Merge branch 'master' into docs/issue-656-mcp-restart-governance

docs(governance): correct linked-issue descriptions in restart ADR (#656 )
The Related section and cross-reference lines described #652, #653, #630, #642, and #591 by roles they do not hold. Align each description with the linked issue's actual title and scope: - #652 is the Control Plane Web Console product vision (restart controls live in its capability area A), not a restart-specific vision. - #653 is the console phased-delivery roadmap; restart controls are Phase 2. - #630 is the manual process-kill contamination guard, not the coordinator; the coordinator remains an unimplemented later child of #655. - #642 is the sanctioned restart / graceful reload console UX. - #591 is auto-restart on master advance (closed); only #584 is transport-flap reconnect. They were previously collapsed into one transport-recovery label. Documentation-only wording change. Policy IDs RG-01..RG-08, the policy version restart-governance/v1, the authorization matrix, and every normative statement are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-23 19:53:16 -05:00 · 2026-07-23 19:18:47 -04:00 · 2026-07-23 19:17:05 -04:00 · 2026-07-23 19:16:28 -04:00
15 changed files with 366 additions and 2227 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+# ADR: MCP restart governance and authorization policy
+
+- **Status:** Accepted (policy effective immediately for LLM and operator sessions; enforcement tooling may lag)
+- **Date:** 2026-07-23
+- **Tracking issue:** [#656](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/656)
+- **Policy version:** `restart-governance/v1`
+- **Related:**
+  - Umbrella: [#655](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/655) — governed MCP restart coordination and zero-disruption recovery
+  - Vision: [#652](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/652) — MCP Control Plane Web Console product vision (§A system health and process control)
+  - Roadmap: [#653](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/653) — Control Plane Web Console phased delivery (Phase 2 restart controls)
+  - Contamination guard: [#630](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/630) — blocks manual process-kill recovery
+  - Console restart UX: [#642](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/642) — sanctioned restart and graceful reload
+  - Existing restart / reconnect paths to inventory: [#591](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/591) — auto-restart on master advance (closed); [#584](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/584) — host auto-reconnect on transport flap
+  - Stable-control runtime split: `docs/architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md` (#615)
+  - Client-namespace health: `docs/mcp-namespace-health.md` (#543)
+  - Reconnect-only EOF recovery: `docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md`
+
+## 1. Context
+
+The Gitea MCP server is the **control plane** for real issue and PR mutations
+(create, comment, lock, review, merge, reconcile). The same process serves every
+role namespace (`gitea-author`, `gitea-reviewer`, `gitea-merger`,
+`gitea-reconciler`, `gitea-controller`) and holds the in-memory capability-gate
+code loaded at startup.
+
+Restarting that process is destructive to concurrent work:
+
+- It resets every session's identity, preflight, and capability-lease binding.
+- It can interrupt a mutation mid-critical-section (a lock acquire, a review
+  submit, a merge), leaving durable state half-written.
+- Relaunching from the wrong checkout or worktree silently changes which code
+  the control plane runs, defeating master-parity gates (#420 / #615).
+
+Today there is **no durable written policy** stating who may restart MCP, under
+what conditions, that restart is a last resort, and how controller approval,
+automated safety gates, and break-glass interact. Operators and LLM sessions
+therefore invent restart behavior ad hoc, which makes concurrent multi-role work
+unsafe. #630 and #642 need this policy as their backbone.
+
+This ADR defines that policy. It does **not** implement coordinator code or HA
+multi-instance restart (those are later children of #655).
+
+## 2. Decision
+
+### 2.1 v1 decision (recorded)
+
+**Restart authority in v1 is `controller approval + automated safety gates`.**
+
+A restart of the stable control runtime is authorized only when **both** hold:
+
+1. A **controller** role explicitly approves the restart, recording an audit
+   entry (who, why, scope, affected sessions), **and**
+2. The **automated safety gates** pass: a completed drain acknowledgement (no
+   affected session is mid-critical-section) or a declared break-glass incident
+   (§2.5).
+
+Quorum among multiple controllers is **not** required day-one. It is deferred
+unless a later investigation (tracked under #653) proves single-controller
+approval is insufficient. This ADR records the v1 decision so enforcement code
+(#630) has a fixed target; changing it requires a superseding ADR.
+
+### 2.2 Restart is a last resort — the recovery ladder
+
+Restart is the **last** rung. Before any restart, exhaust the narrower
+recoveries, in order:
+
+1. **Reconnect** the IDE/client MCP namespace (transport EOF, `client is
+   closing: EOF`, transient `#584` flap). No process change. See
+   `docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md`.
+2. **Refresh / rebind** the session workspace: re-run `gitea_whoami`,
+   `gitea_resolve_task_capability`, and pass an explicit validated
+   `worktree_path`. Fixes stale session context without touching the process.
+3. **Scoped restart** of a single misbehaving namespace/service (where the
+   deployment supports per-service restart) rather than the whole control plane.
+4. **Full restart** of the stable control runtime process — operator-owned,
+   controller-approved, drained.
+5. **Host / infrastructure restart** — the broadest action; same authorization
+   as a full restart plus infrastructure ownership.
+
+A session **must** try rungs 1–2 and record why they were insufficient before
+requesting a restart at rung 3 or above. Skipping straight to restart is a
+policy violation.
+
+### 2.3 Authorization matrix
+
+| Role | Reconnect (1) | Refresh/rebind (2) | Scoped restart (3) | Full restart (4) | Host restart (5) |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **author** | self | self | request only | **forbidden** | forbidden |
+| **reviewer** | self | self | request only | **forbidden** | forbidden |
+| **merger** | self | self | request only | **forbidden** | forbidden |
+| **reconciler** | self | self | request only | **forbidden** | forbidden |
+| **controller** | self | self | **approve** (+gates) | **approve** (+gates) | request to operator |
+| **operator** | self | self | execute (controller-approved) | execute (controller-approved) | execute (controller-approved) |
+| **admin** | self | self | execute | execute | execute (break-glass) |
+
+Legend: *self* = may perform for its own client session; *request only* = may
+raise a restart request but not authorize or execute it; *approve* = may
+authorize under §2.1 gates; *execute* = may perform the process action after the
+authorization is recorded.
+
+Key invariants:
+
+- **No LLM worker role (author/reviewer/merger/reconciler) may perform or
+  authorize a full or host restart.** They may only reconnect/rebind their own
+  client and file a restart request.
+- **Controller approval authorizes; operator/admin executes.** The approving
+  controller and the executing operator may be the same human, but both the
+  approval and the execution are audited.
+- Privileged process actions (full restart, host restart) are reserved to
+  **operator/admin**, never to an automated worker.
+
+### 2.4 Approved conditions
+
+A restart at rung 3+ is approved only under one of these recorded conditions:
+
+- **No affected sessions:** the control plane has no live session that would be
+  interrupted (verified, not assumed).
+- **Full drain acknowledged:** every affected session has drained
+  (no open critical section — no held mutation lease mid-write) and the drain is
+  acknowledged in the audit record.
+- **Controller + gates:** controller approval plus passing automated safety
+  gates (§2.1), the standard v1 path.
+- **Quorum:** not required in v1; reserved for a future superseding ADR.
+- **Break-glass:** an incident-backed emergency exception (§2.5).
+
+Restart **never** bypasses mutation gates mid-critical-section. Drain before
+restart is mandatory except under break-glass with a declared incident.
+
+### 2.5 Break-glass
+
+Break-glass is a **separate, narrower** authorization path for emergencies where
+the normal drain-and-approve path cannot complete (e.g. the control plane is
+wedged and cannot drain).
+
+Break-glass conditions:
+
+- A declared incident record exists (id, timestamp, declarer) **before** the
+  action.
+- The action is taken by **operator or admin** authority only — never by an LLM
+  worker role, and never unilaterally by an operator with active peers when a
+  controller is reachable.
+- The scope is the minimum necessary rung of the ladder.
+- A **mandatory post-hoc audit** entry is filed: what was restarted, why the
+  normal path was impossible, which sessions were affected, and the incident id.
+
+Break-glass suspends the drain requirement, not the audit requirement.
+
+### 2.6 Explicit prohibitions
+
+- **A unilateral LLM or operator full restart while active peer sessions
+  exist is forbidden.** An LLM worker role must not kill, restart, or relaunch
+  the MCP process; a lone operator must not full-restart over live peer work
+  without controller approval or a break-glass incident.
+- Process-kill recovery is forbidden as a routine tool (#630). This ADR does not
+  introduce a kill path.
+- Ambiguous policy state **denies** restart (§4).
+
+## 3. Security requirements
+
+- Full restart and host restart are **privileged**; only operator/admin execute
+  them, only after a controller approval or break-glass incident is recorded.
+- Break-glass is a distinct authorization path with its own audit mandate; it is
+  never the default and never silent.
+- **Every approval and every restart action is audited** (who approved, who
+  executed, scope, affected sessions, condition, policy version). No restart is
+  authorized without a durable audit entry.
+
+## 4. Failure behavior
+
+**Ambiguous policy → deny restart.** If it cannot be established that a
+restart is authorized under §2 — unknown affected-session state, missing
+controller approval, absent break-glass incident, or an unclassifiable request —
+the safe action is to **refuse** the restart and stop with a recovery report,
+never to restart on assumption.
+
+## 5. Policy IDs (for enforcement code)
+
+Enforcement code — the restart coordinator (a later child of #655), the #630
+contamination guard, and the #642 console restart UX — binds to these stable
+policy identifiers rather than to prose:
+
+| Policy ID | Statement |
+|---|---|
+| `RG-01` | Restart is last resort; rungs 1–2 must be tried and recorded first (§2.2). |
+| `RG-02` | v1 authority = controller approval + automated safety gates (§2.1). |
+| `RG-03` | No LLM worker role performs or authorizes full/host restart (§2.3). |
+| `RG-04` | Full/host restart executed by operator/admin only, post approval (§2.3). |
+| `RG-05` | Drain before restart is mandatory except break-glass with incident (§2.4). |
+| `RG-06` | Break-glass requires a pre-declared incident and post-hoc audit (§2.5). |
+| `RG-07` | Unilateral LLM/operator full restart with active peers is forbidden (§2.6). |
+| `RG-08` | Ambiguous policy state denies restart (§4). |
+
+The `restart-governance/v1` **policy version** field is emitted on future
+restart audit events so approvals can be reconciled against the policy revision
+in force.
+
+## 6. Dogfooding
+
+Gitea-Tools governs its own MCP control plane by this policy. Author, reviewer,
+merger, and reconciler sessions operating on this repository use the recovery
+ladder (§2.2) — reconnect and rebind, never self-restart — and any real restart
+of the Gitea-Tools stable control runtime follows the controller-approval +
+drain path defined here.
+
+## 7. Acceptance and cross-links
+
+This ADR is the authoritative restart-governance policy. It **must** stay
+cross-linked from the safety model and the web-console deployment boundary:
+
+- `docs/safety-model.md` § Process restart governance references this ADR.
+- `docs/webui-deployment.md` references this ADR for restart/reload disposition.
+
+It is linked to its issue lineage — umbrella **#655**, vision **#652**, roadmap
+**#653**, contamination guard **#630**, and console restart UX **#642** — in
+§ Related above.
+
+## 8. Non-goals
+
+- Implementing the restart coordinator or approval state machine (#630, later
+  children of #655).
+- Implementing HA multi-instance restart or quorum machinery.
+- Introducing any process-kill or auto-restart tool; existing auto-restart
+  behavior must be inventoried before any new restart tool is enabled.
@@ -46,3 +46,17 @@ If shell helpers are unavailable and MCP commit cannot run, stop with a recovery
 report (restart session, clear hung terminals, use MCP-native commit). See
 [`llm-workflow-runbooks.md`](llm-workflow-runbooks.md) § MCP-native commit path
 (#260) and agent temp artifact cleanup (#261).
+
+## 7. Process restart governance
+
+Restarting the MCP control-plane process is destructive to concurrent multi-role
+work and is governed by a dedicated policy. Restart is a **last resort** behind
+narrower recoveries (reconnect, rebind), full/host restart is reserved to
+operator/admin under **controller approval + automated safety gates**, a
+unilateral LLM or operator full restart with active peers is **forbidden**, and
+ambiguous policy state **denies** restart. Break-glass is a separate,
+incident-backed path with a mandatory audit.
+
+See [`architecture/mcp-restart-governance.md`](architecture/mcp-restart-governance.md)
+(#656) for the authorization matrix, the recovery ladder, break-glass
+conditions, and the `RG-01`–`RG-08` policy IDs.
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-# Sanctioned restart and graceful reload controls (#642)
-
-Sessions used to recover MCP connectivity by killing the host daemon
-(`pkill -f mcp_server.py`, #630). That is forbidden and stays forbidden: it
-kills every namespace on the host, contaminates whichever session survives, and
-leaves no audit trail. This document describes the sanctioned replacement,
-implemented in `webui/sanctioned_restart.py`.
-
-## What the console will and will not do
-
-The console **never** restarts anything. It authorizes an intent, records it,
-and hands off to a host supervisor. There is no code path in which the console
-sends a signal, spawns a process, or renders a kill command — a regression test
-asserts the module contains no `subprocess`, `signal`, `os.kill`, `os.system`,
-or `popen` reference, and that no returned payload contains a kill command.
-
-## Operations
-
-| Mode | Action | Minimum role | Behaviour |
-|------|--------|--------------|-----------|
-| `reload` | `system.reload_namespace` | controller | Host supervisor reloads the namespace in place, draining in-flight requests. |
-| `restart` | `system.restart_namespace` | admin | Host supervisor restarts the namespace. In-flight requests are lost. |
-
-Scope is always exactly one namespace. A fleet-wide restart is an explicit
-non-goal: `all`, `*`, `fleet`, and an empty scope are refused with
-`fleet_scope_not_permitted`, because that is precisely the blast radius the
-forbidden kill already had. An unrecognised namespace is refused rather than
-passed through to the host.
-
-## The gate sequence
-
-`assess_restart_request()` applies every gate in order and reports the first
-failure with a stable reason code:
-
-| Order | Gate | Reason code on failure |
-|-------|------|------------------------|
-| 1 | Mode is `restart` or `reload` | `unknown_mode` |
-| 2 | Scope is a single known namespace | `fleet_scope_not_permitted`, `unknown_namespace` |
-| 3 | Principal holds the required console role | `unauthorized` |
-| 4 | Confirmation phrase supplied | `confirmation_required` |
-| 5 | Confirmation names this namespace and mode | `confirmation_mismatch` |
-| 6 | Out-of-band operator authorization present | `operator_authorization_missing` |
-| 7 | Runtime is not contaminated | `contaminated_runtime` |
-| 8 | Host restart hook configured | `restart_hook_not_configured` |
-
-Passing every gate yields `host_action_required`, never "restarted".
-
-### Confirmation binds the namespace
-
-The required phrase is `"<mode> <namespace>"` — for example
-`restart gitea-author`. Binding the namespace into the phrase is the point: a
-confirmation typed for one namespace cannot be replayed against another.
-
-### Operator authorization is not self-assertable
-
-Host daemon maintenance is authorized out of band through
-`GITEA_OPERATOR_DAEMON_MAINTENANCE_AUTHORIZATION`, read from the process
-environment and nowhere else (#630; #710 finding F1). A worker session cannot
-set an environment variable for an already-running daemon, so this cannot be
-faked the way a tool argument could.
-
-### The host hook
-
-`GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK` holds an opaque reference the *host* resolves —
-a supervisor label such as a launchd job name, never a command line. With no
-hook configured the request is refused; the console does not fall back to a
-process kill. The value is read server-side and never rendered to a client.
-
-## Manual kill remains contamination
-
-`classify_restart_command()` classifies an operator-proposed recovery command.
-A manual `pkill`/`kill`/`killall` of the MCP daemon is contamination, not a
-restart: it returns `clean_claim_allowed: false` and builds a durable
-contamination marker (redacted command only, never secrets) naming
-`system.restart_namespace` as the sanctioned alternative.
-
-A live, uncleared contamination marker also blocks a restart. This is stricter
-than #630's task-scoped gate, which deliberately lets a contaminated worker keep
-commenting and handing off: restarting a contaminated runtime would launder the
-contamination rather than resolve it. Clear the marker through the reconciler
-path first.
-
-## Post-restart health verification
-
-After the host supervisor acts, `verify_post_restart_health()` decides whether
-the session may claim to be clean:
-
-| Status | Meaning | Clean claim |
-|--------|---------|-------------|
-| `clean` | Required tool callable, proven through the live client namespace | Allowed |
-| `unproven` | Reported healthy without live client-namespace evidence | Refused |
-| `unhealthy` | Probe failed | Refused |
-
-Only `probe_source=client_namespace` evidence clears a session. Static tool
-registration is not proof, and neither is an offline subprocess probe — an IDE
-client can hold a registered tool list while live calls fail with
-`client is closing: EOF` (see
-[`mcp-namespace-health.md`](mcp-namespace-health.md)).
-
-## Audit
-
-Every attempt — allowed or denied — is recorded through
-`webui.console_audit` with actor, target namespace, mode, result, and reason
-code, and is redacted before it is persisted. `system.restart_namespace` is
-break-glass, so its records are retained for 730 days. Records carry
-`process_kill_executed: false`, which is a fact about the code path rather than
-a claim: no such path exists.
-
-## Environment variables
-
-| Variable | Purpose |
-|----------|---------|
-| `GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK` | Host supervisor reference; absent means restart is refused. |
-| `GITEA_OPERATOR_DAEMON_MAINTENANCE_AUTHORIZATION` | Out-of-band operator authorization reference. |
-| `WEBUI_AUDIT_LOG` | Console audit sink; absent means records are built but not persisted. |
-
-## Non-goals
-
-* No unrestricted `kill` from the UI, in any role, in any phase.
-* No fleet-wide restart.
-* No silent auto-restart loop: every attempt is confirmed and audited.
-* This does not implement the Phase 1 health API (#634).
@@ -91,8 +91,6 @@ already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
 | `close_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
 | `merge_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.merge` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
 | `delete_branch` | admin | destructive | `gitea.branch.delete` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
-| `system.reload_namespace` | controller | privileged | `runtime.reload_namespace` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `system.restart_namespace` | admin | destructive | `runtime.restart_namespace` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 2 |

 **Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
 second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is
@@ -104,13 +102,6 @@ honouring it.
 `delete_branch` is admin-only rather than controller because it is the one
 irreversible action in the set.

-`system.restart_namespace` is admin-only for the same reason: restarting a
-namespace drops every in-flight request on it. `system.reload_namespace` drains
-first, so it is privileged but not destructive. Neither action is ever executed
-by the console — both hand off to a host supervisor, and neither exposes a raw
-process kill. See
-[`sanctioned-restart-controls.md`](sanctioned-restart-controls.md) (#642).
-
 ### Authorization decision

 `authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=False)` returns a decision
@@ -208,8 +199,8 @@ breaking the request it describes.
 | Class | Applies to | Default |
 |-------|-----------|---------|
 | `standard` | Routine gated writes | 90 days |
-| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, `system.reload_namespace`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
-| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch`, `system.restart_namespace` | 730 days |
+| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
+| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch` | 730 days |

 Each record carries its own class, day count, and computed `expires_at`, so
 retention is auditable per record rather than inferred from file age. An
@@ -55,6 +55,15 @@ shipped to the browser.
 assumption paths, and the client-secret policy. Use it to verify an instance is
 configured for internal-only operation.

+## Process restart / reload disposition
+
+The console never exposes a restart or reload control; process restart of the
+MCP control-plane runtime is governed separately. Restart is a last resort behind
+reconnect/rebind, full restart is operator/admin-only under controller approval
+plus safety gates, and break-glass is an incident-backed path. See
+[`architecture/mcp-restart-governance.md`](architecture/mcp-restart-governance.md)
+(#656).
+
 ## Non-goals (MVP)

 - Full SSO or session login in the UI
@@ -11634,7 +11634,6 @@ def gitea_audit_worktree_cleanup(
    org: str | None = None,
    repo: str | None = None,
    ttl_hours: float = worktree_cleanup_audit.DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS,
-    merged_pr_limit: int = 200,
 ) -> dict:
    """Read-only: classify every session-owned worktree under ``branches/`` (#401).

@@ -11645,26 +11644,17 @@ def gitea_audit_worktree_cleanup(
    the active issue-lock branch is read from the local lock file and treated
    as active work. Deletes nothing and mutates no Gitea state.

-    Merged PRs are fetched as well, so an issue worktree can be linked to the
-    PR that owns its branch (#858). Such a worktree only becomes removable
-    when that owning PR is unambiguous and merged, the worktree head is
-    already contained in authoritative master, and nothing else protects it —
-    no open or competing PR, lease, issue lock, live session, dirty file, or
-    protected/control checkout. Anything unproven keeps it classified as
-    active issue work.
-
-    Fails closed if the live open-PR list, the merged-PR list, or the
-    control-plane lease state cannot be read: without them removability
-    cannot be proven, so no candidates are returned.
+    Fails closed if the live open-PR list cannot be fetched: without it,
+    removability cannot be proven, so no candidates are returned.

    Args:
        remote: Known instance — 'dadeschools' or 'prgs'.
        host: Override the Gitea host.
        org: Override the owner/organization.
        repo: Override the repository name.
-        ttl_hours: Age (hours) after which a clean conflict-fix worktree
-            becomes stale-removable (default from GITEA_WORKTREE_TTL_HOURS).
-        merged_pr_limit: Max closed PRs scanned for merged-PR ownership.
+        ttl_hours: Age (hours) after which a clean issue/conflict-fix
+            worktree becomes stale-removable (default from
+            GITEA_WORKTREE_TTL_HOURS).

    Returns:
        dict with per-worktree classifications, counts, removable
@@ -11700,84 +11690,22 @@ def gitea_audit_worktree_cleanup(
        if (pr.get("head") or {}).get("ref")
    }

-    # #858: merged PRs are the ownership evidence that lets a landed issue
-    # worktree stop being reported as active work. Without them the audit can
-    # never agree with the PR-scoped reconciler, so treat a fetch failure the
-    # same way an open-PR fetch failure is treated: fail closed.
-    try:
-        closed_prs = api_get_all(
-            f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls?state=closed", auth, limit=merged_pr_limit
-        )
-    except Exception as exc:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "performed": False,
-            "open_pr_state_verified": True,
-            "merged_pr_state_verified": False,
-            "reasons": [
-                "could not fetch merged PRs; worktree ownership unverified "
-                f"(fail closed): {_redact(str(exc))}"
-            ],
-        }
-    merged_prs = [pr for pr in closed_prs if (pr.get("merged") or pr.get("merged_at"))]
-    pr_index = worktree_cleanup_audit.build_pr_index(list(open_prs) + merged_prs)
-
-    # #858: the auditor already accepted lease evidence but nothing ever
-    # supplied it, so every worktree looked unleased. Removability is now
-    # reachable for issue worktrees, so authoritative control-plane leases
-    # must be readable or the audit fails closed.
-    db, lease_errs = _control_plane_db_or_error()
-    if db is None:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "performed": False,
-            "open_pr_state_verified": True,
-            "merged_pr_state_verified": True,
-            "lease_state_verified": False,
-            "reasons": [
-                "could not read control-plane leases; worktree protection "
-                "unverified (fail closed)",
-                *lease_errs,
-            ],
-        }
-    lease_result = lease_lifecycle.list_active_leases(
-        db, remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, include_non_active=False, limit=500
-    )
-    leased_issue_numbers: set[int] = set()
-    live_session_paths: set[str] = set()
-    for lease in lease_result.get("leases") or []:
-        if lease.get("work_kind") == "issue" and lease.get("work_number") is not None:
-            try:
-                leased_issue_numbers.add(int(lease["work_number"]))
-            except (TypeError, ValueError):
-                pass
-        if lease.get("worktree_path"):
-            live_session_paths.add(str(lease["worktree_path"]))
-
    active_issue_branches: set[str] = set()
    lock = merged_cleanup_reconcile.read_issue_lock(ISSUE_LOCK_FILE)
    if lock and lock.get("branch_name"):
        active_issue_branches.add(str(lock["branch_name"]).strip())

-    master_ref = f"{remote}/master" if remote in REMOTES else "origin/master"
    report = worktree_cleanup_audit.audit_branches_directory(
        _canonical_local_git_root(),
        open_pr_branches=open_pr_branches,
        active_issue_branches=active_issue_branches,
        now=datetime.now(timezone.utc),
        ttl_hours=ttl_hours,
-        pr_index=pr_index,
-        leased_issue_numbers=leased_issue_numbers,
-        live_session_paths=live_session_paths,
-        master_ref=master_ref,
    )
    return {
        "success": True,
        "performed": False,
        "open_pr_state_verified": True,
-        "merged_pr_state_verified": True,
-        "lease_state_verified": True,
-        "master_ref": master_ref,
        "task_mode": "work-issue",
        **report,
    }
@@ -335,21 +335,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
        "role": "controller",
    },

-    # #642: sanctioned host-daemon lifecycle controls. Deliberately *not* a
-    # ``gitea.*`` operation — restarting an MCP namespace is a host action, not
-    # a Gitea API call, and no configured Gitea profile should be able to
-    # satisfy it by accident. Authority comes from the console RBAC model plus
-    # out-of-band operator authorization (#630); these entries exist so the
-    # console cannot invent an authority the capability layer never declared.
-    "restart_namespace": {
-        "permission": "runtime.restart_namespace",
-        "role": "controller",
-    },
-    "reload_namespace": {
-        "permission": "runtime.reload_namespace",
-        "role": "controller",
-    },
-
    # #601 first-class lease lifecycle — inspect/list need read; mutations gate on
    # ownership in the control-plane DB (not a separate Gitea write permission).
    "list_workflow_leases": {
@@ -1,551 +0,0 @@
-"""Merged-PR awareness for the worktree cleanup audit (#858).
-
-Before #858 an ``issue_work`` worktree could never leave ``active_issue_work``:
-the audit had no PR linkage at all (``pr_number`` was structurally ``None``)
-and its only route to ``clean_stale_removable`` was a TTL derived from a
-``last_used_at`` that nothing ever populated. A merged, clean, unprotected
-worktree was therefore reported as active work forever, disagreeing with the
-PR-scoped reconciler.
-
-These tests use fabricated temporary repositories and synthetic PR records
-only. Nothing here removes a worktree or deletes a branch.
-"""
-
-import os
-import subprocess
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-import merged_cleanup_reconcile as mcr  # noqa: E402
-import worktree_cleanup_audit as wca  # noqa: E402
-
-
-MERGED_BRANCH = "feat/issue-777-timeline"
-MERGED_PATH = "/repo/branches/issue-777-timeline"
-HEAD_SHA = "a" * 40
-
-
-def _pr(number, branch, *, merged=True, sha=HEAD_SHA, state=None):
-    """Synthetic Gitea PR payload."""
-    return {
-        "number": number,
-        "head": {"ref": branch, "sha": sha},
-        "merged_at": "2026-07-24T01:00:00Z" if merged else None,
-        "state": state or ("closed" if merged else "open"),
-    }
-
-
-def _porcelain(*entries):
-    out = []
-    for path, branch, sha in entries:
-        out.append(f"worktree {path}")
-        out.append(f"HEAD {sha}")
-        if branch is None:
-            out.append("detached")
-        else:
-            out.append(f"branch refs/heads/{branch}")
-        out.append("")
-    return "\n".join(out)
-
-
-class _AuditHarness(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Runs audit_branches_directory over a fabricated worktree listing."""
-
-    PORCELAIN = _porcelain(
-        ("/repo", "master", "f" * 40),
-        (MERGED_PATH, MERGED_BRANCH, HEAD_SHA),
-    )
-
-    def run_audit(self, *, dirty_paths=(), contained=True, **kwargs):
-        def fake_dirty(path):
-            if path in dirty_paths:
-                return {"exists": True, "dirty": True, "dirty_files": [" M x.py"]}
-            return {"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []}
-
-        with patch.object(
-            wca, "list_worktrees",
-            return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(self.PORCELAIN),
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "read_worktree_dirty", side_effect=fake_dirty
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=contained
-        ):
-            report = wca.audit_branches_directory("/repo", **kwargs)
-        return {wt["path"]: wt for wt in report["worktrees"]}, report
-
-    def merged_audit(self, **kwargs):
-        kwargs.setdefault("pr_index", wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]))
-        kwargs.setdefault("master_ref", "prgs/master")
-        return self.run_audit(**kwargs)
-
-
-class TestMergedWorktreeBecomesRemovable(_AuditHarness):
-    def test_clean_merged_issue_worktree_is_linked_and_removable(self):
-        by_path, report = self.merged_audit()
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE)
-        self.assertTrue(entry["removable"])
-        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_MERGED)
-        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"], [])
-        self.assertIn(MERGED_PATH, [c["path"] for c in report["removable_candidates"]])
-
-    def test_pr_number_populated_from_authoritative_linkage(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit()
-        self.assertEqual(by_path[MERGED_PATH]["pr_number"], 849)
-
-    def test_regression_without_pr_evidence_stays_active_issue_work(self):
-        """The pre-#858 behaviour, still correct when no PR state is supplied."""
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit()
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-        self.assertIsNone(entry["pr_number"])
-
-
-class TestProtectiveSignalsSurvive(_AuditHarness):
-    def test_open_pr_worktree_is_not_removable(self):
-        index = wca.build_pr_index([_pr(900, MERGED_BRANCH, merged=False)])
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(
-            pr_index=index,
-            master_ref="prgs/master",
-            open_pr_branches={MERGED_BRANCH},
-        )
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_OPEN_PR)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-        # linkage still reports the owning PR, it just is not merge proof
-        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_OPEN)
-        self.assertEqual(entry["pr_number"], 900)
-
-    def test_dirty_tracked_worktree_is_not_removable(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(dirty_paths=(MERGED_PATH,))
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_DIRTY_LOCAL)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-        self.assertIn(
-            "worktree has uncommitted changes",
-            entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"],
-        )
-
-    def test_untracked_only_worktree_is_not_removable(self):
-        """``git status --porcelain`` reports untracked files as dirty too."""
-        def untracked(path):
-            if path == MERGED_PATH:
-                return {"exists": True, "dirty": True, "dirty_files": ["?? scratch.txt"]}
-            return {"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []}
-
-        with patch.object(
-            wca, "list_worktrees",
-            return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(self.PORCELAIN),
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "read_worktree_dirty", side_effect=untracked
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=True
-        ):
-            report = wca.audit_branches_directory(
-                "/repo",
-                pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]),
-                master_ref="prgs/master",
-            )
-        entry = {wt["path"]: wt for wt in report["worktrees"]}[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_DIRTY_LOCAL)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_active_lease_by_issue_number_is_protective(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(leased_issue_numbers={777})
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertTrue(entry["has_active_lease"])
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_active_lease_by_branch_is_protective(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(leased_branches={MERGED_BRANCH})
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertTrue(entry["has_active_lease"])
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_active_issue_lock_is_protective(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(active_issue_branches={MERGED_BRANCH})
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertTrue(entry["has_active_issue_lock"])
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_live_session_worktree_is_protective(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(live_session_paths={MERGED_PATH})
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertTrue(entry["has_live_session"])
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_head_not_contained_in_master_is_not_removable(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(contained=False)
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-        self.assertIn(
-            "worktree head is not contained in authoritative master "
-            "(unmerged commits remain)",
-            entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"],
-        )
-
-    def test_unknown_containment_fails_closed(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(contained=None)
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-        self.assertIn(
-            "containment of the worktree head in master is unknown",
-            entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"],
-        )
-
-    def test_missing_master_ref_fails_closed(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(
-            pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)])
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(by_path[MERGED_PATH]["removable"])
-
-    def test_unmerged_owning_pr_is_not_removable(self):
-        index = wca.build_pr_index([_pr(901, MERGED_BRANCH, merged=False)])
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(pr_index=index, master_ref="prgs/master")
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-        self.assertIn(
-            "owning PR #901 is not merged",
-            entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"],
-        )
-
-    def test_control_checkout_is_never_removable(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit()
-        control = by_path["/repo"]
-        self.assertTrue(control["is_protected"])
-        self.assertEqual(control["classification"], wca.CLASS_UNSAFE_UNKNOWN)
-        self.assertFalse(control["removable"])
-
-    def test_control_checkout_not_removable_even_if_linked_and_merged(self):
-        """A merged PR on the control checkout must not unlock removal."""
-        porcelain = _porcelain(("/repo", MERGED_BRANCH, HEAD_SHA))
-        with patch.object(
-            wca, "list_worktrees", return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(porcelain)
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "read_worktree_dirty",
-            return_value={"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []},
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=True
-        ):
-            report = wca.audit_branches_directory(
-                "/repo",
-                pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]),
-                master_ref="prgs/master",
-            )
-        entry = report["worktrees"][0]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_UNSAFE_UNKNOWN)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-
-class TestAmbiguousLinkageFailsClosed(_AuditHarness):
-    def test_competing_prs_on_one_branch_fail_closed(self):
-        index = wca.build_pr_index(
-            [_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH), _pr(860, MERGED_BRANCH)]
-        )
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(pr_index=index, master_ref="prgs/master")
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS)
-        self.assertIsNone(entry["pr_number"])
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_merged_plus_open_pr_on_one_branch_fails_closed(self):
-        index = wca.build_pr_index(
-            [_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH), _pr(861, MERGED_BRANCH, merged=False)]
-        )
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(pr_index=index, master_ref="prgs/master")
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_no_owning_pr_fails_closed(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(
-            pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, "feat/other-branch")]),
-            master_ref="prgs/master",
-        )
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_NONE)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_malformed_pr_records_are_dropped_not_guessed(self):
-        index = wca.build_pr_index(
-            [
-                {"number": None, "head": {"ref": MERGED_BRANCH}},
-                {"number": 5, "head": {}},
-                {"number": "not-an-int", "head": {"ref": MERGED_BRANCH}},
-            ]
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(index, {})
-        self.assertEqual(
-            wca.resolve_owning_pr(branch=MERGED_BRANCH, pr_index=index)["status"],
-            wca.LINKAGE_NONE,
-        )
-
-    def test_detached_worktree_has_no_branch_linkage(self):
-        self.assertEqual(
-            wca.resolve_owning_pr(branch=None, pr_index={})["status"],
-            wca.LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
-        )
-
-
-class TestUnrelatedClassificationsUnchanged(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Non-issue_work worktrees keep their pre-#858 classifications."""
-
-    PORCELAIN = _porcelain(
-        ("/repo", "master", "f" * 40),
-        ("/repo/branches/review-pr42", "review-pr42", "2" * 40),
-        ("/repo/branches/baseline-master-x", "baseline-master-x", "3" * 40),
-        ("/repo/branches/conflict-fix-pr50", "conflict-fix-pr50", "4" * 40),
-        ("/repo/branches/review-pr99", None, "5" * 40),
-    )
-
-    def _audit(self, **kwargs):
-        with patch.object(
-            wca, "list_worktrees",
-            return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(self.PORCELAIN),
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "read_worktree_dirty",
-            return_value={"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []},
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=True
-        ):
-            report = wca.audit_branches_directory("/repo", **kwargs)
-        return {wt["path"]: wt for wt in report["worktrees"]}
-
-    def test_classifications_identical_with_and_without_pr_evidence(self):
-        without = self._audit()
-        with_evidence = self._audit(
-            pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]),
-            master_ref="prgs/master",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            {p: e["classification"] for p, e in without.items()},
-            {p: e["classification"] for p, e in with_evidence.items()},
-        )
-
-    def test_lease_on_issue_does_not_capture_similarly_named_scratch_trees(self):
-        """A lease on issue 777 protects issue work, not baseline/review trees."""
-        porcelain = _porcelain(
-            ("/repo/branches/baseline-master-issue-777", "baseline-issue-777", "7" * 40),
-            ("/repo/branches/issue-777-timeline", MERGED_BRANCH, HEAD_SHA),
-        )
-        with patch.object(
-            wca, "list_worktrees", return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(porcelain)
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "read_worktree_dirty",
-            return_value={"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []},
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=True
-        ):
-            report = wca.audit_branches_directory(
-                "/repo",
-                pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]),
-                master_ref="prgs/master",
-                leased_issue_numbers={777},
-            )
-        by_path = {wt["path"]: wt for wt in report["worktrees"]}
-
-        baseline = by_path["/repo/branches/baseline-master-issue-777"]
-        self.assertFalse(baseline["has_active_lease"])
-        self.assertEqual(baseline["classification"], wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE)
-
-        issue_work = by_path["/repo/branches/issue-777-timeline"]
-        self.assertTrue(issue_work["has_active_lease"])
-        self.assertFalse(issue_work["removable"])
-
-    def test_review_and_baseline_still_removable(self):
-        by_path = self._audit(
-            pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([]), master_ref="prgs/master"
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            by_path["/repo/branches/review-pr42"]["classification"],
-            wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            by_path["/repo/branches/baseline-master-x"]["classification"],
-            wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            by_path["/repo/branches/review-pr99"]["classification"],
-            wca.CLASS_DETACHED_REVIEW_LEFTOVER,
-        )
-
-    def test_conflict_fix_ttl_behaviour_unchanged(self):
-        """conflict_fix still needs only TTL expiry; #858 did not touch it."""
-        self.assertEqual(
-            wca.classify_worktree(
-                workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_CONFLICT_FIX,
-                is_dirty=False,
-                ttl_expired=True,
-            ),
-            wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            wca.classify_worktree(
-                workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_CONFLICT_FIX,
-                is_dirty=False,
-                ttl_expired=False,
-            ),
-            wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK,
-        )
-
-    def test_issue_work_ttl_alone_no_longer_grants_removal(self):
-        """Age is not landing proof: TTL alone must not reclaim issue work."""
-        self.assertEqual(
-            wca.classify_worktree(
-                workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK,
-                is_dirty=False,
-                ttl_expired=True,
-            ),
-            wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK,
-        )
-
-
-class TestAssessorPerformsNoDeletion(_AuditHarness):
-    def test_audit_never_removes_a_worktree(self):
-        with patch.object(wca, "remove_worktree") as removal:
-            self.merged_audit()
-        removal.assert_not_called()
-
-    def test_audit_shells_out_to_no_destructive_git_command(self):
-        seen = []
-        real_run = subprocess.run
-
-        def recording_run(cmd, *args, **kwargs):
-            seen.append(cmd)
-            return real_run(["true"], *args, **kwargs)
-
-        with patch.object(subprocess, "run", side_effect=recording_run):
-            wca.audit_branches_directory("/nonexistent-repo-for-audit")
-
-        joined = [" ".join(c) if isinstance(c, list) else str(c) for c in seen]
-        for cmd in joined:
-            self.assertNotIn("worktree remove", cmd)
-            self.assertNotIn("branch -D", cmd)
-            self.assertNotIn("push", cmd)
-
-
-class TestAgreementWithPrScopedReconciler(unittest.TestCase):
-    """The audit and merged_cleanup_reconcile must agree on identical input.
-
-    Uses a real throwaway git repository so containment is computed by git
-    rather than asserted. Nothing outside the temporary directory is touched.
-    """
-
-    def _git(self, *args):
-        subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "-C", self.root, *args],
-            check=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            text=True,
-        )
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.root = os.path.realpath(self._tmp.name)
-        self._git("init", "-b", "master", ".")
-        self._git("config", "user.email", "[email protected]")
-        self._git("config", "user.name", "Test")
-        with open(os.path.join(self.root, "seed.txt"), "w") as fh:
-            fh.write("seed\n")
-        self._git("add", "seed.txt")
-        self._git("commit", "-m", "seed")
-
-        self.branch = "feat/issue-777-timeline"
-        self._git("checkout", "-b", self.branch)
-        with open(os.path.join(self.root, "feature.txt"), "w") as fh:
-            fh.write("feature\n")
-        self._git("add", "feature.txt")
-        self._git("commit", "-m", "feature")
-        self.head_sha = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "-C", self.root, "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
-            capture_output=True, text=True, check=True,
-        ).stdout.strip()
-        self._git("checkout", "master")
-        self._git("merge", "--no-ff", "-m", "merge feature", self.branch)
-
-        self.worktree = os.path.join(self.root, "branches", "issue-777-timeline")
-        self._git("worktree", "add", self.worktree, self.branch)
-
-    def tearDown(self):
-        self._tmp.cleanup()
-
-    def _pr_index(self):
-        return wca.build_pr_index(
-            [
-                {
-                    "number": 849,
-                    "head": {"ref": self.branch, "sha": self.head_sha},
-                    "merged_at": "2026-07-24T01:00:00Z",
-                }
-            ]
-        )
-
-    def _audit_entry(self):
-        report = wca.audit_branches_directory(
-            self.root, pr_index=self._pr_index(), master_ref="master"
-        )
-        return next(wt for wt in report["worktrees"] if wt["path"] == self.worktree)
-
-    def _reconciler_entry(self):
-        return mcr.assess_local_worktree_cleanup(
-            pr_number=849,
-            head_branch=self.branch,
-            merged=True,
-            worktree_state=mcr.resolve_cleanup_worktree_state(
-                project_root=self.root,
-                head_branch=self.branch,
-                issue_number=777,
-                pr_head_sha=self.head_sha,
-                target_ref="master",
-            ),
-            active_lock=False,
-        )
-
-    def test_both_assessors_agree_the_worktree_is_safe(self):
-        audit_entry = self._audit_entry()
-        reconciler = self._reconciler_entry()
-
-        self.assertTrue(reconciler["safe_to_remove_worktree"], reconciler)
-        self.assertTrue(audit_entry["removable"], audit_entry)
-        self.assertEqual(audit_entry["pr_number"], reconciler["pr_number"])
-        self.assertEqual(audit_entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"], [])
-        self.assertEqual(reconciler["block_reasons"], [])
-
-    def test_both_assessors_agree_a_dirty_worktree_is_unsafe(self):
-        with open(os.path.join(self.worktree, "feature.txt"), "a") as fh:
-            fh.write("local edit\n")
-
-        audit_entry = self._audit_entry()
-        reconciler = self._reconciler_entry()
-
-        self.assertFalse(audit_entry["removable"])
-        self.assertFalse(reconciler["safe_to_remove_worktree"])
-
-    def test_worktree_still_present_after_audit(self):
-        self._audit_entry()
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(self.worktree))
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+"""Documentation acceptance for the MCP restart governance ADR (#656).
+
+Enforces issue #656 acceptance criteria:
+
+* AC1 — policy document exists with an authorization matrix and the recorded
+  v1 decision (controller approval + automated safety gates).
+* AC2 — restart is stated as a last resort with enumerated narrower recoveries.
+* AC3 — a unilateral LLM full restart with affected sessions is forbidden.
+* AC4 — break-glass conditions are listed.
+* AC5 — the ADR is linked to #655, #652, #653, #630, #642, and is cross-linked
+  from the safety model and the web-console deployment boundary docs.
+"""
+from pathlib import Path
+
+REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+ADR = REPO_ROOT / "docs" / "architecture" / "mcp-restart-governance.md"
+ADR_BASENAME = "mcp-restart-governance.md"
+
+CROSS_LINK_DOCS = (
+    REPO_ROOT / "docs" / "safety-model.md",
+    REPO_ROOT / "docs" / "webui-deployment.md",
+)
+
+LINKED_ISSUES = ("#655", "#652", "#653", "#630", "#642")
+POLICY_IDS = ("RG-01", "RG-02", "RG-03", "RG-04", "RG-05", "RG-06", "RG-07", "RG-08")
+
+
+def _read(path: Path) -> str:
+    assert path.is_file(), f"missing {path.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)}"
+    return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def test_ac1_adr_exists_with_matrix_and_v1_decision():
+    text = _read(ADR)
+    lower = text.lower()
+    assert text.lstrip().startswith("#"), "ADR lacks a title"
+    assert "#656" in text
+    assert "authorization matrix" in lower
+    # The matrix is a real table with the worker and privileged roles.
+    for role in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller",
+                 "operator", "admin"):
+        assert role in lower, f"authorization matrix missing role {role!r}"
+    # Recorded v1 decision.
+    assert "restart-governance/v1" in text
+    assert "controller approval" in lower and "automated safety gates" in lower
+
+
+def test_ac2_restart_is_last_resort_with_narrower_recoveries():
+    text = _read(ADR)
+    lower = text.lower()
+    assert "last resort" in lower
+    # Enumerated narrower recoveries precede full restart on the ladder.
+    for rung in ("reconnect", "rebind", "scoped restart", "full restart",
+                 "host"):
+        assert rung in lower, f"recovery ladder missing rung {rung!r}"
+
+
+def test_ac3_forbids_unilateral_llm_full_restart_with_affected_sessions():
+    text = _read(ADR)
+    lower = text.lower()
+    assert "forbidden" in lower
+    assert "llm" in lower and "restart" in lower
+    assert "unilateral" in lower
+    # A worker role must not perform or authorize full/host restart.
+    assert "must not" in lower
+
+
+def test_ac4_break_glass_conditions_listed():
+    text = _read(ADR)
+    lower = text.lower()
+    assert "break-glass" in lower
+    assert "incident" in lower
+    assert "audit" in lower
+
+
+def test_ac5_adr_links_issue_lineage():
+    text = _read(ADR)
+    for issue in LINKED_ISSUES:
+        assert issue in text, f"ADR must link issue {issue}"
+
+
+def test_ac5_safety_model_and_deployment_cross_link_adr():
+    for path in CROSS_LINK_DOCS:
+        text = _read(path)
+        assert ADR_BASENAME in text, (
+            f"{path.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)} must cross-link {ADR_BASENAME} "
+            f"(issue #656 acceptance criterion 5)"
+        )
+
+
+def test_policy_ids_present_for_enforcement_code():
+    text = _read(ADR)
+    for pid in POLICY_IDS:
+        assert pid in text, f"policy id {pid} missing from ADR"
+
+
+def test_failure_behavior_denies_on_ambiguity():
+    text = _read(ADR)
+    lower = text.lower()
+    assert "ambiguous" in lower and "deny" in lower
+
+
+def test_cross_links_do_not_embed_secrets():
+    for path in (ADR,) + CROSS_LINK_DOCS:
+        text = _read(path)
+        for marker in ("ghp_", "BEGIN PRIVATE KEY", "Authorization: Bearer"):
+            assert marker not in text, f"{path} contains {marker!r}"
@@ -1,502 +0,0 @@
-"""Sanctioned restart / graceful reload control tests (#642).
-
-Acceptance criteria under test:
-
-1. The sanctioned restart path is implemented behind gates (capability,
-   confirmation, operator authorization, host hook).
-2. Manual ``pkill`` stays forbidden and is classified as contamination.
-3. Post-restart mutations require clean health/session proof.
-4. Authorized restart preview, unauthorized deny, contamination classification.
-5. No entry point exposes a raw kill.
-"""
-
-import json
-import os
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-
-import mcp_namespace_health
-import runtime_recovery_guard
-from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP
-from webui import console_audit, console_authz, gated_actions, sanctioned_restart
-
-NAMESPACE = "gitea-author"
-
-# An operator-authorized, hook-configured host. Passed explicitly so no test
-# depends on (or mutates) the real process environment.
-READY_ENV = {
-    sanctioned_restart.RESTART_HOOK_ENV: "launchd:cc.prgs.gitea-author",
-    runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV: "ops-ticket-4821",
-}
-
-
-def admin(subject: str = "[email protected]") -> console_authz.Principal:
-    return console_authz.Principal(
-        subject=subject,
-        role=console_authz.ADMIN,
-        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
-        authenticated=True,
-    )
-
-
-def viewer() -> console_authz.Principal:
-    return console_authz.Principal(
-        subject="[email protected]",
-        role=console_authz.VIEWER,
-        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
-        authenticated=True,
-    )
-
-
-class TestCapabilityWiring(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC1: authority is declared, not invented by the console."""
-
-    def test_actions_resolve_through_the_capability_map(self):
-        for action_id in (
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
-                self.assertIsNotNone(action)
-                self.assertIn(action.task_key, TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP)
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    action.mcp_permission,
-                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["permission"],
-                )
-
-    def test_restart_permission_is_not_a_gitea_operation(self):
-        """No configured Gitea profile should satisfy a host restart."""
-        permission = TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP["restart_namespace"]["permission"]
-        self.assertFalse(permission.startswith("gitea."))
-
-    def test_restart_is_destructive_dual_control_break_glass(self):
-        action = console_authz.get_action(
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(action.action_class, console_authz.CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE)
-        self.assertEqual(action.minimum_role, console_authz.ADMIN)
-        self.assertTrue(action.dual_control)
-        self.assertTrue(action.break_glass)
-        self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
-
-    def test_reload_is_privileged_but_not_destructive(self):
-        action = console_authz.get_action(
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(action.action_class, console_authz.CLASS_PRIVILEGED)
-        self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
-
-
-class TestPreview(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC4: an authorized preview renders the plan without executing it."""
-
-    def test_preview_lists_the_mutation_ledger(self):
-        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
-            NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
-        )
-        steps = [entry["step"] for entry in preview["mutation_ledger"]]
-        self.assertEqual(
-            steps, ["quiesce", "host_restart_hook", "health_recheck", "audit"]
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(preview["scope_valid"])
-        self.assertTrue(preview["post_restart_verification_required"])
-
-    def test_reload_preview_drains_instead_of_restarting(self):
-        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
-            NAMESPACE, sanctioned_restart.MODE_RELOAD,
-            principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV,
-        )
-        steps = [entry["step"] for entry in preview["mutation_ledger"]]
-        self.assertIn("host_graceful_reload", steps)
-        self.assertNotIn("host_restart_hook", steps)
-
-    def test_preview_never_enables_execution(self):
-        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
-            NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(preview["execution_enabled"])
-        self.assertFalse(preview["authorization"]["execution_enabled"])
-
-    def test_confirmation_phrase_binds_the_namespace(self):
-        self.assertTrue(
-            sanctioned_restart.confirmation_matches(
-                NAMESPACE, sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART,
-                "restart gitea-author",
-            )
-        )
-        # A phrase typed for one namespace must not authorize another.
-        self.assertFalse(
-            sanctioned_restart.confirmation_matches(
-                "gitea-merger", sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART,
-                "restart gitea-author",
-            )
-        )
-
-
-class TestGates(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC1/AC4: every gate denies with a stable reason code."""
-
-    def _assess(self, **kwargs):
-        params = {
-            "principal": admin(),
-            "confirmation": f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
-            "env": READY_ENV,
-        }
-        params.update(kwargs)
-        namespace = params.pop("namespace", NAMESPACE)
-        mode = params.pop("mode", sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART)
-        return sanctioned_restart.assess_restart_request(
-            namespace, mode, **params
-        )
-
-    def test_authorized_confirmed_request_passes_every_gate(self):
-        result = self._assess()
-        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED
-        )
-
-    def test_passing_every_gate_is_not_an_execution_grant(self):
-        """An allowed request still never lets the console touch the process."""
-        result = self._assess()
-        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["execution_enabled"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["console_executes"])
-
-    def test_unauthorized_principal_is_denied(self):
-        result = self._assess(principal=viewer())
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
-        )
-
-    def test_anonymous_principal_is_denied(self):
-        result = self._assess(principal=None)
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
-        )
-
-    def test_missing_confirmation_is_denied(self):
-        result = self._assess(confirmation=None)
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING
-        )
-
-    def test_confirmation_for_another_namespace_is_denied(self):
-        result = self._assess(confirmation="restart gitea-merger")
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH
-        )
-
-    def test_missing_operator_authorization_is_denied(self):
-        env = {sanctioned_restart.RESTART_HOOK_ENV: "launchd:cc.prgs.author"}
-        result = self._assess(env=env)
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"],
-            sanctioned_restart.DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION,
-        )
-
-    def test_missing_host_hook_is_denied_without_kill_fallback(self):
-        env = {
-            runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV: "ops-ticket-1",
-        }
-        result = self._assess(env=env)
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED
-        )
-
-    def test_fleet_scope_is_refused(self):
-        for scope in ("all", "*", "fleet"):
-            with self.subTest(scope=scope):
-                result = self._assess(
-                    namespace=scope, confirmation=f"restart {scope}"
-                )
-                self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_FLEET_SCOPE
-                )
-
-    def test_unknown_namespace_is_refused(self):
-        result = self._assess(
-            namespace="gitea-nope", confirmation="restart gitea-nope"
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE
-        )
-
-    def test_unknown_mode_is_refused(self):
-        result = self._assess(mode="obliterate")
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE
-        )
-
-    def test_live_contamination_marker_blocks_restart(self):
-        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
-            reason_class=runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL,
-            command_redacted="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
-        )
-        result = self._assess(contamination_marker=marker)
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME
-        )
-
-    def test_reconciler_cleared_marker_no_longer_blocks(self):
-        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
-            reason_class=runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL,
-            command_redacted="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
-        )
-        marker = dict(marker, cleared_by_reconciler=True)
-        result = self._assess(contamination_marker=marker)
-        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
-
-
-class TestExecutionNeverKills(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC5: no path exposes or runs a raw process kill."""
-
-    def test_authorized_execution_defers_to_the_host_supervisor(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
-            NAMESPACE,
-            principal=admin(),
-            confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
-            env=READY_ENV,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["process_kill_executed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["outcome"], sanctioned_restart.ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED
-        )
-
-    def test_denied_execution_reports_the_refusing_gate(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
-            NAMESPACE, principal=viewer(), confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
-            env=READY_ENV,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["outcome"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["process_kill_executed"])
-
-    def test_module_never_spawns_a_process(self):
-        path = os.path.join(
-            os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))),
-            "webui", "sanctioned_restart.py",
-        )
-        with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-            source = handle.read()
-        for forbidden in (
-            "import subprocess", "import signal", "os.kill", "os.system",
-            "popen",
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(forbidden=forbidden):
-                self.assertNotIn(forbidden, source.lower())
-
-    def test_no_surface_returns_a_kill_command(self):
-        payloads = [
-            sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
-                NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
-            ),
-            sanctioned_restart.restart_policy(),
-            sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
-                NAMESPACE, principal=admin(),
-                confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}", env=READY_ENV,
-            ),
-        ]
-        for payload in payloads:
-            rendered = json.dumps(payload, default=str).lower()
-            self.assertNotIn("kill -9", rendered)
-            self.assertNotIn("pkill -f", rendered)
-
-    def test_policy_declares_no_raw_kill_and_no_silent_restart(self):
-        policy = sanctioned_restart.restart_policy()
-        self.assertFalse(policy["raw_kill_exposed"])
-        self.assertFalse(policy["console_executes_process_kill"])
-        self.assertFalse(policy["fleet_scope_permitted"])
-        self.assertFalse(policy["silent_auto_restart_permitted"])
-        self.assertTrue(policy["audit_required"])
-
-
-class TestContaminationClassification(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC2: manual pkill is contamination, and it blocks clean claims."""
-
-    def test_manual_daemon_pkill_is_contamination(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(
-            "pkill -f mcp_server.py"
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result["contamination"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-        self.assertIsNotNone(result["contamination_marker"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["sanctioned_alternative"],
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
-        )
-
-    def test_broad_process_kill_is_contamination(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command("killall -9 Python")
-        self.assertTrue(result["contamination"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-
-    def test_marker_names_the_sanctioned_alternative(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(
-            "pkill -f mcp_server.py"
-        )
-        marker = result["contamination_marker"]
-        self.assertIn(
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, marker["detail"]
-        )
-
-    def test_benign_command_is_not_contamination(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command("git status")
-        self.assertFalse(result["contamination"])
-        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-
-    def test_no_command_is_not_contamination(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(None)
-        self.assertFalse(result["contamination"])
-        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-
-
-class TestPostRestartHealth(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC3: a clean post-restart claim needs live client-namespace proof."""
-
-    def test_live_client_probe_clears_the_session(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
-            NAMESPACE,
-            probe_result={"success": True},
-            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT,
-            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
-            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(result["status"], sanctioned_restart.HEALTH_CLEAN)
-        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-        self.assertTrue(result["mutations_allowed"])
-
-    def test_offline_probe_does_not_clear_the_session(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
-            NAMESPACE,
-            probe_result={"success": True},
-            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_OFFLINE,
-            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
-            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["mutations_allowed"])
-
-    def test_failed_probe_is_unhealthy(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
-            NAMESPACE,
-            probe_result={"success": False, "error": "client is closing: EOF"},
-            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT,
-            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
-            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(result["status"], sanctioned_restart.HEALTH_UNHEALTHY)
-        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-
-    def test_static_registration_alone_never_clears_the_session(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
-            NAMESPACE,
-            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
-            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-
-
-class TestAuditEmission(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Every restart attempt is audited with actor, target, and result."""
-
-    def _run(self, principal, sink):
-        prior = os.environ.get(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV)
-        os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = sink
-        try:
-            return sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
-                NAMESPACE,
-                principal=principal,
-                confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
-                env=READY_ENV,
-                request_id="req-642",
-            )
-        finally:
-            if prior is None:
-                os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
-            else:
-                os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = prior
-
-    def test_allowed_attempt_is_written_with_actor_and_target(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "audit.jsonl")
-            result = self._run(admin(), sink)
-            self.assertTrue(result["audit"]["written"])
-            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
-        self.assertEqual(
-            record["action"], sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(record["target"]["namespace"], NAMESPACE)
-        self.assertEqual(record["target"]["mode"], "restart")
-        self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED)
-        self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["subject"], "[email protected]")
-        self.assertFalse(record["metadata"]["process_kill_executed"])
-
-    def test_denied_attempt_is_audited_too(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "audit.jsonl")
-            self._run(viewer(), sink)
-            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
-        self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_DENIED)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            record["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
-        )
-
-    def test_restart_audit_uses_break_glass_retention(self):
-        action = console_authz.get_action(
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.retention_class_for(action),
-            console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS,
-        )
-
-
-class TestRegistrySurface(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC5: the console surfaces the control, still disabled, with no kill."""
-
-    def test_registry_exposes_both_actions_disabled(self):
-        registry = gated_actions.load_action_registry()
-        for action_id in (
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                action = registry.get(action_id)
-                self.assertIsNotNone(action)
-                self.assertFalse(action.enabled)
-
-    def test_registry_preview_names_the_namespace_target(self):
-        preview = gated_actions.preview_action(
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, namespace=NAMESPACE
-        )
-        target = preview["mutation_ledger"][0]["target"]
-        self.assertIn(NAMESPACE, target)
-        self.assertFalse(preview["enabled"])
-
-    def test_registry_attempt_fails_closed(self):
-        result = gated_actions.attempt_action(
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, namespace=NAMESPACE
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()
@@ -134,35 +134,13 @@ class TestClassification(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertEqual(cls, wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_OPEN_PR)
        self.assertFalse(wca.is_removable(cls))

-    def test_stale_clean_issue_worktree_needs_merged_pr_proof(self):
-        # Scenario 5 (#858): age is not proof that the branch landed, so a
-        # TTL-expired issue worktree stays active work. Only authoritative
-        # merged-PR evidence makes it removable, which is what keeps a
-        # worktree holding unmerged commits from being reclaimed by age.
+    def test_stale_clean_issue_worktree_removable(self):
+        # Scenario 5: clean issue worktree, TTL expired, no lock -> removable.
        cls = wca.classify_worktree(
            workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK,
            is_dirty=False,
            ttl_expired=True,
        )
-        self.assertEqual(cls, wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(wca.is_removable(cls))
-
-        cls = wca.classify_worktree(
-            workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK,
-            is_dirty=False,
-            ttl_expired=True,
-            merged_pr_cleanup={"proven": True},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(cls, wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE)
-        self.assertTrue(wca.is_removable(cls))
-
-    def test_stale_clean_conflict_fix_worktree_removable(self):
-        # conflict_fix keeps the original TTL rule; #858 changed issue work only.
-        cls = wca.classify_worktree(
-            workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_CONFLICT_FIX,
-            is_dirty=False,
-            ttl_expired=True,
-        )
        self.assertEqual(cls, wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE)
        self.assertTrue(wca.is_removable(cls))

@@ -236,34 +236,6 @@ _ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
        phase=3,
        summary="Remove a remote feature branch.",
    ),
-    # #642: sanctioned daemon lifecycle. These exist so operators have an
-    # audited path off `pkill -f mcp_server.py` (#630). Restart drops every
-    # in-flight request on a namespace, so it carries the same dual-control and
-    # break-glass weight as a merge; reload drains first and is privileged but
-    # not destructive. Neither ever exposes a raw kill: execution is handed to
-    # a host supervisor by ``webui.sanctioned_restart``.
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="system.reload_namespace",
-        task_key="reload_namespace",
-        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
-        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Gracefully reload one MCP namespace via the host supervisor.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="system.restart_namespace",
-        task_key="restart_namespace",
-        action_class=CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE,
-        minimum_role=ADMIN,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=True,
-        break_glass=True,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Restart one MCP namespace via the host supervisor.",
-    ),
 )

 ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}
@@ -110,8 +110,6 @@ def _format_target(action_id: str, params: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
        )
    if action_id == "create_issue":
        return f"issue {params.get('title', '?')!r}"
-    if action_id in {"system.restart_namespace", "system.reload_namespace"}:
-        return f"MCP namespace {params.get('namespace', '?')!r}"
    return "unspecified"


@@ -167,17 +165,6 @@ def build_action_registry() -> ActionRegistry:
         "gitea_create_issue_comment", "Post a PR review thread comment."),
        ("close_pr", "Close PR", "close_pr", "gitea_edit_pr",
         "Close a pull request without merge."),
-        # #642: the sanctioned replacement for the forbidden manual daemon-kill
-        # recovery path (#630). The "tool" is a host supervisor hook, not an MCP
-        # call — the console never signals a process. Preview and gating live in
-        # ``webui.sanctioned_restart``; these stay disabled like every other
-        # registry entry.
-        ("system.reload_namespace", "Reload MCP namespace", "reload_namespace",
-         "host.supervisor_reload",
-         "Gracefully reload one MCP namespace via the host supervisor."),
-        ("system.restart_namespace", "Restart MCP namespace",
-         "restart_namespace", "host.supervisor_restart",
-         "Restart one MCP namespace via the host supervisor."),
    )
    actions = tuple(
        GatedAction(
@@ -1,613 +0,0 @@
-"""Sanctioned MCP restart and graceful reload controls (#642, Phase 2).
-
-Sessions have historically recovered MCP connectivity by killing the host
-daemon (``pkill -f mcp_server.py``, #630). That path stays forbidden: it kills
-every namespace on the host, contaminates the surviving session, and leaves no
-audit trail. This module is the sanctioned replacement.
-
-A restart is modelled as a *gated action*, never as a command:
-
-1. **Capability** — the console action resolves through ``console_authz``
-   against ``task_capability_map``, so the console cannot invent an authority
-   the MCP layer does not already define.
-2. **Preview** — :func:`build_restart_preview` renders a mutation ledger and
-   the exact confirmation phrase. It never returns a shell command.
-3. **Confirmation** — the operator echoes a phrase naming the exact namespace
-   and mode. A phrase for one namespace never authorizes another.
-4. **Operator authorization** — host daemon maintenance is authorized out of
-   band through the environment (#630, and #710 finding F1: a worker session
-   cannot set an env var for an already-running daemon, so this cannot be
-   self-asserted the way a tool argument could).
-5. **Execution** — :func:`execute_restart` never spawns a process. Once every
-   gate passes it hands the request to the configured host-managed restart
-   hook; with no hook configured it fails closed.
-6. **Health recheck** — :func:`verify_post_restart_health` requires live
-   client-namespace probe evidence before any post-restart clean claim.
-
-Manual ``pkill`` remains forbidden and is classified as contamination by
-:func:`classify_restart_command`, which blocks clean claims (#630 AC3).
-
-This module performs no I/O beyond reading its own environment configuration,
-imports no MCP client, and holds no credential.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
-from typing import Any
-
-import mcp_namespace_health
-import runtime_recovery_guard
-from webui import console_audit, console_authz
-
-# --- Operations -------------------------------------------------------------
-
-MODE_RESTART = "restart"
-MODE_RELOAD = "reload"
-MODES: tuple[str, ...] = (MODE_RESTART, MODE_RELOAD)
-
-ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE = "system.restart_namespace"
-ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE = "system.reload_namespace"
-
-ACTION_FOR_MODE: dict[str, str] = {
-    MODE_RESTART: ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
-    MODE_RELOAD: ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
-}
-
-# Namespaces the console may target. An unlisted name fails closed rather than
-# being passed through to a host hook.
-KNOWN_NAMESPACES: tuple[str, ...] = tuple(
-    sorted(
-        set(mcp_namespace_health.DEFAULT_NAMESPACES)
-        | {"gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger",
-           "gitea-reconciler", "gitea-controller"}
-    )
-)
-
-# Scope tokens that would mean "everything at once". Explicit non-goal: the
-# console never offers a fleet-wide restart, because that is the blast radius
-# `pkill -f mcp_server.py` already had.
-_FLEET_TOKENS = frozenset({"*", "all", "fleet", "any", ""})
-
-# --- Environment configuration ----------------------------------------------
-# Read server-side only; the value is an opaque host hook reference (e.g. a
-# launchd label), never a command line, and is never rendered to a client.
-RESTART_HOOK_ENV = "GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK"
-
-# --- Reason codes -----------------------------------------------------------
-
-DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE = "unknown_mode"
-DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE = "unknown_namespace"
-DENY_FLEET_SCOPE = "fleet_scope_not_permitted"
-DENY_UNAUTHORIZED = "unauthorized"
-DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING = "confirmation_required"
-DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH = "confirmation_mismatch"
-DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION = "operator_authorization_missing"
-DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED = "restart_hook_not_configured"
-DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME = "contaminated_runtime"
-
-ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED = "host_action_required"
-
-# Post-restart verification outcomes.
-HEALTH_CLEAN = "clean"
-HEALTH_UNPROVEN = "unproven"
-HEALTH_UNHEALTHY = "unhealthy"
-
-
-def _clean(value: Any) -> str:
-    return str(value or "").strip()
-
-
-# --- Mutation ledger --------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class RestartLedgerEntry:
-    """One planned step, shown before anything is asked of the host."""
-
-    sequence: int
-    step: str
-    summary: str
-    executes_process_kill: bool = False
-
-
-def _mutation_ledger(namespace: str, mode: str) -> tuple[RestartLedgerEntry, ...]:
-    if mode == MODE_RELOAD:
-        middle = RestartLedgerEntry(
-            sequence=2,
-            step="host_graceful_reload",
-            summary=(
-                f"Ask the configured host supervisor to reload {namespace} "
-                "in place, draining in-flight requests. The console does not "
-                "signal the process itself."
-            ),
-        )
-    else:
-        middle = RestartLedgerEntry(
-            sequence=2,
-            step="host_restart_hook",
-            summary=(
-                f"Ask the configured host supervisor to restart {namespace}. "
-                "The console never sends a signal and never runs a kill."
-            ),
-        )
-    return (
-        RestartLedgerEntry(
-            sequence=1,
-            step="quiesce",
-            summary=(
-                f"Stop admitting new gated mutations for {namespace} and "
-                "record the intent before anything restarts."
-            ),
-        ),
-        middle,
-        RestartLedgerEntry(
-            sequence=3,
-            step="health_recheck",
-            summary=(
-                f"Re-probe {namespace} through the live client namespace and "
-                "prove the required tool is callable again."
-            ),
-        ),
-        RestartLedgerEntry(
-            sequence=4,
-            step="audit",
-            summary=(
-                "Append actor, target namespace, mode, and result to the "
-                "console audit log."
-            ),
-        ),
-    )
-
-
-# --- Confirmation -----------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def confirmation_phrase(namespace: str, mode: str) -> str:
-    """Exact phrase an operator must echo, naming the namespace and mode.
-
-    Binding the namespace into the phrase is the point: a confirmation typed
-    for ``gitea-author`` cannot be replayed against ``gitea-merger``.
-    """
-    return f"{_clean(mode)} {_clean(namespace)}"
-
-
-def confirmation_matches(
-    namespace: str, mode: str, confirmation: str | None
-) -> bool:
-    """Compare *confirmation* to the required phrase (exact, whitespace-trimmed)."""
-    return _clean(confirmation) == confirmation_phrase(namespace, mode)
-
-
-# --- Scope validation -------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def _validate_scope(namespace: str, mode: str) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
-    """Return ``(reason_code, detail)`` when the scope is refused."""
-    ns = _clean(namespace)
-    md = _clean(mode)
-
-    if md not in MODES:
-        return (
-            DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE,
-            f"Mode {md!r} is not one of {', '.join(MODES)}.",
-        )
-    if ns.lower() in _FLEET_TOKENS:
-        return (
-            DENY_FLEET_SCOPE,
-            (
-                "Fleet-wide restart is an explicit non-goal: it reproduces the "
-                "blast radius of `pkill -f mcp_server.py` (#630). Restart one "
-                "namespace at a time."
-            ),
-        )
-    if ns not in KNOWN_NAMESPACES:
-        return (
-            DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE,
-            f"Namespace {ns!r} is not a known MCP namespace.",
-        )
-    return None
-
-
-# --- Host hook --------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def restart_hook(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Report the configured host-managed restart hook.
-
-    The hook is a reference the *host* resolves (a supervisor label), not a
-    command this process runs. ``configured=False`` fails restart closed.
-    """
-    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
-    reference = _clean(source.get(RESTART_HOOK_ENV))
-    return {
-        "configured": bool(reference),
-        "reference": reference or None,
-        "source": RESTART_HOOK_ENV if reference else None,
-        "self_assertable": False,
-        "console_executes_process": False,
-    }
-
-
-# --- Preview ----------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def build_restart_preview(
-    namespace: str,
-    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
-    *,
-    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
-    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Render the dry-run preview for a restart/reload request.
-
-    Read-only: no authorization is granted, no host is contacted, and the
-    result never contains a shell command.
-    """
-    ns = _clean(namespace)
-    md = _clean(mode)
-    action_id = ACTION_FOR_MODE.get(md, ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE)
-    action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
-    decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id, principal)
-    scope_error = _validate_scope(ns, md)
-    hook = restart_hook(env)
-    operator = runtime_recovery_guard.operator_authorization(env)
-
-    return {
-        "action_id": action_id,
-        "namespace": ns,
-        "mode": md,
-        "scope_valid": scope_error is None,
-        "scope_reason_code": scope_error[0] if scope_error else None,
-        "scope_detail": scope_error[1] if scope_error else None,
-        "required_role": action.minimum_role if action else None,
-        "required_permission": action.mcp_permission if action else None,
-        "action_class": action.action_class if action else None,
-        "dual_control": action.dual_control if action else True,
-        "break_glass": action.break_glass if action else True,
-        "requires_confirmation": True,
-        "confirmation_phrase": confirmation_phrase(ns, md),
-        "mutation_ledger": [asdict(entry) for entry in _mutation_ledger(ns, md)],
-        "authorization": decision.to_dict(),
-        "operator_authorization": operator,
-        "restart_hook": hook,
-        "execution_enabled": False,
-        "raw_process_kill_exposed": False,
-        "known_namespaces": list(KNOWN_NAMESPACES),
-        "post_restart_verification_required": True,
-    }
-
-
-# --- Gate -------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def assess_restart_request(
-    namespace: str,
-    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
-    *,
-    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
-    confirmation: str | None = None,
-    contamination_marker: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Decide whether a restart request may proceed to the host hook.
-
-    Every gate must pass. The first failure wins and is reported with a stable
-    reason code; a pass never means "restarted", only "may be handed to the
-    configured host hook".
-    """
-    ns = _clean(namespace)
-    md = _clean(mode)
-    action_id = ACTION_FOR_MODE.get(md, ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE)
-    preview = build_restart_preview(ns, md, principal=principal, env=env)
-
-    def refuse(reason_code: str, detail: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "allowed": False,
-            "gates_passed": False,
-            "reason_code": reason_code,
-            "detail": detail,
-            "action_id": action_id,
-            "namespace": ns,
-            "mode": md,
-            "preview": preview,
-            "execution_enabled": False,
-        }
-
-    scope_error = _validate_scope(ns, md)
-    if scope_error is not None:
-        return refuse(*scope_error)
-
-    # Authority is checked as an authorization decision, not an execution
-    # grant. ``for_execution=True`` asks "may the console perform this write?",
-    # and the answer here is permanently no: step 2 of the ledger is a request
-    # to the host supervisor, so the console's Phase 2 execution gate is not
-    # the relevant gate. Every branch below keeps ``execution_enabled`` False
-    # and :func:`execute_restart` never touches a process.
-    decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id, principal)
-    if not decision.allowed:
-        return refuse(DENY_UNAUTHORIZED, decision.detail)
-
-    if not _clean(confirmation):
-        return refuse(
-            DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING,
-            (
-                "Type the confirmation phrase "
-                f"{preview['confirmation_phrase']!r} to proceed."
-            ),
-        )
-    if not confirmation_matches(ns, md, confirmation):
-        return refuse(
-            DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH,
-            (
-                "Confirmation does not name this namespace and mode; expected "
-                f"{preview['confirmation_phrase']!r}."
-            ),
-        )
-
-    operator = preview["operator_authorization"]
-    if not operator["authorized"]:
-        return refuse(
-            DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION,
-            (
-                "Host daemon maintenance requires out-of-band operator "
-                "authorization via "
-                f"{runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV}."
-            ),
-        )
-
-    # #630's task-scoped gate deliberately lets a contaminated worker keep
-    # commenting and handing off. Restart is stricter and unconditional: a
-    # runtime already contaminated by a manual kill must be reconciled before
-    # it is restarted again, or the restart just launders the contamination.
-    if contamination_marker and not contamination_marker.get(
-        "cleared_by_reconciler"
-    ):
-        return refuse(
-            DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME,
-            (
-                "A live contamination marker is present; clear it through the "
-                "reconciler path before restarting."
-            ),
-        )
-
-    hook = preview["restart_hook"]
-    if not hook["configured"]:
-        return refuse(
-            DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED,
-            (
-                "No host-managed restart hook is configured "
-                f"({RESTART_HOOK_ENV}). The console will not fall back to a "
-                "process kill."
-            ),
-        )
-
-    return {
-        "allowed": True,
-        "gates_passed": True,
-        "reason_code": ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED,
-        "detail": (
-            "Every gate passed. The restart must be performed by the "
-            "configured host supervisor; the console does not signal the "
-            "process."
-        ),
-        "action_id": action_id,
-        "namespace": ns,
-        "mode": md,
-        "preview": preview,
-        "execution_enabled": False,
-        "console_executes": False,
-        "console_active_phase": console_authz.ACTIVE_PHASE,
-    }
-
-
-# --- Execution --------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def execute_restart(
-    namespace: str,
-    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
-    *,
-    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
-    confirmation: str | None = None,
-    contamination_marker: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-    request_id: str | None = None,
-    session_id: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Run every gate, audit the outcome, and hand off to the host.
-
-    This function never spawns a process, never sends a signal, and never
-    builds a command line. ``success`` is False in both directions: a refused
-    request is refused, and an authorized request still requires the host
-    supervisor to act.
-    """
-    assessment = assess_restart_request(
-        namespace,
-        mode,
-        principal=principal,
-        confirmation=confirmation,
-        contamination_marker=contamination_marker,
-        env=env,
-    )
-    action_id = assessment["action_id"]
-    allowed = assessment["allowed"]
-
-    audit = console_audit.record_event(
-        action_id=action_id,
-        result=(
-            console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED if allowed
-            else console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
-        ),
-        principal=principal,
-        target={"namespace": assessment["namespace"], "mode": assessment["mode"]},
-        reason_code=assessment["reason_code"],
-        detail=assessment["detail"],
-        request_id=request_id,
-        session_id=session_id,
-        metadata={
-            "gates_passed": assessment["gates_passed"],
-            "process_kill_executed": False,
-            "post_restart_verification_required": True,
-        },
-    )
-
-    return {
-        "success": False,
-        "outcome": (
-            ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED if allowed else assessment["reason_code"]
-        ),
-        "allowed": allowed,
-        "detail": assessment["detail"],
-        "namespace": assessment["namespace"],
-        "mode": assessment["mode"],
-        "action_id": action_id,
-        "process_kill_executed": False,
-        "host_hook": assessment["preview"]["restart_hook"],
-        "next_action": (
-            "Have the host supervisor perform the restart, then call "
-            "verify_post_restart_health with live client-namespace evidence "
-            "before claiming a clean session."
-            if allowed
-            else assessment["detail"]
-        ),
-        "assessment": assessment,
-        "audit": audit,
-    }
-
-
-# --- Contamination classification -------------------------------------------
-
-
-def classify_restart_command(
-    command: str | None,
-    *,
-    mcp_pids: list[Any] | tuple[Any, ...] | None = None,
-    session_id: str | None = None,
-    remote: str | None = None,
-    role: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Classify an operator-proposed recovery command (#630 AC2).
-
-    A manual ``pkill``/``kill`` of the MCP daemon is contamination, not a
-    restart. When contaminating, a durable marker is returned so downstream
-    gated mutations and clean claims fail closed.
-    """
-    classification = runtime_recovery_guard.classify_recovery_command(
-        command, mcp_pids=mcp_pids
-    )
-    contaminating = bool(classification.get("contamination"))
-
-    marker = None
-    if contaminating:
-        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
-            reason_class=(
-                classification.get("reason_class")
-                or runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL
-            ),
-            command_redacted=classification.get("redacted_command"),
-            session_id=session_id,
-            remote=remote,
-            role=role,
-            detail=(
-                "Manual daemon kill is forbidden; use the sanctioned "
-                f"{ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE} gated action instead."
-            ),
-        )
-
-    return {
-        "contamination": contaminating,
-        "sanctioned": not contaminating and not classification.get("process_kill"),
-        "clean_claim_allowed": not contaminating,
-        "reason_class": classification.get("reason_class"),
-        "redacted_command": classification.get("redacted_command"),
-        "classification": classification,
-        "contamination_marker": marker,
-        "sanctioned_alternative": ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
-    }
-
-
-# --- Post-restart health verification ---------------------------------------
-
-
-def verify_post_restart_health(
-    namespace: str,
-    *,
-    probe_result: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    probe_source: str | None = None,
-    registered_tools: list[str] | tuple[str, ...] | None = None,
-    required_tool: str | None = None,
-    profile: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Require live proof a namespace is callable before any clean claim (AC3).
-
-    Static registration is not proof and neither is an offline subprocess
-    probe: only ``probe_source=client_namespace`` evidence can clear a
-    post-restart session for mutations.
-    """
-    ns = _clean(namespace)
-    health = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
-        ns,
-        required_tool=required_tool,
-        registered_tools=registered_tools,
-        probe_result=probe_result,
-        profile=profile,
-        probe_source=probe_source,
-    )
-    healthy = bool(health.get("healthy"))
-    proven = bool(health.get("ide_namespace_proven"))
-
-    if healthy and proven:
-        status = HEALTH_CLEAN
-    elif healthy:
-        status = HEALTH_UNPROVEN
-    else:
-        status = HEALTH_UNHEALTHY
-
-    reasons = list(health.get("reasons") or [])
-    if status == HEALTH_UNPROVEN:
-        reasons.append(
-            "Namespace reported healthy without live client-namespace "
-            "evidence; a post-restart clean claim requires "
-            f"probe_source={mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT!r}."
-        )
-
-    return {
-        "namespace": ns,
-        "status": status,
-        "healthy": healthy,
-        "ide_namespace_proven": proven,
-        "clean_claim_allowed": status == HEALTH_CLEAN,
-        "mutations_allowed": status == HEALTH_CLEAN,
-        "reasons": reasons,
-        "health": health,
-    }
-
-
-# --- Policy surface ---------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def restart_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Machine-readable description of the sanctioned restart contract."""
-    return {
-        "policy_version": 1,
-        "modes": list(MODES),
-        "actions": [ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE],
-        "known_namespaces": list(KNOWN_NAMESPACES),
-        "fleet_scope_permitted": False,
-        "console_executes_process_kill": False,
-        "raw_kill_exposed": False,
-        "requires_confirmation": True,
-        "confirmation_binds_namespace": True,
-        "operator_authorization_env": (
-            runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV
-        ),
-        "restart_hook_env": RESTART_HOOK_ENV,
-        "manual_kill_classified_as": runtime_recovery_guard.CONTAMINATION_KIND,
-        "post_restart_clean_claim_requires": (
-            mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT
-        ),
-        "audit_required": True,
-        "silent_auto_restart_permitted": False,
-    }
@@ -34,11 +34,7 @@ import subprocess
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from typing import Any

-from merged_cleanup_reconcile import (
-    branch_worktree_folder,
-    is_head_ancestor_of_ref,
-    read_local_worktree_state,
-)
+from merged_cleanup_reconcile import branch_worktree_folder, read_local_worktree_state
 from reviewer_worktree import parse_dirty_tracked_files, REVIEW_WORKTREE_RE

 PROTECTED_BRANCHES = frozenset({"master", "main", "dev"})
@@ -71,14 +67,6 @@ REMOVABLE_CLASSES = frozenset(
    {CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE, CLASS_DETACHED_REVIEW_LEFTOVER}
 )

-# Merged-PR linkage outcomes for issue worktrees (#858). Only ``LINKAGE_MERGED``
-# is ownership proof; every other outcome leaves the worktree protected.
-LINKAGE_MERGED = "merged_pr"
-LINKAGE_OPEN = "open_pr"
-LINKAGE_NONE = "no_owning_pr"
-LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS = "ambiguous"
-LINKAGE_UNKNOWN = "unknown"
-
 _ISSUE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"issue-(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE)
 _ISSUE_BRANCH_PREFIXES = ("feat/", "fix/", "docs/", "chore/")

@@ -181,186 +169,6 @@ def is_ttl_expired(
    return (now_dt - last).total_seconds() > ttl_hours * 3600.0


-def build_pr_index(prs: list[dict[str, Any]] | None) -> dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]]:
-    """Index PR records by head branch for deterministic worktree linkage (#858).
-
-    Accepts Gitea PR payloads (``head`` as a dict) and pre-flattened records
-    (``head_branch``/``head_sha``). Records without a usable head branch or
-    number are dropped rather than guessed at, so a branch is only ever linked
-    to a PR the caller actually proved.
-    """
-    index: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
-    for pr in prs or []:
-        head = pr.get("head")
-        if isinstance(head, dict):
-            head_branch = head.get("ref")
-            head_sha = head.get("sha")
-        else:
-            head_branch = pr.get("head_branch") or (head if isinstance(head, str) else None)
-            head_sha = pr.get("head_sha")
-        number = pr.get("number")
-        if not head_branch or number is None:
-            continue
-        try:
-            pr_number = int(number)
-        except (TypeError, ValueError):
-            continue
-        index.setdefault(str(head_branch).strip(), []).append(
-            {
-                "pr_number": pr_number,
-                "head_branch": str(head_branch).strip(),
-                "head_sha": head_sha,
-                "merged": bool(pr.get("merged") or pr.get("merged_at")),
-                "state": pr.get("state"),
-            }
-        )
-    return index
-
-
-def resolve_owning_pr(
-    *,
-    branch: str | None,
-    pr_index: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] | None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Resolve the single PR that owns ``branch``, failing closed when unclear.
-
-    Ownership is only ``LINKAGE_MERGED`` when exactly one PR claims the branch
-    and that PR is merged. Several distinct PRs on one branch is a competing
-    claim (``LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS``), and a still-open owner is reported as
-    ``LINKAGE_OPEN`` — both keep the worktree protected while still exposing
-    the PR number the audit resolved.
-    """
-    if pr_index is None:
-        return {
-            "status": LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
-            "pr_number": None,
-            "candidate_pr_numbers": [],
-            "reasons": ["live PR state was not supplied; ownership unproven"],
-        }
-    branch_name = (branch or "").strip()
-    if not branch_name:
-        return {
-            "status": LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
-            "pr_number": None,
-            "candidate_pr_numbers": [],
-            "reasons": ["worktree has no attached branch; ownership unproven"],
-        }
-
-    candidates = list(pr_index.get(branch_name) or [])
-    numbers = sorted({c["pr_number"] for c in candidates})
-    if not candidates:
-        return {
-            "status": LINKAGE_NONE,
-            "pr_number": None,
-            "candidate_pr_numbers": [],
-            "reasons": [f"no PR claims branch '{branch_name}'"],
-        }
-    if len(numbers) > 1:
-        return {
-            "status": LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS,
-            "pr_number": None,
-            "candidate_pr_numbers": numbers,
-            "reasons": [
-                f"branch '{branch_name}' is claimed by competing PRs {numbers}; "
-                "ownership is ambiguous"
-            ],
-        }
-
-    owner = candidates[0]
-    pr_number = owner["pr_number"]
-    if owner.get("head_branch") != branch_name:
-        return {
-            "status": LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
-            "pr_number": pr_number,
-            "candidate_pr_numbers": numbers,
-            "reasons": [
-                f"PR #{pr_number} head branch '{owner.get('head_branch')}' does not "
-                f"match worktree branch '{branch_name}'"
-            ],
-        }
-    if not owner.get("merged"):
-        return {
-            "status": LINKAGE_OPEN,
-            "pr_number": pr_number,
-            "candidate_pr_numbers": numbers,
-            "pr_head_sha": owner.get("head_sha"),
-            "reasons": [f"owning PR #{pr_number} is not merged"],
-        }
-    return {
-        "status": LINKAGE_MERGED,
-        "pr_number": pr_number,
-        "candidate_pr_numbers": numbers,
-        "pr_head_sha": owner.get("head_sha"),
-        "reasons": [],
-    }
-
-
-def assess_merged_pr_worktree_cleanup(
-    *,
-    linkage: dict[str, Any] | None,
-    head_sha: str | None,
-    head_in_master: bool | None,
-    is_dirty: bool,
-    has_open_pr: bool,
-    has_active_lease: bool,
-    has_active_issue_lock: bool,
-    is_protected: bool,
-    has_live_session: bool = False,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Decide whether a merged issue worktree satisfies the full cleanup policy.
-
-    Every condition must be independently proven: conclusive merged-PR
-    ownership, agreement between the worktree branch and the PR head branch,
-    containment of the worktree head in authoritative master (which is what
-    proves no unmerged commits remain), absence of any open/competing PR,
-    lease, issue lock, or live session, a clean tree, and a worktree that is
-    not the protected control checkout. Anything unknown blocks.
-    """
-    link = linkage or {
-        "status": LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
-        "pr_number": None,
-        "reasons": ["no linkage assessment supplied"],
-    }
-    status = link.get("status")
-    reasons: list[str] = []
-
-    if status != LINKAGE_MERGED:
-        reasons.extend(
-            link.get("reasons") or ["owning PR could not be conclusively identified"]
-        )
-    if is_protected:
-        reasons.append("worktree is protected or the stable control checkout")
-    if is_dirty:
-        reasons.append("worktree has uncommitted changes")
-    if has_open_pr:
-        reasons.append("worktree branch has an open PR")
-    if has_active_lease:
-        reasons.append("worktree has an active lease")
-    if has_active_issue_lock:
-        reasons.append("an active issue lock references this branch")
-    if has_live_session:
-        reasons.append("a live process or session is using this worktree")
-    if not head_sha:
-        reasons.append("worktree head sha is unknown")
-    if head_in_master is None:
-        reasons.append("containment of the worktree head in master is unknown")
-    elif not head_in_master:
-        reasons.append(
-            "worktree head is not contained in authoritative master "
-            "(unmerged commits remain)"
-        )
-
-    proven = not reasons
-    return {
-        "linkage_status": status,
-        "pr_number": link.get("pr_number"),
-        "pr_head_sha": link.get("pr_head_sha"),
-        "head_in_master": head_in_master,
-        "proven": proven,
-        "block_reasons": reasons,
-    }
-
-
 def classify_worktree(
    *,
    workflow_type: str,
@@ -373,8 +181,6 @@ def classify_worktree(
    ttl_expired: bool = False,
    is_protected: bool = False,
    metadata_known: bool = True,
-    merged_pr_cleanup: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    has_live_session: bool = False,
 ) -> str:
    """Classify a worktree, safety-first: any preservation signal wins.

@@ -393,8 +199,6 @@ def classify_worktree(
        return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK  # never auto-deleted (criterion 8)
    if has_active_issue_lock:
        return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK
-    if has_live_session:
-        return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK  # a live session still owns this tree
    if not metadata_known or workflow_type == WORKFLOW_UNKNOWN:
        return CLASS_UNSAFE_UNKNOWN  # never auto-deleted without proof

@@ -403,15 +207,7 @@ def classify_worktree(
        if is_detached or branch_gone:
            return CLASS_DETACHED_REVIEW_LEFTOVER
        return CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE
-    if workflow_type == WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK:
-        # #858: an issue worktree becomes removable only on authoritative
-        # merged-PR evidence satisfying the whole cleanup policy. Age alone
-        # never proves the branch landed, so TTL cannot qualify one by itself
-        # — otherwise a worktree holding unmerged commits would be reclaimed.
-        if (merged_pr_cleanup or {}).get("proven"):
-            return CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE
-        return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK
-    # conflict_fix: only removable once the TTL has expired.
+    # issue_work / conflict_fix: only removable once the TTL has expired.
    if ttl_expired:
        return CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE
    return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK
@@ -604,20 +400,6 @@ def remove_worktree(project_root: str, path: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
    }


-def head_contained_in_ref(
-    project_root: str, head_sha: str | None, ref: str | None
-) -> bool | None:
-    """Return True when ``head_sha`` is already contained in ``ref``.
-
-    Shares :mod:`merged_cleanup_reconcile`'s ancestry check so the audit and
-    the PR-scoped reconciler agree on what "already landed" means (#858).
-    Returns None when containment cannot be determined, which fails closed.
-    """
-    if not head_sha or not ref:
-        return None
-    return is_head_ancestor_of_ref(project_root, head_sha, ref)
-
-
 def _is_under_branches(project_root: str, path: str) -> bool:
    branches_root = os.path.join(os.path.abspath(project_root), "branches")
    return os.path.abspath(path or "").startswith(branches_root + os.sep)
@@ -631,30 +413,16 @@ def audit_branches_directory(
    active_issue_branches: set[str] | None = None,
    now: datetime | str | None = None,
    ttl_hours: float = DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS,
-    pr_index: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] | None = None,
-    leased_issue_numbers: set[int] | None = None,
-    live_session_paths: set[str] | None = None,
-    master_ref: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
    """Classify every session-owned worktree under ``branches/``.

    Read-only: shells out to git for discovery and dirty state, then applies
    the pure classifier. Returns per-worktree classifications, counts, the
    list of removable candidates, and the ``git worktree list`` proof.
-
-    ``pr_index`` (see :func:`build_pr_index`) supplies the authoritative PR
-    ownership used to link issue worktrees to their merged PR (#858).
-    ``master_ref`` is the ref a worktree head must be contained in before it
-    can be considered landed. Both are optional and their absence only ever
-    fails closed: without them no issue worktree becomes removable.
    """
    open_pr_branches = open_pr_branches or set()
    leased_branches = leased_branches or set()
    active_issue_branches = active_issue_branches or set()
-    leased_issue_numbers = leased_issue_numbers or set()
-    live_session_paths = {
-        os.path.abspath(p) for p in (live_session_paths or set()) if p
-    }

    worktrees: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
    for entry in list_worktrees(project_root):
@@ -665,42 +433,12 @@ def audit_branches_directory(
        )
        dirty_state = read_worktree_dirty(path)
        is_dirty = bool(dirty_state.get("dirty"))
-        head_sha = entry.get("head")
-        linkage = resolve_owning_pr(branch=branch, pr_index=pr_index)
        metadata = build_worktree_metadata(
-            path=path,
-            branch=branch,
-            head_sha=head_sha,
-            pr_number=linkage.get("pr_number"),
+            path=path, branch=branch, head_sha=entry.get("head")
        )
        has_open_pr = bool(branch) and branch in open_pr_branches
-        # A lease on issue N protects that issue's own work worktree. It must
-        # not incidentally protect a baseline/review scratch tree that merely
-        # carries the same issue marker in its name, which would change the
-        # classification of worktrees this policy does not own.
-        has_active_lease = (bool(branch) and branch in leased_branches) or (
-            metadata["workflow_type"] == WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK
-            and metadata.get("issue_number") is not None
-            and metadata["issue_number"] in leased_issue_numbers
-        )
+        has_active_lease = bool(branch) and branch in leased_branches
        has_active_lock = bool(branch) and branch in active_issue_branches
-        has_live_session = bool(path) and os.path.abspath(path) in live_session_paths
-        head_in_master = (
-            head_contained_in_ref(project_root, head_sha, master_ref)
-            if master_ref
-            else None
-        )
-        merged_pr_cleanup = assess_merged_pr_worktree_cleanup(
-            linkage=linkage,
-            head_sha=head_sha,
-            head_in_master=head_in_master,
-            is_dirty=is_dirty,
-            has_open_pr=has_open_pr,
-            has_active_lease=has_active_lease,
-            has_active_issue_lock=has_active_lock,
-            is_protected=is_protected,
-            has_live_session=has_live_session,
-        )
        ttl_expired = is_ttl_expired(
            last_used_at=metadata.get("last_used_at"), now=now, ttl_hours=ttl_hours
        )
@@ -714,8 +452,6 @@ def audit_branches_directory(
            branch_gone=branch is None and not entry.get("detached"),
            ttl_expired=ttl_expired,
            is_protected=is_protected,
-            merged_pr_cleanup=merged_pr_cleanup,
-            has_live_session=has_live_session,
        )
        metadata["cleanup_eligibility"] = classification
        worktrees.append(
@@ -727,10 +463,7 @@ def audit_branches_directory(
                "has_open_pr": has_open_pr,
                "has_active_lease": has_active_lease,
                "has_active_issue_lock": has_active_lock,
-                "has_live_session": has_live_session,
                "is_protected": is_protected,
-                "merged_pr_linkage": linkage,
-                "merged_pr_cleanup": merged_pr_cleanup,
                "classification": classification,
                "removable": is_removable(classification),
            }
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jcwalker3	dc99c15ffa	Merge branch 'master' into docs/issue-656-mcp-restart-governance	2026-07-23 19:53:16 -05:00
sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8	9f759150b8	docs(governance): correct linked-issue descriptions in restart ADR (#656 ) The Related section and cross-reference lines described #652, #653, #630, #642, and #591 by roles they do not hold. Align each description with the linked issue's actual title and scope: - #652 is the Control Plane Web Console product vision (restart controls live in its capability area A), not a restart-specific vision. - #653 is the console phased-delivery roadmap; restart controls are Phase 2. - #630 is the manual process-kill contamination guard, not the coordinator; the coordinator remains an unimplemented later child of #655. - #642 is the sanctioned restart / graceful reload console UX. - #591 is auto-restart on master advance (closed); only #584 is transport-flap reconnect. They were previously collapsed into one transport-recovery label. Documentation-only wording change. Policy IDs RG-01..RG-08, the policy version restart-governance/v1, the authorization matrix, and every normative statement are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-07-23 19:18:47 -04:00
sysadmin	347464a057	Merge branch 'master' into docs/issue-656-mcp-restart-governance	2026-07-23 19:17:05 -04:00
sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8	1301a57de4	docs(governance): MCP restart governance and authorization policy (#656 ) Adds docs/architecture/mcp-restart-governance.md, the restart-governance/v1 ADR defining who may restart the MCP control plane and under what conditions. - Recovery ladder (reconnect -> rebind -> scoped restart -> full restart -> host) with restart stated as the last resort. - Authorization matrix across author/reviewer/merger/reconciler/controller/ operator/admin; no LLM worker role may perform or authorize a full or host restart. - v1 authority decision recorded: controller approval + automated safety gates; quorum deferred to a superseding ADR. - Break-glass path with pre-declared incident and mandatory post-hoc audit. - Ambiguous policy state denies restart. - Stable policy IDs RG-01..RG-08 for later enforcement code to bind to. Cross-links the ADR from docs/safety-model.md and docs/webui-deployment.md, and adds tests/test_mcp_restart_governance_docs.py asserting acceptance criteria 1-5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-07-23 19:16:28 -04:00