docs(webui): document the read-only restart console surface (#667 )

Records the two GET routes, what each panel consumes, and the three properties the surface is held to: an unreadable source reports unavailable rather than green, authorization is probed with for_execution=True so a Phase 1 refusal is never shown as an allow, and the control-plane database is opened mode=ro so reading status never creates it. Refs #655 #642 #658 #661 #662 #663 #633 #652 #653 #664 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
feat(webui): add read-only console restart status and impact controls (Closes #667 )
2026-07-25 17:26:30 -04:00 · 2026-07-25 17:23:52 -04:00
11 changed files with 1470 additions and 975 deletions
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-# MCP restart audit events and incidents (#665)
-
-Restarts and recovery attempts leave a forensic trail. Failed drains and
-break-glass paths also raise durable Gitea incident issues so unsafe restarts
-cannot be silently repeated.
-
-Parent umbrella: **#655**. Related: impact coordinator **#658**, drain proof
-**#661**, restart classes **#663**, break-glass **#664**, post-restart reconcile
-**#662**, vision **#652**, roadmap **#653**, console recovery **#642**.
-
-## Components
-
-| Piece | Where | Responsibility |
-|-------|-------|----------------|
-| Event schema + emission | `restart_audit.py` | `mcp.restart.*` vocabulary, redacted payload builder, append-only sink via `gitea_audit` |
-| Fail-closed privileged gate | `restart_audit.require_audit_or_deny` | When `GITEA_AUDIT_LOG` is set and the write fails, privileged apply is denied |
-| Incident descriptors | `restart_audit.build_incident_descriptor` | Durable follow-up issues (failed drain, break-glass, reconcile unresolved, unguarded) |
-| Materializer | `restart_audit.materialize_incident` | Injected `create_issue_fn` (network kept out of pure tests) |
-| Wiring | `gitea_request_mcp_restart` | Correlation id, impact-preview audit, apply-gate / break-glass audit + incident creation |
-
-## Event vocabulary
-
-| Event type | When |
-|------------|------|
-| `mcp.restart.impact_preview` | Every `gitea_request_mcp_restart` evaluation |
-| `mcp.restart.drain_enter` | Drain window starts (schema reserved; emit from drain path) |
-| `mcp.restart.drain_exit` | Drain window ends |
-| `mcp.restart.drain_proof` | Drain-proof verification result |
-| `mcp.restart.apply_gate` | Apply hard gate (`dry_run=False`) |
-| `mcp.restart.break_glass` | Authorized break-glass bypass |
-| `mcp.restart.post_restart_reconcile` | Post-restart reconcile outcome |
-| `mcp.restart.narrower_recovery` | Narrower recovery attempt recorded |
-| `mcp.restart.unguarded_detected` | Unguarded restart path detected |
-
-All free text is redacted before sink write or issue body assembly. Emission
-never raises; callers decide fail-closed policy.
-
-## Correlation
-
-Each restart lifecycle mints a short `correlation_id` (`rst-` + 16 hex) shared
-across impact preview → apply gate → incident descriptors so operators can join
-the trail.
-
-## Privileged deny-on-audit-fail
-
-Rollout policy (issue #665):
-
-1. Configure `GITEA_AUDIT_LOG` so writes land.
-2. Only then enforce deny when a privileged restart path cannot audit.
-
-When audit is **not** configured, privileged apply still proceeds (no false
-denials during rollout). When audit **is** configured and the write fails,
-`apply_authorized` is cleared.
-
-## Incidents
-
-| Kind | Trigger |
-|------|---------|
-| `restart_failed_drain` | Apply denied by drain hard gate / failed proof |
-| `restart_break_glass` | Any authorized break-glass apply |
-| `restart_reconcile_unresolved` | Post-restart reconcile left work unresolved |
-| `restart_unguarded_detected` | Unguarded restart attempt detected |
-
-Break-glass **always** creates an incident descriptor (and a Gitea issue when
-the create path is available). Failed drain does the same. Incident bodies
-include correlation id, session, class, scope, proof id, and redacted reasons.
-
-Default labels: `mcp-health`, `safety`, `observability`, `status:ready`,
-`type:bug`, `workflow-hardening`.
-
-## Tool payload surface
-
-`gitea_request_mcp_restart` returns:
-
-* `correlation_id` — lifecycle join key
-* `restart_audit.impact_preview_written` — sink success for the preview event
-* `restart_audit.apply_gate_written` — sink success for apply/break-glass (apply only)
-* `restart_audit.incident_result` — materialization outcome when an incident was required
-* `incident` — durable descriptor (when gate requires follow-up)
-
-## Security
-
-* No secrets in audit payloads or issue bodies.
-* This module never restarts a process.
-* Drain proof verification remains #661; audit only records the decision.
-* Incident creation failures are recorded in `incident_result.reasons` and never
-  crash the restart evaluation path (audit write failure still fails closed for
-  privileged apply when the sink is enabled).
-
-## Tests
-
-See `tests/test_restart_audit.py`: schema, redaction, emission, deny policy,
-incident materialization mocks, break-glass / failed-drain selection.
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ recovery behavior for all nine classes.
 | `ControlPlaneDB.list_sessions` | `control_plane_db.py` | Read-only session inventory (the process-level unit a restart kills). |
 | `gitea_request_mcp_restart` | `gitea_mcp_server.py` | MCP tool: gathers inventory from the #613 DB, calls the coordinator, returns the report, and on `dry_run=False` runs the #661 drain-proof hard gate. Never restarts a process. |
 | `drain_proof.gate_apply_restart` | `drain_proof.py` | The #661 hard gate: verifies a drain proof against the current impact fingerprint, or records an authorized break-glass bypass. |
-| `restart_audit` | `restart_audit.py` | #665 forensic trail: `mcp.restart.*` events via `gitea_audit`, correlation ids, durable incidents for failed drain / break-glass. See [`mcp-restart-audit.md`](./mcp-restart-audit.md). |

 ## Dimensions evaluated

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+# Web Console: restart status, impact preview, and approval state (#667)
+
+Phase 1 of the console restart surface. It consumes the #655 coordinator
+substrate and displays it. It performs no restart, reload, drain, approval, or
+process action, and it registers no write endpoint.
+
+Issue #667's rollout is explicit — *status views first, write approval after the
+backend gates are green* — and this change delivers only the status half.
+
+## Surfaces
+
+| Path | Method | Purpose |
+|------|--------|---------|
+| `/runtime/restart` | GET | Restart status page |
+| `/api/v1/system/restart/status` | GET | Same snapshot as JSON |
+
+Both accept an optional `restart_class` query parameter (default
+`full_mcp_restart`). An unrecognised class is not an error: the coordinator
+resolves it as unknown and fails closed, and the page shows the resulting deny.
+
+Neither path accepts `POST`; a write attempt returns `405`, and a test asserts
+it.
+
+## What it shows
+
+* **Impact preview (#658)** — verdict, blast radius, affected sessions, leases,
+  critical sections, mutations, and the counts behind them, evaluated
+  `dry_run=True` against live control-plane state.
+* **Drain proof (#661)** — verification of a supplied proof: valid, clean,
+  expired, tampered, and the reasons behind a refusal.
+* **Post-restart reconcile (#662)** — the most recent completion proof, its
+  overall status, and which dimensions still require follow-up.
+* **Restart classes (#663)** — the least-privilege matrix, with *you may
+  request* and *you may execute* computed for the viewing role rather than for a
+  generic operator.
+* **Approval controls (#633)** — the authorization state of
+  `system.restart_namespace` and `system.reload_namespace`.
+* **Break-glass (#664)** — declared and marked unavailable; see below.
+
+## Three rules this surface holds itself to
+
+A status page that is wrong is worse than one that is missing, because an
+operator acts on it. Three properties are enforced by tests, and each was
+verified by reverting the guard and watching a test fail.
+
+### An unreadable source reports unavailable, never green
+
+Every source carries its own `SourceStatus`. Nothing substitutes a default,
+placeholder, or self-comparison for a reading that failed. An unreadable
+control-plane database yields `inventory_complete: false`, which the coordinator
+itself turns into a fail-closed verdict, and the page says the blast radius is
+unknown rather than showing an empty affected-sessions table.
+
+An absent drain proof is reported as absent — not as a pass. The #661 gate
+authorizes a restart only against a valid, unexpired, clean proof, so no proof
+is precisely the state that gate denies on.
+
+### Authorization is asked the way execution would ask it
+
+Every probe passes `for_execution=True`.
+
+Asked without it, an admin is `allowed` for `system.restart_namespace`. On a
+control surface that reads as a live button. Asked the way an execution attempt
+would ask, the same principal is refused `phase_not_active`, because the console
+is in Phase 1 and the action is Phase 2. This surface reports the second answer.
+
+`execution_enabled` is therefore `false` for every action and every role today,
+and a test asserts that across the whole role matrix.
+
+### The control-plane database is opened read-only
+
+`ControlPlaneDB()` creates directories and runs migrations on construction — a
+write. This surface never constructs one. It opens the sqlite file with
+`mode=ro`, exactly as `webui/inventory.py` does, and treats a missing file as
+missing authority rather than as an empty inventory.
+
+The test that protects this points at a path inside a directory that already
+exists, so a read-write `connect` would really create the file. A nested
+missing-directory path would have passed for the wrong reason.
+
+## Break-glass is declared, not offered
+
+The break-glass workflow (#664) is not available on this branch's base. The
+panel is rendered to operator-class roles as **unavailable**, naming the issue
+that tracks it. It is not silently omitted, because an operator who has been
+told a governance path exists needs to see that it is not wired here; and it is
+not rendered as a control, because there is nothing behind it.
+
+Unprivileged viewers see only a note that the surface is operator-class.
+
+## Redaction and escaping
+
+Every interpolated value passes through `_esc` (`html.escape(..., quote=True)`).
+Free-form text and anything that can carry a filesystem path additionally passes
+through `webui.inventory.scrub_text`, which redacts credential-shaped tokens
+inside a string rather than only at its start. The impact payload is passed
+through `webui.inventory.scrub` before rendering.
+
+## Linkage
+
+Parent #655 · extends #642 · consumes #658, #661, #662, #663 · RBAC #633 ·
+console #631 · vision #652 · roadmap #653 · break-glass #664.
@@ -2069,7 +2069,6 @@ import lease_policy  # noqa: E402
 import workflow_dashboard  # noqa: E402  # #605 live queue/lease dashboard
 import restart_coordinator  # noqa: E402  # #658 MCP restart coordinator/impact
 import drain_proof  # noqa: E402  # #661 pre-restart drain proof and hard gate
-import restart_audit  # noqa: E402  # #665 restart audit events + incidents
 import incident_bridge  # noqa: E402
 import sentry_observability  # noqa: E402  (#606 optional Sentry observability)
 import sentry_incident_bridge  # noqa: E402  (#607 Sentry→Gitea incident bridge)
@@ -22751,38 +22750,6 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
    # and a durable incident is raised. Break-glass is the only bypass and its
    # authorization is read from the environment, never self-asserted.
    payload["apply_supported"] = False
-    # #665: correlation id threads impact preview → apply gate → incidents.
-    correlation_id = restart_audit.new_correlation_id()
-    payload["correlation_id"] = correlation_id
-    auth_user = None
-    try:
-        # remote-only: host override is for operator diagnostics, not required here
-        auth_user = (gitea_whoami(remote=remote) or {}).get("username")
-    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 — identity is best-effort for audit
-        auth_user = None
-    preview_audit = restart_audit.record_restart_lifecycle(
-        event_type=restart_audit.EVENT_IMPACT_PREVIEW,
-        outcome=str(report.verdict or "unknown"),
-        correlation_id=correlation_id,
-        remote=remote,
-        org=o,
-        repo=r,
-        requesting_session_id=sid,
-        restart_class=restart_class,
-        profile_name=profile_name,
-        authenticated_username=auth_user,
-        reasons=list(report.reasons or []),
-        details={
-            "dry_run": True,
-            "allow_restart": bool(report.allow_restart),
-            "inventory_complete": inventory_complete,
-        },
-        privileged=False,
-    )
-    payload["restart_audit"] = {
-        "correlation_id": correlation_id,
-        "impact_preview_written": preview_audit["audit_written"],
-    }
    if not dry_run:
        proof_obj: dict | None = None
        proof_parse_error: str | None = None
@@ -22842,86 +22809,6 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
        )
        if not gate.allow and gate.incident is not None:
            payload["incident"] = gate.incident
-
-        # #665: audit apply-gate + materialize durable incidents for failed
-        # drain and break-glass. Privileged apply denies if audit is enabled
-        # and the sink write fails.
-        incident_desc = restart_audit.incident_from_apply_gate(
-            gate_payload={
-                **gate_payload,
-                "incident": gate.incident,
-                "allow": gate.allow,
-            },
-            break_glass=break_glass,
-            correlation_id=correlation_id,
-            requesting_session_id=sid,
-            restart_class=restart_class,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=o,
-            repo=r,
-        )
-        if incident_desc is not None:
-            payload["incident"] = incident_desc
-
-        def _create_restart_incident_issue(
-            *, title, body, labels, org=None, repo=None, **_kw
-        ):
-            return gitea_create_issue(
-                title=title,
-                body=body,
-                labels=labels,
-                remote=remote,
-                host=h,
-                org=org or o,
-                repo=repo or r,
-            )
-
-        apply_audit = restart_audit.record_restart_lifecycle(
-            event_type=(
-                restart_audit.EVENT_BREAK_GLASS
-                if break_glass
-                else restart_audit.EVENT_APPLY_GATE
-            ),
-            outcome=(
-                "break_glass"
-                if break_glass
-                else ("allow" if payload["apply_authorized"] else "deny")
-            ),
-            correlation_id=correlation_id,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=o,
-            repo=r,
-            requesting_session_id=sid,
-            restart_class=restart_class,
-            profile_name=profile_name,
-            authenticated_username=auth_user,
-            reasons=list(gate_payload.get("reasons") or []),
-            details={
-                "apply_authorized": payload["apply_authorized"],
-                "drain_gate_allow": gate_payload.get("drain_gate_allow"),
-                "restart_class_authorized": restart_class_authorized,
-                "break_glass": break_glass,
-                "proof_id": gate_payload.get("proof_id"),
-            },
-            privileged=True,
-            create_incident=incident_desc,
-            create_issue_fn=_create_restart_incident_issue
-            if incident_desc is not None
-            else None,
-            dry_run_incident=False,
-        )
-        payload["restart_audit"] = {
-            "correlation_id": correlation_id,
-            "impact_preview_written": preview_audit["audit_written"],
-            "apply_gate_written": apply_audit["audit_written"],
-            "incident_result": apply_audit.get("incident_result"),
-        }
-        if apply_audit["deny_reasons"]:
-            payload["apply_authorized"] = False
-            payload["reasons"] = list(payload.get("reasons") or []) + list(
-                apply_audit["deny_reasons"]
-            )
-            payload["success"] = True
    return payload


@@ -1,426 +0,0 @@
-"""MCP restart lifecycle audit events and incident materialization (#665).
-
-Restarts and recovery attempts must leave a forensic trail: impact previews,
-drain enter/exit, drain-proof results, apply gate verdicts, break-glass, and
-post-restart reconcile outcomes. Failed drains and break-glass must also raise
-durable Gitea incident issues so they cannot be silently repeated.
-
-This module is the pure + sink layer for that trail:
-
-* **Schema** — ``mcp.restart.*`` event names and a redacted payload builder.
-* **Emission** — append-only via :mod:`gitea_audit` (off when ``GITEA_AUDIT_LOG``
-  is unset; privileged apply can still *require* a successful write).
-* **Incidents** — descriptors for failed drain / break-glass / unguarded restart,
-  plus an optional materializer that creates a Gitea issue through an injected
-  ``create_issue_fn`` (keeps this module free of network I/O in tests).
-
-Design rules:
-
-* **No secrets.** All free text is redacted before write or issue body assembly.
-* **Never raises from emission.** ``emit_restart_event`` returns False on sink
-  failure so callers can decide fail-closed policy for privileged restarts.
-* **Does not restart.** Audit never executes a process restart.
-* **Drain proof stays #661.** This module records what the gate decided; it
-  does not re-verify proofs.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import uuid
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, Sequence
-
-import gitea_audit
-
-# ── Event vocabulary (stable identifiers for operators + tests) ───────────────
-
-EVENT_IMPACT_PREVIEW = "mcp.restart.impact_preview"
-EVENT_DRAIN_ENTER = "mcp.restart.drain_enter"
-EVENT_DRAIN_EXIT = "mcp.restart.drain_exit"
-EVENT_DRAIN_PROOF = "mcp.restart.drain_proof"
-EVENT_APPLY_GATE = "mcp.restart.apply_gate"
-EVENT_BREAK_GLASS = "mcp.restart.break_glass"
-EVENT_POST_RESTART_RECONCILE = "mcp.restart.post_restart_reconcile"
-EVENT_NARROWER_RECOVERY = "mcp.restart.narrower_recovery"
-EVENT_UNGUARDED_DETECTED = "mcp.restart.unguarded_detected"
-
-RESTART_EVENT_TYPES: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
-    {
-        EVENT_IMPACT_PREVIEW,
-        EVENT_DRAIN_ENTER,
-        EVENT_DRAIN_EXIT,
-        EVENT_DRAIN_PROOF,
-        EVENT_APPLY_GATE,
-        EVENT_BREAK_GLASS,
-        EVENT_POST_RESTART_RECONCILE,
-        EVENT_NARROWER_RECOVERY,
-        EVENT_UNGUARDED_DETECTED,
-    }
-)
-
-# Incident kinds (durable Gitea issues).
-INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN = "restart_failed_drain"
-INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS = "restart_break_glass"
-INCIDENT_RECONCILE_UNRESOLVED = "restart_reconcile_unresolved"
-INCIDENT_UNGUARDED = "restart_unguarded_detected"
-
-DEFAULT_INCIDENT_LABELS: tuple[str, ...] = (
-    "mcp-health",
-    "safety",
-    "observability",
-    "status:ready",
-    "type:bug",
-    "workflow-hardening",
-)
-
-CreateIssueFn = Callable[..., dict[str, Any]]
-
-
-def _utc_now_iso() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
-
-
-def new_correlation_id() -> str:
-    """Mint a short correlation id shared across a restart lifecycle."""
-    return f"rst-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]}"
-
-
-def build_restart_event(
-    *,
-    event_type: str,
-    outcome: str,
-    correlation_id: str | None = None,
-    remote: str | None = None,
-    org: str | None = None,
-    repo: str | None = None,
-    requesting_session_id: str | None = None,
-    restart_class: str | None = None,
-    profile_name: str | None = None,
-    authenticated_username: str | None = None,
-    reasons: Sequence[str] | None = None,
-    details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-    now: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build a redacted ``mcp.restart.*`` audit event.
-
-    Raises ``ValueError`` on unknown event types so a typo cannot silently land
-    under a free-form action name.
-    """
-    name = str(event_type or "").strip()
-    if name not in RESTART_EVENT_TYPES:
-        raise ValueError(
-            f"unknown restart audit event_type {name!r}; expected one of "
-            f"{sorted(RESTART_EVENT_TYPES)}"
-        )
-    redacted_reasons = [
-        gitea_audit.redact(str(r)) for r in (reasons or []) if str(r).strip()
-    ]
-    redacted_details = gitea_audit.redact(dict(details or {}))
-    if not isinstance(redacted_details, dict):
-        redacted_details = {"value": redacted_details}
-
-    event = gitea_audit.build_event(
-        action=name,
-        result=str(outcome or "unknown"),
-        remote=remote,
-        repository=f"{org}/{repo}" if org and repo else None,
-        profile_name=profile_name,
-        authenticated_username=authenticated_username,
-        reason="; ".join(redacted_reasons) if redacted_reasons else None,
-        request_metadata={
-            "event_family": "mcp.restart",
-            "correlation_id": correlation_id or new_correlation_id(),
-            "restart_class": restart_class,
-            "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
-            "org": org,
-            "repo": repo,
-            "details": redacted_details,
-            "reasons": redacted_reasons,
-        },
-        now=now or _utc_now_iso(),
-        operation=name,
-    )
-    event["action_type"] = "restart_lifecycle"
-    event["event_type"] = name
-    event["correlation_id"] = (event.get("request_metadata") or {}).get(
-        "correlation_id"
-    )
-    return event
-
-
-def emit_restart_event(event: Mapping[str, Any], *, path: str | None = None) -> bool:
-    """Append *event* to the audit sink. Never raises. Returns write success."""
-    try:
-        return bool(gitea_audit.write_event(dict(event), path=path))
-    except Exception:
-        return False
-
-
-def require_audit_or_deny(
-    *,
-    privileged: bool,
-    written: bool,
-    audit_enabled: bool | None = None,
-) -> list[str]:
-    """Return deny reasons when a privileged restart path fails to audit.
-
-    When audit is not configured (``GITEA_AUDIT_LOG`` unset), privileged apply
-    still proceeds under the rollout policy "enable audit before enforcing
-    deny-on-audit-fail" — but *if* audit is enabled and the write fails,
-    privileged apply is denied (fail closed).
-    """
-    enabled = (
-        gitea_audit.audit_enabled() if audit_enabled is None else bool(audit_enabled)
-    )
-    if not privileged:
-        return []
-    if not enabled:
-        return []
-    if written:
-        return []
-    return [
-        "privileged restart path requires a successful audit write; "
-        "audit sink failed (fail closed, #665)"
-    ]
-
-
-# ── Incident descriptors ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def build_incident_descriptor(
-    *,
-    kind: str,
-    reasons: Sequence[str],
-    correlation_id: str | None = None,
-    requesting_session_id: str | None = None,
-    restart_class: str | None = None,
-    remote: str | None = None,
-    org: str | None = None,
-    repo: str | None = None,
-    proof_id: str | None = None,
-    at: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build a durable incident descriptor (no network)."""
-    titles = {
-        INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN: "Restart denied: drain proof failed the hard gate",
-        INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS: "Break-glass MCP restart authorized",
-        INCIDENT_RECONCILE_UNRESOLVED: "Post-restart reconcile left unresolved work",
-        INCIDENT_UNGUARDED: "Unguarded MCP restart attempt detected",
-    }
-    title = titles.get(kind, f"MCP restart incident ({kind})")
-    redacted_reasons = [
-        gitea_audit.redact(str(r)) for r in reasons if str(r).strip()
-    ]
-    return {
-        "kind": kind,
-        "title": title,
-        "labels": list(DEFAULT_INCIDENT_LABELS),
-        "reasons": redacted_reasons,
-        "correlation_id": correlation_id,
-        "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
-        "restart_class": restart_class,
-        "remote": remote,
-        "org": org,
-        "repo": repo,
-        "proof_id": proof_id,
-        "at": at or _utc_now_iso(),
-        "source": "restart_audit#665",
-    }
-
-
-def incident_body(descriptor: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
-    """Render a redacted markdown body for a Gitea incident issue."""
-    reasons = descriptor.get("reasons") or []
-    reason_lines = "\n".join(f"- {gitea_audit.redact(str(r))}" for r in reasons) or (
-        "- (no reasons recorded)"
-    )
-    return "\n".join(
-        [
-            "<!-- mcp-restart-incident:v1 -->",
-            f"## MCP restart incident (`{descriptor.get('kind')}`)",
-            "",
-            f"**Correlation:** `{descriptor.get('correlation_id') or 'none'}`",
-            f"**Session:** `{descriptor.get('requesting_session_id') or 'none'}`",
-            f"**Class:** `{descriptor.get('restart_class') or 'none'}`",
-            f"**Scope:** `{descriptor.get('remote')}/{descriptor.get('org')}/"
-            f"{descriptor.get('repo')}`",
-            f"**At:** `{descriptor.get('at')}`",
-            f"**Proof id:** `{descriptor.get('proof_id') or 'none'}`",
-            "",
-            "### Reasons",
-            reason_lines,
-            "",
-            "### Operator next steps",
-            "- Treat this as durable follow-up work under the restart-governance umbrella (#655).",
-            "- Do not invent a second restart path; use sanctioned coordinator tools only.",
-            "- Raw secrets must never appear in this issue (already redacted).",
-            "",
-            f"_Source: {descriptor.get('source')}_",
-        ]
-    )
-
-
-def materialize_incident(
-    descriptor: Mapping[str, Any],
-    *,
-    create_issue_fn: CreateIssueFn | None,
-    dry_run: bool = False,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Create a Gitea issue from *descriptor* when *create_issue_fn* is provided.
-
-    Returns a result dict with ``created`` / ``issue_number`` / ``dry_run`` /
-    ``reasons``. Never raises.
-    """
-    base: dict[str, Any] = {
-        "created": False,
-        "dry_run": bool(dry_run),
-        "issue_number": None,
-        "kind": descriptor.get("kind"),
-        "reasons": [],
-        "descriptor": dict(descriptor),
-    }
-    if dry_run:
-        base["reasons"] = ["dry-run only; no Gitea issue created"]
-        return base
-    if create_issue_fn is None:
-        base["reasons"] = [
-            "create_issue_fn not provided; incident descriptor retained only"
-        ]
-        return base
-    try:
-        result = create_issue_fn(
-            title=str(descriptor.get("title") or "MCP restart incident"),
-            body=incident_body(descriptor),
-            labels=list(descriptor.get("labels") or DEFAULT_INCIDENT_LABELS),
-            org=descriptor.get("org"),
-            repo=descriptor.get("repo"),
-        )
-        number = None
-        if isinstance(result, dict):
-            number = result.get("number") or result.get("issue_number")
-        if number is not None:
-            base["created"] = True
-            base["issue_number"] = int(number)
-            base["reasons"] = [f"created incident issue #{int(number)}"]
-        else:
-            base["reasons"] = ["create_issue_fn returned no issue number"]
-    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — never break restart path here
-        base["reasons"] = [
-            f"incident issue creation failed: {gitea_audit.redact(str(exc))}"
-        ]
-    return base
-
-
-def record_restart_lifecycle(
-    *,
-    event_type: str,
-    outcome: str,
-    correlation_id: str,
-    remote: str | None = None,
-    org: str | None = None,
-    repo: str | None = None,
-    requesting_session_id: str | None = None,
-    restart_class: str | None = None,
-    profile_name: str | None = None,
-    authenticated_username: str | None = None,
-    reasons: Sequence[str] | None = None,
-    details: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-    privileged: bool = False,
-    create_incident: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
-    create_issue_fn: CreateIssueFn | None = None,
-    dry_run_incident: bool = False,
-    audit_path: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Emit one restart audit event and optionally materialize an incident.
-
-    Returns ``{event, audit_written, deny_reasons, incident_result}``.
-    """
-    event = build_restart_event(
-        event_type=event_type,
-        outcome=outcome,
-        correlation_id=correlation_id,
-        remote=remote,
-        org=org,
-        repo=repo,
-        requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id,
-        restart_class=restart_class,
-        profile_name=profile_name,
-        authenticated_username=authenticated_username,
-        reasons=reasons,
-        details=details,
-    )
-    written = emit_restart_event(event, path=audit_path)
-    deny = require_audit_or_deny(privileged=privileged, written=written)
-    incident_result = None
-    if create_incident is not None:
-        incident_result = materialize_incident(
-            create_incident,
-            create_issue_fn=create_issue_fn,
-            dry_run=dry_run_incident,
-        )
-    return {
-        "event": event,
-        "audit_written": written,
-        "deny_reasons": deny,
-        "incident_result": incident_result,
-        "correlation_id": correlation_id,
-    }
-
-
-def incident_from_apply_gate(
-    *,
-    gate_payload: Mapping[str, Any],
-    break_glass: bool,
-    correlation_id: str,
-    requesting_session_id: str | None,
-    restart_class: str | None,
-    remote: str | None,
-    org: str | None,
-    repo: str | None,
-) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Choose an incident descriptor from an apply-gate payload, if required."""
-    reasons = list(gate_payload.get("reasons") or [])
-    proof_id = gate_payload.get("proof_id")
-    if break_glass:
-        return build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS,
-            reasons=reasons
-            or ["break-glass restart path used; durable incident required (#665)"],
-            correlation_id=correlation_id,
-            requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id,
-            restart_class=restart_class,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=org,
-            repo=repo,
-            proof_id=proof_id if isinstance(proof_id, str) else None,
-        )
-    # Failed drain / deny path.
-    incident = gate_payload.get("incident")
-    if isinstance(incident, Mapping) and incident:
-        # Normalize gate-provided descriptor into our schema.
-        return build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN,
-            reasons=list(incident.get("reasons") or reasons),
-            correlation_id=correlation_id,
-            requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id
-            or incident.get("requesting_session_id"),
-            restart_class=restart_class,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=org,
-            repo=repo,
-            proof_id=incident.get("proof_id") or proof_id,
-            at=incident.get("at"),
-        )
-    if not gate_payload.get("allow") and not gate_payload.get("drain_gate_allow", True):
-        return build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN,
-            reasons=reasons or ["restart apply denied"],
-            correlation_id=correlation_id,
-            requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id,
-            restart_class=restart_class,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=org,
-            repo=repo,
-            proof_id=proof_id if isinstance(proof_id, str) else None,
-        )
-    return None
@@ -1,342 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for MCP restart lifecycle audit events and incidents (#665)."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-import gitea_audit
-import restart_audit as ra
-
-
-class TestEventSchema(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_all_lifecycle_event_types_are_named(self):
-        expected = {
-            "mcp.restart.impact_preview",
-            "mcp.restart.drain_enter",
-            "mcp.restart.drain_exit",
-            "mcp.restart.drain_proof",
-            "mcp.restart.apply_gate",
-            "mcp.restart.break_glass",
-            "mcp.restart.post_restart_reconcile",
-            "mcp.restart.narrower_recovery",
-            "mcp.restart.unguarded_detected",
-        }
-        self.assertEqual(set(ra.RESTART_EVENT_TYPES), expected)
-
-    def test_build_restart_event_core_fields(self):
-        event = ra.build_restart_event(
-            event_type=ra.EVENT_IMPACT_PREVIEW,
-            outcome="safe",
-            correlation_id="rst-abc123",
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-            repo="Gitea-Tools",
-            requesting_session_id="sess-1",
-            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
-            profile_name="prgs-author",
-            authenticated_username="bot",
-            reasons=["inventory complete"],
-            details={"allow_restart": True},
-            now="2026-07-25T12:00:00+00:00",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(event["event_type"], ra.EVENT_IMPACT_PREVIEW)
-        self.assertEqual(event["action"], ra.EVENT_IMPACT_PREVIEW)
-        self.assertEqual(event["action_type"], "restart_lifecycle")
-        self.assertEqual(event["result"], "safe")
-        self.assertEqual(event["correlation_id"], "rst-abc123")
-        self.assertEqual(event["profile_name"], "prgs-author")
-        self.assertEqual(event["authenticated_username"], "bot")
-        meta = event["request_metadata"]
-        self.assertEqual(meta["event_family"], "mcp.restart")
-        self.assertEqual(meta["correlation_id"], "rst-abc123")
-        self.assertEqual(meta["restart_class"], "full_mcp_restart")
-        self.assertEqual(meta["details"]["allow_restart"], True)
-
-    def test_unknown_event_type_raises(self):
-        with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as ctx:
-            ra.build_restart_event(
-                event_type="mcp.restart.not_a_real_event",
-                outcome="x",
-                correlation_id="rst-1",
-            )
-        self.assertIn("unknown restart audit event_type", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_reasons_and_details_are_redacted(self):
-        event = ra.build_restart_event(
-            event_type=ra.EVENT_APPLY_GATE,
-            outcome="deny",
-            correlation_id="rst-sec",
-            reasons=["token secret-xyz rejected", "ok"],
-            details={"token": "leak-token", "status": "denied"},
-        )
-        self.assertNotIn("secret-xyz", event.get("reason") or "")
-        meta = event["request_metadata"]
-        self.assertEqual(meta["details"]["token"], gitea_audit.REDACTED)
-        self.assertEqual(meta["details"]["status"], "denied")
-        for reason in meta["reasons"]:
-            self.assertNotIn("secret-xyz", reason)
-
-    def test_new_correlation_id_shape(self):
-        cid = ra.new_correlation_id()
-        self.assertTrue(cid.startswith("rst-"))
-        self.assertEqual(len(cid), len("rst-") + 16)
-
-
-class TestEmitAndRequire(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_emit_appends_json_line(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
-            path = os.path.join(d, "audit.log")
-            event = ra.build_restart_event(
-                event_type=ra.EVENT_DRAIN_PROOF,
-                outcome="pass",
-                correlation_id="rst-write",
-            )
-            self.assertTrue(ra.emit_restart_event(event, path=path))
-            with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
-                lines = fh.read().splitlines()
-            self.assertEqual(len(lines), 1)
-            loaded = json.loads(lines[0])
-            self.assertEqual(loaded["event_type"], ra.EVENT_DRAIN_PROOF)
-            self.assertEqual(loaded["correlation_id"], "rst-write")
-
-    def test_emit_never_raises(self):
-        self.assertFalse(
-            ra.emit_restart_event({"action": "x"}, path="/no/such/dir/audit.log")
-        )
-
-    def test_require_audit_denies_privileged_when_write_fails_and_enabled(self):
-        deny = ra.require_audit_or_deny(
-            privileged=True, written=False, audit_enabled=True
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(len(deny), 1)
-        self.assertIn("fail closed", deny[0])
-
-    def test_require_audit_allows_when_audit_disabled(self):
-        # Rollout policy: enable audit before enforcing deny-on-audit-fail.
-        deny = ra.require_audit_or_deny(
-            privileged=True, written=False, audit_enabled=False
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(deny, [])
-
-    def test_require_audit_noop_for_non_privileged(self):
-        deny = ra.require_audit_or_deny(
-            privileged=False, written=False, audit_enabled=True
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(deny, [])
-
-    def test_require_audit_allows_when_written(self):
-        deny = ra.require_audit_or_deny(
-            privileged=True, written=True, audit_enabled=True
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(deny, [])
-
-
-class TestIncidents(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_break_glass_descriptor(self):
-        desc = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=ra.INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS,
-            reasons=["break-glass authorized"],
-            correlation_id="rst-bg",
-            requesting_session_id="s1",
-            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="O",
-            repo="R",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(desc["kind"], ra.INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS)
-        self.assertIn("Break-glass", desc["title"])
-        self.assertIn("mcp-health", desc["labels"])
-        self.assertEqual(desc["source"], "restart_audit#665")
-
-    def test_incident_body_redacts_and_includes_correlation(self):
-        desc = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=ra.INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN,
-            reasons=["token secret-xyz failed proof"],
-            correlation_id="rst-body",
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="O",
-            repo="R",
-            proof_id="proof-1",
-        )
-        body = ra.incident_body(desc)
-        self.assertIn("rst-body", body)
-        self.assertIn("proof-1", body)
-        self.assertIn("mcp-restart-incident:v1", body)
-        self.assertNotIn("secret-xyz", body)
-
-    def test_materialize_dry_run(self):
-        desc = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=ra.INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN,
-            reasons=["denied"],
-            correlation_id="rst-dr",
-        )
-        result = ra.materialize_incident(desc, create_issue_fn=lambda **k: {}, dry_run=True)
-        self.assertFalse(result["created"])
-        self.assertTrue(result["dry_run"])
-        self.assertIn("dry-run", result["reasons"][0])
-
-    def test_materialize_without_create_fn(self):
-        desc = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=ra.INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN,
-            reasons=["denied"],
-            correlation_id="rst-nfn",
-        )
-        result = ra.materialize_incident(desc, create_issue_fn=None)
-        self.assertFalse(result["created"])
-        self.assertIn("create_issue_fn not provided", result["reasons"][0])
-
-    def test_materialize_creates_issue(self):
-        created = {}
-
-        def _create(*, title, body, labels, org=None, repo=None, **_kw):
-            created["title"] = title
-            created["body"] = body
-            created["labels"] = labels
-            created["org"] = org
-            created["repo"] = repo
-            return {"number": 999}
-
-        desc = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=ra.INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS,
-            reasons=["break-glass"],
-            correlation_id="rst-create",
-            org="O",
-            repo="R",
-        )
-        result = ra.materialize_incident(desc, create_issue_fn=_create)
-        self.assertTrue(result["created"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["issue_number"], 999)
-        self.assertIn("Break-glass", created["title"])
-        self.assertIn("rst-create", created["body"])
-        self.assertEqual(created["org"], "O")
-
-    def test_materialize_never_raises_on_create_failure(self):
-        def _boom(**_kw):
-            raise RuntimeError("token secret-xyz network")
-
-        desc = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-            kind=ra.INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN,
-            reasons=["x"],
-            correlation_id="rst-boom",
-        )
-        result = ra.materialize_incident(desc, create_issue_fn=_boom)
-        self.assertFalse(result["created"])
-        self.assertIn("failed", result["reasons"][0])
-        self.assertNotIn("secret-xyz", result["reasons"][0])
-
-
-class TestIncidentFromApplyGate(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_break_glass_always_incident(self):
-        desc = ra.incident_from_apply_gate(
-            gate_payload={"allow": True, "reasons": [], "proof_id": None},
-            break_glass=True,
-            correlation_id="rst-bg2",
-            requesting_session_id="s",
-            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="O",
-            repo="R",
-        )
-        self.assertIsNotNone(desc)
-        self.assertEqual(desc["kind"], ra.INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS)
-
-    def test_failed_drain_from_gate_incident(self):
-        desc = ra.incident_from_apply_gate(
-            gate_payload={
-                "allow": False,
-                "drain_gate_allow": False,
-                "reasons": ["proof expired"],
-                "incident": {
-                    "reasons": ["proof expired"],
-                    "proof_id": "p1",
-                },
-            },
-            break_glass=False,
-            correlation_id="rst-fd",
-            requesting_session_id="s",
-            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="O",
-            repo="R",
-        )
-        self.assertIsNotNone(desc)
-        self.assertEqual(desc["kind"], ra.INCIDENT_FAILED_DRAIN)
-        self.assertEqual(desc["proof_id"], "p1")
-
-    def test_allow_without_break_glass_no_incident(self):
-        desc = ra.incident_from_apply_gate(
-            gate_payload={
-                "allow": True,
-                "drain_gate_allow": True,
-                "reasons": [],
-            },
-            break_glass=False,
-            correlation_id="rst-ok",
-            requesting_session_id="s",
-            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="O",
-            repo="R",
-        )
-        self.assertIsNone(desc)
-
-
-class TestRecordLifecycle(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_record_emits_and_materializes(self):
-        created = []
-
-        def _create(**kwargs):
-            created.append(kwargs)
-            return {"number": 42}
-
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
-            path = os.path.join(d, "audit.log")
-            with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_AUDIT_LOG": path}, clear=False):
-                incident = ra.build_incident_descriptor(
-                    kind=ra.INCIDENT_BREAK_GLASS,
-                    reasons=["bg"],
-                    correlation_id="rst-lc",
-                    org="O",
-                    repo="R",
-                )
-                out = ra.record_restart_lifecycle(
-                    event_type=ra.EVENT_BREAK_GLASS,
-                    outcome="break_glass",
-                    correlation_id="rst-lc",
-                    remote="prgs",
-                    org="O",
-                    repo="R",
-                    privileged=True,
-                    create_incident=incident,
-                    create_issue_fn=_create,
-                    audit_path=path,
-                )
-        self.assertTrue(out["audit_written"])
-        self.assertEqual(out["deny_reasons"], [])
-        self.assertTrue(out["incident_result"]["created"])
-        self.assertEqual(out["incident_result"]["issue_number"], 42)
-        self.assertEqual(len(created), 1)
-
-    def test_privileged_deny_when_audit_write_fails(self):
-        with patch.dict(
-            os.environ, {"GITEA_AUDIT_LOG": "/no/such/dir/a.log"}, clear=False
-        ):
-            with patch("restart_audit.emit_restart_event", return_value=False):
-                with patch("gitea_audit.audit_enabled", return_value=True):
-                    out = ra.record_restart_lifecycle(
-                        event_type=ra.EVENT_APPLY_GATE,
-                        outcome="deny",
-                        correlation_id="rst-deny",
-                        privileged=True,
-                        audit_path="/no/such/dir/a.log",
-                    )
-        self.assertFalse(out["audit_written"])
-        self.assertEqual(len(out["deny_reasons"]), 1)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,452 @@
+"""Read-only restart console: views, gates, and honesty rules (#667).
+
+The console consumes the #655 substrate. These tests hold it to the three
+properties that make a status surface trustworthy:
+
+* an unreadable source is reported unavailable, never rendered as green;
+* authorization is probed the way execution would probe it, so an allow is
+  never shown for something that could not run;
+* the surface performs no mutation, including no write to the control-plane DB.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient  # noqa: E402
+
+import restart_coordinator  # noqa: E402
+from webui import console_authz, restart_console, restart_views  # noqa: E402
+from webui.app import create_app  # noqa: E402
+
+NOW = datetime(2026, 7, 25, 21, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _principal(role: str) -> console_authz.Principal:
+    return console_authz.Principal(
+        subject="[email protected]",
+        role=role,
+        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV,
+        authenticated=True,
+    )
+
+
+def _inventory(*, complete: bool = True, sessions=(), leases=()):
+    def _read(**_kwargs):
+        return {
+            "sessions": list(sessions),
+            "leases": list(leases),
+            "terminal_lock": None,
+            "prior_recovery_attempts": [],
+            "inventory_complete": complete,
+            "incomplete_reasons": (
+                [] if complete else ["fixture: inventory withheld"]
+            ),
+        }
+
+    return _read
+
+
+def _live_session(session_id: str = "prgs-author-1234-abcd") -> dict:
+    return {
+        "session_id": session_id,
+        "role": "author",
+        "profile": "prgs-author",
+        "pid": os.getpid(),
+        "status": "active",
+        "last_heartbeat_at": (NOW - timedelta(seconds=30)).isoformat(),
+    }
+
+
+def drain_proof_fixture() -> dict:
+    """A structurally complete but unsigned drain proof."""
+    return {
+        "version": "drain-proof/v1",
+        "proof_id": "deadbeef" * 8,
+        "clean": True,
+        "issued_at": (NOW - timedelta(minutes=1)).isoformat(),
+        "expires_at": (NOW + timedelta(minutes=5)).isoformat(),
+        "requesting_session_id": "s-live",
+        "impact_fingerprint": "f" * 64,
+        "checks": [],
+        "failed_checks": [],
+    }
+
+
+class RestartClassMatrixTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_every_policy_class_is_rendered(self) -> None:
+        views = restart_console.build_restart_class_views("operator")
+        self.assertEqual(len(views), len(restart_coordinator.RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES))
+
+    def test_viewer_capability_is_role_scoped_not_generic(self) -> None:
+        """A worker role must not be shown as able to request a full restart."""
+        author = {
+            v.restart_class: v
+            for v in restart_console.build_restart_class_views("author")
+        }
+        operator = {
+            v.restart_class: v
+            for v in restart_console.build_restart_class_views("operator")
+        }
+        full = restart_coordinator.RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART.value
+
+        self.assertFalse(author[full].viewer_may_request)
+        self.assertFalse(author[full].viewer_may_execute)
+        self.assertTrue(operator[full].viewer_may_request)
+        self.assertTrue(operator[full].viewer_may_execute)
+
+    def test_unknown_role_may_do_nothing(self) -> None:
+        views = restart_console.build_restart_class_views("not-a-role")
+        self.assertTrue(all(not v.viewer_may_request for v in views))
+        self.assertTrue(all(not v.viewer_may_execute for v in views))
+
+
+class AuthorizationProbeTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_probe_asks_for_execution_so_phase_gate_is_reported(self) -> None:
+        """An admin clears the role bar and still cannot execute in Phase 1.
+
+        This is the case that distinguishes the two probes. Asked without
+        ``for_execution`` an admin is *allowed* for ``system.restart_namespace``,
+        which on a control surface reads as a live button. Asked the way
+        execution asks, the same principal is refused ``phase_not_active``. The
+        console must report the second answer.
+        """
+        by_id = {
+            a.action_id: a
+            for a in restart_console.build_action_authorizations(
+                _principal(console_authz.ADMIN)
+            )
+        }
+        restart = by_id["system.restart_namespace"]
+
+        self.assertFalse(restart.execution_enabled)
+        self.assertEqual(restart.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE)
+
+        permissive = console_authz.authorize(
+            "system.restart_namespace", _principal(console_authz.ADMIN)
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(
+            permissive.allowed,
+            "guard precondition: without for_execution an admin is allowed, "
+            "which is exactly why the console must not probe that way",
+        )
+
+    def test_operator_is_refused_the_admin_only_restart_action(self) -> None:
+        """Role refusal precedes the phase gate and is reported as such."""
+        by_id = {
+            a.action_id: a
+            for a in restart_console.build_action_authorizations(
+                _principal(console_authz.OPERATOR)
+            )
+        }
+        self.assertEqual(
+            by_id["system.restart_namespace"].reason_code,
+            console_authz.DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE,
+        )
+
+    def test_anonymous_is_denied_unauthenticated(self) -> None:
+        by_id = {
+            a.action_id: a for a in restart_console.build_action_authorizations(None)
+        }
+        self.assertEqual(
+            by_id["system.restart_namespace"].reason_code,
+            console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED,
+        )
+
+    def test_no_authorization_ever_reports_execution_enabled(self) -> None:
+        for role in (
+            console_authz.VIEWER,
+            console_authz.OPERATOR,
+            console_authz.CONTROLLER,
+            console_authz.ADMIN,
+        ):
+            for auth in restart_console.build_action_authorizations(_principal(role)):
+                self.assertFalse(
+                    auth.execution_enabled,
+                    f"{role} reported execution_enabled for {auth.action_id}",
+                )
+
+
+class ImpactPreviewTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_impact_renders_from_coordinator_dto(self) -> None:
+        impact, source = restart_console.load_impact_report(
+            principal=_principal(console_authz.OPERATOR),
+            read_inventory=_inventory(sessions=[_live_session()]),
+            now=NOW,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(source.available)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(impact)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            impact["restart_class"],
+            restart_coordinator.RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART.value,
+        )
+        self.assertIn("verdict", impact)
+        self.assertFalse(impact["restart_performed"])
+        self.assertTrue(impact["dry_run"])
+
+    def test_incomplete_inventory_is_surfaced_and_denies(self) -> None:
+        impact, source = restart_console.load_impact_report(
+            principal=_principal(console_authz.OPERATOR),
+            read_inventory=_inventory(complete=False),
+            now=NOW,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(impact["inventory_complete"])
+        self.assertFalse(impact["allow_restart"])
+        self.assertTrue(source.detail, "incomplete inventory must explain itself")
+
+    def test_inventory_reader_failure_is_unavailable_not_empty(self) -> None:
+        """A reader that raises must not be rendered as 'no sessions affected'."""
+
+        def _boom(**_kwargs):
+            raise RuntimeError("control-plane unreachable")
+
+        impact, source = restart_console.load_impact_report(
+            principal=_principal(console_authz.OPERATOR),
+            read_inventory=_boom,
+            now=NOW,
+        )
+        self.assertIsNone(impact)
+        self.assertFalse(source.available)
+        self.assertIn("control-plane unreachable", source.detail)
+
+
+class ControlPlaneReadTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_missing_database_is_incomplete_not_empty(self) -> None:
+        inventory = restart_console.read_control_plane_inventory(
+            db_path="/nonexistent/control-plane.sqlite3"
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(inventory["inventory_complete"])
+        self.assertEqual(inventory["sessions"], [])
+        self.assertTrue(inventory["incomplete_reasons"])
+
+    def test_reader_never_creates_the_database(self) -> None:
+        """Reading status must not bring a control-plane DB into existence.
+
+        The path deliberately sits in a directory that already exists: a
+        read-write ``sqlite3.connect`` would happily create the file there, so
+        this fails if the reader ever stops opening the database ``mode=ro``.
+        A nested-missing-directory path would pass for the wrong reason,
+        because sqlite cannot create the parent directory either way.
+        """
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            path = os.path.join(tmp, "control_plane.sqlite3")
+            self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(os.path.dirname(path)))
+
+            inventory = restart_console.read_control_plane_inventory(db_path=path)
+
+            self.assertFalse(
+                os.path.exists(path),
+                "reading restart status created a control-plane database",
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(inventory["inventory_complete"])
+
+    def test_reads_active_sessions_from_a_real_database(self) -> None:
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            path = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3")
+            conn = sqlite3.connect(path)
+            conn.execute(
+                "CREATE TABLE sessions (session_id TEXT, role TEXT, profile TEXT,"
+                " pid INTEGER, status TEXT, last_heartbeat_at TEXT)"
+            )
+            conn.execute(
+                "CREATE TABLE work_items (work_item_id INTEGER, kind TEXT,"
+                " number INTEGER)"
+            )
+            conn.execute(
+                "CREATE TABLE leases (lease_id TEXT, session_id TEXT, role TEXT,"
+                " phase TEXT, status TEXT, worktree_path TEXT,"
+                " work_item_id INTEGER, expires_at TEXT)"
+            )
+            conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO sessions VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                ("s-live", "author", "prgs-author", 4242, "active", NOW.isoformat()),
+            )
+            conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO sessions VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                ("s-done", "author", "prgs-author", 11, "closed", NOW.isoformat()),
+            )
+            conn.execute("INSERT INTO work_items VALUES (1, 'issue', 667)")
+            conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO leases VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
+                (
+                    "l-1",
+                    "s-live",
+                    "author",
+                    "allocated",
+                    "active",
+                    None,
+                    1,
+                    NOW.isoformat(),
+                ),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            conn.close()
+
+            inventory = restart_console.read_control_plane_inventory(db_path=path)
+
+        self.assertTrue(inventory["inventory_complete"])
+        self.assertEqual([s["session_id"] for s in inventory["sessions"]], ["s-live"])
+        self.assertEqual(inventory["leases"][0]["work_number"], 667)
+
+
+class DrainAndReconcileTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_absent_drain_proof_is_not_a_pass(self) -> None:
+        drain, source = restart_console.load_drain_status(proof=None, now=NOW)
+        self.assertIsNone(drain)
+        self.assertFalse(source.available)
+        self.assertIn("denies", source.detail)
+
+    def test_tampered_drain_proof_is_reported_invalid(self) -> None:
+        proof = drain_proof_fixture()
+        proof["clean"] = True
+        proof["proof_id"] = "0" * 64
+        drain, source = restart_console.load_drain_status(proof=proof, now=NOW)
+        self.assertTrue(source.available)
+        self.assertFalse(drain["valid"])
+
+    def test_absent_reconcile_proof_is_unavailable(self) -> None:
+        reconcile, source = restart_console.load_reconcile_status(load_proof=None)
+        self.assertIsNone(reconcile)
+        self.assertFalse(source.available)
+
+    def test_reconcile_proof_is_rendered_when_supplied(self) -> None:
+        payload = {
+            "overall_status": "degraded",
+            "mode": "log_only",
+            "resolved_count": 3,
+            "unresolved_count": 2,
+            "items": [
+                {
+                    "dimension": "leases",
+                    "status": "unresolved",
+                    "summary": "2 orphaned leases",
+                    "follow_up_required": True,
+                }
+            ],
+        }
+        reconcile, source = restart_console.load_reconcile_status(
+            load_proof=lambda: payload
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(source.available)
+        self.assertEqual(reconcile["unresolved_count"], 2)
+
+
+class RenderingTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def _snapshot(self, **kwargs):
+        params = {
+            "principal": _principal(console_authz.OPERATOR),
+            "read_inventory": _inventory(sessions=[_live_session()]),
+            "now": NOW,
+        }
+        params.update(kwargs)
+        return restart_console.load_restart_console_snapshot(**params)
+
+    def test_page_renders_every_section(self) -> None:
+        html = restart_views.render_restart_console_page(self._snapshot())
+        for heading in (
+            "Impact preview",
+            "Drain proof",
+            "Post-restart reconcile",
+            "Restart classes",
+            "Approval controls",
+            "Break-glass",
+        ):
+            self.assertIn(heading, html)
+
+    def test_hostile_session_id_is_escaped(self) -> None:
+        hostile = "<script>alert('x')</script>"
+        html = restart_views.render_restart_console_page(
+            self._snapshot(read_inventory=_inventory(sessions=[_live_session(hostile)]))
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn("<script>alert", html)
+        self.assertIn("&lt;script&gt;", html)
+
+    def test_unavailable_impact_says_unsafe_rather_than_clean(self) -> None:
+        def _boom(**_kwargs):
+            raise RuntimeError("nope")
+
+        snapshot = self._snapshot(read_inventory=_boom)
+        html = restart_views.render_restart_console_page(snapshot)
+        self.assertIn("blast radius of a restart is unknown", html)
+        self.assertIn("unavailable", html)
+
+    def test_break_glass_is_hidden_from_unprivileged_viewers(self) -> None:
+        viewer_html = restart_views.render_restart_console_page(
+            self._snapshot(principal=_principal(console_authz.VIEWER))
+        )
+        self.assertIn("visible to operator-class", viewer_html)
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            f"#{restart_console.BREAK_GLASS_ISSUE}", viewer_html
+        )
+
+    def test_break_glass_shown_to_operator_is_marked_unavailable(self) -> None:
+        html = restart_views.render_restart_console_page(self._snapshot())
+        self.assertIn("unavailable", html)
+        self.assertIn(f"#{restart_console.BREAK_GLASS_ISSUE}", html)
+
+    def test_snapshot_always_declares_itself_read_only(self) -> None:
+        self.assertTrue(self._snapshot().read_only)
+
+
+class RestartConsoleRouteTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+
+    def test_page_route_renders(self) -> None:
+        res = self.client.get("/runtime/restart")
+        self.assertEqual(res.status_code, 200)
+        self.assertIn("Restart status and impact", res.text)
+
+    def test_api_route_exports_snapshot(self) -> None:
+        res = self.client.get("/api/v1/system/restart/status")
+        self.assertEqual(res.status_code, 200)
+        payload = res.json()
+        self.assertTrue(payload["read_only"])
+        self.assertEqual(payload["links"]["issue"], 667)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            len(payload["restart_classes"]),
+            len(restart_coordinator.RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES),
+        )
+
+    def test_restart_class_is_selectable(self) -> None:
+        res = self.client.get(
+            "/api/v1/system/restart/status?restart_class=client_reconnect"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res.status_code, 200)
+        self.assertEqual(res.json()["impact"]["restart_class"], "client_reconnect")
+
+    def test_unknown_restart_class_fails_closed(self) -> None:
+        res = self.client.get(
+            "/api/v1/system/restart/status?restart_class=obliterate-everything"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res.status_code, 200)
+        impact = res.json()["impact"]
+        self.assertFalse(impact["allow_restart"])
+
+    def test_anonymous_api_reader_gets_no_execution_grant(self) -> None:
+        payload = self.client.get("/api/v1/system/restart/status").json()
+        self.assertFalse(payload["break_glass"]["available"])
+        for auth in payload["authorizations"]:
+            self.assertFalse(auth["execution_enabled"])
+
+    def test_route_is_registered_in_nav(self) -> None:
+        from webui.nav import nav_hrefs
+
+        self.assertIn("/runtime/restart", nav_hrefs())
+
+    def test_no_write_method_is_exposed(self) -> None:
+        """The surface is read-only: nothing accepts a POST."""
+        for path in ("/runtime/restart", "/api/v1/system/restart/status"):
+            self.assertEqual(self.client.post(path).status_code, 405, path)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ from webui.traffic_views import render_traffic_page
 from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as worktree_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
 from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
+import restart_coordinator
+from webui.restart_console import load_restart_console_snapshot
+from webui.restart_views import render_restart_console_page
 from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
 from webui.session_loader import (
    load_session_view_snapshot,
@@ -331,6 +334,33 @@ async def api_runtime(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
    return JSONResponse(runtime_snapshot_to_dict(load_runtime_snapshot()))


+def _restart_console_snapshot(request: Request):
+    """Build the read-only restart snapshot for the requesting principal (#667)."""
+    principal = resolve_principal(request.headers)
+    restart_class = (
+        request.query_params.get("restart_class")
+        or restart_coordinator.RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART.value
+    )
+    return load_restart_console_snapshot(
+        principal=principal, restart_class=restart_class
+    )
+
+
+async def restart_console_page(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
+    """Restart status, impact preview, and approval state (#667). Read-only."""
+    snapshot = _restart_console_snapshot(request)
+    return HTMLResponse(
+        render_page(
+            title="Restart", body_html=render_restart_console_page(snapshot)
+        )
+    )
+
+
+async def api_restart_status(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    """JSON export of the read-only restart console snapshot (#667)."""
+    return JSONResponse(_restart_console_snapshot(request).as_dict())
+
+
 async def sessions(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
    """Runtime and session view (#641) — read-only composition of health + inventory."""
    snapshot = load_session_view_snapshot()
@@ -781,6 +811,13 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
            Route("/api/prompts", api_prompts, methods=["GET"]),
            Route("/runtime", runtime, methods=["GET"]),
            Route("/api/runtime", api_runtime, methods=["GET"]),
+            # #667 read-only restart status / impact preview / approval state.
+            Route("/runtime/restart", restart_console_page, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route(
+                "/api/v1/system/restart/status",
+                api_restart_status,
+                methods=["GET"],
+            ),
            Route("/sessions", sessions, methods=["GET"]),
            Route("/api/sessions", api_sessions, methods=["GET"]),
            Route("/api/v1/sessions", api_sessions, methods=["GET"]),
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
    )),
    NavGroup("Runtime/Sessions", (
        NavItem("/runtime", "Runtime health"),
+        NavItem("/runtime/restart", "Restart status"),
        NavItem("/sessions", "Sessions"),
    )),
    NavGroup("Projects", (
@@ -0,0 +1,579 @@
+"""Read-only restart status, impact preview, and approval state (#667).
+
+Phase 1 of the console restart surface. It *consumes* the #655 coordinator
+substrate and renders it; it never restarts, reloads, drains, approves, or kills
+anything. There is no apply path in this module, so there is no execution gate
+here to arm incorrectly — the only writes the console could perform are the ones
+it does not implement.
+
+Sources, each independently fail-soft and each reported with its own
+:class:`SourceStatus`:
+
+* :mod:`restart_coordinator` — restart-class policy matrix (#663) and the
+  blast-radius impact report (#658).
+* :mod:`drain_proof` — drain checklist and gate verdict (#661), verified
+  read-only against a caller-supplied proof.
+* :mod:`post_restart_reconcile` — post-restart completion proof (#662).
+* :mod:`webui.console_authz` — role authorization for the approval controls
+  (#633).
+
+Three rules this module holds itself to, because a status surface that lies is
+worse than one that is absent:
+
+**A source that could not be read is reported unavailable, never green.** No
+default, placeholder, or self-comparison is substituted for a reading that
+failed. An unreadable control-plane DB yields ``inventory_complete=False``,
+which the coordinator itself turns into a fail-closed verdict.
+
+**Authorization is asked the way execution would ask it.** Every authorization
+probe passes ``for_execution=True``, so the console reports whether the action
+could actually run rather than the weaker "this principal is the right role".
+While the console is in Phase 1 that answer is ``phase_not_active`` for every
+phase-2 action, and the surface says so plainly instead of showing an allow.
+
+**The database is opened read-only.** ``ControlPlaneDB()`` creates directories
+and runs migrations on construction, which is a write; this module opens the
+sqlite file with ``mode=ro`` exactly as :mod:`webui.inventory` does, and treats
+a missing file as missing authority rather than an empty inventory.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sqlite3
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping
+
+import control_plane_db
+import drain_proof
+import restart_coordinator
+from webui import console_authz
+from webui.inventory import redact_path, scrub
+
+# --- Source status ----------------------------------------------------------
+
+STATUS_OK = "ok"
+STATUS_UNAVAILABLE = "unavailable"
+
+#: Console actions whose authorization state this surface reports. Both are
+#: pre-existing #642 actions; this module adds no new console action because it
+#: performs no console action.
+REPORTED_ACTIONS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "system.restart_namespace",
+    "system.reload_namespace",
+)
+
+#: The break-glass workflow (#664) is not consumed here. It is declared so the
+#: surface is honest about the gap rather than silently omitting a governance
+#: path the operator has been told exists.
+BREAK_GLASS_ISSUE = 664
+BREAK_GLASS_PENDING_REASON = (
+    "The break-glass workflow (#664) is not yet available on this branch's "
+    "base; no break-glass control is offered and none is implied."
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SourceStatus:
+    """Whether one backing source could be read, and why not when it could not."""
+
+    name: str
+    status: str
+    detail: str = ""
+
+    @property
+    def available(self) -> bool:
+        return self.status == STATUS_OK
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "name": self.name,
+            "status": self.status,
+            "available": self.available,
+            "detail": self.detail,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RestartClassView:
+    """One row of the #663 restart-class matrix, scoped to the viewer's role."""
+
+    restart_class: str
+    required_permission: str
+    expected_blast_radius: str
+    drain_requirement: str
+    full_drain_required: bool
+    approval_requirement: str
+    request_roles: tuple[str, ...]
+    execution_roles: tuple[str, ...]
+    viewer_may_request: bool
+    viewer_may_execute: bool
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "restart_class": self.restart_class,
+            "required_permission": self.required_permission,
+            "expected_blast_radius": self.expected_blast_radius,
+            "drain_requirement": self.drain_requirement,
+            "full_drain_required": self.full_drain_required,
+            "approval_requirement": self.approval_requirement,
+            "request_roles": list(self.request_roles),
+            "execution_roles": list(self.execution_roles),
+            "viewer_may_request": self.viewer_may_request,
+            "viewer_may_execute": self.viewer_may_execute,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ActionAuthorization:
+    """Authorization state for one console action, asked as execution would."""
+
+    action_id: str
+    summary: str
+    required_role: str
+    allowed: bool
+    execution_enabled: bool
+    reason_code: str
+    detail: str
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "action_id": self.action_id,
+            "summary": self.summary,
+            "required_role": self.required_role,
+            "allowed": self.allowed,
+            "execution_enabled": self.execution_enabled,
+            "reason_code": self.reason_code,
+            "detail": self.detail,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BreakGlassSurface:
+    """Declared-but-unavailable break-glass panel (#664 is not on this base)."""
+
+    available: bool
+    issue: int
+    reason: str
+    viewer_is_privileged: bool
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "available": self.available,
+            "issue": self.issue,
+            "reason": self.reason,
+            "viewer_is_privileged": self.viewer_is_privileged,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RestartConsoleSnapshot:
+    """Everything the read-only restart console renders."""
+
+    generated_at: str
+    viewer_role: str
+    viewer_authenticated: bool
+    read_only: bool
+    impact: dict[str, Any] | None
+    impact_source: SourceStatus
+    drain: dict[str, Any] | None
+    drain_source: SourceStatus
+    reconcile: dict[str, Any] | None
+    reconcile_source: SourceStatus
+    restart_classes: tuple[RestartClassView, ...]
+    authorizations: tuple[ActionAuthorization, ...]
+    break_glass: BreakGlassSurface
+    notes: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "generated_at": self.generated_at,
+            "viewer_role": self.viewer_role,
+            "viewer_authenticated": self.viewer_authenticated,
+            "read_only": self.read_only,
+            "impact": self.impact,
+            "impact_source": self.impact_source.as_dict(),
+            "drain": self.drain,
+            "drain_source": self.drain_source.as_dict(),
+            "reconcile": self.reconcile,
+            "reconcile_source": self.reconcile_source.as_dict(),
+            "restart_classes": [c.as_dict() for c in self.restart_classes],
+            "authorizations": [a.as_dict() for a in self.authorizations],
+            "break_glass": self.break_glass.as_dict(),
+            "notes": list(self.notes),
+            "links": {
+                "issue": 667,
+                "extends": 642,
+                "umbrella": 655,
+                "coordinator": 658,
+                "drain_proof": 661,
+                "reconcile": 662,
+                "restart_classes": 663,
+                "break_glass": BREAK_GLASS_ISSUE,
+                "vision": 652,
+                "roadmap": 653,
+            },
+        }
+
+
+def _utc_now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+# --- Control-plane inventory (read-only) ------------------------------------
+
+
+def read_control_plane_inventory(
+    *,
+    db_path: str | None = None,
+    limit: int = 200,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Read sessions and leases for an impact evaluation, read-only.
+
+    Returns the inventory mapping
+    :func:`restart_coordinator.evaluate_restart_impact` expects.
+    ``inventory_complete`` is True only when every read succeeded, so a partial
+    read denies rather than under-reporting the blast radius.
+
+    The database is never created, migrated, or written: a missing file means
+    the console has no session authority, which is not the same as there being
+    no sessions.
+    """
+
+    path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path() or "").strip()
+    incomplete: list[str] = []
+
+    def _incomplete(reason: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "sessions": [],
+            "leases": [],
+            "terminal_lock": None,
+            "prior_recovery_attempts": [],
+            "inventory_complete": False,
+            "incomplete_reasons": [reason],
+        }
+
+    if not path:
+        return _incomplete("control-plane database path is not configured")
+    if not os.path.exists(path):
+        return _incomplete(
+            f"control-plane database not present at {redact_path(path)}; "
+            "no session or lease authority available"
+        )
+
+    try:
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=5)
+        conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+    except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+        return _incomplete(f"control-plane database could not be opened: {exc}")
+
+    sessions: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    leases: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    capped = max(1, int(limit))
+    try:
+        tables = {
+            str(row[0])
+            for row in conn.execute(
+                "SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type = 'table'"
+            ).fetchall()
+        }
+        if "sessions" not in tables:
+            incomplete.append("control-plane database has no sessions table")
+        else:
+            sessions = [
+                dict(row)
+                for row in conn.execute(
+                    "SELECT session_id, role, profile, pid, status,"
+                    " last_heartbeat_at FROM sessions"
+                    " WHERE status = 'active'"
+                    " ORDER BY last_heartbeat_at DESC LIMIT ?",
+                    (capped,),
+                ).fetchall()
+            ]
+
+        if "leases" not in tables:
+            incomplete.append("control-plane database has no leases table")
+        elif "work_items" not in tables:
+            incomplete.append(
+                "control-plane database has no work_items table; lease work "
+                "identity cannot be resolved"
+            )
+        else:
+            leases = [
+                dict(row)
+                for row in conn.execute(
+                    "SELECT l.lease_id, l.session_id, l.role, l.phase,"
+                    " l.status AS freshness, l.worktree_path,"
+                    " w.kind AS work_kind, w.number AS work_number"
+                    " FROM leases l"
+                    " JOIN work_items w ON w.work_item_id = l.work_item_id"
+                    " WHERE l.status = 'active'"
+                    " ORDER BY l.expires_at DESC LIMIT ?",
+                    (capped,),
+                ).fetchall()
+            ]
+    except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+        return _incomplete(f"control-plane database read failed: {exc}")
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+    return {
+        "sessions": sessions,
+        "leases": leases,
+        "terminal_lock": None,
+        "prior_recovery_attempts": [],
+        "inventory_complete": not incomplete,
+        "incomplete_reasons": incomplete,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Composition ------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def build_restart_class_views(viewer_role: str | None) -> tuple[RestartClassView, ...]:
+    """Render the #663 class matrix, marking what this viewer may request."""
+
+    normalized = str(viewer_role or "").strip().lower()
+    views: list[RestartClassView] = []
+    for policy in restart_coordinator.RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES.values():
+        views.append(
+            RestartClassView(
+                restart_class=policy.restart_class.value,
+                required_permission=policy.required_permission,
+                expected_blast_radius=policy.expected_blast_radius,
+                drain_requirement=policy.drain_requirement,
+                full_drain_required=policy.full_drain_required,
+                approval_requirement=policy.approval_requirement,
+                request_roles=tuple(policy.request_roles),
+                execution_roles=tuple(policy.execution_roles),
+                viewer_may_request=normalized in policy.request_roles,
+                viewer_may_execute=normalized in policy.execution_roles,
+            )
+        )
+    return tuple(views)
+
+
+def build_action_authorizations(
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None,
+) -> tuple[ActionAuthorization, ...]:
+    """Authorization state for the approval controls, asked as execution.
+
+    ``for_execution=True`` is deliberate. Asking without it answers "is this
+    principal senior enough", which is not the question an operator looking at a
+    control needs answered; asking with it answers "would this run", and while
+    the console is in Phase 1 the honest answer is no.
+    """
+
+    results: list[ActionAuthorization] = []
+    for action_id in REPORTED_ACTIONS:
+        action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
+        decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=True)
+        results.append(
+            ActionAuthorization(
+                action_id=action_id,
+                summary=action.summary if action else "",
+                required_role=(
+                    action.minimum_role if action else console_authz.OPERATOR
+                ),
+                allowed=bool(decision.allowed),
+                execution_enabled=bool(decision.execution_enabled),
+                reason_code=str(decision.reason_code or ""),
+                detail=str(decision.detail or ""),
+            )
+        )
+    return tuple(results)
+
+
+def viewer_is_privileged(principal: console_authz.Principal | None) -> bool:
+    """True when the viewer holds at least the operator role."""
+
+    who = principal if principal is not None else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
+    if not who.authenticated:
+        return False
+    return who.rank >= console_authz.ROLE_ORDER.index(console_authz.OPERATOR)
+
+
+def load_impact_report(
+    *,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    restart_class: str = restart_coordinator.RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART.value,
+    db_path: str | None = None,
+    limit: int = 200,
+    read_inventory: Callable[..., Mapping[str, Any]] | None = None,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+) -> tuple[dict[str, Any] | None, SourceStatus]:
+    """Evaluate the blast radius for *restart_class*, always dry-run."""
+
+    reader = read_inventory or read_control_plane_inventory
+    try:
+        inventory = dict(reader(db_path=db_path, limit=limit))
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+        return None, SourceStatus(
+            "impact",
+            STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+            f"control-plane inventory failed: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}",
+        )
+
+    who = principal if principal is not None else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
+    viewer_role = str(who.role or "").strip().lower()
+    try:
+        report = restart_coordinator.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            inventory,
+            now=now,
+            dry_run=True,
+            restart_class=restart_class,
+            requester_role=viewer_role,
+            requester_permissions=restart_coordinator.permissions_for_role(
+                viewer_role
+            ),
+        )
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+        return None, SourceStatus(
+            "impact",
+            STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+            f"impact evaluation failed: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}",
+        )
+
+    payload = scrub(report.as_dict())
+    detail = ""
+    if not report.inventory_complete:
+        detail = "; ".join(report.incomplete_reasons) or "inventory incomplete"
+    return payload, SourceStatus("impact", STATUS_OK, detail)
+
+
+def load_drain_status(
+    *,
+    proof: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+    expected_impact_fingerprint: str | None = None,
+) -> tuple[dict[str, Any] | None, SourceStatus]:
+    """Verify a supplied drain proof read-only and report the verdict.
+
+    No proof supplied is not a failure and not a pass: it is reported as the
+    absence of a proof, which is exactly what the #661 gate would deny on.
+    """
+
+    if proof is None:
+        return None, SourceStatus(
+            "drain",
+            STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+            "no drain proof supplied; the #661 gate denies a restart without a "
+            "valid unexpired clean proof",
+        )
+    try:
+        verified = drain_proof.verify_drain_proof(
+            proof,
+            now=now,
+            expected_impact_fingerprint=expected_impact_fingerprint,
+        )
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+        return None, SourceStatus(
+            "drain",
+            STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+            f"drain proof verification failed: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}",
+        )
+    return scrub(verified.as_dict()), SourceStatus("drain", STATUS_OK)
+
+
+def load_reconcile_status(
+    *,
+    load_proof: Callable[[], Any] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[dict[str, Any] | None, SourceStatus]:
+    """Report the most recent post-restart completion proof (#662)."""
+
+    if load_proof is None:
+        return None, SourceStatus(
+            "reconcile",
+            STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+            "no post-restart completion proof source is wired into this view",
+        )
+    try:
+        proof = load_proof()
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+        return None, SourceStatus(
+            "reconcile",
+            STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+            f"reconcile proof unavailable: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}",
+        )
+    if proof is None:
+        return None, SourceStatus(
+            "reconcile",
+            STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+            "no post-restart reconcile has been recorded",
+        )
+    payload = proof.as_dict() if hasattr(proof, "as_dict") else dict(proof)
+    return scrub(payload), SourceStatus("reconcile", STATUS_OK)
+
+
+def load_restart_console_snapshot(
+    *,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    restart_class: str = restart_coordinator.RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART.value,
+    db_path: str | None = None,
+    limit: int = 200,
+    drain_proof_payload: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
+    read_inventory: Callable[..., Mapping[str, Any]] | None = None,
+    load_reconcile_proof: Callable[[], Any] | None = None,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+) -> RestartConsoleSnapshot:
+    """Compose the read-only restart console snapshot."""
+
+    who = principal if principal is not None else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
+    moment = now or _utc_now()
+
+    impact, impact_source = load_impact_report(
+        principal=who,
+        restart_class=restart_class,
+        db_path=db_path,
+        limit=limit,
+        read_inventory=read_inventory,
+        now=moment,
+    )
+    fingerprint = None
+    if impact is not None:
+        try:
+            fingerprint = drain_proof.impact_fingerprint(impact)
+        except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001
+            fingerprint = None
+
+    drain, drain_source = load_drain_status(
+        proof=drain_proof_payload,
+        now=moment,
+        expected_impact_fingerprint=fingerprint,
+    )
+    reconcile, reconcile_source = load_reconcile_status(
+        load_proof=load_reconcile_proof
+    )
+
+    notes: list[str] = [
+        "This surface is read-only: it evaluates and displays, and performs no "
+        "restart, reload, drain, approval, or process action.",
+    ]
+    if not impact_source.available:
+        notes.append(
+            "Impact preview unavailable — a restart decision must not be made "
+            "from this page while the blast radius is unknown."
+        )
+
+    return RestartConsoleSnapshot(
+        generated_at=moment.isoformat(),
+        viewer_role=str(who.role or "anonymous"),
+        viewer_authenticated=bool(who.authenticated),
+        read_only=True,
+        impact=impact,
+        impact_source=impact_source,
+        drain=drain,
+        drain_source=drain_source,
+        reconcile=reconcile,
+        reconcile_source=reconcile_source,
+        restart_classes=build_restart_class_views(who.role),
+        authorizations=build_action_authorizations(who),
+        break_glass=BreakGlassSurface(
+            available=False,
+            issue=BREAK_GLASS_ISSUE,
+            reason=BREAK_GLASS_PENDING_REASON,
+            viewer_is_privileged=viewer_is_privileged(who),
+        ),
+        notes=tuple(notes),
+    )
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+"""HTML views for the read-only restart console (#667).
+
+Every interpolated value passes through :func:`_esc`. Values that can carry a
+filesystem path or free-form operator text additionally pass through
+:func:`webui.inventory.scrub_text`, which redacts credential-shaped tokens
+*inside* a string rather than only at its start.
+
+The page renders state and never offers a control that would mutate anything:
+the approval and break-glass panels report authorization and availability, and
+there is no form, button, or endpoint behind them.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import html
+
+from webui.inventory import scrub_text
+from webui.restart_console import RestartConsoleSnapshot, SourceStatus
+
+
+def _esc(value: object) -> str:
+    """Escape any value for HTML text or a quoted attribute."""
+    if value is None:
+        return ""
+    return html.escape(str(value), quote=True)
+
+
+def _esc_text(value: object) -> str:
+    """Escape free-form text after redacting secrets embedded inside it."""
+    if value is None:
+        return ""
+    return _esc(scrub_text(str(value)))
+
+
+def _bool_badge(
+    value: bool, *, true_label: str = "yes", false_label: str = "no"
+) -> str:
+    css = "badge-ok" if value else "badge-blocked"
+    label = true_label if value else false_label
+    return f'<span class="badge {css}">{_esc(label)}</span>'
+
+
+def _source_badge(source: SourceStatus) -> str:
+    css = "badge-ok" if source.available else "badge-blocked"
+    badge = f'<span class="badge {css}">{_esc(source.status)}</span>'
+    if source.detail:
+        badge += f' <span class="muted">{_esc_text(source.detail)}</span>'
+    return badge
+
+
+def _notes_block(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
+    if not snapshot.notes:
+        return ""
+    items = "".join(f"<li>{_esc_text(note)}</li>" for note in snapshot.notes)
+    return f"<ul class='reasons'>{items}</ul>"
+
+
+def _impact_section(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
+    head = (
+        "<section class='health-card'>"
+        f"<h3>Impact preview {_source_badge(snapshot.impact_source)}</h3>"
+    )
+    impact = snapshot.impact
+    if impact is None:
+        return (
+            head
+            + "<p class='muted'>No impact preview is available, so the blast "
+            "radius of a restart is unknown. Treat this as unsafe.</p></section>"
+        )
+
+    counts = impact.get("counts") or {}
+    verdict = str(impact.get("verdict") or "unknown")
+    verdict_css = "badge-ok" if verdict == "safe" else "badge-blocked"
+    rows = "".join(
+        f"<tr><th>{_esc(key.replace('_', ' '))}</th><td>{_esc(value)}</td></tr>"
+        for key, value in sorted(counts.items())
+    )
+    reasons = "".join(
+        f"<li>{_esc_text(reason)}</li>" for reason in (impact.get("reasons") or [])
+    )
+    incomplete = ""
+    if not impact.get("inventory_complete", False):
+        detail = "; ".join(str(r) for r in (impact.get("incomplete_reasons") or []))
+        incomplete = (
+            "<p class='error'><strong>Inventory incomplete:</strong> "
+            f"{_esc_text(detail or 'unspecified')}. The coordinator fails "
+            "closed on an incomplete inventory.</p>"
+        )
+
+    sessions = impact.get("affected_sessions") or []
+    session_rows = "".join(
+        "<tr>"
+        f"<td><code>{_esc(s.get('session_id'))}</code></td>"
+        f"<td>{_esc(s.get('role'))}</td>"
+        f"<td>{_esc(s.get('pid'))}</td>"
+        f"<td>{_bool_badge(bool(s.get('live')), true_label='live', false_label='idle')}</td>"
+        f"<td>{_bool_badge(not s.get('heartbeat_stale'), true_label='fresh', false_label='stale')}</td>"
+        "</tr>"
+        for s in sessions[:50]
+    )
+    session_table = (
+        "<h4>Sessions a restart would terminate</h4>"
+        "<div class='table-scroll'><table class='registry'><thead><tr>"
+        "<th>Session</th><th>Role</th><th>PID</th><th>State</th>"
+        "<th>Heartbeat</th></tr></thead><tbody>"
+        f"{session_rows}</tbody></table></div>"
+        if session_rows
+        else "<p class='muted'>No affected sessions reported.</p>"
+    )
+    truncated = (
+        f"<p class='muted'>Showing the first 50 of {_esc(len(sessions))} "
+        "affected sessions.</p>"
+        if len(sessions) > 50
+        else ""
+    )
+
+    return (
+        head
+        + "<p class='health-headline'>Verdict "
+        f"<span class='badge {verdict_css}'>{_esc(verdict)}</span> · "
+        f"blast radius <code>{_esc(impact.get('blast_radius'))}</code> · "
+        f"class <code>{_esc(impact.get('restart_class'))}</code></p>"
+        + incomplete
+        + (f"<ul class='reasons'>{reasons}</ul>" if reasons else "")
+        + (f"<table class='registry'><tbody>{rows}</tbody></table>" if rows else "")
+        + session_table
+        + truncated
+        + "</section>"
+    )
+
+
+def _drain_section(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
+    head = (
+        "<section class='health-card'>"
+        f"<h3>Drain proof {_source_badge(snapshot.drain_source)}</h3>"
+    )
+    drain = snapshot.drain
+    if drain is None:
+        return (
+            head
+            + "<p class='muted'>No drain proof has been presented to this view. "
+            "The #661 gate authorizes a restart only against a valid, unexpired, "
+            "clean proof, so the absence of one is a denial, not a pass.</p>"
+            "</section>"
+        )
+    reasons = "".join(
+        f"<li>{_esc_text(reason)}</li>" for reason in (drain.get("reasons") or [])
+    )
+    return (
+        head
+        + "<table class='registry'><tbody>"
+        f"<tr><th>Valid</th><td>{_bool_badge(bool(drain.get('valid')))}</td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Clean</th><td>{_bool_badge(bool(drain.get('clean')))}</td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Expired</th><td>{_bool_badge(not drain.get('expired'), true_label='no', false_label='yes')}</td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Tampered</th><td>{_bool_badge(not drain.get('tampered'), true_label='no', false_label='yes')}</td></tr>"
+        f"<tr><th>Proof id</th><td><code>{_esc(drain.get('proof_id'))}</code></td></tr>"
+        "</tbody></table>"
+        + (f"<ul class='reasons'>{reasons}</ul>" if reasons else "")
+        + "</section>"
+    )
+
+
+def _reconcile_section(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
+    head = (
+        "<section class='health-card'>"
+        f"<h3>Post-restart reconcile {_source_badge(snapshot.reconcile_source)}</h3>"
+    )
+    proof = snapshot.reconcile
+    if proof is None:
+        return (
+            head
+            + "<p class='muted'>No post-restart completion proof is recorded. "
+            "Until one is, the last restart's recovery state is unproven.</p>"
+            "</section>"
+        )
+    items = "".join(
+        "<tr>"
+        f"<td>{_esc(item.get('dimension'))}</td>"
+        f"<td>{_esc(item.get('status'))}</td>"
+        f"<td>{_esc_text(item.get('summary'))}</td>"
+        f"<td>{_bool_badge(not item.get('follow_up_required'), true_label='no', false_label='yes')}</td>"
+        "</tr>"
+        for item in (proof.get("items") or [])
+    )
+    return (
+        head
+        + "<p class='health-headline'>Status "
+        f"<code>{_esc(proof.get('overall_status'))}</code> · mode "
+        f"<code>{_esc(proof.get('mode'))}</code> · resolved "
+        f"{_esc(proof.get('resolved_count'))} · unresolved "
+        f"{_esc(proof.get('unresolved_count'))}</p>"
+        + (
+            "<div class='table-scroll'><table class='registry'><thead><tr>"
+            "<th>Dimension</th><th>Status</th><th>Summary</th>"
+            "<th>Follow-up required</th></tr></thead><tbody>"
+            f"{items}</tbody></table></div>"
+            if items
+            else "<p class='muted'>No reconcile dimensions reported.</p>"
+        )
+        + "</section>"
+    )
+
+
+def _class_matrix_section(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
+    rows = "".join(
+        "<tr>"
+        f"<td><code>{_esc(view.restart_class)}</code></td>"
+        f"<td><code>{_esc(view.required_permission)}</code></td>"
+        f"<td>{_esc(view.expected_blast_radius)}</td>"
+        f"<td>{_esc(view.drain_requirement)}</td>"
+        f"<td>{_esc(view.approval_requirement)}</td>"
+        f"<td>{_bool_badge(view.viewer_may_request)}</td>"
+        f"<td>{_bool_badge(view.viewer_may_execute)}</td>"
+        "</tr>"
+        for view in snapshot.restart_classes
+    )
+    return (
+        "<section class='health-card'>"
+        "<h3>Restart classes</h3>"
+        "<p class='muted'>The least-privilege matrix each restart request is "
+        "resolved against. &ldquo;You may request&rdquo; and &ldquo;you may "
+        "execute&rdquo; are computed for the current viewer role, not for a "
+        "generic operator.</p>"
+        "<div class='table-scroll'><table class='registry'><thead><tr>"
+        "<th>Class</th><th>Permission</th><th>Blast radius</th>"
+        "<th>Drain</th><th>Approval</th><th>You may request</th>"
+        "<th>You may execute</th></tr></thead><tbody>"
+        f"{rows}</tbody></table></div>"
+        "</section>"
+    )
+
+
+def _approval_section(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
+    rows = "".join(
+        "<tr>"
+        f"<td><code>{_esc(a.action_id)}</code></td>"
+        f"<td>{_esc(a.required_role)}</td>"
+        f"<td>{_bool_badge(a.allowed)}</td>"
+        f"<td>{_bool_badge(a.execution_enabled)}</td>"
+        f"<td><code>{_esc(a.reason_code)}</code></td>"
+        f"<td>{_esc_text(a.detail)}</td>"
+        "</tr>"
+        for a in snapshot.authorizations
+    )
+    return (
+        "<section class='health-card'>"
+        "<h3>Approval controls</h3>"
+        "<p class='muted'>Authorization is probed the way execution would probe "
+        "it, so &ldquo;execution enabled&rdquo; answers whether the action would "
+        "actually run — not merely whether this role outranks the requirement. "
+        "No control on this page performs the action.</p>"
+        "<div class='table-scroll'><table class='registry'><thead><tr>"
+        "<th>Action</th><th>Required role</th><th>Authorized</th>"
+        "<th>Execution enabled</th><th>Reason</th><th>Detail</th>"
+        "</tr></thead><tbody>"
+        f"{rows}</tbody></table></div>"
+        "</section>"
+    )
+
+
+def _break_glass_section(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
+    bg = snapshot.break_glass
+    if not bg.viewer_is_privileged:
+        return (
+            "<section class='health-card'>"
+            "<h3>Break-glass</h3>"
+            "<p class='muted'>Break-glass status is visible to operator-class "
+            "roles only. Your role does not carry that authority, so no "
+            "emergency surface is shown.</p>"
+            "</section>"
+        )
+    return (
+        "<section class='health-card'>"
+        "<h3>Break-glass "
+        f"{_bool_badge(bg.available, true_label='available', false_label='unavailable')}"
+        "</h3>"
+        f"<p class='muted'>{_esc_text(bg.reason)}</p>"
+        f"<p class='meta'>Tracked by issue #{_esc(bg.issue)}.</p>"
+        "</section>"
+    )
+
+
+def render_restart_console_page(snapshot: RestartConsoleSnapshot) -> str:
+    """Render the whole read-only restart console body."""
+
+    return (
+        "<h2>Restart status and impact</h2>"
+        f"<p class='meta'>Generated <code>{_esc(snapshot.generated_at)}</code> · "
+        f"viewer role <code>{_esc(snapshot.viewer_role)}</code> · "
+        f"authenticated {_bool_badge(snapshot.viewer_authenticated)} · "
+        f"read-only {_bool_badge(snapshot.read_only)}</p>"
+        + _notes_block(snapshot)
+        + _impact_section(snapshot)
+        + _drain_section(snapshot)
+        + _reconcile_section(snapshot)
+        + _class_matrix_section(snapshot)
+        + _approval_section(snapshot)
+        + _break_glass_section(snapshot)
+    )