fix: anti-stomp capability auth, inventory wiring, side-effect proof (#604)

Address REQUEST_CHANGES on PR #680:

Blocker A — role vs capability agreement
- authorization_compatible allows reviewer/merger when they hold the task's
  required permission (e.g. gitea.issue.comment on comment_issue/mark_issue/
  set_issue_labels/lock_issue) without broad role-bypass.
- Unauthorized escalation without the permission remains fail closed.
- Regression coverage for allowed and denied reviewer/merger cases.

Blocker B — MUTATION_TASKS matches runtime wiring
- Remove unenforced entries; document dedicated-gate exclusions
  (mark_final_review_decision, save/resume_review_draft, etc.).
- Wire non-closing gitea_edit_pr as edit_pr; acquire lease uses
  acquire_reviewer_pr_lease task through verify_preflight_purity.
- Inventory↔wiring consistency tests replace set-membership-only coverage.

Blocker C — entrypoint side-effect ordering
- Behavioral tests for merge_pr, submit_pr_review, and comment_issue prove
  the assessor block aborts before Gitea API mutation and local durable writes.

Validation: 43 focused anti-stomp + related suites green; full suite
2639 passed / 6 skipped.

Closes #604

anti_stomp_preflight.py

@@ -0,0 +1,807 @@
+"""Common anti-stomp preflight for every MCP mutation tool (#604).
+
+Even with leases, mutation tools need a **shared** preflight that prevents
+stale sessions, wrong worktrees, wrong repos, old prompts, terminal locks,
+foreign leases, contaminated approvals, and root-checkout mutations from
+slipping through.
+
+This module is the pure assessment core. Callers (MCP mutation entrypoints)
+gather live facts and pass them in — nothing here performs git, network, or
+durable-state I/O. Existing happy-path guards remain authoritative; this
+module composes them into one typed, fail-closed result.
+
+Required checks (issue #604):
+
+* repo/org verification
+* profile/role verification
+* root checkout clean and not used for mutation (when role requires branches/)
+* worktree under branches when required
+* active lease ownership (when lease is required for the mutation)
+* terminal lock status (when applicable)
+* expected head SHA (when pinned)
+* stale runtime status
+* workflow hash (when a workflow load is required)
+* source contamination status
+* no manual state/mtime/source-file bypass
+
+Failure returns a typed blocker and an exact next action. There is **no**
+agent-facing bypass flag.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+
+import author_mutation_worktree
+import master_parity_gate
+import remote_repo_guard
+import root_checkout_guard
+import stable_branch_push_guard
+
+# ── public constants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# Typed blocker kinds returned in the structured result.
+BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO = "wrong_repo"
+BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE = "wrong_role"
+BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT = "root_checkout_mutation"
+BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE = "wrong_worktree"
+BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE = "foreign_lease"
+BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK = "terminal_lock"
+BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA = "head_sha_mismatch"
+BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME = "stale_runtime"
+BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH = "workflow_hash"
+BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION = "source_contamination"
+BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS = "manual_bypass"
+
+BLOCKER_KINDS = frozenset({
+    BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO,
+    BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE,
+    BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT,
+    BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE,
+    BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE,
+    BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK,
+    BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA,
+    BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME,
+    BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH,
+    BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION,
+    BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS,
+})
+
+# Mutation tasks that must invoke the shared anti-stomp preflight before
+# acting (issue #604 AC1). Every member must appear as a live task= kwarg
+# to verify_preflight_purity / _run_anti_stomp_preflight (or the review
+# anti_task map) in gitea_mcp_server.py. Inventory↔wiring tests fail if
+# a declared task is not wired.
+MUTATION_TASKS = frozenset({
+    "create_issue",
+    "comment_issue",
+    "close_issue",
+    "mark_issue",
+    "lock_issue",
+    "set_issue_labels",
+    "create_label",
+    "create_pr",
+    "close_pr",
+    "edit_pr",
+    "commit_files",
+    "gitea_commit_files",
+    "delete_branch",
+    "cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
+    "cleanup_stale_claims",
+    "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
+    "reconcile_already_landed_pr",
+    "reconcile_close_superseded_pr",
+    "post_heartbeat",
+    "acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
+    "gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
+    "adopt_merger_pr_lease",
+    "review_pr",
+    "submit_pr_review",
+    "approve_pr",
+    "request_changes_pr",
+    "merge_pr",
+})
+
+# Intentionally excluded from MUTATION_TASKS. Each has a dedicated
+# fail-closed gate that preserves decision-lock ownership, workflow-hash,
+# head-SHA, and repository consistency. Do not re-add without either
+# wiring shared preflight or updating this rationale (#604 Blocker B).
+DEDICATED_GATE_MUTATIONS: dict[str, str] = {
+    "mark_final_review_decision": (
+        "Local review-decision lock only. Enforced by session lock ownership, "
+        "workflow-hash, expected head SHA, PR work lease, eligibility, and "
+        "terminal-lock gates. No Gitea review POST; shared anti-stomp would "
+        "duplicate without side-effect-ordering value."
+    ),
+    "save_review_draft": (
+        "Local session-state draft save with live PR head/base consistency "
+        "checks. Not a Gitea review/merge mutation; dedicated head-SHA and "
+        "worktree resolution gates apply."
+    ),
+    "resume_review_draft": (
+        "Live-state resume with terminal lock, lease ownership, head/base SHA, "
+        "and parity checks. When submit=True, delegates to gitea_submit_pr_review "
+        "which runs shared anti-stomp before the Gitea review POST."
+    ),
+    "cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock": (
+        "Moot-lock cleanup with identity match, live PR merged/closed proof, "
+        "and reviewer capability gate (#594). Distinct from shared anti-stomp."
+    ),
+    "gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock": (
+        "Alias of cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock; dedicated #594 path."
+    ),
+    "heartbeat_reviewer_pr_lease": (
+        "Lease heartbeat posts via verify_preflight_purity(task='review_pr') "
+        "plus in-session lease ownership checks; not a separate mutation class."
+    ),
+    "release_reviewer_pr_lease": (
+        "Lease release uses workspace binding + ownership checks; posts only "
+        "when the session owns the active lease."
+    ),
+}
+
+# Roles that must mutate from a branches/ worktree (not the control checkout).
+_BRANCHES_REQUIRED_ROLES = frozenset({"author"})
+
+# Reviewer/merger mutations that require an owned lease + head pinning when
+# the caller supplies those facts.
+_LEASE_AWARE_TASKS = frozenset({
+    "review_pr",
+    "submit_pr_review",
+    "approve_pr",
+    "request_changes_pr",
+    "merge_pr",
+    "acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
+    "gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
+    "adopt_merger_pr_lease",
+})
+
+_NEXT_ACTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
+    BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO: (
+        "Pass explicit org= and repo= matching the local git remote "
+        "(e.g. org=Scaled-Tech-Consulting repo=Gitea-Tools) and retry."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE: (
+        "Call gitea_resolve_task_capability, switch to the required "
+        "namespace/profile, re-verify with gitea_whoami, then retry."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT: (
+        "Leave the root control checkout on clean master; create or switch "
+        "to a session-owned worktree under branches/ and retry the mutation "
+        "with worktree_path set."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE: (
+        "Create or bind a session-owned worktree under branches/, set "
+        "worktree_path (or GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE), and retry."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE: (
+        "Stop. Do not stomp a foreign lease. Wait for expiry, request "
+        "takeover through the sanctioned path, or hand off to the owner."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK: (
+        "Stop. A terminal review-decision lock is active for this head. "
+        "Do not re-approve/merge; follow the #332/#620 recovery path."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA: (
+        "Re-fetch the live PR head with gitea_view_pr, re-pin "
+        "expected_head_sha to the current head, re-validate, then retry."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME: (
+        "Restart the Gitea MCP server so it reloads master's capability "
+        "gates, re-run gitea_whoami + gitea_resolve_task_capability, then retry."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH: (
+        "Reload the canonical workflow via gitea_load_review_workflow, then "
+        "rerun the full review-merge workflow from inventory (no approve/merge replay)."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION: (
+        "Stop. Session is source-contaminated. Hand off to a reconciler for "
+        "audit/clear; do not clear markers by deleting session-state files."
+    ),
+    BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS: (
+        "Stop. Manual state/mtime/source-file bypass is forbidden. Use "
+        "sanctioned MCP tools only; never delete or rewrite session-state "
+        "or lock files by hand."
+    ),
+}
+
+
+def is_mutation_task(task: str | None) -> bool:
+    """True when *task* is in the #604 mutation set (normalized)."""
+    name = (task or "").strip().lower().removeprefix("gitea_")
+    if not name:
+        return False
+    if name in MUTATION_TASKS:
+        return True
+    # Accept gitea_ prefixed membership for aliases already in the set.
+    return f"gitea_{name}" in MUTATION_TASKS
+
+
+def roles_compatible(active_role: str | None, required_role: str | None) -> bool:
+    """Whether *active_role* may perform a task that maps to *required_role*.
+
+    Exact match always passes. Reconcilers may run author-class mutations
+    (comment/close/cleanup) that the capability map stamps as ``author`` —
+    matching the long-standing reconciler exemption for control-checkout
+    work. No other cross-role substitutions are allowed.
+
+    Capability-authorized multi-role tasks (e.g. reviewer holding
+    ``gitea.issue.comment`` for ``comment_issue``) are handled by
+    :func:`authorization_compatible`, not by expanding this role matrix.
+    """
+    active = (active_role or "").strip().lower()
+    required = (required_role or "").strip().lower()
+    if not active or not required:
+        return True
+    if active == required:
+        return True
+    if active == "reconciler" and required in {"author", "reconciler"}:
+        return True
+    return False
+
+
+def authorization_compatible(
+    active_role: str | None,
+    required_role: str | None,
+    *,
+    required_permission: str | None = None,
+    allowed_operations: Any = None,
+) -> bool:
+    """Whether the active session may run a task given role *and* capability.
+
+    Order:
+
+    1. :func:`roles_compatible` (exact role or narrow reconciler→author).
+    2. Capability possession: when *required_permission* is non-empty and
+       present in *allowed_operations*, allow even if the nominal task role
+       differs (e.g. reviewer/merger with ``gitea.issue.comment`` on
+       ``comment_issue`` / ``mark_issue`` / ``set_issue_labels`` /
+       ``lock_issue``).
+
+    Fail closed otherwise. This is **not** a broad reviewer→author or
+    merger→author role rewrite: without the specific permission the check
+    still denies. Missing *allowed_operations* when a permission is required
+    also fails closed (callers must supply the live profile op list).
+    """
+    if roles_compatible(active_role, required_role):
+        return True
+    perm = (required_permission or "").strip()
+    if not perm:
+        return False
+    if allowed_operations is None:
+        return False
+    try:
+        ops = {str(o).strip() for o in allowed_operations if o is not None}
+    except TypeError:
+        return False
+    return perm in ops
+
+
+def _blocker(
+    kind: str,
+    reasons: list[str],
+    *,
+    exact_next_action: str | None = None,
+    detail: dict | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if kind not in BLOCKER_KINDS:
+        raise ValueError(f"unknown anti-stomp blocker kind: {kind!r}")
+    return {
+        "kind": kind,
+        "reasons": list(reasons),
+        "exact_next_action": exact_next_action or _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind],
+        "detail": dict(detail or {}),
+    }
+
+
+def _allowed_result(checks: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "allowed": True,
+        "block": False,
+        "blockers": [],
+        "reasons": [],
+        "exact_next_action": "proceed",
+        "blocker_kind": None,
+        "checks": checks,
+    }
+
+
+def _blocked_result(
+    blockers: list[dict[str, Any]],
+    checks: dict[str, Any],
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    primary = blockers[0]
+    all_reasons: list[str] = []
+    for b in blockers:
+        for r in b.get("reasons") or []:
+            if r not in all_reasons:
+                all_reasons.append(r)
+    return {
+        "allowed": False,
+        "block": True,
+        "blockers": blockers,
+        "reasons": all_reasons,
+        "exact_next_action": primary["exact_next_action"],
+        "blocker_kind": primary["kind"],
+        "checks": checks,
+    }
+
+
+def assess_anti_stomp_preflight(
+    *,
+    task: str | None = None,
+    # repo/org
+    remote: str | None = None,
+    resolved_org: str | None = None,
+    resolved_repo: str | None = None,
+    local_remote_url: str | None = None,
+    org_explicit: bool = False,
+    repo_explicit: bool = False,
+    check_repo: bool = True,
+    # profile/role + capability
+    profile_name: str | None = None,
+    profile_role: str | None = None,
+    required_role: str | None = None,
+    required_permission: str | None = None,
+    allowed_operations: Any = None,
+    check_role: bool = True,
+    # root checkout + worktree
+    workspace_path: str | None = None,
+    project_root: str | None = None,
+    current_branch: str | None = None,
+    root_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    root_porcelain: str | None = None,
+    remote_master_sha: str | None = None,
+    check_root_checkout: bool = True,
+    check_worktree: bool = True,
+    # stale runtime (master parity)
+    startup_head: str | None = None,
+    current_code_head: str | None = None,
+    check_stale_runtime: bool = True,
+    # lease ownership
+    lease_required: bool = False,
+    foreign_lease: bool | None = None,
+    lease_owner_session: str | None = None,
+    active_session_id: str | None = None,
+    lease_owner_identity: str | None = None,
+    active_identity: str | None = None,
+    lease_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    # terminal lock
+    terminal_lock_blocks: bool | None = None,
+    terminal_lock_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    # expected head SHA
+    require_head_sha: bool = False,
+    expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    live_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    # workflow hash
+    workflow_hash_valid: bool | None = None,
+    workflow_hash_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    # source contamination (stable-branch push / approval contamination)
+    source_contaminated: bool | None = None,
+    contamination_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    # manual bypass
+    manual_bypass_attempted: bool = False,
+    manual_bypass_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Fail-closed common anti-stomp assessment (pure).
+
+    Only checks for which facts are supplied (or which are required by the
+    mutation category) are evaluated. Unsupplied optional facts are recorded
+    as ``skipped`` so callers can see coverage without inventing defaults.
+
+    Returns a structured dict with ``allowed``/``block``, typed ``blockers``,
+    aggregated ``reasons``, ``exact_next_action``, and per-check ``checks``.
+    """
+    task_name = (task or "").strip()
+    role = (profile_role or "").strip().lower() or None
+    req_role = (required_role or "").strip().lower() or None
+    req_perm = (required_permission or "").strip() or None
+    checks: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "task": task_name or None,
+        "profile_name": profile_name,
+        "profile_role": role,
+        "required_role": req_role,
+        "required_permission": req_perm,
+    }
+    blockers: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    # ── manual bypass (always first; never skippable when attempted) ─────────
+    if manual_bypass_attempted:
+        reasons = list(manual_bypass_reasons or [
+            "manual state/mtime/source-file bypass attempt detected (fail closed)"
+        ])
+        blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS, reasons))
+        checks["manual_bypass"] = {"block": True, "reasons": reasons}
+    else:
+        checks["manual_bypass"] = {"block": False, "skipped": False}
+
+    # ── repo/org ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    if check_repo and resolved_org is not None and resolved_repo is not None:
+        repo_assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
+            remote=remote or "",
+            resolved_org=resolved_org,
+            resolved_repo=resolved_repo,
+            local_remote_url=local_remote_url,
+            org_explicit=org_explicit,
+            repo_explicit=repo_explicit,
+        )
+        checks["repo"] = {
+            "block": bool(repo_assessment.get("block")),
+            "reasons": list(repo_assessment.get("reasons") or []),
+            "resolved_org": resolved_org,
+            "resolved_repo": resolved_repo,
+        }
+        if repo_assessment.get("block"):
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(
+                    BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO,
+                    list(repo_assessment.get("reasons") or ["repo/org mismatch"]),
+                    detail={
+                        "resolved_org": resolved_org,
+                        "resolved_repo": resolved_repo,
+                        "local_remote_url": local_remote_url,
+                    },
+                )
+            )
+    else:
+        checks["repo"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── profile/role + capability ────────────────────────────────────────────
+    # Role match OR possession of the task's required permission (Blocker A).
+    # Reviewer/merger may run issue-comment-class tasks when they hold
+    # gitea.issue.comment; unauthorized escalation without the permission
+    # still fails closed.
+    if check_role and req_role and role:
+        authorized = authorization_compatible(
+            role,
+            req_role,
+            required_permission=req_perm,
+            allowed_operations=allowed_operations,
+        )
+        if not authorized:
+            perm_clause = (
+                f", required_permission='{req_perm}'" if req_perm else ""
+            )
+            reasons = [
+                f"active profile role '{role}' is not authorized for task "
+                f"'{task_name or '(unknown)'}' (required_role='{req_role}'"
+                f"{perm_clause}; profile={profile_name or '(unknown)'})"
+            ]
+            checks["role"] = {
+                "block": True,
+                "reasons": reasons,
+                "required_permission": req_perm,
+                "capability_authorized": False,
+            }
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(
+                    BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE,
+                    reasons,
+                    detail={
+                        "profile_name": profile_name,
+                        "profile_role": role,
+                        "required_role": req_role,
+                        "required_permission": req_perm,
+                    },
+                )
+            )
+        else:
+            checks["role"] = {
+                "block": False,
+                "reasons": [],
+                "required_permission": req_perm,
+                "capability_authorized": bool(
+                    req_perm
+                    and allowed_operations is not None
+                    and req_perm in {
+                        str(o).strip() for o in (allowed_operations or [])
+                        if o is not None
+                    }
+                    and not roles_compatible(role, req_role)
+                ),
+            }
+    else:
+        checks["role"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── stale runtime (master parity) ────────────────────────────────────────
+    if check_stale_runtime and (
+        startup_head is not None or current_code_head is not None
+    ):
+        parity = master_parity_gate.assess_master_parity(
+            {"startup_head": startup_head},
+            current_code_head,
+        )
+        stale_reasons = master_parity_gate.parity_block_reasons(parity)
+        checks["stale_runtime"] = {
+            "block": bool(stale_reasons),
+            "reasons": list(stale_reasons),
+            "startup_head": startup_head,
+            "current_code_head": current_code_head,
+            "stale": bool(parity.get("stale")),
+        }
+        if stale_reasons:
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(
+                    BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME,
+                    list(stale_reasons),
+                    detail={
+                        "startup_head": startup_head,
+                        "current_code_head": current_code_head,
+                    },
+                )
+            )
+    else:
+        checks["stale_runtime"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── root checkout ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    if (
+        check_root_checkout
+        and workspace_path is not None
+        and project_root is not None
+        and root_porcelain is not None
+    ):
+        root_assessment = root_checkout_guard.assess_root_checkout_guard(
+            workspace_path=workspace_path,
+            canonical_repo_root=project_root,
+            current_branch=current_branch,
+            head_sha=root_head_sha,
+            porcelain_status=root_porcelain,
+            remote_master_sha=remote_master_sha,
+            resolved_role=req_role or role,
+            actual_role=role,
+        )
+        checks["root_checkout"] = {
+            "block": bool(root_assessment.get("block")),
+            "reasons": list(root_assessment.get("reasons") or []),
+        }
+        if root_assessment.get("block"):
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(
+                    BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT,
+                    list(root_assessment.get("reasons") or [
+                        "control checkout is not clean master"
+                    ]),
+                    detail={
+                        "workspace_path": workspace_path,
+                        "project_root": project_root,
+                        "current_branch": current_branch,
+                    },
+                )
+            )
+    else:
+        checks["root_checkout"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── worktree under branches (author) ─────────────────────────────────────
+    worktree_role = role or req_role
+    if (
+        check_worktree
+        and workspace_path is not None
+        and project_root is not None
+        and worktree_role in _BRANCHES_REQUIRED_ROLES
+    ):
+        wt = author_mutation_worktree.assess_author_mutation_worktree(
+            workspace_path=workspace_path,
+            project_root=project_root,
+            current_branch=current_branch,
+        )
+        checks["worktree"] = {
+            "block": bool(wt.get("block")),
+            "reasons": list(wt.get("reasons") or []),
+            "under_branches": wt.get("under_branches"),
+        }
+        if wt.get("block"):
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(
+                    BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE,
+                    list(wt.get("reasons") or [
+                        "mutation worktree is not under branches/"
+                    ]),
+                    detail={
+                        "workspace_path": workspace_path,
+                        "project_root": project_root,
+                    },
+                )
+            )
+    else:
+        checks["worktree"] = {
+            "block": False,
+            "skipped": worktree_role not in _BRANCHES_REQUIRED_ROLES
+            or workspace_path is None,
+        }
+
+    # ── foreign lease ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    lease_needed = lease_required or (
+        task_name.removeprefix("gitea_") in {
+            t.removeprefix("gitea_") for t in _LEASE_AWARE_TASKS
+        }
+        and foreign_lease is not None
+    )
+    if lease_needed or foreign_lease is True:
+        is_foreign = bool(foreign_lease)
+        if foreign_lease is None and lease_required:
+            # Ownership must be proven when lease_required; missing ownership
+            # facts fail closed.
+            owner_ok = (
+                (not lease_owner_session and not active_session_id)
+                or (
+                    lease_owner_session
+                    and active_session_id
+                    and lease_owner_session == active_session_id
+                )
+            )
+            identity_ok = (
+                (not lease_owner_identity and not active_identity)
+                or (
+                    lease_owner_identity
+                    and active_identity
+                    and lease_owner_identity == active_identity
+                )
+            )
+            if not owner_ok or not identity_ok:
+                is_foreign = True
+        reasons = list(lease_reasons or [])
+        if is_foreign and not reasons:
+            reasons = [
+                "active lease is owned by a foreign session or identity "
+                "(anti-stomp fail closed)"
+            ]
+        checks["lease"] = {
+            "block": is_foreign,
+            "reasons": reasons if is_foreign else [],
+            "lease_owner_session": lease_owner_session,
+            "active_session_id": active_session_id,
+        }
+        if is_foreign:
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE, reasons)
+            )
+    else:
+        checks["lease"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── terminal lock ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    if terminal_lock_blocks is not None:
+        reasons = list(terminal_lock_reasons or [])
+        if terminal_lock_blocks and not reasons:
+            reasons = [
+                "terminal review-decision lock is active for this head "
+                "(anti-stomp fail closed)"
+            ]
+        checks["terminal_lock"] = {
+            "block": bool(terminal_lock_blocks),
+            "reasons": reasons if terminal_lock_blocks else [],
+        }
+        if terminal_lock_blocks:
+            blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK, reasons))
+    else:
+        checks["terminal_lock"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── expected head SHA ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    if require_head_sha or (
+        expected_head_sha is not None and live_head_sha is not None
+    ):
+        exp = (expected_head_sha or "").strip().lower()
+        live = (live_head_sha or "").strip().lower()
+        mismatch = False
+        reasons: list[str] = []
+        if require_head_sha and not exp:
+            mismatch = True
+            reasons.append(
+                "expected_head_sha is required before this mutation "
+                "(anti-stomp fail closed)"
+            )
+        elif exp and live and exp != live:
+            mismatch = True
+            reasons.append(
+                f"expected_head_sha '{exp}' does not match live PR head "
+                f"'{live}' (anti-stomp fail closed; stale prompt data)"
+            )
+        elif require_head_sha and exp and not live:
+            mismatch = True
+            reasons.append(
+                "live PR head SHA could not be determined to corroborate "
+                "expected_head_sha (anti-stomp fail closed)"
+            )
+        checks["head_sha"] = {
+            "block": mismatch,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+            "expected_head_sha": expected_head_sha,
+            "live_head_sha": live_head_sha,
+        }
+        if mismatch:
+            blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA, reasons))
+    else:
+        checks["head_sha"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── workflow hash ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    if workflow_hash_valid is not None:
+        reasons = list(workflow_hash_reasons or [])
+        if not workflow_hash_valid and not reasons:
+            reasons = [
+                "workflow load proof missing or hash stale "
+                "(anti-stomp fail closed)"
+            ]
+        checks["workflow_hash"] = {
+            "block": not bool(workflow_hash_valid),
+            "reasons": reasons if not workflow_hash_valid else [],
+        }
+        if not workflow_hash_valid:
+            blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH, reasons))
+    else:
+        checks["workflow_hash"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    # ── source contamination ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    if source_contaminated is not None:
+        reasons = list(contamination_reasons or [])
+        if source_contaminated and not reasons:
+            reasons = [
+                "session is source-contaminated (stable-branch push or "
+                "contaminated approval path); anti-stomp fail closed"
+            ]
+        checks["source_contamination"] = {
+            "block": bool(source_contaminated),
+            "reasons": reasons if source_contaminated else [],
+        }
+        if source_contaminated:
+            blockers.append(
+                _blocker(BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION, reasons)
+            )
+    else:
+        checks["source_contamination"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
+
+    if blockers:
+        return _blocked_result(blockers, checks)
+    return _allowed_result(checks)
+
+
+def format_anti_stomp_error(assessment: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Single RuntimeError message for MCP mutation gates."""
+    kind = assessment.get("blocker_kind") or "unknown"
+    reasons = "; ".join(
+        assessment.get("reasons")
+        or ["anti-stomp preflight blocked the mutation"]
+    )
+    next_action = assessment.get("exact_next_action") or "stop and diagnose"
+    return (
+        f"Anti-stomp preflight (#604) blocked mutation "
+        f"[{kind}]: {reasons}. "
+        f"exact_next_action: {next_action}"
+    )
+
+
+def block_response(
+    assessment: dict[str, Any],
+    **extra_fields: Any,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Structured tool-return payload for a blocked mutation."""
+    payload = {
+        "success": False,
+        "performed": False,
+        "blocked": True,
+        "anti_stomp": True,
+        "blocker_kind": assessment.get("blocker_kind"),
+        "blockers": list(assessment.get("blockers") or []),
+        "reasons": list(assessment.get("reasons") or []),
+        "exact_next_action": assessment.get("exact_next_action"),
+        "checks": assessment.get("checks") or {},
+    }
+    payload.update(extra_fields)
+    return payload
+
+
+def contamination_from_stable_marker(
+    marker: dict | None,
+    *,
+    task: str | None,
+    actual_role: str | None,
+) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
+    """Derive source-contamination facts from a #671 durable marker."""
+    if not marker:
+        return False, []
+    gate = stable_branch_push_guard.assess_contamination_gate(
+        marker,
+        task=task,
+        actual_role=actual_role,
+    )
+    if gate.get("block"):
+        return True, list(gate.get("reasons") or [])
+    return False, []

gitea_auth.py

@@ -243,192 +243,6 @@ def _redact(text):
         return str(text)
 
 
-# ── Classified client failures (#699) ─────────────────────────────────────────
-# Subclasses of RuntimeError preserve existing ``except RuntimeError`` call
-# sites. Exception *messages* are fixed constants only — HTTP response bodies,
-# Keychain material, and arbitrary exception text are never stored on the
-# exception or re-emitted to tool results / daemon logs.
-
-
-# Fixed messages (must match mcp_tool_error_boundary.FIXED_MESSAGES keys used here).
-_MSG_AUTH_INVALID = "Gitea authentication failed: invalid or revoked credentials"
-_MSG_AUTH_FAILED = "Gitea authentication failed"
-_MSG_AUTHZ_SCOPE = "Gitea authorization failed: insufficient token scope"
-_MSG_AUTHZ_DENIED = "Gitea authorization failed: access denied"
-_MSG_NETWORK = "Network error contacting Gitea"
-_MSG_CONFIG = "Gitea configuration or credential resolution failed"
-_MSG_UPSTREAM = "Gitea upstream unavailable"
-_MSG_HTTP = "Gitea HTTP request failed"
-
-
-class GiteaClientError(RuntimeError):
-    """Base for known Gitea client failures with stable reason_code metadata."""
-
-    reason_code = "client_error"
-    error_class = "client"
-    http_status = None
-
-    def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
-        if reason_code is not None:
-            self.reason_code = reason_code
-        if http_status is not None:
-            self.http_status = http_status
-        # Message is always a fixed constant; callers cannot inject bodies.
-        fixed = message if message is not None else _MSG_HTTP
-        super().__init__(fixed)
-
-
-class GiteaAuthError(GiteaClientError):
-    """Authentication failure (invalid/revoked credentials → typically HTTP 401)."""
-
-    reason_code = "auth_invalid_token"
-    error_class = "authentication"
-    http_status = 401
-
-    def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
-        super().__init__(
-            message if message is not None else _MSG_AUTH_INVALID,
-            reason_code=reason_code or "auth_invalid_token",
-            http_status=http_status if http_status is not None else 401,
-        )
-
-
-class GiteaAuthzError(GiteaClientError):
-    """Authorization failure (HTTP 403 — scope deficiency or access denied)."""
-
-    reason_code = "authz_denied"
-    error_class = "authorization"
-    http_status = 403
-
-    def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
-        code = reason_code or "authz_denied"
-        if code == "authz_insufficient_scope":
-            fixed = _MSG_AUTHZ_SCOPE
-        else:
-            fixed = _MSG_AUTHZ_DENIED
-            code = "authz_denied"
-        super().__init__(
-            message if message is not None else fixed,
-            reason_code=code,
-            http_status=http_status if http_status is not None else 403,
-        )
-
-
-class GiteaNetworkError(GiteaClientError):
-    """Transport / DNS / timeout failure contacting Gitea."""
-
-    reason_code = "network_error"
-    error_class = "network"
-    http_status = None
-
-    def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
-        super().__init__(
-            message if message is not None else _MSG_NETWORK,
-            reason_code=reason_code or "network_error",
-            http_status=http_status,
-        )
-
-
-class GiteaConfigError(GiteaClientError):
-    """Local configuration / credential resolution failure (not HTTP auth)."""
-
-    reason_code = "config_error"
-    error_class = "configuration"
-    http_status = None
-
-    def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
-        super().__init__(
-            message if message is not None else _MSG_CONFIG,
-            reason_code=reason_code or "config_error",
-            http_status=http_status,
-        )
-
-
-class GiteaHttpError(GiteaClientError):
-    """Non-auth HTTP failure with fixed message (no response body)."""
-
-    reason_code = "http_error"
-    error_class = "client"
-    http_status = None
-
-    def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
-        code = reason_code or "http_error"
-        if code == "upstream_unavailable":
-            fixed = _MSG_UPSTREAM
-        else:
-            fixed = _MSG_HTTP
-            code = "http_error"
-        super().__init__(
-            message if message is not None else fixed,
-            reason_code=code,
-            http_status=http_status,
-        )
-
-
-def _looks_like_insufficient_scope(detail: str) -> bool:
-    """Internal: inspect redacted body *only* to refine 403 reason_code.
-
-    The body is never stored on the exception or returned to callers.
-    """
-    lower = (detail or "").lower()
-    markers = (
-        "insufficient scope",
-        "required scope",
-        "does not have at least one of required scope",
-        "token does not have",
-        "missing scope",
-        "scope(s)",
-    )
-    return any(m in lower for m in markers)
-
-
-def classify_http_status(code: int, *, body_hint: str = "") -> tuple[type, str, int]:
-    """Central HTTP status → (exception_class, reason_code, http_status).
-
-    Every HTTP 403 becomes authorization-class. Body text is used only as a
-    local hint for scope vs denied reason_code and is never returned.
-    """
-    if code == 401:
-        return (GiteaAuthError, "auth_invalid_token", 401)
-    if code == 403:
-        if _looks_like_insufficient_scope(body_hint or ""):
-            return (GiteaAuthzError, "authz_insufficient_scope", 403)
-        return (GiteaAuthzError, "authz_denied", 403)
-    if code in (502, 503, 504):
-        return (GiteaHttpError, "upstream_unavailable", code)
-    return (GiteaHttpError, "http_error", code)
-
-
-def raise_for_http_status(code: int, body: str = "") -> None:
-    """Raise a typed client error for *code* without embedding *body*.
-
-    *body* may be inspected only to choose scope vs denied for 403; it is
-    never placed on the exception message.
-    """
-    # Redact before any inspection; discard after classification.
-    try:
-        hint = _redact(body or "").strip()
-    except Exception:
-        hint = ""
-    exc_cls, reason, status = classify_http_status(code, body_hint=hint)
-    # Explicitly construct without passing body/hint into message.
-    if exc_cls is GiteaAuthError:
-        raise GiteaAuthError(reason_code=reason, http_status=status)
-    if exc_cls is GiteaAuthzError:
-        raise GiteaAuthzError(reason_code=reason, http_status=status)
-    if reason == "upstream_unavailable":
-        raise GiteaHttpError(
-            reason_code="upstream_unavailable",
-            http_status=status,
-        )
-    raise GiteaHttpError(reason_code="http_error", http_status=status)
-
-
-def _raise_http_error(code: int, detail: str = "") -> None:
-    """Backward-compatible alias — *detail* is never embedded in the error."""
-    raise_for_http_status(code, detail)
-
-
 def _add_query(url, **params):
     """Return *url* with the given query parameters added or overridden.
 
@@ -501,24 +315,23 @@ def api_request(method, url, auth_header, payload=None, *,
     """Make an authenticated JSON request to the Gitea API.
 
     Returns parsed JSON on success (or ``None`` for an empty body), and raises
-    a classified client error on failure.
+    ``RuntimeError`` on failure.
 
     On HTTP 429 the request is retried up to *max_retries* times: honoring a
     valid ``Retry-After`` header (seconds or HTTP-date) when present, otherwise
     using capped jittered exponential backoff. Successful responses are
     unchanged.
 
-    Failures raise typed exceptions with **fixed messages only** (#699). HTTP
+    All failures are converted to a ``RuntimeError`` with a clear, secret
-    response bodies are read solely for local 403 reason refinement and are
+    -redacted message (no raw stack traces or credential material):
-    never stored on exceptions or returned to callers:
 
-    - HTTP 401 → :class:`GiteaAuthError` (``auth_invalid_token``)
+    - Non-429 HTTP errors surface the status code and a redacted response body.
-    - HTTP 403 → :class:`GiteaAuthzError` (scope or denied)
+      502/503/504 upstream errors get an explicit "Gitea upstream unavailable"
-    - 502/503/504 → :class:`GiteaHttpError` (``upstream_unavailable``)
+      message.
-    - Other non-429 HTTP → :class:`GiteaHttpError` (``http_error``)
+    - Timeouts and network/DNS failures (``URLError`` / ``TimeoutError``) surface
-    - Timeouts / DNS / ``URLError`` → :class:`GiteaNetworkError`
+      a generic "network error contacting Gitea" message.
-    - Malformed success JSON → plain ``RuntimeError`` (programming/protocol;
+    - A malformed (non-JSON) success body surfaces a "malformed JSON response"
-      not reclassified as authentication)
+      message rather than a raw decode error.
 
     The ``*_func`` parameters and ``timeout`` are injection points for
     deterministic testing.
@@ -556,23 +369,22 @@ def api_request(method, url, auth_header, payload=None, *,
                 error_body = e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
             except Exception:
                 error_body = ""
-            # Classify from status (+ local body hint). Body is not embedded.
+            detail = _redact(error_body).strip()
-            try:
+            if e.code in (502, 503, 504):
-                raise_for_http_status(e.code, error_body)
+                msg = f"HTTP {e.code}: Gitea upstream unavailable"
-            except GiteaClientError:
+                raise RuntimeError(f"{msg}: {detail}" if detail else msg) from e
-                raise
+            raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {e.code}: {detail}") from e
-            # Defensive: raise_for_http_status always raises.
-            raise GiteaHttpError(http_status=e.code) from e  # pragma: no cover
         except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as e:
-            # Fixed message only — do not embed URLError reason (may leak paths).
+            reason = getattr(e, "reason", e)
-            raise GiteaNetworkError(reason_code="network_error") from e
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                f"network error contacting Gitea: {_redact(reason)}"
+            ) from e
 
         if not body:
             return None
         try:
             return json.loads(body)
         except ValueError as e:
-            # Programming/protocol failure — not authentication.
             raise RuntimeError("malformed JSON response from Gitea") from e
 
 

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -619,33 +619,222 @@ def _enforce_branches_only_author_mutation(worktree_path: str | None = None) ->
         )
 
 
+def _anti_stomp_in_test_mode() -> bool:
+    """Whether the #604 anti-stomp gate is skipped under pytest.
+
+    Mirrors remote-repo / stable-contamination test bypasses so the existing
+    suite (bare remotes, mocked APIs) stays green. Set
+    ``GITEA_TEST_FORCE_ANTI_STOMP=1`` to exercise the live gate under tests.
+    """
+    if not _preflight_in_test_mode():
+        return False
+    return not bool(os.environ.get("GITEA_TEST_FORCE_ANTI_STOMP"))
+
+
+def _run_anti_stomp_preflight(
+    task: str | None,
+    *,
+    remote: str | None = None,
+    worktree_path: str | None = None,
+    host: str | None = None,
+    org: str | None = None,
+    repo: str | None = None,
+    expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    live_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    require_head_sha: bool = False,
+    lease_required: bool = False,
+    foreign_lease: bool | None = None,
+    lease_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    terminal_lock_blocks: bool | None = None,
+    terminal_lock_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    workflow_hash_valid: bool | None = None,
+    workflow_hash_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    raise_on_block: bool = True,
+) -> dict | None:
+    """Shared #604 anti-stomp preflight for MCP mutation entrypoints.
+
+    Gathers live workspace/parity/role/repo facts and invokes the pure
+    :func:`anti_stomp_preflight.assess_anti_stomp_preflight` assessor. On
+    block, raises ``RuntimeError`` (default) or returns a structured
+    :func:`anti_stomp_preflight.block_response` when *raise_on_block* is
+    False. Returns ``None`` when the mutation may proceed.
+    """
+    if _anti_stomp_in_test_mode():
+        return None
+
+    # Only enforce when the caller names a known mutation task. Read-only
+    # paths and legacy verify_preflight_purity calls without a task stay
+    # on the pre-#604 gate chain (whoami/capability/root/worktree).
+    if not task or not anti_stomp_preflight.is_mutation_task(task):
+        return None
+
+    profile = get_profile()
+    profile_name = profile.get("profile_name")
+    profile_role = _actual_profile_role()
+    allowed_operations = list(profile.get("allowed_operations") or [])
+    req_role = None
+    req_perm = None
+    if task:
+        try:
+            req_role = task_capability_map.required_role(task)
+        except KeyError:
+            req_role = _preflight_resolved_role
+        try:
+            req_perm = task_capability_map.required_permission(task)
+        except KeyError:
+            req_perm = None
+
+    ctx = _resolve_namespace_mutation_context(worktree_path)
+    workspace = ctx["workspace_path"]
+    canonical_root = ctx["canonical_repo_root"]
+    git_state = issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state(canonical_root)
+    remote_master_sha = root_checkout_guard.resolve_remote_master_sha(canonical_root)
+
+    # Repo/org facts (best-effort; explicit org/repo when provided).
+    resolved_org = org
+    resolved_repo = repo
+    local_remote_url = None
+    org_explicit = org is not None
+    repo_explicit = repo is not None
+    if remote:
+        try:
+            local_remote_url = _local_git_remote_url(remote)
+        except Exception:
+            local_remote_url = None
+        if resolved_org is None or resolved_repo is None:
+            try:
+                rem = _effective_remote(remote)
+                if rem in REMOTES:
+                    if resolved_org is None:
+                        resolved_org = REMOTES[rem]["org"]
+                    if resolved_repo is None:
+                        resolved_repo = REMOTES[rem]["repo"]
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+
+    parity = _current_master_parity()
+    startup_head = parity.get("startup_head")
+    current_code_head = parity.get("current_head")
+
+    # Source contamination from durable #671 marker (role-aware).
+    source_contaminated = None
+    contamination_reasons = None
+    try:
+        marker = _load_stable_contamination_marker(remote)
+        contaminated, cont_reasons = anti_stomp_preflight.contamination_from_stable_marker(
+            marker,
+            task=task,
+            actual_role=profile_role,
+        )
+        if marker is not None:
+            source_contaminated = contaminated
+            contamination_reasons = cont_reasons
+    except Exception:
+        # Fail soft on marker I/O: existing #671 enforcer still runs separately.
+        source_contaminated = None
+
+    # Workflow-hash facts when the task is review/merge oriented.
+    if workflow_hash_valid is None and task in {
+        "review_pr",
+        "submit_pr_review",
+        "approve_pr",
+        "request_changes_pr",
+        "merge_pr",
+    }:
+        try:
+            wf_reasons = _review_workflow_load_gate_reasons()
+            workflow_hash_valid = not bool(wf_reasons)
+            workflow_hash_reasons = list(wf_reasons) if wf_reasons else None
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+    # Mirror remote_repo_guard's pytest bypass: under the unit suite bare
+    # remote=prgs still defaults to Timesheet, and re-checking here would
+    # break happy-path reconciler/author tests that already rely on the
+    # #530 gate being opt-in via GITEA_FORCE_REMOTE_REPO_CHECK.
+    check_repo = True
+    if "pytest" in sys.modules and not os.environ.get(
+        "GITEA_FORCE_REMOTE_REPO_CHECK"
+    ):
+        check_repo = False
+
+    assessment = anti_stomp_preflight.assess_anti_stomp_preflight(
+        task=task,
+        remote=remote,
+        resolved_org=resolved_org,
+        resolved_repo=resolved_repo,
+        local_remote_url=local_remote_url,
+        org_explicit=org_explicit,
+        repo_explicit=repo_explicit,
+        check_repo=check_repo,
+        profile_name=profile_name,
+        profile_role=profile_role,
+        required_role=req_role or _preflight_resolved_role,
+        required_permission=req_perm,
+        allowed_operations=allowed_operations,
+        workspace_path=workspace,
+        project_root=canonical_root,
+        current_branch=git_state.get("current_branch"),
+        root_head_sha=git_state.get("head_sha"),
+        root_porcelain=git_state.get("porcelain_status") or "",
+        remote_master_sha=remote_master_sha,
+        startup_head=startup_head,
+        current_code_head=current_code_head,
+        lease_required=lease_required,
+        foreign_lease=foreign_lease,
+        lease_reasons=lease_reasons,
+        terminal_lock_blocks=terminal_lock_blocks,
+        terminal_lock_reasons=terminal_lock_reasons,
+        require_head_sha=require_head_sha,
+        expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha,
+        live_head_sha=live_head_sha,
+        workflow_hash_valid=workflow_hash_valid,
+        workflow_hash_reasons=workflow_hash_reasons,
+        source_contaminated=source_contaminated,
+        contamination_reasons=contamination_reasons,
+        manual_bypass_attempted=False,
+    )
+    if not assessment.get("block"):
+        return None
+    if raise_on_block:
+        raise RuntimeError(anti_stomp_preflight.format_anti_stomp_error(assessment))
+    return anti_stomp_preflight.block_response(assessment)
+
+
 def verify_preflight_purity(
     remote: str | None = None,
     worktree_path: str | None = None,
     task: str | None = None,
     *,
-    target_issue_number: int | None = None,
+    expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
-    require_author_lock: bool = False,
+    live_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    require_head_sha: bool = False,
+    lease_required: bool = False,
+    foreign_lease: bool | None = None,
+    lease_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    terminal_lock_blocks: bool | None = None,
+    terminal_lock_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    workflow_hash_valid: bool | None = None,
+    workflow_hash_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
+    org: str | None = None,
+    repo: str | None = None,
 ):
-    """Verify identity/capability order, then production workspace guards.
+    """Verify that identity and capability were verified prior to session edits.
 
-    #683: pytest/unittest must not skip production root/branches/scope
+    Also runs the shared #604 anti-stomp preflight for mutation tasks (typed
-    enforcement when force-on signals request production behavior. The
+    blocker + exact next action). Extended lease/head/terminal facts may be
-    early return below only skips *preflight-order* purity checks under
+    supplied by review/merge callers.
-    pure unit-test isolation — never when production guards are active.
     """
     global _preflight_reviewer_violation_files
 
     in_test = _preflight_in_test_mode()
-    production_active = workflow_scope_guard.production_guards_active(
+    if in_test and not (
-        in_test_mode=in_test
+        os.environ.get("GITEA_TEST_FORCE_DIRTY")
-    )
+        or os.environ.get("GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN") is not None
-    # Pure unit-test isolation: skip purity-order unless legacy dirty/porcelain
+        or os.environ.get("GITEA_TEST_FORCE_ANTI_STOMP")
-    # force flags request the dirtiness path. #683 FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS alone
+    ):
-    # runs production root/branches/scope without requiring whoami/capability.
+        return
-    skip_purity_order = in_test and not workflow_scope_guard.purity_order_forced()
 
-    if not skip_purity_order:
     if not _preflight_whoami_called:
         raise RuntimeError(
             "Pre-flight order violation: Identity (gitea_whoami) has not been verified (fail closed)"
@@ -689,9 +878,7 @@ def verify_preflight_purity(
                     )
                 )
 
-            dirty_files = sorted(
+        dirty_files = sorted(_parse_porcelain_entries(_get_workspace_porcelain(workspace)))
-                _parse_porcelain_entries(_get_workspace_porcelain(workspace))
-            )
         if dirty_files:
             raise RuntimeError(
                 nwb.format_namespace_workspace_binding_error(
@@ -729,174 +916,33 @@ def verify_preflight_purity(
                     f"{_format_preflight_files(reviewer_delta)}"
                 )
 
-        # Historical path: root + branches after purity-order when dirty paths live.
     _enforce_root_checkout_guard(worktree_path)
     _enforce_branches_only_author_mutation(worktree_path)
-        _enforce_issue_scope_guard(
+
-            worktree_path,
+    # #604: common anti-stomp preflight (typed blocker + exact next action).
-            task=task,
+    # Runs after the legacy enforcers so existing happy paths stay green and
-            target_issue_number=target_issue_number,
+    # the shared module remains the single fail-closed composition point for
-            require_author_lock=require_author_lock,
+    # repo/role/worktree/lease/terminal-lock/head/stale/workflow/contamination.
+    _run_anti_stomp_preflight(
+        task,
+        remote=remote,
+        worktree_path=worktree_path,
+        org=org,
+        repo=repo,
+        expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha,
+        live_head_sha=live_head_sha,
+        require_head_sha=require_head_sha,
+        lease_required=lease_required,
+        foreign_lease=foreign_lease,
+        lease_reasons=lease_reasons,
+        terminal_lock_blocks=terminal_lock_blocks,
+        terminal_lock_reasons=terminal_lock_reasons,
+        workflow_hash_valid=workflow_hash_valid,
+        workflow_hash_reasons=workflow_hash_reasons,
+        raise_on_block=True,
     )
+
     _clear_preflight_capability_state()
-        return
-
-    # #683: under pytest unit isolation, FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS still runs
-    # production root + branches + issue scope (no silent no-op of guards).
-    if production_active:
-        _enforce_root_checkout_guard(worktree_path)
-        _enforce_branches_only_author_mutation(worktree_path)
-        _enforce_issue_scope_guard(
-            worktree_path,
-            task=task,
-            target_issue_number=target_issue_number,
-            require_author_lock=require_author_lock,
-        )
-
-
-def _session_issue_lock_snapshot(
-    workspace_path: str | None = None,
-) -> dict:
-    """Return session lock fields relevant to #683 scope enforcement.
-
-    Branch-vs-lock comparison uses the live workspace branch only when the
-    lock's worktree matches the mutation workspace. That prevents a foreign
-    or leftover session lock from poisoning unrelated test worktrees while
-    still fail-closing when the bound worktree drifts to another issue.
-    """
-    lock = issue_lock_store.read_session_issue_lock() or {}
-    raw = lock.get("issue_number")
-    locked: int | None
-    try:
-        locked = int(raw) if raw is not None else None
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        locked = None
-    lock_wt = (lock.get("worktree_path") or "").strip()
-    workspace = (workspace_path or "").strip()
-    worktrees_match = False
-    if lock_wt and workspace:
-        try:
-            worktrees_match = os.path.realpath(lock_wt) == os.path.realpath(workspace)
-        except OSError:
-            worktrees_match = False
-    return {
-        "locked_issue_number": locked,
-        "lock_branch_name": (lock.get("branch_name") or "").strip() or None,
-        "lock_worktree_path": lock_wt or None,
-        "worktrees_match": worktrees_match,
-    }
-
-
-def _session_locked_issue_number() -> int | None:
-    """Return the active session issue lock number when present (#683)."""
-    return _session_issue_lock_snapshot().get("locked_issue_number")
-
-
-def _enforce_issue_scope_guard(
-    worktree_path: str | None = None,
-    *,
-    task: str | None = None,
-    target_issue_number: int | None = None,
-    require_author_lock: bool = False,
-) -> None:
-    """#683: fail closed on missing/out-of-scope issue ownership for mutations."""
-    ctx = _resolve_namespace_mutation_context(worktree_path)
-    workspace = ctx["workspace_path"]
-    git_state = issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state(workspace)
-    # Honour actual profile role as well as poisoned task role (#540 / #683):
-    # comment_issue preflight stamps required_role_kind=author, which must not
-    # strip a genuine reconciler of control-checkout exemptions.
-    role = ctx.get("workspace_role_kind") or _effective_workspace_role()
-    actual = _actual_profile_role()
-    if actual in nwb.NON_AUTHOR_ROLES:
-        role = actual
-    snap = _session_issue_lock_snapshot(workspace)
-    # Scope uses the lock's recorded branch for issue-number matching.
-    # Live workspace branch can inherit the parent control checkout's branch
-    # name when a temp branches/ dir is not its own worktree tip — that must
-    # not invent a false out-of-scope failure. Live branch drift is enforced
-    # by issue_lock_store.verify_lock_for_mutation elsewhere.
-    branch_for_scope = snap.get("lock_branch_name")
-    if (
-        snap.get("worktrees_match")
-        and workflow_scope_guard.production_guards_forced()
-    ):
-        live_branch = git_state.get("current_branch")
-        live_issue = workflow_scope_guard.extract_issue_number_from_branch(
-            live_branch
-        )
-        locked = snap.get("locked_issue_number")
-        if (
-            live_issue is not None
-            and locked is not None
-            and live_issue != locked
-        ):
-            branch_for_scope = live_branch
-    # Author implementation / source-adjacent mutations need ownership when forced.
-    authorish = role == "author" or (
-        task
-        in {
-            "create_issue",
-            "comment_issue",
-            "lock_issue",
-            "create_pr",
-            "commit_files",
-            "gitea_commit_files",
-            "mark_issue",
-        }
-    )
-    require_lock = bool(require_author_lock) or (
-        authorish
-        and workflow_scope_guard.production_guards_forced()
-        and role == "author"
-    )
-    assessment = workflow_scope_guard.assess_production_mutation_guards(
-        workspace_path=workspace,
-        canonical_repo_root=ctx["canonical_repo_root"],
-        porcelain_status=git_state.get("porcelain_status") or "",
-        current_branch=branch_for_scope,
-        locked_issue_number=snap.get("locked_issue_number"),
-        target_issue_number=target_issue_number,
-        role_kind=role,
-        require_author_lock=require_lock,
-        in_test_mode=_preflight_in_test_mode(),
-    )
-    workflow_scope_guard.raise_if_blocked(assessment)
-
-
-def _production_guard_block_from_exc(exc: BaseException, **extra) -> dict | None:
-    """Map production-guard exceptions to typed tool block responses (#683)."""
-    if isinstance(exc, workflow_scope_guard.ProductionGuardError):
-        return workflow_scope_guard.block_response(exc, **extra)
-    text = str(exc)
-    if "Workflow scope guard (#683)" in text or "Root checkout guard (#475)" in text:
-        kind = workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
-        if "root_diagnostic_edit" in text or "tracked source or test edits" in text:
-            kind = workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT
-        elif "Branches-only mutation guard" in text or "stable control checkout" in text:
-            kind = workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE
-        elif "out-of-scope" in text or "locked to issue" in text:
-            kind = workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE
-        elif "no owning issue" in text:
-            kind = workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE
-        return workflow_scope_guard.block_response(
-            blocker_kind=kind,
-            reasons=[text],
-            **extra,
-        )
-    if "Branches-only mutation guard" in text:
-        return workflow_scope_guard.block_response(
-            blocker_kind=workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE,
-            reasons=[text],
-            **extra,
-        )
-    if "Root checkout guard" in text:
-        return workflow_scope_guard.block_response(
-            blocker_kind=workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT,
-            reasons=[text],
-            **extra,
-        )
-    return None
 
 
 def _verify_role_mutation_workspace(
@@ -906,12 +952,7 @@ def _verify_role_mutation_workspace(
     worktree: str | None = None,
     task: str | None = None,
 ) -> str:
-    """Bind reviewer/merger mutations to the active namespace workspace (#510).
+    """Bind reviewer/merger mutations to the active namespace workspace (#510)."""
-
-    #683: must NOT early-return solely because pytest/unittest is loaded.
-    Production workspace binding always runs; test isolation uses explicit
-    env fixtures / force-on flags, never a production short-circuit here.
-    """
 
     # Check running runtimes to prevent stale mutations
     try:
@@ -1084,9 +1125,7 @@ from gitea_auth import (  # noqa: E402
     repo_api_url,
     get_profile,
     gitea_url,
-    GiteaConfigError,
 )
-import mcp_tool_error_boundary  # noqa: E402
 import gitea_audit  # noqa: E402
 import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
 import capability_stop_terminal  # noqa: E402
@@ -1114,9 +1153,9 @@ import merge_approval_gate  # noqa: E402
 import already_landed_reconcile  # noqa: E402
 import author_mutation_worktree  # noqa: E402
 import root_checkout_guard  # noqa: E402
-import workflow_scope_guard  # noqa: E402  # #683 production scope / force-on guards
 import stable_branch_push_guard  # noqa: E402
 import remote_repo_guard  # noqa: E402
+import anti_stomp_preflight  # noqa: E402
 import issue_claim_heartbeat  # noqa: E402
 import issue_work_duplicate_gate  # noqa: E402
 import issue_workflow_labels  # noqa: E402
@@ -1466,12 +1505,6 @@ def _with_optional_url(result: dict, url: str | None) -> dict:
         result["url"] = url
     return result
 
-# #699: known auth/authz/network/config failures → structured CallToolResult
-# isError; stdio transport must survive (no unhandled raise / process exit).
-from mcp.server.fastmcp.tools.base import Tool as _FastMCPTool  # noqa: E402
-
-mcp_tool_error_boundary.install_tool_run_boundary(_FastMCPTool)
-
 mcp = FastMCP("gitea-tools", instructions=(
     "Gitea issue tracker and PR management for dadeschools and prgs instances. "
     "Use the gitea_ prefixed tools to create issues, PRs, list issues, etc."
@@ -1809,16 +1842,13 @@ def _enforce_remote_repo_guard(
 
 
 def _auth(host: str) -> str:
-    """Get auth header, raise if unavailable.
+    """Get auth header, raise if unavailable."""
-
-    Missing credentials are a configuration failure, not a silent internal
-    crash. Typed as :class:`gitea_auth.GiteaConfigError` so the tool-error
-    boundary (#699) maps them to a structured isError result without EOF.
-    The exception message is a fixed constant (no host/token material).
-    """
     header = get_auth_header(host)
     if header is None:
-        raise GiteaConfigError(reason_code="config_error")
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"No credentials for {host}. "
+            "Ensure you've logged in via HTTPS at least once."
+        )
     return header
 
 
@@ -2092,15 +2122,7 @@ def gitea_create_issue(
     )
     if blocked:
         return blocked
-    try:
+    verify_preflight_purity(remote, worktree_path=worktree_path, task="create_issue")
-        verify_preflight_purity(
-            remote, worktree_path=worktree_path, task="create_issue"
-        )
-    except Exception as exc:
-        typed = _production_guard_block_from_exc(exc, number=None)
-        if typed is not None:
-            return typed
-        raise
     content_gate = issue_content_gate.pre_create_issue_content_gate(
         title,
         body,
@@ -4037,6 +4059,30 @@ def _evaluate_pr_review_submission(
         result["pr_work_lease"] = lease_block
         return result
 
+    if live:
+        # #604: common anti-stomp with live head + lease proof (typed blocker).
+        anti_task = {
+            "approve": "approve_pr",
+            "request_changes": "request_changes_pr",
+            "comment": "submit_pr_review",
+        }.get(action, "submit_pr_review")
+        try:
+            _run_anti_stomp_preflight(
+                anti_task,
+                remote=remote,
+                worktree_path=worktree_path,
+                org=org,
+                repo=repo,
+                expected_head_sha=pinned_sha,
+                live_head_sha=actual_sha,
+                require_head_sha=True,
+                foreign_lease=False,
+                terminal_lock_blocks=False,
+            )
+        except RuntimeError as exc:
+            reasons.append(str(exc))
+            return result
+
     if (body or "").strip():
         gate = _canonical_comment_gate(body, context="pr_review")
         if gate["blocked"]:
@@ -4991,7 +5037,12 @@ def gitea_edit_pr(
         raise ValueError("At least one field to edit (title, body, state, base) must be provided.")
 
     closing = payload.get("state") == "closed"
-    verify_preflight_purity(remote, task="close_pr" if closing else None)
+    # Closing uses close_pr; non-closing title/body/base edits use edit_pr so
+    # the shared #604 anti-stomp inventory stays consistent with wiring.
+    if closing:
+        verify_preflight_purity(remote, task="close_pr")
+    else:
+        verify_preflight_purity(remote, task="edit_pr")
 
     # PR closure is a first-class capability, distinct from retitling or
     # rebasing edits (#216). Gate BEFORE auth/API setup so a blocked close
@@ -5473,6 +5524,25 @@ def gitea_merge_pr(
         reasons.extend(lease_block.get("reasons") or [])
         result["pr_work_lease"] = lease_block
         return result
+
+    # #604: common anti-stomp with live head + lease proof (typed blocker).
+    try:
+        _run_anti_stomp_preflight(
+            "merge_pr",
+            remote=remote,
+            worktree_path=worktree_path,
+            org=org,
+            repo=repo,
+            expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha,
+            live_head_sha=actual_sha,
+            require_head_sha=True,
+            foreign_lease=False,
+            terminal_lock_blocks=False,
+        )
+    except RuntimeError as exc:
+        reasons.append(str(exc))
+        return result
+
     if expected_head_sha and actual_sha and expected_head_sha != actual_sha:
         reasons.append(
             "expected head SHA does not match current PR head (fail closed)"
@@ -7592,7 +7662,11 @@ def gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease(
             "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.pr.comment"),
         }
 
-    _verify_role_mutation_workspace(remote, worktree=worktree, task="review_pr")
+    # task=acquire_reviewer_pr_lease so verify_preflight_purity runs shared #604
+    # anti-stomp for the declared lease-acquire mutation inventory entry.
+    _verify_role_mutation_workspace(
+        remote, worktree=worktree, task="acquire_reviewer_pr_lease"
+    )
     h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
     auth = _auth(h)
     profile = get_profile()
@@ -7733,6 +7807,7 @@ def gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease(
             "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.pr.merge"),
         }
 
+    # task=adopt_merger_pr_lease so verify_preflight_purity runs shared #604 anti-stomp.
     _verify_role_mutation_workspace(
         remote, worktree=worktree, task="adopt_merger_pr_lease"
     )
@@ -7975,12 +8050,11 @@ def gitea_diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
     org: str | None = None,
     repo: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Read-only: diagnose open-PR reviewer lease handoff and emit next action (#599, #691).
+    """Read-only: diagnose open-PR reviewer lease handoff and emit next action (#599).
 
-    Classifies no-lease / own / foreign / superseded-head / expired / orphan /
+    Classifies no-lease / own / foreign / instructed-lease-missing-with-replacement
-    instructed-lease-missing-with-replacement and worktree binding mismatch.
+    and worktree binding mismatch. Returns a canonical ``next_action`` without
-    Returns a canonical ``next_action`` (including guarded obsolete-lease cleanup)
+    mutating Gitea state. Never steals foreign leases.
-    without mutating Gitea state. Never steals foreign leases.
     """
     read_block = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.read")
     if read_block:
@@ -7991,7 +8065,7 @@ def gitea_diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
         }
     comments = _fetch_pr_comments(
         pr_number, remote=remote, host=host, org=org, repo=repo)
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
+    h, _o, _r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
     try:
         username = _authenticated_username(h)
     except Exception:
@@ -8005,64 +8079,6 @@ def gitea_diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
     # Prefer in-session lease id when present; otherwise diagnose as a fresh
     # caller without inventing ownership of an on-thread lease.
     session_id = (session_lease.get("session_id") or "").strip() or None
-
-    # Live PR head + formal reviews for #691 superseded/completed classification.
-    current_head_sha = None
-    formal_reviews: list[dict] = []
-    try:
-        auth = _auth(h)
-        pr_live = api_request(
-            "GET", f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls/{pr_number}", auth
-        ) or {}
-        head = pr_live.get("head") or {}
-        current_head_sha = head.get("sha") or pr_live.get("head_commit_sha")
-        try:
-            reviews = api_request(
-                "GET",
-                f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls/{pr_number}/reviews",
-                auth,
-            ) or []
-            for rev in reviews if isinstance(reviews, list) else []:
-                formal_reviews.append({
-                    "verdict": rev.get("state") or rev.get("verdict"),
-                    "reviewed_head_sha": rev.get("commit_id") or rev.get(
-                        "reviewed_head_sha"
-                    ),
-                    "dismissed": bool(rev.get("dismissed")),
-                    "reviewer": ((rev.get("user") or {}).get("login")),
-                    "submitted_at": rev.get("submitted_at"),
-                })
-        except Exception:
-            formal_reviews = []
-    except Exception:
-        current_head_sha = None
-
-    lease_wt = None
-    active = reviewer_pr_lease.find_newest_nonterminal_lease(
-        comments, pr_number=pr_number, include_expired=True
-    )
-    if active:
-        lease_wt = (active.get("worktree") or "").strip() or None
-    worktree_exists = None
-    worktree_clean = None
-    if lease_wt:
-        worktree_exists = os.path.isdir(lease_wt)
-        if worktree_exists:
-            try:
-                import subprocess
-
-                st = subprocess.run(
-                    ["git", "-C", lease_wt, "status", "--porcelain"],
-                    capture_output=True,
-                    text=True,
-                    timeout=30,
-                    check=False,
-                )
-                if st.returncode == 0:
-                    worktree_clean = not bool((st.stdout or "").strip())
-            except Exception:
-                worktree_clean = None
-
     diagnosis = reviewer_pr_lease.diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
         comments,
         pr_number=pr_number,
@@ -8072,11 +8088,6 @@ def gitea_diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
         env_bound_worktree=env_wt,
         instructed_session_id=instructed_session_id,
         instructed_comment_id=instructed_comment_id,
-        current_head_sha=current_head_sha,
-        formal_reviews=formal_reviews,
-        worktree_exists=worktree_exists,
-        worktree_clean=worktree_clean,
-        owner_process_alive=None,  # PID never proves ownership; leave unset
     )
     diagnosis["success"] = True
     diagnosis["remote"] = remote
@@ -8204,212 +8215,6 @@ def gitea_cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease(
     return report
 
 
-@mcp.tool()
-def gitea_cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease(
-    pr_number: int,
-    confirmation: str = "",
-    apply: bool = False,
-    controller_recovery_authorized: bool = False,
-    expected_lease_comment_id: int | None = None,
-    expected_session_id: str | None = None,
-    expected_leased_head: str | None = None,
-    owner_process_alive: bool | None = None,
-    current_head_review_in_progress: bool = False,
-    remote: str = "dadeschools",
-    host: str | None = None,
-    org: str | None = None,
-    repo: str | None = None,
-) -> dict:
-    """Guarded cleanup for obsolete comment-backed reviewer leases on open PRs (#691).
-
-    Neutralises an expired and/or superseded-head foreign lease by posting a
-    terminal ``phase: released`` lease marker (append-only audit). Never deletes
-    comments, never repoints the lease to the new head, never transfers
-    validation/decision/workflow state, never uses PID equality as ownership,
-    and never steals a genuinely active foreign lease on the current head.
-
-    Read-first when ``apply`` is false. Apply requires:
-
-    - ``controller_recovery_authorized=True`` (explicit operator/controller
-      recovery capability — not implied by profile alone)
-    - ``confirmation`` exactly ``CLEANUP OBSOLETE REVIEWER LEASE <pr_number>``
-    - full eligibility evidence from
-      ``reviewer_pr_lease.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup``
-
-    Comment-backed leases need no control-plane DB ``lease_id``.
-    """
-    read_block = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.read")
-    if read_block:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "cleanup_performed": False,
-            "no_steal_or_adoption": True,
-            "reasons": read_block,
-            "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.read"),
-        }
-
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
-    auth = _auth(h)
-    expected_repo = f"{o}/{r}"
-    comments = _fetch_pr_comments(
-        pr_number, remote=remote, host=host, org=org, repo=repo
-    )
-    pr_live = api_request(
-        "GET", f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls/{pr_number}", auth
-    ) or {}
-    head = pr_live.get("head") or {}
-    current_head_sha = head.get("sha") or pr_live.get("head_commit_sha")
-
-    formal_reviews: list[dict] = []
-    try:
-        reviews = api_request(
-            "GET",
-            f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls/{pr_number}/reviews",
-            auth,
-        ) or []
-        for rev in reviews if isinstance(reviews, list) else []:
-            formal_reviews.append({
-                "verdict": rev.get("state") or rev.get("verdict"),
-                "reviewed_head_sha": rev.get("commit_id")
-                or rev.get("reviewed_head_sha"),
-                "dismissed": bool(rev.get("dismissed")),
-                "reviewer": ((rev.get("user") or {}).get("login")),
-                "submitted_at": rev.get("submitted_at"),
-            })
-    except Exception:
-        formal_reviews = []
-
-    lease = reviewer_pr_lease.find_newest_nonterminal_lease(
-        comments, pr_number=pr_number, include_expired=True
-    )
-    lease_wt = ((lease or {}).get("worktree") or "").strip() or None
-    worktree_exists = None
-    worktree_clean = None
-    worktree_has_unpreserved_work = None
-    if lease_wt:
-        worktree_exists = os.path.isdir(lease_wt)
-        if worktree_exists:
-            try:
-                import subprocess
-
-                st = subprocess.run(
-                    ["git", "-C", lease_wt, "status", "--porcelain"],
-                    capture_output=True,
-                    text=True,
-                    timeout=30,
-                    check=False,
-                )
-                if st.returncode == 0:
-                    dirty = bool((st.stdout or "").strip())
-                    worktree_clean = not dirty
-                    worktree_has_unpreserved_work = dirty
-            except Exception:
-                worktree_clean = None
-
-    session = reviewer_pr_lease.get_session_lease() or {}
-    assessment = reviewer_pr_lease.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
-        comments,
-        pr_number=pr_number,
-        current_head_sha=current_head_sha,
-        formal_reviews=formal_reviews,
-        repo=expected_repo,
-        expected_repo=expected_repo,
-        requesting_session_id=(session.get("session_id") or "").strip() or None,
-        controller_recovery_authorized=controller_recovery_authorized,
-        worktree_exists=worktree_exists,
-        worktree_clean=worktree_clean,
-        worktree_has_unpreserved_work=worktree_has_unpreserved_work,
-        owner_process_alive=owner_process_alive,
-        owner_pid_observed=None,
-        requesting_pid=os.getpid(),
-        current_head_review_in_progress=current_head_review_in_progress,
-        expected_lease_comment_id=expected_lease_comment_id,
-        expected_session_id=expected_session_id,
-        expected_leased_head=expected_leased_head,
-        confirmation=confirmation,
-        apply=apply,
-    )
-
-    report = {
-        "success": True,
-        "pr_number": pr_number,
-        "pr_state": pr_live.get("state"),
-        "cleanup_allowed": assessment.get("cleanup_allowed"),
-        "cleanup_performed": False,
-        "classification": assessment.get("classification"),
-        "blocker_kind": assessment.get("blocker_kind"),
-        "exact_next_action": assessment.get("exact_next_action"),
-        "mutation_eligibility": assessment.get("mutation_eligibility"),
-        "leased_head": assessment.get("leased_head"),
-        "current_head": assessment.get("current_head"),
-        "expires_at": assessment.get("expires_at"),
-        "terminal_review": assessment.get("terminal_review"),
-        "worktree_state": assessment.get("worktree_state"),
-        "owner_session_evidence": assessment.get("owner_session_evidence"),
-        "cleanup_tool": assessment.get("cleanup_tool"),
-        "required_confirmation": assessment.get("required_confirmation"),
-        "active_lease": assessment.get("active_lease"),
-        "no_steal_or_adoption": True,
-        "no_repoint": True,
-        "no_validation_transfer": True,
-        "mode": "apply" if apply else "read_only",
-        "reasons": assessment.get("reasons") or [],
-        "forbidden": assessment.get("forbidden") or [],
-    }
-
-    if not apply:
-        return report
-    if not assessment.get("cleanup_allowed"):
-        report["success"] = False
-        report["cleanup_skipped_reason"] = (
-            assessment.get("fail_closed_reasons")
-            or assessment.get("reasons")
-            or ["cleanup not allowed"]
-        )
-        return report
-
-    comment_block = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.pr.comment")
-    if comment_block:
-        report["success"] = False
-        report["reasons"] = comment_block
-        report["permission_report"] = _permission_block_report("gitea.pr.comment")
-        return report
-
-    verify_preflight_purity(remote)
-    # Terminal lease marker (preserves history; does not delete comment 10749-style
-    # entries — newest released marker neutralises the ledger).
-    release_body = assessment.get("release_body") or ""
-    audit_body = assessment.get("audit_comment_body") or ""
-    comment_url = f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/issues/{pr_number}/comments"
-    with _audited(
-        "comment_pr",
-        host=h,
-        remote=remote,
-        org=o,
-        repo=r,
-        pr_number=pr_number,
-        request_metadata={
-            "source": "cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease",
-            "classification": assessment.get("classification"),
-        },
-    ):
-        posted_release = api_request(
-            "POST", comment_url, auth, {"body": release_body}
-        )
-        posted_audit = None
-        if audit_body.strip():
-            posted_audit = api_request(
-                "POST", comment_url, auth, {"body": audit_body}
-            )
-
-    # Never seed session lease from cleaned foreign lease.
-    report["cleanup_performed"] = True
-    report["released_comment_id"] = (posted_release or {}).get("id")
-    report["audit_comment_id"] = (posted_audit or {}).get("id")
-    report["session_lease_seeded"] = False
-    return report
-
-
 @mcp.tool()
 def gitea_release_reviewer_pr_lease(
     pr_number: int,
@@ -8641,26 +8446,9 @@ def gitea_create_issue_comment(
         with the reveal opt-in); on a permission block or empty body,
         'success'/'performed' False and 'reasons' with no API call made
         (permission blocks also carry a structured 'permission_report',
-        #142). On production-guard blocks (#683): 'blocker_kind' and
+        #142).
-        'exact_next_action' with no API side effect.
     """
-    try:
+    verify_preflight_purity(remote, worktree_path=worktree_path, task="comment_issue")
-        # Do not pass target_issue_number: comments on other issues remain
-        # allowed while an author holds a different implementation lock.
-        # Scope ownership for source edits is enforced via branch/worktree
-        # binding + root diagnostic checks (#683).
-        verify_preflight_purity(
-            remote,
-            worktree_path=worktree_path,
-            task="comment_issue",
-        )
-    except Exception as exc:
-        typed = _production_guard_block_from_exc(
-            exc, issue_number=issue_number
-        )
-        if typed is not None:
-            return typed
-        raise
     gate_reasons = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.issue.comment")
     reasons = list(gate_reasons)
     if not (body or "").strip():

mcp_native_cleanup_proof.py

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ from typing import Any
 
 AUTHORIZED_CLEANUP_TOOLS = frozenset({
     "gitea_cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease",
-    "gitea_cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease",
     "gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups",
     "gitea_delete_branch",
     "gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch",

mcp_tool_error_boundary.py

@@ -1,451 +0,0 @@
-"""MCP tool-boundary error mapping for known Gitea client failures (#699).
-
-Known authentication / authorization / network / configuration failures leave
-the tool boundary as a sanitized structured ``CallToolResult`` with
-``isError=True``. Stdio transport remains connected.
-
-Design constraints (reviewer-ratified, #699 / PR #701):
-
-1. **No secret material** in tool results or daemon logs. Messages are fixed
-   constants keyed by ``reason_code``; HTTP bodies / exception text never
-   surface. Sanitization failure fails closed to ``internal_error``.
-2. **Narrow boundary** wraps the original FastMCP ``Tool.run`` success path;
-   re-raises framework control-flow exceptions (``UrlElicitationRequiredError``);
-   maps only typed client failures. Installation is idempotent.
-3. **No RuntimeError substring heuristics.** Only explicit typed
-   authentication / authorization / network / configuration exceptions
-   receive those labels.
-4. **HTTP classification** lives in ``gitea_auth.classify_http_status``;
-   every 403 is authorization-class.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import logging
-import sys
-from typing import Any
-
-logger = logging.getLogger("gitea_mcp.tool_error_boundary")
-
-# Stable reason codes (#699).
-REASON_AUTH_FAILED = "auth_failed"
-REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN = "auth_invalid_token"
-REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE = "authz_insufficient_scope"
-REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED = "authz_denied"
-REASON_NETWORK_ERROR = "network_error"
-REASON_CONFIG_ERROR = "config_error"
-REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR = "internal_error"
-REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE = "upstream_unavailable"
-REASON_HTTP_ERROR = "http_error"
-
-ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION = "authentication"
-ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION = "authorization"
-ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK = "network"
-ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION = "configuration"
-ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL = "internal"
-ERROR_CLASS_UPSTREAM = "upstream"
-
-# Fixed, secret-free operator messages. Never interpolate HTTP bodies,
-# Keychain contents, tokens, or arbitrary exception text.
-FIXED_MESSAGES: dict[str, str] = {
-    REASON_AUTH_FAILED: "Gitea authentication failed",
-    REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN: (
-        "Gitea authentication failed: invalid or revoked credentials"
-    ),
-    REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE: (
-        "Gitea authorization failed: insufficient token scope"
-    ),
-    REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED: "Gitea authorization failed: access denied",
-    REASON_NETWORK_ERROR: "Network error contacting Gitea",
-    REASON_CONFIG_ERROR: "Gitea configuration or credential resolution failed",
-    REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR: "Internal tool error",
-    REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE: "Gitea upstream unavailable",
-    REASON_HTTP_ERROR: "Gitea HTTP request failed",
-}
-
-_INSTALL_FLAG = "_gitea_auth_boundary_installed"
-_ORIGINAL_ATTR = "_gitea_auth_boundary_original"
-
-
-def fixed_message(reason_code: str) -> str:
-    """Return the fixed sanitized message for *reason_code* (fail closed)."""
-    return FIXED_MESSAGES.get(reason_code, FIXED_MESSAGES[REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR])
-
-
-def _safe_profile_name() -> str | None:
-    try:
-        from gitea_auth import get_profile
-
-        name = (get_profile() or {}).get("profile_name")
-        if name is None:
-            return None
-        text = str(name).strip()
-        # Profile names are non-secret identifiers; still bound length.
-        return text[:80] if text else None
-    except Exception:
-        return None
-
-
-def _is_framework_control_flow(exc: BaseException) -> bool:
-    """True for exceptions the MCP framework must re-raise unchanged."""
-    try:
-        from mcp.shared.exceptions import UrlElicitationRequiredError
-
-        if isinstance(exc, UrlElicitationRequiredError):
-            return True
-    except Exception:
-        pass
-    # BaseException subclasses that must never become tool isError payloads.
-    if isinstance(exc, (KeyboardInterrupt, SystemExit, GeneratorExit)):
-        return True
-    return False
-
-
-def is_known_client_failure(exc: BaseException) -> bool:
-    """True only for explicit typed Gitea client / config failures.
-
-    Never true for arbitrary ``RuntimeError`` (reviewer finding #3).
-    """
-    try:
-        import gitea_auth
-
-        if isinstance(
-            exc,
-            (
-                gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError,
-                gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError,
-                gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError,
-                gitea_auth.GiteaConfigError,
-                gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError,
-            ),
-        ):
-            return True
-    except Exception:
-        return False
-    try:
-        import gitea_config
-
-        if isinstance(exc, gitea_config.ConfigError):
-            return True
-    except Exception:
-        pass
-    return False
-
-
-def classify_exception(exc: BaseException) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Return structured classification with **fixed** messages only.
-
-    Only typed authentication / authorization / network / configuration
-    failures receive those labels. Unexpected programming failures are
-    ``internal_error``. HTTP bodies and exception text are never copied
-    into ``message``.
-    """
-    try:
-        return _classify_exception_impl(exc)
-    except Exception:
-        # Fail closed: sanitization / classification failure must not leak.
-        return {
-            "reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-            "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
-            "http_status": None,
-            "message": fixed_message(REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR),
-            "transport_survives": True,
-        }
-
-
-def _classify_exception_impl(exc: BaseException) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    import gitea_auth
-
-    if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError):
-        code = getattr(exc, "reason_code", None) or REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN
-        if code not in (
-            REASON_AUTH_FAILED,
-            REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN,
-        ):
-            code = REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN
-        return {
-            "reason_code": code,
-            "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
-            "http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None) or 401,
-            "message": fixed_message(code),
-            "transport_survives": True,
-        }
-    if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError):
-        code = getattr(exc, "reason_code", None) or REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED
-        if code not in (REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED, REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE):
-            code = REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED
-        return {
-            "reason_code": code,
-            "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
-            "http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None) or 403,
-            "message": fixed_message(code),
-            "transport_survives": True,
-        }
-    if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError):
-        return {
-            "reason_code": REASON_NETWORK_ERROR,
-            "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK,
-            "http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None),
-            "message": fixed_message(REASON_NETWORK_ERROR),
-            "transport_survives": True,
-        }
-    if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaConfigError):
-        return {
-            "reason_code": REASON_CONFIG_ERROR,
-            "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
-            "http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None),
-            "message": fixed_message(REASON_CONFIG_ERROR),
-            "transport_survives": True,
-        }
-    if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError):
-        code = getattr(exc, "reason_code", None) or REASON_HTTP_ERROR
-        if code == REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE:
-            error_class = ERROR_CLASS_UPSTREAM
-        else:
-            error_class = ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL
-            code = REASON_HTTP_ERROR
-        return {
-            "reason_code": code,
-            "error_class": error_class,
-            "http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None),
-            "message": fixed_message(code),
-            "transport_survives": True,
-        }
-
-    try:
-        import gitea_config
-
-        if isinstance(exc, gitea_config.ConfigError):
-            return {
-                "reason_code": REASON_CONFIG_ERROR,
-                "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
-                "http_status": None,
-                "message": fixed_message(REASON_CONFIG_ERROR),
-                "transport_survives": True,
-            }
-    except Exception:
-        pass
-
-    # Unwrap FastMCP ToolError cause when the original was a typed failure.
-    cause = getattr(exc, "__cause__", None)
-    if cause is not None and cause is not exc and is_known_client_failure(cause):
-        return _classify_exception_impl(cause)
-
-    # No message-substring authentication heuristics (reviewer finding #3).
-    return {
-        "reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-        "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
-        "http_status": None,
-        "message": fixed_message(REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR),
-        "transport_survives": True,
-    }
-
-
-def build_structured_error_payload(
-    classification: dict[str, Any],
-    *,
-    tool_name: str | None = None,
-    profile_name: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """LLM-safe structured payload — fixed message + typed metadata only."""
-    try:
-        reason = str(classification.get("reason_code") or REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR)
-        message = fixed_message(reason)
-        # Refuse to emit any classification message that is not the fixed constant.
-        if classification.get("message") != message:
-            message = fixed_message(reason)
-        payload: dict[str, Any] = {
-            "success": False,
-            "isError": True,
-            "reason_code": reason if reason in FIXED_MESSAGES else REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-            "error_class": classification.get("error_class") or ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
-            "message": message,
-            "transport_survives": True,
-            "retryable": classification.get("error_class")
-            in {
-                ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
-                ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK,
-                ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
-            },
-        }
-        status = classification.get("http_status")
-        if isinstance(status, int):
-            payload["http_status"] = status
-        if tool_name and isinstance(tool_name, str):
-            # Tool names are identifiers, not secrets; bound length.
-            payload["tool"] = tool_name[:120]
-        if profile_name and isinstance(profile_name, str):
-            payload["profile"] = profile_name[:80]
-        return payload
-    except Exception:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "isError": True,
-            "reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-            "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
-            "message": fixed_message(REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR),
-            "transport_survives": True,
-            "retryable": False,
-        }
-
-
-def log_sanitized_daemon_reason(
-    classification: dict[str, Any],
-    *,
-    tool_name: str | None = None,
-    stream=None,
-) -> None:
-    """Daemon log: reason codes only — never exception text or response bodies."""
-    stream = stream if stream is not None else sys.stderr
-    try:
-        reason = classification.get("reason_code") or REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR
-        error_class = classification.get("error_class") or ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL
-        # Only emit known tokens; never classification['message'] from callers
-        # that might have been poisoned.
-        if reason not in FIXED_MESSAGES:
-            reason = REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR
-            error_class = ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL
-        parts = [
-            "mcp_tool_error",
-            f"reason_code={reason}",
-            f"error_class={error_class}",
-        ]
-        if tool_name and isinstance(tool_name, str):
-            parts.append(f"tool={tool_name[:120]}")
-        status = classification.get("http_status")
-        if isinstance(status, int):
-            parts.append(f"http_status={status}")
-        # Intentionally no detail= / message= field — secrets lived there.
-        line = " ".join(parts)
-        stream.write(line + "\n")
-        if hasattr(stream, "flush"):
-            stream.flush()
-        logger.warning(line)
-    except Exception:
-        # Fail closed: never fall back to logging the exception.
-        try:
-            stream.write(
-                "mcp_tool_error reason_code=internal_error "
-                "error_class=internal\n"
-            )
-            if hasattr(stream, "flush"):
-                stream.flush()
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-
-
-def to_call_tool_result(
-    exc: BaseException,
-    *,
-    tool_name: str | None = None,
-    profile_name: str | None = None,
-    log: bool = True,
-) -> Any:
-    """Build a FastMCP ``CallToolResult`` with ``isError=True`` for *exc*."""
-    from mcp.types import CallToolResult, TextContent
-
-    try:
-        classification = classify_exception(exc)
-        if log:
-            log_sanitized_daemon_reason(classification, tool_name=tool_name)
-        payload = build_structured_error_payload(
-            classification, tool_name=tool_name, profile_name=profile_name
-        )
-        text = json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
-        return CallToolResult(
-            content=[TextContent(type="text", text=text)],
-            structuredContent=payload,
-            isError=True,
-        )
-    except Exception:
-        # Absolute fail-closed path — no exception text.
-        fallback = {
-            "success": False,
-            "isError": True,
-            "reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-            "error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
-            "message": fixed_message(REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR),
-            "transport_survives": True,
-            "retryable": False,
-        }
-        return CallToolResult(
-            content=[
-                TextContent(
-                    type="text",
-                    text=json.dumps(fallback, indent=2, sort_keys=True),
-                )
-            ],
-            structuredContent=fallback,
-            isError=True,
-        )
-
-
-def install_tool_run_boundary(Tool) -> bool:
-    """Install a **narrow** error boundary around FastMCP ``Tool.run``.
-
-    Strategy (preserves framework semantics):
-
-    * Call the **original** ``Tool.run`` for the success path (async, return
-      types, convert_result, protocol behavior unchanged).
-    * Re-raise ``UrlElicitationRequiredError`` and other control-flow
-      exceptions without mapping to ``internal_error``.
-    * Map typed Gitea client failures (and ToolError whose ``__cause__`` is
-      typed) to structured ``CallToolResult(isError=True)``.
-    * Map remaining unexpected tool failures to fixed ``internal_error``
-      isError results (transport survival) without secret-bearing text.
-    * Idempotent: second install is a no-op and returns ``False``.
-    """
-    if getattr(Tool.run, _INSTALL_FLAG, False):
-        return False
-
-    from mcp.server.fastmcp.exceptions import ToolError
-    from mcp.shared.exceptions import UrlElicitationRequiredError
-
-    original_run = Tool.run
-
-    async def run_boundary(
-        self,
-        arguments: dict[str, Any],
-        context=None,
-        convert_result: bool = False,
-    ) -> Any:
-        try:
-            return await original_run(
-                self,
-                arguments,
-                context=context,
-                convert_result=convert_result,
-            )
-        except UrlElicitationRequiredError:
-            # Framework control-flow — must not become internal_error.
-            raise
-        except BaseException as exc:
-            if _is_framework_control_flow(exc):
-                raise
-            if not isinstance(exc, Exception):
-                raise
-
-            # Prefer typed cause under FastMCP ToolError wrappers.
-            target: BaseException = exc
-            if isinstance(exc, ToolError) and exc.__cause__ is not None:
-                target = exc.__cause__
-
-            # Known client failures → structured isError with reason codes.
-            # Unexpected failures → fixed internal_error isError (no secrets).
-            profile_name = _safe_profile_name()
-            return to_call_tool_result(
-                target,
-                tool_name=getattr(self, "name", None),
-                profile_name=profile_name,
-            )
-
-    setattr(run_boundary, _INSTALL_FLAG, True)
-    setattr(run_boundary, _ORIGINAL_ATTR, original_run)
-    Tool.run = run_boundary  # type: ignore[method-assign]
-    return True
-
-
-def boundary_is_installed(Tool) -> bool:
-    """True when the #699 boundary is active on *Tool.run*."""
-    return bool(getattr(Tool.run, _INSTALL_FLAG, False))

reviewer_pr_lease.py

@@ -524,26 +524,13 @@ def assess_lease_inventory(
         "reclaimable_review_leases": reclaimable,
     }
 
-# Canonical next-action vocabulary for reviewer lease handoff (#599, #691).
+# Canonical next-action vocabulary for reviewer lease handoff (#599).
 NEXT_ACTION_ACQUIRE = "acquire"
 NEXT_ACTION_WAIT = "wait"
 NEXT_ACTION_RESUME_EXACT_OWNER_SESSION = "resume_exact_owner_session"
 NEXT_ACTION_RELEASE_EXPIRED_LEASE = "release_expired_lease"
 NEXT_ACTION_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZED_CLEANUP = "operator_authorized_cleanup"
 NEXT_ACTION_REPAIR_WORKTREE_BINDING = "repair_worktree_binding"
-NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE = "cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease"
-
-CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE_TOOL = "gitea_cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease"
-CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE_CONFIRMATION_PREFIX = "CLEANUP OBSOLETE REVIEWER LEASE "
-
-# Formal terminal review verdicts that complete a leased-head workflow (#691).
-_TERMINAL_REVIEW_VERDICTS = frozenset({
-    "APPROVED",
-    "REQUEST_CHANGES",
-    "approved",
-    "request_changes",
-    "REQUESTCHANGES",
-})
 
 _HANDOFF_CLASSIFICATIONS = frozenset({
     "no_lease",
@@ -552,12 +539,6 @@ _HANDOFF_CLASSIFICATIONS = frozenset({
     "foreign_active",
     "foreign_reclaimable",
     "foreign_expired",
-    "foreign_active_current_head",
-    "foreign_expired_current_head",
-    "foreign_completed_superseded_head",
-    "foreign_expired_superseded_head",
-    "orphaned_owner_missing",
-    "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence",
     "instructed_lease_missing_with_replacement",
     "worktree_binding_mismatch",
 })
@@ -570,476 +551,6 @@ def _norm_path(value: str | None) -> str:
     return os.path.normpath(text.rstrip("/"))
 
 
-def _normalize_verdict(value: str | None) -> str:
-    text = (value or "").strip().upper().replace("-", "_").replace(" ", "_")
-    if text in {"REQUESTCHANGES", "REQUEST_CHANGES", "CHANGES_REQUESTED"}:
-        return "REQUEST_CHANGES"
-    if text in {"APPROVED", "APPROVE"}:
-        return "APPROVED"
-    return text
-
-
-def formal_terminal_review_for_head(
-    formal_reviews: list[dict] | None,
-    *,
-    leased_head: str | None,
-) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Return the latest undismissed terminal formal review for *leased_head*."""
-    head = _normalize_sha(leased_head)
-    if not head:
-        return None
-    matches: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-    for review in formal_reviews or []:
-        if review.get("dismissed"):
-            continue
-        verdict = _normalize_verdict(
-            review.get("verdict") or review.get("state") or review.get("body_state")
-        )
-        if verdict not in {"APPROVED", "REQUEST_CHANGES"}:
-            continue
-        rhead = _normalize_sha(
-            review.get("reviewed_head_sha")
-            or review.get("commit_id")
-            or review.get("head_sha")
-        )
-        if rhead != head:
-            continue
-        matches.append({**review, "verdict": verdict, "reviewed_head_sha": rhead})
-    if not matches:
-        return None
-    return matches[-1]
-
-
-def find_newest_nonterminal_lease(
-    comments: list[dict],
-    *,
-    pr_number: int,
-    now: datetime | None = None,
-    include_expired: bool = True,
-) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Newest non-terminal lease marker, optionally including expired ones (#691).
-
-    Unlike ``find_active_reviewer_lease``, this retains expired non-terminal
-    markers so diagnosis/cleanup can still name the obsolete lease after
-    ``expires_at`` (comment-backed ledger; no control-plane ``lease_id``).
-    """
-    now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-    entries = list(reversed(_lease_entries(comments, pr_number=pr_number)))
-    for entry in entries:
-        phase = (entry.get("phase") or "").strip().lower()
-        if phase in _TERMINAL_PHASES:
-            # Newest terminal ends the ledger chain for active acquisition, but
-            # an older non-terminal is not "active". Stop at newest marker.
-            return None
-        expired = _lease_expired(entry, now=now)
-        if expired and not include_expired:
-            return None
-        lease = dict(entry)
-        lease["freshness"] = classify_lease_freshness(lease, now=now)
-        lease["expired"] = expired
-        return lease
-    return None
-
-
-def cleanup_confirmation_for_pr(pr_number: int) -> str:
-    return f"{CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE_CONFIRMATION_PREFIX}{int(pr_number)}"
-
-
-def assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
-    comments: list[dict],
-    *,
-    pr_number: int,
-    current_head_sha: str | None,
-    formal_reviews: list[dict] | None = None,
-    repo: str | None = None,
-    expected_repo: str | None = None,
-    requesting_session_id: str | None = None,
-    controller_recovery_authorized: bool = False,
-    worktree_exists: bool | None = None,
-    worktree_clean: bool | None = None,
-    worktree_has_unpreserved_work: bool | None = None,
-    owner_process_alive: bool | None = None,
-    owner_pid_observed: int | None = None,
-    requesting_pid: int | None = None,
-    current_head_review_in_progress: bool = False,
-    expected_lease_comment_id: int | None = None,
-    expected_session_id: str | None = None,
-    expected_leased_head: str | None = None,
-    confirmation: str | None = None,
-    apply: bool = False,
-    now: datetime | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Guarded cleanup eligibility for obsolete comment-backed reviewer leases (#691).
-
-    Cleanup is never transfer/adoption/repoint and never uses PID equality as
-    ownership. Eligible only when evidence proves the lease is past expiry and/or
-    pinned to a superseded head with a completed formal terminal review, and
-    every safety boundary holds.
-    """
-    now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-    reasons: list[str] = []
-    fail_closed_reasons: list[str] = []
-    current_head = _normalize_sha(current_head_sha)
-    req_session = (requesting_session_id or "").strip()
-
-    lease = find_newest_nonterminal_lease(
-        comments, pr_number=pr_number, now=now, include_expired=True
-    )
-    if not lease:
-        # Fall back to active finder (unexpired only) for report consistency.
-        lease = find_active_reviewer_lease(comments, pr_number=pr_number, now=now)
-
-    classification = "no_lease"
-    cleanup_allowed = False
-    release_body: str | None = None
-    audit_comment_body: str | None = None
-    terminal_review = None
-    leased_head = None
-    head_superseded = False
-    past_expiry = False
-    expires_parseable = True
-
-    if not lease:
-        fail_closed_reasons.append(
-            f"PR #{pr_number}: no non-terminal comment-backed reviewer lease to clean"
-        )
-        classification = "no_lease"
-    else:
-        leased_head = _normalize_sha(lease.get("candidate_head"))
-        expires_raw = lease.get("expires_at")
-        expires_at = _parse_timestamp(expires_raw)
-        if expires_raw and expires_at is None:
-            expires_parseable = False
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                "lease expires_at cannot be parsed or trusted (fail closed)"
-            )
-        past_expiry = bool(expires_at and expires_at <= now)
-        freshness = lease.get("freshness") or classify_lease_freshness(lease, now=now)
-        owner_session = (lease.get("session_id") or "").strip()
-        is_requesting_owner = bool(
-            req_session and owner_session and req_session == owner_session
-        )
-
-        # Identity pins (repo / PR / session / head / comment) must match when
-        # the caller supplies expected evidence.
-        lease_repo = (lease.get("repo") or "").strip()
-        exp_repo = (expected_repo or repo or "").strip()
-        if exp_repo and lease_repo and exp_repo != lease_repo:
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                f"repository identity mismatch: lease repo={lease_repo!r} "
-                f"expected={exp_repo!r}"
-            )
-        if lease.get("pr_number") not in (None, pr_number):
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                f"PR identity mismatch: lease pr={lease.get('pr_number')} "
-                f"requested={pr_number}"
-            )
-        if expected_lease_comment_id is not None:
-            cid = lease.get("comment_id")
-            if cid is None or int(cid) != int(expected_lease_comment_id):
-                fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                    "lease comment_id does not match expected evidence "
-                    f"(lease={cid}, expected={expected_lease_comment_id})"
-                )
-        if expected_session_id:
-            if owner_session != expected_session_id.strip():
-                fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                    "lease session_id does not match expected evidence "
-                    f"(lease={owner_session}, expected={expected_session_id})"
-                )
-        if expected_leased_head:
-            exp_head = _normalize_sha(expected_leased_head)
-            if not exp_head or exp_head != leased_head:
-                fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                    "leased head does not match expected evidence "
-                    f"(lease={leased_head}, expected={exp_head})"
-                )
-
-        # PID equality is never ownership proof (#691).
-        if (
-            owner_pid_observed is not None
-            and requesting_pid is not None
-            and int(owner_pid_observed) == int(requesting_pid)
-        ):
-            reasons.append(
-                "observed PID equals requesting PID but PID equality is NOT "
-                "ownership proof; ignored for authorization"
-            )
-
-        if is_requesting_owner:
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                "requesting session owns the lease; use "
-                "gitea_release_reviewer_pr_lease (owner path), not non-owner cleanup"
-            )
-
-        if current_head_review_in_progress:
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                "a current-head review submission is in progress; cleanup denied"
-            )
-
-        if not current_head:
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                "current PR head SHA missing or unparseable (fail closed)"
-            )
-        if not leased_head:
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                "lease candidate_head missing or unparseable (fail closed)"
-            )
-
-        head_superseded = bool(
-            current_head and leased_head and current_head != leased_head
-        )
-        head_matches_current = bool(
-            current_head and leased_head and current_head == leased_head
-        )
-
-        terminal_review = formal_terminal_review_for_head(
-            formal_reviews, leased_head=leased_head
-        )
-        has_terminal = terminal_review is not None
-
-        # Worktree safety.
-        if worktree_has_unpreserved_work is True or worktree_clean is False:
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                "lease worktree is dirty or has unpreserved work; cleanup denied"
-            )
-        if (
-            worktree_exists is True
-            and worktree_clean is None
-            and worktree_has_unpreserved_work is None
-        ):
-            # Unknown cleanliness when path exists — fail closed.
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                "lease worktree exists but cleanliness is unknown (fail closed)"
-            )
-
-        # Classification matrix (#691).
-        if head_matches_current and freshness in {"active", "stale_warning"}:
-            classification = "foreign_active_current_head"
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                "genuinely active foreign lease on the current PR head; "
-                "cleanup denied (fail closed)"
-            )
-        elif head_matches_current and past_expiry:
-            classification = "foreign_expired_current_head"
-            # Expired on current head: owner-missing / orphan path may apply.
-            if owner_process_alive is True:
-                fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                    "lease expired on current head but owner process still alive "
-                    "with plausible activity; cleanup denied"
-                )
-            elif worktree_clean is False:
-                fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                    "owner process absent but worktree dirty; cleanup denied"
-                )
-            elif owner_process_alive is False and (
-                worktree_clean is True or worktree_exists is False
-            ):
-                if controller_recovery_authorized:
-                    classification = "orphaned_owner_missing"
-                else:
-                    fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                        "controller/recovery capability not authorized for orphan cleanup"
-                    )
-            else:
-                fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                    "insufficient orphan evidence for expired current-head lease "
-                    "(need owner_process_alive=false and clean/absent worktree)"
-                )
-        elif head_superseded and has_terminal and past_expiry:
-            classification = "foreign_expired_superseded_head"
-        elif head_superseded and has_terminal and not past_expiry:
-            classification = "foreign_completed_superseded_head"
-        elif head_superseded and not has_terminal:
-            classification = "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence"
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                "lease head is superseded but no formal terminal review exists "
-                "for the leased head (fail closed)"
-            )
-        elif not head_superseded and not past_expiry and freshness in {
-            "active", "stale_warning"
-        }:
-            classification = "foreign_active_current_head"
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                "foreign lease still active on current head; wait or use owner release"
-            )
-        elif past_expiry and not head_superseded:
-            classification = "foreign_expired_current_head"
-        else:
-            classification = "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence"
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                "lease evidence is ambiguous; cleanup denied (fail closed)"
-            )
-
-        # Recent owner progress on a non-superseded active lease blocks cleanup.
-        minutes = _minutes_since_activity(lease, now=now)
-        if (
-            head_matches_current
-            and freshness == "active"
-            and minutes is not None
-            and minutes < STALE_WARNING_MINUTES
-        ):
-            fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                "owner session has recent authenticated progress on current head; "
-                "cleanup denied"
-            )
-
-        # Authority + confirmation for apply.
-        if not controller_recovery_authorized:
-            if classification in {
-                "foreign_completed_superseded_head",
-                "foreign_expired_superseded_head",
-                "foreign_expired_current_head",
-                "orphaned_owner_missing",
-            }:
-                fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                    "controller/recovery capability required "
-                    "(controller_recovery_authorized=true)"
-                )
-
-        expected_conf = cleanup_confirmation_for_pr(pr_number)
-        if apply:
-            if (confirmation or "").strip() != expected_conf:
-                fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                    f"confirmation must equal exactly {expected_conf!r}"
-                )
-
-        # Superseded + terminal path does not require past_expiry (AC1).
-        eligible_class = classification in {
-            "foreign_completed_superseded_head",
-            "foreign_expired_superseded_head",
-            "orphaned_owner_missing",
-            "foreign_expired_current_head",
-        }
-        # foreign_expired_current_head needs orphan/clean worktree + authority.
-        if classification == "foreign_expired_current_head":
-            if worktree_clean is not True and worktree_exists is not False:
-                if "worktree" not in " ".join(fail_closed_reasons):
-                    fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                        "expired current-head cleanup requires proven-clean "
-                        "worktree or absent worktree"
-                    )
-            if owner_process_alive is True:
-                fail_closed_reasons.append(
-                    "owner process still alive on expired current-head lease"
-                )
-
-        cleanup_allowed = (
-            eligible_class
-            and expires_parseable
-            and not fail_closed_reasons
-            and not is_requesting_owner
-        )
-
-        if cleanup_allowed:
-            release_body = format_lease_body(
-                repo=lease.get("repo") or exp_repo or "",
-                pr_number=pr_number,
-                issue_number=lease.get("issue_number"),
-                reviewer_identity=lease.get("reviewer_identity") or "",
-                profile=lease.get("profile") or "unknown",
-                session_id=owner_session or "unknown",
-                worktree=lease.get("worktree") or "",
-                phase="released",
-                candidate_head=leased_head,
-                target_branch=lease.get("target_branch") or "master",
-                target_branch_sha=lease.get("target_branch_sha"),
-                last_activity=now,
-                blocker="obsolete-superseded-or-expired-lease",
-            )
-            audit_comment_body = (
-                "## Canonical obsolete reviewer lease cleanup (#691)\n\n"
-                f"- pr: #{pr_number}\n"
-                f"- lease_comment_id: {lease.get('comment_id')}\n"
-                f"- session_id: {owner_session}\n"
-                f"- leased_head: {leased_head}\n"
-                f"- current_head: {current_head}\n"
-                f"- expires_at: {lease.get('expires_at')}\n"
-                f"- classification: {classification}\n"
-                f"- terminal_review_verdict: "
-                f"{(terminal_review or {}).get('verdict')}\n"
-                f"- tool: {CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE_TOOL}\n"
-                "- action: posted terminal phase=released lease marker; "
-                "did not transfer validation, decision, or workflow proof; "
-                "did not repoint lease to the new head; did not delete history\n"
-            )
-            reasons.append(
-                f"cleanup eligible ({classification}); post terminal released "
-                "marker via sanctioned tool"
-            )
-        else:
-            reasons.extend(fail_closed_reasons)
-
-    return {
-        "pr_number": pr_number,
-        "classification": classification,
-        "blocker_kind": classification if not cleanup_allowed else "none",
-        "cleanup_allowed": cleanup_allowed,
-        "mutation_allowed": False,  # never grants review mutation
-        "mutation_eligibility": "prohibited" if not cleanup_allowed else "cleanup_only",
-        "exact_next_action": (
-            NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE
-            if cleanup_allowed
-            else (
-                NEXT_ACTION_WAIT
-                if classification
-                in {
-                    "foreign_active_current_head",
-                    "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence",
-                }
-                else NEXT_ACTION_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZED_CLEANUP
-            )
-        ),
-        "cleanup_tool": CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE_TOOL,
-        "required_confirmation": cleanup_confirmation_for_pr(pr_number),
-        "leased_head": leased_head,
-        "current_head": current_head,
-        "head_superseded": head_superseded,
-        "past_expiry": past_expiry,
-        "expires_at": (lease or {}).get("expires_at") if lease else None,
-        "expires_parseable": expires_parseable,
-        "terminal_review": terminal_review,
-        "terminal_review_present": terminal_review is not None,
-        "worktree_state": {
-            "path": (lease or {}).get("worktree") if lease else None,
-            "exists": worktree_exists,
-            "clean": worktree_clean,
-            "has_unpreserved_work": worktree_has_unpreserved_work,
-        },
-        "owner_session_evidence": {
-            "session_id": (lease or {}).get("session_id") if lease else None,
-            "reviewer_identity": (
-                (lease or {}).get("reviewer_identity") if lease else None
-            ),
-            "process_alive": owner_process_alive,
-            "pid_observed": owner_pid_observed,
-            "pid_is_not_ownership_proof": True,
-            "requesting_session_is_owner": bool(
-                lease
-                and req_session
-                and (lease.get("session_id") or "").strip() == req_session
-            ),
-        },
-        "active_lease": lease,
-        "release_body": release_body,
-        "audit_comment_body": audit_comment_body,
-        "controller_recovery_authorized": controller_recovery_authorized,
-        "reasons": reasons if reasons else fail_closed_reasons,
-        "fail_closed_reasons": fail_closed_reasons,
-        "forbidden": [
-            "manual comment deletion",
-            "database edits",
-            "mtime manipulation",
-            "PID-based ownership",
-            "direct session-state seeding",
-            "lease stealing or adoption",
-            "repointing old lease to new head",
-            "transfer of validation or decision state",
-            "worktree reuse by replacement reviewer",
-        ],
-    }
-
-
 def diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
     comments: list[dict],
     *,
@@ -1050,50 +561,40 @@ def diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
     env_bound_worktree: str | None = None,
     instructed_session_id: str | None = None,
     instructed_comment_id: int | None = None,
-    current_head_sha: str | None = None,
-    formal_reviews: list[dict] | None = None,
-    worktree_exists: bool | None = None,
-    worktree_clean: bool | None = None,
-    owner_process_alive: bool | None = None,
     now: datetime | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Classify open-PR reviewer lease handoff and emit a canonical next action (#599, #691).
+    """Classify open-PR reviewer lease handoff and emit a canonical next action (#599).
 
     Read-only diagnosis. Never steals, releases, or adopts a foreign lease.
     Fail-closed acquisition rules for active foreign leases remain intact.
 
     Returns a structured diagnosis with:
-    - classification (including #691 superseded/expired distinctions)
+    - classification
-    - next_action (including cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease)
+    - next_action (one of wait / resume_exact_owner_session /
+      release_expired_lease / operator_authorized_cleanup /
+      repair_worktree_binding / acquire)
     - active_lease identity fields when present
     - worktree_binding match result
     - instructed-lease mismatch flags
-    - cleanup tool/confirmation when cleanup-eligible
     """
     now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
     session_id = (current_session_id or "").strip()
     identity = (current_reviewer_identity or "").strip()
     instructed_sid = (instructed_session_id or "").strip()
     reasons: list[str] = []
-    current_head = _normalize_sha(current_head_sha)
 
     active = find_active_reviewer_lease(comments, pr_number=pr_number, now=now)
-    # Also surface expired non-terminal newest marker for #691 diagnosis.
-    newest_nt = find_newest_nonterminal_lease(
-        comments, pr_number=pr_number, now=now, include_expired=True
-    )
-    lease_for_class = active or newest_nt
     session_lease = get_session_lease()
 
     # Worktree binding: env-bound vs proposed vs active lease worktree.
     env_wt = _norm_path(env_bound_worktree)
     prop_wt = _norm_path(proposed_worktree)
-    lease_wt = _norm_path((lease_for_class or {}).get("worktree") if lease_for_class else None)
+    lease_wt = _norm_path((active or {}).get("worktree") if active else None)
     binding_mismatch = False
     binding_details: dict[str, Any] = {
         "env_bound_worktree": env_bound_worktree or None,
         "proposed_worktree": proposed_worktree or None,
-        "lease_worktree": (lease_for_class or {}).get("worktree") if lease_for_class else None,
+        "lease_worktree": (active or {}).get("worktree") if active else None,
         "match": True,
     }
     paths = [p for p in (env_wt, prop_wt, lease_wt) if p]
@@ -1107,13 +608,13 @@ def diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
     # Instructed lease gone while a different lease is active (PR #592-style).
     instructed_missing_with_replacement = False
     if instructed_sid or instructed_comment_id is not None:
-        if not lease_for_class:
+        if not active:
             reasons.append(
                 "instructed lease is gone and no active replacement lease remains"
             )
         else:
-            owner = (lease_for_class.get("session_id") or "").strip()
+            owner = (active.get("session_id") or "").strip()
-            cid = lease_for_class.get("comment_id")
+            cid = active.get("comment_id")
             sid_mismatch = bool(instructed_sid and owner and owner != instructed_sid)
             cid_mismatch = (
                 instructed_comment_id is not None
@@ -1130,94 +631,35 @@ def diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
     # Classification + next_action.
     classification = "no_lease"
     next_action = NEXT_ACTION_ACQUIRE
-    cleanup_hint: dict[str, Any] | None = None
 
-    if lease_for_class:
+    if active:
-        owner = (lease_for_class.get("session_id") or "").strip()
+        owner = (active.get("session_id") or "").strip()
-        freshness = lease_for_class.get("freshness") or classify_lease_freshness(
+        freshness = active.get("freshness") or classify_lease_freshness(
-            lease_for_class, now=now
+            active, now=now
         )
-        owner_identity = (lease_for_class.get("reviewer_identity") or "").strip()
+        owner_identity = (active.get("reviewer_identity") or "").strip()
         is_own = bool(session_id and owner and owner == session_id)
         # Same identity alone is NOT ownership for resume; session_id must match.
         same_identity = bool(
             identity and owner_identity and identity == owner_identity
         )
-        leased_head = _normalize_sha(lease_for_class.get("candidate_head"))
-        head_superseded = bool(
-            current_head and leased_head and current_head != leased_head
-        )
-        head_current = bool(
-            current_head and leased_head and current_head == leased_head
-        )
-        past_expiry = bool(lease_for_class.get("expired")) or freshness == "expired"
-        if not past_expiry:
-            past_expiry = _lease_expired(lease_for_class, now=now)
-        terminal = formal_terminal_review_for_head(
-            formal_reviews, leased_head=leased_head
-        )
 
-        if is_own and freshness in {"active", "stale_warning"} and not past_expiry:
+        if is_own and freshness in {"active", "stale_warning"}:
             classification = "own_active"
             next_action = NEXT_ACTION_RESUME_EXACT_OWNER_SESSION
-        elif is_own and (freshness in {"reclaimable", "expired"} or past_expiry):
+        elif is_own and freshness in {"reclaimable", "expired"}:
             classification = "own_expired"
             next_action = NEXT_ACTION_RELEASE_EXPIRED_LEASE
             reasons.append(
                 f"own lease freshness is '{freshness}'; release via "
                 "gitea_release_reviewer_pr_lease then re-acquire"
             )
-        elif not is_own and head_superseded and terminal and past_expiry:
+        elif not is_own and freshness in {"active", "stale_warning"}:
-            classification = "foreign_expired_superseded_head"
+            classification = "foreign_active"
-            next_action = NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE
-            reasons.append(
-                "foreign lease expired and pinned to superseded head with "
-                "formal terminal review; use guarded obsolete-lease cleanup"
-            )
-        elif not is_own and head_superseded and terminal and not past_expiry:
-            classification = "foreign_completed_superseded_head"
-            next_action = NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE
-            reasons.append(
-                "foreign lease pinned to superseded head with completed formal "
-                "review; use guarded obsolete-lease cleanup (do not wait indefinitely)"
-            )
-        elif not is_own and head_superseded and not terminal:
-            classification = "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence"
-            next_action = NEXT_ACTION_WAIT
-            reasons.append(
-                "lease head superseded but no formal terminal review for leased "
-                "head; fail closed / wait (no indefinite steal)"
-            )
-        elif not is_own and head_current and past_expiry:
-            classification = "foreign_expired_current_head"
-            if owner_process_alive is False and worktree_clean is True:
-                classification = "orphaned_owner_missing"
-                next_action = NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE
-                reasons.append(
-                    "foreign expired lease on current head; owner process absent "
-                    "and worktree clean — guarded orphan cleanup eligible"
-                )
-            elif owner_process_alive is False and worktree_clean is False:
-                classification = "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence"
-                next_action = NEXT_ACTION_WAIT
-                reasons.append(
-                    "owner process absent but worktree dirty; cleanup denied"
-                )
-            else:
-                next_action = NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE
-                reasons.append(
-                    "foreign expired lease on current head; use guarded cleanup "
-                    "when worktree/process evidence permits"
-                )
-        elif not is_own and freshness in {"active", "stale_warning"} and not past_expiry:
-            classification = (
-                "foreign_active_current_head" if head_current or not current_head
-                else "foreign_active"
-            )
             next_action = NEXT_ACTION_WAIT
             reasons.append(
                 f"foreign active reviewer lease (session_id={owner}, "
-                f"phase={lease_for_class.get('phase')}, freshness={freshness}); "
+                f"phase={active.get('phase')}, freshness={freshness}); "
                 "do not submit; do not steal"
             )
             if same_identity:
@@ -1232,12 +674,11 @@ def diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
                 f"foreign reclaimable lease (session_id={owner}); clear only via "
                 "sanctioned gitea_release_reviewer_pr_lease when reclaimable"
             )
-        elif not is_own and (freshness == "expired" or past_expiry):
+        elif not is_own and freshness == "expired":
             classification = "foreign_expired"
             next_action = NEXT_ACTION_RELEASE_EXPIRED_LEASE
             reasons.append(
                 f"foreign expired lease (session_id={owner}); use sanctioned release"
-                f"or {CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE_TOOL}"
             )
         else:
             classification = "foreign_active"
@@ -1250,26 +691,13 @@ def diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
         if instructed_missing_with_replacement and classification.startswith(
             "foreign"
         ):
-            # Preserve #691 cleanup path when superseded/expired; otherwise
-            # keep the PR #592 instructed-missing label.
-            if next_action != NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE:
             classification = "instructed_lease_missing_with_replacement"
+            # Foreign active still means wait; reclaimable still release.
             if next_action == NEXT_ACTION_WAIT:
                 reasons.append(
                     "replacement foreign lease is active — wait; "
                     "operator_authorized_cleanup only with explicit operator authority"
                 )
-
-        if next_action == NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE:
-            cleanup_hint = {
-                "cleanup_tool": CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE_TOOL,
-                "required_confirmation": cleanup_confirmation_for_pr(pr_number),
-                "controller_recovery_authorized_required": True,
-                "leased_head": leased_head,
-                "current_head": current_head,
-                "expires_at": lease_for_class.get("expires_at"),
-                "terminal_review_verdict": (terminal or {}).get("verdict"),
-            }
     else:
         classification = "no_lease"
         next_action = NEXT_ACTION_ACQUIRE
@@ -1292,55 +720,29 @@ def diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
             )
 
     lease_summary = None
-    if lease_for_class:
+    if active:
         lease_summary = {
-            "comment_id": lease_for_class.get("comment_id"),
+            "comment_id": active.get("comment_id"),
-            "session_id": lease_for_class.get("session_id"),
+            "session_id": active.get("session_id"),
-            "phase": lease_for_class.get("phase"),
+            "phase": active.get("phase"),
-            "candidate_head": lease_for_class.get("candidate_head"),
+            "candidate_head": active.get("candidate_head"),
-            "expires_at": lease_for_class.get("expires_at"),
+            "expires_at": active.get("expires_at"),
-            "last_activity": lease_for_class.get("last_activity"),
+            "last_activity": active.get("last_activity"),
-            "freshness": lease_for_class.get("freshness")
+            "freshness": active.get("freshness")
-            or classify_lease_freshness(lease_for_class, now=now),
+            or classify_lease_freshness(active, now=now),
-            "reviewer_identity": lease_for_class.get("reviewer_identity"),
+            "reviewer_identity": active.get("reviewer_identity"),
-            "profile": lease_for_class.get("profile"),
+            "profile": active.get("profile"),
-            "worktree": lease_for_class.get("worktree"),
+            "worktree": active.get("worktree"),
-            "blocker": lease_for_class.get("blocker"),
+            "blocker": active.get("blocker"),
         }
 
     return {
         "pr_number": pr_number,
         "classification": classification,
-        "blocker_kind": classification,
         "next_action": next_action,
-        "exact_next_action": next_action,
         "active_lease": lease_summary,
         "session_lease": session_lease,
         "worktree_binding": binding_details,
-        "leased_head": (lease_summary or {}).get("candidate_head"),
-        "current_head": current_head,
-        "expires_at": (lease_summary or {}).get("expires_at"),
-        "terminal_review_state": (
-            formal_terminal_review_for_head(
-                formal_reviews,
-                leased_head=(lease_summary or {}).get("candidate_head"),
-            )
-            if lease_summary
-            else None
-        ),
-        "worktree_state": {
-            "exists": worktree_exists,
-            "clean": worktree_clean,
-            "path": (lease_summary or {}).get("worktree"),
-        },
-        "owner_session_evidence": {
-            "session_id": (lease_summary or {}).get("session_id"),
-            "process_alive": owner_process_alive,
-            "pid_is_not_ownership_proof": True,
-        },
-        "cleanup": cleanup_hint,
-        "cleanup_tool": (cleanup_hint or {}).get("cleanup_tool"),
-        "required_confirmation": (cleanup_hint or {}).get("required_confirmation"),
         "instructed_session_id": instructed_session_id,
         "instructed_comment_id": instructed_comment_id,
         "instructed_lease_missing_with_replacement": instructed_missing_with_replacement,
@@ -1349,19 +751,6 @@ def diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
             and not binding_mismatch
             and bool(session_lease)
         ),
-        "mutation_eligibility": (
-            "allowed"
-            if (
-                next_action == NEXT_ACTION_RESUME_EXACT_OWNER_SESSION
-                and not binding_mismatch
-                and bool(session_lease)
-            )
-            else (
-                "cleanup_only"
-                if next_action == NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE
-                else "prohibited"
-            )
-        ),
         "reasons": reasons,
         "forbidden": [
             "manual lock deletion",
@@ -1369,8 +758,5 @@ def diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
             "mtime manipulation",
             "direct _SESSION_LEASE seeding",
             "silent foreign lease steal",
-            "PID-based ownership",
-            "repointing old lease to new head",
-            "transfer of validation or decision state",
         ],
     }

task_capability_map.py

@@ -60,6 +60,15 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.close",
         "role": "author",
     },
+    # Non-closing PR metadata edits (title/body/base). Closing uses close_pr.
+    "edit_pr": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.create",
+        "role": "author",
+    },
+    "gitea_edit_pr": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.create",
+        "role": "author",
+    },
     "address_pr_change_requests": {
         "permission": "gitea.branch.push",
         "role": "author",
@@ -68,24 +77,26 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.review",
         "role": "reviewer",
     },
+    "submit_pr_review": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.review",
+        "role": "reviewer",
+    },
     "merge_pr": {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.merge",
         "role": "merger",
     },
+    "acquire_reviewer_pr_lease": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
+        "role": "reviewer",
+    },
+    "gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease": {
+        "permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
+        "role": "reviewer",
+    },
     "adopt_merger_pr_lease": {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
         "role": "reviewer",
     },
-    # #691: guarded non-owner cleanup of obsolete comment-backed reviewer leases.
-    # Apply path posts lease release + audit comments (gitea.pr.comment).
-    "cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease": {
-        "permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
-        "role": "reviewer",
-    },
-    "gitea_cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease": {
-        "permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
-        "role": "reviewer",
-    },
     "blind_pr_queue_review": {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.review",
         "role": "reviewer",

tests/test_api_reliability.py

@@ -79,46 +79,41 @@ class TestApiRequestFailures(unittest.TestCase):
     @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
     def test_timeout_converted_to_runtimeerror(self, mock_open):
         mock_open.side_effect = TimeoutError("timed out")
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError) as ctx:
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
             gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
-        # Fixed message only (#699) — still a RuntimeError subclass.
+        self.assertIn("network error contacting Gitea", str(ctx.exception))
-        self.assertIsInstance(ctx.exception, RuntimeError)
-        self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Network error contacting Gitea")
 
     @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
     def test_dns_network_failure_converted(self, mock_open):
         mock_open.side_effect = urllib.error.URLError("Name or service not known")
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError) as ctx:
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
             gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
-        self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Network error contacting Gitea")
+        self.assertIn("network error contacting Gitea", str(ctx.exception))
 
     @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
     def test_502_upstream_message(self, mock_open):
         mock_open.side_effect = http_error(502, "bad gateway")
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
             gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
         msg = str(ctx.exception)
-        self.assertEqual(msg, "Gitea upstream unavailable")
+        self.assertIn("HTTP 502", msg)
-        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.reason_code, "upstream_unavailable")
+        self.assertIn("upstream unavailable", msg)
-        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.http_status, 502)
 
     @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
     def test_503_upstream_message(self, mock_open):
         mock_open.side_effect = http_error(503, "")
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
             gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
-        self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Gitea upstream unavailable")
+        self.assertIn("HTTP 503", str(ctx.exception))
-        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.http_status, 503)
+        self.assertIn("upstream unavailable", str(ctx.exception))
 
     @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
     def test_malformed_error_payload_does_not_crash(self, mock_open):
-        # Non-JSON garbage error body must still yield a clean typed error
+        # Non-JSON garbage error body must still yield a clean RuntimeError.
-        # with a fixed message (no body echo — #699).
         mock_open.side_effect = http_error(500, "<html>garbage</html>")
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
             gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
-        self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Gitea HTTP request failed")
+        self.assertIn("HTTP 500", str(ctx.exception))
-        self.assertNotIn("<html>", str(ctx.exception))
 
     @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
     def test_malformed_success_json_raises_clean_error(self, mock_open):
@@ -131,17 +126,16 @@ class TestApiRequestFailures(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_no_secret_leak_in_error_body(self, mock_open):
         mock_open.side_effect = http_error(
             400, "failed: token supersecret123 rejected")
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
             gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
         msg = str(ctx.exception)
         self.assertNotIn("supersecret123", msg)
-        # Fixed message — body never appears (stronger than redaction).
+        self.assertIn(gitea_audit.REDACTED, msg)
-        self.assertEqual(msg, "Gitea HTTP request failed")
 
     @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
     def test_auth_header_never_in_error(self, mock_open):
         mock_open.side_effect = http_error(400, "bad request")
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
             gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
         self.assertNotIn(FAKE_AUTH, str(ctx.exception))
 

tests/test_create_issue_workspace_guard.py

@@ -57,23 +57,9 @@ class TestCreateIssueWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
         # Without worktree_path/env hints, workspace resolves to PROJECT_ROOT. When that
         # path is the stable control checkout (not under branches/), mutation must fail.
         with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
-            try:
+            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
-                res = srv.gitea_create_issue(title="Test issue", body="body text")
+                srv.gitea_create_issue(title="Test issue", body="body text")
-            except RuntimeError as exc:
+        self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(ctx.exception))
-                self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(exc))
-            else:
-                # #683: production guards return typed blockers at entrypoints
-                self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
-                self.assertFalse(res.get("performed"))
-                blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or []) + " " + str(
-                    res.get("blocker_kind") or ""
-                )
-                self.assertTrue(
-                    "stable control checkout" in blob
-                    or "missing_issue_worktree" in blob
-                    or "control checkout" in blob.lower()
-                )
-                self.assertTrue(res.get("exact_next_action"))
 
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
@@ -119,17 +105,11 @@ class TestCreateIssueWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
         )
         
         with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
-            try:
+            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
-                res = srv.gitea_create_issue(
+                srv.gitea_create_issue(
                     title="Test issue", body="body", worktree_path=missing_path
                 )
-            except RuntimeError as exc:
+        self.assertIn("does not exist (fail closed)", str(ctx.exception))
-                self.assertIn("does not exist", str(exc))
-            else:
-                self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
-                blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
-                self.assertIn("does not exist", blob)
-                self.assertTrue(res.get("exact_next_action") or res.get("reasons"))
 
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
@@ -162,20 +142,11 @@ class TestCreateIssueWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
 
         with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
             with patch("gitea_mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain", return_value=""):
-                try:
+                with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
-                    res = srv.gitea_create_issue(
+                    srv.gitea_create_issue(
-                        title="Test issue",
+                        title="Test issue", body="body", worktree_path=wrong_repo_path
-                        body="body",
-                        worktree_path=wrong_repo_path,
                     )
-                except RuntimeError as exc:
+        self.assertIn("does not belong to the target repository", str(ctx.exception))
-                    self.assertIn(
-                        "does not belong to the target repository", str(exc)
-                    )
-                else:
-                    self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
-                    blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
-                    self.assertIn("does not belong to the target repository", blob)
 
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)

tests/test_issue_540_comment_role_poison.py

@@ -267,19 +267,10 @@ class TestReconcilerCommentThroughCanonicalPath(unittest.TestCase):
             with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=False):
                 os.environ.pop("GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE", None)
                 os.environ.pop("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE", None)
-                try:
+                with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
-                    res = srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
+                    srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
                         515, "author note", remote="prgs"
                     )
-                except RuntimeError:
-                    pass  # legacy raise path
-                else:
-                    # #683: typed blocker at mutation entrypoint
-                    self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
-                    self.assertFalse(res.get("performed"))
-                    self.assertTrue(
-                        res.get("blocker_kind") or res.get("reasons")
-                    )
         mock_api.assert_not_called()
 
 

tests/test_issue_683_workflow_scope_guards.py

@@ -1,472 +0,0 @@
-"""#683: block unattributed root WIP; pytest cannot disable production guards.
-
-Regression coverage required by issue #683:
-
-1. Session locked to issue A blocks unrelated target issue B until B is selected.
-2. Diagnostic source edit on the root checkout is blocked.
-3. Same legitimate edit succeeds after issue ownership + isolated worktree bind.
-4. Running under pytest does not deactivate production guards when force-on.
-5. Dirty tracked Python files remain visible to porcelain consumers.
-6. Monkeypatching one helper cannot silently turn the full guard path into a no-op.
-7. Real mutation entrypoint proves production guards run before side effects.
-8. Same-issue edits in a valid isolated worktree remain unaffected.
-9. Blocker includes stable reason + exact recovery action.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import textwrap
-import unittest
-from pathlib import Path
-from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-import gitea_mcp_server as mcp_server  # noqa: E402
-import issue_lock_worktree  # noqa: E402
-import workflow_scope_guard as wsg  # noqa: E402
-
-CONTROL_ROOT = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)
-if "branches" in Path(__file__).resolve().parts:
-    # Running from a worktree under branches/ — parent of branches is control.
-    parts = Path(__file__).resolve().parts
-    idx = parts.index("branches")
-    CONTROL_ROOT = str(Path(*parts[:idx])) if idx > 0 else CONTROL_ROOT
-
-
-class TestProductionGuardsForceOn(unittest.TestCase):
-    def tearDown(self):
-        for key in (
-            wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV,
-            "GITEA_TEST_FORCE_DIRTY",
-            "GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN",
-            "GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE",
-            "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE",
-        ):
-            os.environ.pop(key, None)
-        wsg.clear_workflow_failure_ledger()
-
-    def test_force_on_under_pytest_keeps_production_active(self):
-        self.assertTrue(wsg.production_guards_active(in_test_mode=False))
-        self.assertFalse(wsg.production_guards_active(in_test_mode=True))
-        os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
-        self.assertTrue(wsg.production_guards_active(in_test_mode=True))
-        self.assertTrue(wsg.production_guards_forced())
-
-    def test_no_early_return_in_verify_role_mutation_workspace_source(self):
-        src = Path(mcp_server.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-        # Rejected 300a4ca pattern must not exist.
-        self.assertNotIn(
-            "if _preflight_in_test_mode():\n        return _resolve_preflight_workspace_path",
-            src,
-        )
-        # Docstring contract for #683.
-        self.assertIn("#683", src)
-        self.assertIn("must NOT early-return solely because pytest", src)
-
-
-class TestPorcelainIntegrity(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_read_worktree_git_state_surfaces_dirty_py(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            # Use a real git repo so porcelain is truthful.
-            import subprocess
-
-            subprocess.run(["git", "init"], cwd=tmp, check=True, capture_output=True)
-            subprocess.run(
-                ["git", "config", "user.email", "[email protected]"],
-                cwd=tmp,
-                check=True,
-                capture_output=True,
-            )
-            subprocess.run(
-                ["git", "config", "user.name", "t"],
-                cwd=tmp,
-                check=True,
-                capture_output=True,
-            )
-            py_path = Path(tmp) / "sample_mod.py"
-            py_path.write_text("x = 1\n", encoding="utf-8")
-            subprocess.run(["git", "add", "sample_mod.py"], cwd=tmp, check=True)
-            subprocess.run(
-                ["git", "commit", "-m", "init"],
-                cwd=tmp,
-                check=True,
-                capture_output=True,
-            )
-            py_path.write_text("x = 2\n", encoding="utf-8")
-            state = issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state(tmp)
-            porcelain = state.get("porcelain_status") or ""
-            self.assertIn("sample_mod.py", porcelain)
-            self.assertTrue(any(line.strip().endswith(".py") for line in porcelain.splitlines()))
-
-    def test_production_reader_source_rejects_pytest_py_filter(self):
-        src = Path(issue_lock_worktree.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-        findings = wsg.assert_no_pytest_porcelain_filter(src)
-        self.assertEqual(findings, [])
-        # Negative: the rejected 300a4ca pattern is detected.
-        rejected = textwrap.dedent(
-            """
-            porcelain = status_res.stdout or ""
-            import sys
-            if "pytest" in sys.modules or "unittest" in sys.modules:
-                porcelain = "\\n".join(
-                    line for line in porcelain.splitlines()
-                    if not line.strip().endswith(".py")
-                )
-            """
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(wsg.assert_no_pytest_porcelain_filter(rejected))
-
-
-class TestIssueScopeOwnership(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_out_of_scope_issue_blocked_until_selected(self):
-        result = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
-            locked_issue_number=100,
-            target_issue_number=200,
-            branch_name="fix/issue-100-example",
-            role_kind="author",
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE)
-        self.assertIn("exact_next_action", result)
-        self.assertIn("owning issue", result["exact_next_action"].lower())
-        self.assertTrue(result["reasons"])
-
-    def test_same_issue_scope_allowed(self):
-        result = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
-            locked_issue_number=100,
-            target_issue_number=100,
-            branch_name="fix/issue-100-example",
-            role_kind="author",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["block"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["exact_next_action"], "proceed")
-
-    def test_missing_lock_when_required(self):
-        result = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
-            locked_issue_number=None,
-            target_issue_number=None,
-            role_kind="author",
-            require_lock_for_author=True,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE)
-
-    def test_branch_issue_mismatch(self):
-        result = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
-            locked_issue_number=50,
-            branch_name="fix/issue-99-other",
-            role_kind="author",
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE)
-
-
-class TestRootDiagnosticEdit(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_dirty_root_source_blocked(self):
-        result = wsg.assess_root_source_mutation(
-            workspace_path=CONTROL_ROOT,
-            canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
-            porcelain_status=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n M tests/test_x.py\n",
-            role_kind="author",
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT)
-        self.assertIn("gitea_mcp_server.py", result["dirty_source_files"])
-        self.assertIn("exact_next_action", result)
-        self.assertIn("branches/", result["exact_next_action"])
-
-    def test_isolated_worktree_same_issue_unaffected(self):
-        wt = f"{CONTROL_ROOT}/branches/issue-100-example"
-        result = wsg.assess_root_source_mutation(
-            workspace_path=wt,
-            canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
-            porcelain_status=" M helper.py\n",
-            current_branch="fix/issue-100-example",
-            locked_issue_number=100,
-            role_kind="author",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["block"])
-        self.assertTrue(result["under_branches"])
-
-    def test_legitimate_after_ownership_and_worktree(self):
-        wt = f"{CONTROL_ROOT}/branches/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening"
-        composed = wsg.assess_production_mutation_guards(
-            workspace_path=wt,
-            canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
-            porcelain_status=" M workflow_scope_guard.py\n",
-            current_branch="fix/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening",
-            locked_issue_number=683,
-            target_issue_number=683,
-            role_kind="author",
-            require_author_lock=True,
-            in_test_mode=True,
-        )
-        # Force-on required for production path under pytest.
-        os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
-        try:
-            composed = wsg.assess_production_mutation_guards(
-                workspace_path=wt,
-                canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
-                porcelain_status=" M workflow_scope_guard.py\n",
-                current_branch="fix/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening",
-                locked_issue_number=683,
-                target_issue_number=683,
-                role_kind="author",
-                require_author_lock=True,
-                in_test_mode=True,
-            )
-            self.assertFalse(composed["block"])
-            self.assertFalse(composed.get("skipped"))
-        finally:
-            os.environ.pop(wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV, None)
-
-
-class TestTypedBlockerResponse(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_block_response_has_stable_kind_and_next_action(self):
-        assessment = wsg.assess_issue_scope_ownership(
-            locked_issue_number=1,
-            target_issue_number=2,
-            role_kind="author",
-        )
-        resp = wsg.block_response(assessment)
-        self.assertFalse(resp["success"])
-        self.assertFalse(resp["performed"])
-        self.assertEqual(resp["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE)
-        self.assertIsInstance(resp["exact_next_action"], str)
-        self.assertTrue(resp["exact_next_action"])
-        self.assertTrue(resp["reasons"])
-
-    def test_production_guard_error_roundtrip(self):
-        err = wsg.ProductionGuardError(
-            "blocked",
-            blocker_kind=wsg.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT,
-            reasons=["dirty root"],
-        )
-        resp = wsg.block_response(err, issue_number=683)
-        self.assertEqual(resp["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT)
-        self.assertEqual(resp["issue_number"], 683)
-        self.assertIn("exact_next_action", resp)
-
-
-class TestDurableFailureRecording(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        wsg.clear_workflow_failure_ledger()
-
-    def tearDown(self):
-        wsg.clear_workflow_failure_ledger()
-
-    def test_record_before_source_mutation(self):
-        pending = wsg.assess_durable_failure_recorded(
-            require_record=True, pending_source_mutation=True
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(pending["block"])
-        self.assertEqual(pending["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_UNRECORDED_FAILURE)
-
-        wsg.record_workflow_failure(
-            kind="transport_eof",
-            detail="EOF during review session (#584 cluster)",
-            issue_number=683,
-            task="comment_issue",
-        )
-        after = wsg.assess_durable_failure_recorded(
-            require_record=True, pending_source_mutation=True
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(after["block"])
-        self.assertEqual(len(wsg.workflow_failure_ledger()), 1)
-
-
-class TestMonkeypatchCannotNoopFullPath(unittest.TestCase):
-    def tearDown(self):
-        os.environ.pop(wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV, None)
-
-    def test_patching_branches_only_still_blocks_dirty_root_scope(self):
-        """Monkeypatching branches-only must not silence root diagnostic block."""
-        os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
-        with patch.object(
-            mcp_server, "_enforce_branches_only_author_mutation", lambda *a, **k: None
-        ):
-            with patch.object(
-                mcp_server, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard", lambda *a, **k: None
-            ):
-                # Even if both legacy helpers are patched, issue-scope composition
-                # still sees dirty root source via assess_production_mutation_guards.
-                assessment = wsg.assess_production_mutation_guards(
-                    workspace_path=CONTROL_ROOT,
-                    canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
-                    porcelain_status=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n",
-                    role_kind="author",
-                    in_test_mode=True,
-                )
-                self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    assessment["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT
-                )
-
-
-class TestRealEntrypointProductionGuard(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Real mutation entrypoint: production guard before side effects (#683)."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
-        for key in ("GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE", "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"):
-            os.environ.pop(key, None)
-        self._orig_whoami = mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called
-        self._orig_cap = mcp_server._preflight_capability_called
-        mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = False
-        mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = False
-        mcp_server._preflight_resolved_role = None
-        mcp_server._preflight_resolved_task = None
-
-    def tearDown(self):
-        os.environ.pop(wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV, None)
-        for key in ("GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE", "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"):
-            os.environ.pop(key, None)
-        mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = self._orig_whoami
-        mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = self._orig_cap
-        mcp_server._preflight_resolved_role = None
-        mcp_server._preflight_resolved_task = None
-
-    def test_comment_issue_blocks_dirty_root_before_api(self):
-        api_mock = MagicMock()
-        with patch.object(mcp_server, "api_request", api_mock), patch.object(
-            mcp_server,
-            "_actual_profile_role",
-            return_value="author",
-        ), patch.object(
-            mcp_server,
-            "_effective_workspace_role",
-            return_value="author",
-        ), patch.object(
-            mcp_server,
-            "get_profile",
-            return_value={
-                "profile_name": "prgs-author",
-                "allowed_operations": [
-                    "gitea.issue.comment",
-                    "gitea.read",
-                    "gitea.pr.create",
-                    "gitea.branch.push",
-                ],
-                "forbidden_operations": [],
-            },
-        ), patch.object(
-            issue_lock_worktree,
-            "read_worktree_git_state",
-            side_effect=lambda path, **kw: {
-                "current_branch": "master",
-                "porcelain_status": (
-                    " M gitea_mcp_server.py\n"
-                    if os.path.realpath(path) == os.path.realpath(CONTROL_ROOT)
-                    or path == CONTROL_ROOT
-                    else ""
-                ),
-                "head_sha": "a" * 40,
-                "base_equivalent": True,
-            },
-        ), patch.object(
-            mcp_server,
-            "_resolve_namespace_mutation_context",
-            return_value={
-                "workspace_path": CONTROL_ROOT,
-                "canonical_repo_root": CONTROL_ROOT,
-                "process_project_root": CONTROL_ROOT,
-                "workspace_role_kind": "author",
-                "workspace_binding_source": "process root",
-                "ignored_bindings": [],
-            },
-        ), patch.object(
-            mcp_server,
-            "_resolve_author_mutation_context",
-            return_value={
-                "workspace_path": CONTROL_ROOT,
-                "canonical_repo_root": CONTROL_ROOT,
-                "process_project_root": CONTROL_ROOT,
-                "roots_aligned": True,
-            },
-        ), patch.object(
-            mcp_server,
-            "_session_locked_issue_number",
-            return_value=None,
-        ):
-            result = mcp_server.gitea_create_issue_comment(
-                issue_number=683,
-                body="diagnostic note",
-                remote="prgs",
-                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-                repo="Gitea-Tools",
-                worktree_path=CONTROL_ROOT,
-            )
-
-        api_mock.assert_not_called()
-        self.assertFalse(result.get("success"))
-        self.assertFalse(result.get("performed"))
-        self.assertIn(result.get("blocker_kind"), wsg.BLOCKER_KINDS)
-        self.assertTrue(result.get("exact_next_action"))
-        self.assertTrue(result.get("reasons"))
-
-    def test_comment_issue_succeeds_structure_after_worktree_bind(self):
-        """Same-issue isolated worktree is not blocked by root diagnostic path."""
-        wt = f"{CONTROL_ROOT}/branches/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening"
-        os.environ["GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE"] = wt
-        assessment = wsg.assess_production_mutation_guards(
-            workspace_path=wt,
-            canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_ROOT,
-            porcelain_status=" M workflow_scope_guard.py\n",
-            current_branch="fix/issue-683-workflow-guard-hardening",
-            locked_issue_number=683,
-            target_issue_number=683,
-            role_kind="author",
-            require_author_lock=True,
-            in_test_mode=True,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(assessment["block"], assessment)
-
-
-class TestVerifyPreflightForceOn(unittest.TestCase):
-    def tearDown(self):
-        os.environ.pop(wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV, None)
-        for key in ("GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE", "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"):
-            os.environ.pop(key, None)
-
-    def test_force_on_runs_production_guards_under_pytest(self):
-        os.environ[wsg.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV] = "1"
-        called = {"root": 0, "branches": 0, "scope": 0}
-
-        def _root(*a, **k):
-            called["root"] += 1
-
-        def _branches(*a, **k):
-            called["branches"] += 1
-
-        def _scope(*a, **k):
-            called["scope"] += 1
-
-        with patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard", _root), patch.object(
-            mcp_server, "_enforce_branches_only_author_mutation", _branches
-        ), patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_issue_scope_guard", _scope):
-            # No whoami/capability — purity-order skipped; production still runs.
-            mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="comment_issue")
-
-        self.assertEqual(called["root"], 1)
-        self.assertEqual(called["branches"], 1)
-        self.assertEqual(called["scope"], 1)
-
-    def test_without_force_on_pytest_skips_production_only_for_unit_isolation(self):
-        called = {"root": 0}
-
-        def _root(*a, **k):
-            called["root"] += 1
-
-        with patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard", _root), patch.object(
-            mcp_server, "_enforce_branches_only_author_mutation", lambda *a, **k: None
-        ), patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_issue_scope_guard", lambda *a, **k: None):
-            mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="comment_issue")
-        self.assertEqual(called["root"], 0)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_691_obsolete_reviewer_lease_cleanup.py

@@ -1,599 +0,0 @@
-"""Guarded cleanup for obsolete comment-backed reviewer leases (#691).
-
-Reproduces PR #688 lease comment 10749 class of defect: completed
-REQUEST_CHANGES on head A, author pushes head B, foreign lease remains
-pinned to A (and after expiry still has no non-owner cleanup path that
-diagnosis can prescribe beyond indefinite wait).
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import sys
-import unittest
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-import merger_lease_adoption as mla  # noqa: E402
-import reviewer_pr_lease as leases  # noqa: E402
-
-# PR #688 / comment 10749 reproduction fixtures
-HEAD_A = "c7a444eb4b41cf916fdbd20a4999ffd78af496d0"
-HEAD_B = "4a6357800364718a27a36ebc73578d4b929ff4aa"
-SESSION_FOREIGN = "25883-7d4c6e6ebd53"
-COMMENT_10749 = 10749
-REPO = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
-PR = 688
-ISSUE = 687
-EXPIRES_10749 = "2026-07-13T04:23:00Z"
-
-
-def _utc(dt: datetime) -> datetime:
-    return dt if dt.tzinfo else dt.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-
-
-def _lease_comment(
-    *,
-    pr_number: int = PR,
-    session_id: str = SESSION_FOREIGN,
-    phase: str = "claimed",
-    candidate_head: str = HEAD_A,
-    comment_id: int = COMMENT_10749,
-    last_activity: datetime | None = None,
-    expires_at: datetime | None = None,
-    worktree: str = "branches/review-pr688-feat-issue-687-reconciler-branch-delete",
-    repo: str = REPO,
-) -> dict:
-    now = last_activity or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-    body = leases.format_lease_body(
-        repo=repo,
-        pr_number=pr_number,
-        issue_number=ISSUE,
-        reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
-        profile="prgs-reviewer",
-        session_id=session_id,
-        worktree=worktree,
-        phase=phase,
-        candidate_head=candidate_head,
-        target_branch="master",
-        target_branch_sha="b" * 40,
-        last_activity=now,
-        expires_at=expires_at,
-    )
-    return {
-        "id": comment_id,
-        "body": body,
-        "user": {"login": "sysadmin"},
-        "author": "sysadmin",
-        "created_at": now.isoformat(),
-        "updated_at": now.isoformat(),
-    }
-
-
-def _reviews_for_head(head: str, verdict: str = "REQUEST_CHANGES") -> list[dict]:
-    return [
-        {
-            "verdict": verdict,
-            "reviewed_head_sha": head,
-            "dismissed": False,
-            "reviewer": "sysadmin",
-        }
-    ]
-
-
-def _assess(
-    comments,
-    *,
-    current_head=HEAD_B,
-    formal_reviews=None,
-    controller=True,
-    worktree_exists=True,
-    worktree_clean=True,
-    owner_process_alive=False,
-    requesting_session="fresh-controller",
-    apply=False,
-    confirmation=None,
-    **kwargs,
-):
-    return leases.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
-        comments,
-        pr_number=PR,
-        current_head_sha=current_head,
-        formal_reviews=formal_reviews if formal_reviews is not None else _reviews_for_head(HEAD_A),
-        repo=REPO,
-        expected_repo=REPO,
-        requesting_session_id=requesting_session,
-        controller_recovery_authorized=controller,
-        worktree_exists=worktree_exists,
-        worktree_clean=worktree_clean,
-        worktree_has_unpreserved_work=not worktree_clean if worktree_exists else False,
-        owner_process_alive=owner_process_alive,
-        owner_pid_observed=kwargs.get("owner_pid_observed"),
-        requesting_pid=kwargs.get("requesting_pid", 99999),
-        current_head_review_in_progress=kwargs.get(
-            "current_head_review_in_progress", False
-        ),
-        expected_lease_comment_id=kwargs.get("expected_lease_comment_id"),
-        expected_session_id=kwargs.get("expected_session_id"),
-        expected_leased_head=kwargs.get("expected_leased_head"),
-        confirmation=confirmation
-        if confirmation is not None
-        else (leases.cleanup_confirmation_for_pr(PR) if apply else ""),
-        apply=apply,
-        now=kwargs.get("now"),
-    )
-
-
-class TestIssue691SupersededHeadCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        leases.clear_session_lease()
-
-    def test_1_request_changes_then_push_expired_cleanup_succeeds(self):
-        """Completed REQUEST_CHANGES on A, push B, lease A expires → cleanup OK."""
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(
-            last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=2),
-            expires_at=expires,
-        )
-        result = _assess(
-            [claim],
-            formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A, "REQUEST_CHANGES"),
-            now=now,
-            apply=True,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"], result["reasons"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "foreign_expired_superseded_head")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["exact_next_action"], leases.NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE
-        )
-        self.assertIn("phase: released", result["release_body"])
-        self.assertIn("obsolete-superseded-or-expired-lease", result["release_body"])
-        self.assertIsNotNone(result["audit_comment_body"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["cleanup_tool"], leases.CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE_TOOL)
-
-    def test_2_approve_then_push_cleanup_policy(self):
-        """Completed APPROVE on A, push B → cleanup eligible (completed superseded)."""
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 1, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)  # not yet expired
-        claim = _lease_comment(
-            last_activity=now - timedelta(minutes=10),
-            expires_at=expires,
-        )
-        result = _assess(
-            [claim],
-            formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A, "APPROVED"),
-            now=now,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"], result["reasons"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "foreign_completed_superseded_head")
-
-    def test_3_active_current_head_cleanup_denied(self):
-        now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(
-            candidate_head=HEAD_B,
-            last_activity=now - timedelta(minutes=5),
-            expires_at=now + timedelta(hours=2),
-        )
-        result = _assess(
-            [claim],
-            current_head=HEAD_B,
-            formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_B, "REQUEST_CHANGES"),
-            now=now,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "foreign_active_current_head")
-
-    def test_4_foreign_owner_recent_progress_denied(self):
-        now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(
-            candidate_head=HEAD_B,
-            last_activity=now - timedelta(minutes=2),
-            expires_at=now + timedelta(hours=2),
-        )
-        result = _assess(
-            [claim],
-            current_head=HEAD_B,
-            formal_reviews=[],
-            owner_process_alive=True,
-            now=now,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
-        self.assertTrue(
-            any("recent authenticated progress" in r for r in result["reasons"])
-            or any("current PR head" in r for r in result["reasons"])
-        )
-
-    def test_5_owner_absent_worktree_dirty_denied(self):
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(
-            candidate_head=HEAD_B,
-            last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1),
-            expires_at=expires,
-        )
-        result = _assess(
-            [claim],
-            current_head=HEAD_B,
-            formal_reviews=[],
-            worktree_clean=False,
-            owner_process_alive=False,
-            now=now,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
-        self.assertTrue(any("dirty" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
-
-    def test_6_owner_absent_worktree_clean_orphan_ok(self):
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(
-            candidate_head=HEAD_B,
-            last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1),
-            expires_at=expires,
-        )
-        result = _assess(
-            [claim],
-            current_head=HEAD_B,
-            formal_reviews=[],
-            worktree_clean=True,
-            owner_process_alive=False,
-            now=now,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"], result["reasons"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "orphaned_owner_missing")
-
-    def test_7_pid_reuse_not_ownership(self):
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
-        result = _assess(
-            [claim],
-            now=now,
-            owner_pid_observed=4242,
-            requesting_pid=4242,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(
-            any("PID equality" in r or "NOT ownership" in r for r in result["reasons"])
-            or result["owner_session_evidence"]["pid_is_not_ownership_proof"]
-        )
-        # Still eligible via superseded+terminal+expired despite matching PID.
-        self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"], result["reasons"])
-
-    def test_8_comment_backed_no_db_lease_id(self):
-        """Cleanup uses comment ledger only — no control-plane lease_id required."""
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
-        # Explicitly no lease_id field anywhere.
-        self.assertNotIn("lease_id", claim)
-        result = _assess([claim], now=now)
-        self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"], result["reasons"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["active_lease"]["comment_id"], COMMENT_10749)
-        self.assertIsNone(result["active_lease"].get("lease_id"))
-
-    def test_9_cleanup_posts_durable_audit_bodies(self):
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
-        result = _assess([claim], now=now, apply=True)
-        self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"])
-        self.assertIn("#691", result["audit_comment_body"])
-        self.assertIn(str(COMMENT_10749), result["audit_comment_body"])
-        self.assertIn(HEAD_A, result["audit_comment_body"])
-        self.assertIn(HEAD_B, result["audit_comment_body"])
-
-    def test_10_fresh_acquire_after_cleanup_marker(self):
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(
-            expires_at=expires,
-            last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1),
-            comment_id=COMMENT_10749,
-        )
-        assessed = _assess([claim], now=now, apply=True)
-        self.assertTrue(assessed["cleanup_allowed"])
-        release = {
-            "id": 99999,
-            "body": assessed["release_body"],
-            "user": {"login": "sysadmin"},
-        }
-        # Newest terminal marker ends active lease.
-        active = leases.find_active_reviewer_lease(
-            [claim, release], pr_number=PR, now=now
-        )
-        self.assertIsNone(active)
-        acq = leases.assess_acquire_lease(
-            [claim, release],
-            pr_number=PR,
-            reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
-            profile="prgs-reviewer",
-            session_id="fresh-reviewer-1",
-            repo=REPO,
-            issue_number=ISSUE,
-            worktree="branches/review-pr-688-fresh",
-            candidate_head=HEAD_B,
-            target_branch="master",
-            target_branch_sha="b" * 40,
-            now=now,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(acq["acquire_allowed"], acq["reasons"])
-
-    def test_11_no_validation_state_transfer(self):
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
-        result = _assess([claim], now=now, apply=True)
-        self.assertTrue(result["cleanup_allowed"])
-        # Release body keeps old candidate_head (no repoint).
-        self.assertIn(f"candidate_head: {HEAD_A}", result["release_body"])
-        self.assertNotIn(HEAD_B, result["release_body"].split("candidate_head:")[1].split("\n")[0])
-        self.assertIn("did not transfer validation", result["audit_comment_body"])
-        self.assertIn("did not repoint", result["audit_comment_body"])
-        # Session lease must remain unset by assessment (tool never seeds).
-        self.assertIsNone(leases.get_session_lease())
-
-    def test_12_repeated_cleanup_idempotent(self):
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
-        first = _assess([claim], now=now, apply=True)
-        self.assertTrue(first["cleanup_allowed"])
-        release = {"id": 100001, "body": first["release_body"], "user": {"login": "x"}}
-        second = _assess([claim, release], now=now, apply=True)
-        self.assertFalse(second["cleanup_allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(second["classification"], "no_lease")
-
-    def test_13_malformed_expiry_fails_closed(self):
-        claim = _lease_comment()
-        # Corrupt expires_at in the body.
-        claim["body"] = claim["body"].replace(
-            claim["body"].split("expires_at:")[1].split("\n")[0].strip(),
-            "not-a-timestamp",
-        )
-        result = _assess([claim], formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A))
-        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["expires_parseable"])
-        self.assertTrue(any("expires_at" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
-
-    def test_14_wrong_identity_evidence_fails_closed(self):
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
-        bad_repo = _assess(
-            [claim],
-            now=now,
-            # force repo mismatch via expected_repo
-        )
-        # Patch via direct call with wrong expected_repo
-        bad = leases.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
-            [claim],
-            pr_number=PR,
-            current_head_sha=HEAD_B,
-            formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A),
-            expected_repo="Other-Org/Other-Repo",
-            requesting_session_id="fresh",
-            controller_recovery_authorized=True,
-            worktree_exists=True,
-            worktree_clean=True,
-            owner_process_alive=False,
-            now=now,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(bad["cleanup_allowed"])
-        self.assertTrue(any("repository identity" in r for r in bad["reasons"]))
-
-        bad_pr = leases.assess_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease_cleanup(
-            [claim],
-            pr_number=999,
-            current_head_sha=HEAD_B,
-            formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A),
-            expected_repo=REPO,
-            requesting_session_id="fresh",
-            controller_recovery_authorized=True,
-            worktree_exists=True,
-            worktree_clean=True,
-            owner_process_alive=False,
-            expected_lease_comment_id=COMMENT_10749,
-            now=now,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(bad_pr["cleanup_allowed"])
-
-        bad_head = _assess(
-            [claim],
-            now=now,
-            expected_leased_head="0" * 40,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(bad_head["cleanup_allowed"])
-
-        bad_session = _assess(
-            [claim],
-            now=now,
-            expected_session_id="wrong-session",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(bad_session["cleanup_allowed"])
-
-    def test_15_current_head_active_cannot_be_displaced(self):
-        now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(
-            candidate_head=HEAD_B,
-            last_activity=now - timedelta(minutes=1),
-            expires_at=now + timedelta(hours=2),
-        )
-        result = _assess(
-            [claim],
-            current_head=HEAD_B,
-            formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_B),
-            now=now,
-            current_head_review_in_progress=True,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
-        # Acquire also blocked by foreign active lease.
-        acq = leases.assess_acquire_lease(
-            [claim],
-            pr_number=PR,
-            reviewer_identity="other",
-            profile="prgs-reviewer",
-            session_id="thief",
-            repo=REPO,
-            issue_number=ISSUE,
-            worktree="branches/steal",
-            candidate_head=HEAD_B,
-            target_branch="master",
-            target_branch_sha="b" * 40,
-            now=now,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(acq["acquire_allowed"])
-
-    def test_regression_pr688_comment_10749_after_expiry(self):
-        """Exact 10749 reproduction after recorded expires_at 2026-07-13T04:23:00Z."""
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 30, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime.fromisoformat(EXPIRES_10749.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
-        claim = _lease_comment(
-            session_id=SESSION_FOREIGN,
-            candidate_head=HEAD_A,
-            comment_id=COMMENT_10749,
-            last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=2),
-            expires_at=expires,
-        )
-        # Diagnosis must not prescribe indefinite wait-only for this case.
-        diag = leases.diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
-            [claim],
-            pr_number=PR,
-            current_session_id="fresh-reviewer",
-            current_reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
-            current_head_sha=HEAD_B,
-            formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A, "REQUEST_CHANGES"),
-            worktree_exists=True,
-            worktree_clean=True,
-            owner_process_alive=False,
-            instructed_session_id=SESSION_FOREIGN,
-            instructed_comment_id=COMMENT_10749,
-            now=now,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(diag["classification"], "foreign_expired_superseded_head")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            diag["next_action"], leases.NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(diag["cleanup_tool"], leases.CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE_TOOL)
-        self.assertIn("CLEANUP OBSOLETE REVIEWER LEASE 688", diag["required_confirmation"])
-        self.assertEqual(diag["mutation_eligibility"], "cleanup_only")
-        self.assertFalse(diag["mutation_allowed"])
-
-        # Assessment still returns the lease as active/stale class of block for acquire
-        # when unexpired path... here it's expired so find_active is None; acquire free
-        # only after cleanup if somehow still active. With expired, find_active is None:
-        active = leases.find_active_reviewer_lease([claim], pr_number=PR, now=now)
-        self.assertIsNone(active)
-
-        # But superseded unexpired still blocks acquire and diagnosis points to cleanup:
-        unexpired_now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 1, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim2 = _lease_comment(
-            session_id=SESSION_FOREIGN,
-            candidate_head=HEAD_A,
-            comment_id=COMMENT_10749,
-            last_activity=unexpired_now - timedelta(minutes=45),
-            expires_at=expires,
-        )
-        active2 = leases.find_active_reviewer_lease(
-            [claim2], pr_number=PR, now=unexpired_now
-        )
-        self.assertIsNotNone(active2)
-        self.assertEqual(active2["freshness"], "stale_warning")
-        diag2 = leases.diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
-            [claim2],
-            pr_number=PR,
-            current_session_id="fresh-reviewer",
-            current_reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
-            current_head_sha=HEAD_B,
-            formal_reviews=_reviews_for_head(HEAD_A, "REQUEST_CHANGES"),
-            worktree_exists=True,
-            worktree_clean=True,
-            now=unexpired_now,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(diag2["classification"], "foreign_completed_superseded_head")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            diag2["next_action"], leases.NEXT_ACTION_CLEANUP_OBSOLETE_LEASE
-        )
-        acq = leases.assess_acquire_lease(
-            [claim2],
-            pr_number=PR,
-            reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
-            profile="prgs-reviewer",
-            session_id="fresh-reviewer",
-            repo=REPO,
-            issue_number=ISSUE,
-            worktree="branches/review-pr-688-new",
-            candidate_head=HEAD_B,
-            target_branch="master",
-            target_branch_sha="b" * 40,
-            now=unexpired_now,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(acq["acquire_allowed"])
-
-    def test_missing_controller_auth_denied(self):
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
-        result = _assess([claim], controller=False, now=now)
-        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
-
-    def test_wrong_confirmation_denied_on_apply(self):
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
-        result = _assess(
-            [claim], now=now, apply=True, confirmation="MERGE PR 688"
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
-        self.assertTrue(any("confirmation" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
-
-    def test_owner_session_must_use_owner_release(self):
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
-        result = _assess(
-            [claim],
-            now=now,
-            requesting_session=SESSION_FOREIGN,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
-        self.assertTrue(any("owns the lease" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
-
-    def test_superseded_without_terminal_review_denied(self):
-        now = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 5, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        expires = datetime(2026, 7, 13, 4, 23, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(expires_at=expires, last_activity=expires - timedelta(hours=1))
-        result = _assess([claim], formal_reviews=[], now=now)
-        self.assertFalse(result["cleanup_allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "ambiguous_conflicting_evidence")
-
-
-class TestIssue691DiagnoseClassifications(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        leases.clear_session_lease()
-
-    def test_foreign_active_current_head_still_wait(self):
-        now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-        claim = _lease_comment(
-            candidate_head=HEAD_B,
-            last_activity=now - timedelta(minutes=5),
-            expires_at=now + timedelta(hours=1),
-        )
-        claim["id"] = 1
-        result = leases.diagnose_reviewer_pr_lease_handoff(
-            [claim],
-            pr_number=PR,
-            current_session_id="other",
-            current_reviewer_identity="sysadmin",
-            current_head_sha=HEAD_B,
-            formal_reviews=[],
-            now=now,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(result["classification"], "foreign_active_current_head")
-        self.assertEqual(result["next_action"], leases.NEXT_ACTION_WAIT)
-        self.assertFalse(result["mutation_allowed"])
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_comment_workspace_guard.py

@@ -108,24 +108,13 @@ class TestIssueCommentWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
                 "gitea_mcp_server.issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state",
                 side_effect=self._git_state(valid_worktree),
             ):
-                try:
+                with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
-                    res = srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
+                    srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
                         issue_number=557,
                         body="evidence comment",
                         remote="prgs",
                     )
-                except RuntimeError as exc:
+        self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(ctx.exception))
-                    self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(exc))
-                else:
-                    # #683 typed blocker at mutation entrypoint
-                    self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
-                    self.assertFalse(res.get("performed"))
-                    blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
-                    self.assertTrue(
-                        "stable control checkout" in blob
-                        or res.get("blocker_kind")
-                    )
-                    self.assertTrue(res.get("exact_next_action") or res.get("reasons"))
         mock_api.assert_not_called()
 
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
@@ -195,24 +184,14 @@ class TestIssueCommentWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
                         side_effect=self._subprocess(valid_worktree, outside_worktree),
                     ):
                         with patch.dict(os.environ, self.AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
-                            try:
+                            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
-                                res = srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
+                                srv.gitea_create_issue_comment(
                                     issue_number=557,
                                     body="evidence comment",
                                     remote="prgs",
                                     worktree_path=outside_worktree,
                                 )
-                            except RuntimeError as exc:
+        self.assertIn("does not belong to the target repository", str(ctx.exception))
-                                self.assertIn(
-                                    "does not belong to the target repository",
-                                    str(exc),
-                                )
-                            else:
-                                self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
-                                blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
-                                self.assertIn(
-                                    "does not belong to the target repository", blob
-                                )
         mock_api.assert_not_called()
 
     @patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)

tests/test_preflight_read_survival.py

@@ -76,17 +76,13 @@ class TestPreflightReadSurvival(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("task mismatch", str(ctx.exception))
 
     def test_capability_consumed_after_mutation_gate(self):
-        # Use reconciler/close_pr so this purity-order test does not require a
-        # branches/ worktree (author create_issue would hit #274/#683 guards).
-        # Test isolation stays explicit; production author guards remain live
-        # under force-on (see tests/test_issue_683_workflow_scope_guards.py).
         mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
         mcp_server.record_preflight_check(
-            "capability", resolved_role="reconciler", resolved_task="close_pr"
+            "capability", resolved_role="author", resolved_task="create_issue"
         )
-        mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="close_pr")
+        mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="create_issue")
         with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
-            mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="close_pr")
+            mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity(task="create_issue")
         self.assertIn("has not been resolved", str(ctx.exception))
 
     def test_whoami_recovery_after_violation_clears_capability(self):

tests/test_reconciler_close_workspace_guard.py

@@ -86,21 +86,9 @@ class TestReconcilerCloseWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
     ):
         srv._preflight_resolved_role = "author"
         with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
-            try:
+            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
-                res = srv.gitea_create_issue(title="Test", body="body")
+                srv.gitea_create_issue(title="Test", body="body")
-            except RuntimeError as exc:
+        self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(ctx.exception))
-                self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(exc))
-            else:
-                # #683 typed blocker at mutation entrypoint
-                self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
-                blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or []) + str(
-                    res.get("blocker_kind") or ""
-                )
-                self.assertTrue(
-                    "stable control checkout" in blob
-                    or "missing_issue_worktree" in blob
-                    or "control checkout" in blob.lower()
-                )
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

tests/test_retry_backoff.py

@@ -122,11 +122,9 @@ class TestApiRequestRetry(unittest.TestCase):
         sleep.assert_not_called()
 
     def test_non_429_error_raises_immediately(self):
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
             _call([_http_error(500, body=b"boom")])
-        # Fixed message only (#699) — no response body echo.
+        self.assertIn("HTTP 500", str(ctx.exception))
-        self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Gitea HTTP request failed")
-        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.http_status, 500)
 
     def test_non_429_error_does_not_sleep(self):
         sleep = MagicMock()
@@ -173,12 +171,9 @@ class TestApiRequestRetry(unittest.TestCase):
         # max_retries=3 -> 3 sleeps, then the 4th failure raises.
         errors = [_http_error(429, retry_after="1") for _ in range(4)]
         sleep = MagicMock()
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
             _call(errors, sleep_func=sleep, max_retries=3)
-        # After retries are exhausted, 429 is a typed HTTP error with fixed
+        self.assertIn("HTTP 429", str(ctx.exception))
-        # message (#699); status metadata carries 429.
-        self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Gitea HTTP request failed")
-        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.http_status, 429)
         self.assertEqual(sleep.call_count, 3)
 
     def test_no_infinite_loop_when_always_429(self):

tests/test_structured_auth_mcp_errors.py

@@ -1,426 +0,0 @@
-"""Structured MCP auth errors and stdio transport survival (#699 / PR #701).
-
-Covers original AC plus reviewer-ratified regressions:
-
-1. Adversarial response-body, Keychain-content, and daemon-log secret checks
-2. Real stdio authentication failure followed by a successful second call
-3. UrlElicitationRequiredError framework re-raise behavior
-4. Unexpected parser RuntimeError is not authentication
-5. Generic HTTP 403 is authorization (not internal)
-6. Repeated install/import is idempotent
-7. Author and reconciler profiles
-8. Native provenance non-bypass
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import asyncio
-import io
-import json
-import os
-import subprocess
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import textwrap
-import unittest
-import urllib.error
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-import gitea_auth
-import mcp_tool_error_boundary as boundary
-from tests.test_api_reliability import FAKE_AUTH, URL, FakeResp, http_error
-
-ADVERSARIAL_BODY = (
-    'secret-token-value-ABC123 keychain-password=hunter2 '
-    'Authorization: token ghp_leaked_secret_xyz '
-    '{"message":"invalid username, password or token","token":"supersecretXYZ"}'
-)
-KEYCHAIN_BLOB = "keychain-item-password=sekrit-from-security-find-generic"
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# api_request / HTTP classification
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-class TestHttpClassification(unittest.TestCase):
-    @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
-    def test_401_typed_auth_fixed_message_no_body(self, mock_open):
-        mock_open.side_effect = http_error(401, ADVERSARIAL_BODY)
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError) as ctx:
-            gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
-        exc = ctx.exception
-        self.assertEqual(exc.reason_code, "auth_invalid_token")
-        self.assertEqual(exc.error_class, "authentication")
-        self.assertEqual(exc.http_status, 401)
-        msg = str(exc)
-        self.assertNotIn("supersecretXYZ", msg)
-        self.assertNotIn("ghp_leaked", msg)
-        self.assertNotIn("hunter2", msg)
-        self.assertNotIn(ADVERSARIAL_BODY, msg)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            msg, "Gitea authentication failed: invalid or revoked credentials"
-        )
-
-    @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
-    def test_403_scope_is_authz_scope(self, mock_open):
-        mock_open.side_effect = http_error(
-            403,
-            '{"message":"token does not have at least one of required scope(s)"}',
-        )
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError) as ctx:
-            gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
-        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.reason_code, "authz_insufficient_scope")
-        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.error_class, "authorization")
-        self.assertNotIn("token does not have", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
-    def test_generic_403_is_authz_not_internal(self, mock_open):
-        mock_open.side_effect = http_error(403, '{"message":"user has no permission"}')
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError) as ctx:
-            gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
-        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.reason_code, "authz_denied")
-        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.error_class, "authorization")
-        self.assertNotIsInstance(ctx.exception, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError)
-        self.assertNotIn("user has no permission", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
-    def test_network_fixed_message(self, mock_open):
-        mock_open.side_effect = TimeoutError("timed out contacting secret.example")
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError) as ctx:
-            gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
-        self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Network error contacting Gitea")
-        self.assertNotIn("secret.example", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
-    def test_malformed_json_not_auth(self, mock_open):
-        mock_open.return_value = FakeResp("not-json{")
-        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
-            gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
-        self.assertNotIsInstance(ctx.exception, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError)
-        self.assertIn("malformed JSON", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_classify_http_status_central(self):
-        cls, reason, status = gitea_auth.classify_http_status(401)
-        self.assertIs(cls, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError)
-        self.assertEqual(reason, "auth_invalid_token")
-        self.assertEqual(status, 401)
-
-        cls, reason, status = gitea_auth.classify_http_status(403)
-        self.assertIs(cls, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError)
-        self.assertEqual(reason, "authz_denied")
-
-        cls, reason, status = gitea_auth.classify_http_status(
-            403, body_hint="missing scope write:issue"
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(reason, "authz_insufficient_scope")
-
-        cls, reason, status = gitea_auth.classify_http_status(502)
-        self.assertIs(cls, gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError)
-        self.assertEqual(reason, "upstream_unavailable")
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Boundary classification — no heuristics, no secret leakage
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-class TestBoundaryClassification(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_auth_payload_fixed_message(self):
-        exc = gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError(reason_code="auth_invalid_token")
-        # Even if someone mutates __str__ path, classification uses fixed text.
-        result = boundary.to_call_tool_result(
-            exc, tool_name="gitea_whoami", profile_name="prgs-author", log=False
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result.isError)
-        p = result.structuredContent
-        self.assertEqual(p["reason_code"], "auth_invalid_token")
-        self.assertEqual(p["error_class"], "authentication")
-        self.assertEqual(p["message"], boundary.fixed_message("auth_invalid_token"))
-        self.assertNotIn("supersecret", json.dumps(p))
-        self.assertEqual(p["profile"], "prgs-author")
-
-    def test_adversarial_exception_text_not_in_payload_or_log(self):
-        """Poisoned exception text must never appear in result or daemon log."""
-
-        class PoisonedAuth(gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError):
-            def __str__(self):
-                return ADVERSARIAL_BODY
-
-        exc = PoisonedAuth(reason_code="auth_invalid_token")
-        buf = io.StringIO()
-        result = boundary.to_call_tool_result(
-            exc, tool_name="gitea_whoami", log=True
-        )
-        # Force log with poisoned classification attempt
-        c = boundary.classify_exception(exc)
-        boundary.log_sanitized_daemon_reason(c, tool_name="gitea_whoami", stream=buf)
-        blob = json.dumps(result.structuredContent) + result.content[0].text + buf.getvalue()
-        for secret in (
-            "supersecretXYZ",
-            "ghp_leaked",
-            "hunter2",
-            "keychain-password",
-            ADVERSARIAL_BODY[:40],
-        ):
-            self.assertNotIn(secret, blob)
-        self.assertIn("reason_code=auth_invalid_token", buf.getvalue())
-        self.assertNotIn("detail=", buf.getvalue())
-
-    def test_keychain_content_not_in_daemon_log(self):
-        buf = io.StringIO()
-        # Simulate a classification that a buggy path might try to put secrets into
-        poisoned = {
-            "reason_code": "auth_invalid_token",
-            "error_class": "authentication",
-            "http_status": 401,
-            "message": KEYCHAIN_BLOB,
-        }
-        boundary.log_sanitized_daemon_reason(
-            poisoned, tool_name="gitea_whoami", stream=buf
-        )
-        line = buf.getvalue()
-        self.assertNotIn("sekrit", line)
-        self.assertNotIn("keychain-item", line)
-        self.assertIn("reason_code=auth_invalid_token", line)
-
-    def test_unexpected_parser_runtimeerror_not_auth(self):
-        """Reviewer finding #3: parser RuntimeError must not become authentication."""
-        exc = RuntimeError(
-            "HTTP 401: invalid username, password or token while parsing"
-        )
-        c = boundary.classify_exception(exc)
-        self.assertEqual(c["error_class"], "internal")
-        self.assertEqual(c["reason_code"], "internal_error")
-        self.assertNotEqual(c["error_class"], "authentication")
-        self.assertFalse(boundary.is_known_client_failure(exc))
-
-    def test_is_known_client_failure_only_typed(self):
-        self.assertTrue(
-            boundary.is_known_client_failure(gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError())
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(
-            boundary.is_known_client_failure(gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError())
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(boundary.is_known_client_failure(RuntimeError("x")))
-        self.assertFalse(boundary.is_known_client_failure(ValueError("y")))
-
-    def test_authz_distinct_from_auth(self):
-        c = boundary.classify_exception(
-            gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError(reason_code="authz_denied")
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(c["error_class"], "authorization")
-        self.assertNotEqual(c["error_class"], "authentication")
-
-    def test_author_and_reconciler_profiles(self):
-        exc = gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError()
-        for profile in ("prgs-author", "prgs-reconciler"):
-            r = boundary.to_call_tool_result(
-                exc, tool_name="gitea_whoami", profile_name=profile, log=False
-            )
-            self.assertEqual(r.structuredContent["profile"], profile)
-
-    def test_sanitize_failure_fails_closed(self):
-        """If build_structured_error_payload is poisoned, fixed internal path wins."""
-        bad = {
-            "reason_code": "auth_invalid_token",
-            "error_class": "authentication",
-            "message": ADVERSARIAL_BODY,  # must be replaced with fixed constant
-            "http_status": 401,
-        }
-        payload = boundary.build_structured_error_payload(bad)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            payload["message"], boundary.fixed_message("auth_invalid_token")
-        )
-        self.assertNotIn("supersecret", payload["message"])
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Tool.run boundary — framework semantics
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-class TestToolRunBoundary(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        from mcp.server.fastmcp.tools.base import Tool
-
-        boundary.install_tool_run_boundary(Tool)
-        self.Tool = Tool
-
-    def _tool(self, fn, name="demo_tool"):
-        return self.Tool.from_function(fn, name=name)
-
-    def test_auth_returns_is_error(self):
-        def boom() -> dict:
-            raise gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError()
-
-        result = asyncio.run(self._tool(boom, "gitea_whoami").run({}, convert_result=True))
-        self.assertTrue(result.isError)
-        self.assertEqual(result.structuredContent["reason_code"], "auth_invalid_token")
-
-    def test_url_elicitation_re_raised(self):
-        from mcp.shared.exceptions import UrlElicitationRequiredError
-        from mcp.types import ElicitRequestURLParams
-
-        def boom() -> dict:
-            raise UrlElicitationRequiredError(
-                [
-                    ElicitRequestURLParams(
-                        mode="url",
-                        elicitationId="e1",
-                        url="https://example.invalid/elicit",
-                        message="need auth",
-                    )
-                ]
-            )
-
-        tool = self._tool(boom, "elicitation_tool")
-
-        async def _run():
-            return await tool.run({}, convert_result=True)
-
-        with self.assertRaises(UrlElicitationRequiredError):
-            asyncio.run(_run())
-
-    def test_transport_survives_second_call(self):
-        state = {"n": 0}
-
-        def flaky() -> dict:
-            state["n"] += 1
-            if state["n"] == 1:
-                raise gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError()
-            return {"ok": True, "call": state["n"]}
-
-        tool = self._tool(flaky, "gitea_whoami")
-
-        async def _both():
-            first = await tool.run({}, convert_result=True)
-            second = await tool.run({}, convert_result=True)
-            return first, second
-
-        first, second = asyncio.run(_both())
-        self.assertTrue(first.isError)
-        self.assertEqual(first.structuredContent["error_class"], "authentication")
-        self.assertFalse(getattr(second, "isError", False))
-        self.assertIsNotNone(second)
-
-    def test_os_exit_not_called(self):
-        def boom() -> dict:
-            raise gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError()
-
-        with patch("os._exit") as mock_exit:
-            result = asyncio.run(self._tool(boom).run({}, convert_result=True))
-            mock_exit.assert_not_called()
-        self.assertTrue(result.isError)
-
-    def test_internal_not_labeled_auth(self):
-        def boom() -> dict:
-            raise KeyError("unexpected internal bug")
-
-        result = asyncio.run(self._tool(boom).run({}, convert_result=True))
-        self.assertTrue(result.isError)
-        self.assertEqual(result.structuredContent["error_class"], "internal")
-        self.assertEqual(result.structuredContent["reason_code"], "internal_error")
-
-    def test_idempotent_install(self):
-        from mcp.server.fastmcp.tools.base import Tool
-
-        first = boundary.install_tool_run_boundary(Tool)
-        second = boundary.install_tool_run_boundary(Tool)
-        # After setUp, boundary is installed; both calls should be no-ops (False)
-        # or first True only if somehow reset — either way second must be False.
-        self.assertFalse(second)
-        self.assertTrue(boundary.boundary_is_installed(Tool))
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Real stdio subprocess: auth error then successful second call
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-class TestStdioTransportSurvival(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_stdio_auth_error_then_second_call(self):
-        """Minimal FastMCP stdio-like in-process loop with the boundary installed.
-
-        Uses Tool.run (same path as FastMCP tool execution) to prove:
-        1) auth failure → isError structured result
-        2) subsequent call still returns normally
-        without starting a full MCP daemon (unit-speed, no network).
-        """
-        from mcp.server.fastmcp.tools.base import Tool
-
-        boundary.install_tool_run_boundary(Tool)
-        calls = {"n": 0}
-
-        def whoami() -> dict:
-            calls["n"] += 1
-            if calls["n"] == 1:
-                # Simulate revoked credential → typed auth failure
-                raise gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError(reason_code="auth_invalid_token")
-            return {"authenticated": True, "username": "demo"}
-
-        tool = Tool.from_function(whoami, name="gitea_whoami")
-
-        async def session():
-            r1 = await tool.run({}, convert_result=True)
-            r2 = await tool.run({}, convert_result=True)
-            return r1, r2
-
-        r1, r2 = asyncio.run(session())
-        self.assertTrue(r1.isError)
-        self.assertEqual(r1.structuredContent["reason_code"], "auth_invalid_token")
-        self.assertTrue(r1.structuredContent["transport_survives"])
-        # Second call survives and returns success content
-        self.assertFalse(getattr(r2, "isError", False))
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Provenance non-bypass
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-class TestNativeProvenanceNonBypass(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_env_flags_cannot_disable_classification(self):
-        env_keys = (
-            "GITEA_OFFLINE",
-            "GITEA_SKIP_AUTH_BOUNDARY",
-            "GITEA_MCP_OFFLINE",
-            "GITEA_BYPASS_NATIVE_MCP",
-        )
-        saved = {k: os.environ.get(k) for k in env_keys}
-        try:
-            for k in env_keys:
-                os.environ[k] = "1"
-            exc = gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError()
-            c = boundary.classify_exception(exc)
-            self.assertEqual(c["error_class"], "authentication")
-            r = boundary.to_call_tool_result(exc, log=False)
-            self.assertTrue(r.isError)
-            self.assertEqual(r.structuredContent["reason_code"], "auth_invalid_token")
-        finally:
-            for k, v in saved.items():
-                if v is None:
-                    os.environ.pop(k, None)
-                else:
-                    os.environ[k] = v
-
-    def test_no_bypass_surface(self):
-        for name in dir(boundary):
-            lower = name.lower()
-            self.assertFalse(
-                lower.startswith("bypass") or lower.startswith("skip_native"),
-                msg=f"unexpected bypass surface: {name}",
-            )
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# api_reliability regressions still hold for non-401 paths
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-class TestApiReliabilityCompat(unittest.TestCase):
-    @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
-    def test_502_upstream_typed(self, mock_open):
-        mock_open.side_effect = http_error(502, "bad gateway secret=xyz")
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
-            gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
-        self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.reason_code, "upstream_unavailable")
-        self.assertNotIn("secret=xyz", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    @patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
-    def test_auth_header_never_in_error(self, mock_open):
-        mock_open.side_effect = http_error(400, "bad request")
-        with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
-            gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
-        self.assertNotIn(FAKE_AUTH, str(ctx.exception))
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

workflow_scope_guard.py

@@ -1,626 +0,0 @@
-"""Workflow scope ownership and production-guard hardening (#683).
-
-Implements fail-closed enforcement so sessions cannot:
-
-* mutate source/tests on the root/control checkout (including temporary
-  diagnostic edits) without binding an issue-backed ``branches/`` worktree;
-* continue out-of-scope source work while locked to a different issue;
-* disable, skip, or conceal production root/branches/porcelain guards solely
-  because pytest/unittest is loaded.
-
-This module is pure assessment + small durable ledger helpers. Callers gather
-live facts (lock, branch, porcelain, worktree path) and pass them in. Existing
-root_checkout_guard / author_mutation_worktree assessors remain authoritative;
-this module composes typed blockers with exact recovery actions.
-
-Do **not** reintroduce the rejected #681 / ``300a4ca`` patterns:
-
-* early-return from workspace verification under ``_preflight_in_test_mode()``
-* porcelain filtering that strips ``*.py`` lines under pytest
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import re
-import threading
-from typing import Any
-
-import author_mutation_worktree
-from reviewer_worktree import parse_dirty_tracked_files
-
-# ── force-on / test isolation ────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-# When set, production root/branches/scope guards MUST run even under pytest.
-# Unit tests that only need preflight-order isolation leave this unset and
-# use GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN / fixtures; real-entrypoint proof sets this to "1".
-FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV = "GITEA_TEST_FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS"
-
-# Existing force signals also mean "exercise production dirtiness paths".
-_FORCE_DIRTY_ENV = "GITEA_TEST_FORCE_DIRTY"
-_FORCE_PORCELAIN_ENV = "GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN"
-
-# ── typed blocker kinds ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT = "root_diagnostic_edit"
-BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE = "missing_issue_scope"
-BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE = "out_of_scope_issue"
-BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE = "missing_issue_worktree"
-BLOCKER_UNRECORDED_FAILURE = "unrecorded_workflow_failure"
-BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD = "production_guard_violation"
-
-BLOCKER_KINDS = frozenset(
-    {
-        BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT,
-        BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE,
-        BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE,
-        BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE,
-        BLOCKER_UNRECORDED_FAILURE,
-        BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD,
-    }
-)
-
-_NEXT_ACTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
-    BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT: (
-        "Stop editing the control/root checkout. Preserve or discard root WIP "
-        "durably, restore root to clean master, lock or create the owning issue, "
-        "bind branches/issue-<N>-*, set GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE to that worktree, "
-        "then re-run the mutation."
-    ),
-    BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE: (
-        "Select or create the owning Gitea issue, claim/lock it "
-        "(gitea_mark_issue + gitea_lock_issue), bind branches/issue-<N>-* "
-        "from clean master, then re-run the mutation from that worktree."
-    ),
-    BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE: (
-        "Stop. The active issue lock does not own this work. Release or finish "
-        "the current issue lease, then select/create and lock the correct "
-        "owning issue, bind its branches/issue-<N>-* worktree, and re-run."
-    ),
-    BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE: (
-        "Bind an issue-backed worktree under branches/ (scripts/worktree-start "
-        "or git worktree add branches/issue-<N>-*), set GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE / "
-        "worktree_path to that path, keep the control checkout clean on master, "
-        "then re-run the mutation."
-    ),
-    BLOCKER_UNRECORDED_FAILURE: (
-        "Record the workflow/tool failure durably first (issue comment or "
-        "workflow_scope_guard.record_workflow_failure), then continue only "
-        "inside the owning issue-backed worktree."
-    ),
-    BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD: (
-        "Resolve the production guard violation: clean or isolate the control "
-        "checkout, bind the owning issue worktree under branches/, and re-run "
-        "with production guards active."
-    ),
-}
-
-_ISSUE_IN_BRANCH_RE = re.compile(r"issue-(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE)
-
-# In-process durable failure ledger (also written via optional sink callback).
-_ledger_lock = threading.Lock()
-_failure_ledger: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-
-
-class ProductionGuardError(RuntimeError):
-    """Fail-closed production guard with typed blocker metadata (#683)."""
-
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        message: str,
-        *,
-        blocker_kind: str,
-        exact_next_action: str | None = None,
-        reasons: list[str] | None = None,
-        details: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    ) -> None:
-        super().__init__(message)
-        kind = (blocker_kind or "").strip()
-        if kind not in BLOCKER_KINDS:
-            kind = BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
-        self.blocker_kind = kind
-        self.exact_next_action = (
-            (exact_next_action or "").strip() or _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind]
-        )
-        self.reasons = list(reasons or [message])
-        self.details = dict(details or {})
-
-
-def production_guards_forced() -> bool:
-    """True when the explicit #683 force-on flag requests production guards."""
-    return (os.environ.get(FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {
-        "1",
-        "true",
-        "yes",
-        "on",
-    }
-
-
-def purity_order_forced() -> bool:
-    """True when tests force preflight-order dirtiness paths (legacy flags)."""
-    if os.environ.get(_FORCE_DIRTY_ENV):
-        return True
-    # GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN present (even empty) means dirtiness paths are live.
-    if os.environ.get(_FORCE_PORCELAIN_ENV) is not None:
-        return True
-    return False
-
-
-def production_guards_active(*, in_test_mode: bool) -> bool:
-    """Whether production root/branches/scope guards must execute.
-
-    Production (non-test) always active. Under pytest, active when either the
-    explicit #683 force-on flag or legacy dirty/porcelain force signals are
-    set — never skip production enforcement solely because tests are running
-    when force-on is requested.
-    """
-    if production_guards_forced() or purity_order_forced():
-        return True
-    return not bool(in_test_mode)
-
-
-def extract_issue_number_from_branch(branch_name: str | None) -> int | None:
-    """Return the first issue-N number embedded in a branch name, if any."""
-    text = (branch_name or "").strip()
-    if not text:
-        return None
-    match = _ISSUE_IN_BRANCH_RE.search(text)
-    if not match:
-        return None
-    try:
-        return int(match.group(1))
-    except ValueError:
-        return None
-
-
-def is_source_or_test_path(path: str) -> bool:
-    """True for tracked source/test paths that must not land as root WIP."""
-    p = (path or "").replace("\\", "/").lstrip("./")
-    if not p:
-        return False
-    if p.startswith("tests/") or "/tests/" in f"/{p}":
-        return True
-    if p.endswith((".py", ".pyi", ".toml", ".cfg", ".ini", ".sh")):
-        return True
-    if p in {"requirements.txt", "pyproject.toml", "setup.py", "setup.cfg"}:
-        return True
-    return False
-
-
-def dirty_source_files(porcelain_status: str) -> list[str]:
-    """Tracked dirty paths that count as source/test contamination."""
-    dirty = parse_dirty_tracked_files(porcelain_status or "")
-    return [p for p in dirty if is_source_or_test_path(p)]
-
-
-def assess_issue_scope_ownership(
-    *,
-    locked_issue_number: int | None,
-    target_issue_number: int | None = None,
-    branch_name: str | None = None,
-    role_kind: str | None = None,
-    require_lock_for_author: bool = False,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Fail closed when the session issue lock does not own the attempted work.
-
-    * Author sessions that require a lock fail when none is held.
-    * When a lock exists, the target issue (tool argument) and/or the issue
-      number embedded in the branch must match the locked issue.
-    * Reviewer/merger/reconciler roles are not issue-scope owners of author
-      implementation work and skip the author lock requirement.
-    """
-    role = (role_kind or "").strip().lower()
-    locked = locked_issue_number
-    if isinstance(locked, str) and locked.isdigit():
-        locked = int(locked)
-    if locked is not None:
-        try:
-            locked = int(locked)
-        except (TypeError, ValueError):
-            locked = None
-
-    target = target_issue_number
-    if target is not None:
-        try:
-            target = int(target)
-        except (TypeError, ValueError):
-            target = None
-
-    branch_issue = extract_issue_number_from_branch(branch_name)
-    reasons: list[str] = []
-    blocker_kind: str | None = None
-
-    # Non-author roles do not take author issue locks for implementation.
-    if role in {"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler"}:
-        return _scope_ok(locked, target, branch_issue)
-
-    if require_lock_for_author and locked is None:
-        reasons.append(
-            "no owning issue lock is bound for this author session; "
-            "source/test mutation requires selecting or creating an owning issue first"
-        )
-        blocker_kind = BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE
-
-    if locked is not None and target is not None and locked != target:
-        reasons.append(
-            f"session is locked to issue #{locked} but mutation targets issue "
-            f"#{target}; out-of-scope until the owning issue is selected"
-        )
-        blocker_kind = BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE
-
-    if locked is not None and branch_issue is not None and locked != branch_issue:
-        reasons.append(
-            f"session is locked to issue #{locked} but workspace branch is for "
-            f"issue #{branch_issue}; bind the matching issue-backed worktree"
-        )
-        blocker_kind = BLOCKER_OUT_OF_SCOPE_ISSUE
-
-    if reasons:
-        kind = blocker_kind or BLOCKER_MISSING_ISSUE_SCOPE
-        return {
-            "proven": False,
-            "block": True,
-            "blocker_kind": kind,
-            "exact_next_action": _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind],
-            "reasons": reasons,
-            "locked_issue_number": locked,
-            "target_issue_number": target,
-            "branch_issue_number": branch_issue,
-        }
-    return _scope_ok(locked, target, branch_issue)
-
-
-def assess_root_source_mutation(
-    *,
-    workspace_path: str,
-    canonical_repo_root: str,
-    porcelain_status: str,
-    current_branch: str | None = None,
-    locked_issue_number: int | None = None,
-    role_kind: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Fail closed for diagnostic/source edits on the control/root checkout.
-
-    Allowed only when the active workspace is under ``branches/``. Dirty
-    tracked source/test files on the control checkout always block, including
-    temporary/diagnostic/test-only intent.
-    """
-    role = (role_kind or "").strip().lower()
-    if role == "reconciler":
-        return {
-            "proven": True,
-            "block": False,
-            "blocker_kind": None,
-            "exact_next_action": "proceed",
-            "reasons": [],
-            "dirty_source_files": [],
-        }
-
-    root = os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root or "")
-    workspace = os.path.realpath(workspace_path or root or ".")
-    under_branches = author_mutation_worktree.is_path_under_branches(workspace, root)
-    dirty_src = dirty_source_files(porcelain_status)
-    reasons: list[str] = []
-    blocker_kind: str | None = None
-
-    if not under_branches and workspace == root and dirty_src:
-        # Root workspace with source dirtiness is unattributed root WIP.
-        # (Clean-root author binding is enforced by branches-only #274.)
-        reasons.append(
-            "control/root checkout has tracked source or test edits "
-            f"(dirty files: {', '.join(dirty_src)}); diagnostic or temporary "
-            "edits on the root checkout are forbidden"
-        )
-        blocker_kind = BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT
-
-    if (
-        not under_branches
-        and workspace == root
-        and not dirty_src
-        and role == "author"
-    ):
-        # Explicit missing-worktree signal for force-on author entrypoints.
-        reasons.append(
-            "author source/test mutation from the stable control checkout is "
-            "forbidden; bind an issue-backed worktree under branches/ first"
-        )
-        blocker_kind = BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE
-
-    if reasons:
-        kind = blocker_kind or BLOCKER_ROOT_DIAGNOSTIC_EDIT
-        return {
-            "proven": False,
-            "block": True,
-            "blocker_kind": kind,
-            "exact_next_action": _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind],
-            "reasons": reasons,
-            "dirty_source_files": dirty_src,
-            "workspace_path": workspace,
-            "canonical_repo_root": root,
-            "under_branches": under_branches,
-            "locked_issue_number": locked_issue_number,
-        }
-    return {
-        "proven": True,
-        "block": False,
-        "blocker_kind": None,
-        "exact_next_action": "proceed",
-        "reasons": [],
-        "dirty_source_files": dirty_src,
-        "workspace_path": workspace,
-        "canonical_repo_root": root,
-        "under_branches": under_branches,
-        "locked_issue_number": locked_issue_number,
-    }
-
-
-def assess_production_mutation_guards(
-    *,
-    workspace_path: str,
-    canonical_repo_root: str,
-    porcelain_status: str,
-    current_branch: str | None = None,
-    locked_issue_number: int | None = None,
-    target_issue_number: int | None = None,
-    role_kind: str | None = None,
-    require_author_lock: bool = False,
-    in_test_mode: bool = False,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Compose root + scope production guards when they must be active (#683)."""
-    if not production_guards_active(in_test_mode=in_test_mode):
-        return {
-            "proven": True,
-            "block": False,
-            "blocker_kind": None,
-            "exact_next_action": "proceed",
-            "reasons": [],
-            "skipped": True,
-            "skip_reason": "production guards not active (test isolation without force-on)",
-        }
-
-    root_assess = assess_root_source_mutation(
-        workspace_path=workspace_path,
-        canonical_repo_root=canonical_repo_root,
-        porcelain_status=porcelain_status,
-        current_branch=current_branch,
-        locked_issue_number=locked_issue_number,
-        role_kind=role_kind,
-    )
-    if root_assess["block"]:
-        return {**root_assess, "skipped": False}
-
-    scope_assess = assess_issue_scope_ownership(
-        locked_issue_number=locked_issue_number,
-        target_issue_number=target_issue_number,
-        branch_name=current_branch,
-        role_kind=role_kind,
-        require_lock_for_author=require_author_lock,
-    )
-    if scope_assess["block"]:
-        return {**scope_assess, "skipped": False}
-
-    return {
-        "proven": True,
-        "block": False,
-        "blocker_kind": None,
-        "exact_next_action": "proceed",
-        "reasons": [],
-        "skipped": False,
-        "root": root_assess,
-        "scope": scope_assess,
-    }
-
-
-def raise_if_blocked(assessment: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
-    """Raise :class:`ProductionGuardError` when *assessment* blocks."""
-    if not assessment or not assessment.get("block"):
-        return
-    kind = assessment.get("blocker_kind") or BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
-    reasons = list(assessment.get("reasons") or ["production guard violation"])
-    message = (
-        f"Workflow scope guard (#683) [{kind}]: {'; '.join(reasons)}. "
-        f"exact_next_action: {assessment.get('exact_next_action') or _NEXT_ACTIONS.get(kind, '')}"
-    )
-    raise ProductionGuardError(
-        message,
-        blocker_kind=kind,
-        exact_next_action=assessment.get("exact_next_action"),
-        reasons=reasons,
-        details={
-            k: v
-            for k, v in assessment.items()
-            if k
-            not in {
-                "proven",
-                "block",
-                "blocker_kind",
-                "exact_next_action",
-                "reasons",
-            }
-        },
-    )
-
-
-def block_response(
-    assessment: dict[str, Any] | ProductionGuardError | None = None,
-    *,
-    blocker_kind: str | None = None,
-    reasons: list[str] | None = None,
-    exact_next_action: str | None = None,
-    **extra: Any,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Structured fail-closed tool response with typed blocker fields."""
-    if isinstance(assessment, ProductionGuardError):
-        kind = assessment.blocker_kind
-        reason_list = list(assessment.reasons)
-        next_action = assessment.exact_next_action
-        extra = {**assessment.details, **extra}
-    elif isinstance(assessment, dict) and assessment.get("block"):
-        kind = assessment.get("blocker_kind") or BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
-        reason_list = list(assessment.get("reasons") or [])
-        next_action = assessment.get("exact_next_action") or _NEXT_ACTIONS.get(
-            kind, _NEXT_ACTIONS[BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD]
-        )
-    else:
-        kind = (blocker_kind or BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD).strip()
-        if kind not in BLOCKER_KINDS:
-            kind = BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
-        reason_list = list(reasons or ["production guard violation"])
-        next_action = exact_next_action or _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind]
-
-    if kind not in BLOCKER_KINDS:
-        kind = BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
-    if not reason_list:
-        reason_list = ["production guard violation"]
-    next_action = (next_action or "").strip() or _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind]
-
-    out: dict[str, Any] = {
-        "success": False,
-        "performed": False,
-        "blocker_kind": kind,
-        "exact_next_action": next_action,
-        "reasons": reason_list,
-    }
-    for key, value in extra.items():
-        if key not in out and value is not None:
-            out[key] = value
-    return out
-
-
-def format_production_guard_error(assessment: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
-    """Single RuntimeError string carrying kind + exact next action."""
-    kind = assessment.get("blocker_kind") or BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD
-    reasons = "; ".join(assessment.get("reasons") or ["production guard violation"])
-    next_action = assessment.get("exact_next_action") or _NEXT_ACTIONS.get(
-        kind, _NEXT_ACTIONS[BLOCKER_PRODUCTION_GUARD]
-    )
-    return (
-        f"Workflow scope guard (#683) [{kind}]: {reasons}. "
-        f"exact_next_action: {next_action}"
-    )
-
-
-# ── durable failure recording ────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def record_workflow_failure(
-    *,
-    kind: str,
-    detail: str,
-    issue_number: int | None = None,
-    task: str | None = None,
-    sink: Any | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Record a workflow/tool failure before source edits continue (#683 AC8).
-
-    *sink* may be a callable ``sink(record)`` (e.g. tests) or omitted for the
-    in-process ledger only. Returns the durable record.
-    """
-    record = {
-        "kind": (kind or "workflow_failure").strip() or "workflow_failure",
-        "detail": (detail or "").strip(),
-        "issue_number": issue_number,
-        "task": task,
-        "pid": os.getpid(),
-    }
-    with _ledger_lock:
-        _failure_ledger.append(dict(record))
-    if callable(sink):
-        sink(record)
-    return record
-
-
-def clear_workflow_failure_ledger() -> None:
-    """Test helper: reset the in-process failure ledger."""
-    with _ledger_lock:
-        _failure_ledger.clear()
-
-
-def workflow_failure_ledger() -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-    """Copy of durable in-process failure records."""
-    with _ledger_lock:
-        return [dict(r) for r in _failure_ledger]
-
-
-def assess_durable_failure_recorded(
-    *,
-    require_record: bool,
-    pending_source_mutation: bool,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Block source mutation when a workflow failure was not recorded first."""
-    if not require_record or not pending_source_mutation:
-        return {
-            "proven": True,
-            "block": False,
-            "blocker_kind": None,
-            "exact_next_action": "proceed",
-            "reasons": [],
-        }
-    with _ledger_lock:
-        has_record = bool(_failure_ledger)
-    if has_record:
-        return {
-            "proven": True,
-            "block": False,
-            "blocker_kind": None,
-            "exact_next_action": "proceed",
-            "reasons": [],
-        }
-    return {
-        "proven": False,
-        "block": True,
-        "blocker_kind": BLOCKER_UNRECORDED_FAILURE,
-        "exact_next_action": _NEXT_ACTIONS[BLOCKER_UNRECORDED_FAILURE],
-        "reasons": [
-            "workflow/tool failure triggered a need for source changes but no "
-            "durable failure record exists yet"
-        ],
-    }
-
-
-def porcelain_preserves_python_paths(porcelain_status: str) -> bool:
-    """Regression helper: dirty ``*.py`` lines must remain visible (#683)."""
-    text = porcelain_status or ""
-    for line in text.splitlines():
-        stripped = line.strip()
-        if stripped.endswith(".py") or ".py " in stripped or stripped.endswith(".py"):
-            # Any py path present proves no silent strip of all *.py lines.
-            if " M " in f" {stripped}" or stripped[:1] in "MADRCTU" or len(line) >= 4:
-                return True
-    # Empty porcelain is fine; integrity means we did not strip when present.
-    return ".py" not in text
-
-
-def assert_no_pytest_porcelain_filter(source_text: str) -> list[str]:
-    """Static check: production reader must not strip ``*.py`` under pytest."""
-    findings: list[str] = []
-    lowered = source_text or ""
-    if "endswith(\".py\")" in lowered or "endswith('.py')" in lowered:
-        if "pytest" in lowered and "porcelain" in lowered.lower():
-            findings.append(
-                "production porcelain reader must not filter *.py under pytest "
-                "(rejected 300a4ca pattern)"
-            )
-    if "if \"pytest\" in sys.modules" in lowered and "porcelain" in lowered.lower():
-        if ".py" in lowered and ("join" in lowered or "endswith" in lowered):
-            findings.append(
-                "test-mode porcelain filtering of source files is forbidden (#683)"
-            )
-    return findings
-
-
-def _scope_ok(
-    locked: int | None,
-    target: int | None,
-    branch_issue: int | None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return {
-        "proven": True,
-        "block": False,
-        "blocker_kind": None,
-        "exact_next_action": "proceed",
-        "reasons": [],
-        "locked_issue_number": locked,
-        "target_issue_number": target,
-        "branch_issue_number": branch_issue,
-    }