Merge branch 'master' into feat/issue-658-mcp-restart-coordinator

Child of umbrella #655 (governed MCP restart coordination); builds on the
#657 restart-path inventory. Adds a central coordinator that evaluates live
control-plane state before a restart and returns a blast-radius impact
preview, so operators and the web console (#642/#652) can see what a restart
would disrupt before concurrent LLM work is destroyed.

Changes
- restart_coordinator.py (new) — pure classification: inventory -> impact
  report DTO (RestartImpactReport/SessionImpact/LeaseImpact). Verdicts:
  safe / unsafe / override. Never restarts anything; fails closed on an
  incomplete inventory.
- control_plane_db.py — additive ControlPlaneDB.list_sessions() read-only
  session inventory (the process-level unit a restart kills).
- gitea_mcp_server.py — new dry-run MCP tool gitea_request_mcp_restart:
  gathers sessions/leases/terminal-lock from the #613 DB, calls the
  coordinator, returns the report. Override authority is read from the
  environment, never self-asserted (#630/#710 F1 pattern). Apply is gated
  by a later drain proof (non-goal here).
- docs/mcp-restart-coordinator.md + docs/mcp-restart-impact-sample.json — doc
  and a real dry-run sample report.
- docs/mcp-tool-inventory.md — register the new tool (inventory sync).
- tests/test_restart_coordinator.py (new) — 15 tests: multi-session fixtures,
  deny-when-critical-section-open, fail-closed deny, override, terminal lock,
  stale heartbeat, JSON-serializable DTO, list_sessions.

Tests: pytest tests/test_restart_coordinator.py -> 15 passed. Full suite:
13 failed / 4753 passed; all 13 reproduce identically on clean master
@ef14622 (0 regressions). The residual test_issue_781 doc-registry failure
is a pre-existing baseline gap for gitea_rebind_dirty_same_claimant_author_session
(merged #864, undocumented on master) — out of scope for #658.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

canonical_thread_handoff.py

@@ -46,6 +46,17 @@ _FIELD_RE = re.compile(
 )
 
 
+def is_known_cth_type(value: str | None) -> bool:
+    """True when *value* is a declared member of the :data:`CTH_TYPES` contract.
+
+    ``CTH_TYPES`` is the single authority for what a CTH type may be. The
+    heading a comment carries is free text, so a *read* path that turns a parsed
+    type into something durable — a serialized field, a routing decision — must
+    check membership here rather than trust the parse or keep a list of its own.
+    """
+    return (value or "").strip() in CTH_TYPES
+
+
 def format_cth_body(
     *,
     cth_type: str,
@@ -60,7 +71,7 @@ def format_cth_body(
 ) -> str:
     """Render a canonical CTH comment body."""
     normalized_type = (cth_type or "").strip()
-    if normalized_type not in CTH_TYPES:
+    if not is_known_cth_type(normalized_type):
         raise ValueError(
             f"unknown CTH type '{cth_type}'; expected one of {sorted(CTH_TYPES)}"
         )
@@ -101,6 +112,12 @@ def parse_cth_comment(body: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
         fields[key] = match.group(2).strip()
     return {
         "cth_type": cth_type,
+        # The heading capture is unconstrained free text, so the parse states
+        # whether it satisfies the CTH_TYPES contract instead of leaving every
+        # reader to decide (or forget). Parsing stays total — an unknown type is
+        # still parsed and reported, never raised on — but a reader that turns
+        # the type into a durable value can now tell the two apart.
+        "cth_type_known": is_known_cth_type(cth_type),
         "fields": fields,
         "raw_body": text,
     }
@@ -119,7 +136,7 @@ def assess_cth_comment(body: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
         }
 
     cth_type = parsed.get("cth_type") or ""
-    if cth_type not in CTH_TYPES:
+    if not is_known_cth_type(cth_type):
         reasons.append(
             f"unknown CTH type '{cth_type}'; expected one of {sorted(CTH_TYPES)}"
         )

control_plane_db.py

@@ -599,6 +599,35 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
                 (_ts(), session_id),
             )
 
+    def list_sessions(
+        self,
+        *,
+        statuses: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+        limit: int = 500,
+    ) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        """List session rows for restart / impact analysis (#658).
+
+        Read-only. Sessions are the process-level unit an MCP restart
+        disrupts, so the restart coordinator inventories them to compute blast
+        radius. Optional ``statuses`` filter (e.g. ``('active',)``) narrows to
+        live rows. Never returns secrets — only operational metadata.
+        """
+        clauses: list[str] = []
+        params: list[Any] = []
+        if statuses:
+            placeholders = ", ".join("?" for _ in statuses)
+            clauses.append(f"status IN ({placeholders})")
+            params.extend(statuses)
+        where = ("WHERE " + " AND ".join(clauses)) if clauses else ""
+        sql = (
+            f"SELECT * FROM sessions {where} "
+            "ORDER BY last_heartbeat_at DESC LIMIT ?"
+        )
+        params.append(max(1, int(limit)))
+        with self._tx(immediate=False) as conn:
+            rows = conn.execute(sql, params).fetchall()
+            return [dict(r) for r in rows]
+
     # ── work items ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
     def upsert_work_item(

docs/mcp-restart-coordinator.md

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# MCP restart coordinator and impact analysis (#658)
+
+Before any sanctioned MCP restart, a central coordinator evaluates the live
+control-plane state and produces an **impact preview** so operators and the web
+console (#642 / #652) can see the blast radius *before* concurrent LLM work is
+disrupted. Uncoordinated restarts destroy in-flight author/reviewer/merger work
+and give operators no way to see what they are about to break.
+
+This lands the coordinator + impact DTO + a dry-run MCP tool. It is the single
+sanctioned entry point for restart evaluation post-#657 (which inventoried the
+restart/reload/kill paths). The **mutative apply** path — actually performing a
+restart — is a later child gated by a drain proof and is explicitly out of
+scope here.
+
+## Components
+
+| Piece | Where | Responsibility |
+|-------|-------|----------------|
+| `restart_coordinator.evaluate_restart_impact` | `restart_coordinator.py` | Pure classification: inventory → impact report DTO. No I/O, no restart. |
+| `RestartImpactReport` / `SessionImpact` / `LeaseImpact` | `restart_coordinator.py` | Console-facing DTO (`.as_dict()` is JSON-serializable). |
+| `ControlPlaneDB.list_sessions` | `control_plane_db.py` | Read-only session inventory (the process-level unit a restart kills). |
+| `gitea_request_mcp_restart` | `gitea_mcp_server.py` | MCP tool: gathers inventory from the #613 DB, calls the coordinator, returns the report. Dry-run only. |
+
+## Dimensions evaluated
+
+The coordinator classifies the inventory across the dimensions #658 requires:
+
+- **Sessions** — every active MCP session; a restart terminates all of them.
+  Liveness = `status == active` **and** the owner pid is alive **and** the
+  heartbeat is fresh (default window 15 min). Dead/stale sessions do not count
+  toward blast radius.
+- **Leases / locks** — control-plane leases joined with work items and their
+  freshness (`lease_lifecycle.classify_lease_freshness`). Only `active` (live
+  owner) leases are *disruptive*; expired / released / dead-process leases never
+  withhold a restart.
+- **Issue / PR work** — the issues and PRs behind disruptive leases.
+- **Mutations / critical sections** — a live lease carrying an author worktree
+  or a mutating phase (`implementing`, `publishing`, `merging`, …) is a
+  critical section a restart must not sever.
+- **Terminal (merge) lock** — an active terminal lock always makes a restart
+  unsafe.
+- **Prior recovery attempts** — narrower recovery already tried (e.g. sanctioned
+  client reconnects) is echoed so the operator sees the escalation history.
+
+## Verdict
+
+Exactly three verdicts, matching the acceptance criteria:
+
+| Verdict | `allow_restart` | Meaning |
+|---------|-----------------|---------|
+| `safe` | `true` | No other live sessions, no live leases, no terminal lock. |
+| `unsafe` | `false` | Live work would be disrupted and no operator override is present — **or** the inventory could not be completed (fail closed). |
+| `override` | `true` | Live work present, but an operator override accepts the blast radius. |
+
+`override_would_allow` tells the console whether an override path exists for the
+current state. `blast_radius` is a `none` / `low` / `medium` / `high` severity
+band derived from the affected session and work counts.
+
+### Fail closed
+
+If the control-plane inventory cannot be completed (DB unavailable, a listing
+failed), `inventory_complete` is `false` and the verdict is `unsafe` / deny. An
+incomplete evaluation must never green-light a restart.
+
+### Operator override authority
+
+Override authority is read from the environment variable
+`GITEA_OPERATOR_RESTART_OVERRIDE_AUTHORIZATION` and **never** from a tool
+argument. A worker session cannot set an environment variable on an
+already-running daemon, so override cannot be self-asserted (same pattern as the
+#630 daemon-maintenance authorization). The `request_override` tool argument only
+expresses caller intent; it takes effect solely when the environment
+authorization is present.
+
+## The tool
+
+```text
+gitea_request_mcp_restart(remote, host, org, repo,
+                          dry_run=True, request_override=False,
+                          session_id=None, limit=200)
+```
+
+Read-only, dry-run, and it **never restarts anything**. `apply_supported` is
+always `false`; passing `dry_run=False` performs no restart and reports that
+apply is gated by a drain proof (a separate child).
+
+## Audit
+
+Every evaluation carries an `audit_record` (event, coordinator version, verdict,
+allow decision, blast radius, counts, timestamp) so restart decisions are
+auditable. No secrets flow through the coordinator — session ids, pids, and
+profiles are operational metadata only.
+
+A representative dry-run report is in
+[`mcp-restart-impact-sample.json`](./mcp-restart-impact-sample.json).

docs/mcp-restart-impact-sample.json

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+{
+  "coordinator_version": "1.0.0-issue-658",
+  "evaluated_at": "2026-07-24T06:00:00+00:00",
+  "dry_run": true,
+  "restart_performed": false,
+  "inventory_complete": true,
+  "incomplete_reasons": [],
+  "verdict": "unsafe",
+  "allow_restart": false,
+  "override_would_allow": true,
+  "operator_override": false,
+  "blast_radius": "high",
+  "reasons": [
+    "live work would be disrupted; restart denied without operator override",
+    "1 critical section(s) in flight (active lease with a live owner)"
+  ],
+  "affected_sessions": [
+    {
+      "session_id": "prgs-author-30988-d6f43c25",
+      "role": "author",
+      "profile": "prgs-author",
+      "pid": 1,
+      "status": "active",
+      "alive": true,
+      "heartbeat_stale": false,
+      "is_requester": false,
+      "live": true
+    },
+    {
+      "session_id": "prgs-reviewer-4157-0ce9",
+      "role": "reviewer",
+      "profile": "prgs-reviewer",
+      "pid": 1,
+      "status": "active",
+      "alive": true,
+      "heartbeat_stale": false,
+      "is_requester": true,
+      "live": true
+    }
+  ],
+  "affected_leases": [
+    {
+      "lease_id": "lease-abc",
+      "session_id": "prgs-author-30988-d6f43c25",
+      "role": "author",
+      "phase": "implementing",
+      "freshness": "active",
+      "work_kind": "issue",
+      "work_number": 658,
+      "worktree_path": "/repo/branches/feat-issue-658",
+      "disruptive": true,
+      "is_mutation": true,
+      "is_critical_section": true
+    },
+    {
+      "lease_id": "lease-dead",
+      "session_id": "prgs-author-91485",
+      "role": "author",
+      "phase": "allocated",
+      "freshness": "stale_dead_process",
+      "work_kind": "issue",
+      "work_number": 651,
+      "worktree_path": null,
+      "disruptive": false,
+      "is_mutation": false,
+      "is_critical_section": false
+    }
+  ],
+  "critical_sections": [
+    {
+      "lease_id": "lease-abc",
+      "session_id": "prgs-author-30988-d6f43c25",
+      "role": "author",
+      "phase": "implementing",
+      "freshness": "active",
+      "work_kind": "issue",
+      "work_number": 658,
+      "worktree_path": "/repo/branches/feat-issue-658",
+      "disruptive": true,
+      "is_mutation": true,
+      "is_critical_section": true
+    }
+  ],
+  "affected_issues": [
+    658
+  ],
+  "affected_prs": [],
+  "mutations": [
+    {
+      "lease_id": "lease-abc",
+      "session_id": "prgs-author-30988-d6f43c25",
+      "role": "author",
+      "phase": "implementing",
+      "freshness": "active",
+      "work_kind": "issue",
+      "work_number": 658,
+      "worktree_path": "/repo/branches/feat-issue-658",
+      "disruptive": true,
+      "is_mutation": true,
+      "is_critical_section": true
+    }
+  ],
+  "terminal_lock": null,
+  "ack_state": {
+    "prgs-author-30988-d6f43c25": "pending"
+  },
+  "prior_recovery_attempts": [
+    {
+      "kind": "client_reconnect",
+      "at": "2026-07-24T06:00:00+00:00",
+      "outcome": "insufficient"
+    }
+  ],
+  "counts": {
+    "sessions_total": 2,
+    "sessions_live_other": 1,
+    "leases_total": 2,
+    "leases_disruptive": 1,
+    "critical_sections": 1,
+    "mutations": 1,
+    "affected_issues": 1,
+    "affected_prs": 0,
+    "prior_recovery_attempts": 1
+  },
+  "audit_record": {
+    "event": "restart_impact_evaluated",
+    "coordinator_version": "1.0.0-issue-658",
+    "evaluated_at": "2026-07-24T06:00:00+00:00",
+    "dry_run": true,
+    "operator_override": false,
+    "requesting_session_id": "prgs-reviewer-4157-0ce9",
+    "inventory_complete": true,
+    "verdict": "unsafe",
+    "allow_restart": false,
+    "blast_radius": "high",
+    "counts": {
+      "sessions_total": 2,
+      "sessions_live_other": 1,
+      "leases_total": 2,
+      "leases_disruptive": 1,
+      "critical_sections": 1,
+      "mutations": 1,
+      "affected_issues": 1,
+      "affected_prs": 0,
+      "prior_recovery_attempts": 1
+    }
+  }
+}

docs/mcp-tool-inventory.md

@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ that gates each call, not which tools exist.
 - `gitea_release_merger_pr_lease`
 - `gitea_release_reviewer_pr_lease`
 - `gitea_release_workflow_lease`
+- `gitea_request_mcp_restart`
 - `gitea_resolve_task_capability`
 - `gitea_resume_review_draft`
 - `gitea_review_pr`

docs/webui-local-dev.md

@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | `/api/actions/{id}/preview` | Mutation ledger preview (GET, read-only) |
 | `/leases` | Lease and collision visibility (#433) |
 | `/api/leases` | JSON lease/collision export |
+| `/sessions` | Phase 1 shell stub — session inventory (backed by #636) |
+| `/inventory` | Phase 1 shell stub — unified inventory (backed by #636) |
+| `/timeline` | Phase 1 shell stub — workflow event timeline |
+| `/policy` | Phase 1 shell stub — capability/role policy placeholder |
+| `/insights` | Phase 1 shell stub — operational insights placeholder |
 
 Most routes are GET-only. POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE return `405` with
 `read-only-mvp`, except `/audit` and `/api/audit` which accept POST for
@@ -233,6 +238,26 @@ health, workflow/schema SHA-256 hashes, and stale-runtime warnings when the
 checkout is behind merged safety-gate changes. Restart guidance links to #420;
 no tokens or MCP restart actions are exposed.
 
+## Application shell — Phase 1 (#638)
+
+The console shell (`webui/layout.py`) renders a grouped navigation driven by a
+single nav-config module, `webui/nav.py`. Nav groups follow the epic #631
+Phase 1 information architecture: **Health, Traffic, Runtime/Sessions,
+Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy** (placeholder), and **Insights**
+(placeholder). Live views and Phase 1 placeholders (`stub`) are declared in one
+place so the layout and the route table cannot drift.
+
+The header carries two read-only status badges — an **environment** badge
+(`local` for loopback binds, `remote` otherwise, derived from `WEBUI_HOST`) and
+a **mode: read-only** badge — plus a **Docs** link to this document. No
+privileged action controls are present in the Phase 1 shell.
+
+Not-yet-implemented surfaces (`/sessions`, `/inventory`, `/timeline`,
+`/policy`, `/insights`) resolve to graceful read-only stub pages instead of
+404s; their backing views land in later child issues of #631 (the inventory
+surfaces are backed by #636). Mutating methods on stub routes still fail closed
+with `read-only-mvp`.
+
 ## Deployment boundary (#435)
 
 MVP serves on loopback by default. Binding `0.0.0.0` or `::` is **refused**
@@ -292,6 +317,108 @@ health, workflow/schema SHA-256 hashes, and stale-runtime warnings when the
 checkout is behind merged safety-gate changes. Restart guidance links to #420;
 no tokens or MCP restart actions are exposed.
 
+## Workflow-event timeline (#637)
+
+`GET /api/v1/timeline` is a read-only, versioned aggregation of workflow
+events from every available source into one normalised, filterable stream. It
+is the model layer for the Phase 1 timeline console view (a later child issue
+of #631); this issue ships the schema, adapters, and read API only.
+
+### Schema (versioned)
+
+`webui/timeline.py` declares `TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION` (currently `1`) and the
+frozen `WorkflowEvent` record. Every response carries `schema_version` so a
+consumer can branch on shape. One event:
+
+```json
+{
+  "source": "control_plane",
+  "event_type": "lease.renew",
+  "event_key": "cp:1421",
+  "timestamp": "2026-07-23T02:00:00Z",
+  "actor": null,
+  "role": null,
+  "issue_number": 637,
+  "pr_number": null,
+  "session_id": null,
+  "tool_name": null,
+  "decision": null,
+  "message": "lease renewed",
+  "correlation_id": "issue#637",
+  "evidence_refs": [],
+  "sensitive": true
+}
+```
+
+`event_key` is stable and unique per source (`cp:<event_id>`,
+`cth:<kind>:<number>:<comment_id>`), so pagination and dedup are deterministic.
+
+### Sources and field authority
+
+| Source | Adapter | Authority |
+|---|---|---|
+| Control-plane `events` ⋈ `work_items` | `adapt_cp_events` | `event_type`, `message`, `timestamp`, issue/PR scope come from the CP database, read through a `mode=ro` URI (never creates the DB or runs migrations) |
+| Gitea Canonical Thread Handoff comments | `adapt_cth_comments` | `actor`, `role` (next owner), `decision`, `evidence_refs`, `timestamp` come from the parsed CTH comment body (`canonical_thread_handoff`) |
+
+Handoff comments are thread-scoped: they are only read when the request filters
+by a single `issue` or `pr`. Otherwise the handoff source reports `not run`
+with a reason — it is never rendered as empty-and-healthy. Each source degrades
+independently: an unavailable control-plane DB or a failed comment fetch is a
+`sources[]` entry with `ok:false` and a `reason`, never a dropped timeline.
+
+### Query parameters
+
+`issue`, `pr`, `session` (conjunctive filters); `limit` (default 50, max 500)
+and `offset` for pagination; `remote`, `org`, `repo` to override the default
+registry-project scope. Events sort ascending by
+`(timestamp, source_rank, event_key)`; missing timestamps sort last.
+
+### Filter authority, and refusing what cannot be answered
+
+A filter dimension is only meaningful for a source whose records carry it.
+Each source declares its own support in `_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT` and reports it
+per response as `supported_filters` / `unsupported_filters`:
+
+| Source | issue | pr | session |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `control_plane` | yes | yes | **no** — the `events` table is `(event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)` and records no session |
+| `gitea_handoff` | yes | yes | yes — a CTH comment declares its own `Session:` field |
+
+`session_id` is read only from that declared CTH field. It is never inferred
+from a work item, an actor, or message text, and a value that is
+redaction-altering or bare-secret-shaped is dropped rather than emitted.
+
+When **no source that ran** can carry a requested dimension, the request is
+refused rather than answered: the response is `422` with `ok:false` and a
+structured `error` naming `unsupported_filters` and the per-source reason. A
+`200` with zero events would tell an operator that no such activity exists,
+which is a stronger — and false — claim than "this cannot be answered here".
+A source that *can* answer the dimension and simply matched nothing still
+returns `200` with `ok:true` and an empty page.
+
+### Redaction
+
+Every free-text field (event messages, decision/proof text, roles, actors) is
+passed through the console redaction policy (`webui.console_redaction`, backed
+by `gitea_audit.redact`) before it leaves the module, failing closed to the
+placeholder. No unredacted tool arguments or secrets are ever emitted, and a
+generation error never drops raw data to a caller or a log.
+
+Redaction also runs *before* any structured value is derived from free text.
+`evidence_refs` are extracted from already-redacted proof/decision text, and a
+commit reference is recognised only where the text declares one (`commit`,
+`head`, `base`, `sha`, …). An undeclared 40-character hex run has the exact
+shape of a Gitea access token, so it is never lifted out of prose into a
+structured field. Every reference is then independently revalidated against an
+allowed shape and a second redaction pass immediately before serialization;
+anything unproven is dropped and the event is flagged `sensitive`.
+
+### Tests
+
+```bash
+pytest tests/test_webui_timeline.py -q
+```
+
 ## Tests
 
 ```bash

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -440,13 +440,32 @@ def _session_author_lock_worktree() -> str | None:
 
     Used to derive the author mutation workspace when no explicit
     ``worktree_path`` or env binding is provided. Never invents a path.
+
+    #864: a session pointer whose owner PID is dead and is not this process
+    must not force workspace binding for other issues — rebind is required for
+    that issue, and a stale dead-owner pointer must not poison unrelated work.
     """
     try:
         lock = issue_lock_store.read_session_issue_lock() or {}
     except Exception:
         return None
     path = (lock.get("worktree_path") or "").strip()
-    return path or None
+    if not path:
+        return None
+    pid = lock.get("session_pid")
+    if pid is None:
+        pid = lock.get("pid")
+    try:
+        pid_i = int(pid) if pid is not None else None
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        pid_i = None
+    if (
+        pid_i is not None
+        and pid_i != os.getpid()
+        and not issue_lock_store.is_process_alive(pid_i)
+    ):
+        return None
+    return path
 
 
 def _resolve_preflight_workspace_path(worktree_path: str | None = None) -> str:
@@ -2021,6 +2040,7 @@ import dependency_graph  # noqa: E402  # #784 durable dependency edges
 import control_plane_db  # noqa: E402
 import lease_lifecycle  # noqa: E402
 import workflow_dashboard  # noqa: E402  # #605 live queue/lease dashboard
+import restart_coordinator  # noqa: E402  # #658 MCP restart coordinator/impact
 import incident_bridge  # noqa: E402
 import sentry_observability  # noqa: E402  (#606 optional Sentry observability)
 import sentry_incident_bridge  # noqa: E402  (#607 Sentry→Gitea incident bridge)
@@ -2031,6 +2051,7 @@ import issue_lock_store  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_adoption  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_recovery  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_renewal  # noqa: E402
+import dirty_same_claimant_session_rebind  # noqa: E402  # #864
 import stacked_pr_support  # noqa: E402
 import merge_approval_gate  # noqa: E402
 import review_quarantine  # noqa: E402  # #695 contaminated formal-review quarantine
@@ -4342,6 +4363,263 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
     return result
 
 
+@mcp.tool()
+def gitea_rebind_dirty_same_claimant_author_session(
+    issue_number: int,
+    branch_name: str,
+    worktree_path: str,
+    old_pid: int,
+    expected_local_head: str,
+    expected_remote_head: str,
+    expected_dirty_paths: list[str],
+    expected_fingerprints: dict,
+    remote: str = "dadeschools",
+    host: str | None = None,
+    org: str | None = None,
+    repo: str | None = None,
+    dry_run: bool = False,
+    authorize_reconciler_execute: bool = False,
+) -> dict:
+    """Rebind a dirty registered issue worktree to this session (#864).
+
+    Sanctioned only when every pin agrees: same claimant, dead old_pid matching
+    the durable lock, matching local/remote heads, exact dirty path set, and
+    per-path sha256 fingerprints. Preserves every tracked/untracked byte.
+    Does not sync remote, create recovery worktrees, clean, reset, or move heads.
+
+    Role gate:
+    * author — must match the lock claimant identity/profile
+    * reconciler — execute only when ``authorize_reconciler_execute=True``
+    * reviewer/merger — always refuse
+
+    ``gitea.issue.comment`` (author map entry) is required for mutation; dry_run
+    still assesses fully but writes nothing. Permission alone is never ownership
+    proof — every pin is re-checked server-side.
+
+    Args:
+        issue_number: Tracking issue number on the durable lock.
+        branch_name: Exact locked branch name.
+        worktree_path: Registered dirty worktree path (must be under branches/).
+        old_pid: Dead owner PID recorded on the lock (must match session_pid/pid).
+        expected_local_head: Full local HEAD sha the caller observed.
+        expected_remote_head: Full remote-tracking HEAD sha the caller observed.
+        expected_dirty_paths: Exact set of dirty relative paths (tracked+untracked).
+        expected_fingerprints: Map of relative path -> sha256 hex of file bytes.
+        remote: Known instance — 'dadeschools' or 'prgs'.
+        host/org/repo: Optional target overrides (validated against binding).
+        dry_run: When true, assess only (no lock/session writes).
+        authorize_reconciler_execute: Reconciler-only execute gate.
+    """
+    role = _profile_role_kind(get_profile())
+    role_norm = (role or "").strip().lower()
+
+    # Permission: authors need comment; dry_run assess is reachable under read
+    # for diagnosis, but execute always needs comment. Reconciler execute also
+    # needs comment when authorized.
+    if dry_run:
+        read_block = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.read")
+        if read_block:
+            return {
+                "success": False,
+                "dry_run": True,
+                "reasons": read_block,
+                "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.read"),
+            }
+    else:
+        blocked = _profile_permission_block(
+            task_capability_map.required_permission(
+                "rebind_dirty_same_claimant_author_session"
+            ),
+            issue_number=issue_number,
+            remote=remote,
+            host=host,
+            org=org,
+            repo=repo,
+            org_explicit=org is not None,
+            repo_explicit=repo is not None,
+        )
+        if blocked:
+            return blocked
+
+    if role_norm in {"reviewer", "merger"}:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "dry_run": bool(dry_run),
+            "outcome": dirty_same_claimant_session_rebind.REFUSED,
+            "reasons": [
+                f"role '{role_norm}' cannot rebind dirty same-claimant author "
+                "sessions (fail closed)"
+            ],
+        }
+    if role_norm == "reconciler" and not authorize_reconciler_execute and not dry_run:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "dry_run": False,
+            "outcome": dirty_same_claimant_session_rebind.REFUSED,
+            "reasons": [
+                "reconciler role requires authorize_reconciler_execute=True "
+                "to execute dirty same-claimant rebind (fail closed)"
+            ],
+        }
+
+    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
+    try:
+        identity = _authenticated_username(h)
+    except Exception:
+        identity = None
+    profile = get_profile()
+    profile_name = profile.get("profile_name")
+
+    existing = _load_existing_issue_lock(
+        remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, issue_number=issue_number
+    )
+    resolved_wt = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath((worktree_path or "").strip()))
+    inv = dirty_same_claimant_session_rebind.collect_dirty_inventory(resolved_wt)
+
+    branch_res = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "-C", resolved_wt, "branch", "--show-current"],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        check=False,
+    )
+    current_branch = (branch_res.stdout or "").strip() or None
+    head_res = subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "-C", resolved_wt, "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        check=False,
+    )
+    local_head = (head_res.stdout or "").strip() if head_res.returncode == 0 else None
+
+    # Observe remote-tracking head without network when possible.
+    remote_head = None
+    for ref in (
+        f"refs/remotes/origin/{branch_name}",
+        f"origin/{branch_name}",
+        f"refs/remotes/{remote}/{branch_name}",
+        f"{remote}/{branch_name}",
+    ):
+        rh = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", resolved_wt, "rev-parse", "--verify", "--quiet", ref],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        if rh.returncode == 0 and (rh.stdout or "").strip():
+            remote_head = (rh.stdout or "").strip()
+            break
+    if remote_head is None:
+        # Fall back to caller's pin only for observation absence — assessment
+        # still requires pin==observed, so missing observation fails closed.
+        remote_head = None
+
+    # Competing live locks (other issues / other worktrees).
+    competing_live = []
+    for entry in issue_lock_store.list_live_locks():
+        competing_live.append(entry)
+
+    # Session pointers that claim this issue lock.
+    competing_sessions = []
+    lock_dir = issue_lock_store.default_lock_dir()
+    lock_path = issue_lock_store.lock_file_path(
+        remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, issue_number=issue_number, lock_dir=lock_dir
+    )
+    try:
+        for name in os.listdir(lock_dir):
+            if not name.startswith("session-") or not name.endswith(".json"):
+                continue
+            ptr = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(os.path.join(lock_dir, name))
+            if not ptr:
+                continue
+            ptr_lock = str(ptr.get("lock_file_path") or "").strip()
+            if not ptr_lock:
+                continue
+            try:
+                same = os.path.realpath(ptr_lock) == os.path.realpath(lock_path)
+            except OSError:
+                same = ptr_lock == lock_path
+            if not same:
+                continue
+            try:
+                sess_pid = int(str(name)[len("session-") : -len(".json")])
+            except ValueError:
+                sess_pid = ptr.get("pid")
+            competing_sessions.append(
+                {
+                    "pid": sess_pid,
+                    "lock_file_path": ptr_lock,
+                    "live": issue_lock_store.is_process_alive(sess_pid),
+                }
+            )
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+
+    # Best-effort workflow-lease scan: any live lock file whose work_lease is a
+    # non-author workflow lease on this issue/branch counts as active.
+    workflow_lease_active = False
+    for path in issue_lock_store.iter_lock_files(lock_dir):
+        rec = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(path)
+        if not rec:
+            continue
+        lease = rec.get("work_lease") if isinstance(rec.get("work_lease"), dict) else {}
+        op = str(lease.get("operation_type") or "")
+        if op and op != issue_lock_store.AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE:
+            if rec.get("issue_number") == issue_number or str(
+                rec.get("branch_name") or ""
+            ) == branch_name:
+                if issue_lock_store.is_lease_live(rec):
+                    workflow_lease_active = True
+                    break
+
+    repo_root = _canonical_local_git_root()
+    # permission_allowed reflects profile gate only — never ownership proof.
+    permission_allowed = True
+
+    result = dirty_same_claimant_session_rebind.apply_dirty_same_claimant_session_rebind(
+        remote=remote,
+        org=o,
+        repo=r,
+        issue_number=issue_number,
+        branch_name=branch_name,
+        worktree_path=resolved_wt,
+        claimant_identity=identity,
+        claimant_profile=profile_name,
+        old_pid=old_pid,
+        expected_local_head=expected_local_head,
+        expected_remote_head=expected_remote_head,
+        expected_dirty_paths=list(expected_dirty_paths or []),
+        expected_fingerprints=dict(expected_fingerprints or {}),
+        existing_lock=existing,
+        current_identity=identity,
+        current_profile=profile_name,
+        role_kind=role_norm or role,
+        current_pid=os.getpid(),
+        current_branch=current_branch,
+        local_head=local_head,
+        remote_head=remote_head,
+        dirty_inventory=inv,
+        competing_live_locks=competing_live,
+        competing_sessions=competing_sessions,
+        workflow_lease_active=workflow_lease_active,
+        authorize_reconciler_execute=bool(authorize_reconciler_execute),
+        permission_allowed=permission_allowed,
+        repo_root=repo_root,
+        dry_run=bool(dry_run),
+        lock_dir=lock_dir,
+    )
+    result["observed"] = {
+        "local_head": local_head,
+        "remote_head": remote_head,
+        "current_branch": current_branch,
+        "dirty_paths": inv.get("dirty_paths"),
+        "fingerprints": inv.get("fingerprints"),
+        "identity": identity,
+        "profile": profile_name,
+        "role_kind": role_norm,
+    }
+    return result
+
+
 @mcp.tool()
 def gitea_assess_work_issue_duplicate(
     issue_number: int,
@@ -11242,127 +11520,163 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
     if dry_run:
         report["dry_run"] = True
         report["executed"] = False
+        # #851: surface planned lifecycle order so dry-run matches execute.
+        report["planned_execution_orders"] = {
+            str(entry.get("pr_number")): entry.get("planned_execution_order") or []
+            for entry in (report.get("entries") or [])
+        }
         return {"success": True, "performed": False, **report}
 
     verify_preflight_purity(
         remote, task="reconcile_merged_cleanups", org=org, repo=repo
     )
     actions: list[dict] = []
+    project_root = _canonical_local_git_root()
+
+    def _ownership_records_for_branch(
+        head_branch: str, pr_num_int: int | None
+    ) -> list[dict]:
+        ownership_bundle = _collect_branch_ownership_records(
+            remote=remote,
+            host=h,
+            org=o,
+            repo=r,
+            branch=head_branch,
+            pr_number=pr_num_int,
+            project_root=project_root,
+            auth=auth,
+            base_api=base,
+        )
+        ownership_records = list(ownership_bundle.get("records") or [])
+        if ownership_bundle.get("inventory_error"):
+            ownership_records.append(
+                {
+                    "category": (
+                        branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR
+                    ),
+                    "status": "unknown",
+                    "remote": remote,
+                    "host": h,
+                    "org": o,
+                    "repo": r,
+                    "branch": head_branch,
+                    "reclaim_allowed": False,
+                    "role": "inventory",
+                }
+            )
+        return ownership_records
+
+    def _attempt_owned_remote_delete(
+        *,
+        head_branch: str,
+        pr_num_int: int | None,
+        after_worktree_removal: bool = False,
+    ) -> dict:
+        """Fail-closed remote delete with live ownership reassessment (#851)."""
+        import urllib.parse
+
+        ownership_records = _ownership_records_for_branch(head_branch, pr_num_int)
+        ownership = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_active_branch_ownership(
+            remote=remote,
+            org=o,
+            repo=r,
+            branch=head_branch,
+            host=h,
+            records=ownership_records,
+        )
+        if ownership.get("block"):
+            return {
+                "action": "delete_remote_branch",
+                "branch": head_branch,
+                "success": False,
+                "performed": False,
+                "delete_acknowledged": False,
+                "verified_absent": False,
+                "blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership",
+                "reasons": ownership.get("reasons") or [],
+                "blocking_categories": ownership.get("blocking_categories") or [],
+                "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
+                "ownership_reassessed": after_worktree_removal,
+            }
+
+        encoded = urllib.parse.quote(head_branch, safe="")
+        url = f"{base}/branches/{encoded}"
+        with _audited(
+            "delete_branch",
+            host=h,
+            remote=remote,
+            org=o,
+            repo=r,
+            target_branch=head_branch,
+            request_metadata={
+                "branch": head_branch,
+                "source": "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
+                "ownership_checked": True,
+                "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
+            },
+        ):
+            api_request("DELETE", url, auth)
+        readback = _probe_remote_branch(h, o, r, auth, head_branch)
+        readback_assessment = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_post_delete_readback(
+            readback
+        )
+        verified = bool(readback_assessment.get("verified_absent"))
+        return {
+            "action": "delete_remote_branch",
+            "branch": head_branch,
+            "success": bool(readback_assessment.get("ok")),
+            "performed": True,
+            "delete_acknowledged": True,
+            "verified_absent": verified,
+            "readback": readback_assessment.get("readback"),
+            "reasons": readback_assessment.get("reasons") or [],
+            "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
+            "ownership_reassessed": after_worktree_removal,
+        }
+
     for entry in report.get("entries") or []:
         head_branch = entry.get("head_branch") or ""
         remote_assessment = entry.get("remote_branch") or {}
         local_assessment = entry.get("local_worktree") or {}
+        pr_num = entry.get("pr_number")
+        try:
+            pr_num_int = int(pr_num) if pr_num is not None else None
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            pr_num_int = None
 
-        if remote_assessment.get("safe_to_delete_remote"):
-            import urllib.parse
-
-            pr_num = entry.get("pr_number")
-            try:
-                pr_num_int = int(pr_num) if pr_num is not None else None
-            except (TypeError, ValueError):
-                pr_num_int = None
-            ownership_bundle = _collect_branch_ownership_records(
-                remote=remote,
-                host=h,
-                org=o,
-                repo=r,
-                branch=head_branch,
-                pr_number=pr_num_int,
-                project_root=_canonical_local_git_root(),
-                auth=auth,
-                base_api=base,
-            )
-            ownership_records = list(ownership_bundle.get("records") or [])
-            if ownership_bundle.get("inventory_error"):
-                ownership_records.append(
-                    {
-                        "category": (
-                            branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR
-                        ),
-                        "status": "unknown",
-                        "remote": remote,
-                        "host": h,
-                        "org": o,
-                        "repo": r,
-                        "branch": head_branch,
-                        "reclaim_allowed": False,
-                        "role": "inventory",
-                    }
-                )
-            ownership = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_active_branch_ownership(
-                remote=remote,
-                org=o,
-                repo=r,
-                branch=head_branch,
-                host=h,
-                records=ownership_records,
-            )
-            if ownership.get("block"):
-                actions.append(
-                    {
-                        "action": "delete_remote_branch",
-                        "branch": head_branch,
-                        "success": False,
-                        "performed": False,
-                        "delete_acknowledged": False,
-                        "verified_absent": False,
-                        "blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership",
-                        "reasons": ownership.get("reasons") or [],
-                        "blocking_categories": ownership.get(
-                            "blocking_categories"
-                        )
-                        or [],
-                    }
-                )
-                continue
-
-            encoded = urllib.parse.quote(head_branch, safe="")
-            url = f"{base}/branches/{encoded}"
-            with _audited(
-                "delete_branch",
-                host=h,
-                remote=remote,
-                org=o,
-                repo=r,
-                target_branch=head_branch,
-                request_metadata={
-                    "branch": head_branch,
-                    "source": "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
-                    "ownership_checked": True,
-                },
-            ):
-                api_request("DELETE", url, auth)
-            readback = _probe_remote_branch(h, o, r, auth, head_branch)
-            readback_assessment = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_post_delete_readback(
-                readback
-            )
-            verified = bool(readback_assessment.get("verified_absent"))
-            actions.append(
-                {
-                    "action": "delete_remote_branch",
-                    "branch": head_branch,
-                    "success": bool(readback_assessment.get("ok")),
-                    "performed": True,
-                    "delete_acknowledged": True,
-                    "verified_absent": verified,
-                    "readback": readback_assessment.get("readback"),
-                    "reasons": readback_assessment.get("reasons") or [],
-                }
-            )
-
+        # #851 lifecycle: when the target worktree is independently safe, remove
+        # it first so worktree_binding ownership does not permanently strand
+        # both the worktree and the remote branch. Never skip worktree removal
+        # merely because remote delete would be blocked by that binding.
+        # Ownership protection for remote delete remains fail-closed below.
+        worktree_removed = False
         if local_assessment.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"):
             result = merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree(
-                _canonical_local_git_root(),
+                project_root,
                 head_branch,
                 worktree_path=local_assessment.get("worktree_path"),
             )
             actions.append({"action": "remove_local_worktree", **result})
+            # Idempotent resume: absent worktree is already gone.
+            msg = (result.get("message") or "").lower()
+            worktree_removed = bool(result.get("success")) or (
+                "not found" in msg
+            )
+
+        if remote_assessment.get("safe_to_delete_remote"):
+            actions.append(
+                _attempt_owned_remote_delete(
+                    head_branch=head_branch,
+                    pr_num_int=pr_num_int,
+                    after_worktree_removal=worktree_removed,
+                )
+            )
 
     for scratch in report.get("reviewer_scratch_entries") or []:
         if not scratch.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"):
             continue
         result = merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_reviewer_scratch_worktree(
-            _canonical_local_git_root(), scratch.get("worktree_path") or ""
+            project_root, scratch.get("worktree_path") or ""
         )
         actions.append({"action": "remove_reviewer_scratch_worktree", **result})
 
@@ -11598,6 +11912,7 @@ def gitea_audit_worktree_cleanup(
     org: str | None = None,
     repo: str | None = None,
     ttl_hours: float = worktree_cleanup_audit.DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS,
+    merged_pr_limit: int = 200,
 ) -> dict:
     """Read-only: classify every session-owned worktree under ``branches/`` (#401).
 
@@ -11608,17 +11923,26 @@ def gitea_audit_worktree_cleanup(
     the active issue-lock branch is read from the local lock file and treated
     as active work. Deletes nothing and mutates no Gitea state.
 
-    Fails closed if the live open-PR list cannot be fetched: without it,
-    removability cannot be proven, so no candidates are returned.
+    Merged PRs are fetched as well, so an issue worktree can be linked to the
+    PR that owns its branch (#858). Such a worktree only becomes removable
+    when that owning PR is unambiguous and merged, the worktree head is
+    already contained in authoritative master, and nothing else protects it —
+    no open or competing PR, lease, issue lock, live session, dirty file, or
+    protected/control checkout. Anything unproven keeps it classified as
+    active issue work.
+
+    Fails closed if the live open-PR list, the merged-PR list, or the
+    control-plane lease state cannot be read: without them removability
+    cannot be proven, so no candidates are returned.
 
     Args:
         remote: Known instance — 'dadeschools' or 'prgs'.
         host: Override the Gitea host.
         org: Override the owner/organization.
         repo: Override the repository name.
-        ttl_hours: Age (hours) after which a clean issue/conflict-fix
-            worktree becomes stale-removable (default from
-            GITEA_WORKTREE_TTL_HOURS).
+        ttl_hours: Age (hours) after which a clean conflict-fix worktree
+            becomes stale-removable (default from GITEA_WORKTREE_TTL_HOURS).
+        merged_pr_limit: Max closed PRs scanned for merged-PR ownership.
 
     Returns:
         dict with per-worktree classifications, counts, removable
@@ -11654,22 +11978,84 @@ def gitea_audit_worktree_cleanup(
         if (pr.get("head") or {}).get("ref")
     }
 
+    # #858: merged PRs are the ownership evidence that lets a landed issue
+    # worktree stop being reported as active work. Without them the audit can
+    # never agree with the PR-scoped reconciler, so treat a fetch failure the
+    # same way an open-PR fetch failure is treated: fail closed.
+    try:
+        closed_prs = api_get_all(
+            f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls?state=closed", auth, limit=merged_pr_limit
+        )
+    except Exception as exc:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "open_pr_state_verified": True,
+            "merged_pr_state_verified": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                "could not fetch merged PRs; worktree ownership unverified "
+                f"(fail closed): {_redact(str(exc))}"
+            ],
+        }
+    merged_prs = [pr for pr in closed_prs if (pr.get("merged") or pr.get("merged_at"))]
+    pr_index = worktree_cleanup_audit.build_pr_index(list(open_prs) + merged_prs)
+
+    # #858: the auditor already accepted lease evidence but nothing ever
+    # supplied it, so every worktree looked unleased. Removability is now
+    # reachable for issue worktrees, so authoritative control-plane leases
+    # must be readable or the audit fails closed.
+    db, lease_errs = _control_plane_db_or_error()
+    if db is None:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "performed": False,
+            "open_pr_state_verified": True,
+            "merged_pr_state_verified": True,
+            "lease_state_verified": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                "could not read control-plane leases; worktree protection "
+                "unverified (fail closed)",
+                *lease_errs,
+            ],
+        }
+    lease_result = lease_lifecycle.list_active_leases(
+        db, remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, include_non_active=False, limit=500
+    )
+    leased_issue_numbers: set[int] = set()
+    live_session_paths: set[str] = set()
+    for lease in lease_result.get("leases") or []:
+        if lease.get("work_kind") == "issue" and lease.get("work_number") is not None:
+            try:
+                leased_issue_numbers.add(int(lease["work_number"]))
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                pass
+        if lease.get("worktree_path"):
+            live_session_paths.add(str(lease["worktree_path"]))
+
     active_issue_branches: set[str] = set()
     lock = merged_cleanup_reconcile.read_issue_lock(ISSUE_LOCK_FILE)
     if lock and lock.get("branch_name"):
         active_issue_branches.add(str(lock["branch_name"]).strip())
 
+    master_ref = f"{remote}/master" if remote in REMOTES else "origin/master"
     report = worktree_cleanup_audit.audit_branches_directory(
         _canonical_local_git_root(),
         open_pr_branches=open_pr_branches,
         active_issue_branches=active_issue_branches,
         now=datetime.now(timezone.utc),
         ttl_hours=ttl_hours,
+        pr_index=pr_index,
+        leased_issue_numbers=leased_issue_numbers,
+        live_session_paths=live_session_paths,
+        master_ref=master_ref,
     )
     return {
         "success": True,
         "performed": False,
         "open_pr_state_verified": True,
+        "merged_pr_state_verified": True,
+        "lease_state_verified": True,
+        "master_ref": master_ref,
         "task_mode": "work-issue",
         **report,
     }
@@ -21104,6 +21490,156 @@ def gitea_workflow_dashboard(
     return payload
 
 
+@mcp.tool()
+def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
+    remote: str = "dadeschools",
+    host: str | None = None,
+    org: str | None = None,
+    repo: str | None = None,
+    dry_run: bool = True,
+    request_override: bool = False,
+    session_id: str | None = None,
+    limit: int = 200,
+) -> dict:
+    """Evaluate a proposed MCP restart and return an impact preview (#658).
+
+    Central restart coordinator: gathers live control-plane state (sessions,
+    leases/locks, in-flight issue/PR work, mutations, worktrees) and returns a
+    blast-radius impact report with a ``safe`` / ``unsafe`` / ``override``
+    verdict, so the console (#642/#652) and operators can see what a restart
+    would disrupt *before* any concurrent LLM work is destroyed.
+
+    This tool is **dry-run and never restarts anything.** The mutative apply
+    path is a separate child gated by a drain proof (non-goal here); calling
+    with ``dry_run=False`` still performs no restart and reports that apply is
+    not yet available.
+
+    Operator override authority is read from the process environment
+    (``GITEA_OPERATOR_RESTART_OVERRIDE_AUTHORIZATION``), never self-asserted by
+    the requesting session: ``request_override`` only expresses caller intent
+    and takes effect solely when that environment authorization is present.
+
+    Fails closed: if the control-plane inventory cannot be completed, the
+    verdict is ``unsafe`` / deny (an incomplete evaluation must never green-light
+    a restart).
+    """
+    read_block = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.read")
+    if read_block:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "read_only": True,
+            "dry_run": True,
+            "restart_performed": False,
+            "reasons": read_block,
+            "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.read"),
+        }
+
+    try:
+        h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "read_only": True,
+            "dry_run": True,
+            "restart_performed": False,
+            "reasons": [str(exc)],
+        }
+
+    inventory_complete = True
+    incomplete_reasons: list[str] = []
+    sessions: list[dict] = []
+    leases: list[dict] = []
+    terminal_lock: dict | None = None
+
+    db, db_errs = _control_plane_db_or_error()
+    if db is None:
+        inventory_complete = False
+        incomplete_reasons.extend(
+            db_errs or ["control-plane DB unavailable; cannot evaluate restart"]
+        )
+    else:
+        try:
+            sessions = db.list_sessions(statuses=("active",), limit=max(1, int(limit)))
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+            inventory_complete = False
+            incomplete_reasons.append(
+                f"session inventory failed: {_redact(str(exc))}"
+            )
+        try:
+            lease_result = lease_lifecycle.list_active_leases(
+                db,
+                remote=remote if remote in REMOTES else remote,
+                org=o,
+                repo=r,
+                role=None,
+                include_non_active=False,
+                limit=max(1, int(limit)),
+            )
+            leases = list(lease_result.get("leases") or [])
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+            inventory_complete = False
+            incomplete_reasons.append(
+                f"lease inventory failed: {_redact(str(exc))}"
+            )
+        try:
+            terminal = db.get_active_terminal_lock(
+                remote=remote if remote in REMOTES else remote,
+                org=o,
+                repo=r,
+            )
+            if terminal:
+                terminal_lock = dict(terminal)
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+            inventory_complete = False
+            incomplete_reasons.append(
+                f"terminal lock lookup failed: {_redact(str(exc))}"
+            )
+
+    profile = get_profile()
+    profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip() or "session"
+    sid = (session_id or "").strip() or f"{profile_name}-{os.getpid()}"
+
+    # Override authority is read from the environment only — a worker session
+    # cannot set an env var for an already-running daemon, so it cannot be
+    # self-asserted the way a tool argument could (#630/#710 F1 pattern).
+    operator_authorized = bool(
+        (os.environ.get("GITEA_OPERATOR_RESTART_OVERRIDE_AUTHORIZATION") or "").strip()
+    )
+    operator_override = bool(request_override and operator_authorized)
+
+    inventory = {
+        "sessions": sessions,
+        "leases": leases,
+        "terminal_lock": terminal_lock,
+        "inventory_complete": inventory_complete,
+        "incomplete_reasons": incomplete_reasons,
+    }
+
+    report = restart_coordinator.evaluate_restart_impact(
+        inventory,
+        operator_override=operator_override,
+        requesting_session_id=sid,
+        dry_run=True,  # coordinator is always analysis-only (#658)
+    )
+
+    payload = report.as_dict()
+    payload["success"] = True
+    payload["read_only"] = True
+    payload["remote"] = remote
+    payload["org"] = o
+    payload["repo"] = r
+    payload["requesting_session_id"] = sid
+    payload["operator_override_requested"] = bool(request_override)
+    payload["operator_override_authorized"] = operator_authorized
+    payload["apply_supported"] = False
+    if not dry_run:
+        payload["reasons"] = list(payload.get("reasons") or []) + [
+            "apply requested but not supported: sanctioned restart apply is "
+            "gated by a drain proof (separate child); no restart performed (#658)"
+        ]
+    return payload
+
+
 @mcp.tool()
 def gitea_inspect_workflow_lease(
     lease_id: str,

issue_lock_provenance.py

@@ -16,11 +16,16 @@ ISSUE_LOCK_FILE = os.environ.get("GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_FILE", "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock
 SOURCE_LOCK_ISSUE = "gitea_lock_issue"
 SOURCE_LOCK_ADOPTION = "gitea_lock_issue_adoption"
 SOURCE_OPERATOR_OVERRIDE = "operator_override"
+# #864: dirty-preserving same-claimant author-session rebind (dead owner PID).
+SOURCE_DIRTY_SAME_CLAIMANT_REBIND = (
+    "gitea_rebind_dirty_same_claimant_author_session"
+)
 
 SANCTIONED_LOCK_SOURCES = frozenset({
     SOURCE_LOCK_ISSUE,
     SOURCE_LOCK_ADOPTION,
     SOURCE_OPERATOR_OVERRIDE,
+    SOURCE_DIRTY_SAME_CLAIMANT_REBIND,
 })
 
 _OPERATOR_OVERRIDE_ENV = "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_OPERATOR_OVERRIDE"

merged_cleanup_reconcile.py

@@ -566,6 +566,10 @@ def build_pr_cleanup_entry(
         worktree_state=worktree_state,
         active_lock=active_lock,
     )
+    planned = plan_cleanup_execution_order(
+        remote_assessment=remote,
+        local_assessment=local,
+    )
     return {
         "pr_number": pr_number,
         "issue_number": issue_number,
@@ -576,9 +580,63 @@ def build_pr_cleanup_entry(
         "merged": merged,
         "remote_branch": remote,
         "local_worktree": local,
+        # #851: dry-run and execute share the same lifecycle order description.
+        "planned_execution_order": planned,
     }
 
 
+def plan_cleanup_execution_order(
+    *,
+    remote_assessment: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    local_assessment: dict[str, Any] | None,
+) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Describe independent worktree-then-reassess-then-remote cleanup order (#851).
+
+    Remote ownership protection remains fail-closed at execute time. A worktree
+    that is independently safe to remove is never skipped merely because remote
+    deletion may be blocked by that same ``worktree_binding``.
+    """
+    remote = remote_assessment or {}
+    local = local_assessment or {}
+    steps: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    worktree_safe = bool(local.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"))
+    remote_safe = bool(remote.get("safe_to_delete_remote"))
+
+    if worktree_safe:
+        steps.append(
+            {
+                "action": "remove_local_worktree",
+                "reason": "independently_safe_to_remove",
+                "phase": 1,
+            }
+        )
+    if remote_safe:
+        if worktree_safe:
+            steps.append(
+                {
+                    "action": "reassess_branch_ownership",
+                    "reason": "after_worktree_removal_clear_worktree_binding",
+                    "phase": 2,
+                }
+            )
+            steps.append(
+                {
+                    "action": "delete_remote_branch",
+                    "reason": "only_if_independently_safe_after_reassessment",
+                    "phase": 3,
+                }
+            )
+        else:
+            steps.append(
+                {
+                    "action": "delete_remote_branch",
+                    "reason": "safe_to_delete_and_no_independent_worktree_removal",
+                    "phase": 1,
+                }
+            )
+    return steps
+
+
 def build_reconciliation_report(
     *,
     project_root: str,

restart_coordinator.py

@@ -0,0 +1,451 @@
+"""MCP restart coordinator and impact analysis (#658).
+
+Before any sanctioned MCP restart, a central coordinator must evaluate the
+live control-plane state — active sessions, leases/locks, in-flight issue/PR
+work, mutations, worktrees, and recovery history — and produce an *impact
+preview* so operators (and the web console, #642/#652) can see the blast
+radius **before** concurrent LLM work is disrupted.
+
+Design rules (mirrors the read-only posture of ``workflow_dashboard`` /
+``lease_lifecycle``):
+
+* **Pure classification.** :func:`evaluate_restart_impact` takes an already
+  gathered inventory and returns a structured report. It never touches the
+  network, the filesystem, or a live process, so multi-session fixtures can
+  drive every branch in unit tests. The coordinator *never restarts anything*;
+  a mutative apply path is a later child gated by a drain proof (non-goal here).
+* **Fail closed.** If the inventory is not explicitly complete, the verdict is
+  ``unsafe`` / deny — an incomplete evaluation must never green-light a restart.
+* **No secrets.** Session ids, pids, and profiles are operational metadata, not
+  credentials; nothing secret flows through this module.
+
+The single sanctioned entry point post-#657 is the MCP tool
+``gitea_request_mcp_restart`` (dry-run by default), which gathers the inventory
+from the #613 control-plane DB and calls :func:`evaluate_restart_impact`.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
+
+import lease_lifecycle
+
+COORDINATOR_VERSION = "1.0.0-issue-658"
+
+# Restart verdicts. Exactly the three the acceptance criteria name.
+VERDICT_SAFE = "safe"
+VERDICT_UNSAFE = "unsafe"
+VERDICT_OVERRIDE = "override"
+
+# Blast-radius severity bands.
+BLAST_NONE = "none"
+BLAST_LOW = "low"
+BLAST_MEDIUM = "medium"
+BLAST_HIGH = "high"
+
+# A live lease with a live owner process is treated as active in-flight work.
+LEASE_FRESHNESS_LIVE = "active"
+
+# Default staleness window for a session heartbeat (seconds). A session whose
+# last heartbeat is older than this is not counted as live even if its row is
+# still marked ``active`` — it is assumed dead/detached.
+DEFAULT_SESSION_HEARTBEAT_STALE_SECONDS = 900
+
+
+def _utc_now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _parse_ts(value: str | None) -> datetime | None:
+    return lease_lifecycle._parse_ts(value)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SessionImpact:
+    """One MCP session a restart would terminate."""
+
+    session_id: str
+    role: str | None
+    profile: str | None
+    pid: int | None
+    status: str | None
+    alive: bool | None
+    heartbeat_stale: bool
+    is_requester: bool
+    live: bool
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "session_id": self.session_id,
+            "role": self.role,
+            "profile": self.profile,
+            "pid": self.pid,
+            "status": self.status,
+            "alive": self.alive,
+            "heartbeat_stale": self.heartbeat_stale,
+            "is_requester": self.is_requester,
+            "live": self.live,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class LeaseImpact:
+    """One control-plane lease a restart would disrupt."""
+
+    lease_id: str | None
+    session_id: str | None
+    role: str | None
+    phase: str | None
+    freshness: str | None
+    work_kind: str | None
+    work_number: int | None
+    worktree_path: str | None
+    disruptive: bool
+    is_mutation: bool
+    is_critical_section: bool
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "lease_id": self.lease_id,
+            "session_id": self.session_id,
+            "role": self.role,
+            "phase": self.phase,
+            "freshness": self.freshness,
+            "work_kind": self.work_kind,
+            "work_number": self.work_number,
+            "worktree_path": self.worktree_path,
+            "disruptive": self.disruptive,
+            "is_mutation": self.is_mutation,
+            "is_critical_section": self.is_critical_section,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RestartImpactReport:
+    """Impact preview DTO returned to the console / operator (#642/#652)."""
+
+    coordinator_version: str
+    evaluated_at: str
+    dry_run: bool
+    restart_performed: bool
+    inventory_complete: bool
+    verdict: str
+    allow_restart: bool
+    override_would_allow: bool
+    operator_override: bool
+    blast_radius: str
+    reasons: list[str]
+    affected_sessions: list[SessionImpact]
+    affected_leases: list[LeaseImpact]
+    critical_sections: list[LeaseImpact]
+    affected_issues: list[int]
+    affected_prs: list[int]
+    mutations: list[LeaseImpact]
+    terminal_lock: dict[str, Any] | None
+    ack_state: dict[str, str]
+    prior_recovery_attempts: list[dict[str, Any]]
+    counts: dict[str, int]
+    audit_record: dict[str, Any]
+    incomplete_reasons: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "coordinator_version": self.coordinator_version,
+            "evaluated_at": self.evaluated_at,
+            "dry_run": self.dry_run,
+            "restart_performed": self.restart_performed,
+            "inventory_complete": self.inventory_complete,
+            "incomplete_reasons": list(self.incomplete_reasons),
+            "verdict": self.verdict,
+            "allow_restart": self.allow_restart,
+            "override_would_allow": self.override_would_allow,
+            "operator_override": self.operator_override,
+            "blast_radius": self.blast_radius,
+            "reasons": list(self.reasons),
+            "affected_sessions": [s.as_dict() for s in self.affected_sessions],
+            "affected_leases": [l.as_dict() for l in self.affected_leases],
+            "critical_sections": [l.as_dict() for l in self.critical_sections],
+            "affected_issues": list(self.affected_issues),
+            "affected_prs": list(self.affected_prs),
+            "mutations": [l.as_dict() for l in self.mutations],
+            "terminal_lock": self.terminal_lock,
+            "ack_state": dict(self.ack_state),
+            "prior_recovery_attempts": list(self.prior_recovery_attempts),
+            "counts": dict(self.counts),
+            "audit_record": dict(self.audit_record),
+        }
+
+
+def _classify_session(
+    row: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    now: datetime,
+    requesting_session_id: str | None,
+    heartbeat_stale_seconds: int,
+) -> SessionImpact:
+    session_id = str(row.get("session_id") or "")
+    pid = row.get("pid")
+    status = (row.get("status") or "").strip().lower() or None
+    alive = lease_lifecycle.is_process_alive(pid) if pid is not None else None
+    hb = _parse_ts(row.get("last_heartbeat_at"))
+    heartbeat_stale = bool(
+        hb is not None and (now - hb).total_seconds() > heartbeat_stale_seconds
+    )
+    live = bool(status == "active" and alive is not False and not heartbeat_stale)
+    return SessionImpact(
+        session_id=session_id,
+        role=row.get("role"),
+        profile=row.get("profile"),
+        pid=pid,
+        status=status,
+        alive=alive,
+        heartbeat_stale=heartbeat_stale,
+        is_requester=bool(
+            requesting_session_id and session_id == requesting_session_id
+        ),
+        live=live,
+    )
+
+
+# Lease phases that represent an active mutation in flight (as opposed to a
+# mere allocation/claim with no work committed yet). An active lease in any of
+# these phases is a critical section a restart must not sever.
+_MUTATING_PHASES = frozenset(
+    {
+        "implementing",
+        "publishing",
+        "pushing",
+        "committing",
+        "reviewing",
+        "merging",
+        "reconciling",
+        "conflict_fix",
+    }
+)
+
+
+def _classify_lease(row: Mapping[str, Any]) -> LeaseImpact:
+    freshness_obj = row.get("freshness")
+    if isinstance(freshness_obj, Mapping):
+        freshness = str(freshness_obj.get("freshness") or "").strip().lower() or None
+    else:
+        freshness = str(freshness_obj or "").strip().lower() or None
+    phase = (row.get("phase") or "").strip().lower() or None
+    worktree = row.get("worktree_path")
+    disruptive = freshness == LEASE_FRESHNESS_LIVE
+    # A live lease is a mutation-in-flight if it carries an author worktree or
+    # its phase names a mutating step. All disruptive leases are critical
+    # sections a restart would sever regardless.
+    is_mutation = bool(
+        disruptive and (bool(worktree) or (phase in _MUTATING_PHASES))
+    )
+    number = row.get("work_number")
+    try:
+        number = int(number) if number is not None else None
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        number = None
+    return LeaseImpact(
+        lease_id=row.get("lease_id"),
+        session_id=row.get("session_id"),
+        role=row.get("role"),
+        phase=phase,
+        freshness=freshness,
+        work_kind=(str(row.get("work_kind") or "").strip().lower() or None),
+        work_number=number,
+        worktree_path=worktree,
+        disruptive=disruptive,
+        is_mutation=is_mutation,
+        is_critical_section=disruptive,
+    )
+
+
+def _blast_radius(*, session_count: int, work_count: int, mutation_count: int) -> str:
+    if mutation_count > 0 or work_count >= 3 or session_count >= 3:
+        return BLAST_HIGH
+    if work_count > 0 or session_count == 2:
+        return BLAST_MEDIUM
+    if session_count == 1:
+        return BLAST_LOW
+    return BLAST_NONE
+
+
+def evaluate_restart_impact(
+    inventory: Mapping[str, Any],
+    *,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+    operator_override: bool = False,
+    requesting_session_id: str | None = None,
+    dry_run: bool = True,
+    session_heartbeat_stale_seconds: int = DEFAULT_SESSION_HEARTBEAT_STALE_SECONDS,
+) -> RestartImpactReport:
+    """Evaluate a proposed MCP restart and return an impact preview.
+
+    ``inventory`` is a mapping with:
+
+    * ``sessions`` — session rows (session_id, role, profile, pid, status,
+      last_heartbeat_at).
+    * ``leases`` — control-plane lease rows, each ideally carrying an enriched
+      ``freshness`` dict (as :func:`lease_lifecycle.list_active_leases` returns);
+      a bare string freshness is also accepted.
+    * ``terminal_lock`` — the active terminal (merge) lock, if any.
+    * ``prior_recovery_attempts`` — narrower recovery attempts already tried
+      (e.g. sanctioned reconnects) so the operator sees escalation history.
+    * ``inventory_complete`` — bool. **Must** be explicitly True; a missing or
+      falsy value forces a deny (fail closed).
+    * ``incomplete_reasons`` — optional reasons the inventory is incomplete.
+
+    The coordinator never restarts anything: ``restart_performed`` is always
+    False and the mutative apply path is a later drain-gated child.
+    """
+    moment = now or _utc_now()
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+
+    inventory_complete = bool(inventory.get("inventory_complete", False))
+    incomplete_reasons = [str(r) for r in (inventory.get("incomplete_reasons") or [])]
+
+    sessions_raw: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]] = inventory.get("sessions") or []
+    leases_raw: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]] = inventory.get("leases") or []
+    terminal_lock = inventory.get("terminal_lock") or None
+    prior_recovery_attempts = [
+        dict(a) for a in (inventory.get("prior_recovery_attempts") or [])
+    ]
+
+    session_impacts = [
+        _classify_session(
+            s,
+            now=moment,
+            requesting_session_id=requesting_session_id,
+            heartbeat_stale_seconds=session_heartbeat_stale_seconds,
+        )
+        for s in sessions_raw
+    ]
+    lease_impacts = [_classify_lease(l) for l in leases_raw]
+
+    # Only *other* live sessions and live leases constitute blast radius: a
+    # restart that would kill only the requesting session with no other work in
+    # flight is safe.
+    other_live_sessions = [
+        s for s in session_impacts if s.live and not s.is_requester
+    ]
+    disruptive_leases = [l for l in lease_impacts if l.disruptive]
+    critical_sections = [l for l in lease_impacts if l.is_critical_section]
+    mutations = [l for l in lease_impacts if l.is_mutation]
+
+    affected_issues = sorted(
+        {
+            l.work_number
+            for l in disruptive_leases
+            if l.work_kind == "issue" and l.work_number is not None
+        }
+    )
+    affected_prs = sorted(
+        {
+            l.work_number
+            for l in disruptive_leases
+            if l.work_kind == "pr" and l.work_number is not None
+        }
+    )
+
+    disruptive = bool(disruptive_leases or other_live_sessions or terminal_lock)
+
+    if not inventory_complete:
+        verdict = VERDICT_UNSAFE
+        allow_restart = False
+        reasons.append(
+            "inventory incomplete: restart evaluation cannot confirm blast "
+            "radius — deny (fail closed, #658)"
+        )
+        reasons.extend(incomplete_reasons)
+    elif not disruptive:
+        verdict = VERDICT_SAFE
+        allow_restart = True
+        reasons.append("no other live sessions, live leases, or terminal lock")
+    elif operator_override:
+        verdict = VERDICT_OVERRIDE
+        allow_restart = True
+        reasons.append(
+            "live work present; operator override accepts the blast radius"
+        )
+    else:
+        verdict = VERDICT_UNSAFE
+        allow_restart = False
+        reasons.append(
+            "live work would be disrupted; restart denied without operator "
+            "override"
+        )
+
+    if critical_sections and inventory_complete:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"{len(critical_sections)} critical section(s) in flight "
+            "(active lease with a live owner)"
+        )
+    if terminal_lock:
+        reasons.append("active terminal (merge) lock present")
+
+    override_would_allow = bool(inventory_complete and disruptive)
+
+    blast_radius = _blast_radius(
+        session_count=len(other_live_sessions),
+        work_count=len(affected_issues) + len(affected_prs),
+        mutation_count=len(mutations),
+    )
+
+    # Acknowledgement is a later child (drain protocol); expose per-session
+    # placeholders so the console can render the ack column now.
+    ack_state = {s.session_id: "pending" for s in other_live_sessions}
+
+    counts = {
+        "sessions_total": len(session_impacts),
+        "sessions_live_other": len(other_live_sessions),
+        "leases_total": len(lease_impacts),
+        "leases_disruptive": len(disruptive_leases),
+        "critical_sections": len(critical_sections),
+        "mutations": len(mutations),
+        "affected_issues": len(affected_issues),
+        "affected_prs": len(affected_prs),
+        "prior_recovery_attempts": len(prior_recovery_attempts),
+    }
+
+    audit_record = {
+        "event": "restart_impact_evaluated",
+        "coordinator_version": COORDINATOR_VERSION,
+        "evaluated_at": moment.isoformat(),
+        "dry_run": dry_run,
+        "operator_override": bool(operator_override),
+        "requesting_session_id": requesting_session_id,
+        "inventory_complete": inventory_complete,
+        "verdict": verdict,
+        "allow_restart": allow_restart,
+        "blast_radius": blast_radius,
+        "counts": counts,
+    }
+
+    return RestartImpactReport(
+        coordinator_version=COORDINATOR_VERSION,
+        evaluated_at=moment.isoformat(),
+        dry_run=dry_run,
+        restart_performed=False,
+        inventory_complete=inventory_complete,
+        verdict=verdict,
+        allow_restart=allow_restart,
+        override_would_allow=override_would_allow,
+        operator_override=bool(operator_override),
+        blast_radius=blast_radius,
+        reasons=reasons,
+        affected_sessions=session_impacts,
+        affected_leases=lease_impacts,
+        critical_sections=critical_sections,
+        affected_issues=affected_issues,
+        affected_prs=affected_prs,
+        mutations=mutations,
+        terminal_lock=dict(terminal_lock)
+        if isinstance(terminal_lock, Mapping)
+        else terminal_lock,
+        ack_state=ack_state,
+        prior_recovery_attempts=prior_recovery_attempts,
+        counts=counts,
+        audit_record=audit_record,
+        incomplete_reasons=incomplete_reasons,
+    )

task_capability_map.py

@@ -32,6 +32,17 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
         "role": "author",
     },
+    # #864: dirty-preserving same-claimant author-session rebind (dead owner PID).
+    # Author MCP tool path. Reconciler execute is gated inside the tool via
+    # authorize_reconciler_execute + role_kind checks (not this map entry).
+    "rebind_dirty_same_claimant_author_session": {
+        "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
+        "role": "author",
+    },
+    "gitea_rebind_dirty_same_claimant_author_session": {
+        "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
+        "role": "author",
+    },
     "set_issue_labels": {
         "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
         "role": "author",

tests/test_branch_cleanup_guard.py

@@ -1266,6 +1266,378 @@ class TestSecondRemediationIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("delete_acknowledged", delete_actions[0])
         self.assertTrue(delete_actions[0].get("verified_absent"))
 
+    def test_issue_851_worktree_removed_when_remote_blocked_only_by_worktree_binding(self):
+        """#851: remote blocked by worktree_binding must not skip safe worktree removal.
+
+        Lifecycle: remove clean owned worktree → reassess ownership → delete
+        remote only if independently safe. Unrelated entries stay untouched.
+        """
+        from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
+
+        target_branch = "fix/issue-844-exclude-epic-containers"
+        foreign_branch = "fix/issue-999-unrelated-active"
+        worktree_path = "/tmp/branches/fix-issue-844-exclude-epic-containers"
+        ownership_calls = []
+        remove_calls = []
+        delete_api_calls = []
+
+        def fake_collect(**kwargs):
+            ownership_calls.append(dict(kwargs))
+            # Ownership is reassessed *after* independent worktree removal (#851).
+            # Target worktree is already gone → no worktree_binding remains.
+            # Foreign branch keeps an active author lease → remote delete blocked.
+            if kwargs.get("branch") == foreign_branch:
+                # Match session-bound org/repo + host used by the tool resolve path.
+                return {
+                    "records": [
+                        {
+                            "category": guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
+                            "status": "active",
+                            "remote": kwargs.get("remote") or "prgs",
+                            "host": kwargs.get("host") or "gitea.example.com",
+                            "org": kwargs.get("org") or "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                            "repo": kwargs.get("repo") or "Gitea-Tools",
+                            "branch": foreign_branch,
+                            "reclaim_allowed": False,
+                        }
+                    ],
+                    "inventory_error": False,
+                }
+            return {"records": [], "inventory_error": False}
+
+        def fake_remove(project_root, branch, worktree_path=None):
+            remove_calls.append(
+                {"branch": branch, "worktree_path": worktree_path}
+            )
+            return {
+                "success": True,
+                "performed": True,
+                "message": f"removed worktree {worktree_path}",
+                "worktree_path": worktree_path,
+            }
+
+        def fake_probe(h, o, r, auth, br):
+            return guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
+                404, not_found_scope=guard.NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH
+            )
+
+        def fake_api(method, url, auth, **kwargs):
+            if method == "DELETE":
+                delete_api_calls.append(url)
+            return {}
+
+        report = {
+            "entries": [
+                {
+                    "pr_number": 848,
+                    "head_branch": target_branch,
+                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
+                    "local_worktree": {
+                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": True,
+                        "worktree_path": worktree_path,
+                    },
+                },
+                {
+                    "pr_number": 999,
+                    "head_branch": foreign_branch,
+                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
+                    "local_worktree": {
+                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": False,
+                        "worktree_path": None,
+                    },
+                },
+            ],
+            "reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
+        }
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_profile",
+            return_value={
+                "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
+                "role": "reconciler",
+                "allowed_operations": [
+                    "gitea.read",
+                    "gitea.branch.delete",
+                    "gitea.pr.close",
+                ],
+                "forbidden_operations": [],
+            },
+        ).start()
+        patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
+            return_value=report,
+        ).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
+            return_value=[],
+        ).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
+            return_value=(True, []),
+        ).start()
+        patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
+            side_effect=fake_collect,
+        ).start()
+        patch("mcp_server._probe_remote_branch", side_effect=fake_probe).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
+            side_effect=fake_remove,
+        ).start()
+        self.mock_api.side_effect = fake_api
+
+        res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
+            dry_run=False,
+            execute_confirmed=True,
+            remote="prgs",
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(res.get("performed") or res.get("executed"))
+        actions = res.get("actions") or []
+
+        remove_actions = [
+            a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"
+        ]
+        self.assertEqual(len(remove_actions), 1, actions)
+        self.assertTrue(remove_actions[0].get("success"))
+        self.assertEqual(remove_calls[0]["branch"], target_branch)
+        self.assertEqual(remove_calls[0]["worktree_path"], worktree_path)
+
+        # Target remote delete succeeds after worktree removal + reassessment.
+        target_deletes = [
+            a
+            for a in actions
+            if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
+            and a.get("branch") == target_branch
+        ]
+        self.assertEqual(len(target_deletes), 1, actions)
+        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("success"))
+        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("after_worktree_removal"))
+        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("ownership_reassessed"))
+        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("verified_absent"))
+
+        # Foreign branch remains protected (author lease) and is not deleted.
+        foreign_deletes = [
+            a
+            for a in actions
+            if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
+            and a.get("branch") == foreign_branch
+        ]
+        self.assertEqual(len(foreign_deletes), 1, actions)
+        self.assertFalse(foreign_deletes[0].get("success"))
+        self.assertEqual(
+            foreign_deletes[0].get("blocker_kind"), "active_branch_ownership"
+        )
+        self.assertIn(
+            guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
+            foreign_deletes[0].get("blocking_categories") or [],
+        )
+        # Only the target branch should hit the DELETE API.
+        self.assertEqual(len(delete_api_calls), 1)
+
+        # Ownership collected for target (post-removal) and foreign; worktree
+        # removal happened before target remote delete in the action log.
+        target_idx = next(
+            i
+            for i, a in enumerate(actions)
+            if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"
+        )
+        delete_idx = next(
+            i
+            for i, a in enumerate(actions)
+            if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
+            and a.get("branch") == target_branch
+            and a.get("success")
+        )
+        self.assertLess(target_idx, delete_idx)
+
+    def test_issue_851_dirty_worktree_not_removed_and_remote_stays_protected(self):
+        """#851: dirty/foreign worktrees remain protected; no unsafe cleanup."""
+        from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
+
+        branch = "fix/issue-851-dirty"
+        remove_calls = []
+
+        def fake_collect(**kwargs):
+            return {
+                "records": [
+                    {
+                        "category": guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING,
+                        "status": "active",
+                        "remote": kwargs.get("remote") or "prgs",
+                        "host": kwargs.get("host") or "gitea.example.com",
+                        "org": kwargs.get("org") or "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                        "repo": kwargs.get("repo") or "Gitea-Tools",
+                        "branch": branch,
+                        "reclaim_allowed": False,
+                    }
+                ],
+                "inventory_error": False,
+            }
+
+        report = {
+            "entries": [
+                {
+                    "pr_number": 851,
+                    "head_branch": branch,
+                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
+                    "local_worktree": {
+                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": False,
+                        "worktree_path": "/tmp/dirty-wt",
+                    },
+                }
+            ],
+            "reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
+        }
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_profile",
+            return_value={
+                "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
+                "role": "reconciler",
+                "allowed_operations": [
+                    "gitea.read",
+                    "gitea.branch.delete",
+                ],
+                "forbidden_operations": [],
+            },
+        ).start()
+        patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
+            return_value=report,
+        ).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
+            return_value=[],
+        ).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
+            return_value=(True, []),
+        ).start()
+        patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
+            side_effect=fake_collect,
+        ).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
+            side_effect=lambda *a, **k: remove_calls.append(k) or {
+                "success": True,
+                "performed": True,
+            },
+        ).start()
+        self.mock_api.side_effect = lambda *a, **k: {}
+
+        res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
+            dry_run=False,
+            execute_confirmed=True,
+            remote="prgs",
+        )
+        actions = res.get("actions") or []
+        self.assertEqual(remove_calls, [])
+        self.assertFalse(
+            any(a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree" for a in actions)
+        )
+        deletes = [
+            a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
+        ]
+        self.assertEqual(len(deletes), 1)
+        self.assertFalse(deletes[0].get("success"))
+        self.assertEqual(deletes[0].get("blocker_kind"), "active_branch_ownership")
+        self.assertIn(
+            guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING,
+            deletes[0].get("blocking_categories") or [],
+        )
+
+    def test_issue_851_idempotent_resume_when_worktree_already_absent(self):
+        """#851: partial failures remain resumable and idempotent."""
+        from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
+
+        branch = "fix/issue-851-resume"
+        ownership_calls = []
+
+        def fake_collect(**kwargs):
+            ownership_calls.append(kwargs)
+            return {"records": [], "inventory_error": False}
+
+        def fake_remove(project_root, branch, worktree_path=None):
+            return {
+                "success": False,
+                "performed": False,
+                "message": f"worktree not found: {worktree_path}",
+            }
+
+        def fake_probe(h, o, r, auth, br):
+            return guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
+                404, not_found_scope=guard.NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH
+            )
+
+        report = {
+            "entries": [
+                {
+                    "pr_number": 851,
+                    "head_branch": branch,
+                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
+                    "local_worktree": {
+                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": True,
+                        "worktree_path": "/tmp/already-gone",
+                    },
+                }
+            ],
+            "reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
+        }
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.get_profile",
+            return_value={
+                "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
+                "role": "reconciler",
+                "allowed_operations": [
+                    "gitea.read",
+                    "gitea.branch.delete",
+                ],
+                "forbidden_operations": [],
+            },
+        ).start()
+        patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
+            return_value=report,
+        ).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
+            return_value=[],
+        ).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
+            return_value=(True, []),
+        ).start()
+        patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
+            side_effect=fake_collect,
+        ).start()
+        patch("mcp_server._probe_remote_branch", side_effect=fake_probe).start()
+        patch(
+            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
+            side_effect=fake_remove,
+        ).start()
+        self.mock_api.side_effect = lambda *a, **k: {}
+
+        res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
+            dry_run=False,
+            execute_confirmed=True,
+            remote="prgs",
+        )
+        actions = res.get("actions") or []
+        removes = [a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"]
+        deletes = [a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"]
+        self.assertEqual(len(removes), 1)
+        self.assertFalse(removes[0].get("success"))
+        self.assertEqual(len(deletes), 1)
+        self.assertTrue(deletes[0].get("success"))
+        self.assertTrue(deletes[0].get("after_worktree_removal"))
+        self.assertTrue(ownership_calls)
+
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

tests/test_issue_858_audit_merged_pr_aware.py

@@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
+"""Merged-PR awareness for the worktree cleanup audit (#858).
+
+Before #858 an ``issue_work`` worktree could never leave ``active_issue_work``:
+the audit had no PR linkage at all (``pr_number`` was structurally ``None``)
+and its only route to ``clean_stale_removable`` was a TTL derived from a
+``last_used_at`` that nothing ever populated. A merged, clean, unprotected
+worktree was therefore reported as active work forever, disagreeing with the
+PR-scoped reconciler.
+
+These tests use fabricated temporary repositories and synthetic PR records
+only. Nothing here removes a worktree or deletes a branch.
+"""
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import merged_cleanup_reconcile as mcr  # noqa: E402
+import worktree_cleanup_audit as wca  # noqa: E402
+
+
+MERGED_BRANCH = "feat/issue-777-timeline"
+MERGED_PATH = "/repo/branches/issue-777-timeline"
+HEAD_SHA = "a" * 40
+
+
+def _pr(number, branch, *, merged=True, sha=HEAD_SHA, state=None):
+    """Synthetic Gitea PR payload."""
+    return {
+        "number": number,
+        "head": {"ref": branch, "sha": sha},
+        "merged_at": "2026-07-24T01:00:00Z" if merged else None,
+        "state": state or ("closed" if merged else "open"),
+    }
+
+
+def _porcelain(*entries):
+    out = []
+    for path, branch, sha in entries:
+        out.append(f"worktree {path}")
+        out.append(f"HEAD {sha}")
+        if branch is None:
+            out.append("detached")
+        else:
+            out.append(f"branch refs/heads/{branch}")
+        out.append("")
+    return "\n".join(out)
+
+
+class _AuditHarness(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Runs audit_branches_directory over a fabricated worktree listing."""
+
+    PORCELAIN = _porcelain(
+        ("/repo", "master", "f" * 40),
+        (MERGED_PATH, MERGED_BRANCH, HEAD_SHA),
+    )
+
+    def run_audit(self, *, dirty_paths=(), contained=True, **kwargs):
+        def fake_dirty(path):
+            if path in dirty_paths:
+                return {"exists": True, "dirty": True, "dirty_files": [" M x.py"]}
+            return {"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []}
+
+        with patch.object(
+            wca, "list_worktrees",
+            return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(self.PORCELAIN),
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "read_worktree_dirty", side_effect=fake_dirty
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=contained
+        ):
+            report = wca.audit_branches_directory("/repo", **kwargs)
+        return {wt["path"]: wt for wt in report["worktrees"]}, report
+
+    def merged_audit(self, **kwargs):
+        kwargs.setdefault("pr_index", wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]))
+        kwargs.setdefault("master_ref", "prgs/master")
+        return self.run_audit(**kwargs)
+
+
+class TestMergedWorktreeBecomesRemovable(_AuditHarness):
+    def test_clean_merged_issue_worktree_is_linked_and_removable(self):
+        by_path, report = self.merged_audit()
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+
+        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE)
+        self.assertTrue(entry["removable"])
+        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_MERGED)
+        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"], [])
+        self.assertIn(MERGED_PATH, [c["path"] for c in report["removable_candidates"]])
+
+    def test_pr_number_populated_from_authoritative_linkage(self):
+        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit()
+        self.assertEqual(by_path[MERGED_PATH]["pr_number"], 849)
+
+    def test_regression_without_pr_evidence_stays_active_issue_work(self):
+        """The pre-#858 behaviour, still correct when no PR state is supplied."""
+        by_path, _ = self.run_audit()
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+        self.assertIsNone(entry["pr_number"])
+
+
+class TestProtectiveSignalsSurvive(_AuditHarness):
+    def test_open_pr_worktree_is_not_removable(self):
+        index = wca.build_pr_index([_pr(900, MERGED_BRANCH, merged=False)])
+        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(
+            pr_index=index,
+            master_ref="prgs/master",
+            open_pr_branches={MERGED_BRANCH},
+        )
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_OPEN_PR)
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+        # linkage still reports the owning PR, it just is not merge proof
+        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_OPEN)
+        self.assertEqual(entry["pr_number"], 900)
+
+    def test_dirty_tracked_worktree_is_not_removable(self):
+        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(dirty_paths=(MERGED_PATH,))
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_DIRTY_LOCAL)
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+        self.assertIn(
+            "worktree has uncommitted changes",
+            entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"],
+        )
+
+    def test_untracked_only_worktree_is_not_removable(self):
+        """``git status --porcelain`` reports untracked files as dirty too."""
+        def untracked(path):
+            if path == MERGED_PATH:
+                return {"exists": True, "dirty": True, "dirty_files": ["?? scratch.txt"]}
+            return {"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []}
+
+        with patch.object(
+            wca, "list_worktrees",
+            return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(self.PORCELAIN),
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "read_worktree_dirty", side_effect=untracked
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=True
+        ):
+            report = wca.audit_branches_directory(
+                "/repo",
+                pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]),
+                master_ref="prgs/master",
+            )
+        entry = {wt["path"]: wt for wt in report["worktrees"]}[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_DIRTY_LOCAL)
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+
+    def test_active_lease_by_issue_number_is_protective(self):
+        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(leased_issue_numbers={777})
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertTrue(entry["has_active_lease"])
+        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+
+    def test_active_lease_by_branch_is_protective(self):
+        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(leased_branches={MERGED_BRANCH})
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertTrue(entry["has_active_lease"])
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+
+    def test_active_issue_lock_is_protective(self):
+        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(active_issue_branches={MERGED_BRANCH})
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertTrue(entry["has_active_issue_lock"])
+        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+
+    def test_live_session_worktree_is_protective(self):
+        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(live_session_paths={MERGED_PATH})
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertTrue(entry["has_live_session"])
+        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+
+    def test_head_not_contained_in_master_is_not_removable(self):
+        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(contained=False)
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+        self.assertIn(
+            "worktree head is not contained in authoritative master "
+            "(unmerged commits remain)",
+            entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"],
+        )
+
+    def test_unknown_containment_fails_closed(self):
+        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(contained=None)
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+        self.assertIn(
+            "containment of the worktree head in master is unknown",
+            entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"],
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_master_ref_fails_closed(self):
+        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(
+            pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)])
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(by_path[MERGED_PATH]["removable"])
+
+    def test_unmerged_owning_pr_is_not_removable(self):
+        index = wca.build_pr_index([_pr(901, MERGED_BRANCH, merged=False)])
+        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(pr_index=index, master_ref="prgs/master")
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+        self.assertIn(
+            "owning PR #901 is not merged",
+            entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"],
+        )
+
+    def test_control_checkout_is_never_removable(self):
+        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit()
+        control = by_path["/repo"]
+        self.assertTrue(control["is_protected"])
+        self.assertEqual(control["classification"], wca.CLASS_UNSAFE_UNKNOWN)
+        self.assertFalse(control["removable"])
+
+    def test_control_checkout_not_removable_even_if_linked_and_merged(self):
+        """A merged PR on the control checkout must not unlock removal."""
+        porcelain = _porcelain(("/repo", MERGED_BRANCH, HEAD_SHA))
+        with patch.object(
+            wca, "list_worktrees", return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(porcelain)
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "read_worktree_dirty",
+            return_value={"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []},
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=True
+        ):
+            report = wca.audit_branches_directory(
+                "/repo",
+                pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]),
+                master_ref="prgs/master",
+            )
+        entry = report["worktrees"][0]
+        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_UNSAFE_UNKNOWN)
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+
+
+class TestAmbiguousLinkageFailsClosed(_AuditHarness):
+    def test_competing_prs_on_one_branch_fail_closed(self):
+        index = wca.build_pr_index(
+            [_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH), _pr(860, MERGED_BRANCH)]
+        )
+        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(pr_index=index, master_ref="prgs/master")
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS)
+        self.assertIsNone(entry["pr_number"])
+        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+
+    def test_merged_plus_open_pr_on_one_branch_fails_closed(self):
+        index = wca.build_pr_index(
+            [_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH), _pr(861, MERGED_BRANCH, merged=False)]
+        )
+        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(pr_index=index, master_ref="prgs/master")
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS)
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+
+    def test_no_owning_pr_fails_closed(self):
+        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(
+            pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, "feat/other-branch")]),
+            master_ref="prgs/master",
+        )
+        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
+        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_NONE)
+        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
+
+    def test_malformed_pr_records_are_dropped_not_guessed(self):
+        index = wca.build_pr_index(
+            [
+                {"number": None, "head": {"ref": MERGED_BRANCH}},
+                {"number": 5, "head": {}},
+                {"number": "not-an-int", "head": {"ref": MERGED_BRANCH}},
+            ]
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(index, {})
+        self.assertEqual(
+            wca.resolve_owning_pr(branch=MERGED_BRANCH, pr_index=index)["status"],
+            wca.LINKAGE_NONE,
+        )
+
+    def test_detached_worktree_has_no_branch_linkage(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            wca.resolve_owning_pr(branch=None, pr_index={})["status"],
+            wca.LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
+        )
+
+
+class TestUnrelatedClassificationsUnchanged(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Non-issue_work worktrees keep their pre-#858 classifications."""
+
+    PORCELAIN = _porcelain(
+        ("/repo", "master", "f" * 40),
+        ("/repo/branches/review-pr42", "review-pr42", "2" * 40),
+        ("/repo/branches/baseline-master-x", "baseline-master-x", "3" * 40),
+        ("/repo/branches/conflict-fix-pr50", "conflict-fix-pr50", "4" * 40),
+        ("/repo/branches/review-pr99", None, "5" * 40),
+    )
+
+    def _audit(self, **kwargs):
+        with patch.object(
+            wca, "list_worktrees",
+            return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(self.PORCELAIN),
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "read_worktree_dirty",
+            return_value={"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []},
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=True
+        ):
+            report = wca.audit_branches_directory("/repo", **kwargs)
+        return {wt["path"]: wt for wt in report["worktrees"]}
+
+    def test_classifications_identical_with_and_without_pr_evidence(self):
+        without = self._audit()
+        with_evidence = self._audit(
+            pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]),
+            master_ref="prgs/master",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            {p: e["classification"] for p, e in without.items()},
+            {p: e["classification"] for p, e in with_evidence.items()},
+        )
+
+    def test_lease_on_issue_does_not_capture_similarly_named_scratch_trees(self):
+        """A lease on issue 777 protects issue work, not baseline/review trees."""
+        porcelain = _porcelain(
+            ("/repo/branches/baseline-master-issue-777", "baseline-issue-777", "7" * 40),
+            ("/repo/branches/issue-777-timeline", MERGED_BRANCH, HEAD_SHA),
+        )
+        with patch.object(
+            wca, "list_worktrees", return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(porcelain)
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "read_worktree_dirty",
+            return_value={"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []},
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
+        ), patch.object(
+            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=True
+        ):
+            report = wca.audit_branches_directory(
+                "/repo",
+                pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]),
+                master_ref="prgs/master",
+                leased_issue_numbers={777},
+            )
+        by_path = {wt["path"]: wt for wt in report["worktrees"]}
+
+        baseline = by_path["/repo/branches/baseline-master-issue-777"]
+        self.assertFalse(baseline["has_active_lease"])
+        self.assertEqual(baseline["classification"], wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE)
+
+        issue_work = by_path["/repo/branches/issue-777-timeline"]
+        self.assertTrue(issue_work["has_active_lease"])
+        self.assertFalse(issue_work["removable"])
+
+    def test_review_and_baseline_still_removable(self):
+        by_path = self._audit(
+            pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([]), master_ref="prgs/master"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            by_path["/repo/branches/review-pr42"]["classification"],
+            wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            by_path["/repo/branches/baseline-master-x"]["classification"],
+            wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            by_path["/repo/branches/review-pr99"]["classification"],
+            wca.CLASS_DETACHED_REVIEW_LEFTOVER,
+        )
+
+    def test_conflict_fix_ttl_behaviour_unchanged(self):
+        """conflict_fix still needs only TTL expiry; #858 did not touch it."""
+        self.assertEqual(
+            wca.classify_worktree(
+                workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_CONFLICT_FIX,
+                is_dirty=False,
+                ttl_expired=True,
+            ),
+            wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            wca.classify_worktree(
+                workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_CONFLICT_FIX,
+                is_dirty=False,
+                ttl_expired=False,
+            ),
+            wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK,
+        )
+
+    def test_issue_work_ttl_alone_no_longer_grants_removal(self):
+        """Age is not landing proof: TTL alone must not reclaim issue work."""
+        self.assertEqual(
+            wca.classify_worktree(
+                workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK,
+                is_dirty=False,
+                ttl_expired=True,
+            ),
+            wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK,
+        )
+
+
+class TestAssessorPerformsNoDeletion(_AuditHarness):
+    def test_audit_never_removes_a_worktree(self):
+        with patch.object(wca, "remove_worktree") as removal:
+            self.merged_audit()
+        removal.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_audit_shells_out_to_no_destructive_git_command(self):
+        seen = []
+        real_run = subprocess.run
+
+        def recording_run(cmd, *args, **kwargs):
+            seen.append(cmd)
+            return real_run(["true"], *args, **kwargs)
+
+        with patch.object(subprocess, "run", side_effect=recording_run):
+            wca.audit_branches_directory("/nonexistent-repo-for-audit")
+
+        joined = [" ".join(c) if isinstance(c, list) else str(c) for c in seen]
+        for cmd in joined:
+            self.assertNotIn("worktree remove", cmd)
+            self.assertNotIn("branch -D", cmd)
+            self.assertNotIn("push", cmd)
+
+
+class TestAgreementWithPrScopedReconciler(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The audit and merged_cleanup_reconcile must agree on identical input.
+
+    Uses a real throwaway git repository so containment is computed by git
+    rather than asserted. Nothing outside the temporary directory is touched.
+    """
+
+    def _git(self, *args):
+        subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", self.root, *args],
+            check=True,
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+        )
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.root = os.path.realpath(self._tmp.name)
+        self._git("init", "-b", "master", ".")
+        self._git("config", "user.email", "[email protected]")
+        self._git("config", "user.name", "Test")
+        with open(os.path.join(self.root, "seed.txt"), "w") as fh:
+            fh.write("seed\n")
+        self._git("add", "seed.txt")
+        self._git("commit", "-m", "seed")
+
+        self.branch = "feat/issue-777-timeline"
+        self._git("checkout", "-b", self.branch)
+        with open(os.path.join(self.root, "feature.txt"), "w") as fh:
+            fh.write("feature\n")
+        self._git("add", "feature.txt")
+        self._git("commit", "-m", "feature")
+        self.head_sha = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", self.root, "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, check=True,
+        ).stdout.strip()
+        self._git("checkout", "master")
+        self._git("merge", "--no-ff", "-m", "merge feature", self.branch)
+
+        self.worktree = os.path.join(self.root, "branches", "issue-777-timeline")
+        self._git("worktree", "add", self.worktree, self.branch)
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def _pr_index(self):
+        return wca.build_pr_index(
+            [
+                {
+                    "number": 849,
+                    "head": {"ref": self.branch, "sha": self.head_sha},
+                    "merged_at": "2026-07-24T01:00:00Z",
+                }
+            ]
+        )
+
+    def _audit_entry(self):
+        report = wca.audit_branches_directory(
+            self.root, pr_index=self._pr_index(), master_ref="master"
+        )
+        return next(wt for wt in report["worktrees"] if wt["path"] == self.worktree)
+
+    def _reconciler_entry(self):
+        return mcr.assess_local_worktree_cleanup(
+            pr_number=849,
+            head_branch=self.branch,
+            merged=True,
+            worktree_state=mcr.resolve_cleanup_worktree_state(
+                project_root=self.root,
+                head_branch=self.branch,
+                issue_number=777,
+                pr_head_sha=self.head_sha,
+                target_ref="master",
+            ),
+            active_lock=False,
+        )
+
+    def test_both_assessors_agree_the_worktree_is_safe(self):
+        audit_entry = self._audit_entry()
+        reconciler = self._reconciler_entry()
+
+        self.assertTrue(reconciler["safe_to_remove_worktree"], reconciler)
+        self.assertTrue(audit_entry["removable"], audit_entry)
+        self.assertEqual(audit_entry["pr_number"], reconciler["pr_number"])
+        self.assertEqual(audit_entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"], [])
+        self.assertEqual(reconciler["block_reasons"], [])
+
+    def test_both_assessors_agree_a_dirty_worktree_is_unsafe(self):
+        with open(os.path.join(self.worktree, "feature.txt"), "a") as fh:
+            fh.write("local edit\n")
+
+        audit_entry = self._audit_entry()
+        reconciler = self._reconciler_entry()
+
+        self.assertFalse(audit_entry["removable"])
+        self.assertFalse(reconciler["safe_to_remove_worktree"])
+
+    def test_worktree_still_present_after_audit(self):
+        self._audit_entry()
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(self.worktree))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_merged_cleanup_reconcile.py

@@ -12,6 +12,59 @@ import merged_cleanup_reconcile as mcr  # noqa: E402
 
 
 class TestMergedCleanupAssessment(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_issue_851_plan_order_worktree_then_reassess_then_remote(self):
+        """#851 dry-run plan: remove worktree, reassess ownership, then remote."""
+        plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
+            remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
+            local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": True},
+        )
+        actions = [s["action"] for s in plan]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            actions,
+            [
+                "remove_local_worktree",
+                "reassess_branch_ownership",
+                "delete_remote_branch",
+            ],
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(plan[0]["phase"], 1)
+        self.assertEqual(plan[-1]["phase"], 3)
+        self.assertIn("independently_safe", plan[0]["reason"])
+        self.assertIn("reassessment", plan[-1]["reason"])
+
+    def test_issue_851_plan_remote_only_when_worktree_not_safe(self):
+        plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
+            remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
+            local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": False},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual([s["action"] for s in plan], ["delete_remote_branch"])
+        self.assertNotIn("reassess_branch_ownership", [s["action"] for s in plan])
+
+    def test_issue_851_plan_worktree_only_when_remote_not_safe(self):
+        plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
+            remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": False},
+            local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": True},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual([s["action"] for s in plan], ["remove_local_worktree"])
+
+    def test_issue_851_entry_includes_planned_execution_order(self):
+        entry = mcr.build_pr_cleanup_entry(
+            pr={
+                "number": 848,
+                "title": "Closes #844",
+                "body": "",
+                "merged_at": "2026-07-23T00:00:00Z",
+                "head": {"ref": "fix/issue-844-x", "sha": "a" * 40},
+            },
+            project_root="/tmp/not-a-real-root",
+            open_pr_heads=set(),
+            remote_branch_exists=True,
+            head_on_master=True,
+            delete_capability_allowed=True,
+        )
+        self.assertIn("planned_execution_order", entry)
+        self.assertIsInstance(entry["planned_execution_order"], list)
+
     def test_extract_linked_issue_from_closes(self):
         issue = mcr.extract_linked_issue(
             "feat: cleanup (Closes #269)",

tests/test_restart_coordinator.py

@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+"""Tests for the MCP restart coordinator and impact analysis (#658).
+
+Multi-session fixtures exercise every verdict branch: safe, unsafe (live work),
+override, and the fail-closed deny on incomplete inventory. Also covers the
+critical-section deny path and the new ``ControlPlaneDB.list_sessions``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+
+import restart_coordinator as rc
+from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
+
+
+NOW = datetime(2026, 7, 24, 6, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _ts(dt: datetime) -> str:
+    return dt.isoformat()
+
+
+def _live_pid() -> int:
+    return os.getpid()
+
+
+def _dead_pid() -> int:
+    # A pid that is essentially never alive. os.kill(0) on it raises
+    # ProcessLookupError → is_process_alive False.
+    return 2_000_000_000
+
+
+def _session(session_id, *, pid, status="active", heartbeat=None, role="author"):
+    return {
+        "session_id": session_id,
+        "role": role,
+        "profile": "prgs-author",
+        "pid": pid,
+        "status": status,
+        "last_heartbeat_at": _ts(heartbeat or NOW),
+    }
+
+
+def _lease(
+    lease_id,
+    *,
+    session_id,
+    freshness,
+    kind="issue",
+    number=658,
+    phase="allocated",
+    worktree=None,
+    role="author",
+):
+    return {
+        "lease_id": lease_id,
+        "session_id": session_id,
+        "role": role,
+        "phase": phase,
+        "work_kind": kind,
+        "work_number": number,
+        "worktree_path": worktree,
+        "freshness": {"freshness": freshness},
+    }
+
+
+class EvaluateRestartImpactTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_incomplete_inventory_denies_fail_closed(self) -> None:
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            {"inventory_complete": False, "incomplete_reasons": ["db down"]},
+            now=NOW,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report.verdict, rc.VERDICT_UNSAFE)
+        self.assertFalse(report.allow_restart)
+        self.assertFalse(report.restart_performed)
+        self.assertIn("db down", report.incomplete_reasons)
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("fail closed" in reasoning for reasoning in report.reasons)
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_completeness_flag_denies(self) -> None:
+        # No inventory_complete key at all → treated as incomplete.
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact({}, now=NOW)
+        self.assertEqual(report.verdict, rc.VERDICT_UNSAFE)
+        self.assertFalse(report.allow_restart)
+
+    def test_no_other_work_is_safe(self) -> None:
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            {
+                "inventory_complete": True,
+                "sessions": [_session("requester", pid=_live_pid())],
+                "leases": [],
+            },
+            now=NOW,
+            requesting_session_id="requester",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report.verdict, rc.VERDICT_SAFE)
+        self.assertTrue(report.allow_restart)
+        self.assertEqual(report.blast_radius, rc.BLAST_NONE)
+        self.assertEqual(report.affected_issues, [])
+
+    def test_dead_foreign_session_and_lease_are_not_disruptive(self) -> None:
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            {
+                "inventory_complete": True,
+                "sessions": [
+                    _session("requester", pid=_live_pid()),
+                    _session("dead", pid=_dead_pid()),
+                ],
+                "leases": [
+                    _lease("l-dead", session_id="dead", freshness="stale_dead_process")
+                ],
+            },
+            now=NOW,
+            requesting_session_id="requester",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report.verdict, rc.VERDICT_SAFE)
+        self.assertTrue(report.allow_restart)
+        self.assertEqual(report.counts["leases_disruptive"], 0)
+        self.assertEqual(report.counts["sessions_live_other"], 0)
+
+    def test_live_foreign_lease_denies_without_override(self) -> None:
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            {
+                "inventory_complete": True,
+                "sessions": [
+                    _session("requester", pid=_live_pid()),
+                    _session("worker", pid=_live_pid()),
+                ],
+                "leases": [
+                    _lease(
+                        "l1",
+                        session_id="worker",
+                        freshness="active",
+                        worktree="/tmp/wt-658",
+                        phase="implementing",
+                    )
+                ],
+            },
+            now=NOW,
+            requesting_session_id="requester",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report.verdict, rc.VERDICT_UNSAFE)
+        self.assertFalse(report.allow_restart)
+        # Critical section detected: active lease with a live owner.
+        self.assertEqual(len(report.critical_sections), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(report.affected_issues, [658])
+        self.assertEqual(report.counts["mutations"], 1)
+        self.assertTrue(report.override_would_allow)
+        self.assertEqual(report.blast_radius, rc.BLAST_HIGH)
+        # Placeholder ack state for the affected session.
+        self.assertEqual(report.ack_state.get("worker"), "pending")
+
+    def test_operator_override_allows_despite_live_work(self) -> None:
+        inv = {
+            "inventory_complete": True,
+            "sessions": [
+                _session("requester", pid=_live_pid()),
+                _session("worker", pid=_live_pid()),
+            ],
+            "leases": [_lease("l1", session_id="worker", freshness="active")],
+        }
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            inv,
+            now=NOW,
+            requesting_session_id="requester",
+            operator_override=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report.verdict, rc.VERDICT_OVERRIDE)
+        self.assertTrue(report.allow_restart)
+        self.assertFalse(report.restart_performed)
+
+    def test_deny_when_critical_section_open(self) -> None:
+        # A single live author lease in a mutating phase is a critical section
+        # that must deny an un-overridden restart.
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            {
+                "inventory_complete": True,
+                "sessions": [_session("worker", pid=_live_pid())],
+                "leases": [
+                    _lease(
+                        "l1",
+                        session_id="worker",
+                        freshness="active",
+                        phase="merging",
+                        kind="pr",
+                        number=900,
+                    )
+                ],
+            },
+            now=NOW,
+            requesting_session_id="requester",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report.verdict, rc.VERDICT_UNSAFE)
+        self.assertFalse(report.allow_restart)
+        self.assertEqual(report.affected_prs, [900])
+        self.assertEqual(len(report.critical_sections), 1)
+
+    def test_terminal_lock_makes_restart_unsafe(self) -> None:
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            {
+                "inventory_complete": True,
+                "sessions": [_session("requester", pid=_live_pid())],
+                "leases": [],
+                "terminal_lock": {"terminal_pr": 812},
+            },
+            now=NOW,
+            requesting_session_id="requester",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report.verdict, rc.VERDICT_UNSAFE)
+        self.assertFalse(report.allow_restart)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(report.terminal_lock)
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("terminal" in reasoning for reasoning in report.reasons)
+        )
+
+    def test_other_live_session_without_lease_is_disruptive(self) -> None:
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            {
+                "inventory_complete": True,
+                "sessions": [
+                    _session("requester", pid=_live_pid()),
+                    _session("idle-but-live", pid=_live_pid()),
+                ],
+                "leases": [],
+            },
+            now=NOW,
+            requesting_session_id="requester",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report.verdict, rc.VERDICT_UNSAFE)
+        self.assertEqual(report.counts["sessions_live_other"], 1)
+
+    def test_stale_heartbeat_session_not_counted_live(self) -> None:
+        stale = NOW - timedelta(hours=2)
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            {
+                "inventory_complete": True,
+                "sessions": [
+                    _session("requester", pid=_live_pid()),
+                    _session("stale", pid=_live_pid(), heartbeat=stale),
+                ],
+                "leases": [],
+            },
+            now=NOW,
+            requesting_session_id="requester",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report.verdict, rc.VERDICT_SAFE)
+        self.assertEqual(report.counts["sessions_live_other"], 0)
+
+    def test_prior_recovery_attempts_echoed(self) -> None:
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            {
+                "inventory_complete": True,
+                "sessions": [_session("requester", pid=_live_pid())],
+                "leases": [],
+                "prior_recovery_attempts": [
+                    {"kind": "client_reconnect", "at": _ts(NOW)}
+                ],
+            },
+            now=NOW,
+            requesting_session_id="requester",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(len(report.prior_recovery_attempts), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(report.counts["prior_recovery_attempts"], 1)
+
+    def test_bare_string_freshness_accepted(self) -> None:
+        lease = _lease("l1", session_id="worker", freshness="active")
+        lease["freshness"] = "active"  # bare string, not a dict
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            {
+                "inventory_complete": True,
+                "sessions": [_session("worker", pid=_live_pid())],
+                "leases": [lease],
+            },
+            now=NOW,
+            requesting_session_id="requester",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report.counts["leases_disruptive"], 1)
+
+    def test_as_dict_is_serializable_dto(self) -> None:
+        import json
+
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            {
+                "inventory_complete": True,
+                "sessions": [_session("requester", pid=_live_pid())],
+                "leases": [],
+            },
+            now=NOW,
+            requesting_session_id="requester",
+        )
+        payload = report.as_dict()
+        # Round-trips through JSON — safe for the console DTO.
+        encoded = json.dumps(payload)
+        decoded = json.loads(encoded)
+        self.assertEqual(decoded["verdict"], rc.VERDICT_SAFE)
+        self.assertIn("audit_record", decoded)
+        self.assertEqual(decoded["audit_record"]["event"], "restart_impact_evaluated")
+        self.assertFalse(decoded["restart_performed"])
+        self.assertIn("coordinator_version", decoded)
+
+
+class ListSessionsTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def test_list_sessions_filters_by_status(self) -> None:
+        self.db.upsert_session(session_id="a", role="author", pid=1, status="active")
+        self.db.upsert_session(session_id="b", role="author", pid=2, status="ended")
+        active = self.db.list_sessions(statuses=("active",))
+        ids = {row["session_id"] for row in active}
+        self.assertEqual(ids, {"a"})
+        every = self.db.list_sessions()
+        self.assertEqual({row["session_id"] for row in every}, {"a", "b"})
+
+    def test_list_sessions_feeds_coordinator(self) -> None:
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="requester", role="author", pid=os.getpid(), status="active"
+        )
+        report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+            {
+                "inventory_complete": True,
+                "sessions": self.db.list_sessions(statuses=("active",)),
+                "leases": [],
+            },
+            now=NOW,
+            requesting_session_id="requester",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report.counts["sessions_total"], 1)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_shell.py

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+"""Tests for the Phase 1 operator console application shell (#638)."""
+import sys
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+from starlette.routing import Route
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from webui import layout
+from webui.app import create_app
+from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS, STUB_PAGES, nav_hrefs
+
+
+class TestShellNav(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+
+    def test_nav_group_labels_present(self):
+        text = self.client.get("/").text
+        for group in NAV_GROUPS:
+            with self.subTest(group=group.label):
+                self.assertIn(f">{group.label}<", text)
+
+    def test_phase1_group_labels_cover_expected_ia(self):
+        labels = {group.label for group in NAV_GROUPS}
+        for expected in (
+            "Health",
+            "Traffic",
+            "Runtime/Sessions",
+            "Projects",
+            "Inventory",
+            "Timeline",
+            "Policy",
+            "Insights",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(label=expected):
+                self.assertIn(expected, labels)
+
+    def test_every_nav_href_resolves_to_a_get_route(self):
+        app = create_app()
+        get_paths = {
+            route.path
+            for route in app.routes
+            if isinstance(route, Route) and "GET" in route.methods
+        }
+        for href in nav_hrefs():
+            with self.subTest(href=href):
+                self.assertIn(href, get_paths, f"nav href {href} has no GET route")
+
+    def test_legacy_hrefs_still_navigable(self):
+        text = self.client.get("/").text
+        for href in ("/queue", "/projects", "/prompts", "/runtime",
+                     "/audit", "/worktrees", "/leases", "/actions"):
+            with self.subTest(href=href):
+                self.assertIn(f'href="{href}"', text)
+
+
+class TestShellBadges(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+
+    def test_mode_badge_present(self):
+        self.assertIn("mode: read-only", self.client.get("/").text)
+
+    def test_environment_badge_present(self):
+        self.assertIn("env:", self.client.get("/").text)
+
+    def test_default_environment_is_local(self):
+        self.assertEqual(layout.environment_label(), "local")
+
+    def test_remote_bind_reports_remote_environment(self):
+        import os
+
+        prior = os.environ.get("WEBUI_HOST")
+        os.environ["WEBUI_HOST"] = "10.0.0.5"
+        try:
+            self.assertEqual(layout.environment_label(), "remote")
+        finally:
+            if prior is None:
+                os.environ.pop("WEBUI_HOST", None)
+            else:
+                os.environ["WEBUI_HOST"] = prior
+
+    def test_docs_link_present(self):
+        text = self.client.get("/").text
+        self.assertIn(layout.DOCS_URL, text)
+        self.assertIn(">Docs<", text)
+
+
+class TestShellStubs(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+
+    def test_stub_routes_render_200(self):
+        for path, (title, _desc) in STUB_PAGES.items():
+            with self.subTest(path=path):
+                response = self.client.get(path)
+                self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200, path)
+                self.assertIn(title, response.text)
+                self.assertIn("placeholder", response.text)
+
+    def test_stub_routes_are_read_only(self):
+        for path in STUB_PAGES:
+            with self.subTest(path=path):
+                response = self.client.post(path)
+                self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
+                self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "read-only-mvp")
+
+    def test_stub_pages_carry_nav_and_badges(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/inventory")
+        self.assertIn("mode: read-only", response.text)
+        self.assertIn('href="/queue"', response.text)
+
+
+class TestShellHome(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+
+    def test_home_summarizes_console(self):
+        text = self.client.get("/").text
+        self.assertIn("Operator console", text)
+        self.assertIn("Phase 1", text)
+
+    def test_home_links_legacy_pages(self):
+        text = self.client.get("/").text
+        self.assertIn("MVP legacy pages", text)
+        for href in ("/queue", "/audit", "/leases"):
+            with self.subTest(href=href):
+                self.assertIn(f'href="{href}"', text)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_worktree_cleanup_audit.py

@@ -134,13 +134,35 @@ class TestClassification(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(cls, wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_OPEN_PR)
         self.assertFalse(wca.is_removable(cls))
 
-    def test_stale_clean_issue_worktree_removable(self):
-        # Scenario 5: clean issue worktree, TTL expired, no lock -> removable.
+    def test_stale_clean_issue_worktree_needs_merged_pr_proof(self):
+        # Scenario 5 (#858): age is not proof that the branch landed, so a
+        # TTL-expired issue worktree stays active work. Only authoritative
+        # merged-PR evidence makes it removable, which is what keeps a
+        # worktree holding unmerged commits from being reclaimed by age.
         cls = wca.classify_worktree(
             workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK,
             is_dirty=False,
             ttl_expired=True,
         )
+        self.assertEqual(cls, wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
+        self.assertFalse(wca.is_removable(cls))
+
+        cls = wca.classify_worktree(
+            workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK,
+            is_dirty=False,
+            ttl_expired=True,
+            merged_pr_cleanup={"proven": True},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(cls, wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE)
+        self.assertTrue(wca.is_removable(cls))
+
+    def test_stale_clean_conflict_fix_worktree_removable(self):
+        # conflict_fix keeps the original TTL rule; #858 changed issue work only.
+        cls = wca.classify_worktree(
+            workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_CONFLICT_FIX,
+            is_dirty=False,
+            ttl_expired=True,
+        )
         self.assertEqual(cls, wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE)
         self.assertTrue(wca.is_removable(cls))
 

webui/app.py

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from starlette.routing import Route
 
 from webui.deployment_boundary import deployment_snapshot
 from webui.layout import render_page
+from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS, STUB_PAGES
 from webui.project_registry import (
     ProjectRegistry,
     RegistryError,
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo
 from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
 from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
+from webui.timeline import load_timeline, snapshot_to_dict as timeline_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.system_health import (
     API_PATH as SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
     load_system_health,
@@ -65,24 +67,62 @@ def _stub_page(title: str, description: str) -> HTMLResponse:
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title=title, body_html=body))
 
 
+_LEGACY_PAGES = (
+    ("/queue", "Queue", "live PR and issue dashboard (#429)"),
+    ("/projects", "Projects", "registry and onboarding (#427)"),
+    ("/prompts", "Prompts", "canonical workflow prompt library (#428)"),
+    ("/runtime", "Runtime", "MCP health and stale-runtime detection (#430)"),
+    ("/audit", "Audit", "final-report paste and validator preview (#431)"),
+    ("/worktrees", "Worktrees", "branch hygiene dashboard (#432)"),
+    ("/leases", "Leases", "collision and lease visibility (#433)"),
+    ("/actions", "Actions", "gated write-action framework (#434)"),
+)
+
+
+def _render_home_nav_groups() -> str:
+    groups = []
+    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
+        items = "".join(
+            f'<li><a href="{item.href}">{item.label}</a>'
+            + ("" if item.status == "live" else " <span class=\"muted\">(stub)</span>")
+            + "</li>"
+            for item in group.items
+        )
+        groups.append(f"<h3>{group.label}</h3><ul>{items}</ul>")
+    return "".join(groups)
+
+
 async def home(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
+    legacy = "".join(
+        f"<li><strong>{label}</strong> — {desc} "
+        f'(<a href="{href}">{href}</a>)</li>'
+        for href, label, desc in _LEGACY_PAGES
+    )
     body = (
         "<h2>Operator console</h2>"
-        "<p>Local entry point for MCP Control Plane operational views.</p>"
-        "<ul>"
-        "<li><strong>Queue</strong> — live PR and issue dashboard (#429)</li>"
-        "<li><strong>Projects</strong> — registry and onboarding (#427)</li>"
-        "<li><strong>Prompts</strong> — canonical workflow prompt library (#428)</li>"
-        "<li><strong>Runtime</strong> — MCP health and stale-runtime detection (#430)</li>"
-        "<li><strong>Audit</strong> — final-report paste and validator preview (#431)</li>"
-        "<li><strong>Worktrees</strong> — branch hygiene dashboard (#432)</li>"
-        "<li><strong>Leases</strong> — collision and lease visibility (#433)</li>"
-        "<li><strong>Actions</strong> — gated write-action framework (#434)</li>"
-        "</ul>"
+        "<p>Read-only home for the MCP Control Plane Phase 1 operator console. "
+        "Gitea, MCP capability gates, and canonical workflows remain the source "
+        "of truth; this console never mutates them.</p>"
+        "<h2>Phase 1 surfaces</h2>"
+        + _render_home_nav_groups()
+        + "<h2>MVP legacy pages</h2>"
+        "<ul>" + legacy + "</ul>"
     )
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title="Home", body_html=body))
 
 
+async def phase_stub(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
+    """Graceful read-only placeholder for a not-yet-implemented Phase 1 surface."""
+    title, description = STUB_PAGES[request.url.path]
+    body = (
+        f"<h2>{title}</h2>"
+        f'<div class="stub"><p>{description}</p>'
+        "<p>Phase 1 shell placeholder — no write actions. Tracked under "
+        "epic #631.</p></div>"
+    )
+    return HTMLResponse(render_page(title=title, body_html=body))
+
+
 async def health(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     """Liveness only — deliberately cheap, runs no dependency probe (#634).
 
@@ -410,6 +450,104 @@ async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     })
 
 
+def _query_int(request: Request, key: str) -> int | None:
+    """Parse an optional integer query parameter; None when absent/invalid."""
+    raw = request.query_params.get(key)
+    if raw is None or not str(raw).strip():
+        return None
+    try:
+        return int(str(raw).strip())
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+
+
+def _derive_remote(host: str) -> str:
+    """Map a Gitea host to its known short remote name (control-plane scope key)."""
+    text = (host or "").lower()
+    if "prgs" in text:
+        return "prgs"
+    if "dadeschools" in text:
+        return "dadeschools"
+    return text.split(".")[0] if text else ""
+
+
+def _timeline_comment_source(host: str, org: str, repo: str):
+    """Build a fail-soft CTH-comment fetcher for one repo, or None when offline.
+
+    Returns a callable ``(kind, number) -> list[comment]``. Credentials or
+    network failures raise inside the callable so ``load_timeline`` degrades the
+    handoff source rather than the whole timeline. Offline test mode yields no
+    live source so the handoff section reports ``not run``.
+    """
+    import os
+
+    from gitea_auth import api_fetch_page, get_auth_header, repo_api_url
+
+    offline = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE") or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes"}
+    if offline:
+        return None
+    auth = get_auth_header(host)
+    if not auth:
+        return None
+
+    def _fetch(kind: str, number: int) -> list:
+        segment = "pulls" if kind == "pr" else "issues"
+        url = f"{repo_api_url(host, org, repo)}/{segment}/{int(number)}/comments"
+        comments: list = []
+        page = 1
+        while page <= 20:
+            raw, meta = api_fetch_page(url, auth, page=page, limit=50)
+            comments.extend(raw)
+            if bool(meta["is_final_page"]):
+                break
+            page += 1
+        return comments
+
+    return _fetch
+
+
+async def api_v1_timeline(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    """Read-only workflow-event timeline (#637). Filter by issue/PR/session."""
+    from webui.queue_loader import _host_from_url  # host normalisation helper
+
+    registry, error = _load_project_registry()
+    if error is not None:
+        return JSONResponse(error.to_dict(), status_code=500)
+    project = registry.projects[0] if registry.projects else None
+
+    org = request.query_params.get("org") or (project.gitea_owner if project else "")
+    repo = request.query_params.get("repo") or (project.repo_name if project else "")
+    host = _host_from_url(project.remote_host) if project else ""
+    remote = request.query_params.get("remote") or _derive_remote(host)
+
+    if not (remote and org and repo):
+        return JSONResponse(
+            {
+                "error": "timeline_scope_unresolved",
+                "detail": "no project in registry and no remote/org/repo query params provided",
+            },
+            status_code=400,
+        )
+
+    comment_source = _timeline_comment_source(host, org, repo) if (host and org and repo) else None
+
+    snapshot = load_timeline(
+        remote=remote,
+        org=org,
+        repo=repo,
+        issue=_query_int(request, "issue"),
+        pr=_query_int(request, "pr"),
+        session=(request.query_params.get("session") or None),
+        limit=_query_int(request, "limit"),
+        offset=_query_int(request, "offset"),
+        comment_source=comment_source,
+    )
+    # A filter no surviving source can carry is refused, not answered empty:
+    # a 200 with zero events would tell the operator no such activity exists.
+    status_code = 200 if snapshot.ok else 422
+    return JSONResponse(timeline_snapshot_to_dict(snapshot), status_code=status_code)
+
+
 async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response:
     path = request.url.path
     if path in _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS and request.method == "POST":
@@ -449,6 +587,7 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
             Route("/api/prompts", api_prompts, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/runtime", runtime, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/runtime", api_runtime, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route("/api/v1/timeline", api_v1_timeline, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/audit", audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]),
             Route("/api/audit", api_audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]),
             Route("/worktrees", worktrees, methods=["GET"]),
@@ -472,6 +611,10 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
                 api_console_security_model,
                 methods=["GET"],
             ),
+            *[
+                Route(path, phase_stub, methods=["GET"])
+                for path in STUB_PAGES
+            ],
         ],
         exception_handlers={405: method_not_allowed},
     )

webui/layout.py

@@ -2,28 +2,66 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-NAV_ITEMS = (
-    ("/", "Home"),
-    ("/queue", "Queue"),
-    ("/projects", "Projects"),
-    ("/prompts", "Prompts"),
-    ("/runtime", "Runtime"),
-    ("/audit", "Audit"),
-    ("/worktrees", "Worktrees"),
-    ("/leases", "Leases"),
-    ("/actions", "Actions"),
-)
+import os
+
+from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS
 
 MVP_NOTICE = (
     "Read-only MVP — Gitea, MCP tools, and canonical workflows remain the "
     "source of truth. No mutation endpoints."
 )
 
+# Canonical docs entry point surfaced from the shell header (#638).
+DOCS_URL = (
+    "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/src/branch/"
+    "master/docs/webui-local-dev.md"
+)
+
+_LOCAL_HOSTS = frozenset({"", "127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1"})
+
+
+def environment_label() -> str:
+    """Classify the serving environment as ``local`` or ``remote`` (#638).
+
+    Derived from the same ``WEBUI_HOST`` default the app binds to; loopback
+    hosts are ``local``, anything else is ``remote``. Read-only signal only.
+    """
+    host = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_HOST", "127.0.0.1") or "").strip().lower()
+    return "local" if host in _LOCAL_HOSTS else "remote"
+
+
+def _render_nav() -> str:
+    groups_html = []
+    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
+        links = "".join(
+            f'<a href="{item.href}"'
+            + (' class="nav-stub"' if item.status == "stub" else "")
+            + f'>{item.label}</a>'
+            for item in group.items
+        )
+        groups_html.append(
+            '<div class="nav-group">'
+            f'<span class="nav-group-label">{group.label}</span>'
+            f'<span class="nav-group-links">{links}</span>'
+            "</div>"
+        )
+    return "".join(groups_html)
+
+
+def _render_badges() -> str:
+    env = environment_label()
+    return (
+        '<div class="header-badges">'
+        f'<span class="badge env-badge env-{env}">env: {env}</span>'
+        '<span class="badge mode-badge">mode: read-only</span>'
+        f'<a class="badge docs-link" href="{DOCS_URL}">Docs</a>'
+        "</div>"
+    )
+
 
 def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
-    nav_links = "".join(
-        f'<a href="{href}">{label}</a>' for href, label in NAV_ITEMS
-    )
+    nav_links = _render_nav()
+    header_badges = _render_badges()
     return f"""<!DOCTYPE html>
 <html lang="en">
 <head>
@@ -53,21 +91,58 @@ def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
       padding: 0.75rem 1.25rem;
     }}
     header h1 {{
-      margin: 0 0 0.5rem;
+      margin: 0;
       font-size: 1.1rem;
       font-weight: 600;
     }}
+    .header-top {{
+      display: flex;
+      flex-wrap: wrap;
+      align-items: center;
+      justify-content: space-between;
+      gap: 0.5rem 1rem;
+      margin-bottom: 0.6rem;
+    }}
+    .header-badges {{ display: inline-flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 0.4rem; }}
+    .env-badge.env-local {{ color: #8fd19e; border-color: #3d6b4a; }}
+    .env-badge.env-remote {{ color: #e0c27a; border-color: #6b5730; }}
+    .mode-badge {{ color: #9ec8f0; border-color: #3d5f7a; }}
+    a.docs-link {{
+      color: var(--accent);
+      border-color: var(--accent);
+      text-decoration: none;
+      text-transform: none;
+    }}
+    a.docs-link:hover {{ filter: brightness(1.12); }}
     nav {{
       display: flex;
       flex-wrap: wrap;
-      gap: 0.75rem 1rem;
+      gap: 0.5rem 1.25rem;
     }}
+    .nav-group {{
+      display: flex;
+      flex-direction: column;
+      gap: 0.15rem;
+    }}
+    .nav-group-label {{
+      font-size: 0.68rem;
+      text-transform: uppercase;
+      letter-spacing: 0.04em;
+      color: var(--muted);
+    }}
+    .nav-group-links {{ display: inline-flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 0.6rem; }}
     nav a {{
       color: var(--accent);
       text-decoration: none;
       font-size: 0.9rem;
     }}
     nav a:hover {{ text-decoration: underline; }}
+    nav a.nav-stub {{ color: var(--muted); }}
+    nav a.nav-stub::after {{
+      content: " ·stub";
+      font-size: 0.7rem;
+      color: var(--muted);
+    }}
     main {{
       max-width: 52rem;
       margin: 0 auto;
@@ -166,7 +241,10 @@ def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
 </head>
 <body>
   <header>
-    <h1>MCP Control Plane</h1>
+    <div class="header-top">
+      <h1>MCP Control Plane</h1>
+      {header_badges}
+    </div>
     <nav>{nav_links}</nav>
   </header>
   <main>

webui/nav.py

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+"""Navigation IA for the Phase 1 operator console shell (#638).
+
+Single source of truth for the console navigation so ``webui/layout.py`` and
+the ``webui/app.py`` route table stay aligned with epic #631. Read-only: every
+destination is a GET view or a Phase 1 placeholder. No mutation links.
+
+Nav groups follow the #631 Phase 1 information architecture: Health, Traffic,
+Runtime/Sessions, Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy (placeholder), and
+Insights (placeholder). Later-phase surfaces are declared as ``stub`` items and
+backed by ``STUB_PAGES`` so their nav links resolve to a graceful placeholder
+instead of a 404.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class NavItem:
+    """A single navigation destination.
+
+    ``status`` is ``"live"`` for implemented views and ``"stub"`` for Phase 1
+    placeholders whose backing view lands in a later child issue.
+    """
+
+    href: str
+    label: str
+    status: str = "live"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class NavGroup:
+    label: str
+    items: tuple[NavItem, ...]
+
+
+NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
+    NavGroup("Health", (
+        NavItem("/health", "Liveness"),
+    )),
+    NavGroup("Traffic", (
+        NavItem("/queue", "Queue"),
+        NavItem("/leases", "Leases"),
+        NavItem("/actions", "Actions"),
+    )),
+    NavGroup("Runtime/Sessions", (
+        NavItem("/runtime", "Runtime health"),
+        NavItem("/sessions", "Sessions", "stub"),
+    )),
+    NavGroup("Projects", (
+        NavItem("/projects", "Projects"),
+    )),
+    NavGroup("Inventory", (
+        NavItem("/inventory", "Inventory", "stub"),
+        NavItem("/worktrees", "Worktrees"),
+    )),
+    NavGroup("Timeline", (
+        NavItem("/timeline", "Timeline", "stub"),
+    )),
+    NavGroup("Policy", (
+        NavItem("/policy", "Policy", "stub"),
+        NavItem("/prompts", "Prompts"),
+    )),
+    NavGroup("Insights", (
+        NavItem("/insights", "Insights", "stub"),
+        NavItem("/audit", "Audit"),
+    )),
+)
+
+
+# Phase 1 placeholder destinations whose backing views land in later child
+# issues of epic #631. Each maps a path to (title, description). Routes are
+# registered so nav links resolve to a graceful, read-only stub page.
+STUB_PAGES: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {
+    "/sessions": (
+        "Sessions",
+        "Active session, capability, and role inventory. Backed by the unified "
+        "inventory API (#636) once it lands.",
+    ),
+    "/inventory": (
+        "Inventory",
+        "Unified sessions, leases, locks, namespaces, and worktree inventory. "
+        "Backed by the Phase 1 inventory API (#636).",
+    ),
+    "/timeline": (
+        "Timeline",
+        "Workflow event timeline across issues and PRs. A later Phase 1 surface.",
+    ),
+    "/policy": (
+        "Policy",
+        "Capability and role policy surface. Placeholder until a later phase.",
+    ),
+    "/insights": (
+        "Insights",
+        "Aggregate operational insights and trends. Placeholder until a later "
+        "phase.",
+    ),
+}
+
+
+def iter_nav_items():
+    """Yield every ``NavItem`` across all groups in declared order."""
+    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
+        for item in group.items:
+            yield item
+
+
+def nav_hrefs() -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Return every navigation href in declared order."""
+    return tuple(item.href for item in iter_nav_items())

webui/timeline.py

@@ -0,0 +1,906 @@
+"""Workflow-event and conversation timeline model (#637, Phase 1).
+
+Operators cannot browse a unified timeline of workflow events, decisions,
+tool calls, and handoffs: the evidence is scattered across control-plane
+events, Gitea canonical handoff comments, and local logs. This module defines
+one durable, versioned event schema and per-source adapters that normalise
+those scattered records into a single ``WorkflowEvent`` stream, plus a
+read-only query layer (filter by issue / PR / session, stable ordering,
+pagination) that the ``/api/v1/timeline`` route serves.
+
+Design rules honoured here:
+
+- **Read-only.** Sources are read; nothing is mutated. The control-plane
+  database is opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI so a missing or unwritable DB
+  degrades to a reason instead of creating directories or running migrations.
+- **Fail-soft per source.** An unavailable source degrades to a status with a
+  reason rather than raising, and a source that could not run is never
+  rendered as an empty-and-healthy timeline.
+- **Answerable filters only.** Each source declares which filter dimensions it
+  can actually answer. A filter dimension no source that ran can carry is
+  refused with an explicit reason rather than silently matching nothing: an
+  empty page from an unanswerable filter reads to an operator as "no such
+  activity", which is a different — and false — statement.
+- **Redaction at the boundary, fail closed.** Every free-text field (event
+  messages, redacted tool arguments, decision/proof text) is run through the
+  console redaction policy before it leaves this module, and *before* any
+  structured value is derived from it — evidence references are extracted from
+  redacted text, then independently revalidated before serialization. An
+  unredactable value becomes the placeholder, and a value that cannot be proven
+  safe is dropped — an unredacted payload is never emitted, and a generation
+  error never drops raw data to a caller or a log.
+- **Stable ordering.** Events sort by ``(timestamp, source_rank, event_key)``
+  with a deterministic tiebreak, so pagination is stable across calls and
+  events with equal or missing timestamps keep a fixed order.
+
+Non-goals (from the issue): no full chat replay, no mutation of historical
+events, no unredacted tool-argument storage.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import sqlite3
+from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Any, Callable, Iterable
+
+import control_plane_db
+from webui import console_redaction
+
+# The schema is versioned so consumers can branch on shape. Bump on any
+# breaking change to WorkflowEvent's serialized form.
+TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+# Known event sources and their deterministic ordering rank. When two events
+# carry the same timestamp, the source rank breaks the tie before the
+# per-source event key, so a control-plane event and a handoff comment minted
+# in the same second always sort in a fixed order.
+SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE = "control_plane"
+SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF = "gitea_handoff"
+_SOURCE_RANK = {
+    SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE: 0,
+    SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF: 1,
+}
+
+# The filter dimensions the query layer accepts.
+FILTER_ISSUE = "issue"
+FILTER_PR = "pr"
+FILTER_SESSION = "session"
+
+# Which dimensions each source can actually answer. This is a property of the
+# underlying records, not of the query code: the control-plane ``events`` table
+# is (event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at) and carries no
+# session identity at all, so no control-plane event can ever match a session
+# filter. A CTH handoff comment can declare its session as a field, so the
+# handoff source answers all three. Filtering on a dimension the surviving
+# sources cannot carry is refused in ``load_timeline`` rather than answered
+# with an empty page.
+_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
+    SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE: (FILTER_ISSUE, FILTER_PR),
+    SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF: (FILTER_ISSUE, FILTER_PR, FILTER_SESSION),
+}
+
+# Why a source cannot answer a dimension, for the refusal reason an operator reads.
+_SOURCE_FILTER_LIMITS: dict[tuple[str, str], str] = {
+    (SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE, FILTER_SESSION): (
+        "control-plane events carry no session identity "
+        "(the events table has no session column)"
+    ),
+}
+
+# A timestamp far in the future so events with no parseable timestamp sort
+# last (after everything real) instead of first, without raising.
+_MISSING_TS_SORT = "9999-12-31T23:59:59Z"
+
+
+def _parse_ts(value: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """Normalise a timestamp to ``...Z`` UTC, or None when unparseable."""
+    if not value:
+        return None
+    text = str(value).strip()
+    if not text:
+        return None
+    candidate = text[:-1] + "+00:00" if text.endswith("Z") else text
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(candidate)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _redact(value: Any) -> Any:
+    """Redact a single free-text field, failing closed to the placeholder."""
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    return console_redaction.redact_text(str(value))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class WorkflowEvent:
+    """One normalised timeline event.
+
+    Every field is optional except ``source``/``event_type``/``event_key``
+    because sources carry different subsets. The class is frozen so an adapted
+    event is an immutable record; a consumer that needs a variant builds a new
+    one rather than mutating history.
+    """
+
+    source: str
+    event_type: str
+    event_key: str
+    timestamp: str | None = None
+    actor: str | None = None
+    role: str | None = None
+    issue_number: int | None = None
+    pr_number: int | None = None
+    session_id: str | None = None
+    tool_name: str | None = None
+    decision: str | None = None
+    message: str | None = None
+    correlation_id: str | None = None
+    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    sensitive: bool = False
+
+    def sort_key(self) -> tuple[str, int, str]:
+        return (
+            self.timestamp or _MISSING_TS_SORT,
+            _SOURCE_RANK.get(self.source, 99),
+            self.event_key,
+        )
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "source": self.source,
+            "event_type": self.event_type,
+            "event_key": self.event_key,
+            "timestamp": self.timestamp,
+            "actor": self.actor,
+            "role": self.role,
+            "issue_number": self.issue_number,
+            "pr_number": self.pr_number,
+            "session_id": self.session_id,
+            "tool_name": self.tool_name,
+            "decision": self.decision,
+            "message": self.message,
+            "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
+            "evidence_refs": list(self.evidence_refs),
+            "sensitive": self.sensitive,
+        }
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Adapters — pure functions from a source's raw records to WorkflowEvents.     #
+# Each is total: a malformed record is skipped, never raised on.               #
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+# Event types whose payload is treated as sensitive and always redaction-hard
+# (they can carry lease/session provenance or tool arguments).
+_SENSITIVE_EVENT_HINTS = ("lease", "capability", "token", "auth", "secret")
+
+# Reference tokens (issue/PR/comment ids) and SHAs parsed out of proof text.
+_EVIDENCE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"(?:#|PR\s*#?|issue\s*#?|comment\s*#?)(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE)
+
+# A commit reference is only recognised when the text *declares* it as one.
+# A bare lowercase hex run is not evidence of anything: at 40 characters it is
+# exactly the shape of a Gitea personal access token, and at 7 it also matches
+# ordinary words such as "defaced". Requiring an anchoring keyword keeps real
+# references ("commit abc1234", "at head a209756...", "base caaae9b6") usable
+# while refusing to lift an undeclared secret-shaped run out of free text.
+_SHA_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i:\b(?:commit|sha|head|base|parent|revision|rev|merge[- ]base)\b[\s:=@#]*)"
+    r"([0-9a-f]{7,40})\b"
+)
+
+# Shapes a serialized evidence reference is allowed to take. Anything else is
+# dropped rather than emitted.
+_REF_ISSUE_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^#[0-9]{1,9}$")
+_REF_SHA_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{7,40}$")
+
+# A long undelimited hex run with no declaring context is treated as credential
+# material wherever it appears, never as an identifier.
+_BARE_SECRET_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{32,}$")
+
+# An event type reads like an identifier, but a stored one is externally
+# influenced: any producer that writes the control-plane ``events`` table
+# chooses the string. It reaches ``to_dict`` verbatim, so it is validated here
+# rather than trusted because of where it came from.
+_CP_EVENT_TYPE_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9._:+-]{0,63}$")
+
+# Emitted in place of a value that cannot be proven safe. Deliberately not a
+# plausible workflow type: an unsafe value is refused, never quietly rewritten
+# into a different valid-looking one that would misdescribe the record.
+UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE = "unsafe:redacted"
+
+# Emitted for a CTH heading that is not a declared member of ``CTH_TYPES``. The
+# contract is enforced on write (``format_cth_body``) and on assess; the read
+# path the timeline uses enforces it too rather than assuming it was.
+UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE = "handoff:unrecognized"
+
+# A source record id is a plain integer in both sources it comes from: the
+# control-plane ``events`` primary key and a Gitea comment id. ``event_key`` is
+# serialized verbatim and is the pagination tiebreak, so anything else is
+# refused rather than interpolated into it.
+_RECORD_ID_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9]{1,19}$")
+
+
+def _kind_to_numbers(kind: str | None, number: int | None) -> tuple[int | None, int | None]:
+    """Map a control-plane work-item (kind, number) to (issue_no, pr_no)."""
+    if number is None:
+        return (None, None)
+    if kind == "pr":
+        return (None, int(number))
+    if kind == "issue":
+        return (int(number), None)
+    return (None, None)
+
+
+def _correlation_for(kind: str | None, number: int | None) -> str | None:
+    if number is None or kind not in ("issue", "pr"):
+        return None
+    return f"{kind}#{number}"
+
+
+def _extract_evidence_refs(*texts: str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Extract issue/PR and declared-commit references from **redacted** text.
+
+    Callers must pass text that has already been through :func:`_redact`; this
+    function derives a structured field from its input, so extracting ahead of
+    redaction would republish whatever redaction was about to remove. Every
+    reference is revalidated by :func:`_validated_evidence_refs` before it is
+    serialized.
+    """
+    refs: list[str] = []
+    for text in texts:
+        if not text:
+            continue
+        for match in _EVIDENCE_REF_RE.finditer(text):
+            token = f"#{match.group(1)}"
+            if token not in refs:
+                refs.append(token)
+        for match in _SHA_RE.finditer(text):
+            token = match.group(1)
+            if token not in refs:
+                refs.append(token)
+    return tuple(refs)
+
+
+def _validated_evidence_refs(refs: Iterable[str]) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], bool]:
+    """Independently revalidate references immediately before serialization.
+
+    Extraction is not trusted on its own. A reference survives only when it has
+    a known reference shape and is unchanged by a second redaction pass — a
+    value the redaction policy would alter is credential material that must not
+    be emitted as a structured field. A full 40-character SHA stays usable
+    because extraction only accepts a hex run the source text explicitly
+    declared as a commit. Returns ``(safe_refs, dropped_any)``; ``dropped_any``
+    marks the event sensitive so the drop is visible rather than silent.
+    """
+    safe: list[str] = []
+    dropped = False
+    for ref in refs or ():
+        try:
+            token = str(ref).strip()
+            if not token:
+                continue
+            recognised = bool(_REF_ISSUE_SHAPE.match(token) or _REF_SHA_SHAPE.match(token))
+            if not recognised:
+                dropped = True
+                continue
+            if _redact(token) != token:
+                dropped = True
+                continue
+            if token not in safe:
+                safe.append(token)
+        except Exception:
+            # Fail closed: a reference that cannot be proven safe is dropped.
+            dropped = True
+            continue
+    return (tuple(safe), dropped)
+
+
+def _safe_session_id(value: Any) -> str | None:
+    """Return a session identifier only when it is safe to emit.
+
+    The value is authoritative source data — a session the record names for
+    itself — but it is still free text. It is dropped when redaction alters it
+    or when it is a bare secret-shaped hex run, so a credential parked in a
+    session field can never reach the payload or be echoed back by a filter.
+    """
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    text = str(value).strip()
+    if not text:
+        return None
+    if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text):
+        return None
+    return text if _redact(text) == text else None
+
+
+def _safe_record_id(value: Any) -> str | None:
+    """Return a source record id only when it is a plain numeric identifier.
+
+    ``event_key`` is serialized verbatim and is the deterministic pagination
+    tiebreak, so an id is interpolated into it only when it has the shape both
+    real sources actually produce. A record whose identity cannot be trusted is
+    refused by the caller rather than keyed on.
+    """
+    if value is None or isinstance(value, bool):
+        return None
+    if isinstance(value, int):
+        return str(value)
+    text = str(value).strip()
+    return text if _RECORD_ID_SHAPE.match(text) else None
+
+
+def _safe_cp_event_type(value: Any) -> tuple[str, bool]:
+    """Validate a stored control-plane event type. Returns ``(type, unsafe)``.
+
+    The stored value is externally influenced — whichever producer wrote the
+    ``events`` row chose the string — and ``to_dict`` serializes it verbatim, so
+    it passes a boundary of its own instead of relying on the one ``message``
+    passes. A value survives only when it is an ordinary identifier, is not a
+    bare secret-shaped hex run, and is unchanged by a redaction pass. Anything
+    else fails closed to :data:`UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE`: the record stays visible as
+    an audit entry, but the value itself is never republished — not verbatim,
+    not partially sanitized, and not rewritten into some other valid-looking
+    type that would misdescribe what happened.
+    """
+    text = ("" if value is None else str(value)).strip()
+    if not text:
+        return ("", False)
+    if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text):
+        return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
+    if not _CP_EVENT_TYPE_SHAPE.match(text):
+        return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
+    if _redact(text) != text:
+        return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
+    return (text, False)
+
+
+def _safe_echo(value: Any) -> Any:
+    """Guard a scalar that is echoed back rather than derived from a record.
+
+    Query scope and filter values are caller-supplied and are reflected in the
+    response so an operator can see what was asked. Reflection is still
+    emission: a value redaction would alter, or a bare secret-shaped hex run, is
+    replaced by the placeholder instead of being echoed verbatim. Ordinary
+    scope and filter values pass through untouched.
+    """
+    if value is None or isinstance(value, (int, bool)):
+        return value
+    text = str(value)
+    if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text.strip()):
+        return console_redaction.REDACTED
+    return _redact(text)
+
+
+def adapt_cp_events(rows: Iterable[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
+    """Adapt control-plane ``events`` rows (joined to work_items) into events.
+
+    Each row is expected to carry ``event_id``, ``event_type``, ``message``,
+    ``created_at`` and the joined work-item ``kind``/``number``. Rows missing
+    an id or type are skipped so a partially written table never raises.
+    """
+    events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
+    for row in rows or []:
+        try:
+            event_id = _safe_record_id(row.get("event_id"))
+            raw_event_type = (row.get("event_type") or "").strip()
+            if event_id is None or not raw_event_type:
+                continue
+            # The stored type is source data, not a trusted constant: validate
+            # it before it is serialized, exactly as `message` below is redacted
+            # before it is serialized.
+            event_type, event_type_unsafe = _safe_cp_event_type(raw_event_type)
+            kind = row.get("kind")
+            number = row.get("number")
+            issue_no, pr_no = _kind_to_numbers(kind, number)
+            sensitive = event_type_unsafe or any(
+                hint in raw_event_type.lower() for hint in _SENSITIVE_EVENT_HINTS
+            )
+            events.append(
+                WorkflowEvent(
+                    source=SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE,
+                    event_type=event_type,
+                    event_key=f"cp:{event_id}",
+                    timestamp=_parse_ts(row.get("created_at")),
+                    issue_number=issue_no,
+                    pr_number=pr_no,
+                    # No session_id: the control-plane events table is
+                    # (event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)
+                    # and records no session. Inventing one from the work item
+                    # or the message text would be a guess, so this source
+                    # declares the session dimension unsupported instead
+                    # (_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT) and the query layer refuses a
+                    # session filter it cannot honestly answer.
+                    message=_redact(row.get("message")),
+                    correlation_id=_correlation_for(kind, number),
+                    sensitive=sensitive,
+                )
+            )
+        except Exception:
+            # A single malformed row must not sink the whole adaptation.
+            continue
+    return events
+
+
+def adapt_cth_comments(
+    comments: Iterable[dict[str, Any]],
+    *,
+    kind: str,
+    number: int,
+) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
+    """Adapt Gitea Canonical Thread Handoff (CTH) comments into events.
+
+    Only comments that parse as a CTH (``canonical_thread_handoff.parse_cth_comment``)
+    become events; ordinary comments are ignored. ``kind``/``number`` scope the
+    events to the issue or PR the comments belong to.
+    """
+    # Imported lazily so this module has no import-time dependency on the
+    # handoff parser when only the control-plane adapter is used.
+    from canonical_thread_handoff import is_known_cth_type, parse_cth_comment
+
+    # ``kind``/``number`` are interpolated into event_key and correlation_id, so
+    # they are normalised once here. A scope this adapter cannot express is
+    # refused outright rather than serialized into an identifier.
+    kind = (kind or "").strip().lower()
+    if kind not in ("issue", "pr"):
+        return []
+    try:
+        number = int(number)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return []
+
+    issue_no, pr_no = _kind_to_numbers(kind, number)
+    correlation = _correlation_for(kind, number)
+    events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
+    for comment in comments or []:
+        try:
+            body = comment.get("body") or ""
+            parsed = parse_cth_comment(body)
+            if not parsed:
+                continue
+            fields = parsed.get("fields") or {}
+            cth_type = parsed.get("cth_type") or ""
+            comment_id = _safe_record_id(comment.get("id"))
+            if comment_id is None:
+                continue
+            # The CTH heading is free text: the parser accepts whatever follows
+            # "## CTH:", and only the write and assess paths check it against
+            # the contract. Check it here too — an unrecognised heading is
+            # reported as such rather than serialized into event_type, so
+            # arbitrary, malformed, or secret-shaped heading content has no way
+            # through. Declared types are preserved exactly.
+            cth_type_known = is_known_cth_type(cth_type)
+            # Redaction runs first, and every derived value is taken from the
+            # redacted text — deriving evidence refs from the raw proof would
+            # re-emit exactly what redaction was about to remove.
+            decision = _redact(fields.get("decision"))
+            proof = _redact(fields.get("proof"))
+            next_action = _redact(fields.get("next action"))
+            refs, refs_dropped = _validated_evidence_refs(
+                _extract_evidence_refs(proof, decision)
+            )
+            events.append(
+                WorkflowEvent(
+                    source=SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF,
+                    event_type=(
+                        f"handoff:{cth_type.strip()}"
+                        if cth_type_known
+                        else UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE
+                    ),
+                    event_key=f"cth:{kind}:{number}:{comment_id}",
+                    timestamp=_parse_ts(comment.get("created_at")),
+                    actor=_redact((comment.get("user") or {}).get("login")),
+                    role=_redact(fields.get("next owner")),
+                    issue_number=issue_no,
+                    pr_number=pr_no,
+                    # A CTH names its own session when the producer records one;
+                    # it is read from that declared field, never inferred from
+                    # unrelated text.
+                    session_id=_safe_session_id(fields.get("session")),
+                    decision=decision,
+                    message=next_action or _redact(fields.get("status")),
+                    correlation_id=correlation,
+                    evidence_refs=refs,
+                    sensitive=refs_dropped or not cth_type_known,
+                )
+            )
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+    return events
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Read-only control-plane event source.                                       #
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+_CP_EVENTS_QUERY = """
+SELECT e.event_id   AS event_id,
+       e.event_type AS event_type,
+       e.message    AS message,
+       e.created_at AS created_at,
+       w.kind       AS kind,
+       w.number     AS number
+FROM events e
+JOIN work_items w ON e.work_item_id = w.work_item_id
+WHERE w.remote = ? AND w.org = ? AND w.repo = ?
+"""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SourceStatus:
+    """Fail-soft status for one timeline source.
+
+    ``supported_filters`` states which filter dimensions this source's records
+    can carry; ``unsupported_filters`` names the requested dimensions it cannot,
+    so an operator can see *why* a source contributed nothing rather than being
+    left to read an empty list as an absence of activity.
+    """
+
+    name: str
+    ok: bool
+    reason: str | None = None
+    count: int = 0
+    supported_filters: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    unsupported_filters: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "name": self.name,
+            "ok": self.ok,
+            "reason": self.reason,
+            "count": self.count,
+            "supported_filters": list(self.supported_filters),
+            "unsupported_filters": list(self.unsupported_filters),
+        }
+
+
+def _cp_status(*, ok: bool, reason: str | None = None, count: int = 0) -> SourceStatus:
+    return SourceStatus(
+        SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE,
+        ok=ok,
+        # A failure reason is serialized like any other field and is often an
+        # exception string carrying a path or a transport error, so it crosses
+        # the redaction boundary too. Static reasons pass through unchanged.
+        reason=_redact(reason),
+        count=count,
+        supported_filters=_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT[SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE],
+    )
+
+
+def _handoff_status(*, ok: bool, reason: str | None = None, count: int = 0) -> SourceStatus:
+    return SourceStatus(
+        SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF,
+        ok=ok,
+        # Same boundary as the control-plane status: this reason can quote an
+        # error raised by a live authenticated fetch.
+        reason=_redact(reason),
+        count=count,
+        supported_filters=_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT[SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF],
+    )
+
+
+def read_cp_events(
+    *,
+    remote: str,
+    org: str,
+    repo: str,
+    db_path: str | None = None,
+) -> tuple[list[WorkflowEvent], SourceStatus]:
+    """Read scoped control-plane events read-only. Never creates the DB.
+
+    Opens the SQLite file through a ``mode=ro`` URI: a health/timeline read
+    must never create directories or run the schema migration that
+    ``ControlPlaneDB()`` performs on construction. A missing or unreadable DB
+    degrades to a status with a reason.
+    """
+    path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path()).strip()
+    conn: sqlite3.Connection | None = None
+    try:
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True)
+        conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+        cursor = conn.execute(_CP_EVENTS_QUERY, (remote, org, repo))
+        rows = [dict(r) for r in cursor.fetchall()]
+    except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+        return ([], _cp_status(ok=False, reason=f"control-plane DB unavailable: {exc}"))
+    except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+        return ([], _cp_status(ok=False, reason=f"control-plane read failed: {exc}"))
+    finally:
+        if conn is not None:
+            conn.close()
+    events = adapt_cp_events(rows)
+    return (events, _cp_status(ok=True, count=len(events)))
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Filter, sort, paginate.                                                     #
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+def filter_events(
+    events: Iterable[WorkflowEvent],
+    *,
+    issue: int | None = None,
+    pr: int | None = None,
+    session: str | None = None,
+) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
+    """Filter events by issue number, PR number, and/or session id.
+
+    Filters are conjunctive. A filter that names a dimension an event does not
+    carry excludes that event (an issue filter excludes PR-only events).
+    """
+    out: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
+    for ev in events:
+        if issue is not None and ev.issue_number != issue:
+            continue
+        if pr is not None and ev.pr_number != pr:
+            continue
+        if session is not None and ev.session_id != session:
+            continue
+        out.append(ev)
+    return out
+
+
+def sort_events(events: Iterable[WorkflowEvent]) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
+    """Return events in stable timeline order (ascending)."""
+    return sorted(events, key=lambda ev: ev.sort_key())
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TimelinePage:
+    """One page of the sorted, filtered timeline."""
+
+    events: tuple[WorkflowEvent, ...]
+    total: int
+    limit: int
+    offset: int
+
+    @property
+    def next_offset(self) -> int | None:
+        nxt = self.offset + len(self.events)
+        return nxt if nxt < self.total else None
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "events": [ev.to_dict() for ev in self.events],
+            "pagination": {
+                "total": self.total,
+                "limit": self.limit,
+                "offset": self.offset,
+                "returned": len(self.events),
+                "next_offset": self.next_offset,
+                "has_more": self.next_offset is not None,
+            },
+        }
+
+
+_MAX_LIMIT = 500
+_DEFAULT_LIMIT = 50
+
+
+def _coerce_bounds(limit: int | None, offset: int | None) -> tuple[int, int]:
+    try:
+        lim = int(limit) if limit is not None else _DEFAULT_LIMIT
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        lim = _DEFAULT_LIMIT
+    try:
+        off = int(offset) if offset is not None else 0
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        off = 0
+    lim = max(1, min(lim, _MAX_LIMIT))
+    off = max(0, off)
+    return (lim, off)
+
+
+def paginate(events: list[WorkflowEvent], *, limit: int | None, offset: int | None) -> TimelinePage:
+    lim, off = _coerce_bounds(limit, offset)
+    window = events[off : off + lim]
+    return TimelinePage(events=tuple(window), total=len(events), limit=lim, offset=off)
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Composition — load_timeline aggregates all sources, fail-soft.              #
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+# A comment source is a callable that, given (kind, number), returns the raw
+# Gitea comment list for that issue/PR. The route supplies a live fail-soft
+# fetcher; tests supply a fixture. When None, the handoff source is reported as
+# not-run (never silently empty-and-healthy).
+CommentSource = Callable[[str, int], list[dict[str, Any]]]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TimelineSnapshot:
+    """One answered timeline query.
+
+    ``ok`` is False when the query could not be answered as asked — currently
+    when a requested filter dimension no surviving source can carry was
+    supplied. The page is then empty *and* the snapshot says so, because an
+    ``ok`` empty page is a claim that no such activity exists.
+    """
+
+    schema_version: int
+    remote: str
+    org: str
+    repo: str
+    filters: dict[str, Any]
+    page: TimelinePage
+    sources: tuple[SourceStatus, ...]
+    ok: bool = True
+    error: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "ok": self.ok,
+            "error": self.error,
+            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
+            # Scope and filters are echoed caller input, not derived record
+            # data. Reflecting a value is still emitting it, so both cross the
+            # same boundary; ordinary scope and filter values are unchanged.
+            "scope": {
+                "remote": _safe_echo(self.remote),
+                "org": _safe_echo(self.org),
+                "repo": _safe_echo(self.repo),
+            },
+            "filters": {key: _safe_echo(value) for key, value in self.filters.items()},
+            "sources": [s.to_dict() for s in self.sources],
+            **self.page.to_dict(),
+        }
+
+
+def _unanswerable_reasons(
+    statuses: Iterable[SourceStatus], unanswerable: Iterable[str]
+) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
+    """Explain, per source, why each unanswerable dimension went unanswered."""
+    out: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+    for status in statuses:
+        for dim in unanswerable:
+            if dim not in status.supported_filters:
+                reason = _SOURCE_FILTER_LIMITS.get(
+                    (status.name, dim), f"this source's records carry no {dim} identity"
+                )
+            elif not status.ok:
+                reason = (
+                    f"this source can carry {dim} but did not run: "
+                    f"{status.reason or 'unavailable'}"
+                )
+            else:
+                continue
+            out.append({"source": status.name, "filter": dim, "reason": reason})
+    return out
+
+
+def load_timeline(
+    *,
+    remote: str,
+    org: str,
+    repo: str,
+    issue: int | None = None,
+    pr: int | None = None,
+    session: str | None = None,
+    limit: int | None = None,
+    offset: int | None = None,
+    db_path: str | None = None,
+    comment_source: CommentSource | None = None,
+) -> TimelineSnapshot:
+    """Aggregate every timeline source into one filtered, paginated snapshot.
+
+    Sources are read independently and fail soft: an unavailable source
+    contributes a ``SourceStatus`` with ``ok=False`` and a reason, and never
+    collapses the whole timeline. The handoff source only runs when a specific
+    issue or PR is requested (a handoff comment belongs to one thread) and a
+    ``comment_source`` is available; otherwise it is reported as ``not run``
+    rather than as an empty-and-healthy source.
+
+    A filter dimension that no surviving source can carry — a ``session``
+    filter when the only source that ran is the control plane, whose events
+    record no session — is refused with ``ok=False`` and a structured error
+    instead of being answered with an empty page.
+    """
+    all_events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
+    statuses: list[SourceStatus] = []
+
+    cp_events, cp_status = read_cp_events(remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo, db_path=db_path)
+    all_events.extend(cp_events)
+    statuses.append(cp_status)
+
+    # Gitea handoff comments are thread-scoped: only fetch when the caller
+    # narrowed to one issue or PR, and only when a source was provided.
+    handoff_target: tuple[str, int] | None = None
+    if pr is not None:
+        handoff_target = ("pr", pr)
+    elif issue is not None:
+        handoff_target = ("issue", issue)
+
+    if handoff_target is None:
+        statuses.append(
+            _handoff_status(
+                ok=False,
+                reason="not run: handoff comments are thread-scoped; filter by issue or pr to include them",
+            )
+        )
+    elif comment_source is None:
+        statuses.append(
+            _handoff_status(
+                ok=False,
+                reason="not run: no comment source configured for this timeline read",
+            )
+        )
+    else:
+        kind, number = handoff_target
+        try:
+            comments = comment_source(kind, number) or []
+            handoff_events = adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind=kind, number=number)
+            all_events.extend(handoff_events)
+            statuses.append(_handoff_status(ok=True, count=len(handoff_events)))
+        except Exception as exc:  # fail soft: a fetch/parse error degrades this source only
+            statuses.append(_handoff_status(ok=False, reason=f"handoff source failed: {exc}"))
+
+    requested = tuple(
+        name
+        for name, value in ((FILTER_ISSUE, issue), (FILTER_PR, pr), (FILTER_SESSION, session))
+        if value is not None
+    )
+    statuses = [
+        replace(
+            status,
+            unsupported_filters=tuple(
+                dim for dim in requested if dim not in status.supported_filters
+            ),
+        )
+        for status in statuses
+    ]
+    filters = {"issue": issue, "pr": pr, "session": session}
+
+    # A dimension is answerable only if a source that actually ran can carry it.
+    # If none can, refuse: an empty page would assert "no such activity", which
+    # is a claim this timeline is not in a position to make.
+    answerable: set[str] = set()
+    for status in statuses:
+        if status.ok:
+            answerable.update(status.supported_filters)
+    unanswerable = tuple(dim for dim in requested if dim not in answerable)
+
+    if unanswerable:
+        return TimelineSnapshot(
+            schema_version=TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+            remote=remote,
+            org=org,
+            repo=repo,
+            filters=filters,
+            page=paginate([], limit=limit, offset=offset),
+            sources=tuple(statuses),
+            ok=False,
+            error={
+                "code": "filter_not_supported",
+                "unsupported_filters": list(unanswerable),
+                "detail": (
+                    "no timeline source that ran can answer "
+                    + ", ".join(f"'{dim}'" for dim in unanswerable)
+                    + "; the result is refused rather than returned empty"
+                ),
+                "sources": _unanswerable_reasons(statuses, unanswerable),
+            },
+        )
+
+    filtered = filter_events(all_events, issue=issue, pr=pr, session=session)
+    ordered = sort_events(filtered)
+    page = paginate(ordered, limit=limit, offset=offset)
+
+    return TimelineSnapshot(
+        schema_version=TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        remote=remote,
+        org=org,
+        repo=repo,
+        filters=filters,
+        page=page,
+        sources=tuple(statuses),
+    )
+
+
+def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: TimelineSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return snapshot.to_dict()

worktree_cleanup_audit.py

@@ -34,7 +34,11 @@ import subprocess
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from typing import Any
 
-from merged_cleanup_reconcile import branch_worktree_folder, read_local_worktree_state
+from merged_cleanup_reconcile import (
+    branch_worktree_folder,
+    is_head_ancestor_of_ref,
+    read_local_worktree_state,
+)
 from reviewer_worktree import parse_dirty_tracked_files, REVIEW_WORKTREE_RE
 
 PROTECTED_BRANCHES = frozenset({"master", "main", "dev"})
@@ -67,6 +71,14 @@ REMOVABLE_CLASSES = frozenset(
     {CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE, CLASS_DETACHED_REVIEW_LEFTOVER}
 )
 
+# Merged-PR linkage outcomes for issue worktrees (#858). Only ``LINKAGE_MERGED``
+# is ownership proof; every other outcome leaves the worktree protected.
+LINKAGE_MERGED = "merged_pr"
+LINKAGE_OPEN = "open_pr"
+LINKAGE_NONE = "no_owning_pr"
+LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS = "ambiguous"
+LINKAGE_UNKNOWN = "unknown"
+
 _ISSUE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"issue-(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE)
 _ISSUE_BRANCH_PREFIXES = ("feat/", "fix/", "docs/", "chore/")
 
@@ -169,6 +181,186 @@ def is_ttl_expired(
     return (now_dt - last).total_seconds() > ttl_hours * 3600.0
 
 
+def build_pr_index(prs: list[dict[str, Any]] | None) -> dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]]:
+    """Index PR records by head branch for deterministic worktree linkage (#858).
+
+    Accepts Gitea PR payloads (``head`` as a dict) and pre-flattened records
+    (``head_branch``/``head_sha``). Records without a usable head branch or
+    number are dropped rather than guessed at, so a branch is only ever linked
+    to a PR the caller actually proved.
+    """
+    index: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
+    for pr in prs or []:
+        head = pr.get("head")
+        if isinstance(head, dict):
+            head_branch = head.get("ref")
+            head_sha = head.get("sha")
+        else:
+            head_branch = pr.get("head_branch") or (head if isinstance(head, str) else None)
+            head_sha = pr.get("head_sha")
+        number = pr.get("number")
+        if not head_branch or number is None:
+            continue
+        try:
+            pr_number = int(number)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            continue
+        index.setdefault(str(head_branch).strip(), []).append(
+            {
+                "pr_number": pr_number,
+                "head_branch": str(head_branch).strip(),
+                "head_sha": head_sha,
+                "merged": bool(pr.get("merged") or pr.get("merged_at")),
+                "state": pr.get("state"),
+            }
+        )
+    return index
+
+
+def resolve_owning_pr(
+    *,
+    branch: str | None,
+    pr_index: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Resolve the single PR that owns ``branch``, failing closed when unclear.
+
+    Ownership is only ``LINKAGE_MERGED`` when exactly one PR claims the branch
+    and that PR is merged. Several distinct PRs on one branch is a competing
+    claim (``LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS``), and a still-open owner is reported as
+    ``LINKAGE_OPEN`` — both keep the worktree protected while still exposing
+    the PR number the audit resolved.
+    """
+    if pr_index is None:
+        return {
+            "status": LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
+            "pr_number": None,
+            "candidate_pr_numbers": [],
+            "reasons": ["live PR state was not supplied; ownership unproven"],
+        }
+    branch_name = (branch or "").strip()
+    if not branch_name:
+        return {
+            "status": LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
+            "pr_number": None,
+            "candidate_pr_numbers": [],
+            "reasons": ["worktree has no attached branch; ownership unproven"],
+        }
+
+    candidates = list(pr_index.get(branch_name) or [])
+    numbers = sorted({c["pr_number"] for c in candidates})
+    if not candidates:
+        return {
+            "status": LINKAGE_NONE,
+            "pr_number": None,
+            "candidate_pr_numbers": [],
+            "reasons": [f"no PR claims branch '{branch_name}'"],
+        }
+    if len(numbers) > 1:
+        return {
+            "status": LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS,
+            "pr_number": None,
+            "candidate_pr_numbers": numbers,
+            "reasons": [
+                f"branch '{branch_name}' is claimed by competing PRs {numbers}; "
+                "ownership is ambiguous"
+            ],
+        }
+
+    owner = candidates[0]
+    pr_number = owner["pr_number"]
+    if owner.get("head_branch") != branch_name:
+        return {
+            "status": LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
+            "pr_number": pr_number,
+            "candidate_pr_numbers": numbers,
+            "reasons": [
+                f"PR #{pr_number} head branch '{owner.get('head_branch')}' does not "
+                f"match worktree branch '{branch_name}'"
+            ],
+        }
+    if not owner.get("merged"):
+        return {
+            "status": LINKAGE_OPEN,
+            "pr_number": pr_number,
+            "candidate_pr_numbers": numbers,
+            "pr_head_sha": owner.get("head_sha"),
+            "reasons": [f"owning PR #{pr_number} is not merged"],
+        }
+    return {
+        "status": LINKAGE_MERGED,
+        "pr_number": pr_number,
+        "candidate_pr_numbers": numbers,
+        "pr_head_sha": owner.get("head_sha"),
+        "reasons": [],
+    }
+
+
+def assess_merged_pr_worktree_cleanup(
+    *,
+    linkage: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    head_sha: str | None,
+    head_in_master: bool | None,
+    is_dirty: bool,
+    has_open_pr: bool,
+    has_active_lease: bool,
+    has_active_issue_lock: bool,
+    is_protected: bool,
+    has_live_session: bool = False,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Decide whether a merged issue worktree satisfies the full cleanup policy.
+
+    Every condition must be independently proven: conclusive merged-PR
+    ownership, agreement between the worktree branch and the PR head branch,
+    containment of the worktree head in authoritative master (which is what
+    proves no unmerged commits remain), absence of any open/competing PR,
+    lease, issue lock, or live session, a clean tree, and a worktree that is
+    not the protected control checkout. Anything unknown blocks.
+    """
+    link = linkage or {
+        "status": LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
+        "pr_number": None,
+        "reasons": ["no linkage assessment supplied"],
+    }
+    status = link.get("status")
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+
+    if status != LINKAGE_MERGED:
+        reasons.extend(
+            link.get("reasons") or ["owning PR could not be conclusively identified"]
+        )
+    if is_protected:
+        reasons.append("worktree is protected or the stable control checkout")
+    if is_dirty:
+        reasons.append("worktree has uncommitted changes")
+    if has_open_pr:
+        reasons.append("worktree branch has an open PR")
+    if has_active_lease:
+        reasons.append("worktree has an active lease")
+    if has_active_issue_lock:
+        reasons.append("an active issue lock references this branch")
+    if has_live_session:
+        reasons.append("a live process or session is using this worktree")
+    if not head_sha:
+        reasons.append("worktree head sha is unknown")
+    if head_in_master is None:
+        reasons.append("containment of the worktree head in master is unknown")
+    elif not head_in_master:
+        reasons.append(
+            "worktree head is not contained in authoritative master "
+            "(unmerged commits remain)"
+        )
+
+    proven = not reasons
+    return {
+        "linkage_status": status,
+        "pr_number": link.get("pr_number"),
+        "pr_head_sha": link.get("pr_head_sha"),
+        "head_in_master": head_in_master,
+        "proven": proven,
+        "block_reasons": reasons,
+    }
+
+
 def classify_worktree(
     *,
     workflow_type: str,
@@ -181,6 +373,8 @@ def classify_worktree(
     ttl_expired: bool = False,
     is_protected: bool = False,
     metadata_known: bool = True,
+    merged_pr_cleanup: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    has_live_session: bool = False,
 ) -> str:
     """Classify a worktree, safety-first: any preservation signal wins.
 
@@ -199,6 +393,8 @@ def classify_worktree(
         return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK  # never auto-deleted (criterion 8)
     if has_active_issue_lock:
         return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK
+    if has_live_session:
+        return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK  # a live session still owns this tree
     if not metadata_known or workflow_type == WORKFLOW_UNKNOWN:
         return CLASS_UNSAFE_UNKNOWN  # never auto-deleted without proof
 
@@ -207,7 +403,15 @@ def classify_worktree(
         if is_detached or branch_gone:
             return CLASS_DETACHED_REVIEW_LEFTOVER
         return CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE
-    # issue_work / conflict_fix: only removable once the TTL has expired.
+    if workflow_type == WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK:
+        # #858: an issue worktree becomes removable only on authoritative
+        # merged-PR evidence satisfying the whole cleanup policy. Age alone
+        # never proves the branch landed, so TTL cannot qualify one by itself
+        # — otherwise a worktree holding unmerged commits would be reclaimed.
+        if (merged_pr_cleanup or {}).get("proven"):
+            return CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE
+        return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK
+    # conflict_fix: only removable once the TTL has expired.
     if ttl_expired:
         return CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE
     return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK
@@ -400,6 +604,20 @@ def remove_worktree(project_root: str, path: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
     }
 
 
+def head_contained_in_ref(
+    project_root: str, head_sha: str | None, ref: str | None
+) -> bool | None:
+    """Return True when ``head_sha`` is already contained in ``ref``.
+
+    Shares :mod:`merged_cleanup_reconcile`'s ancestry check so the audit and
+    the PR-scoped reconciler agree on what "already landed" means (#858).
+    Returns None when containment cannot be determined, which fails closed.
+    """
+    if not head_sha or not ref:
+        return None
+    return is_head_ancestor_of_ref(project_root, head_sha, ref)
+
+
 def _is_under_branches(project_root: str, path: str) -> bool:
     branches_root = os.path.join(os.path.abspath(project_root), "branches")
     return os.path.abspath(path or "").startswith(branches_root + os.sep)
@@ -413,16 +631,30 @@ def audit_branches_directory(
     active_issue_branches: set[str] | None = None,
     now: datetime | str | None = None,
     ttl_hours: float = DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS,
+    pr_index: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] | None = None,
+    leased_issue_numbers: set[int] | None = None,
+    live_session_paths: set[str] | None = None,
+    master_ref: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Classify every session-owned worktree under ``branches/``.
 
     Read-only: shells out to git for discovery and dirty state, then applies
     the pure classifier. Returns per-worktree classifications, counts, the
     list of removable candidates, and the ``git worktree list`` proof.
+
+    ``pr_index`` (see :func:`build_pr_index`) supplies the authoritative PR
+    ownership used to link issue worktrees to their merged PR (#858).
+    ``master_ref`` is the ref a worktree head must be contained in before it
+    can be considered landed. Both are optional and their absence only ever
+    fails closed: without them no issue worktree becomes removable.
     """
     open_pr_branches = open_pr_branches or set()
     leased_branches = leased_branches or set()
     active_issue_branches = active_issue_branches or set()
+    leased_issue_numbers = leased_issue_numbers or set()
+    live_session_paths = {
+        os.path.abspath(p) for p in (live_session_paths or set()) if p
+    }
 
     worktrees: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
     for entry in list_worktrees(project_root):
@@ -433,12 +665,42 @@ def audit_branches_directory(
         )
         dirty_state = read_worktree_dirty(path)
         is_dirty = bool(dirty_state.get("dirty"))
+        head_sha = entry.get("head")
+        linkage = resolve_owning_pr(branch=branch, pr_index=pr_index)
         metadata = build_worktree_metadata(
-            path=path, branch=branch, head_sha=entry.get("head")
+            path=path,
+            branch=branch,
+            head_sha=head_sha,
+            pr_number=linkage.get("pr_number"),
         )
         has_open_pr = bool(branch) and branch in open_pr_branches
-        has_active_lease = bool(branch) and branch in leased_branches
+        # A lease on issue N protects that issue's own work worktree. It must
+        # not incidentally protect a baseline/review scratch tree that merely
+        # carries the same issue marker in its name, which would change the
+        # classification of worktrees this policy does not own.
+        has_active_lease = (bool(branch) and branch in leased_branches) or (
+            metadata["workflow_type"] == WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK
+            and metadata.get("issue_number") is not None
+            and metadata["issue_number"] in leased_issue_numbers
+        )
         has_active_lock = bool(branch) and branch in active_issue_branches
+        has_live_session = bool(path) and os.path.abspath(path) in live_session_paths
+        head_in_master = (
+            head_contained_in_ref(project_root, head_sha, master_ref)
+            if master_ref
+            else None
+        )
+        merged_pr_cleanup = assess_merged_pr_worktree_cleanup(
+            linkage=linkage,
+            head_sha=head_sha,
+            head_in_master=head_in_master,
+            is_dirty=is_dirty,
+            has_open_pr=has_open_pr,
+            has_active_lease=has_active_lease,
+            has_active_issue_lock=has_active_lock,
+            is_protected=is_protected,
+            has_live_session=has_live_session,
+        )
         ttl_expired = is_ttl_expired(
             last_used_at=metadata.get("last_used_at"), now=now, ttl_hours=ttl_hours
         )
@@ -452,6 +714,8 @@ def audit_branches_directory(
             branch_gone=branch is None and not entry.get("detached"),
             ttl_expired=ttl_expired,
             is_protected=is_protected,
+            merged_pr_cleanup=merged_pr_cleanup,
+            has_live_session=has_live_session,
         )
         metadata["cleanup_eligibility"] = classification
         worktrees.append(
@@ -463,7 +727,10 @@ def audit_branches_directory(
                 "has_open_pr": has_open_pr,
                 "has_active_lease": has_active_lease,
                 "has_active_issue_lock": has_active_lock,
+                "has_live_session": has_live_session,
                 "is_protected": is_protected,
+                "merged_pr_linkage": linkage,
+                "merged_pr_cleanup": merged_pr_cleanup,
                 "classification": classification,
                 "removable": is_removable(classification),
             }