return {}
|
||||
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=_api):
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="Basic dGVzdA=="
|
||||
):
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server.get_profile",
|
||||
return_value={
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-merger",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.merge"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
"base_url": None,
|
||||
},
|
||||
):
|
||||
result = mcp_server.gitea_get_pr_review_feedback(
|
||||
pr_number=694,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result.get("success"), result)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result.get("approval_at_current_head"))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result.get("approval_visible"))
|
||||
self.assertIn(427, result.get("quarantined_review_ids") or [])
|
||||
self.assertGreaterEqual(
|
||||
result.get("quarantined_approvals_at_current_head") or 0, 1
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn("quarantined", (result.get("stale_approval_block_reason") or ""))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestDocsStopAfterNativeFailure(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_daemon_guard_doc_requires_stop(self):
|
||||
root = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
|
||||
doc = (root / "docs" / "mcp-daemon-import-guard.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||
self.assertIn("#695", doc)
|
||||
self.assertIn("STOP after native MCP failure", doc)
|
||||
self.assertIn("offline_mcp_runner", doc)
|
||||
self.assertIn("run_quarantine.py", doc)
|
||||
self.assertIn("GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT", doc)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestPR701DirectImportSessionOverrideSequence(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC9 regression: exact PR #701 contaminated-approval sequence must fail closed.
|
||||
|
||||
Observed attack:
|
||||
- GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT=1
|
||||
- import mutation tools from gitea_mcp_server
|
||||
- GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR=.mcp_session_701 (cross-PR lock evasion)
|
||||
- mark_final + submit_pr_review
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
os.environ.pop(mcp_daemon_guard.FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV, None)
|
||||
os.environ.pop(mcp_daemon_guard.SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV, None)
|
||||
os.environ.pop(mcp_daemon_guard.ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV, None)
|
||||
os.environ.pop(mcp_daemon_guard.SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV, None)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_offline_run_submit_sequence_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
"""Fresh interpreter: direct import + state-dir override cannot mark/submit."""
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||
redirect = str(Path(tmp) / ".mcp_session_701")
|
||||
snippet = textwrap.dedent(
|
||||
f"""
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
os.environ["GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT"] = "1"
|
||||
os.environ["GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR"] = {redirect!r}
|
||||
os.environ["GITEA_MCP_PROFILE"] = "prgs-reviewer"
|
||||
# No pytest modules in this subprocess.
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard as g
|
||||
assert g.is_native_mcp_transport() is False
|
||||
assert g.is_production_native_mcp_transport() is False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime("run_submit_mark")
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError as exc:
|
||||
msg = str(exc)
|
||||
assert "GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT" in msg or "#695" in msg
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise SystemExit("direct-import env authorized mutation runtime")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.mark_sanctioned_daemon()
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise SystemExit("mark_sanctioned_daemon authorized offline import")
|
||||
# Simulate decision-lock write into redirected dir only — must not
|
||||
# establish native authority.
|
||||
import mcp_session_state as ss
|
||||
wrote = ss.save_state(
|
||||
kind=ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
payload={{
|
||||
"final_review_decision_ready": True,
|
||||
"ready_pr_number": 701,
|
||||
"ready_action": "approve",
|
||||
"ready_expected_head_sha": "6b675f5c834b41f9d74e8a54294ff44dddf28ae4",
|
||||
"session_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"session_profile_lock": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"remote": "prgs",
|
||||
}},
|
||||
profile_identity="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
state_dir={redirect!r},
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert wrote is not None
|
||||
assert g.is_native_mcp_transport() is False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
g.assert_no_direct_import_bypass("gitea_submit_pr_review")
|
||||
except g.UnsanctionedRuntimeError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise SystemExit("direct-import bypass accepted for submit")
|
||||
print("OK")
|
||||
"""
|
||||
)
|
||||
proc = _run_offline_snippet(snippet)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(proc.returncode, 0, proc.stdout + proc.stderr)
|
||||
self.assertIn("OK", proc.stdout)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_session_state_dir_pin_ignores_post_bind_redirect(self):
|
||||
"""AC2: after production bind, env STATE_DIR override is ignored."""
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
import mcp_session_state
|
||||
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||
legitimate = str(Path(tmp) / "legitimate-state")
|
||||
rogue = str(Path(tmp) / ".mcp_session_701")
|
||||
os.makedirs(legitimate, mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
os.makedirs(rogue, mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_daemon_guard.SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV] = legitimate
|
||||
canonical = str((REPO_ROOT / "mcp_server.py").resolve())
|
||||
|
||||
def _fake_caller():
|
||||
return canonical
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard,
|
||||
"_caller_official_entrypoint_path",
|
||||
side_effect=_fake_caller,
|
||||
):
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard, "is_pytest_runtime", return_value=False
|
||||
):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.mark_sanctioned_daemon()
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.bind_native_mcp_transport(transport="stdio")
|
||||
pinned = mcp_daemon_guard.pinned_session_state_dir()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(pinned, str(Path(legitimate).resolve()))
|
||||
# Attacker redirects env after bind (PR #701).
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_daemon_guard.SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV] = rogue
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.pinned_session_state_dir(),
|
||||
str(Path(legitimate).resolve()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
mcp_session_state.default_state_dir(),
|
||||
str(Path(legitimate).resolve()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(
|
||||
mcp_session_state.default_state_dir(),
|
||||
str(Path(rogue).resolve()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Unpinned env view still sees rogue (diagnostics only).
|
||||
unpinned = mcp_session_state.env_session_state_dir_unpinned()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
unpinned == rogue
|
||||
or Path(unpinned).resolve() == Path(rogue).resolve(),
|
||||
unpinned,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_direct_import_env_does_not_authorize_under_force_unsanctioned(self):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.clear_native_runtime_for_tests()
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_daemon_guard.ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
os.environ[mcp_daemon_guard.FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
self.assertTrue(mcp_daemon_guard.direct_import_env_enabled())
|
||||
# Under pytest, assert_no_direct_import_bypass is a no-op; FORCE path
|
||||
# still blocks is_native / assert_sanctioned via force-unsanctioned.
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mcp_daemon_guard.is_native_mcp_transport())
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError):
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime("direct-import")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_quarantine_voids_merge_approval_for_contaminated_review(self):
|
||||
"""AC6–AC8: quarantined APPROVED does not satisfy merge approval head."""
|
||||
entry = {
|
||||
"verdict": "APPROVED",
|
||||
"dismissed": False,
|
||||
"reviewed_head_sha": "6b675f5c834b41f9d74e8a54294ff44dddf28ae4",
|
||||
"review_id": 431,
|
||||
"submitted_at": "2026-07-13T23:52:34Z",
|
||||
"quarantined": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
result = merge_approval_gate.assess_merge_approval_head(
|
||||
current_head_sha="6b675f5c834b41f9d74e8a54294ff44dddf28ae4",
|
||||
latest_by_reviewer={"sysadmin": entry},
|
||||
quarantined_review_ids={431},
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["approval_at_current_head"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["quarantined_approvals_at_current_head"], 1)
|
||||
self.assertIn("quarantined", (result["stale_approval_block_reason"] or ""))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,461 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Regression tests for #698: final-report validator vs canonical schema.
|
||||
|
||||
Covers the original #698 lead plus the independent reproduction recorded
|
||||
during the PR #703 formal review (issue #698 comment 11246):
|
||||
|
||||
1. non-dict ``action_log`` entries must fail structured, never crash;
|
||||
2. the validator must not demand legacy fields the canonical schema forbids
|
||||
(``Pinned reviewed head``, ``Scratch worktree used``, ``Worktree path``,
|
||||
``Worktree dirty``, ``Mutations``, ``Next``);
|
||||
3. a legitimately blocked report (``Candidate head SHA: none``, no formal
|
||||
verdict) must not owe approval/merge live-head proofs;
|
||||
4. canonical reviewer lease release must not be misclassified as post-merge
|
||||
cleanup;
|
||||
5. structured workflow-load and validation proof must be recognized;
|
||||
6. review mutations are inferred only from authoritative evidence.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
|
||||
import final_report_validator as frv # noqa: E402
|
||||
import post_merge_cleanup_proof as pmcp # noqa: E402
|
||||
import pr_work_lease as pwl # noqa: E402
|
||||
import review_proofs as rp # noqa: E402
|
||||
from review_final_report_schema import ( # noqa: E402
|
||||
assess_review_final_report_schema,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
REVIEWED_HEAD = "a" * 40
|
||||
LIVE_HEAD = "a" * 40
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _pr703_style_report(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
decision: str = "request_changes",
|
||||
cleanup_mutations: str = (
|
||||
"released reviewer PR lease via gitea_release_reviewer_pr_lease "
|
||||
"(terminal lease marker phase=released posted)"
|
||||
),
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
"""Canonical-schema report modeled on the PR #703 formal review handoff."""
|
||||
return f"""
|
||||
Formal review completed with a REQUEST_CHANGES verdict submitted and read
|
||||
back via the native review API.
|
||||
|
||||
## Controller Handoff
|
||||
|
||||
- Task: review-merge-pr
|
||||
- Repo: Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools
|
||||
- Role: reviewer
|
||||
- Identity: sysadmin / prgs-reviewer
|
||||
- Active profile: prgs-reviewer
|
||||
- Runtime context: neutral workspace binding
|
||||
- Selected PR: 703
|
||||
- Linked issue: #702 open
|
||||
- Eligibility class: reviewable
|
||||
- Queue ordering policy: oldest eligible first
|
||||
- Inventory pagination proof: has_more=false, total_count=8
|
||||
- Earlier PRs skipped: none
|
||||
- Candidate head SHA: {REVIEWED_HEAD}
|
||||
- Reviewed head SHA: {REVIEWED_HEAD}
|
||||
- Target branch: master
|
||||
- Target branch SHA: {"2" * 40}
|
||||
- Already-landed gate: not landed
|
||||
- Author-safety result: pass (author differs from reviewer)
|
||||
- Prior request-changes state: none
|
||||
- Review worktree used: true
|
||||
- Review worktree path: branches/review-pr-703-independent
|
||||
- Review worktree inside branches: true
|
||||
- Review worktree HEAD state: detached at pinned head
|
||||
- Review worktree dirty before validation: clean
|
||||
- Review worktree dirty after validation: clean
|
||||
- Baseline worktree used: false
|
||||
- Baseline worktree path: none
|
||||
- Files reviewed: 4
|
||||
- Validation: focused 50 passed; related 94 passed; full 2665 passed, 6 skipped
|
||||
- Official validation integrity status: intact
|
||||
- Terminal review mutation: one REQUEST_CHANGES review submitted and read back
|
||||
- Review decision: {decision}
|
||||
- Merge preflight: not run
|
||||
- Merge result: none
|
||||
- Linked issue status: open (live fetch proof: gitea_view_issue)
|
||||
- Main checkout branch: master
|
||||
- Main checkout dirty state: clean
|
||||
- Main checkout updated: false
|
||||
- File edits by reviewer: none
|
||||
- Worktree/index mutations: none
|
||||
- Git ref mutations: git fetch prgs (recorded)
|
||||
- MCP/Gitea mutations: review submission and lease comments only
|
||||
- Review mutations: one formal REQUEST_CHANGES verdict
|
||||
- Merge mutations: none
|
||||
- Cleanup mutations: {cleanup_mutations}
|
||||
- External-state mutations: none
|
||||
- Read-only diagnostics: gitea_view_pr, gitea_get_pr_review_feedback
|
||||
- Blockers: findings F1-F6 recorded on the PR thread
|
||||
- Current status: review complete; author remediation required
|
||||
- Safe next action: author addresses findings and pushes a new head
|
||||
- Safety statement: no merge attempted; no self-review; no root-checkout edits
|
||||
- Workflow-load helper result: workflow_hash=da045d1e1f1f boundary_status=clean
|
||||
- Live head SHA before approval: {LIVE_HEAD}
|
||||
- Pushes occurred during validation: no
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _blocked_preflight_report() -> str:
|
||||
"""Blocked-run report modeled on the #702 comment 11164 reproduction."""
|
||||
return """
|
||||
Fresh review preflight stopped before any worktree or validation work.
|
||||
|
||||
## Controller Handoff
|
||||
|
||||
- Task: review-merge-pr
|
||||
- Repo: Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools
|
||||
- Role: reviewer
|
||||
- Identity: sysadmin / prgs-reviewer
|
||||
- Active profile: prgs-reviewer
|
||||
- Runtime context: stale workspace binding detected
|
||||
- Selected PR: 701
|
||||
- Linked issue: #699 open
|
||||
- Eligibility class: blocked-before-validation
|
||||
- Queue ordering policy: oldest eligible first
|
||||
- Inventory pagination proof: has_more=false, total_count=8
|
||||
- Earlier PRs skipped: none
|
||||
- Candidate head SHA: none
|
||||
- Reviewed head SHA: none
|
||||
- Target branch: master
|
||||
- Target branch SHA: none
|
||||
- Already-landed gate: not run
|
||||
- Author-safety result: not run
|
||||
- Prior request-changes state: none
|
||||
- Review worktree used: false
|
||||
- Review worktree path: none
|
||||
- Review worktree inside branches: not applicable
|
||||
- Review worktree HEAD state: not applicable
|
||||
- Review worktree dirty before validation: not applicable
|
||||
- Review worktree dirty after validation: not applicable
|
||||
- Baseline worktree used: false
|
||||
- Baseline worktree path: none
|
||||
- Files reviewed: 0
|
||||
- Validation: not run
|
||||
- Official validation integrity status: not applicable
|
||||
- Terminal review mutation: none
|
||||
- Review decision: none
|
||||
- Merge preflight: not run
|
||||
- Merge result: none
|
||||
- Linked issue status: open (live fetch proof: gitea_view_issue)
|
||||
- Main checkout branch: master
|
||||
- Main checkout dirty state: clean
|
||||
- Main checkout updated: false
|
||||
- File edits by reviewer: none
|
||||
- Worktree/index mutations: none
|
||||
- Git ref mutations: none
|
||||
- MCP/Gitea mutations: none
|
||||
- Review mutations: none
|
||||
- Merge mutations: none
|
||||
- Cleanup mutations: none
|
||||
- External-state mutations: none
|
||||
- Read-only diagnostics: gitea_view_pr, gitea_get_runtime_context
|
||||
- Blockers: runtime bound to a foreign task worktree; mutation prohibited
|
||||
- Current status: stopped before validation began
|
||||
- Next actor: operator
|
||||
- Next action: repair the runtime workspace binding, then rerun the full
|
||||
review workflow in a fresh reviewer session
|
||||
- Next prompt: Act as REVIEWER for PR 701 after the operator repairs the
|
||||
runtime binding; acquire the lease before any validation.
|
||||
- Safe next action: operator repairs runtime binding, then a fresh reviewer
|
||||
reruns the full workflow
|
||||
- Safety statement: no lease acquired; no verdict recorded; no source edits
|
||||
- Workflow-load helper result: workflow_hash=da045d1e1f1f boundary_status=clean
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestActionLogRobustness(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""#698 original lead: non-dict action_log must not crash validation."""
|
||||
|
||||
MALFORMED = [
|
||||
"git fetch prgs",
|
||||
42,
|
||||
None,
|
||||
{"action": "edit", "path": "x.py", "performed": True, "tracked": True},
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
def test_assess_final_report_validator_survives_malformed_entries(self):
|
||||
result = frv.assess_final_report_validator(
|
||||
_pr703_style_report(),
|
||||
"review_pr",
|
||||
action_log=self.MALFORMED,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsInstance(result, dict)
|
||||
rule_ids = {f["rule_id"] for f in result["findings"]}
|
||||
self.assertIn("shared.action_log_malformed", rule_ids)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_malformed_entry_errors_are_sanitized(self):
|
||||
_entries, findings = frv.sanitize_action_log(["secret-token-abc123"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(findings), 1)
|
||||
reason = findings[0]["reason"]
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("secret-token-abc123", reason)
|
||||
self.assertIn("str", reason)
|
||||
self.assertIn("entry 0", reason)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_non_list_action_log_is_reported_not_raised(self):
|
||||
entries, findings = frv.sanitize_action_log("not-a-list")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(entries, [])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(findings), 1)
|
||||
self.assertIn("not a list", findings[0]["reason"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_performed_file_mutations_skips_non_dict_entries(self):
|
||||
performed = rp._performed_file_mutations(
|
||||
["oops", {"action": "edited", "path": "a.py"}]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(performed), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(performed[0]["path"], "a.py")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_schema_entrypoint_survives_string_only_log(self):
|
||||
result = assess_review_final_report_schema(
|
||||
_pr703_style_report(),
|
||||
action_log=["just a string", "another string"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsInstance(result, dict)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestLegacyFieldRequirementsRemoved(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""#698: prohibited legacy fields must not be REQUIRED of reports."""
|
||||
|
||||
PROHIBITED = (
|
||||
"Pinned reviewed head",
|
||||
"Scratch worktree used",
|
||||
"Worktree path",
|
||||
"Worktree dirty",
|
||||
"Workspace mutations",
|
||||
"Mutations",
|
||||
"Next",
|
||||
"Issue/PR",
|
||||
"Branch/SHA",
|
||||
"Files changed",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_review_role_field_table_has_no_prohibited_requirements(self):
|
||||
names = [name for name, _ in rp.HANDOFF_ROLE_FIELDS["review"]]
|
||||
for prohibited in ("Pinned reviewed head", "Scratch worktree used",
|
||||
"Worktree path", "Worktree dirty"):
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(prohibited, names)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_merger_role_field_table_has_no_pinned_reviewed_head(self):
|
||||
names = [name for name, _ in rp.HANDOFF_ROLE_FIELDS["merger"]]
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("Pinned reviewed head", names)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_canonical_report_missing_fields_never_include_prohibited(self):
|
||||
result = rp.assess_controller_handoff(
|
||||
_pr703_style_report(), role="review"
|
||||
)
|
||||
for prohibited in self.PROHIBITED:
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(prohibited, result.get("missing_fields") or [])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_canonical_pr703_report_satisfies_required_fields(self):
|
||||
result = rp.assess_controller_handoff(
|
||||
_pr703_style_report(), role="review"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.get("missing_fields") or [], [])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.get("verdict"), "complete")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestBlockedReportAccepted(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""#698: blocked run with no reviewed head / verdict is legitimate."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_stale_head_proof_waived_before_validation(self):
|
||||
result = pwl.assess_reviewer_stale_head_final_report(
|
||||
_blocked_preflight_report()
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["proven"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.get("phase"), "blocked_before_validation")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_blocked_report_passes_schema_validation(self):
|
||||
result = assess_review_final_report_schema(_blocked_preflight_report())
|
||||
blocking = [
|
||||
f for f in result["findings"] if f["severity"] == "block"
|
||||
]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(blocking, [], blocking)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_verdict_phase_still_demands_approval_head_proof(self):
|
||||
report = _blocked_preflight_report().replace(
|
||||
"- Review decision: none",
|
||||
"- Review decision: approve",
|
||||
).replace(
|
||||
"- Candidate head SHA: none",
|
||||
f"- Candidate head SHA: {REVIEWED_HEAD}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = pwl.assess_reviewer_stale_head_final_report(report)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
|
||||
joined = " ".join(result["reasons"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("before approval", joined)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_merge_phase_still_demands_merge_head_proof(self):
|
||||
report = _pr703_style_report().replace(
|
||||
"- Merge result: none",
|
||||
"- Merge result: merged",
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = pwl.assess_reviewer_stale_head_final_report(report)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
"final live head SHA before merge not stated",
|
||||
result["reasons"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_validation_phase_demands_push_disclosure(self):
|
||||
report = _pr703_style_report().replace(
|
||||
"- Pushes occurred during validation: no\n", ""
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = pwl.assess_reviewer_stale_head_final_report(report)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
"whether push occurred during validation not stated",
|
||||
result["reasons"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestLeaseReleaseVsPostMergeCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""#698 (PR #703 review reproduction): lease release is not cleanup."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_lease_release_cleanup_mutations_do_not_demand_checklist(self):
|
||||
result = pmcp.assess_post_merge_cleanup_proof(_pr703_style_report())
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["block"], result["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_release_tool_name_alone_is_recognized(self):
|
||||
report = _pr703_style_report(
|
||||
cleanup_mutations="gitea_release_reviewer_pr_lease comment 11244"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = pmcp.assess_post_merge_cleanup_proof(report)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["block"], result["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_substantive_non_lease_cleanup_still_demands_checklist(self):
|
||||
report = _pr703_style_report(
|
||||
cleanup_mutations="deleted stale scratch directory manually"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = pmcp.assess_post_merge_cleanup_proof(report)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["block"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_remote_branch_delete_claims_still_demand_full_proof(self):
|
||||
report = _pr703_style_report(
|
||||
cleanup_mutations="gitea_delete_branch removed the remote branch"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = pmcp.assess_post_merge_cleanup_proof(report)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["block"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("remote branch deletion missing" in r for r in result["reasons"])
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_full_schema_run_accepts_lease_release_report(self):
|
||||
result = assess_review_final_report_schema(_pr703_style_report())
|
||||
lease_cleanup_blocks = [
|
||||
f for f in result["findings"]
|
||||
if f["rule_id"] == "reviewer.post_merge_cleanup_proof"
|
||||
]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(lease_cleanup_blocks, [], lease_cleanup_blocks)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestStructuredProofRecognition(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""#698: structured workflow-load and validation proof must be accepted."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_key_value_workflow_proof_recognized(self):
|
||||
findings = frv._rule_reviewer_workflow_load_boundary(
|
||||
_pr703_style_report()
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(findings, [], findings)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_colon_form_workflow_proof_still_recognized(self):
|
||||
report = _pr703_style_report().replace(
|
||||
"- Workflow-load helper result: workflow_hash=da045d1e1f1f "
|
||||
"boundary_status=clean",
|
||||
"- Workflow-load helper result: workflow_hash: da045d1e1f1f, "
|
||||
"boundary_status: clean",
|
||||
)
|
||||
findings = frv._rule_reviewer_workflow_load_boundary(report)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(findings, [], findings)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_incomplete_structured_proof_still_blocks(self):
|
||||
report = _pr703_style_report().replace(
|
||||
"workflow_hash=da045d1e1f1f boundary_status=clean",
|
||||
"workflow_hash=da045d1e1f1f",
|
||||
)
|
||||
findings = frv._rule_reviewer_workflow_load_boundary(report)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(findings)
|
||||
self.assertIn("boundary_status", findings[0]["reason"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_validation_counts_accepted_as_pass_proof(self):
|
||||
# "Validation: focused 50 passed; ..." must satisfy the reviewed-head
|
||||
# validation-proof rule (PR #703 reproduction).
|
||||
result = assess_review_final_report_schema(_pr703_style_report())
|
||||
head_blocks = [
|
||||
f for f in result["findings"]
|
||||
if f["rule_id"] == "reviewer.reviewed_head_without_validation"
|
||||
]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(head_blocks, [], head_blocks)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestAuthoritativeMutationInference(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""#698: review mutations inferred only from authoritative evidence."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_read_only_entries_do_not_imply_mutations(self):
|
||||
report = "## Controller Handoff\n- Mutations: none\n"
|
||||
findings = frv._rule_reviewer_vague_mutations_none(
|
||||
report,
|
||||
action_log=[
|
||||
{"action": "gitea_view_pr"},
|
||||
{"action": "gitea_get_pr_review_feedback", "performed": False},
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(findings, [], findings)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_performed_mutation_still_blocks_vague_none(self):
|
||||
report = "## Controller Handoff\n- Mutations: none\n"
|
||||
findings = frv._rule_reviewer_vague_mutations_none(
|
||||
report,
|
||||
action_log=[{"action": "edit", "path": "a.py", "performed": True}],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(findings)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_gated_rejection_is_not_a_mutation(self):
|
||||
report = "## Controller Handoff\n- Mutations: none\n"
|
||||
findings = frv._rule_reviewer_vague_mutations_none(
|
||||
report,
|
||||
action_log=[
|
||||
{"action": "edit", "path": "a.py", "performed": True,
|
||||
"gated_rejected": True},
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(findings, [], findings)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestValidatorRuleErrorContainment(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""#698: a defective rule fails closed with a sanitized error."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_rule_exception_becomes_sanitized_block_finding(self):
|
||||
def _boom(report_text):
|
||||
raise ValueError("raw secret detail that must not leak")
|
||||
|
||||
original = frv._RULES_BY_TASK["review_pr"]
|
||||
frv._RULES_BY_TASK["review_pr"] = [_boom]
|
||||
try:
|
||||
result = frv.assess_final_report_validator(
|
||||
"report body", "review_pr"
|
||||
)
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
frv._RULES_BY_TASK["review_pr"] = original
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["blocked"])
|
||||
finding = next(
|
||||
f for f in result["findings"]
|
||||
if f["rule_id"] == "shared.validator_rule_error"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("raw secret detail", finding["reason"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("ValueError", finding["reason"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("_boom", finding["reason"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,693 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Regression tests for the PR #703 REQUEST_CHANGES findings F1–F6 (#702).
|
||||
|
||||
Formal review at head 889931d independently reproduced six defects:
|
||||
|
||||
F1 — stale-binding recovery ran only AFTER the terminal launcher probe in
|
||||
``gitea_resolve_task_capability``; a worktree removed mid-session wedged
|
||||
every mutation-task resolution on 'missing cwd' before recovery.
|
||||
F2 — ``_resolve_preflight_workspace_path`` skipped the existence checks the
|
||||
canonical mutation context applies; a dead binding could produce empty
|
||||
porcelain and read as a clean workspace.
|
||||
F3 — ``orphaned_expired_superseded_head`` cleanup accepted unknown
|
||||
``worktree_exists``/``worktree_clean`` evidence.
|
||||
F4 — the 4-hour session-state TTL silently discarded recovery-critical
|
||||
crash-orphan shadow evidence.
|
||||
F5 — the single same-profile shadow slot let concurrent sessions overwrite
|
||||
each other's crash evidence.
|
||||
F6 — the environment was cleared BEFORE the audit record was persisted, and
|
||||
audit-write failure was swallowed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import shutil
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_session_state as mss # noqa: E402
|
||||
import namespace_workspace_binding as nwb # noqa: E402
|
||||
import reviewer_pr_lease as leases # noqa: E402
|
||||
import stale_binding_recovery as sbr # noqa: E402
|
||||
import mcp_server # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
REPO = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
OLD_HEAD = "b" * 40
|
||||
NEW_HEAD = "6" * 40
|
||||
|
||||
CONFIG = {
|
||||
"version": 2,
|
||||
"contexts": {
|
||||
"ctx": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.example.com"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"profiles": {
|
||||
"prgs-author": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"context": "ctx",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"username": "jcwalker3",
|
||||
"auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_AUTHOR"},
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create", "gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "prgs-author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _now() -> datetime:
|
||||
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _CapabilityHarness(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Shared config/env plumbing for resolve-capability integration tests."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._remotes = patch.dict(mcp_server.REMOTES, {
|
||||
"prgs": {
|
||||
"host": "gitea.example.com",
|
||||
"org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
"repo": "Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
self._remotes.start()
|
||||
mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
|
||||
self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.config_path = os.path.join(self._dir.name, "profiles.json")
|
||||
with open(self.config_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
fh.write(json.dumps(CONFIG))
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
self._remotes.stop()
|
||||
mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
|
||||
self._dir.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
def _env(self, **extra):
|
||||
env = {
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author",
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_AUTHOR": "author-pass",
|
||||
}
|
||||
env.update(extra)
|
||||
return env
|
||||
|
||||
def _deleted_worktree(self) -> str:
|
||||
path = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-removed-worktree-")
|
||||
shutil.rmtree(path)
|
||||
return path
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestF1RecoveryBeforeTerminalProbe(_CapabilityHarness):
|
||||
"""F1: recovery must run before the terminal cwd probe can wedge."""
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "jcwalker3"})
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
|
||||
def test_removed_worktree_recovers_before_probe(self, _auth, _api):
|
||||
missing = self._deleted_worktree()
|
||||
env = self._env(
|
||||
GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE=missing,
|
||||
GITEA_FORCE_TERMINAL_PROBE="1",
|
||||
GITEA_FORCE_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY="1",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env):
|
||||
res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="create_pr", remote="prgs"
|
||||
)
|
||||
# The provably-stale binding was cleared before the probe ran.
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", os.environ)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("terminal_launcher_unhealthy"))
|
||||
report = res.get("stale_binding_recovery") or {}
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
report.get("classification"),
|
||||
sbr.CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(report.get("recovery_performed"))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("allowed_in_current_session"))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "jcwalker3"})
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
|
||||
def test_probe_block_still_carries_recovery_report(self, _auth, _api):
|
||||
# Recovery disabled (test mode without the force flag) preserves the
|
||||
# fail-closed probe block, but the block must now carry the
|
||||
# classification evidence instead of hiding it.
|
||||
missing = self._deleted_worktree()
|
||||
env = self._env(
|
||||
GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE=missing,
|
||||
GITEA_FORCE_TERMINAL_PROBE="1",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env):
|
||||
res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="create_pr", remote="prgs"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", os.environ)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("terminal_launcher_unhealthy"))
|
||||
report = res.get("stale_binding_recovery") or {}
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
report.get("classification"),
|
||||
sbr.CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(report.get("recovery_performed"))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "jcwalker3"})
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
|
||||
def test_unverified_binding_is_never_cleared_by_reordering(self, _auth, _api):
|
||||
# F1 must not weaken authorization: an existing, uncorroborated
|
||||
# binding survives resolution untouched even with recovery forced.
|
||||
existing = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-existing-worktree-")
|
||||
self.addCleanup(shutil.rmtree, existing, ignore_errors=True)
|
||||
env = self._env(
|
||||
GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE=existing,
|
||||
GITEA_FORCE_TERMINAL_PROBE="1",
|
||||
GITEA_FORCE_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY="1",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env):
|
||||
res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="create_pr", remote="prgs"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"), existing)
|
||||
report = res.get("stale_binding_recovery") or {}
|
||||
self.assertFalse(report.get("recovery_performed"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestF2PreflightPathVerification(_CapabilityHarness):
|
||||
"""F2: preflight and mutation contexts verify resolved paths alike."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_preflight_and_mutation_context_agree_on_dead_binding(self):
|
||||
missing = self._deleted_worktree()
|
||||
env = self._env(GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE=missing)
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env):
|
||||
preflight = mcp_server._resolve_preflight_workspace_path(None)
|
||||
mutation = mcp_server._resolve_namespace_mutation_context(None)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(preflight, mutation["workspace_path"])
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(preflight, os.path.realpath(missing))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_missing_explicit_worktree_never_reads_clean(self):
|
||||
missing = self._deleted_worktree()
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env()):
|
||||
porcelain = mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain(worktree_path=missing)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
porcelain, mcp_server.PREFLIGHT_WORKSPACE_UNAVAILABLE_PORCELAIN
|
||||
)
|
||||
# The sentinel parses as a tracked dirty entry — never clean.
|
||||
self.assertTrue(mcp_server._parse_porcelain_entries(porcelain))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_workspace_deleted_during_evaluation_never_reads_clean(self):
|
||||
# TOCTOU: resolution succeeded, then the path vanished before git ran.
|
||||
missing = self._deleted_worktree()
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env()):
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"_resolve_preflight_workspace_path",
|
||||
return_value=missing,
|
||||
):
|
||||
porcelain = mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
porcelain, mcp_server.PREFLIGHT_WORKSPACE_UNAVAILABLE_PORCELAIN
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_git_failure_never_reads_clean(self):
|
||||
class _Failed:
|
||||
returncode = 128
|
||||
stdout = ""
|
||||
stderr = "fatal: not a git repository"
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env()):
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server.subprocess, "run", return_value=_Failed()
|
||||
):
|
||||
porcelain = mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
porcelain, mcp_server.PREFLIGHT_WORKSPACE_UNAVAILABLE_PORCELAIN
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_symlinked_binding_to_deleted_target_is_demoted(self):
|
||||
target = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-symlink-target-")
|
||||
holder = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-symlink-holder-")
|
||||
self.addCleanup(shutil.rmtree, holder, ignore_errors=True)
|
||||
link = os.path.join(holder, "worktree-link")
|
||||
os.symlink(target, link)
|
||||
shutil.rmtree(target)
|
||||
demotions: list[str] = []
|
||||
_path, source = nwb.resolve_namespace_workspace(
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
process_project_root=os.getcwd(),
|
||||
env={"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": link},
|
||||
demotions=demotions,
|
||||
verify_paths=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(source, "MCP server process root (default)")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(demotions), 1)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dead_binding_falls_through_to_live_role_binding(self):
|
||||
# Path changes during evaluation: the dead candidate demotes at
|
||||
# verification time and never resurrects over the live fallback.
|
||||
alive = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-alive-worktree-")
|
||||
self.addCleanup(shutil.rmtree, alive, ignore_errors=True)
|
||||
missing = self._deleted_worktree()
|
||||
path, source = nwb.resolve_namespace_workspace(
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
process_project_root=os.getcwd(),
|
||||
env={
|
||||
"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": missing,
|
||||
"GITEA_REVIEWER_WORKTREE": alive,
|
||||
},
|
||||
verify_paths=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(path, os.path.realpath(alive))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
source, "GITEA_REVIEWER_WORKTREE environment variable"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestF3AffirmativeWorktreeEvidence(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""F3: unknown worktree evidence must fail closed for crash orphans."""
|
||||
|
||||
def _comments(self) -> list[dict]:
|
||||
stale = _now() - timedelta(hours=3)
|
||||
body = leases.format_lease_body(
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
pr_number=701,
|
||||
issue_number=699,
|
||||
reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
|
||||
profile="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
session_id="65664-4f248d213d60",
|
||||
worktree="branches/review-pr-654",
|
||||
phase="validation-start",
|
||||
candidate_head=OLD_HEAD,
|
||||
target_branch="master",
|
||||
target_branch_sha="2" * 40,
|
||||
last_activity=stale,
|
||||
expires_at=stale + timedelta(minutes=120),
|
||||
)
|
||||
return [{
|
||||
"id": 11131,
|
||||
"body": body,
|
||||
"user": {"login": "sysadmin"},
|
||||
"author": "sysadmin",
|
||||
"created_at": stale.isoformat(),
|
||||
"updated_at": stale.isoformat(),
|
||||
}]
|
||||
|
||||
def _assess(self, **kwargs):
|
||||
defaults = dict(
|
||||
pr_number=701,
|
||||
current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
|
||||
formal_reviews=[],
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
expected_repo=REPO,
|
||||
requesting_session_id="fresh-controller",
|
||||
controller_recovery_authorized=True,
|
||||
owner_process_alive=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
defaults.update(kwargs)
|
||||
return leases.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
|
||||
self._comments(), **defaults
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unknown_worktree_evidence_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
result = self._assess(worktree_exists=None, worktree_clean=None)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
result["classification"], "orphaned_expired_superseded_head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
"affirmative safe evidence",
|
||||
" ".join(result["fail_closed_reasons"]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unknown_cleanliness_with_existing_worktree_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
result = self._assess(worktree_exists=True, worktree_clean=None)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_affirmative_clean_worktree_is_eligible(self):
|
||||
result = self._assess(worktree_exists=True, worktree_clean=True)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
result["classification"], "orphaned_expired_superseded_head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_affirmative_absent_worktree_is_eligible(self):
|
||||
result = self._assess(worktree_exists=False, worktree_clean=None)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_matrix_matches_diagnosis_gate(self):
|
||||
# The cleanup matrix and the diagnosis path must agree: unknown
|
||||
# evidence yields acquire-only, affirmative evidence yields cleanup.
|
||||
diagnosis_unknown = leases.diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
|
||||
self._comments(),
|
||||
pr_number=701,
|
||||
current_session_id=None,
|
||||
current_reviewer_identity="fresh-reviewer",
|
||||
current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
|
||||
formal_reviews=[],
|
||||
owner_process_alive=False,
|
||||
worktree_exists=None,
|
||||
worktree_clean=None,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assess_unknown = self._assess(worktree_exists=None, worktree_clean=None)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(
|
||||
diagnosis_unknown["next_action"],
|
||||
"cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(assess_unknown["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestF4CrashShadowDurability(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""F4: crash-orphan evidence survives the former 4h TTL boundary."""
|
||||
|
||||
SID = "82984-abcabcabcabc"
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self._env = patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR": self._dir.name}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._env.start()
|
||||
leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
self._env.stop()
|
||||
self._dir.cleanup()
|
||||
leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
|
||||
|
||||
def _age_record(self, kind: str, hours: float, instance_id: str | None = None):
|
||||
path = mss.state_file_path(kind=kind, instance_id=instance_id)
|
||||
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
envelope = json.load(fh)
|
||||
stamp = (
|
||||
(_now() - timedelta(hours=hours)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
|
||||
)
|
||||
envelope["recorded_at"] = stamp
|
||||
envelope["updated_at"] = stamp
|
||||
envelope["payload"]["recorded_at"] = stamp
|
||||
envelope["payload"]["updated_at"] = stamp
|
||||
with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
json.dump(envelope, fh)
|
||||
|
||||
def _save_shadow(self) -> None:
|
||||
mss.save_state(
|
||||
kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE,
|
||||
instance_id=self.SID,
|
||||
payload={"session_id": self.SID, "owner_pid": os.getpid()},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def _load_shadow(self):
|
||||
return mss.load_state(
|
||||
kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, instance_id=self.SID
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_shadow_loads_before_former_ttl_boundary(self):
|
||||
self._save_shadow()
|
||||
self._age_record(
|
||||
mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, hours=3.9, instance_id=self.SID
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(self._load_shadow())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_shadow_loads_at_former_ttl_boundary(self):
|
||||
self._save_shadow()
|
||||
self._age_record(
|
||||
mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, hours=4.0, instance_id=self.SID
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(self._load_shadow())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_shadow_loads_long_after_former_ttl_boundary(self):
|
||||
self._save_shadow()
|
||||
self._age_record(
|
||||
mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, hours=27.0, instance_id=self.SID
|
||||
)
|
||||
record = self._load_shadow()
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(record)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(record.get("session_id"), self.SID)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_stale_binding_audit_record_is_also_durable(self):
|
||||
mss.save_state(
|
||||
kind=mss.KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY,
|
||||
payload={"cleared_env": "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._age_record(mss.KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY, hours=27.0)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(
|
||||
mss.load_state(kind=mss.KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_non_recovery_kinds_keep_ttl(self):
|
||||
mss.save_state(
|
||||
kind=mss.KIND_WORKFLOW_LOAD, payload={"workflow_hash": "abc"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._age_record(mss.KIND_WORKFLOW_LOAD, hours=5.0)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(mss.load_state(kind=mss.KIND_WORKFLOW_LOAD))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_sanctioned_clear_is_the_terminal_reconciliation(self):
|
||||
self._save_shadow()
|
||||
self._age_record(
|
||||
mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, hours=27.0, instance_id=self.SID
|
||||
)
|
||||
mss.clear_state(
|
||||
kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, instance_id=self.SID
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(self._load_shadow())
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
mss.list_states(kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE), []
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_crash_orphan_recovery_works_after_former_ttl(self):
|
||||
# End to end: a crashed session's shadow still proves owner exit a
|
||||
# day later.
|
||||
leases.record_session_lease(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"pr_number": 701,
|
||||
"session_id": self.SID,
|
||||
"worktree": "branches/review-pr-654",
|
||||
"candidate_head": OLD_HEAD,
|
||||
"repo": REPO,
|
||||
"comment_id": 11131,
|
||||
"profile": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"reviewer_identity": "sysadmin",
|
||||
"phase": "claimed",
|
||||
},
|
||||
lease_provenance={"source": "acquire", "comment_id": 11131},
|
||||
)
|
||||
leases._SESSION_LEASE = None # simulated crash: no sanctioned clear
|
||||
self._age_record(
|
||||
mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE, hours=27.0, instance_id=self.SID
|
||||
)
|
||||
shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(shadow)
|
||||
verdict = leases.assess_crashed_session_lease_orphan(
|
||||
shadow,
|
||||
lease={"session_id": self.SID},
|
||||
current_pid=os.getpid() + 1,
|
||||
pid_alive=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(verdict["orphan_evidence"])
|
||||
self.assertIs(verdict["owner_process_alive"], False)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestF5ConcurrentSessionShadows(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""F5: concurrent same-profile sessions keep distinct shadow records."""
|
||||
|
||||
SID_A = "11111-aaaaaaaaaaaa"
|
||||
SID_B = "22222-bbbbbbbbbbbb"
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self._env = patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR": self._dir.name}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._env.start()
|
||||
leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
self._env.stop()
|
||||
self._dir.cleanup()
|
||||
leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
|
||||
|
||||
def _lease(self, session_id: str, pr_number: int, head: str) -> dict:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"pr_number": pr_number,
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"worktree": f"branches/review-pr-{pr_number}-{session_id[:5]}",
|
||||
"candidate_head": head,
|
||||
"repo": REPO,
|
||||
"comment_id": 11221,
|
||||
"profile": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"reviewer_identity": "sysadmin",
|
||||
"phase": "claimed",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
def _record(self, lease: dict) -> None:
|
||||
leases.record_session_lease(
|
||||
lease,
|
||||
lease_provenance={"source": "acquire", "comment_id": 11221},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_interleaved_sessions_do_not_overwrite_each_other(self):
|
||||
self._record(self._lease(self.SID_A, 703, OLD_HEAD))
|
||||
self._record(self._lease(self.SID_B, 701, NEW_HEAD))
|
||||
# Session A heartbeats again after B wrote.
|
||||
updated_a = self._lease(self.SID_A, 703, OLD_HEAD)
|
||||
updated_a["phase"] = "validation-start"
|
||||
self._record(updated_a)
|
||||
|
||||
shadow_a = leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_A)
|
||||
shadow_b = leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_B)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(shadow_a.get("session_id"), self.SID_A)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(shadow_a.get("pr_number"), 703)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(shadow_a.get("phase"), "validation-start")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(shadow_b.get("session_id"), self.SID_B)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(shadow_b.get("pr_number"), 701)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(shadow_b.get("candidate_head"), NEW_HEAD)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_shadow_lookup_never_misattributes(self):
|
||||
self._record(self._lease(self.SID_A, 703, OLD_HEAD))
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(
|
||||
leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_B)
|
||||
)
|
||||
verdict = leases.assess_crashed_session_lease_orphan(
|
||||
leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_A),
|
||||
lease={"session_id": self.SID_B},
|
||||
pid_alive=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(verdict["orphan_evidence"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_clearing_one_session_preserves_the_other(self):
|
||||
self._record(self._lease(self.SID_A, 703, OLD_HEAD))
|
||||
self._record(self._lease(self.SID_B, 701, NEW_HEAD))
|
||||
# Sanctioned clear of B (the currently recorded in-memory lease).
|
||||
leases.clear_session_lease()
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(
|
||||
leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_B)
|
||||
)
|
||||
shadow_a = leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_A)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(shadow_a)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(shadow_a.get("session_id"), self.SID_A)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reconnected_process_recovers_by_session_id(self):
|
||||
self._record(self._lease(self.SID_A, 703, OLD_HEAD))
|
||||
self._record(self._lease(self.SID_B, 701, NEW_HEAD))
|
||||
# Simulated crash + reconnect: in-memory state is gone, durable
|
||||
# records remain enumerable and individually attributable.
|
||||
leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
|
||||
records = mss.list_states(kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
sorted(r.get("session_id") for r in records),
|
||||
sorted([self.SID_A, self.SID_B]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_B)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(shadow.get("pr_number"), 701)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_legacy_single_slot_record_still_resolves_by_session_id(self):
|
||||
# Upgrade path: a record written by pre-F5 code (no instance key)
|
||||
# remains usable when its payload names the requested session.
|
||||
mss.save_state(
|
||||
kind=mss.KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE,
|
||||
payload={"session_id": self.SID_A, "owner_pid": os.getpid()},
|
||||
)
|
||||
shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_A)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(shadow)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(
|
||||
leases.load_session_lease_shadow(session_id=self.SID_B)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestF6AuditBeforeClear(_CapabilityHarness):
|
||||
"""F6: the durable audit record is persisted before the env clears."""
|
||||
|
||||
def _recovery_env(self, missing: str) -> dict:
|
||||
return self._env(
|
||||
GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE=missing,
|
||||
GITEA_FORCE_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY="1",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_audit_write_failure_blocks_the_clear(self):
|
||||
missing = self._deleted_worktree()
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._recovery_env(missing)):
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mss, "save_state", side_effect=OSError("disk full")
|
||||
):
|
||||
report = mcp_server._assess_stale_active_binding(
|
||||
auto_recover=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"), missing)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(report["recovery_performed"])
|
||||
self.assertIs(report.get("audit_persisted"), False)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(report.get("audit_write_failed"))
|
||||
self.assertIn("NOT cleared", " ".join(report.get("reasons") or []))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_retry_after_audit_failure_recovers(self):
|
||||
missing = self._deleted_worktree()
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._recovery_env(missing)):
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mss, "save_state", side_effect=OSError("disk full")
|
||||
):
|
||||
first = mcp_server._assess_stale_active_binding(
|
||||
auto_recover=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(first["recovery_performed"])
|
||||
# Persistence recovered; the retry clears with a durable audit.
|
||||
second = mcp_server._assess_stale_active_binding(auto_recover=True)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(second["recovery_performed"])
|
||||
self.assertIs(second.get("audit_persisted"), True)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", os.environ)
|
||||
audit = mss.load_state(kind=mss.KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(audit)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(audit.get("recovery_status"), "performed")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(audit.get("cleared_value"), missing)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_audit_record_exists_before_env_clear(self):
|
||||
missing = self._deleted_worktree()
|
||||
observed: list[tuple[str | None, str | None]] = []
|
||||
real_save = mss.save_state
|
||||
|
||||
def _spy(**kwargs):
|
||||
observed.append(
|
||||
(
|
||||
(kwargs.get("payload") or {}).get("recovery_status"),
|
||||
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
return real_save(**kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._recovery_env(missing)):
|
||||
with patch.object(mss, "save_state", side_effect=_spy):
|
||||
report = mcp_server._assess_stale_active_binding(
|
||||
auto_recover=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(report["recovery_performed"])
|
||||
self.assertGreaterEqual(len(observed), 2)
|
||||
pending_status, env_at_pending = observed[0]
|
||||
performed_status, env_at_performed = observed[-1]
|
||||
# Ordering proof: the binding was still present while the pending
|
||||
# audit persisted, and gone by the time the performed status wrote.
|
||||
self.assertEqual(pending_status, "pending")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(env_at_pending, missing)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(performed_status, "performed")
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(env_at_performed)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_recovery_is_idempotent_after_success(self):
|
||||
missing = self._deleted_worktree()
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._recovery_env(missing)):
|
||||
first = mcp_server._assess_stale_active_binding(auto_recover=True)
|
||||
second = mcp_server._assess_stale_active_binding(auto_recover=True)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(first["recovery_performed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(second["classification"], sbr.CLASSIFICATION_UNBOUND)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(second["recovery_performed"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,517 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Regression tests for #702: stale runtime binding + orphaned durable lease.
|
||||
|
||||
Reproduces the PR #701 incident (lease 65664-4f248d213d60, comments
|
||||
11129/11131): the MCP daemon crashed without teardown, destroying the
|
||||
in-memory session lease while the durable comment lease survived, and the
|
||||
auto-reconnected daemon inherited a stale ``GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE`` binding
|
||||
(``branches/review-pr-654``) from its parent environment.
|
||||
|
||||
Covers the five mandated scenarios:
|
||||
|
||||
1. lost in-session leases — durable shadow survives a crash and yields
|
||||
provable owner-process evidence
|
||||
2. old-head leases — expired superseded-head lease with no terminal
|
||||
review becomes recoverable only with orphan evidence + controller authority
|
||||
3. runtime/worktree mismatch — env bindings to deleted worktrees are demoted,
|
||||
never silently bound
|
||||
4. managed reconnect — boot-inherited uncorroborated bindings are
|
||||
surfaced for managed recovery; provably stale ones are clear-eligible
|
||||
5. safe expiry — pre-expiry stays fail-closed wait (no steal);
|
||||
canonical expiry unlocks acquisition and guarded cleanup
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
|
||||
import namespace_workspace_binding as nwb # noqa: E402
|
||||
import reviewer_pr_lease as leases # noqa: E402
|
||||
import stale_binding_recovery as sbr # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
# PR #701 incident fixtures.
|
||||
OLD_HEAD = "b4d0cb22e452a07c8e816745c704ddb0f43edf0b"
|
||||
NEW_HEAD = "6b675f5c834b41f9d74e8a54294ff44dddf28ae4"
|
||||
CRASHED_SESSION = "65664-4f248d213d60"
|
||||
LEASE_COMMENT = 11131
|
||||
REPO = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
PR = 701
|
||||
ISSUE = 699
|
||||
LEASE_WORKTREE = "branches/review-fix-issue-699-structured-auth-mcp-errors"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _now() -> datetime:
|
||||
return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _lease_comment(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
phase: str = "validation-start",
|
||||
candidate_head: str = OLD_HEAD,
|
||||
session_id: str = CRASHED_SESSION,
|
||||
comment_id: int = LEASE_COMMENT,
|
||||
last_activity: datetime | None = None,
|
||||
expires_at: datetime | None = None,
|
||||
worktree: str = LEASE_WORKTREE,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
stamp = last_activity or _now()
|
||||
body = leases.format_lease_body(
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
pr_number=PR,
|
||||
issue_number=ISSUE,
|
||||
reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
|
||||
profile="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
session_id=session_id,
|
||||
worktree=worktree,
|
||||
phase=phase,
|
||||
candidate_head=candidate_head,
|
||||
target_branch="master",
|
||||
target_branch_sha="2" * 40,
|
||||
last_activity=stamp,
|
||||
expires_at=expires_at,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"id": comment_id,
|
||||
"body": body,
|
||||
"user": {"login": "sysadmin"},
|
||||
"author": "sysadmin",
|
||||
"created_at": stamp.isoformat(),
|
||||
"updated_at": stamp.isoformat(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _expired_superseded_comments() -> list[dict]:
|
||||
stale = _now() - timedelta(hours=3)
|
||||
return [_lease_comment(
|
||||
last_activity=stale,
|
||||
expires_at=stale + timedelta(minutes=120),
|
||||
)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _fresh_superseded_comments() -> list[dict]:
|
||||
recent = _now() - timedelta(minutes=10)
|
||||
return [_lease_comment(
|
||||
last_activity=recent,
|
||||
expires_at=recent + timedelta(minutes=120),
|
||||
)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestLostInSessionLeaseShadow(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Scenario 1: the durable shadow survives a daemon crash (#702 AC3)."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
|
||||
|
||||
def _record(self) -> dict:
|
||||
return leases.record_session_lease(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"pr_number": PR,
|
||||
"issue_number": ISSUE,
|
||||
"session_id": CRASHED_SESSION,
|
||||
"reviewer_identity": "sysadmin",
|
||||
"profile": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"worktree": LEASE_WORKTREE,
|
||||
"phase": "claimed",
|
||||
"candidate_head": OLD_HEAD,
|
||||
"repo": REPO,
|
||||
"comment_id": LEASE_COMMENT,
|
||||
},
|
||||
lease_provenance={"source": "acquire", "comment_id": LEASE_COMMENT},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_shadow_written_on_record_and_survives_simulated_crash(self):
|
||||
self._record()
|
||||
# Simulated unhandled crash: the in-memory dict dies with the process
|
||||
# but the sanctioned clear path never runs.
|
||||
leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
|
||||
shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow()
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(shadow)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(shadow.get("session_id"), CRASHED_SESSION)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(shadow.get("pr_number"), PR)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(int(shadow.get("owner_pid")), os.getpid())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_sanctioned_clear_removes_shadow(self):
|
||||
self._record()
|
||||
leases.clear_session_lease()
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(leases.load_session_lease_shadow())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_orphan_assessment_dead_owner_pid_proves_exit(self):
|
||||
self._record()
|
||||
leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
|
||||
shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow()
|
||||
lease = {"session_id": CRASHED_SESSION}
|
||||
verdict = leases.assess_crashed_session_lease_orphan(
|
||||
shadow, lease=lease, current_pid=os.getpid() + 1, pid_alive=False
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(verdict["orphan_evidence"])
|
||||
self.assertIs(verdict["owner_process_alive"], False)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_orphan_assessment_alive_pid_is_not_ownership_proof(self):
|
||||
self._record()
|
||||
shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow()
|
||||
verdict = leases.assess_crashed_session_lease_orphan(
|
||||
shadow,
|
||||
lease={"session_id": CRASHED_SESSION},
|
||||
current_pid=os.getpid() + 1,
|
||||
pid_alive=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(verdict["orphan_evidence"])
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(verdict["owner_process_alive"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_orphan_assessment_session_mismatch_proves_nothing(self):
|
||||
self._record()
|
||||
shadow = leases.load_session_lease_shadow()
|
||||
verdict = leases.assess_crashed_session_lease_orphan(
|
||||
shadow, lease={"session_id": "other-999"}, pid_alive=False
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(verdict["orphan_evidence"])
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(verdict["owner_process_alive"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_orphan_assessment_without_shadow_is_unknown(self):
|
||||
verdict = leases.assess_crashed_session_lease_orphan(
|
||||
None, lease={"session_id": CRASHED_SESSION}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(verdict["orphan_evidence"])
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(verdict["owner_process_alive"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestOldHeadLeaseCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Scenario 2: expired superseded-head lease with no terminal review."""
|
||||
|
||||
def _assess(self, comments, **kwargs):
|
||||
defaults = dict(
|
||||
pr_number=PR,
|
||||
current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
|
||||
formal_reviews=[],
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
expected_repo=REPO,
|
||||
requesting_session_id="fresh-controller",
|
||||
controller_recovery_authorized=True,
|
||||
worktree_exists=True,
|
||||
worktree_clean=True,
|
||||
owner_process_alive=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
defaults.update(kwargs)
|
||||
return leases.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
|
||||
comments, **defaults
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_expired_orphan_with_full_evidence_is_cleanup_eligible(self):
|
||||
result = self._assess(_expired_superseded_comments())
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "orphaned_expired_superseded_head")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("phase: released", result["release_body"] or "")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
result["exact_next_action"], "cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_expired_orphan_without_owner_evidence_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
result = self._assess(
|
||||
_expired_superseded_comments(), owner_process_alive=None
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
"provable owner-process-exit evidence",
|
||||
" ".join(result["fail_closed_reasons"]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_expired_orphan_without_controller_authority_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
result = self._assess(
|
||||
_expired_superseded_comments(), controller_recovery_authorized=False
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_expired_orphan_with_dirty_worktree_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
result = self._assess(
|
||||
_expired_superseded_comments(),
|
||||
worktree_clean=False,
|
||||
worktree_has_unpreserved_work=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unexpired_superseded_no_terminal_stays_ambiguous_wait(self):
|
||||
# Regression guard: pre-expiry there is still no steal path.
|
||||
result = self._assess(_fresh_superseded_comments())
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["exact_next_action"], "wait")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestRuntimeWorktreeMismatch(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Scenario 3: env bindings to deleted worktrees are demoted (#702 AC2)."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_missing_active_env_binding_is_demoted(self):
|
||||
demotions: list[str] = []
|
||||
missing = "/nonexistent/branches/review-pr-654"
|
||||
path, source = nwb.resolve_namespace_workspace(
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
process_project_root=os.getcwd(),
|
||||
env={"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": missing},
|
||||
demotions=demotions,
|
||||
verify_paths=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(source, "MCP server process root (default)")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(demotions), 1)
|
||||
self.assertIn("no longer exists", demotions[0])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_missing_active_falls_through_to_existing_role_env(self):
|
||||
existing = os.getcwd()
|
||||
path, source = nwb.resolve_namespace_workspace(
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
process_project_root="/tmp",
|
||||
env={
|
||||
"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": "/nonexistent/branches/review-pr-654",
|
||||
"GITEA_REVIEWER_WORKTREE": existing,
|
||||
},
|
||||
verify_paths=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(path, os.path.realpath(existing))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(source, "GITEA_REVIEWER_WORKTREE environment variable")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_existing_active_env_binding_still_wins(self):
|
||||
existing = os.getcwd()
|
||||
path, source = nwb.resolve_namespace_workspace(
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
process_project_root="/tmp",
|
||||
env={"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": existing},
|
||||
verify_paths=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(path, os.path.realpath(existing))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(source, "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE environment variable")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_explicit_worktree_path_argument_is_never_demoted(self):
|
||||
missing = "/nonexistent/branches/explicit"
|
||||
path, source = nwb.resolve_namespace_workspace(
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
worktree_path=missing,
|
||||
process_project_root="/tmp",
|
||||
env={},
|
||||
verify_paths=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(source, "worktree_path argument")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mutation_context_reports_demotion_in_ignored_bindings(self):
|
||||
ctx = nwb.resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
worktree_path=None,
|
||||
process_project_root=os.getcwd(),
|
||||
env={"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": "/nonexistent/branches/review-pr-654"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
joined = " ".join(ctx["ignored_bindings"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("stale binding, #702", joined)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestManagedReconnectRecovery(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Scenario 4: boot-inherited bindings and the sanctioned recovery plan."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_uncorroborated_inherited_reviewer_binding_is_unverified(self):
|
||||
classification = sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
|
||||
active_value=os.getcwd(),
|
||||
role_env_value=None,
|
||||
session_lease_worktree=None,
|
||||
boot_inherited=True,
|
||||
path_exists=True,
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
classification["classification"], sbr.CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(classification["clear_eligible"])
|
||||
plan = sbr.plan_recovery(classification)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(plan["clear_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("managed", plan["exact_next_action"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("do not clear or rewrite", plan["exact_next_action"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_missing_path_binding_is_provably_stale_and_clear_eligible(self):
|
||||
classification = sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
|
||||
active_value="/nonexistent/branches/review-pr-654",
|
||||
boot_inherited=True,
|
||||
path_exists=False,
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
classification["classification"],
|
||||
sbr.CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
|
||||
)
|
||||
plan = sbr.plan_recovery(classification)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(plan["clear_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_inherited_binding_superseded_by_session_lease_is_clear_eligible(self):
|
||||
classification = sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
|
||||
active_value="/tmp",
|
||||
session_lease_worktree=os.getcwd(),
|
||||
boot_inherited=True,
|
||||
path_exists=True,
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
classification["classification"],
|
||||
sbr.CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(sbr.plan_recovery(classification)["clear_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_post_boot_binding_conflict_is_surfaced_not_cleared(self):
|
||||
classification = sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
|
||||
active_value="/tmp",
|
||||
session_lease_worktree=os.getcwd(),
|
||||
boot_inherited=False,
|
||||
path_exists=True,
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
classification["classification"], sbr.CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(sbr.plan_recovery(classification)["clear_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_corroborated_bindings_are_untouched(self):
|
||||
for kwargs in (
|
||||
dict(role_env_value=os.getcwd()),
|
||||
dict(session_lease_worktree=os.getcwd()),
|
||||
):
|
||||
classification = sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
|
||||
active_value=os.getcwd(),
|
||||
boot_inherited=True,
|
||||
path_exists=True,
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
**kwargs,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
classification["classification"], sbr.CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(sbr.plan_recovery(classification)["clear_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_author_inherited_binding_stays_corroborated(self):
|
||||
classification = sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
|
||||
active_value=os.getcwd(),
|
||||
boot_inherited=True,
|
||||
path_exists=True,
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
classification["classification"], sbr.CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_apply_recovery_clears_env_only_for_authorized_plan(self):
|
||||
env = {"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": "/nonexistent/branches/review-pr-654"}
|
||||
plan = sbr.plan_recovery(
|
||||
sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
|
||||
active_value=env["GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"],
|
||||
boot_inherited=True,
|
||||
path_exists=False,
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
applied = sbr.apply_recovery(plan, env=env)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(applied["performed"])
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", env)
|
||||
self.assertIn("review-pr-654", applied["cleared_value"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_apply_recovery_refuses_unauthorized_plan(self):
|
||||
env = {"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE": os.getcwd()}
|
||||
plan = sbr.plan_recovery(
|
||||
sbr.classify_active_worktree_binding(
|
||||
active_value=env["GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"],
|
||||
boot_inherited=True,
|
||||
path_exists=True,
|
||||
role_kind="reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
applied = sbr.apply_recovery(plan, env=env)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(applied["performed"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", env)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestSafeExpiryDiagnosis(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Scenario 5: canonical expiry flips wait into acquire/guarded cleanup."""
|
||||
|
||||
def _diagnose(self, comments, **kwargs):
|
||||
defaults = dict(
|
||||
pr_number=PR,
|
||||
current_session_id=None,
|
||||
current_reviewer_identity="fresh-reviewer",
|
||||
current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
|
||||
formal_reviews=[],
|
||||
)
|
||||
defaults.update(kwargs)
|
||||
return leases.diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(comments, **defaults)
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
leases._SESSION_LEASE = None
|
||||
|
||||
def test_pre_expiry_superseded_no_terminal_stays_wait(self):
|
||||
diagnosis = self._diagnose(_fresh_superseded_comments())
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
diagnosis["classification"], "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(diagnosis["next_action"], "wait")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_post_expiry_without_orphan_evidence_unlocks_acquire(self):
|
||||
diagnosis = self._diagnose(_expired_superseded_comments())
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
diagnosis["classification"], "orphaned_expired_superseded_head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(diagnosis["next_action"], "acquire")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_post_expiry_with_orphan_evidence_offers_guarded_cleanup(self):
|
||||
diagnosis = self._diagnose(
|
||||
_expired_superseded_comments(),
|
||||
owner_process_alive=False,
|
||||
worktree_clean=True,
|
||||
worktree_exists=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
diagnosis["classification"], "orphaned_expired_superseded_head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
diagnosis["next_action"], "cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_expired_lease_no_longer_blocks_fresh_acquisition(self):
|
||||
assessment = leases.assess_acquire_lease(
|
||||
_expired_superseded_comments(),
|
||||
pr_number=PR,
|
||||
reviewer_identity="fresh-reviewer",
|
||||
profile="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
session_id="99999-fresh",
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
issue_number=ISSUE,
|
||||
worktree="branches/review-pr-701-fresh",
|
||||
candidate_head=NEW_HEAD,
|
||||
target_branch="master",
|
||||
target_branch_sha="2" * 40,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(assessment.get("acquire_allowed"))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unparseable_expiry_fails_closed_in_cleanup(self):
|
||||
comment = _lease_comment(
|
||||
last_activity=_now() - timedelta(hours=3), expires_at=None
|
||||
)
|
||||
comment["body"] = comment["body"].replace(
|
||||
"expires_at: ", "expires_at: not-a-timestamp"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = leases.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
|
||||
[comment],
|
||||
pr_number=PR,
|
||||
current_head_sha=NEW_HEAD,
|
||||
formal_reviews=[],
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
expected_repo=REPO,
|
||||
requesting_session_id="fresh-controller",
|
||||
controller_recovery_authorized=True,
|
||||
worktree_exists=True,
|
||||
worktree_clean=True,
|
||||
owner_process_alive=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -1,509 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""#714: production first-bind pins the workspace-verified repository scope.
|
||||
|
||||
These tests drive the real entry points (``gitea_whoami``,
|
||||
``gitea_get_runtime_context``, ``gitea_resolve_task_capability``,
|
||||
``gitea_activate_profile``) in production order. They deliberately do not
|
||||
construct a ``_SessionContext`` directly: the defect they cover is that the
|
||||
production first-bind path left ``repository``/``org`` unbound, so
|
||||
``assess_session_context`` skipped its repository/org drift checks and a
|
||||
same-host mutation against another repository was not blocked.
|
||||
|
||||
The trusted repository identity comes from the workspace-aligned git remote
|
||||
(``Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools`` for this checkout), never from
|
||||
``REMOTES`` (whose ``prgs`` default repo is ``Timesheet``) and never from a
|
||||
caller-supplied ``org``/``repo`` argument.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import threading
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
|
||||
import gitea_config # noqa: E402
|
||||
import gitea_mcp_server as srv # noqa: E402
|
||||
import mcp_server # noqa: E402
|
||||
import session_context_binding as session_ctx # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
WORKSPACE_ORG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
|
||||
WORKSPACE_REPO = "Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
WORKSPACE_SLUG = f"{WORKSPACE_ORG}/{WORKSPACE_REPO}"
|
||||
WORKSPACE_URL = f"https://gitea.prgs.cc/{WORKSPACE_SLUG}.git"
|
||||
|
||||
_BASE_AUTHOR_OPS = [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _config(allowed_repositories=None):
|
||||
profile = {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"context": "prgs",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"username": "jcwalker3",
|
||||
"base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
"auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_AUTHOR"},
|
||||
"allowed_operations": list(_BASE_AUTHOR_OPS),
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.request_changes",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "prgs-author",
|
||||
}
|
||||
if allowed_repositories is not None:
|
||||
profile["allowed_repositories"] = list(allowed_repositories)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"version": 2,
|
||||
# v2-contexts normalizes the config and keeps only rules.* — a
|
||||
# top-level allow_runtime_switching would be dropped.
|
||||
"rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": True},
|
||||
"contexts": {
|
||||
"prgs": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"mdcps": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"gitea": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"profiles": {"prgs-author": profile},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _ProductionOrderBase(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Real entry points, pinned workspace remote, mocked network only."""
|
||||
|
||||
allowed_repositories = [WORKSPACE_SLUG]
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.config_path = os.path.join(self._dir.name, "profiles.json")
|
||||
with open(self.config_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
fh.write(json.dumps(_config(self.allowed_repositories)))
|
||||
self._env = {
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author",
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_AUTHOR": "prgs-author-token",
|
||||
}
|
||||
gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
|
||||
mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
|
||||
srv._MUTATION_AUTHORITY = None
|
||||
# Pin the workspace git remote so the trusted source is deterministic
|
||||
# and never depends on the developer's checkout layout.
|
||||
self._remote_url = patch.object(
|
||||
srv, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=self._local_remote_url
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._remote_url.start()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
self._remote_url.stop()
|
||||
gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
|
||||
mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
|
||||
srv._MUTATION_AUTHORITY = None
|
||||
self._dir.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
def _local_remote_url(self, remote_name):
|
||||
return WORKSPACE_URL if remote_name == "prgs" else None
|
||||
|
||||
def _api(self, method, url, header):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"login": "jcwalker3",
|
||||
"full_name": "Test",
|
||||
"id": 1,
|
||||
"email": "[email protected]",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
def _live(self):
|
||||
return patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestProductionFirstBindPinsRepository(_ProductionOrderBase):
|
||||
def test_whoami_first_bind_is_complete(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
|
||||
ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(ctx)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], WORKSPACE_ORG)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], WORKSPACE_REPO)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx["remote"], "prgs")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx["host"], "gitea.prgs.cc")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_runtime_context_first_bind_is_complete(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_get_runtime_context(remote="prgs")
|
||||
ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], WORKSPACE_ORG)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], WORKSPACE_REPO)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_capability_preflight_first_bind_is_complete(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="comment_issue", remote="prgs")
|
||||
ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], WORKSPACE_ORG)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], WORKSPACE_REPO)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_activate_profile_binds_complete_context(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_activate_profile(profile_name="prgs-author", remote="prgs")
|
||||
ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], WORKSPACE_ORG)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], WORKSPACE_REPO)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestProductionOrderRepositoryDriftBlocks(_ProductionOrderBase):
|
||||
def test_whoami_then_same_host_other_repository_blocks(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org=WORKSPACE_ORG, repo="Other-Tools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("Other-Tools" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]), blocked["reasons"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_whoami_then_timesheet_blocks(self):
|
||||
"""REMOTES['prgs'].repo is Timesheet — a default target, not a scope."""
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
|
||||
repo="Timesheet",
|
||||
org_explicit=True,
|
||||
repo_explicit=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("Timesheet" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]), blocked["reasons"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_whoami_then_same_host_other_org_blocks(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org="Other-Org", repo=WORKSPACE_REPO
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("Other-Org" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]), blocked["reasons"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_runtime_context_then_other_repository_blocks(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_get_runtime_context(remote="prgs")
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org=WORKSPACE_ORG, repo="Other-Tools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_capability_preflight_then_other_repository_blocks(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="comment_issue", remote="prgs")
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org=WORKSPACE_ORG, repo="Other-Tools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_activate_profile_then_other_repository_blocks(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_activate_profile(profile_name="prgs-author", remote="prgs")
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org="Other-Org", repo="Other-Tools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_cross_host_still_blocks(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(remote="dadeschools")
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("cross-host" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]), blocked["reasons"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_authorized_repository_mutation_remains_allowed(self):
|
||||
"""Normal PR #715 author comment/push path must stay functional."""
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(
|
||||
srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org=WORKSPACE_ORG, repo=WORKSPACE_REPO
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
# A bare call with no override resolves to the same bound scope.
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(srv._session_context_mutation_block(remote="prgs"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestMutationRequestCannotEstablishBinding(_ProductionOrderBase):
|
||||
def test_caller_values_cannot_establish_binding_on_first_mutation(self):
|
||||
"""A mutation-first session must not be pinned by request values."""
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(session_ctx.get_session_context())
|
||||
srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org="Attacker-Org", repo="Attacker-Repo"
|
||||
)
|
||||
ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(ctx)
|
||||
# Bound to the verified workspace, never to the request values.
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx["org"], WORKSPACE_ORG)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx["repository"], WORKSPACE_REPO)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mutation_first_with_attacker_values_is_blocked(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org="Attacker-Org", repo="Attacker-Repo"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_later_call_cannot_overwrite_bound_repository(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
|
||||
before = session_ctx.get_session_context()
|
||||
for _ in range(3):
|
||||
srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org="Other-Org", repo="Other-Tools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(session_ctx.get_session_context(), before)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestUnverifiedWorkspaceFailsClosed(_ProductionOrderBase):
|
||||
def _local_remote_url(self, remote_name):
|
||||
return None # no verifiable workspace repository
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mutation_blocks_when_workspace_repository_unverified(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
|
||||
ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(ctx["repository"])
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org=WORKSPACE_ORG, repo=WORKSPACE_REPO
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any(
|
||||
"no verified workspace repository" in r or "unverified" in r
|
||||
for r in blocked["reasons"]
|
||||
),
|
||||
blocked["reasons"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_activate_profile_rejects_unverifiable_workspace(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_activate_profile(profile_name="prgs-author", remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("success", True))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res.get("blocker_kind"), "repository_scope")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestUnauthorizedWorkspaceFailsClosed(_ProductionOrderBase):
|
||||
allowed_repositories = ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Some-Other-Project"]
|
||||
|
||||
def test_workspace_absent_from_allowlist_blocks_mutation(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("not authorized" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]),
|
||||
blocked["reasons"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_workspace_absent_from_allowlist_blocks_activation(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_activate_profile(profile_name="prgs-author", remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("success", True))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res.get("blocker_kind"), "repository_scope")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestTimesheetNotAuthorizedInThisPhase(_ProductionOrderBase):
|
||||
"""Cross-project use is paused: only Gitea-Tools is authorized."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_timesheet_workspace_is_rejected(self):
|
||||
def timesheet_remote(remote_name):
|
||||
return "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet.git"
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
srv, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=timesheet_remote
|
||||
):
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("not authorized" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]),
|
||||
blocked["reasons"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestConcurrentFirstBindSelectsOneRepository(_ProductionOrderBase):
|
||||
def test_concurrent_initialization_cannot_change_selected_repository(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(session_ctx.get_session_context())
|
||||
thread_count = 8
|
||||
barrier = threading.Barrier(thread_count)
|
||||
results = []
|
||||
lock = threading.Lock()
|
||||
|
||||
def racer(index: int) -> None:
|
||||
barrier.wait()
|
||||
srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org=f"Racer-Org-{index}", repo=f"Racer-Repo-{index}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
with lock:
|
||||
results.append(session_ctx.get_session_context())
|
||||
|
||||
threads = [
|
||||
threading.Thread(target=racer, args=(i,)) for i in range(thread_count)
|
||||
]
|
||||
for thread in threads:
|
||||
thread.start()
|
||||
for thread in threads:
|
||||
thread.join(timeout=10)
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertFalse(any(t.is_alive() for t in threads))
|
||||
winner = session_ctx.get_session_context()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(winner["org"], WORKSPACE_ORG)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(winner["repository"], WORKSPACE_REPO)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(results, [winner] * thread_count)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestRepositoryScopeUnits(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_absent_scope_is_not_enforced_for_read_diagnostics(self):
|
||||
scope = session_ctx.assess_repository_scope(
|
||||
workspace_slug=WORKSPACE_SLUG, allowed=[], profile_name="legacy"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(scope["proven"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(scope["scope_enforced"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_require_scope_blocks_empty_or_missing_allowlist(self):
|
||||
scope = session_ctx.assess_repository_scope(
|
||||
workspace_slug=WORKSPACE_SLUG,
|
||||
allowed=[],
|
||||
profile_name="legacy",
|
||||
require_scope=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(scope["block"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("allowed_repositories" in r for r in scope["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_declared_scope_authorizes_only_listed_repository(self):
|
||||
allowed = session_ctx.declared_allowed_repositories(
|
||||
{"allowed_repositories": [WORKSPACE_SLUG]}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(allowed, [WORKSPACE_SLUG])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
session_ctx.assess_repository_scope(
|
||||
workspace_slug=WORKSPACE_SLUG, allowed=allowed
|
||||
)["proven"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
session_ctx.assess_repository_scope(
|
||||
workspace_slug="Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet", allowed=allowed
|
||||
)["block"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_missing_workspace_slug_blocks_when_scope_declared(self):
|
||||
scope = session_ctx.assess_repository_scope(
|
||||
workspace_slug=None, allowed=[WORKSPACE_SLUG]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(scope["block"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_override_must_match_binding(self):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
session_ctx.assess_repository_override(
|
||||
requested_org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
|
||||
requested_repo="Other",
|
||||
bound_org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
|
||||
bound_repo=WORKSPACE_REPO,
|
||||
)["block"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
session_ctx.assess_repository_override(
|
||||
requested_org="Other-Org",
|
||||
requested_repo=WORKSPACE_REPO,
|
||||
bound_org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
|
||||
bound_repo=WORKSPACE_REPO,
|
||||
)["block"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
session_ctx.assess_repository_override(
|
||||
requested_org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
|
||||
requested_repo=WORKSPACE_REPO,
|
||||
bound_org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
|
||||
bound_repo=WORKSPACE_REPO,
|
||||
)["proven"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_malformed_allowlist_entries_are_ignored_in_non_strict_mode(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
session_ctx.declared_allowed_repositories(
|
||||
{"allowed_repositories": ["not-a-slug", 17, None, WORKSPACE_SLUG]}
|
||||
),
|
||||
[WORKSPACE_SLUG],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_strict_mode_rejects_malformed_allowlist_entries(self):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
|
||||
session_ctx.declared_allowed_repositories(
|
||||
{"allowed_repositories": ["not-a-slug", WORKSPACE_SLUG]},
|
||||
strict=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestRemotesDefaultNotCallerOverride(_ProductionOrderBase):
|
||||
def test_resolved_timesheet_default_does_not_block_when_bound_to_workspace(self):
|
||||
"""Tools historically pass REMOTES-filled Timesheet after _resolve; that
|
||||
must not be treated as an explicit override against Gitea-Tools."""
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
|
||||
# Simulate create_issue after resolve: org/repo are REMOTES defaults
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Timesheet",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(blocked, getattr(blocked, "get", lambda *_: blocked)("reasons") if blocked else None)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_git_unavailable_blocks_mutation(self):
|
||||
def no_remote(_name):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=no_remote):
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any(
|
||||
"workspace" in r.lower() or "allowed_repositories" in r or "unverified" in r
|
||||
for r in blocked["reasons"]
|
||||
),
|
||||
blocked["reasons"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_explicit_mismatch_still_blocks(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False), self._live():
|
||||
srv.gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
|
||||
blocked = srv._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org=WORKSPACE_ORG,
|
||||
repo="Other-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,745 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""#714: fail closed on cross-host MCP profile drift and capability substitution."""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import threading
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
|
||||
import gitea_config # noqa: E402
|
||||
import mcp_server # noqa: E402
|
||||
import session_context_binding as session_ctx # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
CONFIG_714 = {
|
||||
"version": 2,
|
||||
"allow_runtime_switching": True,
|
||||
"contexts": {
|
||||
"prgs": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"mdcps": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"profiles": {
|
||||
"prgs-author": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"context": "prgs",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"username": "jcwalker3",
|
||||
"base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
"auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_AUTHOR"},
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.close",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.request_changes",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "prgs-author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"mdcps-reviewer": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"context": "mdcps",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
"username": "913443",
|
||||
"base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
"auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_MDCPS_REVIEWER"},
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.request_changes",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.branch.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["913443/eAgenda"],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "mdcps-reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"mdcps-author": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"context": "mdcps",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"username": "913443",
|
||||
"base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
"auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_MDCPS_AUTHOR"},
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.request_changes",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["913443/eAgenda"],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "mdcps-author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssue714SessionContextImmutability(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.config_path = os.path.join(self._dir.name, "profiles.json")
|
||||
with open(self.config_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
fh.write(json.dumps(CONFIG_714))
|
||||
self._remotes = patch.dict(
|
||||
mcp_server.REMOTES,
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dadeschools": {
|
||||
"host": "gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
"org": "913443",
|
||||
"repo": "eAgenda",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"prgs": {
|
||||
"host": "gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
"org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
"repo": "Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
clear=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._remotes.start()
|
||||
def _url(name):
|
||||
if name == "dadeschools":
|
||||
return "https://gitea.dadeschools.net/913443/eAgenda.git"
|
||||
if name == "prgs":
|
||||
return "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
|
||||
return None
|
||||
self._url_patch = patch.object(mcp_server, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=_url)
|
||||
self._url_patch.start()
|
||||
mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
|
||||
gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
|
||||
mcp_server._MUTATION_AUTHORITY = None
|
||||
self._env = {
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "mdcps-reviewer",
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_MDCPS_REVIEWER": "mdcps-reviewer-token",
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_MDCPS_AUTHOR": "mdcps-author-token",
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_AUTHOR": "prgs-author-token",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
self._url_patch.stop()
|
||||
self._remotes.stop()
|
||||
mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
|
||||
gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
|
||||
mcp_server._MUTATION_AUTHORITY = None
|
||||
self._dir.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
def _api_side_effect(self, method, url, header):
|
||||
# Token identity mapping for whoami endpoint
|
||||
auth = str(header)
|
||||
if "mdcps-reviewer-token" in auth or "mdcps-author-token" in auth:
|
||||
login = "913443"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
login = "jcwalker3"
|
||||
return {"login": login, "full_name": "Test", "id": 1, "email": "[email protected]"}
|
||||
|
||||
def test_pin_mdcps_reviewer_never_drifts_to_prgs_author(self):
|
||||
"""Reproduce the incident: pin mdcps-reviewer then resolve comment_issue."""
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
|
||||
act = mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(act["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(act["after_profile"], "mdcps-reviewer")
|
||||
|
||||
who1 = mcp_server.gitea_whoami(remote="dadeschools")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(who1["profile"]["profile_name"], "mdcps-reviewer")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(who1["username"], "913443")
|
||||
|
||||
# Capability that mdcps-reviewer lacks — must NOT switch to prgs-author
|
||||
res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="comment_issue", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "mdcps-reviewer")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("auto_profile_substitution", True))
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("prgs-author", res["matching_configured_profile"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("mdcps-author", res["matching_configured_profile"])
|
||||
|
||||
who2 = mcp_server.gitea_whoami(remote="dadeschools")
|
||||
rt = mcp_server.gitea_get_runtime_context(remote="dadeschools")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(who2["profile"]["profile_name"], "mdcps-reviewer")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rt["active_profile"], "mdcps-reviewer")
|
||||
# Still pinned — never prgs-author
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "mdcps-reviewer"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_repeated_calls_remain_on_mdcps_reviewer(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
for _ in range(5):
|
||||
res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="review_pr", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "mdcps-reviewer")
|
||||
who = mcp_server.gitea_whoami(remote="dadeschools")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(who["profile"]["profile_name"], "mdcps-reviewer")
|
||||
rt = mcp_server.gitea_get_runtime_context(remote="dadeschools")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rt["active_profile"], "mdcps-reviewer")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dadeschools_request_cannot_resolve_through_prgs_author(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="comment_issue", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(res["active_profile"], "prgs-author")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("prgs-author", res["matching_configured_profile"])
|
||||
# Gate must not silently switch either
|
||||
blocked = mcp_server._profile_permission_block(
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(blocked.get("success", True))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "mdcps-reviewer"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_prgs_request_cannot_resolve_through_mdcps_profile(self):
|
||||
"""Reverse of the incident: a pinned MDCPS profile must never serve a
|
||||
prgs request, nor be silently swapped for the prgs-side profile."""
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-author", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="create_issue", remote="prgs"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(res["active_profile"], "prgs-author")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "mdcps-author")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["stop_required"])
|
||||
blocked = mcp_server._session_context_mutation_block(remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("cross-host" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(gitea_config.selected_profile_name(), "mdcps-author")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unsupported_capability_fails_closed_structured(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="comment_issue", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["stop_required"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("reason", res)
|
||||
self.assertIn("exact_safe_next_action", res)
|
||||
self.assertIn("activate_profile", res["exact_safe_next_action"])
|
||||
# Unknown task still fail closed (structured denial after #723;
|
||||
# never raises into internal_error and never substitutes profile).
|
||||
unknown = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="reopen_issue", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(unknown.get("allowed_in_current_session"))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(unknown.get("stop_required"))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(unknown.get("reason_code"), "unknown_task")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(unknown.get("mutation_performed"), False)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(unknown.get("active_profile"), "mdcps-reviewer")
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(unknown.get("active_profile"), "prgs-author")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_identity_mismatch_blocks_mutation(self):
|
||||
"""Profile expects 913443 but authenticated as jcwalker3."""
|
||||
|
||||
def wrong_identity(method, url, header):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"login": "jcwalker3",
|
||||
"full_name": "Wrong",
|
||||
"id": 9,
|
||||
"email": "[email protected]",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=wrong_identity):
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
blocked = mcp_server._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("identity mismatch" in r for r in blocked["reasons"])
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_repository_host_mismatch_blocks_mutation(self):
|
||||
"""mdcps-reviewer cannot serve prgs remote."""
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
blocked = mcp_server._session_context_mutation_block(remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("cross-host" in r for r in blocked["reasons"])
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_drift_cannot_reach_write(self):
|
||||
"""Simulated mid-session profile override cannot pass permission gate."""
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env, clear=False):
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-reviewer", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Bind session as mdcps-reviewer
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
session_ctx.get_session_context()["profile_name"],
|
||||
"mdcps-reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Hostile override without activate_profile
|
||||
gitea_config._active_profile_override = "prgs-author"
|
||||
blocked = mcp_server._session_context_mutation_block(
|
||||
remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(blocked)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("drift" in r or "cross-host" in r for r in blocked["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_static_prgs_author_still_works(self):
|
||||
env = {
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author",
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_PRGS_AUTHOR": "prgs-author-token",
|
||||
}
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
|
||||
gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
|
||||
res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="create_issue", remote="prgs"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "prgs-author")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["active_identity"], "jcwalker3")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_static_mdcps_author_still_works(self):
|
||||
env = {
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "mdcps-author",
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_MDCPS_AUTHOR": "mdcps-author-token",
|
||||
}
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=False):
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=self._api_side_effect):
|
||||
gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
|
||||
res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="comment_issue", remote="dadeschools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["active_profile"], "mdcps-author")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("prgs-author", res["matching_configured_profile"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestSessionContextBindingUnit(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_profile_matches_remote_by_base_url(self):
|
||||
remotes = {
|
||||
"dadeschools": {"host": "gitea.dadeschools.net"},
|
||||
"prgs": {"host": "gitea.prgs.cc"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
mdcps = {"base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net", "context": "mdcps"}
|
||||
prgs = {"base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc", "context": "prgs"}
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
session_ctx.profile_matches_remote(mdcps, "dadeschools", remotes)
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(session_ctx.profile_matches_remote(mdcps, "prgs", remotes))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(session_ctx.profile_matches_remote(prgs, "prgs", remotes))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_bind_and_detect_drift(self):
|
||||
session_ctx.bind_session_context(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-reviewer",
|
||||
remote="dadeschools",
|
||||
host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
identity="913443",
|
||||
source="test",
|
||||
)
|
||||
ok = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-reviewer",
|
||||
remote="dadeschools",
|
||||
host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
identity="913443",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(ok["proven"])
|
||||
bad = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-author",
|
||||
remote="dadeschools",
|
||||
host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
identity="jcwalker3",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(bad["block"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("drift" in r for r in bad["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_bound_context_survives_multiple_calls_and_exceptions(self):
|
||||
original = session_ctx.bind_session_context(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-reviewer",
|
||||
remote="dadeschools",
|
||||
host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
identity="913443",
|
||||
source="test",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
for _ in range(3):
|
||||
observed = session_ctx.seed_session_context_if_unbound(
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
host="gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
identity="jcwalker3",
|
||||
source="interleaved-test-call",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(observed, original)
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("simulated caller failure")
|
||||
except RuntimeError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertEqual(session_ctx.get_session_context(), original)
|
||||
drift = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
host="gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
identity="jcwalker3",
|
||||
require_bound=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(drift["block"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_parallel_calls_cannot_overwrite_established_binding(self):
|
||||
original = session_ctx.bind_session_context(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-reviewer",
|
||||
remote="dadeschools",
|
||||
host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
identity="913443",
|
||||
source="test",
|
||||
)
|
||||
barrier = threading.Barrier(9)
|
||||
results = []
|
||||
results_lock = threading.Lock()
|
||||
|
||||
def competing_seed(index: int) -> None:
|
||||
barrier.wait()
|
||||
result = session_ctx.seed_session_context_if_unbound(
|
||||
profile_name=f"prgs-author-{index}",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
host="gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
identity=f"other-{index}",
|
||||
source="parallel-test-call",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with results_lock:
|
||||
results.append(result)
|
||||
|
||||
threads = [threading.Thread(target=competing_seed, args=(i,)) for i in range(8)]
|
||||
for thread in threads:
|
||||
thread.start()
|
||||
barrier.wait()
|
||||
for thread in threads:
|
||||
thread.join(timeout=5)
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertFalse(any(thread.is_alive() for thread in threads))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(results, [original] * 8)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(session_ctx.get_session_context(), original)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_concurrent_initialization_has_single_winning_binding(self):
|
||||
"""Racing first-binds from an unbound context: exactly one winner, and
|
||||
every racer observes that same complete binding (never a partial one)."""
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(session_ctx.get_session_context())
|
||||
thread_count = 8
|
||||
barrier = threading.Barrier(thread_count)
|
||||
results = []
|
||||
results_lock = threading.Lock()
|
||||
|
||||
def racing_seed(index: int) -> None:
|
||||
barrier.wait()
|
||||
result = session_ctx.seed_session_context_if_unbound(
|
||||
profile_name=f"prgs-author-{index}",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
host="gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
identity=f"user-{index}",
|
||||
source="concurrent-init-test",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with results_lock:
|
||||
results.append(result)
|
||||
|
||||
threads = [
|
||||
threading.Thread(target=racing_seed, args=(i,))
|
||||
for i in range(thread_count)
|
||||
]
|
||||
for thread in threads:
|
||||
thread.start()
|
||||
for thread in threads:
|
||||
thread.join(timeout=5)
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertFalse(any(thread.is_alive() for thread in threads))
|
||||
winner = session_ctx.get_session_context()
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(winner)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(results), thread_count)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(results, [winner] * thread_count)
|
||||
# A losing racer's identity must never be spliced into the winner.
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
winner["identity"], winner["profile_name"].replace("prgs-author-", "user-")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_repository_mismatch_blocks_before_mutation(self):
|
||||
"""Same host and profile, different repository, must still fail closed."""
|
||||
session_ctx.bind_session_context(
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
host="gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
identity="jcwalker3",
|
||||
repository="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
source="test",
|
||||
)
|
||||
same = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
host="gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
identity="jcwalker3",
|
||||
repository="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
require_bound=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(same["proven"])
|
||||
other_repo = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
host="gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
identity="jcwalker3",
|
||||
repository="eAgenda",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
require_bound=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(other_repo["block"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("repository drift" in r for r in other_repo["reasons"])
|
||||
)
|
||||
other_org = session_ctx.assess_session_context(
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
host="gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
identity="jcwalker3",
|
||||
repository="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
org="913443",
|
||||
require_bound=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(other_org["block"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("org drift" in r for r in other_org["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_returned_snapshot_cannot_mutate_binding(self):
|
||||
session_ctx.bind_session_context(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-reviewer",
|
||||
remote="dadeschools",
|
||||
host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
identity="913443",
|
||||
source="test",
|
||||
)
|
||||
snapshot = session_ctx.get_session_context()
|
||||
snapshot["profile_name"] = "prgs-author"
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
session_ctx.get_session_context()["profile_name"], "mdcps-reviewer"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestSessionContextTestBoundaryIsolation(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_mdcps_binding_starts_clean_and_does_not_escape_test(self):
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(session_ctx.get_session_context())
|
||||
session_ctx.bind_session_context(
|
||||
profile_name="mdcps-reviewer",
|
||||
remote="dadeschools",
|
||||
host="gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
identity="913443",
|
||||
source="test-boundary",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_prgs_binding_starts_clean_and_does_not_escape_test(self):
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(session_ctx.get_session_context())
|
||||
session_ctx.bind_session_context(
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
host="gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
identity="jcwalker3",
|
||||
source="test-boundary",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reset_helper_is_rejected_outside_pytest_boundary(self):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
|
||||
session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssue714MergeCoexistenceWithMaster(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Conflict-resolution regressions after merging advanced master into #715.
|
||||
|
||||
Preserves:
|
||||
- #714 immutable session / no auto profile substitution
|
||||
- #685 side-effect-free resolve (auto_recover=False)
|
||||
- #709 actor identity helper from master
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_auto_switch_helpers_remain_fail_closed(self):
|
||||
self.assertFalse(mcp_server._try_auto_switch_for_operation("gitea.pr.review"))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
mcp_server._try_auto_switch_for_operation(
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment", host="gitea.prgs.cc"
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Active profile is prgs-author; cannot match mdcps review permission
|
||||
# and must not switch.
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"get_profile",
|
||||
return_value={
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-author",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.approve"],
|
||||
"base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
"context": "prgs",
|
||||
},
|
||||
):
|
||||
matched = mcp_server._ensure_matching_profile(
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve", "reviewer", remote="prgs"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(matched)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(
|
||||
gitea_config.selected_profile_name() or "prgs-author",
|
||||
"mdcps-reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_authenticated_actor_helper_survives_merge(self):
|
||||
"""Master #709 F7 actor identity coexists with #714 immutability."""
|
||||
self.assertTrue(hasattr(mcp_server, "_authenticated_actor"))
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value={"Authorization": "token x"}
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server.api_request",
|
||||
return_value={"id": 42, "login": "sysadmin"},
|
||||
):
|
||||
mcp_server._ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
|
||||
actor = mcp_server._authenticated_actor("gitea.prgs.cc")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(actor.get("user_id"), 42)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(actor.get("login"), "sysadmin")
|
||||
# Cached; second call does not re-request
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.api_request") as mock_api:
|
||||
actor2 = mcp_server._authenticated_actor("gitea.prgs.cc")
|
||||
mock_api.assert_not_called()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(actor2.get("user_id"), 42)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_resolve_still_report_only_after_master_merge(self):
|
||||
"""#685: resolve path must not pass auto_recover=True after conflict merge."""
|
||||
allowed = [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
]
|
||||
profile = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-author",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": allowed,
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
"base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
"context": "prgs",
|
||||
}
|
||||
config = {
|
||||
"contexts": {
|
||||
"prgs": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"profiles": {
|
||||
"prgs-author": {
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": allowed,
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
"base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
"context": "prgs",
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
fake_binding = {
|
||||
"classification": "unbound",
|
||||
"active_worktree": None,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
with patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author"}, clear=False
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_config, "load_config", return_value=config
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "_authenticated_username", return_value="jcwalker3"
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"_assess_stale_active_binding",
|
||||
return_value=fake_binding,
|
||||
) as mock_assess, patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "record_preflight_check", return_value=None
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "record_mutation_authority", return_value=None
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "init_review_decision_lock", return_value=None
|
||||
):
|
||||
result = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
|
||||
task="create_issue", remote="prgs"
|
||||
)
|
||||
mock_assess.assert_called()
|
||||
for call in mock_assess.call_args_list:
|
||||
self.assertFalse(call.kwargs.get("auto_recover", True))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.get("mutation_performed"), False)
|
||||
# Session context must not have been rewritten by resolve
|
||||
# (report-only; any prior binding stays; unbound stays unbound unless
|
||||
# seed-on-read path is intentional — resolve must not activate peers).
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(result.get("active_profile"), "mdcps-reviewer")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,499 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""#720: Expired old-head KIND_DECISION_LOCK must not block fresh review.
|
||||
|
||||
Reproduction shape (PR #616):
|
||||
* REQUEST_CHANGES terminal at head A
|
||||
* open PR advanced to head B
|
||||
* durable decision lock age > default 4h TTL
|
||||
* fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed is true but unreachable under TTL-first reject
|
||||
* mark_final fails with "session state expired after 4h"
|
||||
* assessment may report "no lock" while the file remains on disk
|
||||
|
||||
Security invariants preserved:
|
||||
* same-head second terminal remains fail-closed (#332/#620)
|
||||
* REQUEST_CHANGES is never treated as approval
|
||||
* historical mutations remain on the ledger
|
||||
* merged/closed moot cleanup still allowed (#594)
|
||||
* irrecoverable provenance still requires #709 authorization
|
||||
* ordinary profiles do not gain gitea.decision_lock.irrecoverable_recovery
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)
|
||||
if ROOT not in sys.path:
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, ROOT)
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_session_state as ss
|
||||
import mcp_server
|
||||
import stale_review_decision_lock as srdl
|
||||
import task_capability_map
|
||||
|
||||
HEAD_A = "a0fffae576673ba7df7456b32e6aec916581bdfb"
|
||||
HEAD_B = "a6a2243aad9c3e385fc70509f4941a0f0ec33162"
|
||||
HEAD_SAME = HEAD_A
|
||||
|
||||
RC_616_A = {
|
||||
"pr_number": 616,
|
||||
"action": "request_changes",
|
||||
"review_id": 443,
|
||||
"review_state": "request_changes",
|
||||
"head_sha": HEAD_A,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _lock(mutations=None, **kwargs):
|
||||
base = {
|
||||
"task": "review_pr",
|
||||
"kind": ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
"remote": "prgs",
|
||||
"org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
"repo": "Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
"session_pid": os.getpid(),
|
||||
"session_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"session_profile_lock": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"profile_identity": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"final_review_decision_ready": False,
|
||||
"ready_pr_number": kwargs.get("ready_pr"),
|
||||
"ready_action": kwargs.get("ready_action"),
|
||||
"ready_expected_head_sha": kwargs.get("ready_head"),
|
||||
"ready_remote": "prgs" if kwargs.get("ready_pr") else None,
|
||||
"ready_org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting" if kwargs.get("ready_pr") else None,
|
||||
"ready_repo": "Gitea-Tools" if kwargs.get("ready_pr") else None,
|
||||
"live_mutations": list(mutations or []),
|
||||
"correction_authorized": False,
|
||||
"correction_reason": None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return base
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _open_pr(pr_number=616, head=HEAD_B, merged=False, closed=False):
|
||||
state = "closed" if closed or merged else "open"
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"number": pr_number,
|
||||
"state": state,
|
||||
"merged": merged,
|
||||
"merged_at": "2026-07-16T12:00:00Z" if merged else None,
|
||||
"merge_commit_sha": "m" * 40 if merged else None,
|
||||
"head": {"sha": head},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _no_lease():
|
||||
return {"block": False, "reasons": [], "mutation_allowed": True}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _feedback(blocking=False, stale=True):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"has_blocking_change_requests": blocking,
|
||||
"review_feedback_stale": stale,
|
||||
"current_head_sha": HEAD_B,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _age_lock_payload(lock: dict, hours: float = 5.0) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Rewrite timestamps to *hours* ago (simulates durable age without touching prod)."""
|
||||
aged = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=hours)).isoformat().replace(
|
||||
"+00:00", "Z"
|
||||
)
|
||||
out = dict(lock)
|
||||
out["recorded_at"] = aged
|
||||
out["updated_at"] = aged
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssue720ExpiredDecisionLockLifecycle(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.env = patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ,
|
||||
{
|
||||
ss.STATE_DIR_ENV: self._tmp.name,
|
||||
ss.SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK_ENV: "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
clear=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.env.start()
|
||||
mcp_server._REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK = None
|
||||
import review_workflow_load
|
||||
|
||||
review_workflow_load.clear_review_workflow_load()
|
||||
review_workflow_load.record_review_workflow_load(mcp_server.PROJECT_ROOT)
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
mcp_server._REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK = None
|
||||
import review_workflow_load
|
||||
|
||||
review_workflow_load.clear_review_workflow_load()
|
||||
self.env.stop()
|
||||
self._tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
def _persist_aged_lock(self, mutations, hours: float = 5.0, **kwargs):
|
||||
"""Write decision lock aged > TTL to the temp durable store (test-only)."""
|
||||
payload = _age_lock_payload(_lock(mutations, **kwargs), hours=hours)
|
||||
saved = ss.save_state(
|
||||
kind=ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
payload=payload,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
profile_identity="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
# save_state refreshes updated_at; re-age the on-disk envelope for TTL tests.
|
||||
path = ss.state_file_path(
|
||||
kind=ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
profile_identity="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
state_dir=self._tmp.name,
|
||||
)
|
||||
aged = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=hours)).isoformat().replace(
|
||||
"+00:00", "Z"
|
||||
)
|
||||
import json
|
||||
|
||||
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
envelope = json.load(fh)
|
||||
envelope["recorded_at"] = aged
|
||||
envelope["updated_at"] = aged
|
||||
if isinstance(envelope.get("payload"), dict):
|
||||
envelope["payload"]["recorded_at"] = aged
|
||||
envelope["payload"]["updated_at"] = aged
|
||||
with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
json.dump(envelope, fh, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
|
||||
fh.write("\n")
|
||||
# Drop memory so subsequent loads hit durable store.
|
||||
mcp_server._REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK = None
|
||||
return saved
|
||||
|
||||
def _mark(self, pr, action, head, feedback=None):
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server._list_pr_lease_comments", return_value=[]), patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server._pr_work_lease_reviewer_block", return_value=_no_lease()
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"gitea_get_pr_review_feedback",
|
||||
return_value=feedback or _feedback(blocking=False, stale=True),
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"gitea_check_pr_eligibility",
|
||||
return_value={"eligible": True, "head_sha": head},
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server.mcp_daemon_guard,
|
||||
"assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime",
|
||||
return_value=None,
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server.mcp_daemon_guard,
|
||||
"assert_no_direct_import_bypass",
|
||||
return_value=None,
|
||||
):
|
||||
return mcp_server.gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
|
||||
pr_number=pr,
|
||||
action=action,
|
||||
expected_head_sha=head,
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# --- AC regression matrix ---
|
||||
|
||||
def test_under_four_hours_fresh_review_at_b_allowed(self):
|
||||
self._persist_aged_lock(
|
||||
[RC_616_A],
|
||||
hours=1.0,
|
||||
ready_pr=616,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = self._mark(616, "approve", HEAD_B)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("marked_ready"), res)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_over_four_hours_fresh_review_at_b_still_allowed(self):
|
||||
"""Primary #720 defect: age > TTL must not block head-B mark_final."""
|
||||
self._persist_aged_lock(
|
||||
[RC_616_A],
|
||||
hours=5.0,
|
||||
ready_pr=616,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Prove durable load is possible for recovery-critical decision locks.
|
||||
loaded = ss.load_state(
|
||||
kind=ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
profile_identity="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(
|
||||
loaded,
|
||||
"expired KIND_DECISION_LOCK must remain loadable (not generic TTL cache)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = self._mark(616, "approve", HEAD_B)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
res.get("marked_ready"),
|
||||
f"expected mark_ready on head B after >4h; got {res}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("session state expired", reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_historical_review_at_a_preserved_and_stale(self):
|
||||
self._persist_aged_lock(
|
||||
[RC_616_A],
|
||||
hours=5.0,
|
||||
ready_pr=616,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = self._mark(616, "approve", HEAD_B)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("marked_ready"), res)
|
||||
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(lock)
|
||||
hist = [m for m in lock["live_mutations"] if m.get("review_id") == 443]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(hist), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(hist[0]["head_sha"], HEAD_A)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(hist[0]["action"], "request_changes")
|
||||
a = srdl.assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
lock, pr_live=_open_pr(616, HEAD_B)
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(a["stale_by_head"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(a["fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(a["locked_head_sha"], HEAD_A)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_reuse_approval_from_head_a(self):
|
||||
"""REQUEST_CHANGES at A is never an approval credential for B."""
|
||||
self._persist_aged_lock([RC_616_A], hours=5.0)
|
||||
lock = ss.load_state(
|
||||
kind=ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK, profile_identity="prgs-reviewer"
|
||||
)
|
||||
last = srdl.last_terminal_mutation(lock)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(last.get("action"), "request_changes")
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(last.get("action"), "approve")
|
||||
# Gate must still require a new mark/submit for head B; prior RC is not approve.
|
||||
reasons = mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
|
||||
616, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=HEAD_B
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(reasons, [])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_second_terminal_mutation_at_b_same_run_blocked(self):
|
||||
self._persist_aged_lock(
|
||||
[RC_616_A],
|
||||
hours=5.0,
|
||||
ready_pr=616,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = self._mark(616, "approve", HEAD_B)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("marked_ready"), res)
|
||||
# Record terminal approve at B (same run).
|
||||
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
|
||||
lock["final_review_decision_ready"] = True
|
||||
lock["ready_pr_number"] = 616
|
||||
lock["ready_action"] = "approve"
|
||||
lock["ready_expected_head_sha"] = HEAD_B
|
||||
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(lock)
|
||||
mcp_server.record_live_review_mutation(616, "approve", review_id=999)
|
||||
# Second terminal at same head B must hard-stop.
|
||||
hard = mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
|
||||
616, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=HEAD_B
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(hard)
|
||||
res2 = self._mark(616, "approve", HEAD_B)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res2.get("marked_ready"))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_open_pr_same_head_expired_still_fail_closed(self):
|
||||
self._persist_aged_lock(
|
||||
[RC_616_A],
|
||||
hours=5.0,
|
||||
ready_pr=616,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = self._mark(616, "approve", HEAD_SAME)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("marked_ready"), res)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("#332" in r or "already consumed" in r for r in (res.get("reasons") or [])),
|
||||
res,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_merged_pr_moot_cleanup_still_allowed(self):
|
||||
self._persist_aged_lock(
|
||||
[RC_616_A],
|
||||
hours=5.0,
|
||||
ready_pr=616,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
lock = ss.load_state(
|
||||
kind=ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK, profile_identity="prgs-reviewer"
|
||||
)
|
||||
a = srdl.assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
lock, pr_live=_open_pr(616, HEAD_A, merged=True)
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(a["is_moot"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(a["cleanup_allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(a["fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_assessment_reports_expired_old_head_not_absent(self):
|
||||
self._persist_aged_lock(
|
||||
[RC_616_A],
|
||||
hours=5.0,
|
||||
ready_pr=616,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Disk presence + load after lifecycle fix.
|
||||
path = ss.state_file_path(
|
||||
kind=ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
profile_identity="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
state_dir=self._tmp.name,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(path))
|
||||
loaded = ss.load_state(
|
||||
kind=ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK, profile_identity="prgs-reviewer"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(loaded)
|
||||
inspect = ss.inspect_state_envelope(
|
||||
kind=ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
profile_identity="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
state_dir=self._tmp.name,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(inspect.get("on_disk"))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(inspect.get("has_payload"))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(inspect.get("recovery_critical") or inspect.get("ttl_exempt"))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(inspect.get("age_hours", 0) >= 4.0)
|
||||
a = srdl.assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
loaded, pr_live=_open_pr(616, HEAD_B)
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(a["has_lock"])
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("no review decision lock present", " ".join(a["reasons"]))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(a["stale_by_head"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(a["last_terminal_action"], "request_changes")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_existing_serialized_records_compatible(self):
|
||||
"""Pre-fix ledgers without recovery_critical flag still load via kind."""
|
||||
payload = _age_lock_payload(_lock([RC_616_A]), hours=8.0)
|
||||
payload.pop("recovery_critical", None)
|
||||
# Manually write pre-#720-shaped envelope (kind only on envelope).
|
||||
path = ss.state_file_path(
|
||||
kind=ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
profile_identity="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
state_dir=self._tmp.name,
|
||||
)
|
||||
import json
|
||||
|
||||
os.makedirs(self._tmp.name, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
aged = payload["recorded_at"]
|
||||
envelope = {
|
||||
"kind": ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
"remote": "prgs",
|
||||
"org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
"repo": "Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
"profile_identity": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"session_profile_lock": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"recorded_at": aged,
|
||||
"updated_at": aged,
|
||||
"writer_pid": os.getpid(),
|
||||
"payload": payload,
|
||||
}
|
||||
with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
json.dump(envelope, fh, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
|
||||
fh.write("\n")
|
||||
loaded = ss.load_state(
|
||||
kind=ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK, profile_identity="prgs-reviewer"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(loaded)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(loaded["live_mutations"][0]["review_id"], 443)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_decision_lock_is_recovery_critical_kind(self):
|
||||
self.assertIn(ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK, ss.RECOVERY_CRITICAL_KINDS)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_workflow_load_still_ttl_expires(self):
|
||||
"""Do not make every session-state kind permanently TTL-exempt."""
|
||||
aged = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=5)).isoformat().replace(
|
||||
"+00:00", "Z"
|
||||
)
|
||||
rec = {
|
||||
"kind": ss.KIND_WORKFLOW_LOAD,
|
||||
"recorded_at": aged,
|
||||
"updated_at": aged,
|
||||
"profile_identity": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"session_profile_lock": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
}
|
||||
reasons = ss.identity_match_reasons(
|
||||
rec, profile_identity="prgs-reviewer"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("expired" in r for r in reasons), reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_irrecoverable_permission_not_on_ordinary_profiles(self):
|
||||
perm = "gitea.decision_lock.irrecoverable_recovery"
|
||||
# Capability map must not map ordinary author/reviewer/merger tasks to it.
|
||||
for task in (
|
||||
"create_issue",
|
||||
"comment_issue",
|
||||
"review_pr",
|
||||
"merge_pr",
|
||||
"lock_issue",
|
||||
"create_pr",
|
||||
):
|
||||
req = task_capability_map.required_permission(task)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(req, perm, msg=task)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_structured_error_when_same_head_expired(self):
|
||||
self._persist_aged_lock(
|
||||
[RC_616_A],
|
||||
hours=5.0,
|
||||
ready_pr=616,
|
||||
ready_head=HEAD_A,
|
||||
ready_action="request_changes",
|
||||
)
|
||||
res = self._mark(616, "approve", HEAD_A)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("marked_ready"))
|
||||
reasons = res.get("reasons") or []
|
||||
self.assertTrue(reasons)
|
||||
blob = " ".join(reasons)
|
||||
# Actionable recovery text from hard-stop (not generic internal_error).
|
||||
self.assertIn("#332", blob)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
"#620" in blob or "head moved" in blob or "new expected_head_sha" in blob
|
||||
or "already consumed" in blob
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("internal_error", blob.lower())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssue720InspectEnvelope(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.env = patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ,
|
||||
{
|
||||
ss.STATE_DIR_ENV: self._tmp.name,
|
||||
ss.SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK_ENV: "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
clear=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.env.start()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
self.env.stop()
|
||||
self._tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_inspect_missing_file(self):
|
||||
info = ss.inspect_state_envelope(
|
||||
kind=ss.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
profile_identity="prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
state_dir=self._tmp.name,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(info["on_disk"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(info["has_payload"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,385 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Regression matrix for Issue #733.
|
||||
|
||||
``gitea_delete_branch`` accepts explicit ``org``/``repo`` but historically did
|
||||
not propagate them through the anti-stomp preflight: preflight resolved the
|
||||
remote-wide ``REMOTES`` default (bare ``prgs`` → ``Scaled-Tech-Consulting/
|
||||
Timesheet``) and fail-closed with ``wrong_repo`` even though the caller
|
||||
explicitly targeted ``Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools``.
|
||||
|
||||
The fix has two parts, both exercised here:
|
||||
|
||||
1. ``gitea_delete_branch`` forwards the explicit ``org``/``repo`` into
|
||||
``verify_preflight_purity`` so the shared #604 anti-stomp resolution
|
||||
validates the *targeted* repository instead of the remote-wide default.
|
||||
2. A workspace-derived repository-binding gate
|
||||
(``_delete_branch_repository_binding_block``) validates explicit
|
||||
coordinates against the immutable workspace identity, rejecting wrong,
|
||||
substituted, or unverified targets — independent of the anti-stomp
|
||||
remote/repo guard, which by the #530 contract trusts explicit intent.
|
||||
|
||||
Every existing gate (reconciler-only ownership; author/reviewer/merger denial;
|
||||
protected/preservation blocks) is preserved.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_server
|
||||
from mcp_server import gitea_delete_branch
|
||||
import remote_repo_guard
|
||||
import task_capability_map
|
||||
import role_session_router
|
||||
|
||||
FAKE_AUTH = "token fake"
|
||||
|
||||
# The workspace is bound to Gitea-Tools even though the prgs REMOTES default
|
||||
# repo is Timesheet (the exact #733 scenario).
|
||||
WORKSPACE_SLUG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL = "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
|
||||
|
||||
RECONCILER = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read", "gitea.issue.comment", "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.pr.merge"],
|
||||
"audit_label": "prgs-reconciler",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
AUTHOR_WITH_DELETE = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-author",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge"],
|
||||
"audit_label": "prgs-author",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
REVIEWER_WITH_DELETE = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.review", "gitea.branch.delete"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
"audit_label": "prgs-reviewer",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
MERGER_WITH_DELETE = {
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-merger",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.branch.delete"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
"audit_label": "prgs-merger",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _DeleteBranchBase(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._snap = (
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called,
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_capability_called,
|
||||
)
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = False
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = False
|
||||
# prgs default repo is Timesheet — the remote-wide default #733 must NOT
|
||||
# fall back to.
|
||||
self._remotes = patch.dict(mcp_server.REMOTES, {
|
||||
"prgs": {
|
||||
"host": "gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
"org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
"repo": "Timesheet",
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
self._remotes.start()
|
||||
mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
|
||||
patch("gitea_config.load_config", return_value={}).start()
|
||||
patch("gitea_config.is_runtime_switching_enabled", return_value=False).start()
|
||||
patch("gitea_audit.audit_enabled", return_value=False).start()
|
||||
self.mock_api = patch("mcp_server.api_request").start()
|
||||
self.mock_api.return_value = {}
|
||||
patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH).start()
|
||||
# Workspace is verifiably bound to Gitea-Tools.
|
||||
patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server._workspace_repository_slug", return_value=WORKSPACE_SLUG
|
||||
).start()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
patch.stopall()
|
||||
mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
|
||||
(
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called,
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_capability_called,
|
||||
) = self._snap
|
||||
|
||||
def _bind(self, profile, role):
|
||||
patch("mcp_server.get_profile", return_value=profile).start()
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role=role)
|
||||
|
||||
def _delete_calls(self):
|
||||
return [
|
||||
c for c in self.mock_api.call_args_list
|
||||
if c.args and c.args[0] == "DELETE"
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestPositiveTimesheetDefaultExplicitGiteaTools(_DeleteBranchBase):
|
||||
"""AC: prgs default=Timesheet + explicit Gitea-Tools → preflight validates
|
||||
Gitea-Tools and permits an otherwise-eligible deletion."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_explicit_gitea_tools_permits_delete_and_forwards_coords(self):
|
||||
self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity") as vpp:
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(
|
||||
branch="feat/pr-sync-status",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
|
||||
self.assertIn("deleted", res["message"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(self._delete_calls())
|
||||
# Forwarding: preflight received the explicit Gitea-Tools coordinates
|
||||
# and the delete_branch task (not the remote-wide Timesheet default).
|
||||
self.assertTrue(vpp.called)
|
||||
kwargs = vpp.call_args.kwargs
|
||||
self.assertEqual(kwargs.get("task"), "delete_branch")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(kwargs.get("org"), "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(kwargs.get("repo"), "Gitea-Tools")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestNegativeRepositoryBinding(_DeleteBranchBase):
|
||||
"""AC negatives: wrong / substituted / unverified coordinates fail closed."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_wrong_explicit_repo_fails_closed(self):
|
||||
self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity") as vpp:
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(
|
||||
branch="feat/x",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Timesheet", # not the workspace-bound Gitea-Tools
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["performed"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "repository_binding")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("Timesheet" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
|
||||
# Fail closed BEFORE any preflight/deletion side effect.
|
||||
vpp.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_repository_substitution_org_mismatch_rejected(self):
|
||||
self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(
|
||||
branch="feat/x",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Some-Other-Org",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "repository_binding")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_explicit_coords_without_workspace_identity_fail_closed(self):
|
||||
self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server._workspace_repository_slug", return_value=None):
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(
|
||||
branch="feat/x",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], "repository_binding")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("unverified" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_matching_explicit_passes_binding(self):
|
||||
self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
|
||||
block = mcp_server._delete_branch_repository_binding_block(
|
||||
"prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(block)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_omitted_coords_pass_binding_and_are_revalidated_by_preflight(self):
|
||||
# Omitted coordinates pass the binding gate (nothing to corroborate) but
|
||||
# are forwarded as None so the anti-stomp resolution fails closed on the
|
||||
# remote-wide Timesheet default (see TestAntiStompResolution below).
|
||||
self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(
|
||||
mcp_server._delete_branch_repository_binding_block(
|
||||
"prgs", org=None, repo=None
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
with patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity") as vpp:
|
||||
gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/x", remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(vpp.called)
|
||||
kwargs = vpp.call_args.kwargs
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(kwargs.get("org"))
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(kwargs.get("repo"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestRoleDenials(_DeleteBranchBase):
|
||||
"""AC: author, reviewer, and merger remain denied even holding the perm."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_author_with_delete_perm_denied(self):
|
||||
self._bind(AUTHOR_WITH_DELETE, "author")
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(
|
||||
branch="feat/x", remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["active_role_kind"], "author")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reviewer_with_delete_perm_denied(self):
|
||||
self._bind(REVIEWER_WITH_DELETE, "reviewer")
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(
|
||||
branch="feat/x", remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_merger_with_delete_perm_denied(self):
|
||||
self._bind(MERGER_WITH_DELETE, "merger")
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(
|
||||
branch="feat/x", remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["required_role_kind"], "reconciler")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestProtectedAndPreservedBranches(_DeleteBranchBase):
|
||||
"""AC: protected and preservation/evidence branches remain blocked."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_protected_branch_blocked(self):
|
||||
self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
|
||||
for branch in ("master", "main", "dev"):
|
||||
with self.subTest(branch=branch):
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(
|
||||
branch=branch, remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("protected" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_preservation_branch_blocked(self):
|
||||
self._bind(RECONCILER, "reconciler")
|
||||
for branch in ("chore/preserve-local-master", "feat/evidence-run"):
|
||||
with self.subTest(branch=branch):
|
||||
res = gitea_delete_branch(
|
||||
branch=branch, remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("preservation" in r for r in res["reasons"])
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._delete_calls())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestAntiStompResolution(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""The anti-stomp repository resolution validates the *targeted* repo and
|
||||
fails closed on the remote-wide default when coordinates are omitted."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._remotes = patch.dict(mcp_server.REMOTES, {
|
||||
"prgs": {
|
||||
"host": "gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
"org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
"repo": "Timesheet",
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
self._remotes.start()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
patch.stopall()
|
||||
|
||||
def _capture_resolution(self, org, repo):
|
||||
"""Drive the live anti-stomp runner and capture the org/repo it resolved
|
||||
and passed to the pure assessor."""
|
||||
passthrough = {
|
||||
"allowed": True, "block": False, "blockers": [], "reasons": [],
|
||||
"exact_next_action": "proceed", "blocker_kind": None, "checks": {},
|
||||
}
|
||||
with patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ, {"GITEA_TEST_FORCE_ANTI_STOMP": "1"}, clear=False
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server._local_git_remote_url", return_value=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"mcp_server.get_profile", return_value=RECONCILER
|
||||
), patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server.anti_stomp_preflight,
|
||||
"assess_anti_stomp_preflight",
|
||||
return_value=passthrough,
|
||||
) as m:
|
||||
mcp_server._run_anti_stomp_preflight(
|
||||
"delete_branch", remote="prgs", org=org, repo=repo
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(m.called)
|
||||
return m.call_args.kwargs
|
||||
|
||||
def test_explicit_gitea_tools_resolved_and_marked_explicit(self):
|
||||
kw = self._capture_resolution("Scaled-Tech-Consulting", "Gitea-Tools")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(kw["resolved_org"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(kw["resolved_repo"], "Gitea-Tools")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(kw["org_explicit"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(kw["repo_explicit"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_missing_coords_resolve_remote_default_and_fail_closed(self):
|
||||
# Omitted coords resolve the remote-wide Timesheet default with
|
||||
# org/repo NOT explicit; the remote/repo guard then blocks against the
|
||||
# local Gitea-Tools remote — i.e. missing coordinates fail closed.
|
||||
kw = self._capture_resolution(None, None)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(kw["resolved_repo"], "Timesheet")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(kw["org_explicit"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(kw["repo_explicit"])
|
||||
# Compose the guard exactly as the assessor would: Timesheet default,
|
||||
# not explicit, local remote is Gitea-Tools → blocked (wrong_repo).
|
||||
assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
resolved_org=kw["resolved_org"],
|
||||
resolved_repo=kw["resolved_repo"],
|
||||
local_remote_url=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL,
|
||||
org_explicit=kw["org_explicit"],
|
||||
repo_explicit=kw["repo_explicit"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestCapabilityRoleMapConsistency(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC: task-capability and role-routing maps remain consistent (#729)."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_delete_branch_is_reconciler_in_both_maps(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
task_capability_map.required_role("delete_branch"), "reconciler"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
task_capability_map.required_permission("delete_branch"),
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
role_session_router.required_role_for_task("delete_branch"),
|
||||
"reconciler",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
task_capability_map.required_role("delete_branch"),
|
||||
role_session_router.TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE["delete_branch"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import sys as _sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path as _Path
|
||||
_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env # noqa: E402
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
@@ -14,11 +10,7 @@ import gitea_mcp_server as srv
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
FAKE_AUTH = {"Authorization": "token test-token"}
|
||||
current_file_path = Path(__file__).resolve()
|
||||
if "branches" in current_file_path.parts:
|
||||
CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT = str(current_file_path.parents[3])
|
||||
else:
|
||||
CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT = str(current_file_path.parents[1])
|
||||
CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssueCommentWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@@ -112,24 +104,13 @@ class TestIssueCommentWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state",
|
||||
side_effect=self._git_state(valid_worktree),
|
||||
):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
|
||||
issue_number=557,
|
||||
body="evidence comment",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
except RuntimeError as exc:
|
||||
self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(exc))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
# #683 typed blocker at mutation entrypoint
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("performed"))
|
||||
blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
"stable control checkout" in blob
|
||||
or res.get("blocker_kind")
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("exact_next_action") or res.get("reasons"))
|
||||
self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
mock_api.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
@@ -199,24 +180,14 @@ class TestIssueCommentWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
side_effect=self._subprocess(valid_worktree, outside_worktree),
|
||||
):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self.AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
|
||||
issue_number=557,
|
||||
body="evidence comment",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
worktree_path=outside_worktree,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except RuntimeError as exc:
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
"does not belong to the target repository",
|
||||
str(exc),
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
|
||||
blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
"does not belong to the target repository", blob
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn("does not belong to the target repository", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
mock_api.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import sys as _sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path as _Path
|
||||
_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env # noqa: E402
|
||||
"""Tests for the pre-create issue content gate (Issue #582)."""
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
@@ -19,10 +15,9 @@ from issue_content_gate import ( # noqa: E402
|
||||
from mcp_server import gitea_create_issue # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
FAKE_AUTH = "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
|
||||
ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = shared_mutation_env(
|
||||
"test-author-prgs",
|
||||
GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS="gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
)
|
||||
ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = {
|
||||
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestNormalizeAndPointers(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import sys as _sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path as _Path
|
||||
_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env # noqa: E402
|
||||
"""Tests for pre-create issue duplicate gate (Issue #207)."""
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
@@ -23,10 +19,9 @@ from mcp_server import gitea_create_issue # noqa: E402
|
||||
from review_proofs import assess_duplicate_search_proof as proof_assess # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
FAKE_AUTH = "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
|
||||
ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = shared_mutation_env(
|
||||
"test-author-prgs",
|
||||
GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS="gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
)
|
||||
ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = {
|
||||
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
}
|
||||
CANONICAL_TITLE = (
|
||||
"Add hard queue-target resolution wall before PR inventory "
|
||||
"or empty-queue claims"
|
||||
@@ -167,7 +162,7 @@ class TestCreateIssueMCPGate(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
mock_role_check.return_value = (True, [])
|
||||
mock_api.return_value = {"number": 1, "html_url": "https://gitea.example.com/issues/1"}
|
||||
with patch.dict(__import__("os").environ, ISSUE_WRITE_ENV, clear=True):
|
||||
result = gitea_create_issue(title="Unique new issue", body="body text", remote="prgs")
|
||||
result = gitea_create_issue(title="Unique new issue", body="body text")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["number"], 1)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -103,40 +103,20 @@ class TestIssueLockStore(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
self.assertIn("live foreign issue lock", block or "")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_expired_lease_allows_takeover_with_conflict_check(self):
|
||||
# #601: expired + dead pid / missing worktree → sanctioned reclaim (no block).
|
||||
existing = _lock_record(
|
||||
branch_name="feat/issue-420-other",
|
||||
worktree_path="/tmp/other-does-not-exist-420",
|
||||
session_pid=1,
|
||||
worktree_path="/tmp/other",
|
||||
work_lease=_lease("2000-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
incoming = _lock_record(worktree_path="/tmp/mine")
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(ils.assess_foreign_lock_overwrite(existing, incoming))
|
||||
with mock.patch.object(ils, "is_process_alive", return_value=False):
|
||||
block = ils.assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
|
||||
existing,
|
||||
issue_number=420,
|
||||
branch_name="feat/issue-420-server-code-parity",
|
||||
worktree_path="/tmp/mine",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(block)
|
||||
|
||||
# Expired but still-live owner pid AND present worktree → fail closed.
|
||||
present_wt = self.lock_dir # exists
|
||||
sticky = _lock_record(
|
||||
branch_name="feat/issue-420-other",
|
||||
worktree_path=present_wt,
|
||||
session_pid=os.getpid(),
|
||||
work_lease=_lease("2000-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
|
||||
block = ils.assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
|
||||
existing,
|
||||
issue_number=420,
|
||||
branch_name="feat/issue-420-server-code-parity",
|
||||
worktree_path="/tmp/mine",
|
||||
)
|
||||
with mock.patch.object(ils, "is_process_alive", return_value=True):
|
||||
blocked = ils.assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
|
||||
sticky,
|
||||
issue_number=420,
|
||||
branch_name="feat/issue-420-server-code-parity",
|
||||
worktree_path="/tmp/mine",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn("Recovery review is required", blocked or "")
|
||||
self.assertIn("Recovery review is required", block or "")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_same_owner_lease_conflict_allows_refresh(self):
|
||||
worktree = "/tmp/wt-420"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import sys as _sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path as _Path
|
||||
_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env # noqa: E402
|
||||
"""Tests for early duplicate-work detection (#400)."""
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
@@ -148,12 +144,10 @@ class TestInjectableDuplicateFetcher(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
},
|
||||
):
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as lock_dir:
|
||||
env = shared_mutation_env(
|
||||
"test-author-prgs",
|
||||
include_example_repo=True,
|
||||
GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR=lock_dir,
|
||||
)
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, {
|
||||
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR": lock_dir,
|
||||
}, clear=True):
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_lock_issue(
|
||||
issue_number=400,
|
||||
branch_name="feat/issue-400-duplicate-work-preflight",
|
||||
@@ -167,11 +161,7 @@ class TestMcpDuplicateRecheck(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self._env_patch = patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ,
|
||||
shared_mutation_env(
|
||||
"test-author-prgs",
|
||||
include_example_repo=True,
|
||||
GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR=self._dir.name,
|
||||
),
|
||||
{"GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR": self._dir.name},
|
||||
clear=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._env_patch.start()
|
||||
@@ -181,11 +171,6 @@ class TestMcpDuplicateRecheck(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
})
|
||||
self._remotes.start()
|
||||
mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import session_context_binding as _sc
|
||||
_sc._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
patch.stopall()
|
||||
@@ -220,8 +205,6 @@ class TestMcpDuplicateRecheck(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.repo.commit"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
"audit_label": "test-author",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
"base_url": "https://gitea.example.com",
|
||||
})
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token x")
|
||||
def test_commit_files_blocked_on_recheck(self, _auth, _profile, mock_gate):
|
||||
@@ -256,8 +239,6 @@ class TestMcpDuplicateRecheck(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.create"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
"audit_label": "test-author",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
"base_url": "https://gitea.example.com",
|
||||
})
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token x")
|
||||
def test_create_pr_returns_handoff_on_duplicate(self, _auth, _profile, mock_gate):
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -69,139 +69,5 @@ class TestIssueWorkflowStatusTransitions(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result, ["type:process", "status:duplicate"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestLifecycleRoleLabels(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_role_transition_author_to_reviewer_to_merger_single_active(self):
|
||||
after_author = labels.transition_role_labels(
|
||||
["type:feature", "status:pr-open"], "author"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(after_author, ["type:feature", "status:pr-open", "role:author"])
|
||||
|
||||
after_reviewer = labels.transition_role_labels(after_author, "reviewer")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
after_reviewer, ["type:feature", "status:pr-open", "role:reviewer"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("role:author", after_reviewer)
|
||||
|
||||
after_merger = labels.transition_role_labels(after_reviewer, "merger")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(labels.role_labels(after_merger), ["role:merger"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_role_transition_accepts_canonical_label(self):
|
||||
result = labels.transition_role_labels(["type:bug"], "role:reviewer")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result, ["type:bug", "role:reviewer"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unknown_role_raises(self):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
|
||||
labels.canonical_role_label("wizard")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_assess_reports_multiple_active_role_labels(self):
|
||||
result = labels.assess_issue_labels(
|
||||
["type:feature", "status:pr-open", "role:author", "role:reviewer"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["valid"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("multiple active role:* labels" in err for err in result["errors"])
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
sorted(result["role_labels"]), ["role:author", "role:reviewer"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestLifecycleHazardLabels(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_hazards_are_additive_and_multiple(self):
|
||||
one = labels.add_hazard_label(["type:bug", "status:blocked"], "conflicted")
|
||||
two = labels.add_hazard_label(one, "stale-lease")
|
||||
self.assertIn("hazard:conflicted", two)
|
||||
self.assertIn("hazard:stale-lease", two)
|
||||
# status/type untouched
|
||||
self.assertIn("status:blocked", two)
|
||||
self.assertIn("type:bug", two)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(labels.hazard_labels(two)), 2)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_add_hazard_is_idempotent(self):
|
||||
once = labels.add_hazard_label(["type:bug", "status:ready"], "root-mutation")
|
||||
twice = labels.add_hazard_label(once, "root_mutation")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(twice.count("hazard:root-mutation"), 1)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_clear_hazard_leaves_others_intact(self):
|
||||
start = ["type:bug", "status:blocked", "hazard:conflicted", "hazard:stale-lease"]
|
||||
cleared = labels.clear_hazard_label(start, "conflicted")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("hazard:conflicted", cleared)
|
||||
self.assertIn("hazard:stale-lease", cleared)
|
||||
self.assertIn("status:blocked", cleared)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_terminal_blocker_hazard_normalizes(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
labels.canonical_hazard_label("terminal-blocker"),
|
||||
"hazard:terminal-blocker",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_assess_surfaces_hazard_labels(self):
|
||||
result = labels.assess_issue_labels(
|
||||
["type:bug", "status:blocked", "hazard:conflicted"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["hazard_labels"], ["hazard:conflicted"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestDiscussionExclusion(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_discussion_issue_excluded_from_implementation_queue(self):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(labels.is_discussion(["type:discussion", "status:ready"]))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
labels.is_implementation_candidate(["type:discussion", "status:ready"])
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_non_discussion_issue_is_candidate(self):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
labels.is_implementation_candidate(["type:feature", "status:ready"])
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestBlockingReasonRequirement(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_blocked_requires_reason(self):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
labels.requires_blocking_reason(["type:bug", "status:blocked"])
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_hazard_requires_reason(self):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
labels.requires_blocking_reason(
|
||||
["type:bug", "status:ready", "hazard:stale-lease"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_clean_ready_issue_needs_no_reason(self):
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
labels.requires_blocking_reason(["type:feature", "status:ready"])
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestState603SynonymTransitions(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_authoring_maps_to_in_progress(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
labels.canonical_status_label("authoring"), "status:in-progress"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_changes_requested_transition(self):
|
||||
result = labels.transition_status_labels(
|
||||
["type:feature", "status:needs-review"], "changes-requested"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result, ["type:feature", "status:changes-requested"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_merge_ready_maps_to_approved(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(labels.canonical_status_label("merge-ready"), "status:approved")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_abandoned_maps_to_wontfix(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(labels.canonical_status_label("abandoned"), "status:wontfix")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_blocked_and_merged_transitions(self):
|
||||
blocked = labels.transition_status_labels(
|
||||
["type:bug", "status:in-progress"], "blocked"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(blocked, ["type:bug", "status:blocked"])
|
||||
merged = labels.transition_status_labels(
|
||||
["type:feature", "status:approved"], "merged"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(merged, ["type:feature", "status:reconcile"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import install_deterministic_remote_urls # noqa: E402
|
||||
install_deterministic_remote_urls()
|
||||
"""Regression tests: issue-write tool gates match gitea_resolve_task_capability (#69)."""
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
@@ -46,7 +41,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
"gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create", "gitea.issue.close",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools", "Example-Org/Example-Repo", "913443/eAgenda"],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "full-author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Reference in New Issue
Block a user