Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
jcwalker3andClaude Opus 4.8 e33b8d3712 docs(webui): add MCP Control Plane Web Console architecture ADR (Closes #632)
Adds the durable architecture record epic #631 lacked: layer contract,
authority boundaries, the redaction boundary, /api/v1 versioning with a
compatibility rule for the existing unversioned MVP exports, a target page
map, per-child component ownership for all twenty children (#632-#651),
phase gates, and explicit forbidden paths.

Documentation only. No UI, API, or deployment change.

- docs/architecture/webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md (new)
- docs/webui-local-dev.md: cross-link to the ADR
- tests/test_webui_architecture_docs.py: doc gate for the acceptance
  criteria and the cross-link (12 cases)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 04:52:21 -05:00
12 changed files with 415 additions and 1790 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
# ADR: MCP Control Plane Web Console architecture and information architecture
- **Status:** Proposed (documentation only; blocks no code, gates every #631 child)
- **Date:** 2026-07-22
- **Tracking issue:** [#632](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/632) — architecture and information architecture (Phase 1)
- **Parent epic:** [#631](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/631) — MCP Control Plane Web Console
- **Foundation (closed, extend — do not recreate):** #425 tracker and children #426 skeleton, #427 projects, #428 prompts, #429 queue, #430 runtime, #431 audit paste, #432 worktrees, #433 leases, #434 gated actions, #435 auth/deployment boundary, #436 tests/CI
- **Related:** `mcp-allocator-control-plane-observability-adr.md`, `mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md`, `control-plane-db-substrate.md`, `../safety-model.md`, `../tool-boundaries.md`, `../credential-isolation.md`, `../webui-local-dev.md`, `../webui-deployment.md`
## 1. Context
The MVP web UI shipped under `webui/` as a read-only Starlette application with ten operator routes and a JSON export beside most of them. It is a working foundation, not the console product described by epic #631, and it carries no durable architecture record: no layer contract, no authority boundary, no API versioning rule, no page map, and no statement of which phase may open a write path.
Twenty children (#632#651) hang off #631. Without one architecture document each implementer re-derives boundaries, and the most likely failure is not a bad view — it is a privileged action wired into the browser before the authorization and audit model of #633 exists.
This ADR is the single retrievable design source for the console. It decides structure only. It implements no UI, no API, and no change to deployment topology.
## 2. Decision summary (core)
| Layer | Owns | Must not |
|-------|------|----------|
| **Browser UI** | Rendering, navigation, operator affordances | Hold tokens, call Gitea/providers directly, or execute an action the server did not gate |
| **HTTP route layer** (`webui/app.py`) | Versioned routing, authentication, authorization, redaction boundary, audit emission | Contain domain logic or reach past a loader to a raw credential |
| **Domain loaders** (`webui/*_loader.py`, `*_scanner.py`, `runtime_health.py`, `project_registry.py`) | Assembling read models from authoritative sources | Mutate anything, or emit unredacted secrets across the boundary |
| **Gitea** | Durable work record: issues, PRs, comments, reviews, labels, merges | Be the concurrency lock under multi-session load |
| **Control-plane DB** | Sessions, assignment, leases, heartbeats, events | Replace Gitea history |
| **MCP tools / capability gates** | Mutation authorization | Be re-implemented, mirrored, or bypassed by console code |
| **External providers** (Sentry/GlitchTip, AI providers) | Incident and usage data | Assign work or mutate Gitea outside the #612 bridge |
**One-liner:** **Gitea records. The DB coordinates. MCP tools authorize. The console projects state and executes only capability-checked, audited actions. Providers observe.**
## 3. Console surface today versus target
`webui/app.py` currently registers these routes (see `../webui-local-dev.md` for the operator-facing table): `/`, `/health`, `/queue`, `/projects`, `/projects/{id}`, `/prompts`, `/runtime`, `/audit`, `/worktrees`, `/leases`, `/actions`, and the unversioned exports `/api/queue`, `/api/projects`, `/api/prompts`, `/api/runtime`, `/api/audit`, `/api/worktrees`, `/api/leases`, `/api/actions`, `/api/actions/{id}/preview`, `/api/actions/{id}/attempt`.
Every one of these is **retained and evolved**. No child issue may recreate a route from scratch; each states in its PR which MVP surface it extends and what it changes.
## 4. Authority boundaries
### 4.1 Gitea (durable record)
Authoritative for issue and PR identity and state, comments, reviews and verdicts, labels, merges, and branch refs. When the console and Gitea disagree about durable state, Gitea wins and the console view is refreshed — never the reverse.
### 4.2 Control-plane DB (coordination)
Authoritative for live coordination: which session holds which assignment or lease, heartbeat freshness, expiry, and the allocation event log. The console reads it; only allocator and lease tools write it.
### 4.3 MCP capability gates (authorization)
`task_capability_map.py` and `gitea_resolve_task_capability` remain the only authority that decides whether a mutation may run. The console asks; it never answers. A console action that cannot name the MCP tool it delegates to is not an action — it is a defect.
### 4.4 Filesystem and git (local state)
Issue lock files, `branches/` worktrees, and registered git worktrees are read through existing scanners. The console never deletes, rebinds, or force-clears local state outside a Phase 2 gated action.
### 4.5 Providers (observe only)
Sentry/GlitchTip and AI providers are read surfaces. The #612 incident bridge is the only path that turns an observation into Gitea work.
## 5. Request flow and the redaction boundary
```text
browser ──HTTP──> route layer ──> domain loader ──> Gitea REST
│ ├──> control-plane DB
│ ├──> filesystem / git
│ └──> providers
[redaction boundary]
audit event
```
| Stage | May hold credentials | Emits |
|-------|----------------------|-------|
| Loader → route layer | yes (server-side, via `gitea_auth`) | domain objects |
| Route layer → browser | **no** | redacted DTOs, HTML |
Two invariants govern the boundary and are non-negotiable for every child:
1. **No secrets to the browser.** Tokens, keychain identifiers, Authorization headers, raw provider endpoints, and credential-bearing URLs are redacted by default, consistent with `../safety-model.md` §3 and `../credential-isolation.md`. Serializers redact; templates do not sanitize after the fact.
2. **No ungated mutations.** A write reaches an authoritative system only by delegating to an MCP tool that passed its own capability gate. HTML forms and JSON endpoints are transport, never authority.
## 6. API naming and versioning
**Decision:** all console APIs added from Phase 1 onward are served under `/api/v1/...`.
- Nouns are plural and hierarchical: `/api/v1/inventory/leases`, `/api/v1/system/health`.
- Read endpoints are `GET` and side-effect free.
- Phase 2 action endpoints are `POST /api/v1/actions/{action_id}/preview` and `POST /api/v1/actions/{action_id}/execute`; `preview` stays side-effect free and returns a mutation ledger.
- The existing unversioned MVP exports remain as **compatibility aliases** for the whole of Phase 1 so the current operator flow never breaks. They may be retired no earlier than Phase 2, and only after the replacing `v1` route ships and `../webui-local-dev.md` records the swap.
- A breaking change to a `v1` payload requires `/api/v2/...`, not an in-place edit.
- Every JSON payload carries enough provenance for an auditor to tell where the data came from — at minimum the source system and whether the inventory was complete, matching the pagination-proof habit the MVP queue export already established.
## 7. Page map
| Page | Purpose | Owning child | Evolves |
|------|---------|--------------|---------|
| `/` | Console shell, navigation, next-safe-action summary | #638 | MVP `/` (#426) |
| `/system` | System-health dashboard | #639 | new, backed by #634 |
| `/traffic` | Workflow traffic control, queues, blockers | #640 | MVP `/queue` (#429) |
| `/runtime` | Runtime and session view | #641 | MVP `/runtime` (#430) |
| `/projects`, `/projects/{id}` | Project registry and onboarding | #635 | MVP `/projects` (#427) |
| `/inventory` | Sessions, leases, locks, worktrees in one surface | #636 | MVP `/leases` (#433) + `/worktrees` (#432) |
| `/timeline` | Workflow events and conversation timeline | #637 | new |
| `/actions` | Gated action registry, preview, execution | #642, #643, #644 | MVP `/actions` (#434) |
| `/gitea` | Issue and PR linkage console | #645 | new |
| `/policy` | Guardrail visibility, then versioned editing | #646, #647 | new |
| `/notifications` | Human-attention routing | #648 | new |
| `/observability` | Sentry/GlitchTip correlation and durable issue creation | #649 | new |
| `/providers` | AI-provider connections and insights | #650 | new |
| `/analytics` | Usage, token cost, latency, workflow performance | #651 | new |
| `/audit` | Final-report validator preview and audit log | #431 foundation, extended by #633 | MVP `/audit` (#431) |
| `/prompts`, `/prompts/{id}` | Canonical prompt library | #638 | MVP `/prompts` (#428) |
| `/health` | Liveness and deployment metadata | #634 | MVP `/health` (#435) |
## 8. Component ownership for every epic child
Each #631 child maps to at least one architectural component defined above.
| Child | Capability area | Primary component | Phase |
|-------|-----------------|-------------------|-------|
| #632 | Architecture and information architecture | this ADR | 1 |
| #633 | Authorization, RBAC, secret redaction, audit and retention | route layer + redaction boundary (§5) | 1 |
| #634 | Read-only system-health API | `/api/v1/system/health` + health loader | 1 |
| #635 | Project registry API evolution | `/api/v1/projects` + `project_registry.py` | 1 |
| #636 | Session, lease, lock, worktree inventory API | `/api/v1/inventory/*` + `lease_loader.py`, `worktree_scanner.py` | 1 |
| #637 | Workflow-event and conversation timeline model | `/api/v1/events` + control-plane DB event log | 1 |
| #638 | Application shell evolution | browser UI layer + `layout.py` | 1 |
| #639 | System-health dashboard | `/system` page over #634 | 1 |
| #640 | Workflow traffic-control view | `/traffic` page over the queue loader | 1 |
| #641 | Runtime and session view | `/runtime` page over `runtime_health.py` | 1 |
| #642 | Sanctioned restart and graceful reload controls | gated action framework, restart class | 2 |
| #643 | Requests, intent preview, authorization, workflow initiation | `/api/v1/actions/*` execute path | 2 |
| #644 | Stale-runtime recovery, worktree rebinding, reconciliation controls | gated actions over filesystem/git authority | 2 |
| #645 | Gitea issue and PR linkage console | `/gitea` page over Gitea authority | 3 |
| #646 | Workflow policy and guardrail visibility | `/policy` read view over the capability map | 3 |
| #647 | Versioned policy editing, validation, simulation, approval, rollback | `/policy` write path, gated | 3 |
| #648 | Notifications and human-attention routing | notification component over the event model | 3 |
| #649 | Sentry/GlitchTip connections, correlation, durable issue creation | provider layer + #612 incident bridge | 4 |
| #650 | AI-provider connections and operational insights | provider layer | 4 |
| #651 | Model usage, token cost, latency, workflow analytics | analytics component over the event model | 4 |
Related but **outside** this epic: #667 (restart status, impact preview, and approval controls) belongs to the #655 restart-governance umbrella and must reuse the #642 action class rather than adding a second restart surface.
## 9. Phase gates
| Phase | May ship | Entry condition |
|-------|----------|-----------------|
| **1 — read-only visibility** | `GET` pages and `GET /api/v1/...` | this ADR accepted |
| **2 — controlled actions** | gated `POST` action execution | #633 authorization, RBAC, and audit model landed |
| **3 — orchestration and policy** | linkage, policy visibility, versioned policy editing | Phase 1 inventory plus the Phase 2 action framework |
| **4 — insights** | provider correlation, analytics | evidence-backed sources from Phases 13 |
Phase 1 must not open a mutation endpoint, and the read-only guard that returns `405 read-only-mvp` stays in force until the Phase 2 entry condition is met. A phase is not entered by exception; if a control is urgent, the entry condition is what gets prioritized.
## 10. Security and workflow safety
- **Fail closed** on unknown authentication, missing RBAC mapping, or ambiguous lease ownership. An unknown state renders as blocked, never as permitted.
- **Redact by default**, per §5.
- **Every privileged action** requires a resolved capability, an explicit operator confirmation, and a durable audit event naming actor, action, target, and outcome.
- **Contamination surfaces.** Session contamination — including a manually killed MCP daemon (#630) — must be shown and must block clean claims rather than being silently repaired.
- **Deployment boundary unchanged.** Loopback by default, with the existing refusal of public binds (#435). This ADR documents that target; it does not widen it.
## 11. Forbidden paths
These are rejected designs, not preferences:
1. **Raw provider incidents as work.** The allocator never receives an unclassified Sentry/GlitchTip incident; only the #612 bridge turns an observation into a Gitea issue.
2. **Browser-held tokens.** No credential, keychain identifier, or Authorization header is ever sent to the browser or embedded in a client bundle.
3. **Process-kill recovery.** The console must not expose `pkill`, process-identifier termination, or any host process kill as a recovery affordance (#630). Restart is the sanctioned, operator-owned path of #642 and the #655 umbrella.
4. **Ungated browser mutations.** No review, approval, merge, close, or comment may originate from the browser without passing an MCP capability gate.
5. **Policy invented in the console.** The console projects policy from the capability map and canonical workflows; it never encodes a second copy.
6. **Recreating MVP scope.** Re-implementing a #426#436 surface without an explicit evolve-or-extend statement is out of bounds.
## 12. Approval checklist (readable without chat history)
A controller can accept or reject this ADR against these six points alone:
1. Layers and their owners are defined (§2) and each authority is named (§4).
2. The redaction boundary and the two invariants are stated (§5).
3. API versioning is decided, including what happens to the existing unversioned routes (§6).
4. A page map exists and names an owning child for every page (§7).
5. Every #631 child maps to at least one component and one phase (§8).
6. Phase gates and forbidden paths are explicit (§9, §11).
## 13. Open questions and follow-ups
Unresolved choices are recorded here rather than settled by implication. Each needs its own durable issue before the phase that depends on it:
- **Authentication mechanism.** Whether the console authenticates via an access proxy (Cloudflare Access or equivalent) or an application-level session is deferred to #633. This ADR requires only that it fail closed.
- **Event model substrate.** Whether the #637 timeline reads the control-plane event log directly or through a projection is deferred to #637.
- **CI path filter coverage.** `webui/ci_paths.py` triggers the web UI suite on `webui/`, `tests/test_webui_*`, and `docs/webui*`. This ADR lives under `docs/architecture/`, so editing it alone does not trigger that gate; the accompanying `tests/test_webui_architecture_docs.py` does run in the full suite. Widening the filter is a small follow-up, deliberately not bundled into a documentation-only change.
- **Retention.** Audit-event retention duration is owned by #633.
## 14. Acceptance
Accepting this ADR means:
- Phase 1 children may proceed against the layers, page map, and API rules above.
- Phase 2 children may not open a write path until #633 lands.
- Any deviation is recorded as an amendment to this file with its own issue reference, not as an undocumented divergence in code.
+6
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ Optional environment variables:
See [webui-deployment.md](webui-deployment.md) for internal-only serving, See [webui-deployment.md](webui-deployment.md) for internal-only serving,
Cloudflare Access/WARP/VPN guidance, and unsafe bind overrides (#435). Cloudflare Access/WARP/VPN guidance, and unsafe bind overrides (#435).
See
[architecture/webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md](architecture/webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md)
for the console architecture: layer and authority boundaries, the redaction
boundary, `/api/v1/...` versioning, the target page map, and the phase gates
that govern when a write path may open (#632, epic #631).
## Routes (MVP) ## Routes (MVP)
| Path | Description | | Path | Description |
+4 -59
View File
@@ -12536,39 +12536,10 @@ def _try_auto_switch_for_operation(op: str, host: str | None = None) -> bool:
return False return False
def _git_default_remote_name(root: str) -> str:
"""First configured git remote name for *root*, defaulting to 'origin'.
Used to resolve the live remote master target for parity (#610). Best
effort: any failure falls back to 'origin' so callers never raise.
"""
try:
res = subprocess.run(
["git", "-C", root, "remote"],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
except Exception:
return "origin"
if res.returncode != 0:
return "origin"
names = [n.strip() for n in (res.stdout or "").splitlines() if n.strip()]
return names[0] if names else "origin"
def _current_master_parity() -> dict: def _current_master_parity() -> dict:
"""Assess this process's code against local and live remote master (#420/#610). """Assess this process's code against the on-disk master HEAD (#420)."""
Compares the daemon's startup commit, the on-disk checkout HEAD, and the
live remote master target. A stale daemon relative to live master fails
closed for mutations even when the local checkout HEAD still matches the
startup commit. The live-remote read is best effort: an unresolved live
head leaves read-only diagnostics unblocked but is never mutation-safe.
"""
current_head = master_parity_gate.read_git_head(PROJECT_ROOT) current_head = master_parity_gate.read_git_head(PROJECT_ROOT)
live_head = master_parity_gate.read_remote_master_head( return master_parity_gate.assess_master_parity(_STARTUP_PARITY, current_head)
PROJECT_ROOT, remote=_git_default_remote_name(PROJECT_ROOT))
return master_parity_gate.assess_master_parity(
_STARTUP_PARITY, current_head, live_remote_head=live_head)
def _current_runtime_mode_report(refresh: bool = False) -> dict: def _current_runtime_mode_report(refresh: bool = False) -> dict:
@@ -16509,29 +16480,10 @@ def gitea_get_runtime_context(
"restart_required": parity["restart_required"], "restart_required": parity["restart_required"],
"startup_head": parity["startup_head"], "startup_head": parity["startup_head"],
"current_head": parity["current_head"], "current_head": parity["current_head"],
# #610 distinguished mutation-safety signals:
"daemon_start_head": parity["daemon_start_head"],
"local_head": parity["local_head"],
"live_remote_head": parity["live_remote_head"],
"live_known": parity["live_known"],
"live_stale": parity["live_stale"],
"mutation_safe": parity["mutation_safe"],
"summary": master_parity_gate.format_parity(parity), "summary": master_parity_gate.format_parity(parity),
"mutation_gate_enforced": not master_parity_gate.gate_disabled(), "mutation_gate_enforced": not master_parity_gate.gate_disabled(),
# #610: the capability resolver is authoritative for mutation safety;
# local parity alone must never authorize a mutation.
"resolver_authoritative_for_mutation_safety": True,
} }
if parity["restart_required"] and not master_parity_gate.gate_disabled(): if parity["stale"] and not master_parity_gate.gate_disabled():
if parity["live_stale"]:
safe_next_action = (
"Daemon is stale relative to LIVE remote master "
f"(started {parity['startup_head'][:12] if parity['startup_head'] else 'unknown'}, "
f"live master {parity['live_remote_head'][:12] if parity['live_remote_head'] else 'unknown'}); "
"restart/reconnect the Gitea MCP server before mutating. The "
"capability resolver is authoritative for mutation safety."
)
else:
safe_next_action = ( safe_next_action = (
"Server code is stale relative to master; restart the Gitea MCP " "Server code is stale relative to master; restart the Gitea MCP "
"server to load current capability gates before mutating. " "server to load current capability gates before mutating. "
@@ -16585,13 +16537,6 @@ def gitea_assess_master_parity(
"determinable": parity["determinable"], "determinable": parity["determinable"],
"startup_head": parity["startup_head"], "startup_head": parity["startup_head"],
"current_head": parity["current_head"], "current_head": parity["current_head"],
# #610 distinguished mutation-safety signals:
"daemon_start_head": parity["daemon_start_head"],
"local_head": parity["local_head"],
"live_remote_head": parity["live_remote_head"],
"live_known": parity["live_known"],
"live_stale": parity["live_stale"],
"mutation_safe": parity["mutation_safe"],
"mutation_gate_enforced": enforced, "mutation_gate_enforced": enforced,
"summary": master_parity_gate.format_parity(parity), "summary": master_parity_gate.format_parity(parity),
"reasons": parity["reasons"], "reasons": parity["reasons"],
@@ -16608,7 +16553,7 @@ def gitea_assess_master_parity(
source=canonical_source, source=canonical_source,
), ),
} }
if parity["restart_required"] and enforced: if parity["stale"] and enforced:
out["report"] = master_parity_gate.parity_report(parity) out["report"] = master_parity_gate.parity_report(parity)
return out return out
+17 -213
View File
@@ -24,50 +24,12 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import os import os
import subprocess import subprocess
import time
# Live-remote head cache: the parity gate runs on every mutation and every
# runtime-context read, so the ``git ls-remote`` result is cached briefly to
# avoid a network round-trip per call (#610). Keyed by (root, remote, branch).
_REMOTE_HEAD_CACHE: dict[tuple[str, str, str], tuple[float, str | None]] = {}
_REMOTE_HEAD_TTL = 60.0
# When True, ``read_remote_master_head`` never performs ``git ls-remote`` unless
# ``GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD`` is set. Conftest enables this suite-wide so
# feature worktrees (whose HEAD differs from live master) cannot flip legacy
# runtime-context assertions to live_stale, and so unit tests never depend on
# a live network (PR #788 F1/F2 / issue #610). Module-level (not env-only) so
# ``patch.dict(os.environ, …, clear=True)`` cannot re-enable the probe.
_HERMETIC_TEST_MODE: bool = False
def _clear_remote_head_cache() -> None:
"""Reset the live-remote head cache (test isolation / forced refresh)."""
_REMOTE_HEAD_CACHE.clear()
def set_hermetic_test_mode(enabled: bool) -> None:
"""Enable or disable suite-wide hermetic live-remote reads (tests only)."""
global _HERMETIC_TEST_MODE
_HERMETIC_TEST_MODE = bool(enabled)
_clear_remote_head_cache()
def hermetic_test_mode() -> bool:
"""Return whether hermetic live-remote reads are active."""
return bool(_HERMETIC_TEST_MODE)
# Environment escape hatches (ops + tests): # Environment escape hatches (ops + tests):
# GITEA_MCP_DISABLE_PARITY_GATE -> disable enforcement entirely (fail open). # GITEA_MCP_DISABLE_PARITY_GATE -> disable enforcement entirely (fail open).
# GITEA_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD -> force the "current" HEAD read, for tests. # GITEA_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD -> force the "current" HEAD read, for tests.
ENV_DISABLE = "GITEA_MCP_DISABLE_PARITY_GATE" ENV_DISABLE = "GITEA_MCP_DISABLE_PARITY_GATE"
ENV_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD = "GITEA_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD" ENV_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD = "GITEA_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD"
# GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD -> force the live remote master read, for tests.
ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD = "GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD"
# GITEA_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE -> opt a single test into a real ls-remote
# even when hermetic mode is on (rare; prefer ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD).
ENV_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE = "GITEA_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE"
def read_git_head(root: str) -> str | None: def read_git_head(root: str) -> str | None:
@@ -96,75 +58,6 @@ def read_git_head(root: str) -> str | None:
return (res.stdout or "").strip() or None return (res.stdout or "").strip() or None
def read_remote_master_head(
root: str,
remote: str = "origin",
branch: str = "master",
ttl: float = _REMOTE_HEAD_TTL,
) -> str | None:
"""Return the live remote ``branch`` commit SHA, or ``None`` (#610).
Resolves the *live* target commit via ``git ls-remote`` so parity can tell
a daemon that is behind the live remote master apart from one whose local
checkout simply hasn't been pulled. ``None`` means the live head could not
be resolved (offline, no such remote, git unavailable, error) -- callers
must treat unknown live state as *not mutation-safe* while never blocking
read-only diagnostics. A ``GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD`` override takes
precedence so the wiring can be exercised deterministically and offline.
The result is cached for *ttl* seconds per (root, remote, branch) so the
gate does not run a network probe on every mutation/read (``ttl=0`` forces
a live probe). Both hits and ``None`` misses are cached to bound offline
latency; the env override bypasses the cache and the subprocess entirely.
Under suite hermetic mode (``set_hermetic_test_mode(True)``, set by
conftest) a missing override returns ``None`` without network I/O so
feature-worktree test runs cannot observe live_stale against real master
(PR #788 F1) and unit tests stay offline (F2). Opt out with an explicit
``GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD`` pin or ``GITEA_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE``.
"""
forced = os.environ.get(ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD)
if forced is not None:
return forced.strip() or None
if _HERMETIC_TEST_MODE and not (
os.environ.get(ENV_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE) or ""
).strip():
# Hermetic default: live head unknown. live_stale stays False;
# mutation_safe is False when live is unknown (documented #610 note).
return None
# Defense in depth: even without the module flag, never probe while pytest
# is running unless the test opted into a real probe or set an override.
if (os.environ.get("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST") or "").strip() and not (
os.environ.get(ENV_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE) or ""
).strip():
return None
if not root:
return None
key = (root, remote, branch)
now = time.monotonic()
if ttl > 0:
cached = _REMOTE_HEAD_CACHE.get(key)
if cached is not None and (now - cached[0]) < ttl:
return cached[1]
sha: str | None = None
try:
res = subprocess.run(
["git", "-C", root, "ls-remote", remote, f"refs/heads/{branch}"],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
check=False,
timeout=5,
)
if res.returncode == 0:
lines = (res.stdout or "").strip().splitlines()
if lines:
sha = lines[0].split("\t", 1)[0].split()[0].strip() or None
except Exception:
sha = None
_REMOTE_HEAD_CACHE[key] = (now, sha)
return sha
def capture_startup_parity(root: str, head: str | None = None) -> dict: def capture_startup_parity(root: str, head: str | None = None) -> dict:
"""Capture the process source-tree baseline once at server startup. """Capture the process source-tree baseline once at server startup.
@@ -179,38 +72,18 @@ def _short(sha: str | None) -> str:
return sha[:12] if sha else "unknown" return sha[:12] if sha else "unknown"
def assess_master_parity( def assess_master_parity(startup: dict | None, current_head: str | None) -> dict:
startup: dict | None,
current_head: str | None,
live_remote_head: str | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Compare the startup baseline against the current on-disk ``HEAD``. """Compare the startup baseline against the current on-disk ``HEAD``.
Pure: all HEADs are supplied by the caller. Returns a structured result: Pure: both HEADs are supplied by the caller. Returns a structured result:
- ``in_parity`` -- server code matches the on-disk master (or parity - ``in_parity`` -- server code matches the on-disk master (or parity
could not be determined, which is not treated as stale). could not be determined, which is not treated as stale).
- ``stale`` -- the on-disk master has definitively advanced past the - ``stale`` -- the on-disk master has definitively advanced past the
running process. running process.
- ``restart_required`` -- ``stale`` or ``live_stale``; the recovery action. - ``restart_required`` -- alias of ``stale``; the recovery action.
- ``determinable`` -- whether both local HEADs were known well enough to - ``determinable`` -- whether both HEADs were known well enough to compare.
compare.
- ``startup_head`` / ``current_head`` / ``reasons``. - ``startup_head`` / ``current_head`` / ``reasons``.
#610 adds live-remote awareness so a daemon that is stale relative to the
*live* remote master cannot report a mutation-safe result even when the
local checkout HEAD still matches the daemon's startup commit:
- ``daemon_start_head`` -- the commit the running process started at
(alias of ``startup_head``, named for clarity in reports).
- ``local_head`` -- the on-disk checkout HEAD (alias of ``current_head``).
- ``live_remote_head`` -- the live remote target commit, or ``None`` when it
could not be fetched.
- ``live_known`` -- whether the live remote target was resolved.
- ``live_stale`` -- the live remote master has advanced past the running
process (daemon is behind live master) even if local parity is green.
- ``mutation_safe`` -- the daemon code, local checkout, and live remote
target all agree; the only state in which a mutation may rely on parity.
""" """
startup_head = (startup or {}).get("startup_head") startup_head = (startup or {}).get("startup_head")
reasons: list[str] = [] reasons: list[str] = []
@@ -218,56 +91,32 @@ def assess_master_parity(
if startup_head is None: if startup_head is None:
reasons.append( reasons.append(
"startup commit was not captured; code parity cannot be enforced") "startup commit was not captured; code parity cannot be enforced")
return _result(True, False, False, startup_head, current_head, return _result(True, False, False, startup_head, current_head, reasons)
live_remote_head, False, reasons)
if current_head is None: if current_head is None:
reasons.append( reasons.append(
"current workspace HEAD could not be read; code parity cannot be " "current workspace HEAD could not be read; code parity cannot be "
"enforced") "enforced")
return _result(True, False, False, startup_head, current_head, return _result(True, False, False, startup_head, current_head, reasons)
live_remote_head, False, reasons)
if startup_head == current_head:
return _result(True, False, True, startup_head, current_head, reasons)
local_in_parity = startup_head == current_head
local_stale = not local_in_parity
if local_stale:
reasons.append( reasons.append(
f"MCP server started at commit {_short(startup_head)} but the " f"MCP server started at commit {_short(startup_head)} but the workspace "
f"workspace master is now {_short(current_head)}; restart the " f"master is now {_short(current_head)}; restart the server to load the "
f"server to load the current capability gates") f"current capability gates")
return _result(False, True, True, startup_head, current_head, reasons)
live_known = live_remote_head is not None
live_stale = live_known and live_remote_head != startup_head
if live_stale:
reasons.append(
f"live remote master is {_short(live_remote_head)} but the MCP "
f"server started at {_short(startup_head)}; the daemon is stale "
f"relative to live master -- restart/reconnect before mutating")
return _result(
local_in_parity, local_stale, True, startup_head, current_head,
live_remote_head, live_stale, reasons)
def _result(in_parity, stale, determinable, startup_head, current_head, def _result(in_parity, stale, determinable, startup_head, current_head, reasons):
live_remote_head, live_stale, reasons):
live_known = live_remote_head is not None
mutation_safe = (
determinable and in_parity and live_known and not live_stale)
return { return {
"in_parity": in_parity, "in_parity": in_parity,
"stale": stale, "stale": stale,
"restart_required": stale or live_stale, "restart_required": stale,
"determinable": determinable, "determinable": determinable,
"startup_head": startup_head, "startup_head": startup_head,
"current_head": current_head, "current_head": current_head,
# #610 distinguished signals:
"daemon_start_head": startup_head,
"local_head": current_head,
"live_remote_head": live_remote_head,
"live_known": live_known,
"live_stale": live_stale,
"mutation_safe": mutation_safe,
"reasons": list(reasons), "reasons": list(reasons),
} }
@@ -281,13 +130,11 @@ def parity_block_reasons(assessment: dict) -> list[str]:
"""Block reasons for a mutation gate (empty when the mutation may proceed). """Block reasons for a mutation gate (empty when the mutation may proceed).
A disabled gate or an in-parity / non-determinable assessment yields no A disabled gate or an in-parity / non-determinable assessment yields no
reasons. A definitively stale server blocks, and (#610) a daemon that is reasons; only a definitively stale server blocks.
stale relative to the *live* remote master blocks even when the local
checkout HEAD still matches the daemon's startup commit.
""" """
if gate_disabled(): if gate_disabled():
return [] return []
if assessment.get("stale") or assessment.get("live_stale"): if assessment.get("stale"):
return list(assessment.get("reasons") or return list(assessment.get("reasons") or
["server code is stale relative to master (fail closed)"]) ["server code is stale relative to master (fail closed)"])
return [] return []
@@ -300,10 +147,6 @@ def parity_report(assessment: dict) -> dict:
"restart_required": True, "restart_required": True,
"startup_head": assessment.get("startup_head"), "startup_head": assessment.get("startup_head"),
"current_head": assessment.get("current_head"), "current_head": assessment.get("current_head"),
# #610: name the live remote target so the report distinguishes a
# local-code stale from a daemon-behind-live-master stale.
"live_remote_head": assessment.get("live_remote_head"),
"live_stale": bool(assessment.get("live_stale")),
"reasons": list(assessment.get("reasons") or []), "reasons": list(assessment.get("reasons") or []),
"recovery": [ "recovery": [
"The running MCP server is executing code older than the current " "The running MCP server is executing code older than the current "
@@ -314,45 +157,6 @@ def parity_report(assessment: dict) -> dict:
} }
def parity_resolver_disagreement(
assessment: dict,
resolver_restart_required: bool,
) -> dict | None:
"""Typed blocker when the resolver requires restart but parity looks green.
The capability resolver (``gitea_resolve_task_capability``) detects stale
runtime authoritatively for mutation safety (#610). When it requires a
restart, local-only parity must never override it: this returns a typed,
fail-closed blocker that names the resolver as authoritative. Returns
``None`` when the resolver does not require a restart.
"""
if not resolver_restart_required:
return None
parity_optimistic = bool(assessment.get("in_parity")) and not (
assessment.get("stale") or assessment.get("live_stale"))
return {
"kind": "parity_resolver_disagreement",
"restart_required": True,
"resolver_authoritative": True,
"parity_optimistic": parity_optimistic,
"daemon_start_head": assessment.get("daemon_start_head"),
"local_head": assessment.get("local_head"),
"live_remote_head": assessment.get("live_remote_head"),
"reasons": [
"The capability resolver requires a restart/reconnect (stale "
"runtime) but master-parity reported local code as in-parity. "
"The resolver is authoritative for mutation safety; do not mutate "
"on local parity alone. Restart/reconnect the Gitea MCP server "
"and re-verify before mutating.",
],
"recovery": [
"Trust the resolver: treat this session as stale.",
"Restart or /mcp reconnect the Gitea MCP namespace so it reloads "
"current master and live target state, then re-run preflight.",
],
}
def format_parity(assessment: dict) -> str: def format_parity(assessment: dict) -> str:
"""One-line human summary for logs / runtime context.""" """One-line human summary for logs / runtime context."""
if assessment.get("stale"): if assessment.get("stale"):
-29
View File
@@ -167,35 +167,6 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
import pytest import pytest
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _hermetic_live_remote_master_head():
"""#610 / PR #788 F1/F2: keep live-remote parity reads offline in tests.
``read_remote_master_head`` would otherwise ``git ls-remote`` whenever
``GITEA_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD`` is unset. Feature worktrees under
``branches/`` always differ from live master, so legacy suites that assert
runtime-context ``safe_next_action`` flip to live_stale. Module-level
hermetic mode survives ``patch.dict(os.environ, …, clear=True)``.
Tests that exercise the real probe path call
``master_parity_gate.set_hermetic_test_mode(False)`` and/or set
``GITEA_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE``.
"""
try:
import master_parity_gate as _mpg
_mpg.set_hermetic_test_mode(True)
except Exception:
_mpg = None
try:
yield
finally:
if _mpg is not None:
try:
_mpg.set_hermetic_test_mode(False)
except Exception:
pass
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True) @pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _deterministic_workspace_remotes(): def _deterministic_workspace_remotes():
try: try:
-269
View File
@@ -78,95 +78,6 @@ class TestBlockReasonsAndReport(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertTrue(report["recovery"]) self.assertTrue(report["recovery"])
class TestLiveRemoteParity(unittest.TestCase):
"""#610: parity must account for the live remote master, not just local.
The daemon can be stale relative to the live remote target while the local
checkout HEAD still matches the daemon's startup commit, so local parity
reports green even though a mutation would run against outdated code.
"""
SHA_C = "c" * 40
def test_distinguishes_three_shas(self):
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=SHA_B)
self.assertEqual(res["daemon_start_head"], SHA_A)
self.assertEqual(res["local_head"], SHA_A)
self.assertEqual(res["live_remote_head"], SHA_B)
def test_mutation_safe_only_when_all_three_match(self):
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=SHA_A)
self.assertTrue(res["mutation_safe"])
self.assertTrue(res["live_known"])
self.assertFalse(res["live_stale"])
def test_live_stale_when_remote_advanced_past_daemon(self):
# Local checkout still matches the daemon start (local parity green),
# but the live remote master has advanced -> daemon is live-stale.
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=SHA_B)
self.assertTrue(res["in_parity"]) # local parity still green
self.assertTrue(res["live_stale"])
self.assertFalse(res["mutation_safe"])
self.assertTrue(any("live" in r.lower() for r in res["reasons"]))
def test_live_unknown_is_not_mutation_safe_but_not_stale(self):
# Non-goal: unfetchable live remote must not be treated as stale for
# read-only, but a mutation-safe claim fails closed.
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=None)
self.assertFalse(res["live_known"])
self.assertFalse(res["mutation_safe"])
self.assertFalse(res["live_stale"])
self.assertTrue(res["in_parity"])
def test_default_live_remote_preserves_legacy_shape(self):
# Callers that do not supply a live head keep the pre-#610 behavior:
# in-parity, not live-stale, no live-derived block.
res = mp.assess_master_parity({"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A)
self.assertFalse(res["live_stale"])
self.assertEqual(mp.parity_block_reasons(res), [])
class TestLiveStaleBlockAndReport(unittest.TestCase):
"""#610: live-staleness must block mutations and surface a typed blocker."""
def test_live_stale_produces_block_reasons(self):
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=SHA_B)
self.assertTrue(mp.parity_block_reasons(res))
def test_disable_env_suppresses_live_stale_block(self):
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=SHA_B)
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_DISABLE: "1"}):
self.assertEqual(mp.parity_block_reasons(res), [])
def test_resolver_disagreement_returns_typed_blocker(self):
# Parity says local-green, resolver says restart required -> disagreement
# is a typed, fail-closed blocker naming the resolver as authoritative.
res = mp.assess_master_parity({"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A)
blocker = mp.parity_resolver_disagreement(res, resolver_restart_required=True)
self.assertIsNotNone(blocker)
self.assertEqual(blocker["kind"], "parity_resolver_disagreement")
self.assertTrue(blocker["restart_required"])
self.assertTrue(blocker["resolver_authoritative"])
def test_no_disagreement_when_resolver_agrees(self):
res = mp.assess_master_parity({"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A)
self.assertIsNone(
mp.parity_resolver_disagreement(res, resolver_restart_required=False))
def test_live_stale_report_names_live_remote(self):
res = mp.assess_master_parity(
{"startup_head": SHA_A}, SHA_A, live_remote_head=SHA_B)
report = mp.parity_report(res)
self.assertEqual(report["live_remote_head"], SHA_B)
self.assertTrue(report["restart_required"])
class TestReadGitHead(unittest.TestCase): class TestReadGitHead(unittest.TestCase):
def test_test_override_takes_precedence(self): def test_test_override_takes_precedence(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD: SHA_B}): with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD: SHA_B}):
@@ -184,149 +95,6 @@ class TestReadGitHead(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIsNone(mp.read_git_head("")) self.assertIsNone(mp.read_git_head(""))
class TestReadRemoteMasterHead(unittest.TestCase):
"""#610: live remote master head reader (env-overridable, fails to None)."""
def test_test_override_takes_precedence(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_B}):
self.assertEqual(mp.read_remote_master_head("/nonexistent"), SHA_B)
def test_blank_override_is_none(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: " "}):
self.assertIsNone(mp.read_remote_master_head("/nonexistent"))
def test_unfetchable_remote_is_none(self):
# No override; a bogus root/remote must fail closed to None, never raise.
env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items()
if k != mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD}
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
self.assertIsNone(
mp.read_remote_master_head("/nonexistent", remote="nope"))
class TestRemoteHeadCache(unittest.TestCase):
"""#610: live remote reads are cached with a TTL to stay off the network.
The parity gate runs on every mutation and every runtime-context read, so an
unbounded ``git ls-remote`` per call would be a latency/flakiness regression.
"""
def setUp(self):
# These cases intentionally exercise the subprocess/cache path, so they
# opt out of suite-wide hermetic mode (PR #788 F1).
self._saved_hermetic = mp.hermetic_test_mode()
mp.set_hermetic_test_mode(False)
mp._clear_remote_head_cache()
env = {
k: v for k, v in os.environ.items()
if k not in (mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD,
mp.ENV_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE,
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST")
}
# Allow the probe path under hermetic defenses while still mocking
# subprocess so no real network call runs.
env[mp.ENV_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE] = "1"
self._env = patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True)
self._env.start()
self.addCleanup(self._env.stop)
self.addCleanup(mp._clear_remote_head_cache)
self.addCleanup(
lambda: mp.set_hermetic_test_mode(self._saved_hermetic)
)
def _fake_run(self, sha):
class _R:
returncode = 0
stdout = f"{sha}\trefs/heads/master\n"
calls = {"n": 0}
def run(*args, **kwargs):
calls["n"] += 1
return _R()
return run, calls
def test_second_call_within_ttl_uses_cache(self):
run, calls = self._fake_run(SHA_B)
with patch.object(mp.subprocess, "run", run):
a = mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo", remote="prgs", ttl=100)
b = mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo", remote="prgs", ttl=100)
self.assertEqual(a, SHA_B)
self.assertEqual(b, SHA_B)
self.assertEqual(calls["n"], 1)
def test_zero_ttl_bypasses_cache(self):
run, calls = self._fake_run(SHA_B)
with patch.object(mp.subprocess, "run", run):
mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo", remote="prgs", ttl=0)
mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo", remote="prgs", ttl=0)
self.assertEqual(calls["n"], 2)
def test_env_override_never_touches_subprocess(self):
run, calls = self._fake_run(SHA_B)
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_A}):
with patch.object(mp.subprocess, "run", run):
self.assertEqual(
mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo", remote="prgs"), SHA_A)
self.assertEqual(calls["n"], 0)
class TestHermeticLiveRemoteReads(unittest.TestCase):
"""#610 / PR #788 F1/F2: suite hermetic mode never hits the network."""
def setUp(self):
self._saved = mp.hermetic_test_mode()
mp.set_hermetic_test_mode(True)
mp._clear_remote_head_cache()
self.addCleanup(lambda: mp.set_hermetic_test_mode(self._saved))
self.addCleanup(mp._clear_remote_head_cache)
def test_hermetic_mode_returns_none_without_subprocess(self):
run_calls = {"n": 0}
def boom(*args, **kwargs):
run_calls["n"] += 1
raise AssertionError("ls-remote must not run under hermetic mode")
env = {
k: v for k, v in os.environ.items()
if k not in (mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD,
mp.ENV_TEST_ALLOW_LIVE_REMOTE_PROBE)
}
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
with patch.object(mp.subprocess, "run", boom):
self.assertIsNone(
mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo", remote="prgs")
)
self.assertEqual(run_calls["n"], 0)
def test_hermetic_mode_survives_clear_true_env(self):
"""Module flag, not env pin: clear=True cannot re-enable the probe."""
run_calls = {"n": 0}
def boom(*args, **kwargs):
run_calls["n"] += 1
raise AssertionError("ls-remote must not run after clear=True")
with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
with patch.object(mp.subprocess, "run", boom):
self.assertIsNone(mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo"))
self.assertEqual(run_calls["n"], 0)
def test_explicit_override_still_wins_under_hermetic(self):
run_calls = {"n": 0}
def boom(*args, **kwargs):
run_calls["n"] += 1
raise AssertionError("override must bypass subprocess")
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_B}):
with patch.object(mp.subprocess, "run", boom):
self.assertEqual(
mp.read_remote_master_head("/repo"), SHA_B
)
self.assertEqual(run_calls["n"], 0)
class TestServerWiring(unittest.TestCase): class TestServerWiring(unittest.TestCase):
"""Integration with the gate choke point in the server namespace.""" """Integration with the gate choke point in the server namespace."""
@@ -337,13 +105,6 @@ class TestServerWiring(unittest.TestCase):
self._saved = self.srv._STARTUP_PARITY self._saved = self.srv._STARTUP_PARITY
self.srv._STARTUP_PARITY = {"root": self.srv.PROJECT_ROOT, self.srv._STARTUP_PARITY = {"root": self.srv.PROJECT_ROOT,
"startup_head": SHA_A} "startup_head": SHA_A}
# Keep the live-remote read hermetic (no real ls-remote network call):
# default the live master to the daemon start so parity is fully green
# unless a test overrides the live head explicitly (#610).
self._live_patch = patch.dict(
os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_A})
self._live_patch.start()
self.addCleanup(self._live_patch.stop)
def tearDown(self): def tearDown(self):
self.srv._STARTUP_PARITY = self._saved self.srv._STARTUP_PARITY = self._saved
@@ -386,36 +147,6 @@ class TestServerWiring(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertTrue(out["in_parity"]) self.assertTrue(out["in_parity"])
self.assertNotIn("report", out) self.assertNotIn("report", out)
# --- #610: live-remote wiring -------------------------------------------
def test_live_stale_blocks_mutation_though_local_green(self):
# Local checkout matches the daemon start (local parity green) but the
# live remote master has advanced -> mutations must fail closed.
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD: SHA_A,
mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_B}):
self.assertEqual(self.srv._master_parity_block("gitea.read"), [])
self.assertTrue(
self.srv._master_parity_block("gitea.pr.create"))
def test_assess_tool_exposes_three_distinct_shas(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD: SHA_A,
mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_B}):
out = self.srv.gitea_assess_master_parity(remote="prgs")
self.assertEqual(out["daemon_start_head"], SHA_A)
self.assertEqual(out["local_head"], SHA_A)
self.assertEqual(out["live_remote_head"], SHA_B)
self.assertTrue(out["live_stale"])
self.assertFalse(out["mutation_safe"])
self.assertIn("report", out)
def test_assess_tool_mutation_safe_when_all_three_match(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, {mp.ENV_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD: SHA_A,
mp.ENV_TEST_LIVE_REMOTE_HEAD: SHA_A}):
out = self.srv.gitea_assess_master_parity(remote="prgs")
self.assertTrue(out["mutation_safe"])
self.assertFalse(out["live_stale"])
self.assertNotIn("report", out)
if __name__ == "__main__": if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main() unittest.main()
+149
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
"""Documentation acceptance for the web console architecture ADR (#632 / epic #631).
Enforces the acceptance criteria of issue #632:
* AC1 — the ADR exists and covers layers, authority, phases, API versioning,
and a page map.
* AC2 — every #631 child (#632#651) maps to at least one architectural
component.
* AC3 — the closed MVP (#425#436) is stated as foundation, not recreated.
* AC4 — forbidden paths are explicit: raw provider incidents as work,
browser-held tokens, process-kill recovery.
* AC5 — a controller can approve the document without reading chat history.
Plus the linkage requirement: ``docs/webui-local-dev.md`` cross-links the ADR.
"""
from pathlib import Path
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
ADR = (
REPO_ROOT
/ "docs"
/ "architecture"
/ "webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md"
)
ADR_BASENAME = "webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md"
LOCAL_DEV = REPO_ROOT / "docs" / "webui-local-dev.md"
# Epic #631 children, phases 1-4 (twenty capability areas).
EPIC_CHILDREN = tuple(f"#{number}" for number in range(632, 652))
def _read(path: Path) -> str:
assert path.is_file(), f"missing {path.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)}"
return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
def test_ac1_adr_exists_with_required_sections():
text = _read(ADR)
lower = text.lower()
assert text.lstrip().startswith("#"), "ADR lacks a title"
assert "#631" in text and "#632" in text
for heading in (
"## 2. Decision summary",
"## 4. Authority boundaries",
"## 5. Request flow and the redaction boundary",
"## 6. API naming and versioning",
"## 7. Page map",
"## 8. Component ownership",
"## 9. Phase gates",
"## 11. Forbidden paths",
):
assert heading in text, f"ADR must contain section {heading!r}"
assert "browser ui" in lower and "domain loader" in lower
assert "control-plane db" in lower and "capability gate" in lower
def test_ac1_api_versioning_is_decided_including_legacy_routes():
text = _read(ADR)
assert "/api/v1/" in text, "ADR must decide the versioned API prefix"
assert "/api/v2/" in text, "ADR must state how breaking changes are handled"
lower = text.lower()
assert "compatibility alias" in lower, (
"ADR must say what happens to the existing unversioned MVP exports"
)
def test_ac1_page_map_covers_mvp_routes():
text = _read(ADR)
for route in ("`/`", "`/health`", "`/projects`", "`/prompts`", "`/runtime`",
"`/audit`", "`/actions`"):
assert route in text, f"page map must account for MVP route {route}"
def test_ac2_every_epic_child_maps_to_a_component():
text = _read(ADR)
ownership = text.split("## 8. Component ownership", 1)[-1].split("## 9.", 1)[0]
missing = [child for child in EPIC_CHILDREN if child not in ownership]
assert not missing, (
f"epic #631 children without an architectural component: {missing}"
)
def test_ac2_every_child_row_declares_a_phase():
text = _read(ADR)
ownership = text.split("## 8. Component ownership", 1)[-1].split("## 9.", 1)[0]
for child in EPIC_CHILDREN:
row = next(
(line for line in ownership.splitlines() if line.startswith(f"| {child} ")),
None,
)
assert row is not None, f"no ownership row for {child}"
assert row.rstrip().endswith(("| 1 |", "| 2 |", "| 3 |", "| 4 |")), (
f"ownership row for {child} must end with its phase: {row!r}"
)
def test_ac3_mvp_is_foundation_not_recreated():
text = _read(ADR)
assert "#425" in text and "#436" in text
lower = text.lower()
assert "do not recreate" in lower or "recreating mvp scope" in lower
assert "retained and evolved" in lower
def test_ac4_forbidden_paths_are_explicit():
text = _read(ADR)
forbidden = text.split("## 11. Forbidden paths", 1)[-1].split("## 12.", 1)[0]
lower = forbidden.lower()
assert "raw provider incidents" in lower and "#612" in forbidden
assert "browser-held tokens" in lower
assert "process-kill recovery" in lower and "#630" in forbidden
assert "ungated browser mutations" in lower
def test_ac5_approval_checklist_is_self_contained():
text = _read(ADR)
assert "## 12. Approval checklist" in text
checklist = text.split("## 12. Approval checklist", 1)[-1].split("## 13.", 1)[0]
for marker in ("1.", "2.", "3.", "4.", "5.", "6."):
assert marker in checklist, f"approval checklist missing item {marker}"
def test_adr_states_the_two_boundary_invariants():
text = _read(ADR)
lower = text.lower()
assert "no secrets to the browser" in lower
assert "no ungated mutations" in lower
def test_open_questions_are_recorded_not_implied():
text = _read(ADR)
assert "## 13. Open questions and follow-ups" in text
section = text.split("## 13. Open questions and follow-ups", 1)[-1]
assert "#633" in section, "deferred authorization work must name its issue"
def test_local_dev_doc_cross_links_the_adr():
text = _read(LOCAL_DEV)
assert ADR_BASENAME in text, (
"docs/webui-local-dev.md must cross-link the console architecture ADR "
"(issue #632 scope)"
)
def test_docs_do_not_embed_secrets():
for path in (ADR, LOCAL_DEV):
text = _read(path)
for marker in ("ghp_", "BEGIN PRIVATE KEY", "Authorization: Bearer"):
assert marker not in text, f"{path.name} contains {marker!r}"
-458
View File
@@ -1,458 +0,0 @@
"""Tests for the worker registry and configuration schema (#798, epic #797)."""
import json
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
from webui.worker_registry import (
ALLOWED_ROLES,
SCHEMA_VERSION,
RegistryValidationError,
WorkerRegistry,
default_registry_path,
find_provider,
find_worker,
history_dir,
list_revisions,
load_registry,
registry_to_dict,
registry_to_document,
rollback_to_revision,
save_registry,
validate_payload,
worker_to_dict,
workers_for_provider,
)
_EXPECTED_PROVIDER_IDS = ("claude", "grok", "codex", "agy", "kimi-k")
def _provider(provider_id: str = "claude", **overrides) -> dict:
payload = {
"id": provider_id,
"display_name": "Claude",
"vendor": "Anthropic",
"executable": "claude",
"available": True,
"models": ["claude-opus-4-8"],
"notes": "",
}
payload.update(overrides)
return payload
def _worker(worker_id: str = "claude-author", **overrides) -> dict:
payload = {
"id": worker_id,
"display_name": "Claude author",
"provider": "claude",
"model": "claude-opus-4-8",
"project": "gitea-tools",
"role": "author",
"namespace": "gitea-author",
"profile": "prgs-author",
"workflow": "skills/llm-project-workflow/workflows/work-issue.md",
"schedule": {"kind": "cron", "expression": "0 * * * *"},
"timeout_seconds": 3600,
"enabled": True,
"scheduler": {"kind": "launchd", "label": "cc.prgs.claude.author"},
"notes": "",
}
payload.update(overrides)
return payload
def _document(providers=None, workers=None, **overrides) -> dict:
payload = {
"version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
"revision": 1,
"updated_at": "2026-07-22T00:00:00Z",
"providers": providers if providers is not None else [_provider()],
"workers": workers if workers is not None else [_worker()],
}
payload.update(overrides)
return payload
class _TempRegistryCase(unittest.TestCase):
"""Base case giving each test an isolated registry file."""
def setUp(self):
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
self.path = Path(self._tmp.name) / "workers.registry.json"
def write(self, document: dict) -> Path:
self.path.write_text(json.dumps(document, indent=2) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
return self.path
def parse(self, document: dict) -> WorkerRegistry:
return validate_payload(document, source_path=self.path)
class TestPackagedRegistry(unittest.TestCase):
"""AC: the declarative registry is the source of truth and ships with the app."""
def test_default_path_points_at_packaged_data(self):
path = default_registry_path()
self.assertEqual(path.name, "workers.registry.json")
self.assertEqual(path.parent.name, "data")
def test_packaged_registry_loads_and_validates(self):
registry = load_registry()
self.assertEqual(registry.version, SCHEMA_VERSION)
self.assertGreaterEqual(registry.revision, 1)
def test_packaged_registry_declares_all_five_providers(self):
registry = load_registry()
self.assertEqual(
tuple(provider.id for provider in registry.providers),
_EXPECTED_PROVIDER_IDS,
)
def test_packaged_registry_carries_no_credentials(self):
raw = default_registry_path().read_text(encoding="utf-8").lower()
for marker in ("token", "password", "secret", "api_key", "credential"):
self.assertNotIn(marker, raw)
class TestSeparateEntities(_TempRegistryCase):
"""AC: providers and configured workers are separate entities."""
def test_provider_may_exist_with_no_workers(self):
registry = self.parse(
_document(providers=[_provider("grok", display_name="Grok")], workers=[])
)
self.assertEqual(len(registry.providers), 1)
self.assertEqual(registry.workers, ())
self.assertEqual(workers_for_provider(registry, "grok"), ())
def test_many_workers_may_share_one_provider(self):
registry = self.parse(
_document(
workers=[
_worker("claude-author"),
_worker(
"claude-reviewer",
role="reviewer",
namespace="gitea-reviewer",
profile="prgs-reviewer",
scheduler={"kind": "launchd", "label": "cc.prgs.claude.reviewer"},
),
]
)
)
self.assertEqual(len(workers_for_provider(registry, "claude")), 2)
self.assertEqual(len(registry.providers), 1)
def test_worker_referencing_unknown_provider_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(provider="mystery")]))
self.assertIn("unknown provider", str(ctx.exception))
def test_lookup_helpers(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
self.assertIsNotNone(find_worker(registry, "claude-author"))
self.assertIsNone(find_worker(registry, "absent"))
self.assertIsNotNone(find_provider(registry, "claude"))
self.assertIsNone(find_provider(registry, "absent"))
class TestRecordedFields(_TempRegistryCase):
"""AC: records provider, model, project, role, namespace/profile, workflow,
schedule, timeout, enabled state, and scheduler metadata."""
def test_every_required_field_is_recorded(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
worker = registry.workers[0]
self.assertEqual(worker.provider, "claude")
self.assertEqual(worker.model, "claude-opus-4-8")
self.assertEqual(worker.project, "gitea-tools")
self.assertEqual(worker.role, "author")
self.assertEqual(worker.namespace, "gitea-author")
self.assertEqual(worker.profile, "prgs-author")
self.assertEqual(worker.workflow, "skills/llm-project-workflow/workflows/work-issue.md")
self.assertEqual(worker.schedule.kind, "cron")
self.assertEqual(worker.schedule.expression, "0 * * * *")
self.assertEqual(worker.timeout_seconds, 3600)
self.assertTrue(worker.enabled)
self.assertEqual(worker.scheduler.kind, "launchd")
self.assertEqual(worker.scheduler.label, "cc.prgs.claude.author")
def test_each_required_field_is_individually_required(self):
for field in (
"provider", "model", "project", "role", "namespace",
"profile", "workflow", "schedule", "timeout_seconds",
"enabled", "scheduler", "id", "display_name",
):
with self.subTest(field=field):
worker = _worker()
worker.pop(field)
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[worker]))
def test_all_sanctioned_roles_are_accepted(self):
for role in ALLOWED_ROLES:
with self.subTest(role=role):
registry = self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(role=role)]))
self.assertEqual(registry.workers[0].role, role)
def test_unsanctioned_role_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(role="admin")]))
self.assertIn("role must be one of", str(ctx.exception))
def test_worker_dict_round_trips_every_field(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
encoded = worker_to_dict(registry.workers[0])
self.assertEqual(encoded, _worker())
json.dumps(encoded) # must stay JSON-safe for the #799 API
class TestSchemaValidation(_TempRegistryCase):
"""AC: supports schema validation — and fails closed."""
def test_unsupported_version_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(version=2))
def test_root_must_be_an_object(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
validate_payload([], source_path=self.path)
def test_providers_must_be_non_empty(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(providers=[]))
def test_unknown_top_level_field_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(fleet=[]))
self.assertIn("unknown fields", str(ctx.exception))
def test_unknown_worker_field_is_refused_not_ignored(self):
# A typo'd field must not be silently dropped: "timeout_second" would
# otherwise read as "no timeout declared".
worker = _worker()
worker["timeout_second"] = 30
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=[worker]))
self.assertIn("timeout_second", str(ctx.exception))
def test_credentials_are_refused_anywhere_in_the_document(self):
for label, mutate in (
("provider.api_token", lambda doc: doc["providers"][0].__setitem__("api_token", "x")),
("worker.password", lambda doc: doc["workers"][0].__setitem__("password", "x")),
("root.secret", lambda doc: doc.__setitem__("secret", "x")),
):
with self.subTest(field=label):
document = _document()
mutate(document)
with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as ctx:
self.parse(document)
self.assertIn("credential", str(ctx.exception).lower())
def test_duplicate_worker_id_is_refused(self):
workers = [_worker("dup"), _worker("dup", scheduler={"kind": "manual"})]
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=workers))
self.assertIn("duplicate worker id", str(ctx.exception))
def test_duplicate_provider_id_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(providers=[_provider("claude"), _provider("claude")], workers=[]))
self.assertIn("duplicate provider id", str(ctx.exception))
def test_duplicate_launchagent_label_is_refused(self):
# Two workers sharing a label would silently overwrite each other's agent.
workers = [
_worker("a", scheduler={"kind": "launchd", "label": "cc.prgs.same"}),
_worker("b", scheduler={"kind": "launchd", "label": "cc.prgs.same"}),
]
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=workers))
self.assertIn("duplicate scheduler label", str(ctx.exception))
def test_manual_scheduler_needs_no_label_and_many_may_coexist(self):
workers = [
_worker("a", scheduler={"kind": "manual"}),
_worker("b", scheduler={"kind": "manual"}),
]
registry = self.parse(_document(workers=workers))
self.assertEqual([w.scheduler.label for w in registry.workers], [None, None])
def test_launchd_scheduler_requires_a_label(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(scheduler={"kind": "launchd"})]))
self.assertIn("label is required", str(ctx.exception))
def test_unknown_scheduler_kind_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(scheduler={"kind": "systemd", "label": "x"})]))
def test_timeout_must_be_a_positive_bounded_integer(self):
for bad in (0, -1, "3600", 1.5, True, 86_401):
with self.subTest(timeout=bad):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(timeout_seconds=bad)]))
def test_enabled_must_be_a_real_boolean(self):
for bad in ("true", 1, None):
with self.subTest(enabled=bad):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(enabled=bad)]))
def test_identifier_shape_is_enforced(self):
for bad in ("Claude Author", "-leading", "UPPER", ""):
with self.subTest(worker_id=bad):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(bad)]))
class TestScheduleValidation(_TempRegistryCase):
"""Schedules are declarations; next-run computation belongs to #803."""
def test_interval_schedule_requires_positive_seconds(self):
registry = self.parse(
_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "interval", "seconds": 900})])
)
self.assertEqual(registry.workers[0].schedule.seconds, 900)
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "interval"})]))
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "interval", "seconds": 0})]))
def test_cron_schedule_requires_five_fields(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "cron", "expression": "0 *"})]))
self.assertIn("five crontab fields", str(ctx.exception))
def test_manual_schedule_needs_no_timing(self):
registry = self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "manual"})]))
schedule = registry.workers[0].schedule
self.assertEqual(schedule.kind, "manual")
self.assertIsNone(schedule.seconds)
self.assertIsNone(schedule.expression)
def test_fields_from_the_wrong_kind_are_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "manual", "seconds": 60})]))
self.assertIn("not valid for kind", str(ctx.exception))
def test_unknown_schedule_kind_is_refused(self):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(workers=[_worker(schedule={"kind": "hourly"})]))
class TestAtomicPersistence(_TempRegistryCase):
"""AC: atomic persistence."""
def test_save_then_load_round_trips(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
save_registry(registry, self.path)
reloaded = load_registry(self.path)
self.assertEqual(
[worker_to_dict(w) for w in reloaded.workers],
[worker_to_dict(w) for w in registry.workers],
)
def test_save_leaves_no_temp_files_behind(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
save_registry(registry, self.path)
save_registry(registry, self.path)
leftovers = [p.name for p in self.path.parent.iterdir() if p.name.startswith(".")]
self.assertEqual(leftovers, [])
def test_save_refuses_to_persist_an_invalid_document(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
broken = WorkerRegistry(
version=registry.version,
revision=registry.revision,
updated_at=registry.updated_at,
providers=registry.providers,
# A worker whose provider is not declared in the registry.
workers=tuple(
type(worker)(**{**worker.__dict__, "provider": "vanished"})
for worker in registry.workers
),
source_path=self.path,
)
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
save_registry(broken, self.path)
self.assertFalse(self.path.exists(), "invalid save must not create the file")
def test_document_shape_excludes_local_paths_but_api_shape_includes_it(self):
registry = self.parse(_document())
self.assertNotIn("source_path", registry_to_document(registry))
self.assertEqual(registry_to_dict(registry)["source_path"], str(self.path))
class TestVersioningAndRollback(_TempRegistryCase):
"""AC: versioning and rollback."""
def _seed(self) -> WorkerRegistry:
self.write(_document())
return load_registry(self.path)
def test_revision_increments_on_each_save(self):
registry = self._seed()
self.assertEqual(registry.revision, 1)
second = save_registry(registry, self.path)
self.assertEqual(second.revision, 2)
third = save_registry(second, self.path)
self.assertEqual(third.revision, 3)
def test_updated_at_is_refreshed_and_utc(self):
registry = self._seed()
saved = save_registry(registry, self.path)
self.assertRegex(saved.updated_at, r"^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}Z$")
def test_superseded_revisions_are_retained(self):
registry = self._seed()
second = save_registry(registry, self.path)
save_registry(second, self.path)
self.assertEqual(list_revisions(self.path), (1, 2))
self.assertTrue(history_dir(self.path).is_dir())
def test_rollback_restores_prior_content_as_a_new_revision(self):
self.write(_document(workers=[_worker("original")]))
registry = load_registry(self.path)
changed = WorkerRegistry(
version=registry.version,
revision=registry.revision,
updated_at=registry.updated_at,
providers=registry.providers,
workers=(), # operator deletes every worker
source_path=self.path,
)
save_registry(changed, self.path)
self.assertEqual(load_registry(self.path).workers, ())
restored = rollback_to_revision(1, self.path)
self.assertEqual([w.id for w in restored.workers], ["original"])
# Append-only: the rollback publishes a new head rather than rewinding.
self.assertGreater(restored.revision, 2)
self.assertEqual([w.id for w in load_registry(self.path).workers], ["original"])
def test_rollback_to_unknown_revision_fails_closed(self):
self._seed()
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError) as ctx:
rollback_to_revision(99, self.path)
self.assertIn("not retained", str(ctx.exception))
def test_revision_must_be_a_positive_integer(self):
for bad in (0, -1, "1", None):
with self.subTest(revision=bad):
with self.assertRaises(RegistryValidationError):
self.parse(_document(revision=bad))
def test_history_is_empty_before_any_save(self):
self.write(_document())
self.assertEqual(list_revisions(self.path), ())
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
-57
View File
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
{
"version": 1,
"revision": 1,
"updated_at": "2026-07-22T00:00:00Z",
"providers": [
{
"id": "claude",
"display_name": "Claude",
"vendor": "Anthropic",
"executable": "claude",
"available": true,
"models": [
"claude-opus-4-8",
"claude-sonnet-5",
"claude-haiku-4-5-20251001"
],
"notes": "Model list is a declaration. Live enumeration and version inspection belong to the provider adapter framework (#800)."
},
{
"id": "grok",
"display_name": "Grok",
"vendor": "xAI",
"executable": "grok",
"available": true,
"models": [],
"notes": "Models enumerated by the provider adapter (#800); not declared here."
},
{
"id": "codex",
"display_name": "Codex",
"vendor": "OpenAI",
"executable": "codex",
"available": true,
"models": [],
"notes": "Models enumerated by the provider adapter (#800); not declared here."
},
{
"id": "agy",
"display_name": "AGY",
"vendor": "Antigravity",
"executable": "agy",
"available": true,
"models": [],
"notes": "MCP allowlist gating applies to this provider; confirm server-side allowlist before configuring a worker."
},
{
"id": "kimi-k",
"display_name": "Kimi K",
"vendor": "Moonshot AI",
"executable": "kimi",
"available": true,
"models": [],
"notes": "Provider id is kimi-k; the executable on PATH is kimi. Models enumerated by the provider adapter (#800)."
}
],
"workers": []
}
+33 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,27 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any from typing import Any
from webui.registry_safety import reject_credential_keys as _reject_credential_keys _FORBIDDEN_EXACT_KEYS = frozenset({
"token",
"password",
"secret",
"credential",
"auth",
"api_key",
"api-key",
})
_FORBIDDEN_KEY_PREFIXES = ("auth_", "api_key_", "api-key_")
_FORBIDDEN_KEY_SUFFIXES = ("_token", "_secret", "_password", "_credential", "_auth")
def _is_forbidden_key(key: str) -> bool:
lowered = key.lower()
if lowered in _FORBIDDEN_EXACT_KEYS:
return True
return (
lowered.startswith(_FORBIDDEN_KEY_PREFIXES)
or lowered.endswith(_FORBIDDEN_KEY_SUFFIXES)
)
_REQUIRED_PROJECT_FIELDS = ( _REQUIRED_PROJECT_FIELDS = (
"id", "id",
@@ -59,6 +79,18 @@ def default_registry_path() -> Path:
return (Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "data" / "projects.registry.json").resolve() return (Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "data" / "projects.registry.json").resolve()
def _reject_credential_keys(obj: Any, *, path: str = "") -> None:
if isinstance(obj, dict):
for key, value in obj.items():
key_path = f"{path}.{key}" if path else key
if _is_forbidden_key(key):
raise ValueError(f"registry must not store credentials ({key_path})")
_reject_credential_keys(value, path=key_path)
elif isinstance(obj, list):
for index, item in enumerate(obj):
_reject_credential_keys(item, path=f"{path}[{index}]")
def _parse_onboarding(raw: list[dict[str, Any]] | None) -> tuple[OnboardingStep, ...]: def _parse_onboarding(raw: list[dict[str, Any]] | None) -> tuple[OnboardingStep, ...]:
if not raw: if not raw:
return () return ()
-52
View File
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
"""Shared credential-rejection guard for web UI registries (#427, #798).
Registries are operator-editable declarative files that the web UI loads and,
for the worker registry, writes back. None of them may ever carry a secret:
credentials belong in the keychain and reach worker processes through
environment injection, never through a file the browser layer can read.
The check is structural rather than value-based on purpose. A value scanner has
to guess what a secret looks like; a key scanner refuses the *shape* of a
credential field, so an operator cannot introduce one by accident and a later
loader cannot silently pass one through.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import Any
_FORBIDDEN_EXACT_KEYS = frozenset({
"token",
"password",
"secret",
"credential",
"auth",
"api_key",
"api-key",
})
_FORBIDDEN_KEY_PREFIXES = ("auth_", "api_key_", "api-key_")
_FORBIDDEN_KEY_SUFFIXES = ("_token", "_secret", "_password", "_credential", "_auth")
def is_forbidden_key(key: str) -> bool:
"""Return True when *key* names a credential field."""
lowered = key.lower()
if lowered in _FORBIDDEN_EXACT_KEYS:
return True
return (
lowered.startswith(_FORBIDDEN_KEY_PREFIXES)
or lowered.endswith(_FORBIDDEN_KEY_SUFFIXES)
)
def reject_credential_keys(obj: Any, *, path: str = "", subject: str = "registry") -> None:
"""Raise ValueError when *obj* carries a credential-shaped key at any depth."""
if isinstance(obj, dict):
for key, value in obj.items():
key_path = f"{path}.{key}" if path else key
if is_forbidden_key(key):
raise ValueError(f"{subject} must not store credentials ({key_path})")
reject_credential_keys(value, path=key_path, subject=subject)
elif isinstance(obj, list):
for index, item in enumerate(obj):
reject_credential_keys(item, path=f"{path}[{index}]", subject=subject)
-647
View File
@@ -1,647 +0,0 @@
"""Declarative worker registry and configuration schema (#798, epic #797).
The registry is the single source of truth for the scheduled multi-LLM worker
fleet. It is a versioned JSON document holding two *separate* entity kinds:
* **Providers** — the LLM runtimes a worker can be built on (Claude, Grok,
Codex, AGY, Kimi K). A provider describes the runtime itself: vendor,
executable name, models it can serve, and whether it is available on this
machine. Providers exist whether or not any worker uses them.
* **Workers** — a configured *instance*: one provider, one model, one project,
one role, one MCP namespace/profile, one workflow, one schedule. Several
workers may share a provider; a worker naming an undeclared provider is
refused.
Keeping them separate is what lets #799 list all five providers even when a
provider currently has no configured worker, and it stops provider facts from
being copied into (and drifting across) every worker record.
Scope boundary. This module owns the data model, its validation, and its
persistence. It does **not** schedule anything, launch anything, probe provider
executables, or serve HTTP. Loading a registry never touches a process; the
live fields a dashboard wants (PID, elapsed time, next run) are derived
elsewhere (#799, #801, #803, #804) from these declarations.
Safety invariants:
* No credential may be stored (:mod:`webui.registry_safety`), so the registry
stays safe to render and to hand to a browser layer.
* Validation fails closed. Unknown fields are refused rather than ignored, so a
typo cannot silently disable a timeout or a role binding.
* Writes are atomic and every superseded document is retained as a numbered
revision, so a bad edit is recoverable by rollback rather than hand-repair.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import re
import tempfile
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
from webui.registry_safety import reject_credential_keys
SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
#: Roles a worker may hold. These mirror the sanctioned MCP role kinds; a
#: worker may not invent one, because the role selects the namespace/profile
#: whose capability gates constrain it.
ALLOWED_ROLES = ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "cleanup")
#: Scheduler backends the registry can describe. ``manual`` means the worker is
#: only ever started on request and has no recurring trigger.
ALLOWED_SCHEDULER_KINDS = ("launchd", "manual")
#: Schedule kinds. Next-run computation belongs to #803; this module only
#: guarantees the declaration is well formed.
ALLOWED_SCHEDULE_KINDS = ("interval", "cron", "manual")
_REQUIRED_PROVIDER_FIELDS = ("id", "display_name", "vendor", "executable", "available")
_OPTIONAL_PROVIDER_FIELDS = ("models", "notes")
_REQUIRED_WORKER_FIELDS = (
"id",
"display_name",
"provider",
"model",
"project",
"role",
"namespace",
"profile",
"workflow",
"schedule",
"timeout_seconds",
"enabled",
"scheduler",
)
_OPTIONAL_WORKER_FIELDS = ("notes",)
_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*$")
#: Guards against an operator writing a timeout that would let a worker hold a
#: lease effectively forever. 24h is far above any sanctioned cycle.
_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 86_400
#: How many superseded revisions to retain beside the live file.
_HISTORY_LIMIT = 20
_TOP_LEVEL_FIELDS = frozenset({"version", "revision", "updated_at", "providers", "workers"})
class RegistryValidationError(ValueError):
"""Raised when a registry document violates the schema."""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ProviderRecord:
id: str
display_name: str
vendor: str
executable: str
available: bool
models: tuple[str, ...]
notes: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ScheduleSpec:
kind: str
#: Set for ``interval`` schedules.
seconds: int | None
#: Set for ``cron`` schedules — a five-field crontab expression.
expression: str | None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SchedulerSpec:
kind: str
#: LaunchAgent label; required for ``launchd``, absent for ``manual``.
label: str | None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class WorkerRecord:
id: str
display_name: str
provider: str
model: str
project: str
role: str
namespace: str
profile: str
workflow: str
schedule: ScheduleSpec
timeout_seconds: int
enabled: bool
scheduler: SchedulerSpec
notes: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class WorkerRegistry:
version: int
revision: int
updated_at: str
providers: tuple[ProviderRecord, ...]
workers: tuple[WorkerRecord, ...]
source_path: Path
# ── paths ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def default_registry_path() -> Path:
"""Location of the packaged worker registry, overridable for tests/deploys."""
override = os.environ.get("WEBUI_WORKER_REGISTRY", "").strip()
if override:
return Path(override).expanduser().resolve()
return (Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "data" / "workers.registry.json").resolve()
def history_dir(path: Path | None = None) -> Path:
"""Directory holding superseded revisions of *path*."""
source = (path or default_registry_path()).resolve()
return source.parent / f"{source.name}.history"
# ── field helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _require_exact_fields(
raw: Any,
*,
required: tuple[str, ...],
optional: tuple[str, ...],
subject: str,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be an object")
missing = [field for field in required if field not in raw]
if missing:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject} missing required fields: {', '.join(sorted(missing))}"
)
unknown = sorted(set(raw) - set(required) - set(optional))
if unknown:
# Fail closed: silently dropping an unrecognized key is how a typo'd
# "timeout_second" ends up meaning "no timeout".
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} has unknown fields: {', '.join(unknown)}")
return raw
def _require_identifier(value: Any, *, subject: str) -> str:
text = str(value).strip()
if not _ID_RE.match(text):
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject} must be lowercase alphanumeric with '.', '_', or '-' (got {value!r})"
)
return text
def _require_text(value: Any, *, subject: str) -> str:
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be a string (got {value!r})")
text = value.strip()
if not text:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be a non-empty string")
return text
def _require_bool(value: Any, *, subject: str) -> bool:
if not isinstance(value, bool):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be a boolean (got {value!r})")
return value
def _require_positive_int(value: Any, *, subject: str, maximum: int | None = None) -> int:
if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be an integer (got {value!r})")
if value <= 0:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be greater than zero (got {value})")
if maximum is not None and value > maximum:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must not exceed {maximum} (got {value})")
return value
# ── parsing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _parse_provider(raw: Any) -> ProviderRecord:
data = _require_exact_fields(
raw,
required=_REQUIRED_PROVIDER_FIELDS,
optional=_OPTIONAL_PROVIDER_FIELDS,
subject="provider",
)
provider_id = _require_identifier(data["id"], subject="provider.id")
models_raw = data.get("models") or []
if not isinstance(models_raw, list):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"provider[{provider_id}].models must be an array")
models = tuple(
_require_text(item, subject=f"provider[{provider_id}].models[]") for item in models_raw
)
return ProviderRecord(
id=provider_id,
display_name=_require_text(
data["display_name"], subject=f"provider[{provider_id}].display_name"
),
vendor=_require_text(data["vendor"], subject=f"provider[{provider_id}].vendor"),
executable=_require_text(data["executable"], subject=f"provider[{provider_id}].executable"),
available=_require_bool(data["available"], subject=f"provider[{provider_id}].available"),
models=models,
notes=str(data.get("notes") or "").strip(),
)
def _parse_schedule(raw: Any, *, subject: str) -> ScheduleSpec:
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be an object")
kind = _require_text(raw.get("kind"), subject=f"{subject}.kind")
if kind not in ALLOWED_SCHEDULE_KINDS:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject}.kind must be one of {', '.join(ALLOWED_SCHEDULE_KINDS)} (got {kind!r})"
)
seconds: int | None = None
expression: str | None = None
if kind == "interval":
if "seconds" not in raw:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject}.seconds is required for interval schedules")
seconds = _require_positive_int(raw["seconds"], subject=f"{subject}.seconds")
elif kind == "cron":
if "expression" not in raw:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject}.expression is required for cron schedules")
expression = _require_text(raw["expression"], subject=f"{subject}.expression")
if len(expression.split()) != 5:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject}.expression must have five crontab fields (got {expression!r})"
)
allowed = {"kind"}
if kind == "interval":
allowed.add("seconds")
elif kind == "cron":
allowed.add("expression")
unknown = sorted(set(raw) - allowed)
if unknown:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject} has fields not valid for kind {kind!r}: {', '.join(unknown)}"
)
return ScheduleSpec(kind=kind, seconds=seconds, expression=expression)
def _parse_scheduler(raw: Any, *, subject: str) -> SchedulerSpec:
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject} must be an object")
kind = _require_text(raw.get("kind"), subject=f"{subject}.kind")
if kind not in ALLOWED_SCHEDULER_KINDS:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject}.kind must be one of {', '.join(ALLOWED_SCHEDULER_KINDS)} (got {kind!r})"
)
label: str | None = None
if kind == "launchd":
if "label" not in raw:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"{subject}.label is required for launchd schedulers")
label = _require_text(raw["label"], subject=f"{subject}.label")
allowed = {"kind"}
if kind == "launchd":
allowed.add("label")
unknown = sorted(set(raw) - allowed)
if unknown:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"{subject} has fields not valid for kind {kind!r}: {', '.join(unknown)}"
)
return SchedulerSpec(kind=kind, label=label)
def _parse_worker(raw: Any) -> WorkerRecord:
data = _require_exact_fields(
raw,
required=_REQUIRED_WORKER_FIELDS,
optional=_OPTIONAL_WORKER_FIELDS,
subject="worker",
)
worker_id = _require_identifier(data["id"], subject="worker.id")
role = _require_text(data["role"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].role")
if role not in ALLOWED_ROLES:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"worker[{worker_id}].role must be one of {', '.join(ALLOWED_ROLES)} (got {role!r})"
)
return WorkerRecord(
id=worker_id,
display_name=_require_text(
data["display_name"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].display_name"
),
provider=_require_identifier(data["provider"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].provider"),
model=_require_text(data["model"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].model"),
project=_require_text(data["project"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].project"),
role=role,
namespace=_require_text(data["namespace"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].namespace"),
profile=_require_text(data["profile"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].profile"),
workflow=_require_text(data["workflow"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].workflow"),
schedule=_parse_schedule(data["schedule"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].schedule"),
timeout_seconds=_require_positive_int(
data["timeout_seconds"],
subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].timeout_seconds",
maximum=_MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
),
enabled=_require_bool(data["enabled"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].enabled"),
scheduler=_parse_scheduler(data["scheduler"], subject=f"worker[{worker_id}].scheduler"),
notes=str(data.get("notes") or "").strip(),
)
def _require_unique(values: list[str], *, subject: str) -> None:
seen: set[str] = set()
for value in values:
if value in seen:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"duplicate {subject}: {value}")
seen.add(value)
def validate_payload(payload: Any, *, source_path: Path) -> WorkerRegistry:
"""Validate a decoded registry document and return the typed registry.
Raises :class:`RegistryValidationError` on any violation; never partially
accepts a document.
"""
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise RegistryValidationError("registry root must be an object")
version = payload.get("version")
if version != SCHEMA_VERSION:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"unsupported registry version: {version!r}")
reject_credential_keys(payload, subject="worker registry")
unknown = sorted(set(payload) - _TOP_LEVEL_FIELDS)
if unknown:
raise RegistryValidationError(f"registry has unknown fields: {', '.join(unknown)}")
revision = _require_positive_int(payload.get("revision"), subject="revision")
updated_at = _require_text(payload.get("updated_at"), subject="updated_at")
providers_raw = payload.get("providers")
if not isinstance(providers_raw, list) or not providers_raw:
raise RegistryValidationError("providers must be a non-empty array")
providers = tuple(_parse_provider(item) for item in providers_raw)
_require_unique([provider.id for provider in providers], subject="provider id")
workers_raw = payload.get("workers")
if not isinstance(workers_raw, list):
raise RegistryValidationError("workers must be an array")
workers = tuple(_parse_worker(item) for item in workers_raw)
_require_unique([worker.id for worker in workers], subject="worker id")
# Referential integrity: a worker naming an undeclared provider would look
# configured while being unrunnable, which is exactly the ambiguous
# ownership the epic requires to fail closed.
known_providers = {provider.id for provider in providers}
for worker in workers:
if worker.provider not in known_providers:
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"worker[{worker.id}].provider references unknown provider {worker.provider!r}"
)
# A LaunchAgent label identifies a job to launchd; two workers sharing one
# would silently overwrite each other's agent.
_require_unique(
[worker.scheduler.label for worker in workers if worker.scheduler.label],
subject="scheduler label",
)
return WorkerRegistry(
version=version,
revision=revision,
updated_at=updated_at,
providers=providers,
workers=workers,
source_path=source_path,
)
def load_registry(path: Path | None = None) -> WorkerRegistry:
"""Load and validate the worker registry from disk."""
source = (path or default_registry_path()).resolve()
payload = json.loads(source.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
return validate_payload(payload, source_path=source)
# ── serialization ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def provider_to_dict(provider: ProviderRecord) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": provider.id,
"display_name": provider.display_name,
"vendor": provider.vendor,
"executable": provider.executable,
"available": provider.available,
"models": list(provider.models),
"notes": provider.notes,
}
def _schedule_to_dict(schedule: ScheduleSpec) -> dict[str, Any]:
payload: dict[str, Any] = {"kind": schedule.kind}
if schedule.kind == "interval":
payload["seconds"] = schedule.seconds
elif schedule.kind == "cron":
payload["expression"] = schedule.expression
return payload
def _scheduler_to_dict(scheduler: SchedulerSpec) -> dict[str, Any]:
payload: dict[str, Any] = {"kind": scheduler.kind}
if scheduler.kind == "launchd":
payload["label"] = scheduler.label
return payload
def worker_to_dict(worker: WorkerRecord) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": worker.id,
"display_name": worker.display_name,
"provider": worker.provider,
"model": worker.model,
"project": worker.project,
"role": worker.role,
"namespace": worker.namespace,
"profile": worker.profile,
"workflow": worker.workflow,
"schedule": _schedule_to_dict(worker.schedule),
"timeout_seconds": worker.timeout_seconds,
"enabled": worker.enabled,
"scheduler": _scheduler_to_dict(worker.scheduler),
"notes": worker.notes,
}
def registry_to_document(registry: WorkerRegistry) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Serialize to the on-disk document shape (no local paths embedded)."""
return {
"version": registry.version,
"revision": registry.revision,
"updated_at": registry.updated_at,
"providers": [provider_to_dict(provider) for provider in registry.providers],
"workers": [worker_to_dict(worker) for worker in registry.workers],
}
def registry_to_dict(registry: WorkerRegistry) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Serialize for JSON API responses (adds the resolved source path)."""
document = registry_to_document(registry)
document["source_path"] = str(registry.source_path)
return document
def find_worker(registry: WorkerRegistry, worker_id: str) -> WorkerRecord | None:
for worker in registry.workers:
if worker.id == worker_id:
return worker
return None
def find_provider(registry: WorkerRegistry, provider_id: str) -> ProviderRecord | None:
for provider in registry.providers:
if provider.id == provider_id:
return provider
return None
def workers_for_provider(registry: WorkerRegistry, provider_id: str) -> tuple[WorkerRecord, ...]:
return tuple(worker for worker in registry.workers if worker.provider == provider_id)
# ── persistence ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _utc_now() -> str:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
def _atomic_write(path: Path, payload: str) -> None:
"""Write *payload* to *path* atomically: temp file in the same dir, fsync, replace."""
parent = path.parent
parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
fd, temp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{path.name}-", suffix=".tmp", dir=parent)
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
handle.write(payload)
handle.flush()
os.fsync(handle.fileno())
os.replace(temp_path, path)
finally:
if os.path.exists(temp_path):
try:
os.remove(temp_path)
except OSError:
pass
def _revision_path(directory: Path, revision: int) -> Path:
return directory / f"rev-{revision:06d}.json"
def _prune_history(path: Path) -> None:
directory = history_dir(path)
revisions = list_revisions(path)
excess = len(revisions) - _HISTORY_LIMIT
for revision in revisions[: max(0, excess)]:
_revision_path(directory, revision).unlink(missing_ok=True)
def _archive_current(path: Path) -> int | None:
"""Copy the live document into the history dir under its own revision number."""
if not path.exists():
return None
try:
existing = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
revision = int(existing.get("revision", 0))
except (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError, ValueError, AttributeError):
# An unreadable live file has no trustworthy revision number to file it
# under, so it cannot join the history chain.
return None
if revision <= 0:
return None
_atomic_write(
_revision_path(history_dir(path), revision),
json.dumps(existing, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n",
)
_prune_history(path)
return revision
def list_revisions(path: Path | None = None) -> tuple[int, ...]:
"""Revision numbers retained in history for *path*, oldest first."""
directory = history_dir(path)
if not directory.is_dir():
return ()
revisions: list[int] = []
for entry in directory.glob("rev-*.json"):
try:
revisions.append(int(entry.stem.split("-", 1)[1]))
except (IndexError, ValueError):
continue
return tuple(sorted(revisions))
def save_registry(
registry: WorkerRegistry,
path: Path | None = None,
*,
updated_at: str | None = None,
) -> WorkerRegistry:
"""Validate, archive the superseded revision, then atomically persist a new one.
The stored revision is always the previous revision plus one, so a reader
can tell two documents apart even when their content is otherwise equal.
Returns the registry exactly as persisted.
"""
target = (path or registry.source_path or default_registry_path()).resolve()
document = registry_to_document(registry)
# Re-validate before writing: a registry assembled in memory has not
# necessarily been through the loader.
validate_payload(document, source_path=target)
archived = _archive_current(target)
document["revision"] = (archived + 1) if archived is not None else registry.revision
document["updated_at"] = updated_at or _utc_now()
persisted = validate_payload(document, source_path=target)
_atomic_write(target, json.dumps(document, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
return persisted
def rollback_to_revision(revision: int, path: Path | None = None) -> WorkerRegistry:
"""Restore a retained *revision* as a new head revision.
History is append-only: rolling back does not delete the revisions in
between, it republishes the chosen one under the next revision number, so a
rollback is itself reversible.
"""
target = (path or default_registry_path()).resolve()
snapshot_path = _revision_path(history_dir(target), revision)
if not snapshot_path.exists():
available = ", ".join(str(item) for item in list_revisions(target)) or "(none)"
raise RegistryValidationError(
f"revision {revision} is not retained for {target.name}; available: {available}"
)
payload = json.loads(snapshot_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
restored = validate_payload(payload, source_path=target)
return save_registry(restored, target)