Merge branch 'master' into fix/issue-843-cross-role-allocation-handoff

Review #515 F1: gitea_adopt_workflow_lease trusted a caller-supplied role
((role or active_role)), so any namespace holding gitea.read could consume
an author-only cross-role handoff by passing role="author".

- Derive the adopter role authoritatively from the active profile; reject
  any supplied role that does not exactly match (no silent accept).
- Pass the profile-derived role and authoritative profile/namespace context
  to lease_lifecycle.adopt_lease; validate handoff provenance
  required_profile/required_namespace against it (fail closed).
- Fail closed when the profile role cannot be derived (no author default).
- Add MCP-boundary regression tests: reviewer/merger profiles cannot
  consume an author handoff via role="author"; the legitimate author
  profile still consumes; foreign required_profile rejected.

allocator_service.py

@@ -78,6 +78,33 @@ VALID_ROLES = frozenset(
     {ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER, ROLE_RECONCILER, ROLE_CONTROLLER}
 )
 
+# Allocation modes (#840).
+# role_scoped: only candidates whose expected role matches the caller role.
+# cross_role:  controller-owned generic queue selection — inspect full queue,
+# rank/eligibility canonically, return one selection naming the required
+# downstream role/profile. Controller routes; it does not perform mutations.
+ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED = "role_scoped"
+ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE = "cross_role"
+VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES = frozenset(
+    {ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED, ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE}
+)
+
+# Default execution-profile / MCP-namespace names for each role.
+DEFAULT_ROLE_PROFILES: dict[str, str] = {
+    ROLE_AUTHOR: "prgs-author",
+    ROLE_REVIEWER: "prgs-reviewer",
+    ROLE_MERGER: "prgs-merger",
+    ROLE_RECONCILER: "prgs-reconciler",
+    ROLE_CONTROLLER: "prgs-controller",
+}
+DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES: dict[str, str] = {
+    ROLE_AUTHOR: "gitea-author",
+    ROLE_REVIEWER: "gitea-reviewer",
+    ROLE_MERGER: "gitea-merger",
+    ROLE_RECONCILER: "gitea-reconciler",
+    ROLE_CONTROLLER: "gitea-controller",
+}
+
 # Default action matrices by role (mutation gate will re-check).
 ROLE_ACTIONS: dict[str, tuple[tuple[str, ...], tuple[str, ...]]] = {
     ROLE_AUTHOR: (
@@ -259,6 +286,126 @@ def normalize_role(role: str | None, *, profile_name: str | None = None) -> str:
     )
 
 
+def resolve_allocation_mode(
+    role: str,
+    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    """Resolve allocation mode; controller defaults to cross_role (#840)."""
+    raw = (allocation_mode or "").strip().lower()
+    if raw:
+        if raw not in VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES:
+            raise ControlPlaneError(
+                f"unknown allocation_mode {allocation_mode!r}; expected one of "
+                f"{sorted(VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES)}"
+            )
+        return raw
+    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        return ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE
+    return ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED
+
+
+def required_profile_for_role(
+    role: str,
+    *,
+    profile_name: str | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    """Map a required role to the canonical execution profile name."""
+    role_norm = (role or "").strip().lower()
+    # Preserve remote/env prefix from the active profile when present
+    # (e.g. dadeschools-author → dadeschools-reviewer).
+    active = (profile_name or "").strip()
+    if active:
+        lower = active.lower()
+        for token in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"):
+            if lower.endswith(f"-{token}") or lower == token:
+                prefix = active[: -len(token)].rstrip("-")
+                if prefix:
+                    return f"{prefix}-{role_norm}"
+                return role_norm
+    return DEFAULT_ROLE_PROFILES.get(role_norm, f"prgs-{role_norm}")
+
+
+def required_namespace_for_role(
+    role: str,
+    *,
+    profile_name: str | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    """Map a required role to the canonical MCP namespace name."""
+    role_norm = (role or "").strip().lower()
+    profile = required_profile_for_role(role_norm, profile_name=profile_name)
+    # Namespace is typically gitea-<role>; keep stable mapping when profile is
+    # non-prgs (still gitea-<role> for isolation).
+    return DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES.get(role_norm, f"gitea-{role_norm}")
+
+
+def selected_action_for_candidate(c: WorkCandidate, required_role: str) -> str:
+    """Canonical next action for the selected work under *required_role*."""
+    role = (required_role or "").strip().lower()
+    if role == ROLE_AUTHOR:
+        if c.kind == "pr" and c.request_changes_current_head:
+            return "address_pr_change_requests"
+        if c.kind == "pr":
+            return "update_pr"
+        return "implement"
+    if role == ROLE_REVIEWER:
+        if c.approval_stale:
+            return "re_review"
+        return "review"
+    if role == ROLE_MERGER:
+        return "merge"
+    if role == ROLE_RECONCILER:
+        if c.approval_contaminated:
+            return "reconcile_contaminated_approval"
+        return "reconcile"
+    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        return "diagnose"
+    return "process"
+
+
+def build_selection_dict(
+    selected: WorkCandidate,
+    *,
+    active_role: str,
+    required_role: str,
+    profile_name: str | None = None,
+    allocation_mode: str,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Authoritative single selection payload for allocator results (#840)."""
+    action = selected_action_for_candidate(selected, required_role)
+    req_profile = required_profile_for_role(
+        required_role, profile_name=profile_name
+    )
+    req_ns = required_namespace_for_role(
+        required_role, profile_name=profile_name
+    )
+    return {
+        "kind": selected.kind,
+        "number": selected.number,
+        "title": selected.title,
+        "labels": list(selected.labels),
+        "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
+        "priority": selected.priority,
+        "expected_role_next": required_role,
+        "required_role": required_role,
+        "selected_action": action,
+        "action": action,
+        "required_profile": req_profile,
+        "required_namespace": req_ns,
+        "pinned": {
+            "kind": selected.kind,
+            "number": selected.number,
+            "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
+            "issue_number": selected.number if selected.kind == "issue" else None,
+            "pr_number": selected.number if selected.kind == "pr" else None,
+        },
+        "reason_selected": (
+            f"highest-priority eligible candidate under allocation_mode="
+            f"'{allocation_mode}' (active_role={active_role}, "
+            f"required_role={required_role}, action={action})"
+        ),
+    }
+
+
 def expected_role_for_candidate(c: WorkCandidate) -> str:
     """ADR §5.3 routing: which role should take this work next."""
     if c.kind == "pr":
@@ -289,6 +436,7 @@ def classify_skip(
     role: str,
     terminal_pr: int | None,
     claim_ownership: str | None = None,
+    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
 ) -> str | None:
     """Return skip reason, or None if candidate is selectable for *role*.
 
@@ -297,7 +445,12 @@ def classify_skip(
     and unknown claims are excluded so one session's in-progress task can never
     blockade the queue for a different controller; ``own`` stays selectable so
     a controller can resume its own work.
+
+    *allocation_mode* (#840): ``cross_role`` (controller default) ranks the full
+    queue and selects the highest-priority eligible item for any downstream
+    role. ``role_scoped`` retains prior role-match filtering.
     """
+    mode = resolve_allocation_mode(role, allocation_mode)
     if c.state in ("merged", "closed"):
         return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} is {c.state}; never assign"
     if c.blocked or "status:blocked" in c.labels:
@@ -322,34 +475,58 @@ def classify_skip(
     if c.kind == "pr" and not (c.head_sha or "").strip():
         return f"pr#{c.number} missing head_sha pin"
 
+    expected = expected_role_for_candidate(c)
+
     # Terminal path first: when an active terminal PR exists, only that PR
-    # (or controller diagnosis) is assignable for review-path roles.
+    # is assignable for review-path roles (or for work whose expected role is
+    # review/merge under cross_role selection).
     if terminal_pr is not None and c.kind == "pr" and c.number != terminal_pr:
-        if role in (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER):
+        terminal_roles = (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER)
+        if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE:
+            if expected in terminal_roles:
+                return (
+                    f"pr#{c.number} skipped: active terminal-review lock on "
+                    f"PR #{terminal_pr} must be resolved first"
+                )
+        elif role in terminal_roles:
             return (
                 f"pr#{c.number} skipped: active terminal-review lock on "
                 f"PR #{terminal_pr} must be resolved first"
             )
 
-    expected = expected_role_for_candidate(c)
+    if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE:
-    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        # Cross-role controller selection: eligibility only — no active-role
-        # Controller may inspect anything but only assigns diagnosis targets
+        # match filter. The selection payload names required_role.
-        # when contaminated / blocked.
+        pass
+    elif role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        # Legacy diagnosis-only controller path (role_scoped): only reconciler-
+        # needed targets. Prefer cross_role for generic queue allocation.
         if expected == ROLE_RECONCILER or c.blocked:
             return None
-        return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} does not require controller (expected {expected})"
+        return (
-
+            f"{c.kind}#{c.number} does not require controller "
-    if role != expected:
+            f"(expected {expected})"
+        )
+    elif role != expected:
         return (
             f"{c.kind}#{c.number} expects role '{expected}', active role is '{role}'"
         )
 
     # Ready-gate for issues: prefer status:ready when labels present.
+    # Applies for author-bound work in both modes (cross_role only gates
+    # author-expected issues so reconciler/reviewer PRs stay selectable).
     if c.kind == "issue" and c.labels:
-        if "status:ready" not in c.labels and "status:in-progress" not in c.labels:
+        gate_role = expected if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE else role
-            # Allow unlabeled open issues; only skip explicit non-ready states.
+        if gate_role in (ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_CONTROLLER):
+            if (
+                "status:ready" not in c.labels
+                and "status:in-progress" not in c.labels
+            ):
                 if any(l.startswith("status:") for l in c.labels):
-                return f"issue#{c.number} not status:ready ({','.join(c.labels)})"
+                    return (
+                        f"issue#{c.number} not status:ready "
+                        f"({','.join(c.labels)})"
+                    )
     return None
 
 
@@ -501,12 +678,19 @@ def allocate_next_work(
     claims: Mapping[tuple[str, int], dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
     exclude_issue_numbers: Sequence[int] | None = None,
     expected_candidate_set_fingerprint: str | None = None,
+    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Select and optionally reserve the next work unit via control-plane DB.
 
     *apply=False* (default): dry-run selection only — no lease/assignment.
     *apply=True*: atomic ``assign_and_lease`` for the selected candidate.
 
+    *allocation_mode* (#840): ``cross_role`` (default for controller) inspects
+    the complete queue and returns one authoritative selection naming the
+    required downstream role/profile/action. ``role_scoped`` keeps prior
+    per-role filtering. Controller routes only — never grants author/reviewer/
+    merger/reconciler mutation rights to the controller session.
+
     *exclude_issue_numbers* (#776): numbers removed before ranking. Omitted /
     empty preserves prior behavior.
 
@@ -541,6 +725,19 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
         }
 
+    try:
+        mode = resolve_allocation_mode(role_norm, allocation_mode)
+    except ControlPlaneError as exc:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "outcome": OUTCOME_ROLE_INELIGIBLE,
+            "reasons": [str(exc)],
+            "skipped": [],
+            "assignment": None,
+            "substrate": "control_plane_db",
+            "allocation_mode": (allocation_mode or "").strip() or None,
+        }
+
     session_id = (session_id or "").strip() or f"alloc-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}"
     try:
         db.upsert_session(
@@ -748,6 +945,7 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             role=role_norm,
             terminal_pr=terminal_pr,
             claim_ownership=ownership,
+            allocation_mode=mode,
         )
         if reason:
             is_claim_skip = SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION in reason
@@ -828,6 +1026,10 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "outcome": outcome,
             "apply": bool(apply),
             "role": role_norm,
+            "allocation_mode": mode,
+            "routing_role": role_norm,
+            "required_role": None,
+            "selected_action": None,
             "profile_name": profile_name,
             "username": username,
             "session_id": session_id,
@@ -840,6 +1042,12 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
             "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
             "assignment": None,
+            "allocation_evidence": {
+                "mode": "empty",
+                "allocation_mode": mode,
+                "lease_created": False,
+                "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
+            },
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
             "file_lock_only": False,
             "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -852,25 +1060,37 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "owner_session_id": owner_session_id,
             "downstream_note": (
                 "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
+                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+                "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
             ),
         }
 
     expected_role = expected_role_for_candidate(selected)
-    allowed, forbidden = role_actions(role_norm)
+    # Cross-role: lease/action matrix follows the required downstream role so
-    selection = {
+    # evidence names the worker that must act. Controller session still owns
-        "kind": selected.kind,
+    # the routing decision; mutation isolation is enforced by role gates on
-        "number": selected.number,
+    # mutation tools (controller profile lacks author/review/merge ops).
-        "title": selected.title,
+    lease_role = (
-        "labels": list(selected.labels),
+        expected_role if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE else role_norm
-        "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
+    )
-        "priority": selected.priority,
+    allowed, forbidden = role_actions(lease_role)
-        "expected_role_next": expected_role,
+    # Controller must never receive mutation-class rights via cross-role apply.
-        "reason_selected": (
+    if role_norm == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
-            f"highest-priority candidate for role '{role_norm}' "
+        ctrl_allowed, ctrl_forbidden = role_actions(ROLE_CONTROLLER)
-            f"(expected_role={expected_role})"
+        # Keep controller session capability evidence separate from lease_role.
-        ),
+        controller_allowed_actions = ctrl_allowed
-    }
+        controller_forbidden_actions = ctrl_forbidden
+    else:
+        controller_allowed_actions = allowed
+        controller_forbidden_actions = forbidden
+
+    selection = build_selection_dict(
+        selected,
+        active_role=role_norm,
+        required_role=expected_role,
+        profile_name=profile_name,
+        allocation_mode=mode,
+    )
 
     if not apply:
         return {
@@ -878,6 +1098,12 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "outcome": OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
             "apply": False,
             "role": role_norm,
+            "allocation_mode": mode,
+            "routing_role": role_norm,
+            "required_role": expected_role,
+            "selected_action": selection["selected_action"],
+            "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
+            "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
             "profile_name": profile_name,
             "username": username,
             "session_id": session_id,
@@ -889,10 +1115,22 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "reasons": [
                 "dry-run only (apply=false); no assignment/lease created — "
                 "call again with apply=true to reserve via control-plane DB"
+                + (
+                    "; after apply, the required-role worker consumes via "
+                    "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease (#843)"
+                    if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE and expected_role != role_norm
+                    else ""
+                )
             ],
             "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
             "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
             "assignment": None,
+            "allocation_evidence": {
+                "mode": "preview",
+                "allocation_mode": mode,
+                "lease_created": False,
+                "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
+            },
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
             "file_lock_only": False,
             "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -902,18 +1140,24 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
             "exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
             "candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
+            "controller_allowed_actions": list(controller_allowed_actions),
+            "controller_forbidden_actions": list(controller_forbidden_actions),
             "downstream_note": (
                 "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
+                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+                "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
             ),
         }
 
     # Atomic reserve via #613 substrate.
     ttl = lease_ttl_seconds if lease_ttl_seconds is not None else None
     try:
+        cross_role_handoff = (
+            mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE and lease_role != role_norm
+        )
         kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
             "session_id": session_id,
-            "role": role_norm,
+            "role": lease_role,
             "remote": remote,
             "org": org,
             "repo": repo,
@@ -922,7 +1166,8 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "expected_head_sha": selected.head_sha,
             "allowed_actions": allowed,
             "forbidden_actions": forbidden,
-            "phase": "allocated",
+            # #843: mark cross-role allocations as awaiting independent consume
+            "phase": "awaiting_handoff" if cross_role_handoff else "allocated",
         }
         if ttl is not None:
             kwargs["lease_ttl_seconds"] = int(ttl)
@@ -992,11 +1237,72 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         }
 
     # assigned
-    return {
+    lease_proof = {
+        "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
+        "lease_id": result.lease_id,
+        "expires_at": result.expires_at,
+        "expected_head_sha": result.expected_head_sha,
+        "allowed_actions": list(result.allowed_actions),
+        "forbidden_actions": list(result.forbidden_actions),
+        "lease_role": lease_role,
+        "source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
+    }
+    consume_allocation = None
+    if cross_role_handoff and result.lease_id:
+        # Durable handoff marker so independent required-role workers can
+        # consume without sharing the controller session (#843).
+        handoff_prov = {
+            "cross_role_handoff": True,
+            "handoff_status": "pending",
+            "allocating_session_id": session_id,
+            "allocating_role": role_norm,
+            "required_role": expected_role,
+            "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
+            "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
+            "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
+            "lease_id": result.lease_id,
+            "allocation_mode": mode,
+            "adopted_by_session_id": None,
+        }
+        try:
+            db.attach_lease_provenance(result.lease_id, handoff_prov)
+        except ControlPlaneError:
+            # Still return assignment evidence; consume path may be unavailable
+            handoff_prov["attach_failed"] = True
+        consume_allocation = {
+            "tool": "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease",
+            "lease_id": result.lease_id,
+            "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
+            "required_role": expected_role,
+            "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
+            "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
+            "handoff_status": "pending",
+            "controller_session_required": False,
+            "instructions": (
+                f"From an independent {expected_role} session "
+                f"({selection['required_namespace']} / "
+                f"{selection['required_profile']}), call "
+                f"gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(lease_id={result.lease_id!r}) "
+                "to consume this controller allocation. The allocating "
+                "controller process does not need to remain alive. Wrong-role "
+                "and second-adoption attempts fail closed."
+            ),
+        }
+        lease_proof["cross_role_handoff"] = True
+        lease_proof["handoff_status"] = "pending"
+        lease_proof["consume_tool"] = "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease"
+
+    out = {
         "success": True,
         "outcome": OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
         "apply": True,
         "role": role_norm,
+        "allocation_mode": mode,
+        "routing_role": role_norm,
+        "required_role": expected_role,
+        "selected_action": selection["selected_action"],
+        "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
+        "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
         "profile_name": profile_name,
         "username": username,
         "session_id": session_id,
@@ -1012,16 +1318,25 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
         "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
         "assignment": result.as_dict(),
-        "lease_proof": {
+        "lease_proof": lease_proof,
-            "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
+        "allocation_evidence": {
-            "lease_id": result.lease_id,
+            "mode": "assigned",
-            "expires_at": result.expires_at,
+            "allocation_mode": mode,
-            "expected_head_sha": result.expected_head_sha,
+            "lease_created": True,
-            "allowed_actions": list(result.allowed_actions),
+            "lease_role": lease_role,
-            "forbidden_actions": list(result.forbidden_actions),
+            "lease_proof": lease_proof,
-            "source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
+            "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
+            "cross_role_handoff": bool(cross_role_handoff),
         },
-        "next_valid_command": _next_command(role_norm, selected),
+        "next_valid_command": (
+            (
+                f"consume lease {result.lease_id} via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease "
+                f"as {expected_role}, then "
+            )
+            + _next_command(lease_role, selected)
+            if cross_role_handoff
+            else _next_command(lease_role, selected)
+        ),
         "substrate": "control_plane_db",
         "file_lock_only": False,
         "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -1031,11 +1346,19 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
         "exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
         "candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
+        "controller_allowed_actions": list(controller_allowed_actions),
+        "controller_forbidden_actions": list(controller_forbidden_actions),
         "downstream_note": (
             "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-            "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
+            "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+            "controller routes only under cross_role (#840); "
+            "cross-role assignments are consumable by independent "
+            "required-role workers via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease (#843)"
         ),
     }
+    if consume_allocation is not None:
+        out["consume_allocation"] = consume_allocation
+    return out
 
 
 def _next_command(role: str, c: WorkCandidate) -> str:

arch01_platform.py

@@ -0,0 +1,892 @@
+"""ARCH-01 Foundation Slice A — atomic platform installation + authority kernel (#822).
+
+Parents: #820, #821. **First implementation leaf of the ARCH-01 program.**
+
+This module implements the smallest executable ARCH-01 foundation:
+
+* a connection-bound authenticated actor context (``cp_actor_*`` /
+  ``cp_operation_mode`` / ``cp_context_epoch`` SQLite scalar functions that SQL
+  may *read* but can never *set* — ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` authenticity);
+* an immutable authority-dominance lattice with an exact seeded tuple set
+  (``[SCHEMA]``);
+* the principal-equivalence root (a class exists *before* its first principal;
+  ``principals.current_class_id`` is ``NOT NULL``; ``[SCHEMA]``);
+* a single-transaction platform installation that seeds the initial
+  ``platform.bootstrap`` grant and an immutable ``installed`` marker, validated
+  by a fail-closed ``install_state`` ``BEFORE INSERT`` trigger (``[SCHEMA]``).
+
+Everything else in the ARCH-01/02/04 program (evidence stores, repository
+bindings, workspaces, PostgreSQL parity, full grant succession, full principal
+merge) is out of scope here and tracked in its own issue — see #822 §5/§17.
+
+**Readiness / production posture.** This subsystem is *disabled by default*.
+Nothing in the running MCP server imports or enables it. It becomes a security
+boundary only once its readiness checks (the ACs in #822) pass in the target
+environment. Instantiating :class:`PlatformKernel` creates an isolated SQLite
+database and never touches the operational control-plane store.
+
+Enforcement classification (per #820 vocabulary):
+
+* ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` — actor-context authenticity: the scalar functions are
+  registered by the trusted Python process; SQL cannot define or redefine them.
+* ``[SCHEMA]`` — fail-closed aborts, the dominance/immutability/NOT-NULL-class/
+  last-active-grant invariants, enforced by CHECK/FK/trigger.
+* ``[RUNTIME-ADAPTER]`` — *none* in this slice.
+
+SQLite-first. ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serializes concurrent installs and concurrent
+grant/revoke on the singleton invariant row. PostgreSQL parity is a distinct
+issue (#827); this module does **not** claim it.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Iterator, Optional
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Closed enumerations (#822 §4).
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+ACTOR_KINDS = ("operator", "supervisor", "service", "installer")
+OPERATION_MODES = ("normal", "install", "merge", "internal_service")
+
+# Exact seeded authority-dominance tuple set (#822 §4). This set is normative:
+# the install-state trigger rejects any missing, additional, or malformed tuple.
+DOMINANCE_TUPLES = (
+    ("platform.bootstrap", "platform.bootstrap"),
+    ("platform.bootstrap", "project.admin"),
+    ("platform.bootstrap", "supervisor.root.establish"),
+    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.register"),
+    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.verify"),
+    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.recover"),
+)
+
+# The distinguished operator-key issuer seeded during install.
+DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_KIND = "operator-key"
+DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID = "platform.bootstrap.operator-key"
+
+# Structured result codes (#822 §10).
+INSTALLED = "INSTALLED"
+ALREADY_INSTALLED = "ALREADY_INSTALLED"
+INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT = "INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT"
+INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE = "INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE"
+DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH = "DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH"
+AUTHORIZATION_DENIED = "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED"
+CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST = "CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST"
+
+# Required audit events (#822 §14).
+EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED = "platform_installed"
+EVT_GRANT_CREATED = "platform_grant_created"
+EVT_GRANT_REVOKED = "platform_grant_revoked"
+EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED = "principal_registered"
+
+SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+DB_PATH_ENV = "ARCH01_PLATFORM_DB"
+
+
+class PlatformKernelError(RuntimeError):
+    """Base class for structured, code-bearing kernel failures."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str, message: str = "") -> None:
+        super().__init__(message or code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+class ActorContextError(PlatformKernelError):
+    """Raised when a mutation is attempted without a valid actor context."""
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Schema (#822 §6). Tables + fail-closed triggers.
+#
+# Every *mutating* trigger opens with the actor protocol: read the context
+# epoch, read the actor fields, and abort unless the context is present,
+# non-null, mode/kind well-formed, and epoch-consistent with the active
+# transaction. The scalar functions ``cp_*`` are registered from Python only;
+# SQL has no statement that can set them, which is the trusted-service boundary.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL = ", ".join("'%s'" % k for k in ACTOR_KINDS)
+_OP_MODES_SQL = ", ".join("'%s'" % m for m in OPERATION_MODES)
+
+# Actor-protocol predicate: TRUE when the context is INVALID and the trigger
+# must abort. ``cp_actor_context_valid()`` folds "present + non-expired +
+# live-epoch == bound-epoch" (the read/re-read epoch equality of #822 §4) into
+# one trusted-service answer; the remaining reads assert field well-formedness.
+_INVALID_ACTOR = (
+    "cp_actor_context_valid() IS NOT 1 "
+    "OR cp_context_epoch() IS NULL "
+    "OR cp_actor_principal() IS NULL "
+    "OR cp_actor_kind() NOT IN (%s) "
+    "OR cp_operation_mode() NOT IN (%s)" % (_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL, _OP_MODES_SQL)
+)
+
+_ACTOR_GUARD = (
+    "SELECT CASE WHEN (%s) "
+    "THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT') END;" % _INVALID_ACTOR
+)
+
+# require_installed: abort a privileged mutation when there is no install
+# marker and we are not currently installing (#822 §4).
+_REQUIRE_INSTALLED = (
+    "SELECT CASE WHEN ((SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) = 0 "
+    "AND cp_operation_mode() <> 'install') "
+    "THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'NOT_INSTALLED') END;"
+)
+
+_SCHEMA_SQL = f"""
+PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS arch01_meta (
+    key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    value TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+-- Equivalence classes are created BEFORE their first principal (#822 §4).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principal_equivalence_classes (
+    class_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS authoritative_issuers (
+    issuer_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    issuer_kind TEXT NOT NULL,
+    issuer_ref TEXT NOT NULL,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+    UNIQUE (issuer_kind, issuer_ref)
+);
+
+-- current_class_id is NOT NULL: a principal cannot exist without a class
+-- (#822 AC6). issuer_id is nullable ONLY for the installer during install
+-- (#822 AC7), enforced by trg_principals_null_issuer below.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principals (
+    principal_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    actor_kind TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (actor_kind IN ({_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL})),
+    current_class_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES principal_equivalence_classes(class_id),
+    issuer_id INTEGER REFERENCES authoritative_issuers(issuer_id),
+    registered_by TEXT REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS authority_dominance (
+    dominant TEXT NOT NULL,
+    subordinate TEXT NOT NULL,
+    PRIMARY KEY (dominant, subordinate)
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_bootstrap_seed (
+    seed_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (seed_id = 1),
+    installer_principal_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_bootstrap_grants (
+    grant_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    grantee_principal_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    granted_by TEXT REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    active INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1 CHECK (active IN (0, 1)),
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+    revoked_at TEXT
+);
+
+-- Singleton row; active_count floored at 1 by CHECK so the last active grant
+-- can never be revoked (#822 AC11).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_active_invariant (
+    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
+    active_count INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (active_count >= 1)
+);
+
+-- The immutable install marker; inserted LAST in the install transaction.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS install_state (
+    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
+    marker TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (marker = 'installed'),
+    installed_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+-- Append-only (#822 AC14).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_records (
+    audit_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    event TEXT NOT NULL,
+    principal_id TEXT,
+    detail TEXT,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- Actor protocol on every mutating trigger (#822 §4, [SCHEMA] fail-closed).
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_classes_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON principal_equivalence_classes
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON authoritative_issuers
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON principals
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON authority_dominance
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON platform_bootstrap_seed
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_actor_insert
+BEFORE INSERT ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+    {_REQUIRE_INSTALLED}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_actor_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_invariant_actor_insert
+BEFORE INSERT ON platform_active_invariant
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_invariant_actor_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_active_invariant
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON audit_records
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- NOT-NULL-issuer exception for the installer only (#822 AC7).
+-- A NULL issuer_id is accepted solely for an installer principal during
+-- install mode, before the marker exists; any other NULL-issuer principal is
+-- rejected. install-time issuer linkage (installer -> distinguished issuer)
+-- is applied by a later UPDATE, permitted while no marker exists.
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_null_issuer
+BEFORE INSERT ON principals
+WHEN NEW.issuer_id IS NULL
+BEGIN
+    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
+        NEW.actor_kind = 'installer'
+        AND cp_operation_mode() = 'install'
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) = 0
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM principals WHERE issuer_id IS NULL) = 0
+    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE') END;
+END;
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- Post-install immutability of the authority root (#822 §4, AC9).
+-- Registration fields freeze only AFTER the marker exists, so the install
+-- transaction's own installer issuer-linkage UPDATE is permitted.
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_frozen_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON principals
+WHEN (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) > 0
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_frozen_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON principals
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL');
+END;
+
+-- Distinguished issuer identity is immutable once written.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON authoritative_issuers
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_ISSUER');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON authoritative_issuers
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_ISSUER');
+END;
+
+-- The dominance lattice is immutable once seeded.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON authority_dominance
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON authority_dominance
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE');
+END;
+
+-- The bootstrap seed is immutable once written.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_seed
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_SEED');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON platform_bootstrap_seed
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_SEED');
+END;
+
+-- The install marker is immutable once written.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON install_state
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON install_state
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE');
+END;
+
+-- Grants: identity is immutable; the ONLY permitted mutation is a single
+-- active 1 -> 0 revocation (#822 §4 initial-grant identity immutability +
+-- grant/revoke). Reactivation and identity edits are rejected.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_identity_frozen
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+WHEN NOT (
+    NEW.grant_id = OLD.grant_id
+    AND NEW.grantee_principal_id = OLD.grantee_principal_id
+    AND NEW.granted_by IS OLD.granted_by
+    AND NEW.created_at = OLD.created_at
+    AND OLD.active = 1
+    AND NEW.active = 0
+)
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_GRANT');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_no_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_GRANT');
+END;
+
+-- audit_records is append-only.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON audit_records
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_AUDIT');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON audit_records
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_AUDIT');
+END;
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- install_state BEFORE INSERT: validate the whole bootstrap atomically
+-- (#822 §4, AC4). Each dominance tuple is checked individually; a missing,
+-- additional, or malformed tuple -> DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH. The seed<->installer
+-- link, the single active NULL-grantor installer grant, the installer's
+-- non-NULL issuer, the active invariant, and "no extra principal created under
+-- the NULL-issuer exception" -> INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE.
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_validate
+BEFORE INSERT ON install_state
+BEGIN
+    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
+        (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM authority_dominance) = {len(DOMINANCE_TUPLES)}
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='platform.bootstrap')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='project.admin')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='supervisor.root.establish')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.register')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.verify')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.recover')
+    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH') END;
+
+    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
+        (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_seed) = 1
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM principals) = 1
+        AND (SELECT actor_kind FROM principals
+             WHERE principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
+            ) = 'installer'
+        AND (SELECT issuer_id FROM principals
+             WHERE principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
+            ) IS NOT NULL
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_grants
+             WHERE granted_by IS NULL AND active = 1
+               AND grantee_principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
+            ) = 1
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_grants) = 1
+        AND (SELECT active_count FROM platform_active_invariant WHERE id = 1) = 1
+    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE') END;
+END;
+"""
+
+
+def default_db_path() -> str:
+    return os.environ.get(
+        DB_PATH_ENV,
+        os.path.expanduser("~/.cache/gitea-tools/arch01/platform.sqlite3"),
+    )
+
+
+def _utc_now_iso() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OperationResult:
+    """Structured result of a kernel operation (#822 §10)."""
+
+    code: str
+    detail: str = ""
+
+    @property
+    def ok(self) -> bool:
+        return self.code in (INSTALLED, ALREADY_INSTALLED)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class _ActorContext:
+    principal: str
+    kind: str
+    mode: str
+    session: Optional[str]
+    bound_epoch: int
+    live_epoch: int
+    expired: bool = False
+
+
+class PlatformKernel:
+    """ARCH-01 authority kernel over a single SQLite connection.
+
+    The connection carries the trusted-service actor context: the ``cp_*``
+    scalar functions read the context this object holds. Only Python code here
+    can bind or clear it, so no SQL statement can assert an actor identity — the
+    trusted-service authenticity boundary of #822 §4.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path: Optional[str] = None, *, busy_timeout_ms: int = 5000) -> None:
+        self.db_path = db_path or default_db_path()
+        if self.db_path != ":memory:":
+            parent = os.path.dirname(self.db_path)
+            if parent:
+                os.makedirs(parent, exist_ok=True)
+        self._ctx: Optional[_ActorContext] = None
+        self._epoch_seq = 0
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        # check_same_thread=False is safe: every mutation path is serialized
+        # by self._lock, so the connection is never used concurrently even when
+        # callers drive the kernel from different threads (concurrency tests).
+        self._conn = sqlite3.connect(
+            self.db_path, isolation_level=None, check_same_thread=False
+        )
+        self._conn.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
+        self._conn.execute(f"PRAGMA busy_timeout = {int(busy_timeout_ms)}")
+        self._register_actor_functions()
+        self._migrate()
+
+    # -- trusted-service actor functions ---------------------------------- #
+
+    def _register_actor_functions(self) -> None:
+        c = self._conn
+        c.create_function("cp_actor_principal", 0, lambda: self._ctx.principal if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_actor_kind", 0, lambda: self._ctx.kind if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_operation_mode", 0, lambda: self._ctx.mode if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_service_session", 0, lambda: self._ctx.session if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_context_epoch", 0, self._fn_context_epoch)
+        # Trusted-service helper: folds present + non-expired + epoch-consistent
+        # into the read/re-read epoch equality of #822 §4.
+        c.create_function("cp_actor_context_valid", 0, self._fn_context_valid)
+
+    def _fn_context_epoch(self) -> Optional[int]:
+        if self._ctx is None or self._ctx.expired:
+            return None
+        return self._ctx.live_epoch
+
+    def _fn_context_valid(self) -> int:
+        ctx = self._ctx
+        if ctx is None or ctx.expired:
+            return 0
+        # read/re-read epoch equality: a context whose live epoch has drifted
+        # from the epoch it was bound to (a stale/replaced connection context)
+        # is not bound to the active transaction and fails closed.
+        if ctx.live_epoch != ctx.bound_epoch:
+            return 0
+        if ctx.principal is None:
+            return 0
+        if ctx.kind not in ACTOR_KINDS or ctx.mode not in OPERATION_MODES:
+            return 0
+        return 1
+
+    # -- context lifecycle ------------------------------------------------ #
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def actor_context(
+        self, principal: str, kind: str, mode: str, session: Optional[str] = None
+    ) -> Iterator[None]:
+        """Bind a trusted actor context for the duration of the block."""
+        prev = self._ctx
+        self._epoch_seq += 1
+        epoch = self._epoch_seq
+        self._ctx = _ActorContext(
+            principal=principal, kind=kind, mode=mode, session=session,
+            bound_epoch=epoch, live_epoch=epoch,
+        )
+        try:
+            yield
+        finally:
+            self._ctx = prev
+
+    def _clear_context(self) -> None:
+        self._ctx = None
+
+    # -- migration -------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def _migrate(self) -> None:
+        self._conn.executescript(_SCHEMA_SQL)
+        self._conn.execute(
+            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO arch01_meta(key, value) VALUES ('schema_version', ?)",
+            (str(SCHEMA_VERSION),),
+        )
+        self._conn.execute(
+            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO arch01_meta(key, value) VALUES "
+            "('architecture', 'ARCH-01 Slice A: atomic install + authority kernel (#822); "
+            "disabled by default until readiness checks pass')"
+        )
+
+    # -- introspection ---------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def is_installed(self) -> bool:
+        row = self._conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state").fetchone()
+        return bool(row[0])
+
+    def active_grant_count(self) -> int:
+        row = self._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT active_count FROM platform_active_invariant WHERE id = 1"
+        ).fetchone()
+        return int(row[0]) if row else 0
+
+    def audit_events(self) -> list[str]:
+        return [
+            r[0]
+            for r in self._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT event FROM audit_records ORDER BY audit_id"
+            ).fetchall()
+        ]
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        self._conn.close()
+
+    # -- operations ------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def install_platform(
+        self,
+        installer_principal_id: str = "platform.installer",
+        *,
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Single atomic install transaction (#822 §4/§7).
+
+        ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serializes concurrent installs; the loser rechecks
+        the marker and returns ``ALREADY_INSTALLED``, or — if it never acquires
+        the write lock — ``CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST``. On any stage failure
+        the whole transaction rolls back leaving no partial rows (AC3/AC5).
+        """
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                if "locked" in str(exc).lower() or "busy" in str(exc).lower():
+                    return OperationResult(CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST, str(exc))
+                raise
+            try:
+                if self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(ALREADY_INSTALLED, "install marker already present")
+
+                with self.actor_context(installer_principal_id, "installer", "install", session):
+                    c = self._conn
+                    # class -> installer principal (temporary NULL issuer)
+                    cur = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)",
+                        (now,),
+                    )
+                    class_id = cur.lastrowid
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principals"
+                        "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
+                        (installer_principal_id, class_id, installer_principal_id, now),
+                    )
+                    # distinguished operator-key issuer
+                    cur = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
+                        (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_KIND, DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
+                    )
+                    issuer_id = cur.lastrowid
+                    # link installer -> issuer (permitted pre-marker)
+                    c.execute(
+                        "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
+                        (issuer_id, installer_principal_id),
+                    )
+                    # dominance tuples
+                    c.executemany(
+                        "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
+                        DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
+                    )
+                    # seed
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
+                        (installer_principal_id, now),
+                    )
+                    # initial grant (granted_by NULL, active)
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants"
+                        "(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
+                        (installer_principal_id, now),
+                    )
+                    # active invariant
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)"
+                    )
+                    # audit rows for the security-sensitive operation
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED, installer_principal_id, "installer", now),
+                    )
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_GRANT_CREATED, installer_principal_id, "initial platform.bootstrap grant", now),
+                    )
+                    # install marker LAST -> fires the whole-bootstrap validator
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO install_state(id, marker, installed_at) VALUES (1, 'installed', ?)",
+                        (now,),
+                    )
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED, installer_principal_id, "platform installed", now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, "platform installed")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    def register_principal(
+        self,
+        principal_id: str,
+        actor_kind: str,
+        issuer_ref: str,
+        *,
+        actor_principal: str,
+        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Atomically create an equivalence class and its first principal.
+
+        The class is inserted *before* the principal, and ``current_class_id``
+        is ``NOT NULL`` (#822 AC6): a principal can never exist classless.
+        The principal references an existing issuer (non-NULL); the temporary
+        NULL-issuer exception is reserved for the installer during install
+        (AC7).
+        """
+        if actor_kind not in ACTOR_KINDS:
+            return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, f"bad actor_kind {actor_kind!r}")
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
+            try:
+                if not self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
+                row = self._conn.execute(
+                    "SELECT issuer_id FROM authoritative_issuers WHERE issuer_ref = ?",
+                    (issuer_ref,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is None:
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, f"unknown issuer {issuer_ref!r}")
+                issuer_id = row[0]
+                with self.actor_context(actor_principal, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
+                    cur = self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)",
+                        (now,),
+                    )
+                    class_id = cur.lastrowid
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principals"
+                        "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (principal_id, actor_kind, class_id, issuer_id, actor_principal, now),
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED, principal_id, actor_kind, now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"registered {principal_id}")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    def grant_platform_bootstrap(
+        self,
+        grantee_principal_id: str,
+        granted_by: str,
+        *,
+        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Create an additional active platform.bootstrap grant.
+
+        Serialized on the singleton invariant row via ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE``.
+        """
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
+            try:
+                if not self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
+                with self.actor_context(granted_by, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants"
+                        "(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, 1, ?)",
+                        (grantee_principal_id, granted_by, now),
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE platform_active_invariant SET active_count = active_count + 1 WHERE id = 1"
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_GRANT_CREATED, grantee_principal_id, f"granted_by={granted_by}", now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"granted to {grantee_principal_id}")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    def revoke_platform_bootstrap(
+        self,
+        grant_id: int,
+        *,
+        actor_principal: str,
+        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Revoke an active grant, floored so the last one can never drop.
+
+        The ``active_count >= 1`` CHECK plus ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serialization
+        make two concurrent revocations unable to remove the final active grant
+        (#822 AC11): the decrement that would reach zero fails and rolls back.
+        """
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
+            try:
+                if not self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
+                row = self._conn.execute(
+                    "SELECT active, grantee_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                    (grant_id,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is None or row[0] != 1:
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, "grant absent or already inactive")
+                grantee = row[1]
+                with self.actor_context(actor_principal, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
+                    # Decrement first: the CHECK floor rejects dropping below 1,
+                    # aborting the whole revoke before the grant flips inactive.
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE platform_active_invariant SET active_count = active_count - 1 WHERE id = 1"
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE platform_bootstrap_grants SET active = 0, revoked_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                        (now, grant_id),
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_GRANT_REVOKED, grantee, f"grant_id={grant_id}", now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"revoked grant {grant_id}")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    # -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def _safe_rollback(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+        except sqlite3.Error:
+            pass
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _classify(exc: sqlite3.Error) -> str:
+        msg = str(exc)
+        if "INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT" in msg:
+            return INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT
+        if "DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH" in msg:
+            return DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH
+        if "active_count" in msg or "CHECK constraint failed: platform_active_invariant" in msg:
+            # last-active-grant floor tripped
+            return AUTHORIZATION_DENIED
+        if any(tag in msg for tag in (
+            "INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE", "IMMUTABLE_", "NOT_INSTALLED",
+        )):
+            return INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE
+        return INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE

control_plane_db.py

@@ -1637,11 +1637,13 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
         provenance: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
         lease_ttl_seconds: int = DEFAULT_LEASE_TTL_SECONDS,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        """Transfer or refresh a lease with provenance (#601).
+        """Transfer or refresh a lease with provenance (#601 / #843).
 
         * Same owner + active → refresh (owner-resume).
+        * Cross-role handoff pending + matching required role → atomic consume
+          (even while the allocating controller session still "owns" the lease).
         * Expired/abandoned/released → create new assignment+lease with provenance.
-        * Active foreign → raise ForeignLeaseError (never silent steal).
+        * Active foreign (non-handoff) → raise ForeignLeaseError (never silent steal).
         """
         now = _utc_now()
         now_s = _ts(now)
@@ -1677,7 +1679,35 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
                 status = "expired"
 
             owner = lease["session_id"]
-            if status == "active" and owner != adopter_session_id:
+            # Parse durable provenance for cross-role handoff consume (#843).
+            lease_prov: dict[str, Any] = {}
+            if "provenance_json" in lease.keys() and lease["provenance_json"]:
+                try:
+                    loaded = json.loads(lease["provenance_json"])
+                    if isinstance(loaded, dict):
+                        lease_prov = loaded
+                except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+                    lease_prov = {}
+            handoff_pending = bool(lease_prov.get("cross_role_handoff")) and (
+                str(lease_prov.get("handoff_status") or "pending").strip().lower()
+                == "pending"
+            )
+            already_adopted = bool(
+                (lease["adopted_by_session_id"] if "adopted_by_session_id" in lease.keys() else None)
+                or lease_prov.get("adopted_by_session_id")
+            )
+            required_role = str(
+                lease_prov.get("required_role") or lease["role"] or ""
+            ).strip().lower()
+            adopter_role = (role or "").strip().lower()
+            cross_role_consume = (
+                handoff_pending
+                and not already_adopted
+                and status == "active"
+                and owner != adopter_session_id
+            )
+
+            if status == "active" and owner != adopter_session_id and not cross_role_consume:
                 raise ForeignLeaseError(
                     f"cannot adopt active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by {owner}"
                 )
@@ -1761,6 +1791,142 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
                     "reasons": ["owner-resume: refreshed lease with provenance"],
                 }
 
+            # #843: controller→required-role handoff consume (atomic, same lease_id)
+            if cross_role_consume:
+                if not required_role:
+                    raise ControlPlaneError(
+                        f"cross-role handoff lease {lease_id} missing required_role"
+                    )
+                if adopter_role != required_role:
+                    raise ForeignLeaseError(
+                        f"wrong role for cross-role handoff consume: "
+                        f"required={required_role} adopter={adopter_role or 'none'} "
+                        f"(fail closed)"
+                    )
+                # CAS: only transfer if still owned by allocating session and unadopted
+                cols = self._lease_columns(conn)
+                adopted_col_null = (
+                    "(adopted_by_session_id IS NULL OR adopted_by_session_id = '')"
+                    if "adopted_by_session_id" in cols
+                    else "1=1"
+                )
+                cas = conn.execute(
+                    f"""
+                    UPDATE leases
+                    SET session_id = ?,
+                        heartbeat_at = ?,
+                        expires_at = ?,
+                        phase = ?,
+                        role = ?
+                    WHERE lease_id = ?
+                      AND status = 'active'
+                      AND session_id = ?
+                      AND {adopted_col_null}
+                    """,
+                    (
+                        adopter_session_id,
+                        now_s,
+                        expires,
+                        "adopted",
+                        required_role,
+                        lease_id,
+                        owner,
+                    ),
+                )
+                if cas.rowcount != 1:
+                    raise ForeignLeaseError(
+                        f"cross-role handoff consume lost race for lease {lease_id} "
+                        "(already adopted or no longer pending; fail closed)"
+                    )
+                if "adopted_from_session_id" in cols:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        """
+                        UPDATE leases
+                        SET adopted_from_session_id = ?, adopted_by_session_id = ?
+                        WHERE lease_id = ?
+                        """,
+                        (owner, adopter_session_id, lease_id),
+                    )
+                if "worktree_path" in cols and worktree_path:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE leases SET worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                        (worktree_path, lease_id),
+                    )
+                if "owner_pid" in cols and owner_pid is not None:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                        (owner_pid, lease_id),
+                    )
+                if "expected_head_sha" in cols and expected_head_sha:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE leases SET expected_head_sha = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                        (expected_head_sha, lease_id),
+                    )
+                # Merge handoff provenance + caller provenance
+                merged = dict(lease_prov)
+                merged.update(provenance or {})
+                merged["cross_role_handoff"] = True
+                merged["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
+                merged["adopted_from_session_id"] = owner
+                merged["adopted_by_session_id"] = adopter_session_id
+                merged["required_role"] = required_role
+                if "provenance_json" in cols:
+                    conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE leases SET provenance_json = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                        (json.dumps(merged), lease_id),
+                    )
+                # Transfer active assignment ownership atomically
+                asn_cas = conn.execute(
+                    """
+                    UPDATE assignments
+                    SET session_id = ?, role = ?
+                    WHERE lease_id = ? AND status = 'active' AND session_id = ?
+                    """,
+                    (adopter_session_id, required_role, lease_id, owner),
+                )
+                if asn_cas.rowcount < 1:
+                    # Fail closed: assignment must move with the lease
+                    raise ControlPlaneError(
+                        f"cross-role handoff: no active assignment for lease {lease_id} "
+                        f"owned by {owner}"
+                    )
+                lease2 = conn.execute(
+                    "SELECT * FROM leases WHERE lease_id = ?", (lease_id,)
+                ).fetchone()
+                asn = conn.execute(
+                    """
+                    SELECT * FROM assignments
+                    WHERE lease_id = ? AND status = 'active'
+                    ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1
+                    """,
+                    (lease_id,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                conn.execute(
+                    """
+                    INSERT INTO events(work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)
+                    VALUES (?, 'lease_adopted', ?, ?)
+                    """,
+                    (
+                        lease["work_item_id"],
+                        f"cross-role handoff: {adopter_session_id} consumed "
+                        f"{lease_id} from {owner} as {required_role}",
+                        now_s,
+                    ),
+                )
+                return {
+                    "outcome": "adopted_cross_role_handoff",
+                    "lease": dict(lease2) if lease2 else dict(lease),
+                    "assignment": dict(asn) if asn else None,
+                    "reasons": [
+                        "cross-role handoff: independent required-role worker consumed "
+                        "controller allocation without abandonment"
+                    ],
+                    "adopted_by_session_id": adopter_session_id,
+                    "adopted_from_session_id": owner,
+                    "required_role": required_role,
+                    "handoff_status": "adopted",
+                }
+
             # Non-active: create new lease + assignment (transfer)
             new_lease_id = f"lease-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]}"
             new_asn_id = f"asn-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]}"

docs/webui-local-dev.md

@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | Path | Description |
 |------|-------------|
 | `/` | Home / operator overview |
-| `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`) |
+| `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`, `uptime_seconds`) |
+| `/api/v1/system/health` | Structured read-only system health (#634) |
 | `/queue` | Live PR and issue queue dashboard (#429) |
 | `/api/queue` | JSON queue export with pagination metadata |
 | `/projects` | Project registry list with status and onboarding progress (#427, #635) |
@@ -78,6 +79,85 @@ Most routes are GET-only. POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE return `405` with
 `read-only-mvp`, except `/audit` and `/api/audit` which accept POST for
 local validator preview only (no Gitea mutations, no server-side storage).
 
+## System health API (#634)
+
+`GET /api/v1/system/health` is the structured, read-only health surface for
+automated readiness checks. It is the first console API under the `/api/v1`
+prefix; the unversioned MVP exports remain as compatibility aliases.
+
+`/health` is unchanged for existing consumers — every MVP key is still present
+— and now also carries `started_at`, `uptime_seconds`, and a
+`system_health_api` pointer. It stays deliberately cheap and runs no dependency
+probe, because answering readiness costs real work.
+
+**Status codes.** `200` when ready, `503` when a required dependency failed or
+was never probed. Automation can branch on the code without parsing the body.
+
+**Query flags.** The Gitea check is a network call, so it is opt-in:
+`GET /api/v1/system/health?deep=1` runs it and caches the result for
+`WEBUI_HEALTH_PROBE_TTL_SECONDS` (default 15s) so dashboard polling does not
+amplify into remote load. Without the flag that probe reports `skipped`.
+
+**Dependencies.** `control_plane_db` and `repository` are required and drive
+readiness. `gitea` is optional: when it fails the overall `status` degrades but
+`readiness.ready` stays true, because local inventory is still serveable. Each
+entry carries `status`, `detail`, `required`, and `latency_ms`.
+
+Two honesty rules are worth knowing before reading the payload:
+
+* `stale_runtime.mutation_safe` is true only when the runtime, checkout, and
+  remote-tracking commits are all known and equal. An unfetched remote is
+  reported as indeterminate, never as safe.
+* `mcp_namespaces` entries are always `unproven`. A web process runs outside
+  the IDE-managed MCP client and cannot invoke a namespace tool, so per #543
+  only a `client_namespace` probe can prove that path.
+
+Sample response (abridged, healthy):
+
+```json
+{
+  "status": "ok",
+  "service": "mcp-control-plane-webui",
+  "mode": "read-only",
+  "api": "/api/v1/system/health",
+  "timestamp": "2026-07-22T11:04:18.512034+00:00",
+  "readiness": { "ready": true, "complete": true, "reasons": [] },
+  "version": {
+    "git_sha": "620ed6e9a9550b8da2ceb82d9ab8744e8920490f",
+    "git_describe": "v1.1.0-898-g620ed6e",
+    "control_plane_schema_version": 4,
+    "python_version": "3.14.5",
+    "known": true
+  },
+  "process": { "started_at": "2026-07-22T10:58:02.114+00:00", "uptime_seconds": 376.4 },
+  "deep_probes_requested": false,
+  "dependencies": [
+    {
+      "name": "control_plane_db",
+      "kind": "sqlite",
+      "status": "ok",
+      "detail": "schema v4 readable",
+      "required": true,
+      "healthy": true,
+      "latency_ms": 1.482,
+      "metadata": { "schema_version": 4, "active_leases": 3 }
+    },
+    { "name": "repository", "kind": "git", "status": "ok", "required": true, "healthy": true },
+    { "name": "gitea", "kind": "http", "status": "skipped", "required": false, "healthy": false }
+  ],
+  "mcp_namespaces": [
+    { "namespace": "gitea-author", "required_tool": "gitea_whoami", "status": "unproven" }
+  ],
+  "stale_runtime": { "stale": false, "determinable": true, "mutation_safe": true, "reasons": [] },
+  "probe_errors": []
+}
+```
+
+No restart, reload, or process-kill control is exposed here: those are Phase 2
+at the earliest, and #630 forbids process-kill recovery outright. Every probe
+opens its subject read-only — the control-plane database is opened through a
+`mode=ro` URI so a health check can never create or migrate a schema.
+
 ## Report audit (#431)
 
 Paste an LLM final report at `/audit` or POST JSON to `/api/audit`. The UI

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -234,12 +234,25 @@ def _effective_workspace_role() -> str:
 
 
 def _profile_role_kind(profile: dict) -> str:
-    """Resolve a profile's declared role before inferring from permissions."""
+    """Resolve a profile's declared role before inferring from permissions.
-    role = (profile.get("role") or profile.get("role_kind") or "").strip()
+
+    Declared ``role`` / ``role_kind`` always wins so a controller profile is
+    never reclassified as reconciler from permission inference (#840).
+    """
+    role = (profile.get("role") or profile.get("role_kind") or "").strip().lower()
     if role:
+        # Normalize aliases / case.
+        if "control" in role:
+            return "controller"
         return role
     profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip().lower()
-    for candidate in ("reconciler", "merger", "reviewer", "author"):
+    for candidate in (
+        "controller",
+        "reconciler",
+        "merger",
+        "reviewer",
+        "author",
+    ):
         if candidate in profile_name:
             return candidate
     return _role_kind(
@@ -15538,7 +15551,8 @@ def mcp_get_control_plane_guide(
     profile = get_profile()
     allowed = profile["allowed_operations"]
     forbidden = profile["forbidden_operations"]
-    role = _role_kind(allowed, forbidden)
+    # Prefer declared profile role so controller is not mislabeled reconciler (#840).
+    role = _profile_role_kind(profile)
     username = _authenticated_username(h)
 
     identity = {
@@ -15597,6 +15611,16 @@ def mcp_get_control_plane_guide(
             "user, and merging requires explicit operator authorization plus the "
             "'MERGE PR <n>' confirmation. "
             "Review and merge are separate workflow roles. A reviewer approval is not merge authorization.")
+    elif role == "controller":
+        guidance.append(
+            "Controller profile: route work via "
+            "gitea_route_task_session(task_type='process_work_queue') then "
+            "gitea_allocate_next_work (allocation_mode=cross_role by default). "
+            "The allocator returns exactly one authoritative selection with "
+            "required_role / required_profile / selected_action. Do not "
+            "implement, review, approve, or merge in this session — schedule "
+            "the matching role namespace instead. Dashboard output is "
+            "explanatory only and never replaces allocator selection.")
     elif role == "mixed":
         guidance.append(
             "WARNING: this profile allows both authoring and "
@@ -15806,7 +15830,8 @@ def gitea_whoami(
             "environment": profile.get("environment"),
             "service": profile.get("service"),
             "identity": profile.get("identity"),
-            "role": profile.get("role"),
+            "role": profile.get("role") or _profile_role_kind(profile),
+            "role_kind": _profile_role_kind(profile),
             "profile_address": profile.get("profile_path"),
             "execution_profile": profile.get("execution_profile"),
             "audit_label": profile.get("audit_label"),
@@ -20590,9 +20615,10 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
     candidates_json: Any = None,
     exclude_issue_numbers: list[int] | None = None,
     expected_candidate_set_fingerprint: str | None = None,
+    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
     limit: int = 50,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Controller-owned next-work allocator using the #613 control-plane DB (#600).
+    """Controller-owned next-work allocator using the #613 control-plane DB (#600/#840).
 
     Workers must not self-select exclusive work under the standard multi-LLM
     workflow. Call this tool instead.
@@ -20602,6 +20628,14 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
     ``ControlPlaneDB.assign_and_lease`` (never file locks or comment-only
     leases as the coordination source).
 
+    *allocation_mode* (#840): when the active role is controller (or mode is
+    ``cross_role``), inspect the complete queue and return exactly one
+    authoritative selection with selected item, action, required_role,
+    required_profile/namespace, pins, and allocation/lease evidence.
+    Role-scoped workers pass ``role=author|reviewer|merger|reconciler`` (or
+    omit for profile role) for single-role filtering. Controller routes only
+    and does not perform downstream mutations.
+
     Outcomes include: ``assigned_work``, ``preview``, ``wait``,
     ``blocked_by_terminal_path``, ``no_safe_work``, ``role_ineligible``,
     ``blocked_by_excluded_own_lease``, ``candidate_set_drift``.
@@ -20736,6 +20770,7 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
             controller_instance_id=allocator_service.resolve_controller_instance_id(),
             exclude_issue_numbers=exclude_issue_numbers,
             expected_candidate_set_fingerprint=expected_candidate_set_fingerprint,
+            allocation_mode=allocation_mode,
         )
     except ValueError as exc:
         return {
@@ -21113,10 +21148,21 @@ def gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
     remote: str = "dadeschools",
     host: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Adopt a control-plane lease through the sanctioned path (#601).
+    """Adopt a control-plane lease through the sanctioned path (#601 / #843).
 
-    Same-owner resume refreshes provenance. Foreign active leases are refused.
+    Same-owner resume refreshes provenance. Foreign active leases are refused
-    Expired leases may be reclaimed; provenance records adopted_from/by.
+    unless the lease is a pending controller cross-role handoff and the caller
+    holds the required role (independent consume without sharing the
+    controller session). Expired leases may be reclaimed; provenance records
+    adopted_from/by. Terminal (abandoned/released) leases cannot be adopted.
+
+    #843 F1: the adopter role is derived authoritatively from the active
+    authenticated profile — never from caller input. A supplied ``role`` that
+    does not exactly match the profile-derived role is rejected (no silent
+    accept or reinterpretation), and handoff provenance ``required_profile`` /
+    ``required_namespace`` restrictions are validated against the same
+    authoritative caller context. Caller-supplied role/profile/namespace can
+    never grant authority.
     """
     read_block = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.read")
     if read_block:
@@ -21125,25 +21171,64 @@ def gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
             "reasons": read_block,
             "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.read"),
         }
+    profile = get_profile()
+    profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip() or "session"
+    active_role = (_profile_role_kind(profile) or "").strip().lower()
+    if not active_role:
+        return {
+            "success": False,
+            "outcome": "blocked",
+            "mutation_performed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                "active profile role could not be derived authoritatively; "
+                "refusing lease adoption (fail closed, #843)"
+            ],
+            "lease_id": lease_id,
+            "authoritative_source": "control_plane_db",
+            "file_lock_only": False,
+            "comment_lease_only": False,
+        }
+    if role is not None and str(role).strip():
+        supplied_role = str(role).strip().lower()
+        if supplied_role != active_role:
+            return {
+                "success": False,
+                "outcome": "blocked",
+                "mutation_performed": False,
+                "profile_role_kind": active_role,
+                "supplied_role": supplied_role,
+                "reasons": [
+                    f"caller-supplied role '{supplied_role}' does not match "
+                    f"the authenticated profile-derived role '{active_role}'; "
+                    "caller-supplied role/profile/namespace can never grant "
+                    "authority (fail closed, #843)"
+                ],
+                "lease_id": lease_id,
+                "authoritative_source": "control_plane_db",
+                "file_lock_only": False,
+                "comment_lease_only": False,
+            }
     db, errs = _control_plane_db_or_error()
     if db is None:
         return {"success": False, "reasons": errs}
-    profile = get_profile()
-    profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip() or "session"
-    active_role = _profile_role_kind(profile) or "author"
     sid = (session_id or "").strip() or (
         f"{profile_name}-{os.getpid()}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
     )
+    adopter_namespace = allocator_service.DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES.get(
+        active_role, f"gitea-{active_role}"
+    )
     try:
         return lease_lifecycle.adopt_lease(
             db,
             lease_id=lease_id,
             adopter_session_id=sid,
-            role=(role or active_role).strip() or "author",
+            role=active_role,
             worktree_path=worktree_path,
             expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha,
             owner_pid=os.getpid(),
             operator_authorized=bool(operator_authorized),
+            adopter_profile_name=profile_name,
+            adopter_namespace=adopter_namespace,
         )
     except (lease_lifecycle.LeaseLifecycleError, control_plane_db.ControlPlaneError) as exc:
         return {

lease_lifecycle.py

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SAFE_RELEASE_OWNED = "release_owned"
 SAFE_STALE_PROMPT = "stale_prompt_lease"
 SAFE_UNKNOWN = "inspect_only"
 SAFE_NO_AUTHORITY = "file_or_comment_not_authoritative"
+SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE = "consume_cross_role_handoff"
 
 LEASE_STATUS_ACTIVE = "active"
 LEASE_STATUS_RELEASED = "released"
@@ -250,6 +251,23 @@ def decide_safe_next_action(
                 "same_owner": True,
                 "also_allowed": [SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED, SAFE_RELEASE_OWNED],
             }
+        handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff({"lease": lease})
+        if handoff:
+            return {
+                "safe_next_action": SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE,
+                "reasons": [
+                    f"controller allocation pending handoff (freshness={status}); "
+                    "required-role worker may consume without abandon/reassign; "
+                    f"required_role={handoff['required_role']}"
+                ],
+                "block": False,
+                "same_owner": False,
+                "owner_session_id": owner,
+                "required_role": handoff["required_role"],
+                "cross_role_handoff": True,
+                "handoff_status": "pending",
+                "also_allowed": [SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED],
+            }
         return {
             "safe_next_action": SAFE_ABANDON_ALLOWED,
             "reasons": [
@@ -272,6 +290,24 @@ def decide_safe_next_action(
         }
 
     if not same_owner and status == "active":
+        # #843: pending cross-role handoff is consumable by required role
+        handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff({"lease": lease})
+        if handoff:
+            return {
+                "safe_next_action": SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE,
+                "reasons": [
+                    "controller cross-role allocation pending handoff; "
+                    f"required_role={handoff['required_role']}; "
+                    "consume via gitea_adopt_workflow_lease without "
+                    "abandonment or sharing the controller session"
+                ],
+                "block": False,
+                "same_owner": False,
+                "owner_session_id": owner,
+                "required_role": handoff["required_role"],
+                "cross_role_handoff": True,
+                "handoff_status": "pending",
+            }
         return {
             "safe_next_action": SAFE_WAIT_FOREIGN,
             "reasons": [
@@ -440,6 +476,84 @@ def list_active_leases(
     }
 
 
+
+def parse_lease_provenance(lease_or_state: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return durable lease provenance dict (empty when absent/unparseable)."""
+    if not lease_or_state:
+        return {}
+    if "provenance" in lease_or_state and isinstance(lease_or_state.get("provenance"), dict):
+        return dict(lease_or_state["provenance"])
+    raw = None
+    if "provenance_json" in lease_or_state:
+        raw = lease_or_state.get("provenance_json")
+    elif "lease" in lease_or_state and isinstance(lease_or_state.get("lease"), Mapping):
+        raw = lease_or_state["lease"].get("provenance_json")
+    if not raw:
+        return {}
+    if isinstance(raw, dict):
+        return dict(raw)
+    try:
+        loaded = json.loads(raw)
+    except (TypeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        return {}
+    return dict(loaded) if isinstance(loaded, dict) else {}
+
+
+def is_pending_cross_role_handoff(
+    state: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Return handoff evidence when a controller allocation awaits consume (#843).
+
+    A pending handoff is identified by durable provenance written at
+    cross-role apply time — not by title heuristics or session-id guessing.
+    """
+    if not state:
+        return None
+    lease = state.get("lease") if isinstance(state.get("lease"), Mapping) else state
+    if not isinstance(lease, Mapping):
+        return None
+    status = str(lease.get("status") or "").strip().lower()
+    if status in (LEASE_STATUS_ABANDONED, LEASE_STATUS_RELEASED, LEASE_STATUS_EXPIRED):
+        return None
+    prov = parse_lease_provenance(state)
+    if not prov and isinstance(lease, Mapping):
+        prov = parse_lease_provenance(lease)
+    if not prov.get("cross_role_handoff"):
+        return None
+    handoff_status = str(prov.get("handoff_status") or "pending").strip().lower()
+    if handoff_status != "pending":
+        return None
+    adopted_by = (
+        lease.get("adopted_by_session_id")
+        or prov.get("adopted_by_session_id")
+        or ""
+    )
+    if str(adopted_by).strip():
+        return None
+    required_role = str(
+        prov.get("required_role") or lease.get("role") or ""
+    ).strip().lower()
+    if not required_role:
+        return None
+    return {
+        "cross_role_handoff": True,
+        "handoff_status": "pending",
+        "required_role": required_role,
+        "allocating_session_id": str(
+            prov.get("allocating_session_id") or lease.get("session_id") or ""
+        ),
+        "allocating_role": str(prov.get("allocating_role") or "controller"),
+        "lease_id": str(lease.get("lease_id") or ""),
+        "assignment_id": (
+            str(state["assignment"]["assignment_id"])
+            if isinstance(state.get("assignment"), Mapping)
+            and state["assignment"].get("assignment_id")
+            else None
+        ),
+        "provenance": prov,
+    }
+
+
 def adopt_lease(
     db: cpd.ControlPlaneDB,
     *,
@@ -450,8 +564,17 @@ def adopt_lease(
     expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
     owner_pid: int | None = None,
     operator_authorized: bool = False,
+    adopter_profile_name: str | None = None,
+    adopter_namespace: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Sanctioned adopt path with provenance; never silent foreign steal."""
+    """Sanctioned adopt path with provenance; never silent foreign steal.
+
+    #843 F1: for a pending cross-role handoff, ``role`` must be the
+    authoritative profile-derived role supplied by the MCP boundary — never
+    caller-asserted authority. When the handoff provenance declares
+    ``required_profile`` / ``required_namespace`` and the caller context is
+    provided, both are validated exactly; a mismatch fails closed.
+    """
     state = db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
     if not state:
         raise LeaseLifecycleError(
@@ -463,11 +586,8 @@ def adopt_lease(
     owner = str(lease.get("session_id") or "")
     same_owner = owner == str(adopter_session_id)
 
-    if freshness["freshness"] == "active" and not same_owner:
+    handoff = is_pending_cross_role_handoff(state)
-        raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+    adopter_role = (role or "").strip().lower()
-            f"refusing to steal active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by "
-            f"{owner} (fail closed)"
-        )
 
     if freshness["freshness"] in ("abandoned", "released"):
         raise LeaseLifecycleError(
@@ -475,13 +595,64 @@ def adopt_lease(
             "(fail closed)"
         )
 
-    # Expired or stale: require abandon-style safety before ownership transfer
+    if handoff and not same_owner:
-    # when not same owner; same owner may reclaim.
+        # Terminal statuses already rejected above. Freshness may be
-    if not same_owner and freshness["freshness"] in (
+        # active OR stale_dead_process (controller exited) — both are
+        # consumable without abandonment when handoff is still pending.
+        if freshness["freshness"] not in (
+            "active",
+            "stale_dead_process",
+            "stale_missing_worktree",
+        ):
+            raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+                f"lease {lease_id} freshness={freshness['freshness']}; "
+                "terminal or non-active allocation cannot be handoff-consumed "
+                "(fail closed)"
+            )
+        required = handoff["required_role"]
+        if adopter_role != required:
+            raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+                f"wrong role for cross-role handoff consume of {lease_id}: "
+                f"required={required} adopter={adopter_role or 'none'} "
+                "(fail closed)"
+            )
+        # #843 F1: provenance profile/namespace restrictions are validated
+        # against the authoritative caller context when declared. Caller
+        # input can never widen authority; a mismatch fails closed.
+        handoff_prov = handoff.get("provenance") or {}
+        required_profile = str(
+            handoff_prov.get("required_profile") or ""
+        ).strip()
+        if required_profile and adopter_profile_name is not None:
+            if str(adopter_profile_name).strip() != required_profile:
+                raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+                    f"wrong profile for cross-role handoff consume of "
+                    f"{lease_id}: required_profile={required_profile} "
+                    f"adopter_profile={adopter_profile_name} (fail closed)"
+                )
+        required_namespace = str(
+            handoff_prov.get("required_namespace") or ""
+        ).strip()
+        if required_namespace and adopter_namespace is not None:
+            if str(adopter_namespace).strip() != required_namespace:
+                raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+                    f"wrong namespace for cross-role handoff consume of "
+                    f"{lease_id}: required_namespace={required_namespace} "
+                    f"adopter_namespace={adopter_namespace} (fail closed)"
+                )
+        reason = "cross-role-handoff-consume"
+    elif freshness["freshness"] == "active" and not same_owner:
+        raise LeaseLifecycleError(
+            f"refusing to steal active foreign lease {lease_id} owned by "
+            f"{owner} (fail closed)"
+        )
+    elif not same_owner and freshness["freshness"] in (
         "expired",
         "stale_dead_process",
         "stale_missing_worktree",
     ):
+        # Expired or stale (non-handoff): require abandon-style safety before
+        # ownership transfer when not same owner; same owner may reclaim.
         if not operator_authorized and freshness["freshness"] == "expired":
             # Deterministic reclaim of expired foreign lease is allowed
             # without operator flag (sanctioned expire reclaim).
@@ -492,6 +663,9 @@ def adopt_lease(
                 f"lease {lease_id} freshness={freshness['freshness']}; "
                 "use abandon with proof before foreign adopt (fail closed)"
             )
+        reason = "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
+    else:
+        reason = "owner-resume-adopt" if same_owner else "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
 
     provenance = build_adopt_provenance(
         adopted_from_session_id=owner,
@@ -504,10 +678,14 @@ def adopt_lease(
         worktree_path=worktree_path,
         expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha or lease.get("expected_head_sha"),
         prior_lease_id=lease_id,
-        reason=(
+        reason=reason,
-            "owner-resume-adopt" if same_owner else "sanctioned-reclaim-adopt"
-        ),
     )
+    if handoff and not same_owner:
+        provenance["cross_role_handoff"] = True
+        provenance["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
+        provenance["required_role"] = handoff["required_role"]
+        provenance["allocating_session_id"] = handoff["allocating_session_id"]
+        provenance["allocating_role"] = handoff["allocating_role"]
 
     result = db.adopt_lease(
         lease_id=lease_id,
@@ -518,7 +696,7 @@ def adopt_lease(
         owner_pid=owner_pid if owner_pid is not None else os.getpid(),
         provenance=provenance,
     )
-    return {
+    out = {
         "success": True,
         "outcome": result.get("outcome"),
         "same_owner": same_owner,
@@ -531,6 +709,24 @@ def adopt_lease(
         "comment_lease_only": False,
         "reasons": result.get("reasons") or [],
     }
+    if handoff and not same_owner:
+        out["cross_role_handoff"] = True
+        out["handoff_status"] = "adopted"
+        out["required_role"] = handoff["required_role"]
+        out["adopted_by_session_id"] = adopter_session_id
+        out["adopted_from_session_id"] = owner
+        lease_row = result.get("lease") or {}
+        if isinstance(lease_row, Mapping):
+            out["read_after_write"] = {
+                "lease_id": lease_row.get("lease_id"),
+                "session_id": lease_row.get("session_id"),
+                "role": lease_row.get("role"),
+                "status": lease_row.get("status"),
+                "adopted_by_session_id": lease_row.get("adopted_by_session_id"),
+                "adopted_from_session_id": lease_row.get("adopted_from_session_id"),
+                "phase": lease_row.get("phase"),
+            }
+    return out
 
 
 def release_lease(

namespace_workspace_binding.py

@@ -24,7 +24,12 @@ ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS: dict[str, str] = {
     "reconciler": RECONCILER_WORKTREE_ENV,
 }
 
-NON_AUTHOR_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler"})
+# Controller has no task worktree env — it routes only (#840).
+KNOWN_ROLE_KINDS = frozenset(
+    {"author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"}
+)
+
+NON_AUTHOR_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"})
 
 
 def normalize_role_kind(
@@ -37,8 +42,12 @@ def normalize_role_kind(
     profile = (profile_name or "").strip().lower()
     if role == "reviewer" and "merger" in profile:
         return "merger"
+    if "controller" in profile or role == "controller":
+        return "controller"
     if role in ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS:
         return role
+    if role in KNOWN_ROLE_KINDS:
+        return role
     return "author"
 
 
@@ -80,7 +89,7 @@ def resolve_namespace_workspace(
     """
     env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
     role = normalize_role_kind(role_kind, profile_name=profile_name)
-    role_env_key = ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS[role]
+    role_env_key = ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS.get(role)
 
     # #618: durable author resolution — no silent control/master fallback.
     if role == "author" and verify_paths:
@@ -108,13 +117,17 @@ def resolve_namespace_workspace(
             )
         return workspace, source
 
+    role_env_candidate = (
+        (_env_value(env_map, role_env_key), f"{role_env_key} environment variable", True)
+        if role_env_key
+        else (None, "no role worktree env", True)
+    )
     for candidate, source, env_sourced in (
         (worktree_path, "worktree_path argument", False),
         (worktree, "worktree argument", False),
         (_env_value(env_map, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV),
          f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV} environment variable", True),
-        (_env_value(env_map, role_env_key),
+        role_env_candidate,
-         f"{role_env_key} environment variable", True),
         (session_lease_worktree if role in {"reviewer", "merger"} else None,
          "reviewer PR lease worktree", False),
         # Author lock derivation is handled by the durable path above when
@@ -433,7 +446,8 @@ def assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
         reasons.append(
             f"{role} mutation blocked: workspace is the stable control checkout; "
             f"create or reconnect to a session-owned worktree under branches/ "
-            f"or set {ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS[role]} / {ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV}"
+            f"or set {ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS.get(role, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV)} / "
+            f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV}"
         )
     elif (
         role in {"reviewer", "merger"}

role_session_router.py

@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ AUTHOR_TASKS = frozenset({
     "reconcile_landed_pr",
 })
 
+CONTROLLER_TASKS = frozenset({
+    "process_work_queue",
+    "process-work-queue",
+    "cross_role_allocate",
+})
+
 RECONCILER_TASKS = frozenset({
     "cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
     # #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned (gitea.branch.delete is granted
@@ -132,6 +138,10 @@ TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE = {
     "reconcile_close_superseded_pr": "reconciler",
     "reconcile_close_satisfied_issue": "reconciler",
     "reconcile_create_followup_issue": "reconciler",
+    # #840: controller-owned generic queue allocation / routing.
+    "process_work_queue": "controller",
+    "process-work-queue": "controller",
+    "cross_role_allocate": "controller",
 }
 
 WRONG_ROLE_REVIEWER_MSG = (
@@ -147,6 +157,10 @@ WRONG_ROLE_MERGER_MSG = (
     "Wrong role/session for merger task. Launch merger MCP namespace."
 )
 
+WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG = (
+    "Wrong role/session for controller task. Launch controller MCP namespace."
+)
+
 _session_last_route: dict | None = None
 
 
@@ -281,6 +295,27 @@ def route_task_session(
         _record_route(result)
         return result
 
+    if required_role == "controller":
+        result = {
+            "task_type": task_type,
+            "required_role": required_role,
+            "active_role": active_role_kind,
+            "active_profile": active_profile,
+            "route_result": ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE,
+            "downstream_allowed": False,
+            "reasons": [
+                WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG,
+                "Controller tasks (process_work_queue / cross-role allocate) "
+                "cannot run in author, reviewer, merger, or reconciler "
+                "worker sessions.",
+            ],
+            "message": WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG,
+            "runtime_switching_supported": runtime_switching_supported,
+            "profile_switch_blocked": not runtime_switching_supported,
+        }
+        _record_route(result)
+        return result
+
     if required_role == "author":
         route = ROUTE_TO_AUTHOR
         message = (

task_capability_map.py

@@ -309,8 +309,10 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.create",
         "role": "author",
     },
-    # #600: controller-owned allocator — any authenticated profile may call;
+    # #600: workers and controller may call with gitea.read; role-scoped workers
-    # routing enforces role match to selected work. Uses control-plane DB (#613).
+    # pass role=author|reviewer|merger|reconciler. Cross-role routing is the
+    # controller default (#840). The canonical generic queue *task type* is
+    # process_work_queue (controller-only below).
     "allocate_next_work": {
         "permission": "gitea.read",
         "role": "author",
@@ -319,6 +321,19 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.read",
         "role": "author",
     },
+    # #840: documented generic queue task — controller routes only.
+    "process_work_queue": {
+        "permission": "gitea.read",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
+    "process-work-queue": {
+        "permission": "gitea.read",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
+    "cross_role_allocate": {
+        "permission": "gitea.read",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
 
     # #601 first-class lease lifecycle — inspect/list need read; mutations gate on
     # ownership in the control-plane DB (not a separate Gitea write permission).

tests/test_arch01_platform.py

@@ -0,0 +1,572 @@
+"""Executable acceptance tests for ARCH-01 Slice A (#822).
+
+Each acceptance criterion (#822 §12) and named test (#822 §13) is exercised
+against a real SQLite database. The migration runs on a fresh DB in ``setUp``;
+the test-run output is the durable evidence the issue requires (§14).
+
+Enforcement being proven:
+
+* ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` — the ``cp_*`` actor functions exist only on the
+  trusted kernel connection; a raw connection cannot satisfy the triggers.
+* ``[SCHEMA]`` — fail-closed aborts, exact dominance set, NOT-NULL class,
+  immutability, and the last-active-grant floor are enforced by
+  CHECK/FK/trigger, verified here including raw-write bypass and concurrency.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import unittest
+from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
+
+import arch01_platform as ap
+from arch01_platform import (
+    ALREADY_INSTALLED,
+    AUTHORIZATION_DENIED,
+    CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST,
+    DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID,
+    DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+    DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
+    INSTALLED,
+    INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT,
+    INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE,
+    PlatformKernel,
+)
+
+INSTALLER = "platform.installer"
+
+_BOOTSTRAP_TABLES = (
+    "principal_equivalence_classes",
+    "principals",
+    "authoritative_issuers",
+    "authority_dominance",
+    "platform_bootstrap_seed",
+    "platform_bootstrap_grants",
+    "platform_active_invariant",
+    "install_state",
+)
+
+
+def _count(kernel: PlatformKernel, table: str) -> int:
+    return kernel._conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table}").fetchone()[0]
+
+
+def _count_where(kernel: PlatformKernel, table: str, where: str) -> int:
+    return kernel._conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table} WHERE {where}").fetchone()[0]
+
+
+def _all_bootstrap_empty(kernel: PlatformKernel) -> bool:
+    return all(_count(kernel, t) == 0 for t in _BOOTSTRAP_TABLES)
+
+
+class Arch01MemoryTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Single-connection behavior on an in-memory database."""
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.kernel = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self.kernel.close()
+
+    # -- AC1 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_install_clean(self) -> None:  # t_install_clean(+)
+        res = self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res.code, INSTALLED)
+        self.assertTrue(self.kernel.is_installed())
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "install_state"), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.active_grant_count(), 1)
+        self.assertIn(ap.EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED, self.kernel.audit_events())
+        rows = set(
+            self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT dominant, subordinate FROM authority_dominance"
+            ).fetchall()
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(rows, set(DOMINANCE_TUPLES))
+        issuer_ref = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT i.issuer_ref FROM principals p JOIN authoritative_issuers i "
+            "ON p.issuer_id = i.issuer_id WHERE p.principal_id = ?",
+            (INSTALLER,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        self.assertEqual(issuer_ref[0], DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID)
+
+    # -- AC2 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_install_twice(self) -> None:  # t_install_twice(-)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        res2 = self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res2.code, ALREADY_INSTALLED)
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "principals"), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "platform_bootstrap_grants"), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "install_state"), 1)
+
+    # -- AC3 / AC5 -------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_install_stage_rollback(self) -> None:  # t_install_stage_rollback
+        for stop in range(1, 9):
+            with self.subTest(stages=stop):
+                k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+                try:
+                    self._partial_bootstrap_then_rollback(k, stop)
+                    self.assertTrue(
+                        _all_bootstrap_empty(k),
+                        f"partial rows survived rollback at stage {stop}",
+                    )
+                    self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+                finally:
+                    k.close()
+
+    def test_no_partial_after_rollback(self) -> None:  # t_no_partial_after_rollback
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            code = self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1])
+            self.assertEqual(code, DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH)
+            self.assertTrue(_all_bootstrap_empty(k))
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    # -- AC4 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_dominance_missing(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_missing(-)
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1]),
+                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    def test_dominance_extra(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_extra(-)
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            extra = DOMINANCE_TUPLES + (("platform.bootstrap", "rogue.extra"),)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=extra),
+                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    def test_dominance_malformed(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_malformed(-)
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            malformed = DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1] + (("supervisor.root", "WRONG.subordinate"),)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=malformed),
+                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    # -- AC6 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_principal_no_class(self) -> None:  # t_principal_no_class(-)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "install"):
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals"
+                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES ('x', 'operator', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                )
+
+    # -- AC7 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_noninstaller_null_issuer(self) -> None:  # t_nonobstaller_null_issuer(-)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            cur = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+            )
+            class_id = cur.lastrowid
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals"
+                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES ('rogue', 'operator', ?, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')",
+                    (class_id,),
+                )
+            self.assertIn("INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_installer_null_issuer_only_during_install(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("i2", "installer", "install"):
+            cur = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+            )
+            class_id = cur.lastrowid
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals"
+                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES ('i2', 'installer', ?, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')",
+                    (class_id,),
+                )
+
+    # -- AC8 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_context_missing(self) -> None:  # t_context_missing(-)
+        self.assertIsNone(self.kernel._ctx)
+        with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+            self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+            )
+        self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_context_stale(self) -> None:  # t_context_stale(-)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            self.kernel._ctx.expired = True
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                )
+            self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_context_epoch_shift(self) -> None:  # t_context_epoch_shift(-)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            self.kernel._ctx.live_epoch = self.kernel._ctx.bound_epoch + 99
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                )
+            self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_bad_actor_kind_or_mode_rejected(self) -> None:
+        for kind, mode in (("intruder", "normal"), ("operator", "sabotage")):
+            with self.subTest(kind=kind, mode=mode):
+                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", kind, mode):
+                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
+                        self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                            "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) "
+                            "VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                        )
+
+    # -- AC9 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_bootstrap_immutable_update(self) -> None:  # t_bootstrap_immutable_{update}
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        cases = [
+            ("UPDATE install_state SET installed_at = 'x' WHERE id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE"),
+            ("UPDATE platform_bootstrap_seed SET created_at = 'x' WHERE seed_id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_SEED"),
+            ("UPDATE authority_dominance SET subordinate = 'x' WHERE dominant = 'supervisor.root'", "IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE"),
+            (f"UPDATE authoritative_issuers SET issuer_ref = 'x' WHERE issuer_ref = '{DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID}'", "IMMUTABLE_ISSUER"),
+            (f"UPDATE principals SET actor_kind = 'operator' WHERE principal_id = '{INSTALLER}'", "IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL"),
+        ]
+        for sql, tag in cases:
+            with self.subTest(sql=sql):
+                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                        self.kernel._conn.execute(sql)
+                    self.assertIn(tag, str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_bootstrap_immutable_delete(self) -> None:  # t_bootstrap_immutable_{delete}
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        cases = [
+            ("DELETE FROM install_state WHERE id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE"),
+            ("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_SEED"),
+            ("DELETE FROM authority_dominance", "IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE"),
+            ("DELETE FROM authoritative_issuers", "IMMUTABLE_ISSUER"),
+            (f"DELETE FROM principals WHERE principal_id = '{INSTALLER}'", "IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL"),
+            ("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_grants", "IMMUTABLE_GRANT"),
+        ]
+        for sql, tag in cases:
+            with self.subTest(sql=sql):
+                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                        self.kernel._conn.execute(sql)
+                    self.assertIn(tag, str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_grant_reactivation_rejected(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        self.kernel.register_principal(
+            "op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED
+        )
+        gid = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grantee_principal_id = 'op1'"
+        ).fetchone()[0]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code,
+            INSTALLED,
+        )
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "UPDATE platform_bootstrap_grants SET active = 1 WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                    (gid,),
+                )
+            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_GRANT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    # -- AC12 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_raw_write_bypass(self) -> None:  # t_raw_write_bypass(raw-bypass)
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            path = os.path.join(tmp, "p.sqlite3")
+            k = PlatformKernel(path)
+            self.assertEqual(k.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+            k.close()
+            raw = sqlite3.connect(path)
+            raw.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
+            try:
+                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
+                    raw.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES ('forged', '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                    )
+                    raw.commit()
+                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
+                    raw.execute("UPDATE install_state SET installed_at = 'x' WHERE id = 1")
+                    raw.commit()
+                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
+                    raw.execute("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_grants")
+                    raw.commit()
+            finally:
+                raw.close()
+
+    # -- AC13 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_audit_created(self) -> None:  # t_audit_created(+)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        self.kernel.register_principal(
+            "op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED
+        )
+        gid = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grantee_principal_id = 'op1'"
+        ).fetchone()[0]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code,
+            INSTALLED,
+        )
+        events = self.kernel.audit_events()
+        for evt in (
+            ap.EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED,
+            ap.EVT_GRANT_CREATED,
+            ap.EVT_GRANT_REVOKED,
+            ap.EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED,
+        ):
+            self.assertIn(evt, events)
+
+    # -- AC14 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_audit_immutable(self) -> None:  # t_audit_immutable(raw-bypass)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as up:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute("UPDATE audit_records SET event = 'x' WHERE audit_id = 1")
+            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_AUDIT", str(up.exception))
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as dl:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute("DELETE FROM audit_records WHERE audit_id = 1")
+            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_AUDIT", str(dl.exception))
+
+    # -- meta ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_schema_meta(self) -> None:
+        rows = dict(self.kernel._conn.execute("SELECT key, value FROM arch01_meta").fetchall())
+        self.assertEqual(rows["schema_version"], str(ap.SCHEMA_VERSION))
+        self.assertIn("disabled by default", rows["architecture"])
+
+    def test_register_principal_creates_class_first(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        res = self.kernel.register_principal(
+            "svc1", "service", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res.code, INSTALLED)
+        row = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT current_class_id FROM principals WHERE principal_id = 'svc1'"
+        ).fetchone()
+        self.assertIsNotNone(row[0])
+
+    # -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def _partial_bootstrap_then_rollback(self, k: PlatformKernel, stop: int) -> None:
+        """Execute the first ``stop`` bootstrap statements, then ROLLBACK."""
+        now = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
+        k._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+        class_id = None
+        issuer_id = None
+        try:
+            with k.actor_context(INSTALLER, "installer", "install"):
+                c = k._conn
+                if stop >= 1:
+                    class_id = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)", (now,)
+                    ).lastrowid
+                if stop >= 2:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principals(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
+                        (INSTALLER, class_id, INSTALLER, now),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 3:
+                    issuer_id = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) VALUES ('operator-key', ?, ?)",
+                        (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
+                    ).lastrowid
+                if stop >= 4:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
+                        (issuer_id, INSTALLER),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 5:
+                    c.executemany(
+                        "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
+                        DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
+                    )
+                if stop >= 6:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
+                        (INSTALLER, now),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 7:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
+                        (INSTALLER, now),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 8:
+                    c.execute("INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)")
+        finally:
+            k._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+
+    def _seed_bootstrap_and_mark(self, k: PlatformKernel, dominance) -> str:
+        """Seed a full bootstrap with a caller-supplied dominance set, then
+        attempt the marker insert. Returns the classified failure code (or
+        INSTALLED). Rolls back on failure so no partial rows remain."""
+        now = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
+        k._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+        try:
+            with k.actor_context(INSTALLER, "installer", "install"):
+                c = k._conn
+                class_id = c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)", (now,)
+                ).lastrowid
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
+                    (INSTALLER, class_id, INSTALLER, now),
+                )
+                issuer_id = c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) VALUES ('operator-key', ?, ?)",
+                    (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
+                ).lastrowid
+                c.execute(
+                    "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
+                    (issuer_id, INSTALLER),
+                )
+                c.executemany(
+                    "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
+                    dominance,
+                )
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
+                    (INSTALLER, now),
+                )
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
+                    (INSTALLER, now),
+                )
+                c.execute("INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)")
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO install_state(id, marker, installed_at) VALUES (1, 'installed', ?)",
+                    (now,),
+                )
+            k._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+            return INSTALLED
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            k._safe_rollback()
+            return PlatformKernel._classify(exc)
+
+
+class Arch01ConcurrencyTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Concurrency invariants require file-backed DBs and independent connections."""
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "p.sqlite3")
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    # -- AC10 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_concurrent_install(self) -> None:  # t_concurrent_install(concurrency)
+        k1 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=0)
+        k2 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=0)
+        barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
+        results = {}
+
+        def _install(name, kernel):
+            barrier.wait()
+            results[name] = kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code
+
+        try:
+            with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:
+                f1 = ex.submit(_install, "a", k1)
+                f2 = ex.submit(_install, "b", k2)
+                f1.result()
+                f2.result()
+            codes = sorted(results.values())
+            self.assertEqual(codes.count(INSTALLED), 1, f"exactly one install expected: {results}")
+            other = [c for c in results.values() if c != INSTALLED][0]
+            self.assertIn(other, (ALREADY_INSTALLED, CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST))
+            self.assertTrue(k1.is_installed())
+            self.assertEqual(_count(k1, "install_state"), 1)
+            self.assertEqual(_count(k1, "principals"), 1)
+        finally:
+            k1.close()
+            k2.close()
+
+    # -- AC11 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_concurrent_last_grant_revoke(self) -> None:  # t_concurrent_last_grant_revoke
+        setup = PlatformKernel(self.path)
+        self.assertEqual(setup.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        setup.register_principal("op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER)
+        self.assertEqual(setup.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        self.assertEqual(setup.active_grant_count(), 2)
+        gids = [
+            r[0]
+            for r in setup._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE active = 1 ORDER BY grant_id"
+            ).fetchall()
+        ]
+        setup.close()
+        self.assertEqual(len(gids), 2)
+
+        k1 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=3000)
+        k2 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=3000)
+        barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
+        results = {}
+
+        def _revoke(name, kernel, gid):
+            barrier.wait()
+            results[name] = kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code
+
+        try:
+            with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:
+                f1 = ex.submit(_revoke, "a", k1, gids[0])
+                f2 = ex.submit(_revoke, "b", k2, gids[1])
+                f1.result()
+                f2.result()
+            codes = list(results.values())
+            self.assertEqual(codes.count(INSTALLED), 1, f"exactly one revoke should win: {results}")
+            self.assertEqual(codes.count(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED), 1, f"one revoke must be denied: {results}")
+            self.assertEqual(k1.active_grant_count(), 1)
+            self.assertEqual(_count_where(k1, "platform_bootstrap_grants", "active = 1"), 1)
+        finally:
+            k1.close()
+            k2.close()
+
+    def test_revoke_final_grant_denied(self) -> None:
+        k = PlatformKernel(self.path)
+        try:
+            self.assertEqual(k.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+            gid = k._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE active = 1"
+            ).fetchone()[0]
+            res = k.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER)
+            self.assertEqual(res.code, AUTHORIZATION_DENIED)
+            self.assertEqual(k.active_grant_count(), 1)
+            self.assertEqual(_count_where(k, "platform_bootstrap_grants", "active = 1"), 1)
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_cross_role_queue_allocation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,581 @@
+"""Authoritative controller cross-role generic queue allocation (#840)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from allocator_service import (
+    ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+    ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+    OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
+    OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
+    OUTCOME_WAIT,
+    ROLE_AUTHOR,
+    ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+    ROLE_MERGER,
+    ROLE_RECONCILER,
+    ROLE_REVIEWER,
+    WorkCandidate,
+    allocate_next_work,
+    build_selection_dict,
+    classify_skip,
+    required_namespace_for_role,
+    required_profile_for_role,
+    resolve_allocation_mode,
+    selected_action_for_candidate,
+)
+from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
+import role_session_router
+from role_session_router import (
+    ROUTE_ALLOWED,
+    ROUTE_AMBIGUOUS,
+    ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE,
+    route_task_session,
+)
+import namespace_workspace_binding as nwb
+import task_capability_map
+
+
+class CrossRoleAllocationModeTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_controller_defaults_to_cross_role(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_CONTROLLER),
+            ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+
+    def test_worker_defaults_to_role_scoped(self) -> None:
+        for role in (ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER, ROLE_RECONCILER):
+            self.assertEqual(
+                resolve_allocation_mode(role),
+                ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+            )
+
+    def test_explicit_modes(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_CONTROLLER, "role_scoped"),
+            ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_AUTHOR, "cross_role"),
+            ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+
+
+class CrossRoleSelectionPayloadTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_selection_contains_required_fields(self) -> None:
+        c = WorkCandidate(
+            kind="issue",
+            number=840,
+            labels=("status:ready",),
+            title="cross-role",
+            priority=20,
+        )
+        sel = build_selection_dict(
+            c,
+            active_role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            required_role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            profile_name="prgs-controller",
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(sel["number"], 840)
+        self.assertEqual(sel["kind"], "issue")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertEqual(sel["selected_action"], "implement")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["action"], "implement")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
+        self.assertEqual(sel["pinned"]["number"], 840)
+        self.assertIsNone(sel["pinned"]["head_sha"])
+
+    def test_profile_prefix_preserved(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            required_profile_for_role(ROLE_REVIEWER, profile_name="dadeschools-controller"),
+            "dadeschools-reviewer",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            required_namespace_for_role(ROLE_MERGER),
+            "gitea-merger",
+        )
+
+    def test_selected_actions_per_role(self) -> None:
+        issue = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
+        pr_review = WorkCandidate(kind="pr", number=2, head_sha="a" * 40)
+        pr_rc = WorkCandidate(
+            kind="pr",
+            number=3,
+            head_sha="b" * 40,
+            request_changes_current_head=True,
+        )
+        pr_merge = WorkCandidate(
+            kind="pr",
+            number=4,
+            head_sha="c" * 40,
+            approval_on_current_head=True,
+            mergeable=True,
+        )
+        pr_recon = WorkCandidate(
+            kind="pr",
+            number=5,
+            head_sha="d" * 40,
+            approval_contaminated=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(selected_action_for_candidate(issue, ROLE_AUTHOR), "implement")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_rc, ROLE_AUTHOR),
+            "address_pr_change_requests",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_review, ROLE_REVIEWER), "review"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(selected_action_for_candidate(pr_merge, ROLE_MERGER), "merge")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_recon, ROLE_RECONCILER),
+            "reconcile_contaminated_approval",
+        )
+
+
+class CrossRoleAllocateServiceTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def _alloc(self, **kwargs):
+        defaults = dict(
+            db=self.db,
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="org",
+            repo="repo",
+            candidates=[],
+            apply=False,
+            profile_name="prgs-controller",
+            username="controller-bot",
+            controller_instance_id="ctrl-1",
+        )
+        defaults.update(kwargs)
+        return allocate_next_work(**defaults)
+
+    def test_eligible_author_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=100,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                title="author work",
+                priority=20,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_PREVIEW)
+        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(res["selected"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 100)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "implement")
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
+        self.assertIn("allocate", res["controller_allowed_actions"])
+        self.assertIn("merge", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_created"])
+
+    def test_eligible_reviewer_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=200,
+                head_sha="e" * 40,
+                title="needs review",
+                priority=30,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 200)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_REVIEWER)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "review")
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_profile"], "prgs-reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["pinned"]["head_sha"], "e" * 40)
+
+    def test_eligible_merger_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=300,
+                head_sha="f" * 40,
+                approval_on_current_head=True,
+                mergeable=True,
+                priority=40,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 300)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_MERGER)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "merge")
+
+    def test_eligible_reconciler_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=400,
+                head_sha="1" * 40,
+                approval_contaminated=True,
+                priority=50,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 400)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_RECONCILER)
+        self.assertIn("reconcile", res["selected_action"])
+
+    def test_no_eligible_work(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=10,
+                labels=("status:blocked",),
+                blocked=True,
+                priority=99,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=11,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                dependency_unmet=True,
+                dependency_reason="blocked by #10",
+                priority=98,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_NO_SAFE)
+        self.assertIsNone(res["selected"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE)
+
+    def test_leased_work_skipped(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=50,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=20,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=51,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=10,
+            ),
+        ]
+        # Seed a foreign lease on issue 50 via assign_and_lease under another session.
+        other = allocate_next_work(
+            self.db,
+            session_id="other-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="org",
+            repo="repo",
+            candidates=cands[:1],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            controller_instance_id="other-ctrl",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(other["outcome"], "assigned_work")
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(res["selected"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 51)
+        self.assertTrue(any(s["number"] == 50 for s in res["skipped"]))
+        self.assertTrue(res["claims_excluded"])
+
+    def test_dependencies_skipped(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=1,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=99,
+                dependency_unmet=True,
+                dependency_reason="needs #2",
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=2,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=1,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 2)
+        skipped = {s["number"]: s["reason"] for s in res["skipped"]}
+        self.assertIn(1, skipped)
+        self.assertIn("needs #2", skipped[1])
+
+    def test_pagination_limit_only_truncates_skip_report(self) -> None:
+        """Ranking uses full inventory; reporting limit is MCP-layer only.
+
+        Service ranks all candidates; prove higher-priority eligible item
+        wins even when many skipped precede it.
+        """
+        cands = []
+        for n in range(1, 30):
+            cands.append(
+                WorkCandidate(
+                    kind="issue",
+                    number=n,
+                    labels=("status:ready",),
+                    priority=100 - n,
+                    dependency_unmet=True,
+                    dependency_reason=f"dep {n}",
+                )
+            )
+        cands.append(
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=999,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=1,
+            )
+        )
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 999)
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(res["skipped"]), 29)
+
+    def test_role_scoped_controller_legacy_still_restricts(self) -> None:
+        """role_scoped controller only takes reconciler-needed items."""
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=1,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=50,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=2,
+                head_sha="a" * 40,
+                approval_contaminated=True,
+                priority=1,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(
+            candidates=cands,
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED)
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 2)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_RECONCILER)
+
+    def test_cross_role_prefers_highest_priority_across_roles(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=10,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=10,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=20,
+                head_sha="b" * 40,
+                priority=50,
+            ),
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="pr",
+                number=30,
+                head_sha="c" * 40,
+                approval_on_current_head=True,
+                mergeable=True,
+                priority=20,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        # PR #20 highest priority → reviewer
+        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 20)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_REVIEWER)
+
+    def test_apply_creates_lease_evidence_for_required_role(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=777,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+                priority=20,
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands, apply=True)
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], "assigned_work")
+        self.assertTrue(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_created"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        proof = res["lease_proof"]
+        self.assertIsNotNone(proof["lease_id"])
+        self.assertEqual(proof["lease_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertIn("implement", proof["allowed_actions"])
+        # Controller isolation: controller still forbids merge/push/create_pr
+        self.assertIn("merge", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
+        self.assertIn("push", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
+
+    def test_metadata_consistency_role_is_controller(self) -> None:
+        cands = [
+            WorkCandidate(
+                kind="issue",
+                number=1,
+                labels=("status:ready",),
+            ),
+        ]
+        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
+        self.assertEqual(res["role"], ROLE_CONTROLLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res["routing_role"], ROLE_CONTROLLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+
+
+class ProcessWorkQueueRouterTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        role_session_router.clear_route_state()
+
+    def test_process_work_queue_allowed_for_controller(self) -> None:
+        res = route_task_session(
+            "process_work_queue",
+            active_profile="prgs-controller",
+            active_role_kind="controller",
+            allowed_in_current_session=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_ALLOWED)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], "controller")
+        self.assertTrue(res["downstream_allowed"])
+
+    def test_process_work_queue_hyphen_alias(self) -> None:
+        res = route_task_session(
+            "process-work-queue",
+            active_profile="prgs-controller",
+            active_role_kind="controller",
+            allowed_in_current_session=True,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_ALLOWED)
+
+    def test_process_work_queue_wrong_role_for_author(self) -> None:
+        res = route_task_session(
+            "process_work_queue",
+            active_profile="prgs-author",
+            active_role_kind="author",
+            allowed_in_current_session=False,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], "controller")
+        self.assertFalse(res["downstream_allowed"])
+
+    def test_unknown_still_ambiguous(self) -> None:
+        res = route_task_session(
+            "not_a_real_task",
+            active_profile="prgs-controller",
+            active_role_kind="controller",
+            allowed_in_current_session=False,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_AMBIGUOUS)
+
+    def test_capability_map_process_work_queue_is_controller(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            task_capability_map.required_role("process_work_queue"),
+            "controller",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            task_capability_map.required_permission("process_work_queue"),
+            "gitea.read",
+        )
+
+
+class ControllerRoleMetadataTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_normalize_role_kind_controller(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(
+            nwb.normalize_role_kind("controller"),
+            "controller",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            nwb.normalize_role_kind("author", profile_name="prgs-controller"),
+            "controller",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            nwb.normalize_role_kind("reconciler", profile_name="prgs-controller"),
+            "controller",
+        )
+
+    def test_profile_role_kind_prefers_declared_controller(self) -> None:
+        # Import from worktree package path via sys.path already set by pytest.
+        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp
+
+        profile = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-controller",
+            "role": "controller",
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read",
+                "gitea.issue.comment",
+                "gitea.pr.close",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [
+                "gitea.pr.approve",
+                "gitea.pr.merge",
+                "gitea.pr.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+            ],
+        }
+        # Declared role wins even if permissions look reconciler-like.
+        self.assertEqual(mcp._profile_role_kind(profile), "controller")
+        # Name-based fallback.
+        profile_no_role = dict(profile)
+        profile_no_role["role"] = None
+        profile_no_role["role_kind"] = None
+        self.assertEqual(mcp._profile_role_kind(profile_no_role), "controller")
+
+    def test_permission_inference_without_controller_name_stays_reconciler(self) -> None:
+        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp
+
+        # Pure permission inference still may return reconciler when no controller
+        # declaration exists — that is intentional for reconciler profiles.
+        role = mcp._role_kind(
+            ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.close", "gitea.issue.comment"],
+            ["gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(role, "reconciler")
+
+
+class DashboardRemainsExplanatoryTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_dashboard_prompt_points_at_allocator_not_self_select(self) -> None:
+        import workflow_dashboard as wd
+
+        self.assertIn("gitea_allocate_next_work", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER)
+        self.assertIn("process_work_queue", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER)
+        self.assertIn("never replaces allocator", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER.lower())
+        self.assertNotIn("self-select", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER.lower())
+
+
+class ClassifySkipCrossRoleTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_controller_cross_role_accepts_author_issue(self) -> None:
+        c = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
+        self.assertIsNone(
+            classify_skip(
+                c,
+                role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+                terminal_pr=None,
+                allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_legacy_controller_skips_author_issue(self) -> None:
+        c = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
+        reason = classify_skip(
+            c,
+            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            terminal_pr=None,
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+        )
+        self.assertIsNotNone(reason)
+        self.assertIn("does not require controller", reason or "")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_843_cross_role_handoff.py

@@ -0,0 +1,682 @@
+"""Cross-role allocation handoff consumable by independent workers (#843).
+
+Regression coverage for the controller→required-role consume path:
+
+* controller allocates author work; independent author adopts successfully
+* author adoption succeeds after allocating controller process exits
+* author adoption without sharing controller session identity
+* wrong-role adoption rejected
+* concurrent/second adoption rejected without state corruption
+* terminal allocation adoption rejected
+* successful adoption produces authoritative ownership evidence
+* genuine abandoned-lease recovery remains valid
+* process_work_queue / allocate results include consume identifiers
+* same-role allocation behavior remains compatible
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from datetime import timedelta
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from allocator_service import (
+    ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+    ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+    OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
+    ROLE_AUTHOR,
+    ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+    ROLE_REVIEWER,
+    WorkCandidate,
+    allocate_next_work,
+)
+from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, ForeignLeaseError, _ts, _utc_now
+import lease_lifecycle as ll
+
+
+class CrossRoleHandoffTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
+        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role="controller",
+            profile="prgs-controller",
+            pid=99999999,  # dead-looking pid
+        )
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role="author",
+            profile="prgs-author",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="author-worker-2",
+            role="author",
+            profile="prgs-author",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="reviewer-worker",
+            role="reviewer",
+            profile="prgs-reviewer",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        self.wt = self._tmp.name
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def _ready_issue(self, number: int = 843, title: str = "handoff target") -> WorkCandidate:
+        return WorkCandidate(
+            kind="issue",
+            number=number,
+            labels=("status:ready", "type:bug"),
+            title=title,
+            priority=20,
+        )
+
+    def _controller_allocate(self, number: int = 843, **kwargs):
+        defaults = dict(
+            db=self.db,
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            candidates=[self._ready_issue(number)],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-controller",
+            username="controller-user",
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+        defaults.update(kwargs)
+        return allocate_next_work(**defaults)
+
+    def test_controller_allocates_author_independent_author_adopts(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate()
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertIn("consume_allocation", res)
+        consume = res["consume_allocation"]
+        self.assertEqual(consume["tool"], "gitea_adopt_workflow_lease")
+        self.assertEqual(consume["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        self.assertFalse(consume["controller_session_required"])
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        self.assertEqual(consume["lease_id"], lid)
+        self.assertIn(lid, res["next_valid_command"])
+
+        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(adopted["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        raw = adopted["read_after_write"]
+        self.assertEqual(raw["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["status"], "active")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["phase"], "adopted")
+
+        # Authoritative re-read
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "adopted")
+
+    def test_author_adoption_after_controller_process_exits(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=900)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        # Force owner_pid dead + freshness stale_dead_process
+        import sqlite3
+
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
+        try:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999 WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                (lid,),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        fr = ll.classify_lease_freshness(
+            state["lease"], pid_checker=lambda _p: False
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(fr["freshness"], "stale_dead_process")
+
+        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        # No abandon required
+        state2 = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state2["lease"]["status"], "active")
+        self.assertNotEqual(state2["lease"]["status"], "abandoned")
+
+    def test_adoption_without_sharing_controller_session_identity(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=901)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertNotEqual(adopted["adopted_by_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        self.assertFalse(adopted["same_owner"])
+        self.assertEqual(adopted["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+
+    def test_wrong_role_adoption_rejected(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=902)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError) as ctx:
+            ll.adopt_lease(
+                self.db,
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="reviewer-worker",
+                role=ROLE_REVIEWER,
+            )
+        self.assertIn("wrong role", str(ctx.exception).lower())
+        # State unchanged
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        self.assertIsNone(state["lease"].get("adopted_by_session_id") or None)
+        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
+
+    def test_second_adoption_rejected_without_corruption(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=903)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        first = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError):
+            ll.adopt_lease(
+                self.db,
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
+                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+                worktree_path=self.wt,
+            )
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["status"], "active")
+
+    def test_terminal_allocation_adoption_rejected(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=904)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        # Abandon as terminal
+        proof = ll.AbandonProof(
+            dead_process=True,
+            missing_worktree=True,
+            no_open_pr=True,
+            no_live_mutation_risk=True,
+            owner_pid=99999999,
+            worktree_path="/nonexistent/for-843",
+        )
+        # Attach dead pid / missing wt for abandon eligibility
+        import sqlite3
+
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
+        try:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999, worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                ("/nonexistent/for-843", lid),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+        abandoned = ll.abandon_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            requester_session_id="author-worker",
+            proof=proof,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(abandoned["outcome"], "abandoned")
+        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError) as ctx:
+            ll.adopt_lease(
+                self.db,
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            )
+        self.assertIn("abandoned", str(ctx.exception).lower())
+
+    def test_successful_adoption_read_after_write_ownership(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=905)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        adopted = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        raw = adopted["read_after_write"]
+        self.assertEqual(raw["lease_id"], lid)
+        self.assertEqual(raw["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(raw["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        # Re-fetch proves durable write
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], raw["session_id"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], raw["adopted_by_session_id"]
+        )
+
+    def test_genuine_abandoned_recovery_still_valid(self) -> None:
+        """Same-role author lease abandoned remains reclaimable via abandon path."""
+        same = allocate_next_work(
+            self.db,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            candidates=[self._ready_issue(906, "same-role")],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            username="author-user",
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(same["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
+        lid = same["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        import sqlite3
+
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
+        try:
+            conn.execute(
+                "UPDATE leases SET owner_pid = 99999999, worktree_path = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
+                ("/nonexistent/same-role", lid),
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+        proof = ll.AbandonProof(
+            dead_process=True,
+            missing_worktree=True,
+            no_open_pr=True,
+            no_live_mutation_risk=True,
+            owner_pid=99999999,
+            worktree_path="/nonexistent/same-role",
+        )
+        abandoned = ll.abandon_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            requester_session_id="author-worker-2",
+            proof=proof,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(abandoned["outcome"], "abandoned")
+        # Foreign author cannot handoff-consume an abandoned non-handoff lease
+        with self.assertRaises(ll.LeaseLifecycleError):
+            ll.adopt_lease(
+                self.db,
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
+                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            )
+        # Reclaim path still works for expired/abandoned after force-expire
+        reclaimed = ll.reclaim_expired_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="author-worker-2",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(reclaimed["outcome"], "reclaimed")
+        self.assertEqual(reclaimed["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker-2")
+
+    def test_allocate_payload_includes_consume_identifiers(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=907)
+        self.assertIn("consume_allocation", res)
+        c = res["consume_allocation"]
+        for key in (
+            "tool",
+            "lease_id",
+            "assignment_id",
+            "required_role",
+            "required_profile",
+            "required_namespace",
+            "instructions",
+            "handoff_status",
+        ):
+            self.assertIn(key, c)
+        self.assertEqual(c["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
+        self.assertEqual(c["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
+        self.assertIn("gitea_adopt_workflow_lease", c["instructions"])
+        self.assertTrue(res["lease_proof"]["cross_role_handoff"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["lease_proof"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
+
+    def test_same_role_allocation_remains_compatible(self) -> None:
+        res = allocate_next_work(
+            self.db,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            candidates=[self._ready_issue(908)],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-author",
+            username="author-user",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
+        self.assertNotIn("consume_allocation", res)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        # No cross-role handoff provenance
+        prov = state.get("provenance") or {}
+        self.assertFalse(prov.get("cross_role_handoff"))
+        # Owner resume still works
+        resume = ll.adopt_lease(
+            self.db,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(resume["same_owner"])
+        self.assertEqual(resume["outcome"], "adopted_owner_resume")
+
+    def test_inspect_points_required_role_at_consume(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=909)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        decision = ll.inspect_lease(
+            self.db, lid, caller_session_id="author-worker"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            decision["safe_next_action"], ll.SAFE_CONSUME_CROSS_ROLE
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(decision["block"])
+        self.assertEqual(decision["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+
+    def test_db_cas_rejects_concurrent_second_consume(self) -> None:
+        res = self._controller_allocate(number=910)
+        lid = res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+        # First consume via DB layer directly
+        first = self.db.adopt_lease(
+            lease_id=lid,
+            adopter_session_id="author-worker",
+            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+            provenance={
+                "cross_role_handoff": True,
+                "handoff_status": "adopted",
+                "required_role": "author",
+            },
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        # Second CAS must fail
+        with self.assertRaises(ForeignLeaseError):
+            self.db.adopt_lease(
+                lease_id=lid,
+                adopter_session_id="author-worker-2",
+                role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
+                worktree_path=self.wt,
+                provenance={
+                    "cross_role_handoff": True,
+                    "handoff_status": "pending",
+                    "required_role": "author",
+                },
+            )
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+
+
+class MCPBoundaryAdoptRoleBindingTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    """#843 F1: MCP-boundary role binding for ``gitea_adopt_workflow_lease``.
+
+    The library-level wrong-role test calls ``lease_lifecycle.adopt_lease``
+    directly. These tests prove the MCP entry point derives the adopter role
+    authoritatively from the active authenticated profile and rejects any
+    caller-supplied role that disagrees, so a reviewer/merger profile cannot
+    consume an author handoff by passing ``role="author"``.
+    """
+
+    AUTHOR_PROFILE = {
+        "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+        "role": "author",
+        "allowed_operations": [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.pr.create",
+            "gitea.branch.push",
+        ],
+        "forbidden_operations": [],
+    }
+    REVIEWER_PROFILE = {
+        "profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
+        "role": "reviewer",
+        "allowed_operations": [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.pr.review",
+            "gitea.pr.approve",
+            "gitea.pr.request_changes",
+        ],
+        "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
+    }
+    MERGER_PROFILE = {
+        "profile_name": "prgs-merger",
+        "role": "merger",
+        "allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.merge"],
+        "forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
+    }
+    FOREIGN_AUTHOR_PROFILE = {
+        "profile_name": "dadeschools-author",
+        "role": "author",
+        "allowed_operations": [
+            "gitea.read",
+            "gitea.pr.create",
+            "gitea.branch.push",
+        ],
+        "forbidden_operations": [],
+    }
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
+        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role="controller",
+            profile="prgs-controller",
+            pid=99999999,
+        )
+        self.db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role="author",
+            profile="prgs-author",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        self.wt = self._tmp.name
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def _ready_issue(self, number: int) -> WorkCandidate:
+        return WorkCandidate(
+            kind="issue",
+            number=number,
+            labels=("status:ready", "type:bug"),
+            title="handoff target",
+            priority=20,
+        )
+
+    def _handoff_lease(self, number: int = 843) -> str:
+        res = allocate_next_work(
+            db=self.db,
+            session_id="ctrl-session",
+            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            candidates=[self._ready_issue(number)],
+            apply=True,
+            profile_name="prgs-controller",
+            username="controller-user",
+            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
+        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
+        return res["assignment"]["lease_id"]
+
+    def _call_adopt_tool(self, profile: dict, **kwargs):
+        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp_server
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile", return_value=profile),
+            patch.object(
+                mcp_server,
+                "_control_plane_db_or_error",
+                return_value=(self.db, []),
+            ),
+        ):
+            return mcp_server.gitea_adopt_workflow_lease(
+                remote="prgs", **kwargs
+            )
+
+    def _assert_handoff_untouched(self, lease_id: str) -> None:
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lease_id)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        self.assertIsNone(state["lease"].get("adopted_by_session_id") or None)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["status"], "active")
+        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "pending")
+
+    def test_reviewer_profile_cannot_consume_author_handoff_via_role_author(
+        self,
+    ) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(920)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.REVIEWER_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="reviewer-worker",
+            role="author",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "reviewer")
+        self.assertEqual(result["supplied_role"], "author")
+        self.assertIn("does not match", result["reasons"][0])
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_merger_profile_cannot_consume_author_handoff_via_role_author(
+        self,
+    ) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(921)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.MERGER_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="merger-worker",
+            role="author",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "merger")
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_reviewer_profile_rejected_without_role_argument(self) -> None:
+        """Even without a spoofed role, the profile-derived role binds."""
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(922)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.REVIEWER_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="reviewer-worker",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertIn("wrong role", result["reasons"][0].lower())
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_author_profile_mismatching_supplied_role_rejected(self) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(923)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role="reviewer",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertEqual(result["profile_role_kind"], "author")
+        self.assertEqual(result["supplied_role"], "reviewer")
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_foreign_profile_name_rejected_for_author_handoff(self) -> None:
+        """Provenance required_profile binds even when the role matches."""
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(924)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.FOREIGN_AUTHOR_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="foreign-author-worker",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "blocked")
+        self.assertIn("wrong profile", result["reasons"][0].lower())
+        self._assert_handoff_untouched(lid)
+
+    def test_author_profile_consumes_author_handoff(self) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(925)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            role="author",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        self.assertEqual(result["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(result["adopted_from_session_id"], "ctrl-session")
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            state["lease"]["adopted_by_session_id"], "author-worker"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(state["assignment"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["provenance"]["handoff_status"], "adopted")
+
+    def test_author_profile_consumes_author_handoff_without_role_argument(
+        self,
+    ) -> None:
+        lid = self._handoff_lease(926)
+        result = self._call_adopt_tool(
+            self.AUTHOR_PROFILE,
+            lease_id=lid,
+            session_id="author-worker",
+            worktree_path=self.wt,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["success"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "adopted_cross_role_handoff")
+        state = self.db.get_lease_workflow_state(lid)
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["session_id"], "author-worker")
+        self.assertEqual(state["lease"]["role"], "author")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_system_health.py

@@ -0,0 +1,499 @@
+"""Tests for the read-only system-health API (#634).
+
+Covers the acceptance criteria directly: a structured payload with readiness
+and a dependency list (AC1), version and uptime when knowable (AC2), stale
+runtime reported without a false mutation-safe claim (AC3), and the healthy /
+degraded-dependency / redaction cases (AC4).
+"""
+import json
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest import mock
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+import control_plane_db
+from webui.app import create_app
+from webui.deployment_boundary import scan_text_for_client_secrets
+from webui.system_health import (
+    API_PATH,
+    STATUS_DEGRADED,
+    STATUS_DOWN,
+    STATUS_OK,
+    STATUS_SKIPPED,
+    DependencyProbe,
+    StaleRuntime,
+    assess_stale_runtime,
+    clear_probe_cache,
+    load_system_health,
+    namespace_summaries,
+    probe_control_plane_db,
+    probe_gitea,
+    process_uptime,
+    redact,
+    redact_url,
+    snapshot_to_dict,
+)
+
+
+def _probe(name, status, *, required=True, detail="detail", kind="test"):
+    return DependencyProbe(
+        name=name,
+        kind=kind,
+        status=status,
+        detail=detail,
+        required=required,
+        latency_ms=1.5,
+        metadata={},
+    )
+
+
+_ALL_HEALTHY = (
+    _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
+    _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
+    _probe("gitea", STATUS_OK, required=False, kind="http"),
+)
+
+_CLEAN_PARITY = StaleRuntime(
+    daemon_head="abc123",
+    checkout_head="abc123",
+    remote_head="abc123",
+    stale=False,
+    determinable=True,
+    mutation_safe=True,
+    reasons=(),
+)
+
+
+class CleanParityMixin:
+    """Pin parity for tests about aggregation rather than staleness.
+
+    Without this the assertions depend on the real checkout: a worktree whose
+    branch is ahead of its upstream is genuinely stale, which would degrade the
+    overall status and make these cases fail for an unrelated reason.
+    """
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        super().setUp()
+        patcher = mock.patch(
+            "webui.system_health.assess_stale_runtime",
+            return_value=_CLEAN_PARITY,
+        )
+        patcher.start()
+        self.addCleanup(patcher.stop)
+
+
+class TestDependencyAggregation(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC1 — readiness and dependency list derived from probe results."""
+
+    def test_all_healthy_is_ok_and_ready(self):
+        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
+        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_OK)
+        self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
+        self.assertTrue(snapshot.readiness_complete)
+        self.assertEqual(snapshot.readiness_reasons, ())
+        self.assertEqual(len(snapshot.dependencies), 3)
+
+    def test_required_dependency_down_blocks_readiness(self):
+        probes = (
+            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_DOWN, detail="file missing", kind="sqlite"),
+            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
+            _probe("gitea", STATUS_OK, required=False, kind="http"),
+        )
+        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
+        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DOWN)
+        self.assertFalse(snapshot.ready)
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("control_plane_db" in reason for reason in snapshot.readiness_reasons)
+        )
+
+    def test_optional_dependency_down_degrades_but_stays_ready(self):
+        """A failing optional probe must not claim the process itself is unready."""
+        probes = (
+            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
+            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
+            _probe("gitea", STATUS_DOWN, required=False, detail="timeout", kind="http"),
+        )
+        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
+        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
+        self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
+        self.assertTrue(any("gitea" in reason for reason in snapshot.readiness_reasons))
+
+    def test_unrun_required_probe_leaves_readiness_incomplete(self):
+        """Not probed is not the same as passing."""
+        probes = (
+            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
+            _probe("repository", STATUS_SKIPPED, detail="offline", kind="git"),
+        )
+        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
+        self.assertFalse(snapshot.ready)
+        self.assertFalse(snapshot.readiness_complete)
+        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
+
+    def test_skipped_optional_probe_does_not_block_readiness(self):
+        probes = (
+            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_OK, kind="sqlite"),
+            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
+            _probe("gitea", STATUS_SKIPPED, required=False, kind="http"),
+        )
+        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
+        self.assertTrue(snapshot.ready)
+        self.assertTrue(snapshot.readiness_complete)
+
+
+class TestVersionAndUptime(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC2 — version and uptime present when knowable."""
+
+    def test_uptime_and_start_time_present(self):
+        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(snapshot.uptime_seconds, 0.0)
+        self.assertIn("T", snapshot.started_at)
+
+    def test_process_uptime_helper_matches_shape(self):
+        started_at, uptime = process_uptime()
+        self.assertIn("T", started_at)
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(uptime, 0.0)
+
+    def test_version_reports_python_and_schema_version(self):
+        probes = (
+            DependencyProbe(
+                name="control_plane_db",
+                kind="sqlite",
+                status=STATUS_OK,
+                detail="ok",
+                required=True,
+                latency_ms=1.0,
+                metadata={"schema_version": control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION},
+            ),
+            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
+        )
+        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head="abc123")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            snapshot.version.control_plane_schema_version,
+            control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(snapshot.version.python_version)
+
+    def test_version_known_flag_false_when_sha_unavailable(self):
+        with mock.patch("webui.system_health._git", return_value=None):
+            snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
+        self.assertIsNone(snapshot.version.git_sha)
+        self.assertFalse(snapshot.version.known)
+
+
+class TestStaleRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC3 — stale runtime reflected without a false mutation-safe claim."""
+
+    def test_matching_commits_are_mutation_safe(self):
+        assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
+            Path("/tmp"),
+            daemon_head="aaa",
+            git_reader=lambda *args: "aaa",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(assessment.stale)
+        self.assertTrue(assessment.determinable)
+        self.assertTrue(assessment.mutation_safe)
+
+    def test_diverged_commits_are_stale_and_not_mutation_safe(self):
+        reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": "bbb"}
+        assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
+            Path("/tmp"),
+            daemon_head="aaa",
+            git_reader=lambda *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(assessment.stale)
+        self.assertFalse(assessment.mutation_safe)
+        self.assertTrue(assessment.reasons)
+
+    def test_unknown_remote_is_not_mutation_safe(self):
+        """Indeterminate must never read as safe."""
+        reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": None}
+        assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
+            Path("/tmp"),
+            daemon_head="aaa",
+            git_reader=lambda *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(assessment.determinable)
+        self.assertFalse(assessment.mutation_safe)
+        self.assertFalse(assessment.stale)
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("indeterminate" in reason for reason in assessment.reasons)
+        )
+
+    def test_unobservable_daemon_head_is_disclosed(self):
+        assessment = assess_stale_runtime(
+            Path("/tmp"),
+            git_reader=lambda *args: "aaa",
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("not observable" in reason for reason in assessment.reasons)
+        )
+
+    def test_stale_runtime_degrades_overall_status(self):
+        reads = {"HEAD": "aaa", "@{upstream}": "bbb"}
+        # Pinned rather than inherited: this path uses the default git reader,
+        # so the assertion must hold whether or not the suite runs offline.
+        with mock.patch.dict(os.environ, {"WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE": ""}), mock.patch(
+            "webui.system_health._git",
+            side_effect=lambda repo, *args: reads.get(args[-1]),
+        ):
+            snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="aaa")
+        self.assertTrue(snapshot.stale_runtime.stale)
+        self.assertFalse(snapshot.stale_runtime.mutation_safe)
+        self.assertEqual(snapshot.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
+
+
+class TestControlPlaneDbProbe(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The required local dependency, probed read-only."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.addCleanup(self.tmp.cleanup)
+        self.db_path = str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "control-plane.db")
+
+    def _build_db(self, schema_version):
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
+        conn.execute("CREATE TABLE schema_meta (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT)")
+        conn.execute("CREATE TABLE leases (lease_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, status TEXT)")
+        conn.execute(
+            "INSERT INTO schema_meta(key, value) VALUES ('schema_version', ?)",
+            (str(schema_version),),
+        )
+        conn.execute("INSERT INTO leases(lease_id, status) VALUES ('l1', 'active')")
+        conn.commit()
+        conn.close()
+
+    def test_missing_database_is_down(self):
+        probe = probe_control_plane_db(str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "absent.db"))
+        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
+        self.assertTrue(probe.required)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(probe.latency_ms)
+
+    def test_matching_schema_is_ok(self):
+        self._build_db(control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION)
+        probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
+        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_OK)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            probe.metadata["schema_version"], control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(probe.metadata["active_leases"], 1)
+
+    def test_mismatched_schema_is_degraded(self):
+        self._build_db(control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION + 99)
+        probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
+        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
+
+    def test_probe_does_not_create_a_database(self):
+        """A health check must never initialise the substrate it inspects."""
+        absent = str(Path(self.tmp.name) / "never-created.db")
+        probe_control_plane_db(absent)
+        self.assertFalse(Path(absent).exists())
+
+    def test_unreadable_database_is_down_not_raised(self):
+        Path(self.db_path).write_text("this is not a sqlite database")
+        probe = probe_control_plane_db(self.db_path)
+        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
+
+
+class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC4 — redaction. No credential-shaped text crosses the boundary."""
+
+    def test_redacts_token_assignment(self):
+        cleaned = redact("failed with token=ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ012345")
+        self.assertNotIn("ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ012345", cleaned)
+        self.assertIn("[redacted]", cleaned)
+
+    def test_redacts_authorization_header_text(self):
+        cleaned = redact("Authorization: Bearer abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456")
+        self.assertNotIn("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456", cleaned)
+
+    def test_redacts_long_opaque_strings(self):
+        cleaned = redact("value 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef here")
+        self.assertNotIn("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", cleaned)
+
+    def test_url_userinfo_and_query_are_stripped(self):
+        cleaned = redact_url("https://user:[email protected]/api/v1?token=xyz")
+        self.assertNotIn("secretpass", cleaned)
+        self.assertNotIn("token=xyz", cleaned)
+        self.assertEqual(cleaned, "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1")
+
+    def test_url_inside_free_text_is_redacted(self):
+        cleaned = redact("GET https://u:[email protected]/x?token=abc failed")
+        self.assertNotIn("u:p@", cleaned)
+        self.assertNotIn("token=abc", cleaned)
+
+    def test_gitea_probe_failure_detail_is_redacted(self):
+        boom = RuntimeError(
+            "connection refused for https://user:[email protected]/api/v1/version"
+        )
+        with mock.patch("webui.system_health.get_auth_header", return_value="token x"), \
+                mock.patch("webui.system_health.api_request", side_effect=boom):
+            probe = probe_gitea("gitea.example.com")
+        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DOWN)
+        self.assertNotIn("hunter2", probe.detail)
+        self.assertEqual(scan_text_for_client_secrets(probe.detail), [])
+
+    def test_credential_guard_refusal_is_a_status_not_a_crash(self):
+        with mock.patch(
+            "webui.system_health.get_auth_header",
+            side_effect=RuntimeError("daemon guard refused"),
+        ):
+            probe = probe_gitea("gitea.example.com")
+        self.assertEqual(probe.status, STATUS_DEGRADED)
+        self.assertFalse(probe.required)
+
+
+class TestNamespaceSummaries(unittest.TestCase):
+    """A web process cannot prove IDE namespace health, and must not claim to."""
+
+    def test_every_namespace_reports_unproven(self):
+        rows = namespace_summaries()
+        self.assertTrue(rows)
+        for row in rows:
+            with self.subTest(namespace=row["namespace"]):
+                self.assertEqual(row["status"], "unproven")
+                self.assertFalse(row["ide_namespace_proven"])
+                self.assertIn("client_namespace", row["reason"])
+
+
+class TestSystemHealthRoutes(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
+    """The HTTP surface: versioned path, status codes, read-only guard."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        super().setUp()
+        clear_probe_cache()
+        self.addCleanup(clear_probe_cache)
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+
+    def _patch_snapshot(self, probes, daemon_head="abc123"):
+        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=probes, daemon_head=daemon_head)
+        patcher = mock.patch(
+            "webui.app.load_system_health",
+            return_value=snapshot,
+        )
+        patcher.start()
+        self.addCleanup(patcher.stop)
+        return snapshot
+
+    def test_versioned_route_is_registered(self):
+        self.assertEqual(API_PATH, "/api/v1/system/health")
+        self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
+        response = self.client.get(API_PATH)
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+
+    def test_healthy_payload_shape(self):
+        self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
+        data = self.client.get(API_PATH).json()
+        self.assertEqual(data["status"], STATUS_OK)
+        self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["ready"])
+        self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["complete"])
+        self.assertEqual(data["api"], API_PATH)
+        self.assertEqual(len(data["dependencies"]), 3)
+        for key in ("version", "process", "stale_runtime", "mcp_namespaces"):
+            self.assertIn(key, data)
+        self.assertIn("uptime_seconds", data["process"])
+        self.assertIn("mutation_safe", data["stale_runtime"])
+
+    def test_degraded_dependency_returns_503(self):
+        probes = (
+            _probe("control_plane_db", STATUS_DOWN, detail="missing", kind="sqlite"),
+            _probe("repository", STATUS_OK, kind="git"),
+        )
+        self._patch_snapshot(probes)
+        response = self.client.get(API_PATH)
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 503)
+        data = response.json()
+        self.assertFalse(data["readiness"]["ready"])
+        self.assertTrue(data["readiness"]["reasons"])
+
+    def test_dependency_entries_expose_status_and_latency(self):
+        self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
+        data = self.client.get(API_PATH).json()
+        names = {entry["name"] for entry in data["dependencies"]}
+        self.assertEqual(names, {"control_plane_db", "repository", "gitea"})
+        for entry in data["dependencies"]:
+            with self.subTest(dependency=entry["name"]):
+                self.assertIn("status", entry)
+                self.assertIn("required", entry)
+                self.assertIn("latency_ms", entry)
+
+    def test_response_body_carries_no_client_secrets(self):
+        self._patch_snapshot(_ALL_HEALTHY)
+        body = self.client.get(API_PATH).text
+        self.assertEqual(scan_text_for_client_secrets(body), [])
+
+    def test_deep_flag_is_forwarded(self):
+        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
+        with mock.patch(
+            "webui.app.load_system_health", return_value=snapshot
+        ) as loader:
+            self.client.get(f"{API_PATH}?deep=1")
+            loader.assert_called_once_with(deep=True)
+
+    def test_shallow_is_the_default(self):
+        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc")
+        with mock.patch(
+            "webui.app.load_system_health", return_value=snapshot
+        ) as loader:
+            self.client.get(API_PATH)
+            loader.assert_called_once_with(deep=False)
+
+    def test_route_rejects_mutation_methods(self):
+        for method in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"):
+            with self.subTest(method=method):
+                response = self.client.request(method, API_PATH)
+                self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
+                self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "read-only-mvp")
+
+    def test_default_shallow_call_skips_the_network_probe(self):
+        """The expensive probe must not run unless it was asked for."""
+        with mock.patch("webui.system_health.probe_gitea") as probe:
+            snapshot = load_system_health(deep=False)
+        probe.assert_not_called()
+        gitea = next(p for p in snapshot.dependencies if p.name == "gitea")
+        self.assertEqual(gitea.status, STATUS_SKIPPED)
+
+
+class TestHealthRouteBackwardCompatibility(unittest.TestCase):
+    """`/health` is expanded additively; MVP consumers must keep working."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+
+    def test_mvp_keys_are_unchanged(self):
+        data = self.client.get("/health").json()
+        self.assertEqual(data["status"], "ok")
+        self.assertEqual(data["service"], "mcp-control-plane-webui")
+        self.assertEqual(data["mode"], "read-only-mvp")
+        self.assertIn("timestamp", data)
+        self.assertEqual(data["deployment"]["mode"], "internal-operator-console")
+
+    def test_health_points_at_the_versioned_api(self):
+        data = self.client.get("/health").json()
+        self.assertEqual(data["system_health_api"], API_PATH)
+        self.assertIn("uptime_seconds", data)
+        self.assertIn("started_at", data)
+
+    def test_health_runs_no_dependency_probe(self):
+        """Liveness must stay cheap: no probe, no snapshot assembly."""
+        with mock.patch("webui.app.load_system_health") as loader:
+            response = self.client.get("/health")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        loader.assert_not_called()
+
+
+class TestSnapshotSerialisation(CleanParityMixin, unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_snapshot_dict_is_json_serialisable(self):
+        snapshot = load_system_health(probes=_ALL_HEALTHY, daemon_head="abc123")
+        encoded = json.dumps(snapshot_to_dict(snapshot))
+        self.assertIn("readiness", encoded)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo
 from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
 from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
+from webui.system_health import (
+    API_PATH as SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
+    load_system_health,
+    process_uptime,
+    snapshot_to_dict as system_health_to_dict,
+)
 
 _READ_ONLY_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
 _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS = frozenset({"/audit", "/api/audit"})
@@ -78,16 +84,43 @@ async def home(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
 
 
 async def health(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    """Liveness only — deliberately cheap, runs no dependency probe (#634).
+
+    Every MVP key is retained so existing pollers keep working; the additions
+    are a pointer to the structured API and the in-memory process uptime.
+    Readiness lives at that API because answering it costs real probes.
+    """
     bind_host = _request.app.state.webui_bind_host
+    started_at, uptime_seconds = process_uptime()
     return JSONResponse({
         "status": "ok",
         "service": "mcp-control-plane-webui",
         "mode": "read-only-mvp",
         "timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
         "deployment": deployment_snapshot(bind_host=bind_host),
+        "started_at": started_at,
+        "uptime_seconds": uptime_seconds,
+        "system_health_api": SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
     })
 
 
+def _truthy_flag(value: str | None) -> bool:
+    return (value or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
+
+
+async def api_system_health(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    """Structured read-only system health (#634).
+
+    `?deep=1` opts into the expensive network probe. The response status code
+    reflects readiness so automated checks can branch on it without parsing the
+    body: 200 when ready, 503 when a required dependency failed or never ran.
+    """
+    deep = _truthy_flag(request.query_params.get("deep"))
+    snapshot = load_system_health(deep=deep)
+    payload = system_health_to_dict(snapshot)
+    return JSONResponse(payload, status_code=200 if snapshot.ready else 503)
+
+
 async def queue(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
     snapshot = load_queue_snapshot()
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title="Queue", body_html=render_queue_page(snapshot)))
@@ -399,6 +432,7 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
         routes=[
             Route("/", home, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/health", health, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route(SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH, api_system_health, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/queue", queue, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/queue", api_queue, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/projects", projects, methods=["GET"]),

webui/system_health.py

@@ -0,0 +1,682 @@
+"""Read-only system-health model for the operator console API (#634).
+
+`/health` answers liveness only. Operators automating readiness checks need a
+structured view of *why* the control plane is or is not usable: which
+dependencies answered, how long they took, what version of the code is running,
+and whether the runtime is stale relative to its remote.
+
+Three rules shape this module.
+
+* **Read-only.** Every probe opens its subject read-only. The control-plane
+  database is opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI so a health check can never
+  create or migrate a schema, and no probe writes, restarts, or reloads
+  anything — restart controls are Phase 2, and #630 forbids process-kill
+  recovery outright.
+* **Fail-soft.** A dependency that is unreachable is a *status*, not an
+  exception. Probes catch their own failures and report them as a degraded or
+  down entry carrying a reason.
+* **Never claim more than was proven.** Readiness is derived only from probes
+  that actually ran, ``mutation_safe`` stays false unless the parity commits are
+  known and equal, and an MCP namespace is reported unproven because a web
+  process cannot exercise the IDE-managed client path (#543).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import re
+import sqlite3
+import subprocess
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit, urlunsplit
+
+import control_plane_db
+import mcp_namespace_health
+from gitea_auth import api_request, get_auth_header, gitea_url
+
+from webui.project_registry import load_registry
+
+SERVICE_NAME = "mcp-control-plane-webui"
+API_PATH = "/api/v1/system/health"
+
+STATUS_OK = "ok"
+STATUS_DEGRADED = "degraded"
+STATUS_DOWN = "down"
+STATUS_SKIPPED = "skipped"
+STATUS_UNPROVEN = "unproven"
+
+# Statuses that count as a healthy answer from a probe.
+_HEALTHY_STATUSES = frozenset({STATUS_OK})
+# Statuses meaning "this probe did not run", as opposed to "it ran and failed".
+_NOT_RUN_STATUSES = frozenset({STATUS_SKIPPED})
+
+_DEEP_PROBE_TTL_ENV = "WEBUI_HEALTH_PROBE_TTL_SECONDS"
+_DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL = 15.0
+_GITEA_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
+
+_OFFLINE_ENV = "WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE"
+
+# Credential-shaped material that must never reach the browser, mirroring the
+# forbidden client patterns in webui/deployment_boundary.py.
+_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)\b(token|password|passwd|secret|authorization|bearer)\b\s*[:=]?\s*\S+"
+)
+_LONG_OPAQUE_RE = re.compile(r"\b[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{32,}\b")
+
+# Captured once at import so uptime measures this process, not the request.
+_STARTED_AT = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+_STARTED_MONOTONIC = time.monotonic()
+
+# TTL cache for the expensive (network) probe only.
+_deep_cache: dict[str, tuple[float, "DependencyProbe"]] = {}
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class DependencyProbe:
+    """One dependency check, fail-soft, with its own latency."""
+
+    name: str
+    kind: str
+    status: str
+    detail: str
+    required: bool
+    latency_ms: float | None = None
+    metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+
+    @property
+    def healthy(self) -> bool:
+        return self.status in _HEALTHY_STATUSES
+
+    @property
+    def ran(self) -> bool:
+        return self.status not in _NOT_RUN_STATUSES
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class VersionInfo:
+    git_sha: str | None
+    git_describe: str | None
+    control_plane_schema_version: int | None
+    python_version: str
+    known: bool
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class StaleRuntime:
+    """Parity between the running code, the checkout, and the remote.
+
+    ``mutation_safe`` is deliberately conservative: unknown is not safe.
+    """
+
+    daemon_head: str | None
+    checkout_head: str | None
+    remote_head: str | None
+    stale: bool
+    determinable: bool
+    mutation_safe: bool
+    reasons: tuple[str, ...]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SystemHealthSnapshot:
+    status: str
+    ready: bool
+    readiness_complete: bool
+    readiness_reasons: tuple[str, ...]
+    service: str
+    mode: str
+    version: VersionInfo
+    started_at: str
+    uptime_seconds: float
+    timestamp: str
+    deep_probes_requested: bool
+    dependencies: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...]
+    mcp_namespaces: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]
+    stale_runtime: StaleRuntime
+    probe_errors: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+
+def process_uptime() -> tuple[str, float]:
+    """Process start timestamp and uptime — in-memory, safe for `/health`."""
+    return _STARTED_AT.isoformat(), round(time.monotonic() - _STARTED_MONOTONIC, 3)
+
+
+def _offline() -> bool:
+    return (os.environ.get(_OFFLINE_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes"}
+
+
+def _repo_root() -> Path:
+    override = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_REPO_ROOT") or "").strip()
+    if override:
+        return Path(override).resolve()
+    return Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+
+
+def _deep_probe_ttl() -> float:
+    raw = (os.environ.get(_DEEP_PROBE_TTL_ENV) or "").strip()
+    if not raw:
+        return _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
+    try:
+        value = float(raw)
+    except ValueError:
+        return _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
+    return value if value >= 0 else _DEFAULT_DEEP_PROBE_TTL
+
+
+def redact(text: str) -> str:
+    """Strip credential-shaped material from operator-visible probe text.
+
+    Probe details carry exception strings, and an exception raised by an HTTP
+    client can quote the request that failed. Redaction happens here, at the
+    boundary where those strings become part of a browser-bound payload.
+    """
+    if not text:
+        return ""
+    cleaned = _redact_urls(text)
+    cleaned = _SECRET_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}=[redacted]", cleaned)
+    return _LONG_OPAQUE_RE.sub("[redacted]", cleaned)
+
+
+def _redact_urls(text: str) -> str:
+    return re.sub(r"https?://\S+", lambda m: redact_url(m.group(0)), text)
+
+
+def redact_url(url: str) -> str:
+    """Reduce a URL to scheme://host/path — no userinfo, no query, no fragment."""
+    try:
+        parts = urlsplit(url)
+    except ValueError:
+        return "[redacted-url]"
+    if not parts.scheme or not parts.hostname:
+        return "[redacted-url]"
+    netloc = parts.hostname
+    if parts.port:
+        netloc = f"{netloc}:{parts.port}"
+    return urlunsplit((parts.scheme, netloc, parts.path, "", ""))
+
+
+def _git(repo: Path, *args: str) -> str | None:
+    try:
+        completed = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", str(repo), *args],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            check=False,
+            timeout=10,
+        )
+    except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
+        return None
+    if completed.returncode != 0:
+        return None
+    return (completed.stdout or "").strip() or None
+
+
+def _load_version(repo: Path, *, schema_version: int | None) -> VersionInfo:
+    import platform
+
+    git_sha = None if _offline() else _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
+    describe = None if _offline() else _git(repo, "describe", "--tags", "--always")
+    return VersionInfo(
+        git_sha=git_sha,
+        git_describe=describe,
+        control_plane_schema_version=schema_version,
+        python_version=platform.python_version(),
+        known=bool(git_sha),
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Dependency probes
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _elapsed_ms(started: float) -> float:
+    return round((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000, 3)
+
+
+def probe_control_plane_db(db_path: str | None = None) -> DependencyProbe:
+    """Read-only reachability check for the control-plane SQLite substrate.
+
+    Opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI on purpose: ``ControlPlaneDB.__init__``
+    creates directories and runs schema migrations, which a health check must
+    never do.
+    """
+    path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path()).strip()
+    started = time.monotonic()
+    metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"path": path}
+
+    def _result(status: str, detail: str) -> DependencyProbe:
+        return DependencyProbe(
+            name="control_plane_db",
+            kind="sqlite",
+            status=status,
+            detail=detail,
+            required=True,
+            latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
+            metadata=metadata,
+        )
+
+    if not path or not os.path.exists(path):
+        return _result(STATUS_DOWN, "control-plane database file does not exist yet")
+    try:
+        conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=5)
+        try:
+            row = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT value FROM schema_meta WHERE key = 'schema_version'"
+            ).fetchone()
+            leases = conn.execute(
+                "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM leases WHERE status = 'active'"
+            ).fetchone()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+    except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+        return _result(STATUS_DOWN, redact(f"control-plane database unreadable: {exc}"))
+
+    schema_version = int(row[0]) if row and str(row[0]).isdigit() else None
+    metadata["schema_version"] = schema_version
+    metadata["active_leases"] = int(leases[0]) if leases else None
+    if schema_version is None:
+        return _result(
+            STATUS_DEGRADED, "control-plane database has no recorded schema version"
+        )
+    if schema_version != control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION:
+        return _result(
+            STATUS_DEGRADED,
+            f"control-plane schema version {schema_version} does not match the "
+            f"version this code expects ({control_plane_db.SCHEMA_VERSION})",
+        )
+    return _result(STATUS_OK, f"schema v{schema_version} readable")
+
+
+def probe_repository(repo: Path) -> DependencyProbe:
+    """Local checkout reachability — required, cheap, no network."""
+    started = time.monotonic()
+    metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"repo_root": str(repo)}
+    if _offline():
+        return DependencyProbe(
+            name="repository",
+            kind="git",
+            status=STATUS_SKIPPED,
+            detail=f"{_OFFLINE_ENV} is set; git probe skipped",
+            required=True,
+            latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
+            metadata=metadata,
+        )
+    head = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
+    if not head:
+        return DependencyProbe(
+            name="repository",
+            kind="git",
+            status=STATUS_DOWN,
+            detail=f"HEAD could not be read at {repo}",
+            required=True,
+            latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
+            metadata=metadata,
+        )
+    branch = _git(repo, "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD")
+    metadata["head"] = head
+    metadata["branch"] = branch
+    return DependencyProbe(
+        name="repository",
+        kind="git",
+        status=STATUS_OK,
+        detail=f"checkout readable at {branch or 'detached HEAD'}",
+        required=True,
+        latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
+        metadata=metadata,
+    )
+
+
+def probe_gitea(host: str) -> DependencyProbe:
+    """Live Gitea reachability. Expensive (network), so opt-in via ``deep``.
+
+    Optional by design: the console stays useful for local inventory when the
+    remote is unreachable, so a failure here degrades status without claiming
+    the process itself is unready.
+    """
+    started = time.monotonic()
+    metadata: dict[str, Any] = {"host": host}
+
+    def _failure(status: str, detail: str) -> DependencyProbe:
+        return DependencyProbe(
+            name="gitea",
+            kind="http",
+            status=status,
+            detail=detail,
+            required=False,
+            latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
+            metadata=metadata,
+        )
+
+    if not host:
+        return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, "no Gitea host is configured in the registry")
+    try:
+        auth = get_auth_header(host)
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — credential guards are a status here
+        return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, redact(f"credential lookup refused: {exc}"))
+    if not auth:
+        return _failure(STATUS_DEGRADED, f"no credentials available for {host}")
+
+    url = gitea_url(host, "/api/v1/version")
+    metadata["endpoint"] = redact_url(url)
+    try:
+        data = api_request("GET", url, auth, timeout=_GITEA_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — a down dependency is a status
+        return _failure(STATUS_DOWN, redact(f"Gitea probe failed: {exc}"))
+
+    if isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("version"):
+        metadata["gitea_version"] = str(data["version"])
+    return DependencyProbe(
+        name="gitea",
+        kind="http",
+        status=STATUS_OK,
+        detail=f"{host} reachable",
+        required=False,
+        latency_ms=_elapsed_ms(started),
+        metadata=metadata,
+    )
+
+
+def _skipped_gitea(host: str) -> DependencyProbe:
+    return DependencyProbe(
+        name="gitea",
+        kind="http",
+        status=STATUS_SKIPPED,
+        detail="network probe not requested; call with ?deep=1 to run it",
+        required=False,
+        latency_ms=None,
+        metadata={"host": host},
+    )
+
+
+def namespace_summaries() -> tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]:
+    """Declared MCP namespaces, each honestly reported as unproven.
+
+    The web process runs outside the IDE-managed MCP client, so it cannot
+    invoke a namespace tool. Per #543 only a ``client_namespace`` probe proves
+    that path, and inventing a healthy verdict here is exactly the false claim
+    the mutation gates exist to prevent.
+    """
+    rows: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for namespace, required_tool in sorted(
+        mcp_namespace_health.REQUIRED_NAMESPACE_TOOLS.items()
+    ):
+        classification = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
+            namespace,
+            required_tool=required_tool,
+            probe_result=None,
+            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_UNKNOWN,
+        )
+        rows.append(
+            {
+                "namespace": namespace,
+                "required_tool": required_tool,
+                "status": STATUS_UNPROVEN,
+                "ide_namespace_proven": bool(classification.get("ide_namespace_proven")),
+                "reason": (
+                    "the web console cannot invoke the IDE-managed MCP client; "
+                    "namespace health must be proven with a client_namespace "
+                    "probe (#543)"
+                ),
+                "error_type": classification.get("error_type"),
+            }
+        )
+    return tuple(rows)
+
+
+def assess_stale_runtime(
+    repo: Path,
+    *,
+    daemon_head: str | None = None,
+    git_reader: Callable[..., str | None] | None = None,
+) -> StaleRuntime:
+    """Three-way parity view: running code, local checkout, remote-tracking ref.
+
+    ``mutation_safe`` requires all three to be known and equal. Anything less —
+    including "the remote ref was never fetched" — is reported as not safe with
+    a reason, so an operator never reads an unproven green.
+    """
+    reader = git_reader or (lambda *args: _git(repo, *args))
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    # The offline switch suppresses real subprocess calls; an explicitly
+    # injected reader is already a substitute for them and is always used.
+    offline = _offline() and git_reader is None
+
+    checkout_head = None if offline else reader("rev-parse", "HEAD")
+    remote_head = None if offline else reader("rev-parse", "@{upstream}")
+    if offline:
+        reasons.append(f"{_OFFLINE_ENV} is set; parity commits were not read")
+    else:
+        if checkout_head is None:
+            reasons.append("local checkout HEAD could not be read")
+        if remote_head is None:
+            reasons.append(
+                "no remote-tracking commit is known for the current branch; "
+                "remote staleness is indeterminate (no fetch is performed here)"
+            )
+
+    effective_daemon = daemon_head if daemon_head is not None else checkout_head
+    if daemon_head is None:
+        reasons.append(
+            "the running MCP daemon's startup commit is not observable from the "
+            "web process; the checkout commit is reported in its place"
+        )
+
+    determinable = bool(checkout_head and remote_head and effective_daemon)
+    stale = bool(
+        determinable and len({checkout_head, remote_head, effective_daemon}) > 1
+    )
+    if stale:
+        reasons.append(
+            "runtime, checkout, and remote commits disagree; restart the MCP "
+            "server after updating the checkout before trusting capability gates"
+        )
+
+    return StaleRuntime(
+        daemon_head=effective_daemon,
+        checkout_head=checkout_head,
+        remote_head=remote_head,
+        stale=stale,
+        determinable=determinable,
+        mutation_safe=bool(determinable and not stale),
+        reasons=tuple(reasons),
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Snapshot assembly
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _default_host() -> str:
+    registry = load_registry()
+    if not registry.projects:
+        return ""
+    raw = registry.projects[0].remote_host
+    parts = urlsplit(raw.strip())
+    return parts.netloc or raw.strip().rstrip("/")
+
+
+def _aggregate(
+    probes: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...],
+) -> tuple[str, bool, bool, tuple[str, ...]]:
+    """Fold probe results into overall status and readiness.
+
+    Required probes drive readiness; optional probes can only degrade status.
+    A probe that did not run leaves readiness incomplete rather than passing.
+    """
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    required = [probe for probe in probes if probe.required]
+    unrun_required = [probe for probe in required if not probe.ran]
+    failed_required = [probe for probe in required if probe.ran and not probe.healthy]
+    failed_optional = [
+        probe
+        for probe in probes
+        if not probe.required and probe.ran and not probe.healthy
+    ]
+
+    for probe in unrun_required:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"required dependency '{probe.name}' was not probed: {probe.detail}"
+        )
+    for probe in failed_required:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"required dependency '{probe.name}' is {probe.status}: {probe.detail}"
+        )
+    for probe in failed_optional:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"optional dependency '{probe.name}' is {probe.status}: {probe.detail}"
+        )
+
+    readiness_complete = not unrun_required
+    ready = readiness_complete and not failed_required
+
+    if any(probe.status == STATUS_DOWN for probe in failed_required):
+        status = STATUS_DOWN
+    elif failed_required or failed_optional or unrun_required:
+        status = STATUS_DEGRADED
+    else:
+        status = STATUS_OK
+    return status, ready, readiness_complete, tuple(reasons)
+
+
+def load_system_health(
+    *,
+    deep: bool = False,
+    host: str | None = None,
+    probes: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...] | None = None,
+    daemon_head: str | None = None,
+    use_cache: bool = True,
+) -> SystemHealthSnapshot:
+    """Assemble the read-only system-health snapshot.
+
+    ``deep=True`` adds the network probe against Gitea; its result is cached for
+    a short TTL so repeated dashboard polls do not amplify into remote load.
+    """
+    repo = _repo_root()
+    probe_errors: list[str] = []
+
+    if probes is None:
+        collected: list[DependencyProbe] = []
+        for probe_fn in (
+            lambda: probe_control_plane_db(),
+            lambda: probe_repository(repo),
+        ):
+            try:
+                collected.append(probe_fn())
+            except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — a probe must not 500 the API
+                probe_errors.append(redact(f"probe raised: {exc}"))
+        resolved_host = host if host is not None else _default_host()
+        if deep and not _offline():
+            collected.append(_cached_gitea_probe(resolved_host, use_cache=use_cache))
+        else:
+            collected.append(_skipped_gitea(resolved_host))
+        probes = tuple(collected)
+
+    status, ready, readiness_complete, reasons = _aggregate(probes)
+    stale = assess_stale_runtime(repo, daemon_head=daemon_head)
+    if stale.stale:
+        if status == STATUS_OK:
+            status = STATUS_DEGRADED
+        reasons = reasons + (
+            "runtime is stale relative to its remote-tracking commit",
+        )
+
+    db_probe = next((p for p in probes if p.name == "control_plane_db"), None)
+    schema_version = None
+    if db_probe and db_probe.metadata:
+        schema_version = db_probe.metadata.get("schema_version")
+
+    return SystemHealthSnapshot(
+        status=status,
+        ready=ready,
+        readiness_complete=readiness_complete,
+        readiness_reasons=reasons,
+        service=SERVICE_NAME,
+        mode="read-only",
+        version=_load_version(repo, schema_version=schema_version),
+        started_at=_STARTED_AT.isoformat(),
+        uptime_seconds=round(time.monotonic() - _STARTED_MONOTONIC, 3),
+        timestamp=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+        deep_probes_requested=deep,
+        dependencies=probes,
+        mcp_namespaces=namespace_summaries(),
+        stale_runtime=stale,
+        probe_errors=tuple(probe_errors),
+    )
+
+
+def _cached_gitea_probe(host: str, *, use_cache: bool = True) -> DependencyProbe:
+    ttl = _deep_probe_ttl()
+    now = time.monotonic()
+    if use_cache and ttl > 0:
+        cached = _deep_cache.get(host)
+        if cached and (now - cached[0]) < ttl:
+            return cached[1]
+    probe = probe_gitea(host)
+    if use_cache and ttl > 0:
+        _deep_cache[host] = (now, probe)
+    return probe
+
+
+def clear_probe_cache() -> None:
+    """Drop cached deep-probe results (tests and operator-forced refresh)."""
+    _deep_cache.clear()
+
+
+def probe_to_dict(probe: DependencyProbe) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "name": probe.name,
+        "kind": probe.kind,
+        "status": probe.status,
+        "detail": probe.detail,
+        "required": probe.required,
+        "healthy": probe.healthy,
+        "latency_ms": probe.latency_ms,
+        "metadata": dict(probe.metadata or {}),
+    }
+
+
+def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "status": snapshot.status,
+        "service": snapshot.service,
+        "mode": snapshot.mode,
+        "api": API_PATH,
+        "timestamp": snapshot.timestamp,
+        "readiness": {
+            "ready": snapshot.ready,
+            "complete": snapshot.readiness_complete,
+            "reasons": list(snapshot.readiness_reasons),
+        },
+        "version": {
+            "git_sha": snapshot.version.git_sha,
+            "git_describe": snapshot.version.git_describe,
+            "control_plane_schema_version": (
+                snapshot.version.control_plane_schema_version
+            ),
+            "python_version": snapshot.version.python_version,
+            "known": snapshot.version.known,
+        },
+        "process": {
+            "started_at": snapshot.started_at,
+            "uptime_seconds": snapshot.uptime_seconds,
+        },
+        "deep_probes_requested": snapshot.deep_probes_requested,
+        "dependencies": [probe_to_dict(probe) for probe in snapshot.dependencies],
+        "mcp_namespaces": [dict(row) for row in snapshot.mcp_namespaces],
+        "stale_runtime": {
+            "daemon_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.daemon_head,
+            "checkout_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.checkout_head,
+            "remote_head": snapshot.stale_runtime.remote_head,
+            "stale": snapshot.stale_runtime.stale,
+            "determinable": snapshot.stale_runtime.determinable,
+            "mutation_safe": snapshot.stale_runtime.mutation_safe,
+            "reasons": list(snapshot.stale_runtime.reasons),
+        },
+        "probe_errors": list(snapshot.probe_errors),
+    }

workflow_dashboard.py

@@ -65,9 +65,11 @@ PROMPT_RECONCILER = (
     "reconciliation (already-landed / post-merge cleanup). Do not approve or merge."
 )
 PROMPT_CONTROLLER = (
-    "CONTROLLER session: inspect gitea_workflow_dashboard + control-plane leases, "
+    "CONTROLLER session: call gitea_route_task_session(task_type='process_work_queue') "
-    "diagnose blocked/terminal-locked items for {remote}/{org}/{repo}, and schedule "
+    "then gitea_allocate_next_work (cross_role default) for {remote}/{org}/{repo}; "
-    "exactly one fresh role-scoped cycle. Do not implement, review, or merge in-band."
+    "use the returned required_role/profile/action to schedule exactly one downstream "
+    "role cycle. Dashboard is explanatory only and never replaces allocator selection. "
+    "Do not implement, review, approve, or merge in-band."
 )
 PROMPT_IDLE = (
     "IDLE: no safe assignable work for role '{role}' on {remote}/{org}/{repo}. "