fix: bind cross-role handoff consume role to authenticated profile (Closes #843)

Review #515 F1: gitea_adopt_workflow_lease trusted a caller-supplied role
((role or active_role)), so any namespace holding gitea.read could consume
an author-only cross-role handoff by passing role="author".

- Derive the adopter role authoritatively from the active profile; reject
  any supplied role that does not exactly match (no silent accept).
- Pass the profile-derived role and authoritative profile/namespace context
  to lease_lifecycle.adopt_lease; validate handoff provenance
  required_profile/required_namespace against it (fail closed).
- Fail closed when the profile role cannot be derived (no author default).
- Add MCP-boundary regression tests: reviewer/merger profiles cannot
  consume an author handoff via role="author"; the legitimate author
  profile still consumes; foreign required_profile rejected.

allocator_service.py

@@ -1115,6 +1115,12 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "reasons": [
                 "dry-run only (apply=false); no assignment/lease created — "
                 "call again with apply=true to reserve via control-plane DB"
+                + (
+                    "; after apply, the required-role worker consumes via "
+                    "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease (#843)"
+                    if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE and expected_role != role_norm
+                    else ""
+                )
             ],
             "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
             "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
@@ -1146,6 +1152,9 @@ def allocate_next_work(
     # Atomic reserve via #613 substrate.
     ttl = lease_ttl_seconds if lease_ttl_seconds is not None else None
     try:
+        cross_role_handoff = (
+            mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE and lease_role != role_norm
+        )
         kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
             "session_id": session_id,
             "role": lease_role,
@@ -1157,7 +1166,8 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "expected_head_sha": selected.head_sha,
             "allowed_actions": allowed,
             "forbidden_actions": forbidden,
-            "phase": "allocated",
+            # #843: mark cross-role allocations as awaiting independent consume
+            "phase": "awaiting_handoff" if cross_role_handoff else "allocated",
         }
         if ttl is not None:
             kwargs["lease_ttl_seconds"] = int(ttl)
@@ -1237,7 +1247,52 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "lease_role": lease_role,
         "source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
     }
-    return {
+    consume_allocation = None
+    if cross_role_handoff and result.lease_id:
+        # Durable handoff marker so independent required-role workers can
+        # consume without sharing the controller session (#843).
+        handoff_prov = {
+            "cross_role_handoff": True,
+            "handoff_status": "pending",
+            "allocating_session_id": session_id,
+            "allocating_role": role_norm,
+            "required_role": expected_role,
+            "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
+            "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
+            "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
+            "lease_id": result.lease_id,
+            "allocation_mode": mode,
+            "adopted_by_session_id": None,
+        }
+        try:
+            db.attach_lease_provenance(result.lease_id, handoff_prov)
+        except ControlPlaneError:
+            # Still return assignment evidence; consume path may be unavailable
+            handoff_prov["attach_failed"] = True
+        consume_allocation = {
+            "tool": "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease",
+            "lease_id": result.lease_id,
+            "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
+            "required_role": expected_role,
+            "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
+            "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
+            "handoff_status": "pending",
+            "controller_session_required": False,
+            "instructions": (
+                f"From an independent {expected_role} session "
+                f"({selection['required_namespace']} / "
+                f"{selection['required_profile']}), call "
+                f"gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(lease_id={result.lease_id!r}) "
+                "to consume this controller allocation. The allocating "
+                "controller process does not need to remain alive. Wrong-role "
+                "and second-adoption attempts fail closed."
+            ),
+        }
+        lease_proof["cross_role_handoff"] = True
+        lease_proof["handoff_status"] = "pending"
+        lease_proof["consume_tool"] = "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease"
+
+    out = {
         "success": True,
         "outcome": OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
         "apply": True,
@@ -1271,8 +1326,17 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "lease_role": lease_role,
             "lease_proof": lease_proof,
             "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
+            "cross_role_handoff": bool(cross_role_handoff),
         },
-        "next_valid_command": _next_command(lease_role, selected),
+        "next_valid_command": (
+            (
+                f"consume lease {result.lease_id} via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease "
+                f"as {expected_role}, then "
+            )
+            + _next_command(lease_role, selected)
+            if cross_role_handoff
+            else _next_command(lease_role, selected)
+        ),
         "substrate": "control_plane_db",
         "file_lock_only": False,
         "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -1287,9 +1351,14 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "downstream_note": (
             "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
             "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
-            "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
+            "controller routes only under cross_role (#840); "
+            "cross-role assignments are consumable by independent "
+            "required-role workers via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease (#843)"
         ),
     }
+    if consume_allocation is not None:
+        out["consume_allocation"] = consume_allocation
+    return out
 
 
 def _next_command(role: str, c: WorkCandidate) -> str:

control_plane_db.py

@@ -1637,11 +1637,13 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
         provenance: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
         lease_ttl_seconds: int = DEFAULT_LEASE_TTL_SECONDS,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        """Transfer or refresh a lease with provenance (#601).
+        """Transfer or refresh a lease with provenance (#601 / #843).
 
         * Same owner + active → refresh (owner-resume).
+        * Cross-role handoff pending + matching required role → atomic consume
+          (even while the allocating controller session still "owns" the lease).
         * Expired/abandoned/released → create new assignment+lease with provenance.
-        * Active foreign → raise ForeignLeaseError (never silent steal).
+        * Active foreign (non-handoff) → raise ForeignLeaseError (never silent steal).
         """
         now = _utc_now()
         now_s = _ts(now)
@@ -1677,7 +1679,35 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
                 status = "expired"
 
             owner = lease["session_id"]
-            if status == "active" and owner != adopter_session_id:
+            # Parse durable provenance for cross-role handoff consume (#843).
+            lease_prov: dict[str, Any] = {}
+            if "provenance_json" in lease.keys() and lease["provenance_json"]:
+                try:
+                    loaded = json.loads(lease["provenance_json"])
+                    if isinstance(loaded, dict):
+                        lease_prov = loaded
+                except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+                    lease_prov = {}
+            handoff_pending = bool(lease_prov.get("cross_role_handoff")) and (
+                str(lease_prov.get("handoff_status") or "pending").strip().lower()
+                == "pending"
+            )
+            already_adopted = bool(
+                (lease["adopted_by_session_id"] if "adopted_by_session_id" in lease.keys() else None)
+                or lease_prov.get("adopted_by_session_id")
+            )
+            required_role = str(
+                lease_prov.get("required_role") or lease["role"] or ""
+            ).strip().lower()
+            adopter_role = (role or "").strip().lower()
+            cross_role_consume = (
+                handoff_pending
+                and not already_adopted
+                and status == "active"
+                and owner != adopter_session_id
+            )
+
+            if status == "active" and owner != adopter_session_id and not cross_role_consume:
                 raise ForeignLeaseError(
                     f"cannot adopt active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by {owner}"
                 )
@@ -1761,6 +1791,142 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
                     "reasons": ["owner-resume: refreshed lease with provenance"],
                 }
 
+            # #843: controller→required-role handoff consume (atomic, same lease_id)
+            if cross_role_consume:
+                if not required_role:
+                    raise ControlPlaneError(
+                        f"cross-role handoff lease {lease_id} missing required_role"
+                    )
+                if adopter_role != required_role:
+                    raise ForeignLeaseError(
+                        f"wrong role for cross-role handoff consume: "
+                        f"required={required_role} adopter={adopter_role or 'none'} "
+                        f"(fail closed)"
+                    )
+                # CAS: only transfer if still owned by allocating session and unadopted
+                cols = self._lease_columns(conn)
+                adopted_col_null = (
+                    "(adopted_by_session_id IS NULL OR adopted_by_session_id = '')"
+                    if "adopted_by_session_id" in cols
+                    else "1=1"
+                )
+                cas = conn.execute(
+                    f"""
+                    UPDATE leases
+                    SET session_id = ?,
+                        heartbeat_at = ?,
+                        expires_at = ?,
+                        phase = ?,
+                        role = ?
+                    WHERE lease_id = ?
+                      AND status = 'active'
+                      AND session_id = ?
+                      AND {adopted_col_null}
+                    """,
+                    (
+                        adopter_session_id,
+                        now_s,
+                        expires,
+                        "adopted",
+                        required_role,
+                        lease_id,
+                        owner,
+                    ),
+                )
+                if cas.rowcount != 1:
+                    raise ForeignLeaseError(
+                        f"cross-role handoff consume lost race for lease {lease_id} "
+                        "(already adopted or no longer pending; fail closed)"
+                    )
+                if "adopted_from_session_id" in cols:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        """
+                        UPDATE leases
+                        SET adopted_from_session_id = ?, adopted_by_session_id = ?
+                        WHERE lease_id = ?
+                        """,
+                        (owner, adopter_session_id, lease_id),
+                    )
+                if "worktree_path" in cols and worktree_path:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE leases SET worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                        (worktree_path, lease_id),
+                    )
+                if "owner_pid" in cols and owner_pid is not None:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                        (owner_pid, lease_id),
+                    )
+                if "expected_head_sha" in cols and expected_head_sha:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE leases SET expected_head_sha = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                        (expected_head_sha, lease_id),
+                    )
+                # Merge handoff provenance + caller provenance
+                merged = dict(lease_prov)
+                merged.update(provenance or {})
+                merged["cross_role_handoff"] = True
+                merged["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
+                merged["adopted_from_session_id"] = owner
+                merged["adopted_by_session_id"] = adopter_session_id
+                merged["required_role"] = required_role
+                if "provenance_json" in cols:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE leases SET provenance_json = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                        (json.dumps(merged), lease_id),
+                    )
+                # Transfer active assignment ownership atomically
+                asn_cas = conn.execute(
+                    """
+                    UPDATE assignments
+                    SET session_id = ?, role = ?
+                    WHERE lease_id = ? AND status = 'active' AND session_id = ?
+                    """,
+                    (adopter_session_id, required_role, lease_id, owner),
+                )
+                if asn_cas.rowcount < 1:
+                    # Fail closed: assignment must move with the lease
+                    raise ControlPlaneError(
+                        f"cross-role handoff: no active assignment for lease {lease_id} "
+                        f"owned by {owner}"
+                    )
+                lease2 = conn.execute(
+                    "SELECT * FROM leases WHERE lease_id = ?", (lease_id,)
+                ).fetchone()
+                asn = conn.execute(
+                    """
+                    SELECT * FROM assignments
+                    WHERE lease_id = ? AND status = 'active'
+                    ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1
+                    """,
+                    (lease_id,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                conn.execute(
+                    """
+                    INSERT INTO events(work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)
+                    VALUES (?, 'lease_adopted', ?, ?)
+                    """,
+                    (
+                        lease["work_item_id"],
+                        f"cross-role handoff: {adopter_session_id} consumed "
+                        f"{lease_id} from {owner} as {required_role}",
+                        now_s,
+                    ),
+                )
+                return {
+                    "outcome": "adopted_cross_role_handoff",
+                    "lease": dict(lease2) if lease2 else dict(lease),
+                    "assignment": dict(asn) if asn else None,
+                    "reasons": [
+                        "cross-role handoff: independent required-role worker consumed "
+                        "controller allocation without abandonment"
+                    ],
+                    "adopted_by_session_id": adopter_session_id,
+                    "adopted_from_session_id": owner,
+                    "required_role": required_role,
+                    "handoff_status": "adopted",
+                }
+
             # Non-active: create new lease + assignment (transfer)
             new_lease_id = f"lease-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]}"
             new_asn_id = f"asn-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]}"

docs/webui-local-dev.md

@@ -52,8 +52,7 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | Path | Description |
 |------|-------------|
 | `/` | Home / operator overview |
-| `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`, `uptime_seconds`) |
+| `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`) |
-| `/api/v1/system/health` | Structured read-only system health (#634) |
 | `/queue` | Live PR and issue queue dashboard (#429) |
 | `/api/queue` | JSON queue export with pagination metadata |
 | `/projects` | Project registry list with status and onboarding progress (#427, #635) |
@@ -79,85 +78,6 @@ Most routes are GET-only. POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE return `405` with
 `read-only-mvp`, except `/audit` and `/api/audit` which accept POST for
 local validator preview only (no Gitea mutations, no server-side storage).
 
-## System health API (#634)
-
-`GET /api/v1/system/health` is the structured, read-only health surface for
-automated readiness checks. It is the first console API under the `/api/v1`
-prefix; the unversioned MVP exports remain as compatibility aliases.
-
-`/health` is unchanged for existing consumers — every MVP key is still present
-— and now also carries `started_at`, `uptime_seconds`, and a
-`system_health_api` pointer. It stays deliberately cheap and runs no dependency
-probe, because answering readiness costs real work.
-
-**Status codes.** `200` when ready, `503` when a required dependency failed or
-was never probed. Automation can branch on the code without parsing the body.
-
-**Query flags.** The Gitea check is a network call, so it is opt-in:
-`GET /api/v1/system/health?deep=1` runs it and caches the result for
-`WEBUI_HEALTH_PROBE_TTL_SECONDS` (default 15s) so dashboard polling does not
-amplify into remote load. Without the flag that probe reports `skipped`.
-
-**Dependencies.** `control_plane_db` and `repository` are required and drive
-readiness. `gitea` is optional: when it fails the overall `status` degrades but
-`readiness.ready` stays true, because local inventory is still serveable. Each
-entry carries `status`, `detail`, `required`, and `latency_ms`.
-
-Two honesty rules are worth knowing before reading the payload:
-
-* `stale_runtime.mutation_safe` is true only when the runtime, checkout, and
-  remote-tracking commits are all known and equal. An unfetched remote is
-  reported as indeterminate, never as safe.
-* `mcp_namespaces` entries are always `unproven`. A web process runs outside
-  the IDE-managed MCP client and cannot invoke a namespace tool, so per #543
-  only a `client_namespace` probe can prove that path.
-
-Sample response (abridged, healthy):
-
-```json
-{
-  "status": "ok",
-  "service": "mcp-control-plane-webui",
-  "mode": "read-only",
-  "api": "/api/v1/system/health",
-  "timestamp": "2026-07-22T11:04:18.512034+00:00",
-  "readiness": { "ready": true, "complete": true, "reasons": [] },
-  "version": {
-    "git_sha": "620ed6e9a9550b8da2ceb82d9ab8744e8920490f",
-    "git_describe": "v1.1.0-898-g620ed6e",
-    "control_plane_schema_version": 4,
-    "python_version": "3.14.5",
-    "known": true
-  },
-  "process": { "started_at": "2026-07-22T10:58:02.114+00:00", "uptime_seconds": 376.4 },
-  "deep_probes_requested": false,
-  "dependencies": [
-    {
-      "name": "control_plane_db",
-      "kind": "sqlite",
-      "status": "ok",
-      "detail": "schema v4 readable",
-      "required": true,
-      "healthy": true,
-      "latency_ms": 1.482,
-      "metadata": { "schema_version": 4, "active_leases": 3 }
-    },
-    { "name": "repository", "kind": "git", "status": "ok", "required": true, "healthy": true },
-    { "name": "gitea", "kind": "http", "status": "skipped", "required": false, "healthy": false }
-  ],
-  "mcp_namespaces": [
-    { "namespace": "gitea-author", "required_tool": "gitea_whoami", "status": "unproven" }
-  ],
-  "stale_runtime": { "stale": false, "determinable": true, "mutation_safe": true, "reasons": [] },
-  "probe_errors": []
-}
-```
-
-No restart, reload, or process-kill control is exposed here: those are Phase 2
-at the earliest, and #630 forbids process-kill recovery outright. Every probe
-opens its subject read-only — the control-plane database is opened through a
-`mode=ro` URI so a health check can never create or migrate a schema.
-
 ## Report audit (#431)
 
 Paste an LLM final report at `/audit` or POST JSON to `/api/audit`. The UI

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -21148,10 +21148,21 @@ def gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
     remote: str = "dadeschools",
     host: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Adopt a control-plane lease through the sanctioned path (#601).
+    """Adopt a control-plane lease through the sanctioned path (#601 / #843).
 
-    Same-owner resume refreshes provenance. Foreign active leases are refused.
+    Same-owner resume refreshes provenance. Foreign active leases are refused
-    Expired leases may be reclaimed; provenance records adopted_from/by.
+    unless the lease is a pending controller cross-role handoff and the caller
+    holds the required role (independent consume without sharing the
+    controller session). Expired leases may be reclaimed; provenance records
+    adopted_from/by. Terminal (abandoned/released) leases cannot be adopted.
+
+    #843 F1: the adopter role is derived authoritatively from the active
+    authenticated profile — never from caller input. A supplied ``role`` that
+    does not exactly match the profile-derived role is rejected (no silent
+    accept or reinterpretation), and handoff provenance ``required_profile`` /
+    ``required_namespace`` restrictions are validated against the same
+    authoritative caller context. Caller-supplied role/profile/namespace can
+    never grant authority.
     """
     read_block = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.read")
     if read_block:
@@ -21160,25 +21171,64 @@ def gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
             "reasons": read_block,
             "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.read"),
         }
+    profile = get_profile()
+    profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip() or "session"
+    active_role = (_profile_role_kind(profile) or "").strip().lower()
+    if not active_role:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "outcome": "blocked",
+            "mutation_performed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                "active profile role could not be derived authoritatively; "
+                "refusing lease adoption (fail closed, #843)"
+            ],
+            "lease_id": lease_id,
+            "authoritative_source": "control_plane_db",
+            "file_lock_only": False,
+            "comment_lease_only": False,
+        }
+    if role is not None and str(role).strip():
+        supplied_role = str(role).strip().lower()
+        if supplied_role != active_role:
+            return {
+                "success": False,
+                "outcome": "blocked",
+                "mutation_performed": False,
+                "profile_role_kind": active_role,
+                "supplied_role": supplied_role,
+                "reasons": [
+                    f"caller-supplied role '{supplied_role}' does not match "
+                    f"the authenticated profile-derived role '{active_role}'; "
+                    "caller-supplied role/profile/namespace can never grant "
+                    "authority (fail closed, #843)"
+                ],
+                "lease_id": lease_id,
+                "authoritative_source": "control_plane_db",
+                "file_lock_only": False,
+                "comment_lease_only": False,
+            }
     db, errs = _control_plane_db_or_error()
     if db is None:
         return {"success": False, "reasons": errs}
-    profile = get_profile()
-    profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip() or "session"
-    active_role = _profile_role_kind(profile) or "author"
     sid = (session_id or "").strip() or (
         f"{profile_name}-{os.getpid()}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
     )
+    adopter_namespace = allocator_service.DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES.get(
+        active_role, f"gitea-{active_role}"
+    )
     try:
         return lease_lifecycle.adopt_lease(
             db,
             lease_id=lease_id,
             adopter_session_id=sid,
-            role=(role or active_role).strip() or "author",
+            role=active_role,
             worktree_path=worktree_path,
             expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha,
             owner_pid=os.getpid(),
             operator_authorized=bool(operator_authorized),
+            adopter_profile_name=profile_name,
+            adopter_namespace=adopter_namespace,
         )
     except (lease_lifecycle.LeaseLifecycleError, control_plane_db.ControlPlaneError) as exc:
         return {

lease_lifecycle.py

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SAFE_RELEASE_OWNED = "release_owned"
 SAFE_STALE_PROMPT = "stale_prompt_lease"
 SAFE_UNKNOWN = "inspect_only"
 SAFE_NO_AUTHORITY = "file_or_comment_not_authoritative"
+SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE = "consume_cross_role_handoff"
 
 LEASE_STATUS_ACTIVE = "active"
 LEASE_STATUS_RELEASED = "released"
@@ -250,6 +251,23 @@ def decide_safe_next_action(
                 "same_owner": True,
                 "also_allowed": [SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED, SAFE_RELEASE_OWNED],
             }
+        handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff({"lease": lease})
+        if handoff:
+            return {
+                "safe_next_action": SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE,
+                "reasons": [
+                    f"controller allocation pending handoff (freshness={status}); "
+                    "required-role worker may consume without abandon/reassign; "
+                    f"required_role={handoff['required_role']}"
+                ],
+                "block": False,
+                "same_owner": False,
+                "owner_session_id": owner,
+                "required_role": handoff["required_role"],
+                "cross_role_handoff": True,
+                "handoff_status": "pending",
+                "also_allowed": [SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED],
+            }
         return {
             "safe_next_action": SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED,
             "reasons": [
@@ -272,6 +290,24 @@ def decide_safe_next_action(
         }
 
     if not same_owner and status == "active":
+        # #843: pending cross-role handoff is consumable by required role
+        handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff({"lease": lease})
+        if handoff:
+            return {
+                "safe_next_action": SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE,
+                "reasons": [
+                    "controller cross-role allocation pending handoff; "
+                    f"required_role={handoff['required_role']}; "
+                    "consume via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease without "
+                    "abandonment or sharing the controller session"
+                ],
+                "block": False,
+                "same_owner": False,
+                "owner_session_id": owner,
+                "required_role": handoff["required_role"],
+                "cross_role_handoff": True,
+                "handoff_status": "pending",
+            }
         return {
             "safe_next_action": SAFE_WAIT_FOREIGN,
             "reasons": [
@@ -440,6 +476,84 @@ def list_active_leases(
     }
 
 
+
+def parse_lease_provenance(lease_or_state: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return durable lease provenance dict (empty when absent/unparseable)."""
+    if not lease_or_state:
+        return {}
+    if "provenance" in lease_or_state and isinstance(lease_or_state.get("provenance"), dict):
+        return dict(lease_or_state["provenance"])
+    raw = None
+    if "provenance_json" in lease_or_state:
+        raw = lease_or_state.get("provenance_json")
+    elif "lease" in lease_or_state and isinstance(lease_or_state.get("lease"), Mapping):
+        raw = lease_or_state["lease"].get("provenance_json")
+    if not raw:
+        return {}
+    if isinstance(raw, dict):
+        return dict(raw)
+    try:
+        loaded = json.loads(raw)
+    except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        return {}
+    return dict(loaded) if isinstance(loaded, dict) else {}
+
+
+def is_pending_cross_role_handoff(
+    state: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Return handoff evidence when a controller allocation awaits consume (#843).
+
+    A pending handoff is identified by durable provenance written at
+    cross-role apply time — not by title heuristics or session-id guessing.
+    """
+    if not state:
+        return None
+    lease = state.get("lease") if isinstance(state.get("lease"), Mapping) else state
+    if not isinstance(lease, Mapping):
+        return None
+    status = str(lease.get("status") or "").strip().lower()
+    if status in (LEASE_STATUS_ABANDONED, LEASE_STATUS_RELEASED, LEASE_STATUS_EXPIRED):
+        return None
+    prov = parse_lease_provenance(state)
+    if not prov and isinstance(lease, Mapping):
+        prov = parse_lease_provenance(lease)
+    if not prov.get("cross_role_handoff"):
+        return None
+    handoff_status = str(prov.get("handoff_status") or "pending").strip().lower()
+    if handoff_status != "pending":
+        return None
+    adopted_by = (
+        lease.get("adopted_by_session_id")
+        or prov.get("adopted_by_session_id")
+        or ""
+    )
+    if str(adopted_by).strip():
+        return None
+    required_role = str(
+        prov.get("required_role") or lease.get("role") or ""
+    ).strip().lower()
+    if not required_role:
+        return None
+    return {
+        "cross_role_handoff": True,
+        "handoff_status": "pending",
+        "required_role": required_role,
+        "allocating_session_id": str(
+            prov.get("allocating_session_id") or lease.get("session_id") or ""
+        ),
+        "allocating_role": str(prov.get("allocating_role") or "controller"),
+        "lease_id": str(lease.get("lease_id") or ""),
+        "assignment_id": (
+            str(state["assignment"]["assignment_id"])
+            if isinstance(state.get("assignment"), Mapping)
+            and state["assignment"].get("assignment_id")
+            else None
+        ),
+        "provenance": prov,
+    }
+
+
 def adopt_lease(
     db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB,
     *,
@@ -450,8 +564,17 @@ def adopt_lease(
     expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
     owner_pid: int | None = None,
     operator_authorized: bool = False,
+    adopter_profile_name: str | None = None,
+    adopter_namespace: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Sanctioned adopt path with provenance; never silent foreign steal."""
+    """Sanctioned adopt path with provenance; never silent foreign steal.
+
+    #843 F1: for a pending cross-role handoff, ``role`` must be the
+    authoritative profile-derived role supplied by the MCP boundary — never
+    caller-asserted authority. When the handoff provenance declares
+    ``required_profile`` / ``required_namespace`` and the caller context is
+    provided, both are validated exactly; a mismatch fails closed.
+    """
     state = db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
     if not state:
         raise LeaseLifecycleError(
@@ -463,11 +586,8 @@ def adopt_lease(
     owner = str(lease.get("session_id") or "")
     same_owner = owner == str(adopter_session_id)
 
-    if freshness["freshness"] == "active" and not same_owner:
+    handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff(state)
-        raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+    adopter_role = (role or "").strip().lower()
-            f"refusing to steal active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by "
-            f"{owner} (fail closed)"
-        )
 
     if freshness["freshness"] in ("abandoned", "released"):
         raise LeaseLifecycleError(
@@ -475,13 +595,64 @@ def adopt_lease(
             "(fail closed)"
         )
 
-    # Expired or stale: require abandon-style safety before ownership transfer
+    if handoff and not same_owner:
-    # when not same owner; same owner may reclaim.
+        # Terminal statuses already rejected above. Freshness may be
-    if not same_owner and freshness["freshness"] in (
+        # active OR stale_dead_process (controller exited) — both are
+        # consumable without abandonment when handoff is still pending.
+        if freshness["freshness"] not in (
+            "active",
+            "stale_dead_process",
+            "stale_missing_worktree",
+        ):
+            raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+                f"lease {lease_id} freshness={freshness['freshness']}; "
+                "terminal or non-active allocation cannot be handoff-consumed "
+                "(fail closed)"
+            )
+        required = handoff["required_role"]
+        if adopter_role != required:
+            raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+                f"wrong role for cross-role handoff consume of {lease_id}: "
+                f"required={required} adopter={adopter_role or 'none'} "
+                "(fail closed)"
+            )
+        # #843 F1: provenance profile/namespace restrictions are validated
+        # against the authoritative caller context when declared. Caller
+        # input can never widen authority; a mismatch fails closed.
+        handoff_prov = handoff.get("provenance") or {}
+        required_profile = str(
+            handoff_prov.get("required_profile") or ""
+        ).strip()
+        if required_profile and adopter_profile_name is not None:
+            if str(adopter_profile_name).strip() != required_profile:
+                raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+                    f"wrong profile for cross-role handoff consume of "
+                    f"{lease_id}: required_profile={required_profile} "
+                    f"adopter_profile={adopter_profile_name} (fail closed)"
+                )
+        required_namespace = str(
+            handoff_prov.get("required_namespace") or ""
+        ).strip()
+        if required_namespace and adopter_namespace is not None:
+            if str(adopter_namespace).strip() != required_namespace:
+                raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+                    f"wrong namespace for cross-role handoff consume of "
+                    f"{lease_id}: required_namespace={required_namespace} "
+                    f"adopter_namespace={adopter_namespace} (fail closed)"
+                )
+        reason = "cross-role-handoff-consume"
+    elif freshness["freshness"] == "active" and not same_owner:
+        raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+            f"refusing to steal active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by "
+            f"{owner} (fail closed)"
+        )
+    elif not same_owner and freshness["freshness"] in (
         "expired",
         "stale_dead_process",
         "stale_missing_worktree",
     ):
+        # Expired or stale (non-handoff): require abandon-style safety before
+        # ownership transfer when not same owner; same owner may reclaim.
         if not operator_authorized and freshness["freshness"] == "expired":
             # Deterministic reclaim of expired foreign lease is allowed
             # without operator flag (sanctioned expire reclaim).
@@ -492,6 +663,9 @@ def adopt_lease(
                 f"lease {lease_id} freshness={freshness['freshness']}; "
                 "use abandon with proof before foreign adopt (fail closed)"
             )
+        reason = "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
+    else:
+        reason = "owner-resume-adopt" if same_owner else "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
 
     provenance = build_adopt_provenance(
         adopted_from_session_id=owner,
@@ -504,10 +678,14 @@ def adopt_lease(
         worktree_path=worktree_path,
         expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha or lease.get("expected_head_sha"),
         prior_lease_id=lease_id,
-        reason=(
+        reason=reason,
-            "owner-resume-adopt" if same_owner else "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
-        ),
     )
+    if handoff and not same_owner:
+        provenance["cross_role_handoff"] = True
+        provenance["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
+        provenance["required_role"] = handoff["required_role"]
+        provenance["allocating_session_id"] = handoff["allocating_session_id"]
+        provenance["allocating_role"] = handoff["allocating_role"]
 
     result = db.adopt_lease(
         lease_id=lease_id,
@@ -518,7 +696,7 @@ def adopt_lease(
         owner_pid=owner_pid if owner_pid is not None else os.getpid(),
         provenance=provenance,
     )
-    return {
+    out = {
         "success": True,
         "outcome": result.get("outcome"),
         "same_owner": same_owner,
@@ -531,6 +709,24 @@ def adopt_lease(
         "comment_lease_only": False,
         "reasons": result.get("reasons") or [],
     }
+    if handoff and not same_owner:
+        out["cross_role_handoff"] = True
+        out["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
+        out["required_role"] = handoff["required_role"]
+        out["adopted_by_session_id"] = adopter_session_id
+        out["adopted_from_session_id"] = owner
+        lease_row = result.get("lease") or {}
+        if isinstance(lease_row, Mapping):
+            out["read_after_write"] = {
+                "lease_id": lease_row.get("lease_id"),
+                "session_id": lease_row.get("session_id"),
+                "role": lease_row.get("role"),
+                "status": lease_row.get("status"),
+                "adopted_by_session_id": lease_row.get("adopted_by_session_id"),
+                "adopted_from_session_id": lease_row.get("adopted_from_session_id"),
+                "phase": lease_row.get("phase"),
+            }
+    return out
 
 
 def release_lease(

tests/test_issue_843_cross_role_handoff.py

@@ -0,0 +1,682 @@
+"""Cross-role allocation handoff consumable by independent workers (#843).
+
+Regression coverage for the controller→required-role consume path:
+
+* controller allocates author work; independent author adopts successfully
+* author adoption succeeds after allocating controller process exits
+* author adoption without sharing controller session identity
+* wrong-role adoption rejected
+* concurrent/second adoption rejected without state corruption
+* terminal allocation adoption rejected
+* successful adoption produces authoritative ownership evidence
+* genuine abandoned-lease recovery remains valid
+* process_work_queue / allocate results include consume identifiers
+* same-role allocation behavior remains compatible
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from datetime import timedelta
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from allocator_service import (
+    ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+    ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+    OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
+    ROLE_AUTHOR,
+    ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+    ROLE_REVIEWER,
+    WorkCandidate,
+    allocate_next_work,
+)
+from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, ForeignLeaseError, _ts, _utc_now
+import lease_lifecycle as ll
+
+
+class CrossRoleHandoffTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
+        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role="controller",
+            profile="prgs-controller",
+            pid=99999999,  # dead-looking pid
+        )
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role="author",
+            profile="prgs-author",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="author-worker-2",
+            role="author",
+            profile="prgs-author",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="reviewer-worker",
+            role="reviewer",
+            profile="prgs-reviewer",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        self.wt = self._tmp.name
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def _ready_issue(self, number: int = 843, title: str = "handoff target") -> WorkCandidate:
+        return WorkCandidate(
+            kind="issue",
+            number=number,
+            labels=("status:ready", "type:bug"),
+            title=title,
+            priority=20,
+        )
+
+    def _controller_allocate(self, number: int = 843, **kwargs):
+        defaults = dict(
+            db=self.db,
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            candidates=[self._ready_issue(number)],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-controller",
+            username="controller-user",
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+        defaults.update(kwargs)
+        return allocate_next_work(**defaults)
+
+    def test_controller_allocates_author_independent_author_adopts(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate()
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertIn("consume_allocation", res)
+        consume = res["consume_allocation"]
+        self.assertEqual(consume["tool"], "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease")
+        self.assertEqual(consume["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertFalse(consume["controller_session_required"])
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        self.assertEqual(consume["lease_id"], lid)
+        self.assertIn(lid, res["next_valid_command"])
+
+        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(adopted["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        raw = adopted["read_after_write"]
+        self.assertEqual(raw["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["status"], "active")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["phase"], "adopted")
+
+        # Authoritative re-read
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "adopted")
+
+    def test_author_adoption_after_controller_process_exits(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=900)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        # Force owner_pid dead + freshness stale_dead_process
+        import sqlite3
+
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
+        try:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999 WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                (lid,),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        fr = ll.classify_lease_freshness(
+            state["lease"], pid_checker=lambda _p: False
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(fr["freshness"], "stale_dead_process")
+
+        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        # No abandon required
+        state2 = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state2["lease"]["status"], "active")
+        self.assertNotEqual(state2["lease"]["status"], "abandoned")
+
+    def test_adoption_without_sharing_controller_session_identity(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=901)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertNotEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        self.assertFalse(adopted["same_owner"])
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+
+    def test_wrong_role_adoption_rejected(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=902)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError) as ctx:
+            ll.adopt_lease(
+                self.db,
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="reviewer-worker",
+                role=ROLE_REVIEWER,
+            )
+        self.assertIn("wrong role", str(ctx.exception).lower())
+        # State unchanged
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        self.assertIsNone(state["lease"].get("adopted_by_session_id") or None)
+        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
+
+    def test_second_adoption_rejected_without_corruption(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=903)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        first = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError):
+            ll.adopt_lease(
+                self.db,
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
+                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+                worktree_path=self.wt,
+            )
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["status"], "active")
+
+    def test_terminal_allocation_adoption_rejected(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=904)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        # Abandon as terminal
+        proof = ll.AbandonProof(
+            dead_process=True,
+            missing_worktree=True,
+            no_open_pr=True,
+            no_live_mutation_risk=True,
+            owner_pid=99999999,
+            worktree_path="/nonexistent/for-843",
+        )
+        # Attach dead pid / missing wt for abandon eligibility
+        import sqlite3
+
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
+        try:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999, worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                ("/nonexistent/for-843", lid),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+        abandoned = ll.abandon_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            requester_session_id="author-worker",
+            proof=proof,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(abandoned["outcome"], "abandoned")
+        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError) as ctx:
+            ll.adopt_lease(
+                self.db,
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            )
+        self.assertIn("abandoned", str(ctx.exception).lower())
+
+    def test_successful_adoption_read_after_write_ownership(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=905)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        raw = adopted["read_after_write"]
+        self.assertEqual(raw["lease_id"], lid)
+        self.assertEqual(raw["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        # Re-fetch proves durable write
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], raw["session_id"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], raw["adopted_by_session_id"]
+        )
+
+    def test_genuine_abandoned_recovery_still_valid(self) -> None:
+        """Same-role author lease abandoned remains reclaimable via abandon path."""
+        same = allocate_next_work(
+            self.db,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            candidates=[self._ready_issue(906, "same-role")],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            username="author-user",
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(same["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
+        lid = same["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        import sqlite3
+
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
+        try:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999, worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                ("/nonexistent/same-role", lid),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+        proof = ll.AbandonProof(
+            dead_process=True,
+            missing_worktree=True,
+            no_open_pr=True,
+            no_live_mutation_risk=True,
+            owner_pid=99999999,
+            worktree_path="/nonexistent/same-role",
+        )
+        abandoned = ll.abandon_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            requester_session_id="author-worker-2",
+            proof=proof,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(abandoned["outcome"], "abandoned")
+        # Foreign author cannot handoff-consume an abandoned non-handoff lease
+        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError):
+            ll.adopt_lease(
+                self.db,
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
+                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            )
+        # Reclaim path still works for expired/abandoned after force-expire
+        reclaimed = ll.reclaim_expired_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="author-worker-2",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(reclaimed["outcome"], "reclaimed")
+        self.assertEqual(reclaimed["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker-2")
+
+    def test_allocate_payload_includes_consume_identifiers(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=907)
+        self.assertIn("consume_allocation", res)
+        c = res["consume_allocation"]
+        for key in (
+            "tool",
+            "lease_id",
+            "assignment_id",
+            "required_role",
+            "required_profile",
+            "required_namespace",
+            "instructions",
+            "handoff_status",
+        ):
+            self.assertIn(key, c)
+        self.assertEqual(c["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
+        self.assertEqual(c["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
+        self.assertIn("gitea_adopt_workflow_lease", c["instructions"])
+        self.assertTrue(res["lease_proof"]["cross_role_handoff"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["lease_proof"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
+
+    def test_same_role_allocation_remains_compatible(self) -> None:
+        res = allocate_next_work(
+            self.db,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            candidates=[self._ready_issue(908)],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            username="author-user",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
+        self.assertNotIn("consume_allocation", res)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        # No cross-role handoff provenance
+        prov = state.get("provenance") or {}
+        self.assertFalse(prov.get("cross_role_handoff"))
+        # Owner resume still works
+        resume = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(resume["same_owner"])
+        self.assertEqual(resume["outcome"], "adopted_owner_resume")
+
+    def test_inspect_points_required_role_at_consume(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=909)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        decision = ll.inspect_lease(
+            self.db, lid, caller_session_id="author-worker"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            decision["safe_next_action"], ll.SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(decision["block"])
+        self.assertEqual(decision["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+
+    def test_db_cas_rejects_concurrent_second_consume(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=910)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        # First consume via DB layer directly
+        first = self.db.adopt_lease(
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+            provenance={
+                "cross_role_handoff": True,
+                "handoff_status": "adopted",
+                "required_role": "author",
+            },
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        # Second CAS must fail
+        with self.assertRaises(ForeignLeaseError):
+            self.db.adopt_lease(
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
+                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+                worktree_path=self.wt,
+                provenance={
+                    "cross_role_handoff": True,
+                    "handoff_status": "pending",
+                    "required_role": "author",
+                },
+            )
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+
+
+class MCPBoundaryAdoptRoleBindingTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    """#843 F1: MCP-boundary role binding for ``gitea_adopt_workflow_lease``.
+
+    The library-level wrong-role test calls ``lease_lifecycle.adopt_lease``
+    directly. These tests prove the MCP entry point derives the adopter role
+    authoritatively from the active authenticated profile and rejects any
+    caller-supplied role that disagrees, so a reviewer/merger profile cannot
+    consume an author handoff by passing ``role="author"``.
+    """
+
+    AUTHOR_PROFILE = {
+        "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+        "role": "author",
+        "allowed_operations": [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.pr.create",
+            "gitea.branch.push",
+        ],
+        "forbidden_operations": [],
+    }
+    REVIEWER_PROFILE = {
+        "profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
+        "role": "reviewer",
+        "allowed_operations": [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.pr.review",
+            "gitea.pr.approve",
+            "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+        ],
+        "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
+    }
+    MERGER_PROFILE = {
+        "profile_name": "prgs-merger",
+        "role": "merger",
+        "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.merge"],
+        "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
+    }
+    FOREIGN_AUTHOR_PROFILE = {
+        "profile_name": "dadeschools-author",
+        "role": "author",
+        "allowed_operations": [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.pr.create",
+            "gitea.branch.push",
+        ],
+        "forbidden_operations": [],
+    }
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
+        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role="controller",
+            profile="prgs-controller",
+            pid=99999999,
+        )
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role="author",
+            profile="prgs-author",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        self.wt = self._tmp.name
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def _ready_issue(self, number: int) -> WorkCandidate:
+        return WorkCandidate(
+            kind="issue",
+            number=number,
+            labels=("status:ready", "type:bug"),
+            title="handoff target",
+            priority=20,
+        )
+
+    def _handoff_lease(self, number: int = 843) -> str:
+        res = allocate_next_work(
+            db=self.db,
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            candidates=[self._ready_issue(number)],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-controller",
+            username="controller-user",
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        return res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+
+    def _call_adopt_tool(self, profile: dict, **kwargs):
+        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp_server
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile),
+            patch.object(
+                mcp_server,
+                "_control_plane_db_or_error",
+                return_value=(self.db, []),
+            ),
+        ):
+            return mcp_server.gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
+                remote="prgs", **kwargs
+            )
+
+    def _assert_handoff_untouched(self, lease_id: str) -> None:
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        self.assertIsNone(state["lease"].get("adopted_by_session_id") or None)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["status"], "active")
+        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
+
+    def test_reviewer_profile_cannot_consume_author_handoff_via_role_author(
+        self,
+    ) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(920)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.REVIEWER_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="reviewer-worker",
+            role="author",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(result["supplied_role"], "author")
+        self.assertIn("does not match", result["reasons"][0])
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_merger_profile_cannot_consume_author_handoff_via_role_author(
+        self,
+    ) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(921)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.MERGER_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="merger-worker",
+            role="author",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "merger")
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_reviewer_profile_rejected_without_role_argument(self) -> None:
+        """Even without a spoofed role, the profile-derived role binds."""
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(922)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.REVIEWER_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="reviewer-worker",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertIn("wrong role", result["reasons"][0].lower())
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_author_profile_mismatching_supplied_role_rejected(self) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(923)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role="reviewer",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "author")
+        self.assertEqual(result["supplied_role"], "reviewer")
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_foreign_profile_name_rejected_for_author_handoff(self) -> None:
+        """Provenance required_profile binds even when the role matches."""
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(924)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.FOREIGN_AUTHOR_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="foreign-author-worker",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertIn("wrong profile", result["reasons"][0].lower())
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_author_profile_consumes_author_handoff(self) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(925)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role="author",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        self.assertEqual(result["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(result["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "adopted")
+
+    def test_author_profile_consumes_author_handoff_without_role_argument(
+        self,
+    ) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(926)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["role"], "author")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_system_health.py

@@ -1,499 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for the read-only system-health API (#634).
-
-Covers the acceptance criteria directly: a structured payload with readiness
-and a dependency list (AC1), version and uptime when knowable (AC2), stale
-runtime reported without a false mutation-safe claim (AC3), and the healthy /
-degraded-dependency / redaction cases (AC4).
-"""
-import json
-import os
-import sqlite3
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from pathlib import Path
-from unittest import mock
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
-
-import control_plane_db
-from webui.app import create_app
-from webui.deployment_boundary import scan_text_for_client_secrets
-from webui.system_health import (
-    API_PATH,
-    STATUS_DEGRADED,
-    STATUS_DOWN,
-    STATUS_OK,
-    STATUS_SKIPPED,
-    DependencyProbe,
-    StaleRuntime,
-    assess_stale_runtime,
-    clear_probe_cache,
-    load_system_health,
-    namespace_summaries,
-    probe_control_plane_db,
-    probe_gitea,
-    process_uptime,
-    redact,
-    redact_url,
-    snapshot_to_dict,
-)
-
-
-def _probe(name, status, *, required=True, detail="detail", kind="test"):
-    return DependencyProbe(
-        name=name,
-        kind=kind,
-        status=status,
-        detail=detail,
-        required=required,
-        latency_ms=1.5,
-        metadata={},
-    )
-
-
-_ALL_HEALTHY = (
-    _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
-    _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
-    _probe("gitea", STATUS_OK, required=False, kind="http"),
-)
-
-_CLEAN_PARITY = StaleRuntime(
-    daemon_head="abc123",
-    checkout_head="abc123",
-    remote_head="abc123",
-    stale=False,
-    determinable=True,
-    mutation_safe=True,
-    reasons=(),
-)
-
-
-class CleanParityMixin:
-    """Pin parity for tests about aggregation rather than staleness.
-
-    Without this the assertions depend on the real checkout: a worktree whose
-    branch is ahead of its upstream is genuinely stale, which would degrade the
-    overall status and make these cases fail for an unrelated reason.
-    """
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        super().setUp()
-        patcher = mock.patch(
-            "webui.system_health.assess_stale_runtime",
-            return_value=_CLEAN_PARITY,
-        )
-        patcher.start()
-        self.addCleanup(patcher.stop)
-
-
-class TestDependencyAggregation(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC1 — readiness and dependency list derived from probe results."""
-
-    def test_all_healthy_is_ok_and_ready(self):
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_OK)
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.readiness_complete)
-        self.assertEqual(snapshot.readiness_reasons, ())
-        self.assertEqual(len(snapshot.dependencies), 3)
-
-    def test_required_dependency_down_blocks_readiness(self):
-        probes = (
-            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_DOWN, detail="file missing", kind="sqlite"),
-            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
-            _probe("gitea", STATUS_OK, required=False, kind="http"),
-        )
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DOWN)
-        self.assertFalse(snapshot.ready)
-        self.assertTrue(
-            any("control_plane_db" in reason for reason in snapshot.readiness_reasons)
-        )
-
-    def test_optional_dependency_down_degrades_but_stays_ready(self):
-        """A failing optional probe must not claim the process itself is unready."""
-        probes = (
-            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
-            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
-            _probe("gitea", STATUS_DOWN, required=False, detail="timeout", kind="http"),
-        )
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
-        self.assertTrue(any("gitea" in reason for reason in snapshot.readiness_reasons))
-
-    def test_unrun_required_probe_leaves_readiness_incomplete(self):
-        """Not probed is not the same as passing."""
-        probes = (
-            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
-            _probe("repository", STATUS_SKIPPED, detail="offline", kind="git"),
-        )
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertFalse(snapshot.ready)
-        self.assertFalse(snapshot.readiness_complete)
-        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
-
-    def test_skipped_optional_probe_does_not_block_readiness(self):
-        probes = (
-            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
-            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
-            _probe("gitea", STATUS_SKIPPED, required=False, kind="http"),
-        )
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.readiness_complete)
-
-
-class TestVersionAndUptime(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC2 — version and uptime present when knowable."""
-
-    def test_uptime_and_start_time_present(self):
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertGreaterEqual(snapshot.uptime_seconds, 0.0)
-        self.assertIn("T", snapshot.started_at)
-
-    def test_process_uptime_helper_matches_shape(self):
-        started_at, uptime = process_uptime()
-        self.assertIn("T", started_at)
-        self.assertGreaterEqual(uptime, 0.0)
-
-    def test_version_reports_python_and_schema_version(self):
-        probes = (
-            DependencyProbe(
-                name="control_plane_db",
-                kind="sqlite",
-                status=STATUS_OK,
-                detail="ok",
-                required=True,
-                latency_ms=1.0,
-                metadata={"schema_version": control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION},
-            ),
-            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
-        )
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            snapshot.version.control_plane_schema_version,
-            control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.version.python_version)
-
-    def test_version_known_flag_false_when_sha_unavailable(self):
-        with mock.patch("webui.system_health._git", return_value=None):
-            snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
-        self.assertIsNone(snapshot.version.git_sha)
-        self.assertFalse(snapshot.version.known)
-
-
-class TestStaleRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC3 — stale runtime reflected without a false mutation-safe claim."""
-
-    def test_matching_commits_are_mutation_safe(self):
-        assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
-            Path("/tmp"),
-            daemon_head="aaa",
-            git_reader=lambda *args: "aaa",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(assessment.stale)
-        self.assertTrue(assessment.determinable)
-        self.assertTrue(assessment.mutation_safe)
-
-    def test_diverged_commits_are_stale_and_not_mutation_safe(self):
-        reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": "bbb"}
-        assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
-            Path("/tmp"),
-            daemon_head="aaa",
-            git_reader=lambda *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(assessment.stale)
-        self.assertFalse(assessment.mutation_safe)
-        self.assertTrue(assessment.reasons)
-
-    def test_unknown_remote_is_not_mutation_safe(self):
-        """Indeterminate must never read as safe."""
-        reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": None}
-        assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
-            Path("/tmp"),
-            daemon_head="aaa",
-            git_reader=lambda *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(assessment.determinable)
-        self.assertFalse(assessment.mutation_safe)
-        self.assertFalse(assessment.stale)
-        self.assertTrue(
-            any("indeterminate" in reason for reason in assessment.reasons)
-        )
-
-    def test_unobservable_daemon_head_is_disclosed(self):
-        assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
-            Path("/tmp"),
-            git_reader=lambda *args: "aaa",
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(
-            any("not observable" in reason for reason in assessment.reasons)
-        )
-
-    def test_stale_runtime_degrades_overall_status(self):
-        reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": "bbb"}
-        # Pinned rather than inherited: this path uses the default git reader,
-        # so the assertion must hold whether or not the suite runs offline.
-        with mock.patch.dict(os.environ, {"WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE": ""}), mock.patch(
-            "webui.system_health._git",
-            side_effect=lambda repo, *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
-        ):
-            snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="aaa")
-        self.assertTrue(snapshot.stale_runtime.stale)
-        self.assertFalse(snapshot.stale_runtime.mutation_safe)
-        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
-
-
-class TestControlPlaneDbProbe(unittest.TestCase):
-    """The required local dependency, probed read-only."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.addCleanup(self.tmp.cleanup)
-        self.db_path = str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "control-plane.db")
-
-    def _build_db(self, schema_version):
-        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
-        conn.execute("CREATE TABLE schema_meta (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT)")
-        conn.execute("CREATE TABLE leases (lease_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, status TEXT)")
-        conn.execute(
-            "INSERT INTO schema_meta(key, value) VALUES ('schema_version', ?)",
-            (str(schema_version),),
-        )
-        conn.execute("INSERT INTO leases(lease_id, status) VALUES ('l1', 'active')")
-        conn.commit()
-        conn.close()
-
-    def test_missing_database_is_down(self):
-        probe = probe_control_plane_db(str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "absent.db"))
-        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
-        self.assertTrue(probe.required)
-        self.assertIsNotNone(probe.latency_ms)
-
-    def test_matching_schema_is_ok(self):
-        self._build_db(control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION)
-        probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
-        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_OK)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            probe.metadata["schema_version"], control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(probe.metadata["active_leases"], 1)
-
-    def test_mismatched_schema_is_degraded(self):
-        self._build_db(control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION + 99)
-        probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
-        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
-
-    def test_probe_does_not_create_a_database(self):
-        """A health check must never initialise the substrate it inspects."""
-        absent = str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "never-created.db")
-        probe_control_plane_db(absent)
-        self.assertFalse(Path(absent).exists())
-
-    def test_unreadable_database_is_down_not_raised(self):
-        Path(self.db_path).write_text("this is not a sqlite database")
-        probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
-        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
-
-
-class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC4 — redaction. No credential-shaped text crosses the boundary."""
-
-    def test_redacts_token_assignment(self):
-        cleaned = redact("failed with token=ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ012345")
-        self.assertNotIn("ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ012345", cleaned)
-        self.assertIn("[redacted]", cleaned)
-
-    def test_redacts_authorization_header_text(self):
-        cleaned = redact("Authorization: Bearer abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456")
-        self.assertNotIn("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456", cleaned)
-
-    def test_redacts_long_opaque_strings(self):
-        cleaned = redact("value 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef here")
-        self.assertNotIn("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", cleaned)
-
-    def test_url_userinfo_and_query_are_stripped(self):
-        cleaned = redact_url("https://user:[email protected]/api/v1?token=xyz")
-        self.assertNotIn("secretpass", cleaned)
-        self.assertNotIn("token=xyz", cleaned)
-        self.assertEqual(cleaned, "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1")
-
-    def test_url_inside_free_text_is_redacted(self):
-        cleaned = redact("GET https://u:[email protected]/x?token=abc failed")
-        self.assertNotIn("u:p@", cleaned)
-        self.assertNotIn("token=abc", cleaned)
-
-    def test_gitea_probe_failure_detail_is_redacted(self):
-        boom = RuntimeError(
-            "connection refused for https://user:[email protected]/api/v1/version"
-        )
-        with mock.patch("webui.system_health.get_auth_header", return_value="token x"), \
-                mock.patch("webui.system_health.api_request", side_effect=boom):
-            probe = probe_gitea("gitea.example.com")
-        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
-        self.assertNotIn("hunter2", probe.detail)
-        self.assertEqual(scan_text_for_client_secrets(probe.detail), [])
-
-    def test_credential_guard_refusal_is_a_status_not_a_crash(self):
-        with mock.patch(
-            "webui.system_health.get_auth_header",
-            side_effect=RuntimeError("daemon guard refused"),
-        ):
-            probe = probe_gitea("gitea.example.com")
-        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
-        self.assertFalse(probe.required)
-
-
-class TestNamespaceSummaries(unittest.TestCase):
-    """A web process cannot prove IDE namespace health, and must not claim to."""
-
-    def test_every_namespace_reports_unproven(self):
-        rows = namespace_summaries()
-        self.assertTrue(rows)
-        for row in rows:
-            with self.subTest(namespace=row["namespace"]):
-                self.assertEqual(row["status"], "unproven")
-                self.assertFalse(row["ide_namespace_proven"])
-                self.assertIn("client_namespace", row["reason"])
-
-
-class TestSystemHealthRoutes(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
-    """The HTTP surface: versioned path, status codes, read-only guard."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        super().setUp()
-        clear_probe_cache()
-        self.addCleanup(clear_probe_cache)
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def _patch_snapshot(self, probes, daemon_head="abc123"):
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head=daemon_head)
-        patcher = mock.patch(
-            "webui.app.load_system_health",
-            return_value=snapshot,
-        )
-        patcher.start()
-        self.addCleanup(patcher.stop)
-        return snapshot
-
-    def test_versioned_route_is_registered(self):
-        self.assertEqual(API_PATH, "/api/v1/system/health")
-        self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
-        response = self.client.get(API_PATH)
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
-
-    def test_healthy_payload_shape(self):
-        self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
-        data = self.client.get(API_PATH).json()
-        self.assertEqual(data["status"], STATUS_OK)
-        self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["ready"])
-        self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["complete"])
-        self.assertEqual(data["api"], API_PATH)
-        self.assertEqual(len(data["dependencies"]), 3)
-        for key in ("version", "process", "stale_runtime", "mcp_namespaces"):
-            self.assertIn(key, data)
-        self.assertIn("uptime_seconds", data["process"])
-        self.assertIn("mutation_safe", data["stale_runtime"])
-
-    def test_degraded_dependency_returns_503(self):
-        probes = (
-            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_DOWN, detail="missing", kind="sqlite"),
-            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
-        )
-        self._patch_snapshot(probes)
-        response = self.client.get(API_PATH)
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 503)
-        data = response.json()
-        self.assertFalse(data["readiness"]["ready"])
-        self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["reasons"])
-
-    def test_dependency_entries_expose_status_and_latency(self):
-        self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
-        data = self.client.get(API_PATH).json()
-        names = {entry["name"] for entry in data["dependencies"]}
-        self.assertEqual(names, {"control_plane_db", "repository", "gitea"})
-        for entry in data["dependencies"]:
-            with self.subTest(dependency=entry["name"]):
-                self.assertIn("status", entry)
-                self.assertIn("required", entry)
-                self.assertIn("latency_ms", entry)
-
-    def test_response_body_carries_no_client_secrets(self):
-        self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
-        body = self.client.get(API_PATH).text
-        self.assertEqual(scan_text_for_client_secrets(body), [])
-
-    def test_deep_flag_is_forwarded(self):
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
-        with mock.patch(
-            "webui.app.load_system_health", return_value=snapshot
-        ) as loader:
-            self.client.get(f"{API_PATH}?deep=1")
-            loader.assert_called_once_with(deep=True)
-
-    def test_shallow_is_the_default(self):
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
-        with mock.patch(
-            "webui.app.load_system_health", return_value=snapshot
-        ) as loader:
-            self.client.get(API_PATH)
-            loader.assert_called_once_with(deep=False)
-
-    def test_route_rejects_mutation_methods(self):
-        for method in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"):
-            with self.subTest(method=method):
-                response = self.client.request(method, API_PATH)
-                self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
-                self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "read-only-mvp")
-
-    def test_default_shallow_call_skips_the_network_probe(self):
-        """The expensive probe must not run unless it was asked for."""
-        with mock.patch("webui.system_health.probe_gitea") as probe:
-            snapshot = load_system_health(deep=False)
-        probe.assert_not_called()
-        gitea = next(p for p in snapshot.dependencies if p.name == "gitea")
-        self.assertEqual(gitea.status, STATUS_SKIPPED)
-
-
-class TestHealthRouteBackwardCompatibility(unittest.TestCase):
-    """`/health` is expanded additively; MVP consumers must keep working."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_mvp_keys_are_unchanged(self):
-        data = self.client.get("/health").json()
-        self.assertEqual(data["status"], "ok")
-        self.assertEqual(data["service"], "mcp-control-plane-webui")
-        self.assertEqual(data["mode"], "read-only-mvp")
-        self.assertIn("timestamp", data)
-        self.assertEqual(data["deployment"]["mode"], "internal-operator-console")
-
-    def test_health_points_at_the_versioned_api(self):
-        data = self.client.get("/health").json()
-        self.assertEqual(data["system_health_api"], API_PATH)
-        self.assertIn("uptime_seconds", data)
-        self.assertIn("started_at", data)
-
-    def test_health_runs_no_dependency_probe(self):
-        """Liveness must stay cheap: no probe, no snapshot assembly."""
-        with mock.patch("webui.app.load_system_health") as loader:
-            response = self.client.get("/health")
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
-        loader.assert_not_called()
-
-
-class TestSnapshotSerialisation(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_snapshot_dict_is_json_serialisable(self):
-        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
-        encoded = json.dumps(snapshot_to_dict(snapshot))
-        self.assertIn("readiness", encoded)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -45,12 +45,6 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo
 from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
 from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
-from webui.system_health import (
-    API_PATH as SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
-    load_system_health,
-    process_uptime,
-    snapshot_to_dict as system_health_to_dict,
-)
 
 _READ_ONLY_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
 _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS = frozenset({"/audit", "/api/audit"})
@@ -84,43 +78,16 @@ async def home(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
 
 
 async def health(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
-    """Liveness only — deliberately cheap, runs no dependency probe (#634).
-
-    Every MVP key is retained so existing pollers keep working; the additions
-    are a pointer to the structured API and the in-memory process uptime.
-    Readiness lives at that API because answering it costs real probes.
-    """
     bind_host = _request.app.state.webui_bind_host
-    started_at, uptime_seconds = process_uptime()
     return JSONResponse({
         "status": "ok",
         "service": "mcp-control-plane-webui",
         "mode": "read-only-mvp",
         "timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
         "deployment": deployment_snapshot(bind_host=bind_host),
-        "started_at": started_at,
-        "uptime_seconds": uptime_seconds,
-        "system_health_api": SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
     })
 
 
-def _truthy_flag(value: str | None) -> bool:
-    return (value or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
-
-
-async def api_system_health(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
-    """Structured read-only system health (#634).
-
-    `?deep=1` opts into the expensive network probe. The response status code
-    reflects readiness so automated checks can branch on it without parsing the
-    body: 200 when ready, 503 when a required dependency failed or never ran.
-    """
-    deep = _truthy_flag(request.query_params.get("deep"))
-    snapshot = load_system_health(deep=deep)
-    payload = system_health_to_dict(snapshot)
-    return JSONResponse(payload, status_code=200 if snapshot.ready else 503)
-
-
 async def queue(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
     snapshot = load_queue_snapshot()
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title="Queue", body_html=render_queue_page(snapshot)))
@@ -432,7 +399,6 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
         routes=[
             Route("/", home, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/health", health, methods=["GET"]),
-            Route(SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH, api_system_health, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/queue", queue, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/queue", api_queue, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/projects", projects, methods=["GET"]),

webui/system_health.py

@@ -1,682 +0,0 @@
-"""Read-only system-health model for the operator console API (#634).
-
-`/health` answers liveness only. Operators automating readiness checks need a
-structured view of *why* the control plane is or is not usable: which
-dependencies answered, how long they took, what version of the code is running,
-and whether the runtime is stale relative to its remote.
-
-Three rules shape this module.
-
-* **Read-only.** Every probe opens its subject read-only. The control-plane
-  database is opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI so a health check can never
-  create or migrate a schema, and no probe writes, restarts, or reloads
-  anything — restart controls are Phase 2, and #630 forbids process-kill
-  recovery outright.
-* **Fail-soft.** A dependency that is unreachable is a *status*, not an
-  exception. Probes catch their own failures and report them as a degraded or
-  down entry carrying a reason.
-* **Never claim more than was proven.** Readiness is derived only from probes
-  that actually ran, ``mutation_safe`` stays false unless the parity commits are
-  known and equal, and an MCP namespace is reported unproven because a web
-  process cannot exercise the IDE-managed client path (#543).
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import re
-import sqlite3
-import subprocess
-import time
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Callable
-from urllib.parse import urlsplit, urlunsplit
-
-import control_plane_db
-import mcp_namespace_health
-from gitea_auth import api_request, get_auth_header, gitea_url
-
-from webui.project_registry import load_registry
-
-SERVICE_NAME = "mcp-control-plane-webui"
-API_PATH = "/api/v1/system/health"
-
-STATUS_OK = "ok"
-STATUS_DEGRADED = "degraded"
-STATUS_DOWN = "down"
-STATUS_SKIPPED = "skipped"
-STATUS_UNPROVEN = "unproven"
-
-# Statuses that count as a healthy answer from a probe.
-_HEALTHY_STATUSES = frozenset({STATUS_OK})
-# Statuses meaning "this probe did not run", as opposed to "it ran and failed".
-_NOT_RUN_STATUSES = frozenset({STATUS_SKIPPED})
-
-_DEEP_PROBE_TTL_ENV = "WEBUI_HEALTH_PROBE_TTL_SECONDS"
-_DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL = 15.0
-_GITEA_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
-
-_OFFLINE_ENV = "WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE"
-
-# Credential-shaped material that must never reach the browser, mirroring the
-# forbidden client patterns in webui/deployment_boundary.py.
-_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)\b(token|password|passwd|secret|authorization|bearer)\b\s*[:=]?\s*\S+"
-)
-_LONG_OPAQUE_RE = re.compile(r"\b[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{32,}\b")
-
-# Captured once at import so uptime measures this process, not the request.
-_STARTED_AT = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-_STARTED_MONOTONIC = time.monotonic()
-
-# TTL cache for the expensive (network) probe only.
-_deep_cache: dict[str, tuple[float, "DependencyProbe"]] = {}
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class DependencyProbe:
-    """One dependency check, fail-soft, with its own latency."""
-
-    name: str
-    kind: str
-    status: str
-    detail: str
-    required: bool
-    latency_ms: float | None = None
-    metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None
-
-    @property
-    def healthy(self) -> bool:
-        return self.status in _HEALTHY_STATUSES
-
-    @property
-    def ran(self) -> bool:
-        return self.status not in _NOT_RUN_STATUSES
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class VersionInfo:
-    git_sha: str | None
-    git_describe: str | None
-    control_plane_schema_version: int | None
-    python_version: str
-    known: bool
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class StaleRuntime:
-    """Parity between the running code, the checkout, and the remote.
-
-    ``mutation_safe`` is deliberately conservative: unknown is not safe.
-    """
-
-    daemon_head: str | None
-    checkout_head: str | None
-    remote_head: str | None
-    stale: bool
-    determinable: bool
-    mutation_safe: bool
-    reasons: tuple[str, ...]
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class SystemHealthSnapshot:
-    status: str
-    ready: bool
-    readiness_complete: bool
-    readiness_reasons: tuple[str, ...]
-    service: str
-    mode: str
-    version: VersionInfo
-    started_at: str
-    uptime_seconds: float
-    timestamp: str
-    deep_probes_requested: bool
-    dependencies: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...]
-    mcp_namespaces: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]
-    stale_runtime: StaleRuntime
-    probe_errors: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-
-
-def process_uptime() -> tuple[str, float]:
-    """Process start timestamp and uptime — in-memory, safe for `/health`."""
-    return _STARTED_AT.isoformat(), round(time.monotonic() - _STARTED_MONOTONIC, 3)
-
-
-def _offline() -> bool:
-    return (os.environ.get(_OFFLINE_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes"}
-
-
-def _repo_root() -> Path:
-    override = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_REPO_ROOT") or "").strip()
-    if override:
-        return Path(override).resolve()
-    return Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
-
-
-def _deep_probe_ttl() -> float:
-    raw = (os.environ.get(_DEEP_PROBE_TTL_ENV) or "").strip()
-    if not raw:
-        return _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
-    try:
-        value = float(raw)
-    except ValueError:
-        return _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
-    return value if value >= 0 else _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
-
-
-def redact(text: str) -> str:
-    """Strip credential-shaped material from operator-visible probe text.
-
-    Probe details carry exception strings, and an exception raised by an HTTP
-    client can quote the request that failed. Redaction happens here, at the
-    boundary where those strings become part of a browser-bound payload.
-    """
-    if not text:
-        return ""
-    cleaned = _redact_urls(text)
-    cleaned = _SECRET_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}=[redacted]", cleaned)
-    return _LONG_OPAQUE_RE.sub("[redacted]", cleaned)
-
-
-def _redact_urls(text: str) -> str:
-    return re.sub(r"https?://\S+", lambda m: redact_url(m.group(0)), text)
-
-
-def redact_url(url: str) -> str:
-    """Reduce a URL to scheme://host/path — no userinfo, no query, no fragment."""
-    try:
-        parts = urlsplit(url)
-    except ValueError:
-        return "[redacted-url]"
-    if not parts.scheme or not parts.hostname:
-        return "[redacted-url]"
-    netloc = parts.hostname
-    if parts.port:
-        netloc = f"{netloc}:{parts.port}"
-    return urlunsplit((parts.scheme, netloc, parts.path, "", ""))
-
-
-def _git(repo: Path, *args: str) -> str | None:
-    try:
-        completed = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "-C", str(repo), *args],
-            capture_output=True,
-            text=True,
-            check=False,
-            timeout=10,
-        )
-    except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
-        return None
-    if completed.returncode != 0:
-        return None
-    return (completed.stdout or "").strip() or None
-
-
-def _load_version(repo: Path, *, schema_version: int | None) -> VersionInfo:
-    import platform
-
-    git_sha = None if _offline() else _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
-    describe = None if _offline() else _git(repo, "describe", "--tags", "--always")
-    return VersionInfo(
-        git_sha=git_sha,
-        git_describe=describe,
-        control_plane_schema_version=schema_version,
-        python_version=platform.python_version(),
-        known=bool(git_sha),
-    )
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Dependency probes
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def _elapsed_ms(started: float) -> float:
-    return round((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000, 3)
-
-
-def probe_control_plane_db(db_path: str | None = None) -> DependencyProbe:
-    """Read-only reachability check for the control-plane SQLite substrate.
-
-    Opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI on purpose: ``ControlPlaneDB.__init__``
-    creates directories and runs schema migrations, which a health check must
-    never do.
-    """
-    path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path()).strip()
-    started = time.monotonic()
-    metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"path": path}
-
-    def _result(status: str, detail: str) -> DependencyProbe:
-        return DependencyProbe(
-            name="control_plane_db",
-            kind="sqlite",
-            status=status,
-            detail=detail,
-            required=True,
-            latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
-            metadata=metadata,
-        )
-
-    if not path or not os.path.exists(path):
-        return _result(STATUS_DOWN, "control-plane database file does not exist yet")
-    try:
-        conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=5)
-        try:
-            row = conn.execute(
-                "SELECT value FROM schema_meta WHERE key = 'schema_version'"
-            ).fetchone()
-            leases = conn.execute(
-                "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM leases WHERE status = 'active'"
-            ).fetchone()
-        finally:
-            conn.close()
-    except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-        return _result(STATUS_DOWN, redact(f"control-plane database unreadable: {exc}"))
-
-    schema_version = int(row[0]) if row and str(row[0]).isdigit() else None
-    metadata["schema_version"] = schema_version
-    metadata["active_leases"] = int(leases[0]) if leases else None
-    if schema_version is None:
-        return _result(
-            STATUS_DEGRADED, "control-plane database has no recorded schema version"
-        )
-    if schema_version != control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION:
-        return _result(
-            STATUS_DEGRADED,
-            f"control-plane schema version {schema_version} does not match the "
-            f"version this code expects ({control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION})",
-        )
-    return _result(STATUS_OK, f"schema v{schema_version} readable")
-
-
-def probe_repository(repo: Path) -> DependencyProbe:
-    """Local checkout reachability — required, cheap, no network."""
-    started = time.monotonic()
-    metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"repo_root": str(repo)}
-    if _offline():
-        return DependencyProbe(
-            name="repository",
-            kind="git",
-            status=STATUS_SKIPPED,
-            detail=f"{_OFFLINE_ENV} is set; git probe skipped",
-            required=True,
-            latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
-            metadata=metadata,
-        )
-    head = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
-    if not head:
-        return DependencyProbe(
-            name="repository",
-            kind="git",
-            status=STATUS_DOWN,
-            detail=f"HEAD could not be read at {repo}",
-            required=True,
-            latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
-            metadata=metadata,
-        )
-    branch = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD")
-    metadata["head"] = head
-    metadata["branch"] = branch
-    return DependencyProbe(
-        name="repository",
-        kind="git",
-        status=STATUS_OK,
-        detail=f"checkout readable at {branch or 'detached HEAD'}",
-        required=True,
-        latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
-        metadata=metadata,
-    )
-
-
-def probe_gitea(host: str) -> DependencyProbe:
-    """Live Gitea reachability. Expensive (network), so opt-in via ``deep``.
-
-    Optional by design: the console stays useful for local inventory when the
-    remote is unreachable, so a failure here degrades status without claiming
-    the process itself is unready.
-    """
-    started = time.monotonic()
-    metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"host": host}
-
-    def _failure(status: str, detail: str) -> DependencyProbe:
-        return DependencyProbe(
-            name="gitea",
-            kind="http",
-            status=status,
-            detail=detail,
-            required=False,
-            latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
-            metadata=metadata,
-        )
-
-    if not host:
-        return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, "no Gitea host is configured in the registry")
-    try:
-        auth = get_auth_header(host)
-    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — credential guards are a status here
-        return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, redact(f"credential lookup refused: {exc}"))
-    if not auth:
-        return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, f"no credentials available for {host}")
-
-    url = gitea_url(host, "/api/v1/version")
-    metadata["endpoint"] = redact_url(url)
-    try:
-        data = api_request("GET", url, auth, timeout=_GITEA_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
-    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — a down dependency is a status
-        return _failure(STATUS_DOWN, redact(f"Gitea probe failed: {exc}"))
-
-    if isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("version"):
-        metadata["gitea_version"] = str(data["version"])
-    return DependencyProbe(
-        name="gitea",
-        kind="http",
-        status=STATUS_OK,
-        detail=f"{host} reachable",
-        required=False,
-        latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
-        metadata=metadata,
-    )
-
-
-def _skipped_gitea(host: str) -> DependencyProbe:
-    return DependencyProbe(
-        name="gitea",
-        kind="http",
-        status=STATUS_SKIPPED,
-        detail="network probe not requested; call with ?deep=1 to run it",
-        required=False,
-        latency_ms=None,
-        metadata={"host": host},
-    )
-
-
-def namespace_summaries() -> tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]:
-    """Declared MCP namespaces, each honestly reported as unproven.
-
-    The web process runs outside the IDE-managed MCP client, so it cannot
-    invoke a namespace tool. Per #543 only a ``client_namespace`` probe proves
-    that path, and inventing a healthy verdict here is exactly the false claim
-    the mutation gates exist to prevent.
-    """
-    rows: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-    for namespace, required_tool in sorted(
-        mcp_namespace_health.REQUIRED_NAMESPACE_TOOLS.items()
-    ):
-        classification = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
-            namespace,
-            required_tool=required_tool,
-            probe_result=None,
-            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_UNKNOWN,
-        )
-        rows.append(
-            {
-                "namespace": namespace,
-                "required_tool": required_tool,
-                "status": STATUS_UNPROVEN,
-                "ide_namespace_proven": bool(classification.get("ide_namespace_proven")),
-                "reason": (
-                    "the web console cannot invoke the IDE-managed MCP client; "
-                    "namespace health must be proven with a client_namespace "
-                    "probe (#543)"
-                ),
-                "error_type": classification.get("error_type"),
-            }
-        )
-    return tuple(rows)
-
-
-def assess_stale_runtime(
-    repo: Path,
-    *,
-    daemon_head: str | None = None,
-    git_reader: Callable[..., str | None] | None = None,
-) -> StaleRuntime:
-    """Three-way parity view: running code, local checkout, remote-tracking ref.
-
-    ``mutation_safe`` requires all three to be known and equal. Anything less —
-    including "the remote ref was never fetched" — is reported as not safe with
-    a reason, so an operator never reads an unproven green.
-    """
-    reader = git_reader or (lambda *args: _git(repo, *args))
-    reasons: list[str] = []
-    # The offline switch suppresses real subprocess calls; an explicitly
-    # injected reader is already a substitute for them and is always used.
-    offline = _offline() and git_reader is None
-
-    checkout_head = None if offline else reader("rev-parse", "HEAD")
-    remote_head = None if offline else reader("rev-parse", "@{upstream}")
-    if offline:
-        reasons.append(f"{_OFFLINE_ENV} is set; parity commits were not read")
-    else:
-        if checkout_head is None:
-            reasons.append("local checkout HEAD could not be read")
-        if remote_head is None:
-            reasons.append(
-                "no remote-tracking commit is known for the current branch; "
-                "remote staleness is indeterminate (no fetch is performed here)"
-            )
-
-    effective_daemon = daemon_head if daemon_head is not None else checkout_head
-    if daemon_head is None:
-        reasons.append(
-            "the running MCP daemon's startup commit is not observable from the "
-            "web process; the checkout commit is reported in its place"
-        )
-
-    determinable = bool(checkout_head and remote_head and effective_daemon)
-    stale = bool(
-        determinable and len({checkout_head, remote_head, effective_daemon}) > 1
-    )
-    if stale:
-        reasons.append(
-            "runtime, checkout, and remote commits disagree; restart the MCP "
-            "server after updating the checkout before trusting capability gates"
-        )
-
-    return StaleRuntime(
-        daemon_head=effective_daemon,
-        checkout_head=checkout_head,
-        remote_head=remote_head,
-        stale=stale,
-        determinable=determinable,
-        mutation_safe=bool(determinable and not stale),
-        reasons=tuple(reasons),
-    )
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Snapshot assembly
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def _default_host() -> str:
-    registry = load_registry()
-    if not registry.projects:
-        return ""
-    raw = registry.projects[0].remote_host
-    parts = urlsplit(raw.strip())
-    return parts.netloc or raw.strip().rstrip("/")
-
-
-def _aggregate(
-    probes: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...],
-) -> tuple[str, bool, bool, tuple[str, ...]]:
-    """Fold probe results into overall status and readiness.
-
-    Required probes drive readiness; optional probes can only degrade status.
-    A probe that did not run leaves readiness incomplete rather than passing.
-    """
-    reasons: list[str] = []
-    required = [probe for probe in probes if probe.required]
-    unrun_required = [probe for probe in required if not probe.ran]
-    failed_required = [probe for probe in required if probe.ran and not probe.healthy]
-    failed_optional = [
-        probe
-        for probe in probes
-        if not probe.required and probe.ran and not probe.healthy
-    ]
-
-    for probe in unrun_required:
-        reasons.append(
-            f"required dependency '{probe.name}' was not probed: {probe.detail}"
-        )
-    for probe in failed_required:
-        reasons.append(
-            f"required dependency '{probe.name}' is {probe.status}: {probe.detail}"
-        )
-    for probe in failed_optional:
-        reasons.append(
-            f"optional dependency '{probe.name}' is {probe.status}: {probe.detail}"
-        )
-
-    readiness_complete = not unrun_required
-    ready = readiness_complete and not failed_required
-
-    if any(probe.status == STATUS_DOWN for probe in failed_required):
-        status = STATUS_DOWN
-    elif failed_required or failed_optional or unrun_required:
-        status = STATUS_DEGRADED
-    else:
-        status = STATUS_OK
-    return status, ready, readiness_complete, tuple(reasons)
-
-
-def load_system_health(
-    *,
-    deep: bool = False,
-    host: str | None = None,
-    probes: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...] | None = None,
-    daemon_head: str | None = None,
-    use_cache: bool = True,
-) -> SystemHealthSnapshot:
-    """Assemble the read-only system-health snapshot.
-
-    ``deep=True`` adds the network probe against Gitea; its result is cached for
-    a short TTL so repeated dashboard polls do not amplify into remote load.
-    """
-    repo = _repo_root()
-    probe_errors: list[str] = []
-
-    if probes is None:
-        collected: list[DependencyProbe] = []
-        for probe_fn in (
-            lambda: probe_control_plane_db(),
-            lambda: probe_repository(repo),
-        ):
-            try:
-                collected.append(probe_fn())
-            except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — a probe must not 500 the API
-                probe_errors.append(redact(f"probe raised: {exc}"))
-        resolved_host = host if host is not None else _default_host()
-        if deep and not _offline():
-            collected.append(_cached_gitea_probe(resolved_host, use_cache=use_cache))
-        else:
-            collected.append(_skipped_gitea(resolved_host))
-        probes = tuple(collected)
-
-    status, ready, readiness_complete, reasons = _aggregate(probes)
-    stale = assess_stale_runtime(repo, daemon_head=daemon_head)
-    if stale.stale:
-        if status == STATUS_OK:
-            status = STATUS_DEGRADED
-        reasons = reasons + (
-            "runtime is stale relative to its remote-tracking commit",
-        )
-
-    db_probe = next((p for p in probes if p.name == "control_plane_db"), None)
-    schema_version = None
-    if db_probe and db_probe.metadata:
-        schema_version = db_probe.metadata.get("schema_version")
-
-    return SystemHealthSnapshot(
-        status=status,
-        ready=ready,
-        readiness_complete=readiness_complete,
-        readiness_reasons=reasons,
-        service=SERVICE_NAME,
-        mode="read-only",
-        version=_load_version(repo, schema_version=schema_version),
-        started_at=_STARTED_AT.isoformat(),
-        uptime_seconds=round(time.monotonic() - _STARTED_MONOTONIC, 3),
-        timestamp=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-        deep_probes_requested=deep,
-        dependencies=probes,
-        mcp_namespaces=namespace_summaries(),
-        stale_runtime=stale,
-        probe_errors=tuple(probe_errors),
-    )
-
-
-def _cached_gitea_probe(host: str, *, use_cache: bool = True) -> DependencyProbe:
-    ttl = _deep_probe_ttl()
-    now = time.monotonic()
-    if use_cache and ttl > 0:
-        cached = _deep_cache.get(host)
-        if cached and (now - cached[0]) < ttl:
-            return cached[1]
-    probe = probe_gitea(host)
-    if use_cache and ttl > 0:
-        _deep_cache[host] = (now, probe)
-    return probe
-
-
-def clear_probe_cache() -> None:
-    """Drop cached deep-probe results (tests and operator-forced refresh)."""
-    _deep_cache.clear()
-
-
-def probe_to_dict(probe: DependencyProbe) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return {
-        "name": probe.name,
-        "kind": probe.kind,
-        "status": probe.status,
-        "detail": probe.detail,
-        "required": probe.required,
-        "healthy": probe.healthy,
-        "latency_ms": probe.latency_ms,
-        "metadata": dict(probe.metadata or {}),
-    }
-
-
-def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return {
-        "status": snapshot.status,
-        "service": snapshot.service,
-        "mode": snapshot.mode,
-        "api": API_PATH,
-        "timestamp": snapshot.timestamp,
-        "readiness": {
-            "ready": snapshot.ready,
-            "complete": snapshot.readiness_complete,
-            "reasons": list(snapshot.readiness_reasons),
-        },
-        "version": {
-            "git_sha": snapshot.version.git_sha,
-            "git_describe": snapshot.version.git_describe,
-            "control_plane_schema_version": (
-                snapshot.version.control_plane_schema_version
-            ),
-            "python_version": snapshot.version.python_version,
-            "known": snapshot.version.known,
-        },
-        "process": {
-            "started_at": snapshot.started_at,
-            "uptime_seconds": snapshot.uptime_seconds,
-        },
-        "deep_probes_requested": snapshot.deep_probes_requested,
-        "dependencies": [probe_to_dict(probe) for probe in snapshot.dependencies],
-        "mcp_namespaces": [dict(row) for row in snapshot.mcp_namespaces],
-        "stale_runtime": {
-            "daemon_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.daemon_head,
-            "checkout_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.checkout_head,
-            "remote_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.remote_head,
-            "stale": snapshot.stale_runtime.stale,
-            "determinable": snapshot.stale_runtime.determinable,
-            "mutation_safe": snapshot.stale_runtime.mutation_safe,
-            "reasons": list(snapshot.stale_runtime.reasons),
-        },
-        "probe_errors": list(snapshot.probe_errors),
-    }