Merge branch 'master' into feat/issue-707-cross-project-boundaries

docs/mcp-restart-audit.md

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-# MCP restart audit events and incidents (#665)
-
-Restarts and recovery attempts leave a forensic trail. Failed drains and
-break-glass paths also raise durable Gitea incident issues so unsafe restarts
-cannot be silently repeated.
-
-Parent umbrella: **#655**. Related: impact coordinator **#658**, drain proof
-**#661**, restart classes **#663**, break-glass **#664**, post-restart reconcile
-**#662**, vision **#652**, roadmap **#653**, console recovery **#642**.
-
-## Components
-
-| Piece | Where | Responsibility |
-|-------|-------|----------------|
-| Event schema + emission | `restart_audit.py` | `mcp.restart.*` vocabulary, redacted payload builder, append-only sink via `gitea_audit` |
-| Fail-closed privileged gate | `restart_audit.require_audit_or_deny` | When `GITEA_AUDIT_LOG` is set and the write fails, privileged apply is denied |
-| Incident descriptors | `restart_audit.build_incident_descriptor` | Durable follow-up issues (failed drain, break-glass, reconcile unresolved, unguarded) |
-| Materializer | `restart_audit.materialize_incident` | Injected `create_issue_fn` (network kept out of pure tests) |
-| Wiring | `gitea_request_mcp_restart` | Correlation id, impact-preview audit, apply-gate / break-glass audit + incident creation |
-
-## Event vocabulary
-
-| Event type | When |
-|------------|------|
-| `mcp.restart.impact_preview` | Every `gitea_request_mcp_restart` evaluation |
-| `mcp.restart.drain_enter` | Drain window starts (schema reserved; emit from drain path) |
-| `mcp.restart.drain_exit` | Drain window ends |
-| `mcp.restart.drain_proof` | Drain-proof verification result |
-| `mcp.restart.apply_gate` | Apply hard gate (`dry_run=False`) |
-| `mcp.restart.break_glass` | Authorized break-glass bypass |
-| `mcp.restart.post_restart_reconcile` | Post-restart reconcile outcome |
-| `mcp.restart.narrower_recovery` | Narrower recovery attempt recorded |
-| `mcp.restart.unguarded_detected` | Unguarded restart path detected |
-
-All free text is redacted before sink write or issue body assembly. Emission
-never raises; callers decide fail-closed policy.
-
-## Correlation
-
-Each restart lifecycle mints a short `correlation_id` (`rst-` + 16 hex) shared
-across impact preview → apply gate → incident descriptors so operators can join
-the trail.
-
-## Privileged deny-on-audit-fail
-
-Rollout policy (issue #665):
-
-1. Configure `GITEA_AUDIT_LOG` so writes land.
-2. Only then enforce deny when a privileged restart path cannot audit.
-
-When audit is **not** configured, privileged apply still proceeds (no false
-denials during rollout). When audit **is** configured and the write fails,
-`apply_authorized` is cleared.
-
-## Incidents
-
-| Kind | Trigger |
-|------|---------|
-| `restart_failed_drain` | Apply denied by drain hard gate / failed proof |
-| `restart_break_glass` | Any authorized break-glass apply |
-| `restart_reconcile_unresolved` | Post-restart reconcile left work unresolved |
-| `restart_unguarded_detected` | Unguarded restart attempt detected |
-
-Break-glass **always** creates an incident descriptor (and a Gitea issue when
-the create path is available). Failed drain does the same. Incident bodies
-include correlation id, session, class, scope, proof id, and redacted reasons.
-
-Default labels: `mcp-health`, `safety`, `observability`, `status:ready`,
-`type:bug`, `workflow-hardening`.
-
-## Tool payload surface
-
-`gitea_request_mcp_restart` returns:
-
-* `correlation_id` — lifecycle join key
-* `restart_audit.impact_preview_written` — sink success for the preview event
-* `restart_audit.apply_gate_written` — sink success for apply/break-glass (apply only)
-* `restart_audit.incident_result` — materialization outcome when an incident was required
-* `incident` — durable descriptor (when gate requires follow-up)
-
-## Security
-
-* No secrets in audit payloads or issue bodies.
-* This module never restarts a process.
-* Drain proof verification remains #661; audit only records the decision.
-* Incident creation failures are recorded in `incident_result.reasons` and never
-  crash the restart evaluation path (audit write failure still fails closed for
-  privileged apply when the sink is enabled).
-
-## Tests
-
-See `tests/test_restart_audit.py`: schema, redaction, emission, deny policy,
-incident materialization mocks, break-glass / failed-drain selection.

docs/mcp-restart-coordinator.md

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ recovery behavior for all nine classes.
 | `ControlPlaneDB.list_sessions` | `control_plane_db.py` | Read-only session inventory (the process-level unit a restart kills). |
 | `gitea_request_mcp_restart` | `gitea_mcp_server.py` | MCP tool: gathers inventory from the #613 DB, calls the coordinator, returns the report, and on `dry_run=False` runs the #661 drain-proof hard gate. Never restarts a process. |
 | `drain_proof.gate_apply_restart` | `drain_proof.py` | The #661 hard gate: verifies a drain proof against the current impact fingerprint, or records an authorized break-glass bypass. |
-| `restart_audit` | `restart_audit.py` | #665 forensic trail: `mcp.restart.*` events via `gitea_audit`, correlation ids, durable incidents for failed drain / break-glass. See [`mcp-restart-audit.md`](./mcp-restart-audit.md). |
 
 ## Dimensions evaluated
 

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -2100,7 +2100,6 @@ import lease_policy  # noqa: E402
 import workflow_dashboard  # noqa: E402  # #605 live queue/lease dashboard
 import restart_coordinator  # noqa: E402  # #658 MCP restart coordinator/impact
 import drain_proof  # noqa: E402  # #661 pre-restart drain proof and hard gate
-import restart_audit  # noqa: E402  # #665 restart audit events + incidents
 import incident_bridge  # noqa: E402
 import sentry_observability  # noqa: E402  (#606 optional Sentry observability)
 import sentry_incident_bridge  # noqa: E402  (#607 Sentry→Gitea incident bridge)
@@ -3428,10 +3427,16 @@ def _effective_remote(remote: str) -> str:
     return remote
 
 
-def _resolve(remote: str, host: str | None, org: str | None, repo: str | None):
+def _resolve(
+    remote: str,
+    host: str | None,
+    org: str | None,
+    repo: str | None,
+    for_mutation: bool = False,
+):
     """Resolve remote + overrides to (host, org, repo).
 
-    #714 / #530: when the caller omits org and/or repo, prefer the
+    #714 / #530 / #707: when the caller omits org and/or repo, prefer the
     workspace-aligned git remote over ``REMOTES`` defaults (e.g. bare
     ``remote=prgs`` must not force ``Timesheet`` when the checkout is
     ``Gitea-Tools``). Explicit caller org/repo always win and are validated
@@ -3517,6 +3522,7 @@ def _resolve(remote: str, host: str | None, org: str | None, repo: str | None):
         # Workspace-filled sides are intentional alignment for #530.
         org_explicit=org_explicit or filled_org,
         repo_explicit=repo_explicit or filled_repo,
+        for_mutation=for_mutation,
     )
     return (resolved_host, resolved_org, resolved_repo)
 
@@ -3578,8 +3584,9 @@ def _enforce_remote_repo_guard(
     *,
     org_explicit: bool,
     repo_explicit: bool,
+    for_mutation: bool = False,
 ) -> None:
-    """Fail closed on a remote/repo mismatch vs. the local git remote (#530).
+    """Fail closed on a remote/repo mismatch vs. the local git remote (#530/#707).
 
     Best-effort: bypassed under pytest unless ``GITEA_FORCE_REMOTE_REPO_CHECK`` is
     set, so the unit suite (which calls tools with bare remotes against mocked APIs)
@@ -3591,6 +3598,12 @@ def _enforce_remote_repo_guard(
     ):
         return
     local_remote_url = _local_git_remote_url(remote)
+    primary_org = None
+    primary_repo = None
+    ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
+    if ctx:
+        primary_org = ctx.get("org")
+        primary_repo = ctx.get("repository")
     assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
         remote=remote,
         resolved_org=resolved_org,
@@ -3598,6 +3611,9 @@ def _enforce_remote_repo_guard(
         local_remote_url=local_remote_url,
         org_explicit=org_explicit,
         repo_explicit=repo_explicit,
+        for_mutation=for_mutation,
+        primary_org=primary_org,
+        primary_repo=primary_repo,
     )
     if assessment["block"]:
         raise RuntimeError(remote_repo_guard.format_remote_repo_guard_error(assessment))
@@ -4453,7 +4469,7 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
     resolved_worktree = issue_lock_worktree.resolve_author_worktree_path(
         worktree_path, _canonical_local_git_root()
     )
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
+    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
     existing_issue_lock = _load_existing_issue_lock(
         remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, issue_number=issue_number
     )
@@ -5994,7 +6010,7 @@ def gitea_create_pr(
             org=org,
             repo=repo,
         )
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
+    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
 
     # ── Issue Lock Validation (Issue #194 / #196 / #443) ──
     lock_data = _resolve_issue_lock_for_pr(remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, head=head)
@@ -10315,7 +10331,7 @@ def gitea_edit_pr(
                 required_permission="gitea.pr.close",
             )
 
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
+    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
     auth = _auth(h)
     url = f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls/{pr_number}"
 
@@ -10599,7 +10615,7 @@ def gitea_commit_files(
     verify_preflight_purity(remote=remote, worktree_path=worktree_path, task="commit_files", org=org, repo=repo)
     processed_files, source_proofs = _prepare_commit_payload_files(files)
 
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
+    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
     auth = _auth(h)
     url = f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/contents"
 
@@ -10753,7 +10769,7 @@ def gitea_publish_unpublished_issue_branch(
         repo=repo,
     )
 
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
+    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
     git_remote = (git_remote_name or remote or "").strip()
 
     existing_lock = issue_lock_store.load_issue_lock(
@@ -10965,7 +10981,7 @@ def gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
         repo=repo,
     )
 
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
+    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
     canonical_root = _canonical_local_git_root()
 
     # One authority snapshot supplies both halves of the claimant pair (F3), and
@@ -12951,7 +12967,7 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
                 "blocker_kind": "invalid_pr_number",
             }
 
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
+    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
     auth = _auth(h)
     base = repo_api_url(h, o, r)
 
@@ -13341,7 +13357,7 @@ def gitea_assess_already_landed_reconciliation(
             "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.read"),
         }
 
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
+    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
     auth = _auth(h)
     pr = api_request("GET", f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls/{pr_number}", auth)
 
@@ -23868,38 +23884,6 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
     # and a durable incident is raised. Break-glass is the only bypass and its
     # authorization is read from the environment, never self-asserted.
     payload["apply_supported"] = False
-    # #665: correlation id threads impact preview → apply gate → incidents.
-    correlation_id = restart_audit.new_correlation_id()
-    payload["correlation_id"] = correlation_id
-    auth_user = None
-    try:
-        # remote-only: host override is for operator diagnostics, not required here
-        auth_user = (gitea_whoami(remote=remote) or {}).get("username")
-    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 — identity is best-effort for audit
-        auth_user = None
-    preview_audit = restart_audit.record_restart_lifecycle(
-        event_type=restart_audit.EVENT_IMPACT_PREVIEW,
-        outcome=str(report.verdict or "unknown"),
-        correlation_id=correlation_id,
-        remote=remote,
-        org=o,
-        repo=r,
-        requesting_session_id=sid,
-        restart_class=restart_class,
-        profile_name=profile_name,
-        authenticated_username=auth_user,
-        reasons=list(report.reasons or []),
-        details={
-            "dry_run": True,
-            "allow_restart": bool(report.allow_restart),
-            "inventory_complete": inventory_complete,
-        },
-        privileged=False,
-    )
-    payload["restart_audit"] = {
-        "correlation_id": correlation_id,
-        "impact_preview_written": preview_audit["audit_written"],
-    }
     if not dry_run:
         proof_obj: dict | None = None
         proof_parse_error: str | None = None
@@ -23952,86 +23936,6 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
         )
         if not gate.allow and gate.incident is not None:
             payload["incident"] = gate.incident
-
-        # #665: audit apply-gate + materialize durable incidents for failed
-        # drain and break-glass. Privileged apply denies if audit is enabled
-        # and the sink write fails.
-        incident_desc = restart_audit.incident_from_apply_gate(
-            gate_payload={
-                **gate_payload,
-                "incident": gate.incident,
-                "allow": gate.allow,
-            },
-            break_glass=break_glass,
-            correlation_id=correlation_id,
-            requesting_session_id=sid,
-            restart_class=restart_class,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=o,
-            repo=r,
-        )
-        if incident_desc is not None:
-            payload["incident"] = incident_desc
-
-        def _create_restart_incident_issue(
-            *, title, body, labels, org=None, repo=None, **_kw
-        ):
-            return gitea_create_issue(
-                title=title,
-                body=body,
-                labels=labels,
-                remote=remote,
-                host=h,
-                org=org or o,
-                repo=repo or r,
-            )
-
-        apply_audit = restart_audit.record_restart_lifecycle(
-            event_type=(
-                restart_audit.EVENT_BREAK_GLASS
-                if break_glass
-                else restart_audit.EVENT_APPLY_GATE
-            ),
-            outcome=(
-                "break_glass"
-                if break_glass
-                else ("allow" if payload["apply_authorized"] else "deny")
-            ),
-            correlation_id=correlation_id,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=o,
-            repo=r,
-            requesting_session_id=sid,
-            restart_class=restart_class,
-            profile_name=profile_name,
-            authenticated_username=auth_user,
-            reasons=list(gate_payload.get("reasons") or []),
-            details={
-                "apply_authorized": payload["apply_authorized"],
-                "drain_gate_allow": gate_payload.get("drain_gate_allow"),
-                "restart_class_authorized": restart_class_authorized,
-                "break_glass": break_glass,
-                "proof_id": gate_payload.get("proof_id"),
-            },
-            privileged=True,
-            create_incident=incident_desc,
-            create_issue_fn=_create_restart_incident_issue
-            if incident_desc is not None
-            else None,
-            dry_run_incident=False,
-        )
-        payload["restart_audit"] = {
-            "correlation_id": correlation_id,
-            "impact_preview_written": preview_audit["audit_written"],
-            "apply_gate_written": apply_audit["audit_written"],
-            "incident_result": apply_audit.get("incident_result"),
-        }
-        if apply_audit["deny_reasons"]:
-            payload["apply_authorized"] = False
-            payload["reasons"] = list(payload.get("reasons") or []) + list(
-                apply_audit["deny_reasons"]
-            )
-            payload["success"] = True
     return payload
 
 

remote_repo_guard.py

@@ -54,20 +54,62 @@ def assess_remote_repo_match(
     local_remote_url: str | None,
     org_explicit: bool,
     repo_explicit: bool,
+    for_mutation: bool = False,
+    primary_org: str | None = None,
+    primary_repo: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
     """Fail closed when the resolved org/repo disagrees with the local git remote.
 
-    The guard is intentionally conservative:
+    The guard enforces two protection levels:
 
-    * When the caller passed both ``org`` and ``repo`` explicitly, their intent is
+    1. Cross-Project Mutation Boundary (#707):
-      authoritative and the guard never blocks.
+       When ``for_mutation`` is True (codebase mutation operation: branch, commit, PR,
-    * When the local git remote URL is unavailable (``None``/empty), corroboration
+       merge, branch deletion), the target repository (``resolved_org/resolved_repo``)
-      is impossible, so the guard does not block (best-effort only).
+       MUST match the primary authorized project context (``primary_org/primary_repo``
-    * Otherwise, the resolved ``org/repo`` slug must appear in the local remote URL
+       or parsed from ``local_remote_url``). Any attempt to mutate a different project
-      (case-insensitive); if it does not, the guard blocks.
+       fails closed, even if explicit org/repo were passed. Metadata operations (such
+       as creating issues or commenting on issues) across projects remain allowed.
+
+    2. Workspace Mismatch Guard (#530):
+       When ``for_mutation`` is False (or targets match), bare remotes must resolve
+       to an org/repo slug present in the local git remote URL. When explicit org/repo
+       are supplied for non-mutation operations, the caller's intent is authoritative.
     """
     reasons: list[str] = []
 
+    eff_primary_org = primary_org
+    eff_primary_repo = primary_repo
+    if not eff_primary_org or not eff_primary_repo:
+        parsed_primary = parse_org_repo_from_remote_url(local_remote_url)
+        if parsed_primary:
+            eff_primary_org = eff_primary_org or parsed_primary[0]
+            eff_primary_repo = eff_primary_repo or parsed_primary[1]
+
+    # #707: Enforce cross-project codebase mutation boundary if for_mutation is True
+    if for_mutation and eff_primary_org and eff_primary_repo:
+        if (
+            resolved_org.lower() != eff_primary_org.lower()
+            or resolved_repo.lower() != eff_primary_repo.lower()
+        ):
+            reasons.append(
+                f"Cross-project mutation guard (#707): Attempted codebase mutation targeting "
+                f"'{resolved_org}/{resolved_repo}' outside of primary authorized project "
+                f"context '{eff_primary_org}/{eff_primary_repo}'"
+            )
+            return {
+                "proven": False,
+                "block": True,
+                "cross_project_mutation_block": True,
+                "reasons": reasons,
+                "remote": remote,
+                "resolved_org": resolved_org,
+                "resolved_repo": resolved_repo,
+                "primary_org": eff_primary_org,
+                "primary_repo": eff_primary_repo,
+                "local_remote_url": local_remote_url,
+                "remediation": f"Cross-project codebase work is forbidden. Create an issue in the target repository ('{resolved_org}/{resolved_repo}') instead.",
+            }
+
     if org_explicit and repo_explicit:
         return _assessment(True, reasons, remote, resolved_org, resolved_repo, local_remote_url)
 
@@ -88,6 +130,16 @@ def assess_remote_repo_match(
 
 def format_remote_repo_guard_error(assessment: dict) -> str:
     """Single RuntimeError message for the MCP resolver gate."""
+    if assessment.get("cross_project_mutation_block"):
+        resolved = f"{assessment.get('resolved_org')}/{assessment.get('resolved_repo')}"
+        primary = f"{assessment.get('primary_org')}/{assessment.get('primary_repo')}"
+        return (
+            f"Cross-project mutation guard (#707): Attempted codebase mutation targeting '{resolved}' "
+            f"outside of primary authorized project context '{primary}'. "
+            f"Cross-project codebase work (creating branches, committing files, creating PRs) is forbidden; "
+            f"create an issue in the target repository ('{resolved}') instead."
+        )
+
     reasons = "; ".join(
         assessment.get("reasons") or ["remote/repo resolution mismatch"]
     )
@@ -120,3 +172,4 @@ def _assessment(
         "local_remote_url": local_remote_url,
         "remediation": REMEDIATION,
     }
+

restart_audit.py

@@ -1,426 +0,0 @@
-"""MCP restart lifecycle audit events and incident materialization (#665).
-
-Restarts and recovery attempts must leave a forensic trail: impact previews,
-drain enter/exit, drain-proof results, apply gate verdicts, break-glass, and
-post-restart reconcile outcomes. Failed drains and break-glass must also raise
-durable Gitea incident issues so they cannot be silently repeated.
-
-This module is the pure + sink layer for that trail:
-
-* **Schema** — ``mcp.restart.*`` event names and a redacted payload builder.
-* **Emission** — append-only via :mod:`gitea_audit` (off when ``GITEA_AUDIT_LOG``
-  is unset; privileged apply can still *require* a successful write).
-* **Incidents** — descriptors for failed drain / break-glass / unguarded restart,
-  plus an optional materializer that creates a Gitea issue through an injected
-  ``create_issue_fn`` (keeps this module free of network I/O in tests).
-
-Design rules:
-
-* **No secrets.** All free text is redacted before write or issue body assembly.
-* **Never raises from emission.** ``emit_restart_event`` returns False on sink
-  failure so callers can decide fail-closed policy for privileged restarts.
-* **Does not restart.** Audit never executes a process restart.
-* **Drain proof stays #661.** This module records what the gate decided; it
-  does not re-verify proofs.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import uuid
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Sequence
-
-import gitea_audit
-
-# ── Event vocabulary (stable identifiers for operators + tests) ───────────────
-
-EVENT_IMPACT_PREVIEW = "mcp.restart.impact_preview"
-EVENT_DRAIN_ENTER = "mcp.restart.drain_enter"
-EVENT_DRAIN_EXIT = "mcp.restart.drain_exit"
-EVENT_DRAIN_PROOF = "mcp.restart.drain_proof"
-EVENT_APPLY_GATE = "mcp.restart.apply_gate"
-EVENT_BREAK_GLASS = "mcp.restart.break_glass"
-EVENT_POST_RESTART_RECONCILE = "mcp.restart.post_restart_reconcile"
-EVENT_NARROWER_RECOVERY = "mcp.restart.narrower_recovery"
-EVENT_UNGUARDED_DETECTED = "mcp.restart.unguarded_detected"
-
-RESTART_EVENT_TYPES: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
-    {
-        EVENT_IMPACT_PREVIEW,
-        EVENT_DRAIN_ENTER,
-        EVENT_DRAIN_EXIT,
-        EVENT_DRAIN_PROOF,
-        EVENT_APPLY_GATE,
-        EVENT_BREAK_GLASS,
-        EVENT_POST_RESTART_RECONCILE,
-        EVENT_NARROWER_RECOVERY,
-        EVENT_UNGUARDED_DETECTED,
-    }
-)
-
-# Incident kinds (durable Gitea issues).
-INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN = "restart_failed_drain"
-INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS = "restart_break_glass"
-INCIDENT_RECONCILE_UNRESOLVED = "restart_reconcile_unresolved"
-INCIDENT_UNGUARDED = "restart_unguarded_detected"
-
-DEFAULT_INCIDENT_LABELS: tuple[str, ...] = (
-    "mcp-health",
-    "safety",
-    "observability",
-    "status:ready",
-    "type:bug",
-    "workflow-hardening",
-)
-
-CreateIssueFn = Callable[..., dict[str, Any]]
-
-
-def _utc_now_iso() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
-
-
-def new_correlation_id() -> str:
-    """Mint a short correlation id shared across a restart lifecycle."""
-    return f"rst-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]}"
-
-
-def build_restart_event(
-    *,
-    event_type: str,
-    outcome: str,
-    correlation_id: str | None = None,
-    remote: str | None = None,
-    org: str | None = None,
-    repo: str | None = None,
-    requesting_session_id: str | None = None,
-    restart_class: str | None = None,
-    profile_name: str | None = None,
-    authenticated_username: str | None = None,
-    reasons: Sequence[str] | None = None,
-    details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-    now: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build a redacted ``mcp.restart.*`` audit event.
-
-    Raises ``ValueError`` on unknown event types so a typo cannot silently land
-    under a free-form action name.
-    """
-    name = str(event_type or "").strip()
-    if name not in RESTART_EVENT_TYPES:
-        raise ValueError(
-            f"unknown restart audit event_type {name!r}; expected one of "
-            f"{sorted(RESTART_EVENT_TYPES)}"
-        )
-    redacted_reasons = [
-        gitea_audit.redact(str(r)) for r in (reasons or []) if str(r).strip()
-    ]
-    redacted_details = gitea_audit.redact(dict(details or {}))
-    if not isinstance(redacted_details, dict):
-        redacted_details = {"value": redacted_details}
-
-    event = gitea_audit.build_event(
-        action=name,
-        result=str(outcome or "unknown"),
-        remote=remote,
-        repository=f"{org}/{repo}" if org and repo else None,
-        profile_name=profile_name,
-        authenticated_username=authenticated_username,
-        reason="; ".join(redacted_reasons) if redacted_reasons else None,
-        request_metadata={
-            "event_family": "mcp.restart",
-            "correlation_id": correlation_id or new_correlation_id(),
-            "restart_class": restart_class,
-            "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
-            "org": org,
-            "repo": repo,
-            "details": redacted_details,
-            "reasons": redacted_reasons,
-        },
-        now=now or _utc_now_iso(),
-        operation=name,
-    )
-    event["action_type"] = "restart_lifecycle"
-    event["event_type"] = name
-    event["correlation_id"] = (event.get("request_metadata") or {}).get(
-        "correlation_id"
-    )
-    return event
-
-
-def emit_restart_event(event: Mapping[str, Any], *, path: str | None = None) -> bool:
-    """Append *event* to the audit sink. Never raises. Returns write success."""
-    try:
-        return bool(gitea_audit.write_event(dict(event), path=path))
-    except Exception:
-        return False
-
-
-def require_audit_or_deny(
-    *,
-    privileged: bool,
-    written: bool,
-    audit_enabled: bool | None = None,
-) -> list[str]:
-    """Return deny reasons when a privileged restart path fails to audit.
-
-    When audit is not configured (``GITEA_AUDIT_LOG`` unset), privileged apply
-    still proceeds under the rollout policy "enable audit before enforcing
-    deny-on-audit-fail" — but *if* audit is enabled and the write fails,
-    privileged apply is denied (fail closed).
-    """
-    enabled = (
-        gitea_audit.audit_enabled() if audit_enabled is None else bool(audit_enabled)
-    )
-    if not privileged:
-        return []
-    if not enabled:
-        return []
-    if written:
-        return []
-    return [
-        "privileged restart path requires a successful audit write; "
-        "audit sink failed (fail closed, #665)"
-    ]
-
-
-# ── Incident descriptors ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def build_incident_descriptor(
-    *,
-    kind: str,
-    reasons: Sequence[str],
-    correlation_id: str | None = None,
-    requesting_session_id: str | None = None,
-    restart_class: str | None = None,
-    remote: str | None = None,
-    org: str | None = None,
-    repo: str | None = None,
-    proof_id: str | None = None,
-    at: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build a durable incident descriptor (no network)."""
-    titles = {
-        INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN: "Restart denied: drain proof failed the hard gate",
-        INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS: "Break-glass MCP restart authorized",
-        INCIDENT_RECONCILE_UNRESOLVED: "Post-restart reconcile left unresolved work",
-        INCIDENT_UNGUARDED: "Unguarded MCP restart attempt detected",
-    }
-    title = titles.get(kind, f"MCP restart incident ({kind})")
-    redacted_reasons = [
-        gitea_audit.redact(str(r)) for r in reasons if str(r).strip()
-    ]
-    return {
-        "kind": kind,
-        "title": title,
-        "labels": list(DEFAULT_INCIDENT_LABELS),
-        "reasons": redacted_reasons,
-        "correlation_id": correlation_id,
-        "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
-        "restart_class": restart_class,
-        "remote": remote,
-        "org": org,
-        "repo": repo,
-        "proof_id": proof_id,
-        "at": at or _utc_now_iso(),
-        "source": "restart_audit#665",
-    }
-
-
-def incident_body(descriptor: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
-    """Render a redacted markdown body for a Gitea incident issue."""
-    reasons = descriptor.get("reasons") or []
-    reason_lines = "\n".join(f"- {gitea_audit.redact(str(r))}" for r in reasons) or (
-        "- (no reasons recorded)"
-    )
-    return "\n".join(
-        [
-            "<!-- mcp-restart-incident:v1 -->",
-            f"## MCP restart incident (`{descriptor.get('kind')}`)",
-            "",
-            f"**Correlation:** `{descriptor.get('correlation_id') or 'none'}`",
-            f"**Session:** `{descriptor.get('requesting_session_id') or 'none'}`",
-            f"**Class:** `{descriptor.get('restart_class') or 'none'}`",
-            f"**Scope:** `{descriptor.get('remote')}/{descriptor.get('org')}/"
-            f"{descriptor.get('repo')}`",
-            f"**At:** `{descriptor.get('at')}`",
-            f"**Proof id:** `{descriptor.get('proof_id') or 'none'}`",
-            "",
-            "### Reasons",
-            reason_lines,
-            "",
-            "### Operator next steps",
-            "- Treat this as durable follow-up work under the restart-governance umbrella (#655).",
-            "- Do not invent a second restart path; use sanctioned coordinator tools only.",
-            "- Raw secrets must never appear in this issue (already redacted).",
-            "",
-            f"_Source: {descriptor.get('source')}_",
-        ]
-    )
-
-
-def materialize_incident(
-    descriptor: Mapping[str, Any],
-    *,
-    create_issue_fn: CreateIssueFn | None,
-    dry_run: bool = False,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Create a Gitea issue from *descriptor* when *create_issue_fn* is provided.
-
-    Returns a result dict with ``created`` / ``issue_number`` / ``dry_run`` /
-    ``reasons``. Never raises.
-    """
-    base: dict[str, Any] = {
-        "created": False,
-        "dry_run": bool(dry_run),
-        "issue_number": None,
-        "kind": descriptor.get("kind"),
-        "reasons": [],
-        "descriptor": dict(descriptor),
-    }
-    if dry_run:
-        base["reasons"] = ["dry-run only; no Gitea issue created"]
-        return base
-    if create_issue_fn is None:
-        base["reasons"] = [
-            "create_issue_fn not provided; incident descriptor retained only"
-        ]
-        return base
-    try:
-        result = create_issue_fn(
-            title=str(descriptor.get("title") or "MCP restart incident"),
-            body=incident_body(descriptor),
-            labels=list(descriptor.get("labels") or DEFAULT_INCIDENT_LABELS),
-            org=descriptor.get("org"),
-            repo=descriptor.get("repo"),
-        )
-        number = None
-        if isinstance(result, dict):
-            number = result.get("number") or result.get("issue_number")
-        if number is not None:
-            base["created"] = True
-            base["issue_number"] = int(number)
-            base["reasons"] = [f"created incident issue #{int(number)}"]
-        else:
-            base["reasons"] = ["create_issue_fn returned no issue number"]
-    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — never break restart path here
-        base["reasons"] = [
-            f"incident issue creation failed: {gitea_audit.redact(str(exc))}"
-        ]
-    return base
-
-
-def record_restart_lifecycle(
-    *,
-    event_type: str,
-    outcome: str,
-    correlation_id: str,
-    remote: str | None = None,
-    org: str | None = None,
-    repo: str | None = None,
-    requesting_session_id: str | None = None,
-    restart_class: str | None = None,
-    profile_name: str | None = None,
-    authenticated_username: str | None = None,
-    reasons: Sequence[str] | None = None,
-    details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-    privileged: bool = False,
-    create_incident: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-    create_issue_fn: CreateIssueFn | None = None,
-    dry_run_incident: bool = False,
-    audit_path: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Emit one restart audit event and optionally materialize an incident.
-
-    Returns ``{event, audit_written, deny_reasons, incident_result}``.
-    """
-    event = build_restart_event(
-        event_type=event_type,
-        outcome=outcome,
-        correlation_id=correlation_id,
-        remote=remote,
-        org=org,
-        repo=repo,
-        requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id,
-        restart_class=restart_class,
-        profile_name=profile_name,
-        authenticated_username=authenticated_username,
-        reasons=reasons,
-        details=details,
-    )
-    written = emit_restart_event(event, path=audit_path)
-    deny = require_audit_or_deny(privileged=privileged, written=written)
-    incident_result = None
-    if create_incident is not None:
-        incident_result = materialize_incident(
-            create_incident,
-            create_issue_fn=create_issue_fn,
-            dry_run=dry_run_incident,
-        )
-    return {
-        "event": event,
-        "audit_written": written,
-        "deny_reasons": deny,
-        "incident_result": incident_result,
-        "correlation_id": correlation_id,
-    }
-
-
-def incident_from_apply_gate(
-    *,
-    gate_payload: Mapping[str, Any],
-    break_glass: bool,
-    correlation_id: str,
-    requesting_session_id: str | None,
-    restart_class: str | None,
-    remote: str | None,
-    org: str | None,
-    repo: str | None,
-) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Choose an incident descriptor from an apply-gate payload, if required."""
-    reasons = list(gate_payload.get("reasons") or [])
-    proof_id = gate_payload.get("proof_id")
-    if break_glass:
-        return build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS,
-            reasons=reasons
-            or ["break-glass restart path used; durable incident required (#665)"],
-            correlation_id=correlation_id,
-            requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id,
-            restart_class=restart_class,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=org,
-            repo=repo,
-            proof_id=proof_id if isinstance(proof_id, str) else None,
-        )
-    # Failed drain / deny path.
-    incident = gate_payload.get("incident")
-    if isinstance(incident, Mapping) and incident:
-        # Normalize gate-provided descriptor into our schema.
-        return build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN,
-            reasons=list(incident.get("reasons") or reasons),
-            correlation_id=correlation_id,
-            requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id
-            or incident.get("requesting_session_id"),
-            restart_class=restart_class,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=org,
-            repo=repo,
-            proof_id=incident.get("proof_id") or proof_id,
-            at=incident.get("at"),
-        )
-    if not gate_payload.get("allow") and not gate_payload.get("drain_gate_allow", True):
-        return build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN,
-            reasons=reasons or ["restart apply denied"],
-            correlation_id=correlation_id,
-            requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id,
-            restart_class=restart_class,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=org,
-            repo=repo,
-            proof_id=proof_id if isinstance(proof_id, str) else None,
-        )
-    return None

tests/test_cross_project_mutation_boundary.py

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+import os
+import sys
+import unittest
+from unittest import mock
+
+import remote_repo_guard
+import gitea_mcp_server as server
+from session_context_binding import _reset_session_context_for_testing, bind_session_context
+
+
+LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL = "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
+
+
+class TestCrossProjectMutationBoundary(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        os.environ["PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST"] = "test"
+        _reset_session_context_for_testing()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        _reset_session_context_for_testing()
+        os.environ.pop("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", None)
+
+    def test_cross_project_codebase_mutation_blocked(self):
+        """Codebase mutations targeting another project must fail closed (#707)."""
+        assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
+            remote="prgs",
+            resolved_org="Other-Org",
+            resolved_repo="Other-Repo",
+            local_remote_url=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL,
+            org_explicit=True,
+            repo_explicit=True,
+            for_mutation=True,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
+        self.assertTrue(assessment.get("cross_project_mutation_block"))
+        self.assertEqual(assessment["primary_org"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
+        self.assertEqual(assessment["primary_repo"], "Gitea-Tools")
+
+        err_msg = remote_repo_guard.format_remote_repo_guard_error(assessment)
+        self.assertIn("Cross-project mutation guard (#707)", err_msg)
+        self.assertIn("Attempted codebase mutation targeting 'Other-Org/Other-Repo'", err_msg)
+        self.assertIn("outside of primary authorized project context 'Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools'", err_msg)
+        self.assertIn("create an issue in the target repository ('Other-Org/Other-Repo') instead", err_msg)
+
+    def test_same_project_codebase_mutation_allowed(self):
+        """Codebase mutations targeting the primary project context are allowed."""
+        assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
+            remote="prgs",
+            resolved_org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            resolved_repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            local_remote_url=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL,
+            org_explicit=True,
+            repo_explicit=True,
+            for_mutation=True,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["block"])
+        self.assertFalse(assessment.get("cross_project_mutation_block", False))
+
+    def test_cross_project_metadata_operation_allowed(self):
+        """Metadata operations (issue creation, comments) across project boundaries are allowed."""
+        assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
+            remote="prgs",
+            resolved_org="Other-Org",
+            resolved_repo="Other-Repo",
+            local_remote_url=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL,
+            org_explicit=True,
+            repo_explicit=True,
+            for_mutation=False,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["proven"])
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["block"])
+
+    @mock.patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_FORCE_REMOTE_REPO_CHECK": "1"})
+    @mock.patch("gitea_mcp_server._local_git_remote_url", return_value=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL)
+    def test_mcp_server_resolve_cross_project_mutation_fails_closed(self, mock_remote):
+        """_resolve with for_mutation=True blocks cross-project targets."""
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+            server._resolve("prgs", None, "Other-Org", "Other-Repo", for_mutation=True)
+        
+        err = str(ctx.exception)
+        self.assertIn("Cross-project mutation guard (#707)", err)
+        self.assertIn("create an issue in the target repository", err)
+
+    @mock.patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_FORCE_REMOTE_REPO_CHECK": "1"})
+    @mock.patch("gitea_mcp_server._local_git_remote_url", return_value=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL)
+    def test_mcp_server_resolve_cross_project_metadata_succeeds(self, mock_remote):
+        """_resolve with for_mutation=False allows explicit cross-project target."""
+        host, org, repo = server._resolve("prgs", None, "Other-Org", "Other-Repo", for_mutation=False)
+        self.assertEqual(org, "Other-Org")
+        self.assertEqual(repo, "Other-Repo")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_restart_audit.py

@@ -1,342 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for MCP restart lifecycle audit events and incidents (#665)."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-import gitea_audit
-import restart_audit as ra
-
-
-class TestEventSchema(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_all_lifecycle_event_types_are_named(self):
-        expected = {
-            "mcp.restart.impact_preview",
-            "mcp.restart.drain_enter",
-            "mcp.restart.drain_exit",
-            "mcp.restart.drain_proof",
-            "mcp.restart.apply_gate",
-            "mcp.restart.break_glass",
-            "mcp.restart.post_restart_reconcile",
-            "mcp.restart.narrower_recovery",
-            "mcp.restart.unguarded_detected",
-        }
-        self.assertEqual(set(ra.RESTART_EVENT_TYPES), expected)
-
-    def test_build_restart_event_core_fields(self):
-        event = ra.build_restart_event(
-            event_type=ra.EVENT_IMPACT_PREVIEW,
-            outcome="safe",
-            correlation_id="rst-abc123",
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-            repo="Gitea-Tools",
-            requesting_session_id="sess-1",
-            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
-            profile_name="prgs-author",
-            authenticated_username="bot",
-            reasons=["inventory complete"],
-            details={"allow_restart": True},
-            now="2026-07-25T12:00:00+00:00",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(event["event_type"], ra.EVENT_IMPACT_PREVIEW)
-        self.assertEqual(event["action"], ra.EVENT_IMPACT_PREVIEW)
-        self.assertEqual(event["action_type"], "restart_lifecycle")
-        self.assertEqual(event["result"], "safe")
-        self.assertEqual(event["correlation_id"], "rst-abc123")
-        self.assertEqual(event["profile_name"], "prgs-author")
-        self.assertEqual(event["authenticated_username"], "bot")
-        meta = event["request_metadata"]
-        self.assertEqual(meta["event_family"], "mcp.restart")
-        self.assertEqual(meta["correlation_id"], "rst-abc123")
-        self.assertEqual(meta["restart_class"], "full_mcp_restart")
-        self.assertEqual(meta["details"]["allow_restart"], True)
-
-    def test_unknown_event_type_raises(self):
-        with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as ctx:
-            ra.build_restart_event(
-                event_type="mcp.restart.not_a_real_event",
-                outcome="x",
-                correlation_id="rst-1",
-            )
-        self.assertIn("unknown restart audit event_type", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_reasons_and_details_are_redacted(self):
-        event = ra.build_restart_event(
-            event_type=ra.EVENT_APPLY_GATE,
-            outcome="deny",
-            correlation_id="rst-sec",
-            reasons=["token secret-xyz rejected", "ok"],
-            details={"token": "leak-token", "status": "denied"},
-        )
-        self.assertNotIn("secret-xyz", event.get("reason") or "")
-        meta = event["request_metadata"]
-        self.assertEqual(meta["details"]["token"], gitea_audit.REDACTED)
-        self.assertEqual(meta["details"]["status"], "denied")
-        for reason in meta["reasons"]:
-            self.assertNotIn("secret-xyz", reason)
-
-    def test_new_correlation_id_shape(self):
-        cid = ra.new_correlation_id()
-        self.assertTrue(cid.startswith("rst-"))
-        self.assertEqual(len(cid), len("rst-") + 16)
-
-
-class TestEmitAndRequire(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_emit_appends_json_line(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
-            path = os.path.join(d, "audit.log")
-            event = ra.build_restart_event(
-                event_type=ra.EVENT_DRAIN_PROOF,
-                outcome="pass",
-                correlation_id="rst-write",
-            )
-            self.assertTrue(ra.emit_restart_event(event, path=path))
-            with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
-                lines = fh.read().splitlines()
-            self.assertEqual(len(lines), 1)
-            loaded = json.loads(lines[0])
-            self.assertEqual(loaded["event_type"], ra.EVENT_DRAIN_PROOF)
-            self.assertEqual(loaded["correlation_id"], "rst-write")
-
-    def test_emit_never_raises(self):
-        self.assertFalse(
-            ra.emit_restart_event({"action": "x"}, path="/no/such/dir/audit.log")
-        )
-
-    def test_require_audit_denies_privileged_when_write_fails_and_enabled(self):
-        deny = ra.require_audit_or_deny(
-            privileged=True, written=False, audit_enabled=True
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(len(deny), 1)
-        self.assertIn("fail closed", deny[0])
-
-    def test_require_audit_allows_when_audit_disabled(self):
-        # Rollout policy: enable audit before enforcing deny-on-audit-fail.
-        deny = ra.require_audit_or_deny(
-            privileged=True, written=False, audit_enabled=False
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(deny, [])
-
-    def test_require_audit_noop_for_non_privileged(self):
-        deny = ra.require_audit_or_deny(
-            privileged=False, written=False, audit_enabled=True
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(deny, [])
-
-    def test_require_audit_allows_when_written(self):
-        deny = ra.require_audit_or_deny(
-            privileged=True, written=True, audit_enabled=True
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(deny, [])
-
-
-class TestIncidents(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_break_glass_descriptor(self):
-        desc = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=ra.INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS,
-            reasons=["break-glass authorized"],
-            correlation_id="rst-bg",
-            requesting_session_id="s1",
-            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="O",
-            repo="R",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(desc["kind"], ra.INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS)
-        self.assertIn("Break-glass", desc["title"])
-        self.assertIn("mcp-health", desc["labels"])
-        self.assertEqual(desc["source"], "restart_audit#665")
-
-    def test_incident_body_redacts_and_includes_correlation(self):
-        desc = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=ra.INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN,
-            reasons=["token secret-xyz failed proof"],
-            correlation_id="rst-body",
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="O",
-            repo="R",
-            proof_id="proof-1",
-        )
-        body = ra.incident_body(desc)
-        self.assertIn("rst-body", body)
-        self.assertIn("proof-1", body)
-        self.assertIn("mcp-restart-incident:v1", body)
-        self.assertNotIn("secret-xyz", body)
-
-    def test_materialize_dry_run(self):
-        desc = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=ra.INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN,
-            reasons=["denied"],
-            correlation_id="rst-dr",
-        )
-        result = ra.materialize_incident(desc, create_issue_fn=lambda **k: {}, dry_run=True)
-        self.assertFalse(result["created"])
-        self.assertTrue(result["dry_run"])
-        self.assertIn("dry-run", result["reasons"][0])
-
-    def test_materialize_without_create_fn(self):
-        desc = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=ra.INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN,
-            reasons=["denied"],
-            correlation_id="rst-nfn",
-        )
-        result = ra.materialize_incident(desc, create_issue_fn=None)
-        self.assertFalse(result["created"])
-        self.assertIn("create_issue_fn not provided", result["reasons"][0])
-
-    def test_materialize_creates_issue(self):
-        created = {}
-
-        def _create(*, title, body, labels, org=None, repo=None, **_kw):
-            created["title"] = title
-            created["body"] = body
-            created["labels"] = labels
-            created["org"] = org
-            created["repo"] = repo
-            return {"number": 999}
-
-        desc = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=ra.INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS,
-            reasons=["break-glass"],
-            correlation_id="rst-create",
-            org="O",
-            repo="R",
-        )
-        result = ra.materialize_incident(desc, create_issue_fn=_create)
-        self.assertTrue(result["created"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["issue_number"], 999)
-        self.assertIn("Break-glass", created["title"])
-        self.assertIn("rst-create", created["body"])
-        self.assertEqual(created["org"], "O")
-
-    def test_materialize_never_raises_on_create_failure(self):
-        def _boom(**_kw):
-            raise RuntimeError("token secret-xyz network")
-
-        desc = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=ra.INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN,
-            reasons=["x"],
-            correlation_id="rst-boom",
-        )
-        result = ra.materialize_incident(desc, create_issue_fn=_boom)
-        self.assertFalse(result["created"])
-        self.assertIn("failed", result["reasons"][0])
-        self.assertNotIn("secret-xyz", result["reasons"][0])
-
-
-class TestIncidentFromApplyGate(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_break_glass_always_incident(self):
-        desc = ra.incident_from_apply_gate(
-            gate_payload={"allow": True, "reasons": [], "proof_id": None},
-            break_glass=True,
-            correlation_id="rst-bg2",
-            requesting_session_id="s",
-            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="O",
-            repo="R",
-        )
-        self.assertIsNotNone(desc)
-        self.assertEqual(desc["kind"], ra.INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS)
-
-    def test_failed_drain_from_gate_incident(self):
-        desc = ra.incident_from_apply_gate(
-            gate_payload={
-                "allow": False,
-                "drain_gate_allow": False,
-                "reasons": ["proof expired"],
-                "incident": {
-                    "reasons": ["proof expired"],
-                    "proof_id": "p1",
-                },
-            },
-            break_glass=False,
-            correlation_id="rst-fd",
-            requesting_session_id="s",
-            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="O",
-            repo="R",
-        )
-        self.assertIsNotNone(desc)
-        self.assertEqual(desc["kind"], ra.INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN)
-        self.assertEqual(desc["proof_id"], "p1")
-
-    def test_allow_without_break_glass_no_incident(self):
-        desc = ra.incident_from_apply_gate(
-            gate_payload={
-                "allow": True,
-                "drain_gate_allow": True,
-                "reasons": [],
-            },
-            break_glass=False,
-            correlation_id="rst-ok",
-            requesting_session_id="s",
-            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="O",
-            repo="R",
-        )
-        self.assertIsNone(desc)
-
-
-class TestRecordLifecycle(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_record_emits_and_materializes(self):
-        created = []
-
-        def _create(**kwargs):
-            created.append(kwargs)
-            return {"number": 42}
-
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
-            path = os.path.join(d, "audit.log")
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_AUDIT_LOG": path}, clear=False):
-                incident = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-                    kind=ra.INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS,
-                    reasons=["bg"],
-                    correlation_id="rst-lc",
-                    org="O",
-                    repo="R",
-                )
-                out = ra.record_restart_lifecycle(
-                    event_type=ra.EVENT_BREAK_GLASS,
-                    outcome="break_glass",
-                    correlation_id="rst-lc",
-                    remote="prgs",
-                    org="O",
-                    repo="R",
-                    privileged=True,
-                    create_incident=incident,
-                    create_issue_fn=_create,
-                    audit_path=path,
-                )
-        self.assertTrue(out["audit_written"])
-        self.assertEqual(out["deny_reasons"], [])
-        self.assertTrue(out["incident_result"]["created"])
-        self.assertEqual(out["incident_result"]["issue_number"], 42)
-        self.assertEqual(len(created), 1)
-
-    def test_privileged_deny_when_audit_write_fails(self):
-        with patch.dict(
-            os.environ, {"GITEA_AUDIT_LOG": "/no/such/dir/a.log"}, clear=False
-        ):
-            with patch("restart_audit.emit_restart_event", return_value=False):
-                with patch("gitea_audit.audit_enabled", return_value=True):
-                    out = ra.record_restart_lifecycle(
-                        event_type=ra.EVENT_APPLY_GATE,
-                        outcome="deny",
-                        correlation_id="rst-deny",
-                        privileged=True,
-                        audit_path="/no/such/dir/a.log",
-                    )
-        self.assertFalse(out["audit_written"])
-        self.assertEqual(len(out["deny_reasons"]), 1)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()