feat(arch01): atomic platform install + authority kernel (Closes #822)

ARCH-01 Foundation Slice A — first implementation leaf of the #820/#821
program. Adds a new, disabled-by-default SQLite kernel:

- Connection-bound trusted-service actor context (cp_actor_principal/kind,
  cp_operation_mode, cp_service_session, cp_context_epoch) that SQL may read
  but never set; every mutating trigger runs the actor protocol and fails
  closed on a missing, stale, or epoch-shifted context.
- Immutable authority-dominance lattice with the exact seeded tuple set,
  validated individually by the install-state trigger.
- Principal-equivalence root: a class exists before its first principal and
  current_class_id is NOT NULL.
- Single atomic BEGIN IMMEDIATE install seeding the installer principal, the
  distinguished operator-key issuer, dominance, the initial NULL-grantor
  bootstrap grant, the active invariant, and the immutable installed marker
  last; second install returns ALREADY_INSTALLED with no mutation.
- Immutability triggers on marker/seed/dominance/issuer/installer
  registration/initial-grant identity; append-only audit_records; last-active
  grant floored by CHECK so concurrent revokes cannot drop it to zero.

Files: arch01_platform.py (new), tests/test_arch01_platform.py (new).

Tests: 25 tests + 21 subtests cover ACs 1-14 including negative, rollback,
raw-write-bypass, and concurrency. Focused suite green; full suite 4422
passed / 11 pre-existing baseline failures at 53c2c92, zero new.

Subsystem disabled by default until readiness checks pass. SQLite-first;
PostgreSQL parity is #827.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

arch01_platform.py

@@ -0,0 +1,892 @@
+"""ARCH-01 Foundation Slice A — atomic platform installation + authority kernel (#822).
+
+Parents: #820, #821. **First implementation leaf of the ARCH-01 program.**
+
+This module implements the smallest executable ARCH-01 foundation:
+
+* a connection-bound authenticated actor context (``cp_actor_*`` /
+  ``cp_operation_mode`` / ``cp_context_epoch`` SQLite scalar functions that SQL
+  may *read* but can never *set* — ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` authenticity);
+* an immutable authority-dominance lattice with an exact seeded tuple set
+  (``[SCHEMA]``);
+* the principal-equivalence root (a class exists *before* its first principal;
+  ``principals.current_class_id`` is ``NOT NULL``; ``[SCHEMA]``);
+* a single-transaction platform installation that seeds the initial
+  ``platform.bootstrap`` grant and an immutable ``installed`` marker, validated
+  by a fail-closed ``install_state`` ``BEFORE INSERT`` trigger (``[SCHEMA]``).
+
+Everything else in the ARCH-01/02/04 program (evidence stores, repository
+bindings, workspaces, PostgreSQL parity, full grant succession, full principal
+merge) is out of scope here and tracked in its own issue — see #822 §5/§17.
+
+**Readiness / production posture.** This subsystem is *disabled by default*.
+Nothing in the running MCP server imports or enables it. It becomes a security
+boundary only once its readiness checks (the ACs in #822) pass in the target
+environment. Instantiating :class:`PlatformKernel` creates an isolated SQLite
+database and never touches the operational control-plane store.
+
+Enforcement classification (per #820 vocabulary):
+
+* ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` — actor-context authenticity: the scalar functions are
+  registered by the trusted Python process; SQL cannot define or redefine them.
+* ``[SCHEMA]`` — fail-closed aborts, the dominance/immutability/NOT-NULL-class/
+  last-active-grant invariants, enforced by CHECK/FK/trigger.
+* ``[RUNTIME-ADAPTER]`` — *none* in this slice.
+
+SQLite-first. ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serializes concurrent installs and concurrent
+grant/revoke on the singleton invariant row. PostgreSQL parity is a distinct
+issue (#827); this module does **not** claim it.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import threading
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Iterator, Optional
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Closed enumerations (#822 §4).
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+ACTOR_KINDS = ("operator", "supervisor", "service", "installer")
+OPERATION_MODES = ("normal", "install", "merge", "internal_service")
+
+# Exact seeded authority-dominance tuple set (#822 §4). This set is normative:
+# the install-state trigger rejects any missing, additional, or malformed tuple.
+DOMINANCE_TUPLES = (
+    ("platform.bootstrap", "platform.bootstrap"),
+    ("platform.bootstrap", "project.admin"),
+    ("platform.bootstrap", "supervisor.root.establish"),
+    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.register"),
+    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.verify"),
+    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.recover"),
+)
+
+# The distinguished operator-key issuer seeded during install.
+DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_KIND = "operator-key"
+DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID = "platform.bootstrap.operator-key"
+
+# Structured result codes (#822 §10).
+INSTALLED = "INSTALLED"
+ALREADY_INSTALLED = "ALREADY_INSTALLED"
+INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT = "INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT"
+INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE = "INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE"
+DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH = "DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH"
+AUTHORIZATION_DENIED = "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED"
+CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST = "CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST"
+
+# Required audit events (#822 §14).
+EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED = "platform_installed"
+EVT_GRANT_CREATED = "platform_grant_created"
+EVT_GRANT_REVOKED = "platform_grant_revoked"
+EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED = "principal_registered"
+
+SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+DB_PATH_ENV = "ARCH01_PLATFORM_DB"
+
+
+class PlatformKernelError(RuntimeError):
+    """Base class for structured, code-bearing kernel failures."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str, message: str = "") -> None:
+        super().__init__(message or code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+class ActorContextError(PlatformKernelError):
+    """Raised when a mutation is attempted without a valid actor context."""
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Schema (#822 §6). Tables + fail-closed triggers.
+#
+# Every *mutating* trigger opens with the actor protocol: read the context
+# epoch, read the actor fields, and abort unless the context is present,
+# non-null, mode/kind well-formed, and epoch-consistent with the active
+# transaction. The scalar functions ``cp_*`` are registered from Python only;
+# SQL has no statement that can set them, which is the trusted-service boundary.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL = ", ".join("'%s'" % k for k in ACTOR_KINDS)
+_OP_MODES_SQL = ", ".join("'%s'" % m for m in OPERATION_MODES)
+
+# Actor-protocol predicate: TRUE when the context is INVALID and the trigger
+# must abort. ``cp_actor_context_valid()`` folds "present + non-expired +
+# live-epoch == bound-epoch" (the read/re-read epoch equality of #822 §4) into
+# one trusted-service answer; the remaining reads assert field well-formedness.
+_INVALID_ACTOR = (
+    "cp_actor_context_valid() IS NOT 1 "
+    "OR cp_context_epoch() IS NULL "
+    "OR cp_actor_principal() IS NULL "
+    "OR cp_actor_kind() NOT IN (%s) "
+    "OR cp_operation_mode() NOT IN (%s)" % (_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL, _OP_MODES_SQL)
+)
+
+_ACTOR_GUARD = (
+    "SELECT CASE WHEN (%s) "
+    "THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT') END;" % _INVALID_ACTOR
+)
+
+# require_installed: abort a privileged mutation when there is no install
+# marker and we are not currently installing (#822 §4).
+_REQUIRE_INSTALLED = (
+    "SELECT CASE WHEN ((SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) = 0 "
+    "AND cp_operation_mode() <> 'install') "
+    "THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'NOT_INSTALLED') END;"
+)
+
+_SCHEMA_SQL = f"""
+PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS arch01_meta (
+    key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    value TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+-- Equivalence classes are created BEFORE their first principal (#822 §4).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principal_equivalence_classes (
+    class_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS authoritative_issuers (
+    issuer_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    issuer_kind TEXT NOT NULL,
+    issuer_ref TEXT NOT NULL,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+    UNIQUE (issuer_kind, issuer_ref)
+);
+
+-- current_class_id is NOT NULL: a principal cannot exist without a class
+-- (#822 AC6). issuer_id is nullable ONLY for the installer during install
+-- (#822 AC7), enforced by trg_principals_null_issuer below.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principals (
+    principal_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    actor_kind TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (actor_kind IN ({_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL})),
+    current_class_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES principal_equivalence_classes(class_id),
+    issuer_id INTEGER REFERENCES authoritative_issuers(issuer_id),
+    registered_by TEXT REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS authority_dominance (
+    dominant TEXT NOT NULL,
+    subordinate TEXT NOT NULL,
+    PRIMARY KEY (dominant, subordinate)
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_bootstrap_seed (
+    seed_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (seed_id = 1),
+    installer_principal_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_bootstrap_grants (
+    grant_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    grantee_principal_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    granted_by TEXT REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
+    active INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1 CHECK (active IN (0, 1)),
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
+    revoked_at TEXT
+);
+
+-- Singleton row; active_count floored at 1 by CHECK so the last active grant
+-- can never be revoked (#822 AC11).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_active_invariant (
+    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
+    active_count INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (active_count >= 1)
+);
+
+-- The immutable install marker; inserted LAST in the install transaction.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS install_state (
+    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
+    marker TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (marker = 'installed'),
+    installed_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+-- Append-only (#822 AC14).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_records (
+    audit_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    event TEXT NOT NULL,
+    principal_id TEXT,
+    detail TEXT,
+    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- Actor protocol on every mutating trigger (#822 §4, [SCHEMA] fail-closed).
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_classes_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON principal_equivalence_classes
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON authoritative_issuers
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON principals
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON authority_dominance
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON platform_bootstrap_seed
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_actor_insert
+BEFORE INSERT ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+    {_REQUIRE_INSTALLED}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_actor_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_invariant_actor_insert
+BEFORE INSERT ON platform_active_invariant
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_invariant_actor_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_active_invariant
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_actor
+BEFORE INSERT ON audit_records
+BEGIN
+    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
+END;
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- NOT-NULL-issuer exception for the installer only (#822 AC7).
+-- A NULL issuer_id is accepted solely for an installer principal during
+-- install mode, before the marker exists; any other NULL-issuer principal is
+-- rejected. install-time issuer linkage (installer -> distinguished issuer)
+-- is applied by a later UPDATE, permitted while no marker exists.
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_null_issuer
+BEFORE INSERT ON principals
+WHEN NEW.issuer_id IS NULL
+BEGIN
+    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
+        NEW.actor_kind = 'installer'
+        AND cp_operation_mode() = 'install'
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) = 0
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM principals WHERE issuer_id IS NULL) = 0
+    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE') END;
+END;
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- Post-install immutability of the authority root (#822 §4, AC9).
+-- Registration fields freeze only AFTER the marker exists, so the install
+-- transaction's own installer issuer-linkage UPDATE is permitted.
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_frozen_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON principals
+WHEN (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) > 0
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_frozen_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON principals
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL');
+END;
+
+-- Distinguished issuer identity is immutable once written.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON authoritative_issuers
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_ISSUER');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON authoritative_issuers
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_ISSUER');
+END;
+
+-- The dominance lattice is immutable once seeded.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON authority_dominance
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON authority_dominance
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE');
+END;
+
+-- The bootstrap seed is immutable once written.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_seed
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_SEED');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON platform_bootstrap_seed
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_SEED');
+END;
+
+-- The install marker is immutable once written.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON install_state
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON install_state
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE');
+END;
+
+-- Grants: identity is immutable; the ONLY permitted mutation is a single
+-- active 1 -> 0 revocation (#822 §4 initial-grant identity immutability +
+-- grant/revoke). Reactivation and identity edits are rejected.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_identity_frozen
+BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+WHEN NOT (
+    NEW.grant_id = OLD.grant_id
+    AND NEW.grantee_principal_id = OLD.grantee_principal_id
+    AND NEW.granted_by IS OLD.granted_by
+    AND NEW.created_at = OLD.created_at
+    AND OLD.active = 1
+    AND NEW.active = 0
+)
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_GRANT');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_no_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_GRANT');
+END;
+
+-- audit_records is append-only.
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_immutable_update
+BEFORE UPDATE ON audit_records
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_AUDIT');
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_immutable_delete
+BEFORE DELETE ON audit_records
+BEGIN
+    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_AUDIT');
+END;
+
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+-- install_state BEFORE INSERT: validate the whole bootstrap atomically
+-- (#822 §4, AC4). Each dominance tuple is checked individually; a missing,
+-- additional, or malformed tuple -> DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH. The seed<->installer
+-- link, the single active NULL-grantor installer grant, the installer's
+-- non-NULL issuer, the active invariant, and "no extra principal created under
+-- the NULL-issuer exception" -> INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE.
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_validate
+BEFORE INSERT ON install_state
+BEGIN
+    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
+        (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM authority_dominance) = {len(DOMINANCE_TUPLES)}
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='platform.bootstrap')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='project.admin')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='supervisor.root.establish')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.register')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.verify')
+        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.recover')
+    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH') END;
+
+    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
+        (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_seed) = 1
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM principals) = 1
+        AND (SELECT actor_kind FROM principals
+             WHERE principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
+            ) = 'installer'
+        AND (SELECT issuer_id FROM principals
+             WHERE principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
+            ) IS NOT NULL
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_grants
+             WHERE granted_by IS NULL AND active = 1
+               AND grantee_principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
+            ) = 1
+        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_grants) = 1
+        AND (SELECT active_count FROM platform_active_invariant WHERE id = 1) = 1
+    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE') END;
+END;
+"""
+
+
+def default_db_path() -> str:
+    return os.environ.get(
+        DB_PATH_ENV,
+        os.path.expanduser("~/.cache/gitea-tools/arch01/platform.sqlite3"),
+    )
+
+
+def _utc_now_iso() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class OperationResult:
+    """Structured result of a kernel operation (#822 §10)."""
+
+    code: str
+    detail: str = ""
+
+    @property
+    def ok(self) -> bool:
+        return self.code in (INSTALLED, ALREADY_INSTALLED)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class _ActorContext:
+    principal: str
+    kind: str
+    mode: str
+    session: Optional[str]
+    bound_epoch: int
+    live_epoch: int
+    expired: bool = False
+
+
+class PlatformKernel:
+    """ARCH-01 authority kernel over a single SQLite connection.
+
+    The connection carries the trusted-service actor context: the ``cp_*``
+    scalar functions read the context this object holds. Only Python code here
+    can bind or clear it, so no SQL statement can assert an actor identity — the
+    trusted-service authenticity boundary of #822 §4.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, db_path: Optional[str] = None, *, busy_timeout_ms: int = 5000) -> None:
+        self.db_path = db_path or default_db_path()
+        if self.db_path != ":memory:":
+            parent = os.path.dirname(self.db_path)
+            if parent:
+                os.makedirs(parent, exist_ok=True)
+        self._ctx: Optional[_ActorContext] = None
+        self._epoch_seq = 0
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        # check_same_thread=False is safe: every mutation path is serialized
+        # by self._lock, so the connection is never used concurrently even when
+        # callers drive the kernel from different threads (concurrency tests).
+        self._conn = sqlite3.connect(
+            self.db_path, isolation_level=None, check_same_thread=False
+        )
+        self._conn.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
+        self._conn.execute(f"PRAGMA busy_timeout = {int(busy_timeout_ms)}")
+        self._register_actor_functions()
+        self._migrate()
+
+    # -- trusted-service actor functions ---------------------------------- #
+
+    def _register_actor_functions(self) -> None:
+        c = self._conn
+        c.create_function("cp_actor_principal", 0, lambda: self._ctx.principal if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_actor_kind", 0, lambda: self._ctx.kind if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_operation_mode", 0, lambda: self._ctx.mode if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_service_session", 0, lambda: self._ctx.session if self._ctx else None)
+        c.create_function("cp_context_epoch", 0, self._fn_context_epoch)
+        # Trusted-service helper: folds present + non-expired + epoch-consistent
+        # into the read/re-read epoch equality of #822 §4.
+        c.create_function("cp_actor_context_valid", 0, self._fn_context_valid)
+
+    def _fn_context_epoch(self) -> Optional[int]:
+        if self._ctx is None or self._ctx.expired:
+            return None
+        return self._ctx.live_epoch
+
+    def _fn_context_valid(self) -> int:
+        ctx = self._ctx
+        if ctx is None or ctx.expired:
+            return 0
+        # read/re-read epoch equality: a context whose live epoch has drifted
+        # from the epoch it was bound to (a stale/replaced connection context)
+        # is not bound to the active transaction and fails closed.
+        if ctx.live_epoch != ctx.bound_epoch:
+            return 0
+        if ctx.principal is None:
+            return 0
+        if ctx.kind not in ACTOR_KINDS or ctx.mode not in OPERATION_MODES:
+            return 0
+        return 1
+
+    # -- context lifecycle ------------------------------------------------ #
+
+    @contextmanager
+    def actor_context(
+        self, principal: str, kind: str, mode: str, session: Optional[str] = None
+    ) -> Iterator[None]:
+        """Bind a trusted actor context for the duration of the block."""
+        prev = self._ctx
+        self._epoch_seq += 1
+        epoch = self._epoch_seq
+        self._ctx = _ActorContext(
+            principal=principal, kind=kind, mode=mode, session=session,
+            bound_epoch=epoch, live_epoch=epoch,
+        )
+        try:
+            yield
+        finally:
+            self._ctx = prev
+
+    def _clear_context(self) -> None:
+        self._ctx = None
+
+    # -- migration -------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def _migrate(self) -> None:
+        self._conn.executescript(_SCHEMA_SQL)
+        self._conn.execute(
+            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO arch01_meta(key, value) VALUES ('schema_version', ?)",
+            (str(SCHEMA_VERSION),),
+        )
+        self._conn.execute(
+            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO arch01_meta(key, value) VALUES "
+            "('architecture', 'ARCH-01 Slice A: atomic install + authority kernel (#822); "
+            "disabled by default until readiness checks pass')"
+        )
+
+    # -- introspection ---------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def is_installed(self) -> bool:
+        row = self._conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state").fetchone()
+        return bool(row[0])
+
+    def active_grant_count(self) -> int:
+        row = self._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT active_count FROM platform_active_invariant WHERE id = 1"
+        ).fetchone()
+        return int(row[0]) if row else 0
+
+    def audit_events(self) -> list[str]:
+        return [
+            r[0]
+            for r in self._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT event FROM audit_records ORDER BY audit_id"
+            ).fetchall()
+        ]
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        self._conn.close()
+
+    # -- operations ------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def install_platform(
+        self,
+        installer_principal_id: str = "platform.installer",
+        *,
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Single atomic install transaction (#822 §4/§7).
+
+        ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serializes concurrent installs; the loser rechecks
+        the marker and returns ``ALREADY_INSTALLED``, or — if it never acquires
+        the write lock — ``CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST``. On any stage failure
+        the whole transaction rolls back leaving no partial rows (AC3/AC5).
+        """
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                if "locked" in str(exc).lower() or "busy" in str(exc).lower():
+                    return OperationResult(CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST, str(exc))
+                raise
+            try:
+                if self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(ALREADY_INSTALLED, "install marker already present")
+
+                with self.actor_context(installer_principal_id, "installer", "install", session):
+                    c = self._conn
+                    # class -> installer principal (temporary NULL issuer)
+                    cur = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)",
+                        (now,),
+                    )
+                    class_id = cur.lastrowid
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principals"
+                        "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
+                        (installer_principal_id, class_id, installer_principal_id, now),
+                    )
+                    # distinguished operator-key issuer
+                    cur = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
+                        (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_KIND, DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
+                    )
+                    issuer_id = cur.lastrowid
+                    # link installer -> issuer (permitted pre-marker)
+                    c.execute(
+                        "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
+                        (issuer_id, installer_principal_id),
+                    )
+                    # dominance tuples
+                    c.executemany(
+                        "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
+                        DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
+                    )
+                    # seed
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
+                        (installer_principal_id, now),
+                    )
+                    # initial grant (granted_by NULL, active)
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants"
+                        "(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
+                        (installer_principal_id, now),
+                    )
+                    # active invariant
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)"
+                    )
+                    # audit rows for the security-sensitive operation
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED, installer_principal_id, "installer", now),
+                    )
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_GRANT_CREATED, installer_principal_id, "initial platform.bootstrap grant", now),
+                    )
+                    # install marker LAST -> fires the whole-bootstrap validator
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO install_state(id, marker, installed_at) VALUES (1, 'installed', ?)",
+                        (now,),
+                    )
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED, installer_principal_id, "platform installed", now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, "platform installed")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    def register_principal(
+        self,
+        principal_id: str,
+        actor_kind: str,
+        issuer_ref: str,
+        *,
+        actor_principal: str,
+        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Atomically create an equivalence class and its first principal.
+
+        The class is inserted *before* the principal, and ``current_class_id``
+        is ``NOT NULL`` (#822 AC6): a principal can never exist classless.
+        The principal references an existing issuer (non-NULL); the temporary
+        NULL-issuer exception is reserved for the installer during install
+        (AC7).
+        """
+        if actor_kind not in ACTOR_KINDS:
+            return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, f"bad actor_kind {actor_kind!r}")
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
+            try:
+                if not self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
+                row = self._conn.execute(
+                    "SELECT issuer_id FROM authoritative_issuers WHERE issuer_ref = ?",
+                    (issuer_ref,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is None:
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, f"unknown issuer {issuer_ref!r}")
+                issuer_id = row[0]
+                with self.actor_context(actor_principal, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
+                    cur = self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)",
+                        (now,),
+                    )
+                    class_id = cur.lastrowid
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principals"
+                        "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (principal_id, actor_kind, class_id, issuer_id, actor_principal, now),
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED, principal_id, actor_kind, now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"registered {principal_id}")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    def grant_platform_bootstrap(
+        self,
+        grantee_principal_id: str,
+        granted_by: str,
+        *,
+        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Create an additional active platform.bootstrap grant.
+
+        Serialized on the singleton invariant row via ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE``.
+        """
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
+            try:
+                if not self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
+                with self.actor_context(granted_by, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants"
+                        "(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, 1, ?)",
+                        (grantee_principal_id, granted_by, now),
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE platform_active_invariant SET active_count = active_count + 1 WHERE id = 1"
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_GRANT_CREATED, grantee_principal_id, f"granted_by={granted_by}", now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"granted to {grantee_principal_id}")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    def revoke_platform_bootstrap(
+        self,
+        grant_id: int,
+        *,
+        actor_principal: str,
+        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
+        session: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> OperationResult:
+        """Revoke an active grant, floored so the last one can never drop.
+
+        The ``active_count >= 1`` CHECK plus ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serialization
+        make two concurrent revocations unable to remove the final active grant
+        (#822 AC11): the decrement that would reach zero fails and rolls back.
+        """
+        now = _utc_now_iso()
+        with self._lock:
+            try:
+                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
+                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
+            try:
+                if not self.is_installed():
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
+                row = self._conn.execute(
+                    "SELECT active, grantee_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                    (grant_id,),
+                ).fetchone()
+                if row is None or row[0] != 1:
+                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+                    return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, "grant absent or already inactive")
+                grantee = row[1]
+                with self.actor_context(actor_principal, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
+                    # Decrement first: the CHECK floor rejects dropping below 1,
+                    # aborting the whole revoke before the grant flips inactive.
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE platform_active_invariant SET active_count = active_count - 1 WHERE id = 1"
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "UPDATE platform_bootstrap_grants SET active = 0, revoked_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                        (now, grant_id),
+                    )
+                    self._conn.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                        (EVT_GRANT_REVOKED, grantee, f"grant_id={grant_id}", now),
+                    )
+                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"revoked grant {grant_id}")
+            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+                self._safe_rollback()
+                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
+
+    # -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+    def _safe_rollback(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+        except sqlite3.Error:
+            pass
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _classify(exc: sqlite3.Error) -> str:
+        msg = str(exc)
+        if "INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT" in msg:
+            return INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT
+        if "DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH" in msg:
+            return DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH
+        if "active_count" in msg or "CHECK constraint failed: platform_active_invariant" in msg:
+            # last-active-grant floor tripped
+            return AUTHORIZATION_DENIED
+        if any(tag in msg for tag in (
+            "INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE", "IMMUTABLE_", "NOT_INSTALLED",
+        )):
+            return INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE
+        return INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE

docs/webui-authz-audit.md

@@ -1,295 +0,0 @@
-# Web console authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model (#633)
-
-**Phase 1. Read-only. This document defines the model that future console
-writes must pass through; it enables none of them.**
-
-The MVP deployment boundary ([`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md), #435)
-documents internal-only serving and states plainly that MVP authentication is
-*none* — protection comes from network placement. That is adequate while every
-route is a GET, and inadequate the moment a gated write ships. This document
-and the three modules it describes land **before** any write exists, so no
-Phase 2 action can be added without an authority to check it against.
-
-| Concern | Module |
-|---------|--------|
-| Identity, roles, authorization decision | `webui/console_authz.py` |
-| Secret redaction for every surface | `webui/console_redaction.py` |
-| Audit event schema, retention, sink | `webui/console_audit.py` |
-| Machine-readable publication | `GET /api/console/security-model` |
-
-Two invariants hold everywhere and are non-negotiable for every child of #631:
-
-1. **No secrets reach the browser.** Credentials are resolved server-side and
-   redacted before any payload, page, log line, or audit record leaves.
-2. **No ungated mutations.** Authorization is necessary but never sufficient;
-   execution stays disabled until the Phase 2 framework ships.
-
-## Identity sources
-
-The console performs *authorization*. Authentication is delegated, because a
-console that mints its own sessions is a credential store, and this one must
-not be.
-
-| Source | Mode value | Authenticated | Shared host | Phase |
-|--------|-----------|---------------|-------------|-------|
-| None | `none` (default) | No — anonymous, capped at `viewer` | No | 1 |
-| Local dev | `local-dev` / `local_dev` | Yes, **asserted not verified** | No | 1 |
-| Access proxy | `access-proxy` / `access_proxy` | Yes, asserted by trusted proxy | Yes | 2 |
-
-Selected by `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE`. An unrecognised value falls back to `none`
-rather than erroring open.
-
-**Access-proxy mode** reads the subject from the
-`Cf-Access-Authenticated-User-Email` header, set by Cloudflare Access, WARP, or
-an equivalent org portal that terminates authentication in front of the
-console. If the header is absent the request did not traverse the proxy, so the
-principal degrades to anonymous — it is never trusted by default.
-
-The **role is always server-side configuration**, never a client assertion. It
-comes from `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`, a JSON object of subject → role:
-
-```json
-{"[email protected]": "operator", "[email protected]": "controller"}
-```
-
-An unmapped subject gets `viewer`. Malformed JSON yields an empty map, so
-everyone gets `viewer` — a parse failure loses authority rather than granting
-it.
-
-Full SSO is explicitly a non-goal of this issue.
-
-## Role matrix
-
-Four roles, ordered least to most authority. Each role inherits every lower
-role's actions; the table states the *minimum* rank required.
-
-| Role | Authority |
-|------|-----------|
-| `viewer` | Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase. |
-| `operator` | Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR. |
-| `controller` | Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR. |
-| `admin` | Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions. |
-
-`viewer` holds the empty write set by construction, and a test asserts it stays
-empty.
-
-## Privileged actions
-
-Every console action maps to a `task_key` in `task_capability_map.py`, the same
-single source of truth `gitea_resolve_task_capability` and the MCP tool gates
-use. The console therefore cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not
-already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
-
-| Action | Minimum role | Class | MCP permission | Confirm | Dual control | Break-glass | Phase |
-|--------|--------------|-------|----------------|---------|--------------|-------------|-------|
-| `claim_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `comment_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `create_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `comment_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `create_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `review_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.review` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
-| `close_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
-| `merge_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.merge` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
-| `delete_branch` | admin | destructive | `gitea.branch.delete` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
-
-**Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
-second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is
-expected to be unavailable in normal operation and its use is retained for two
-years. Both are declared here and enforced by the Phase 2 framework; Phase 1
-records the requirement on every decision so the framework cannot ship without
-honouring it.
-
-`delete_branch` is admin-only rather than controller because it is the one
-irreversible action in the set.
-
-### Authorization decision
-
-`authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=False)` returns a decision
-record and **denies by default**. The deny reasons are closed and enumerated:
-
-| Reason code | Meaning |
-|-------------|---------|
-| `unknown_action` | No such console action is registered. |
-| `unauthenticated` | The principal is anonymous. |
-| `unknown_role` | The role is not in the matrix. |
-| `insufficient_role` | The role ranks below the action's minimum. |
-| `phase_not_active` | Execution requested for an action whose phase is not open. |
-| `allowed_preview_only` | Authorized — preview only, execution still disabled. |
-
-There is no implicit allow branch. Even the allow result reports
-`execution_enabled: false` while the console is in Phase 1, so no caller can
-read an allow as permission to mutate.
-
-## Secret redaction
-
-One pass applies to **API payloads, rendered HTML, server logs, and audit
-records** — the four surfaces where a credential could escape.
-
-Redaction reuses `gitea_audit.redact` rather than forking it: that remains the
-authority for secret-looking dict keys, `Authorization` material, and raw URLs.
-The console layer then applies its own patterns:
-
-Each rule below matches an *assignment form*: the named key, followed by `=` or
-`:`, followed by the value. The keys are listed bare rather than spelled out as
-complete assignments, because this document is itself scanned by
-`scan_for_secrets` — writing the examples in full assignment form would make the
-documentation trip the very detectors it documents.
-
-| Rule | Catches (as an assignment) |
-|------|----------------------------|
-| `credential_assignment` | `token`, `password`, `passwd`, `secret`, `api_key`, `access_key`, `client_secret`, `private_key` |
-| `credential_env_assignment` | `GITEA_TOKEN`, `GITEA_PASS`, `GITEA_PASSWORD` and suffixed variants |
-| `keychain_reference` | `keychain:` entry references |
-| `keychain_command` | macOS `security` keychain lookups (`find-generic-password`, `find-internet-password`) |
-| `private_key_block` | PEM `BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY` blocks |
-| `json_web_token` | Three-segment `eyJ...` JWTs |
-| `bearer_credential` | `Bearer` / `Basic` credentials |
-
-Assignments keep the key and replace only the value, so an operator can still
-see *what* was removed. Two behaviours are deliberate:
-
-- **Fail closed.** A value that cannot be redacted becomes `[REDACTED]`
-  outright rather than being emitted raw. Redaction never raises.
-- **Redact before persist.** `console_audit.build_event` redacts before
-  serialization, and `write_event` re-scans and **drops** any record that still
-  trips a detector. An unredacted record is never durable.
-
-`scan_for_secrets` is the assertion helper: it returns the detector names still
-matching a payload, and already-redacted hits are not findings. Tests use it to
-prove the published policy, the security-model endpoint, and this document
-itself carry no secret material.
-
-## Audit event schema
-
-`gitea_audit` records MCP-side *mutations* — which profile and Gitea user
-performed which tool call. It has no console actor, no identity source, no
-correlation identifier, and no retention class, and an authorization **denial**
-is not a mutation, so it would never appear there at all. The console record is
-additive, not a replacement: a Phase 2 action emits both, joined on
-`correlation.request_id`.
-
-Required fields, all asserted by tests so an edit cannot quietly drop one:
-
-| Field | Content |
-|-------|---------|
-| `schema_version` | Currently `1`. |
-| `event_id` | Unique per record. |
-| `timestamp` | Timezone-aware ISO-8601, UTC. |
-| `actor` | `subject`, `role`, `identity_source`, `authenticated`. |
-| `action` | Console action id. |
-| `action_class` | `gated_write`, `privileged`, `destructive`, or `unknown`. |
-| `target` | `{kind, ref}`, e.g. `{"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"}`. |
-| `result` | `allowed`, `denied`, `previewed`, `failed`, `succeeded`. |
-| `reason_code` | The authorization reason code above. |
-| `correlation` | `request_id`, `session_id`, `mcp_task`, `mcp_permission`. |
-| `retention` | `class`, `days`, `expires_at`. |
-| `redacted` | Always `true`; records are redacted at build time. |
-
-An unrecognised `result` degrades to `failed` rather than being stored
-verbatim.
-
-The sink is an append-only JSON Lines file named by
-`WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`. It is **off by default**: with the variable unset,
-events are still built — so callers and tests exercise the schema — but nothing
-is written. Auditing never raises; a failed write returns `False` rather than
-breaking the request it describes.
-
-## Retention
-
-| Class | Applies to | Default |
-|-------|-----------|---------|
-| `standard` | Routine gated writes | 90 days |
-| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
-| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch` | 730 days |
-
-Each record carries its own class, day count, and computed `expires_at`, so
-retention is auditable per record rather than inferred from file age. An
-**unknown action is retained as privileged, not standard** — for a safety
-control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
-
-Nothing in this module updates or deletes. Expiry is enforced by an
-operator-run policy against `expires_at`, never by the console silently
-rewriting its own history.
-
-## Phase 2 integration
-
-Phase 2 opens gated writes. It must reuse this model rather than introduce a
-second one. The integration points are already wired and observable:
-
-- **`GET /api/actions/{action_id}/preview`** attaches an `authorization` block
-  to the existing preview payload and records a `previewed` audit event.
-- **`POST /api/actions/{action_id}/attempt`** attaches the same block and
-  records a `denied` event. The terminal outcome is unchanged — the MVP
-  registry in `webui/gated_actions.py` still fails closed for every action — so
-  Phase 1 cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision
-  instead of adding a parallel check.
-- **`GET /api/console/security-model`** publishes the RBAC matrix, redaction
-  policy, and audit policy as JSON for operators and tests.
-
-To open Phase 2, a child issue must: raise `ACTIVE_PHASE`, implement the
-confirmation and dual-control flow the matrix already declares, emit a
-`succeeded` or `failed` record alongside the `gitea_audit` mutation record, and
-keep `viewer` unable to reach any of it. Turning on execution without the
-confirmation flow contradicts a declared requirement and is a review failure,
-not a shortcut.
-
-## Local-dev mode
-
-`WEBUI_AUTH_MODE=local-dev` reads the principal straight from the environment:
-
-| Variable | Purpose |
-|----------|---------|
-| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | Subject string; absent ⇒ anonymous |
-| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | One of `viewer`, `operator`, `controller`, `admin`; unrecognised ⇒ `viewer` |
-
-**INSECURE — this mode is for loopback development only.** The subject and role
-are *asserted by the developer running the process and verified by nothing*.
-Anyone able to set an environment variable on the host is an `admin`, and
-anyone able to reach the port inherits that principal. It provides no
-authentication whatsoever; it exists so Phase 2 authorization paths can be
-exercised without standing up a proxy.
-
-Never enable local-dev mode on a non-loopback bind. Combining it with
-`WEBUI_ALLOW_PUBLIC_BIND=1` or `WEBUI_ALLOW_REMOTE_BIND=1` publishes an
-unauthenticated admin console.
-
-For anything beyond a laptop use `access-proxy` mode behind Cloudflare Access,
-WARP, or a VPN, as [`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) requires.
-
-### Probe authentication
-
-`WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH=1` declares that non-public probes should require an
-authenticated principal. It is **opt-in**: the default is off so the MVP
-`/health` contract is unchanged.
-
-**This flag is declarative in Phase 1 and enforces nothing today.**
-`console_authz.probe_auth_required()` reports the operator's intent, and no
-route consults it — setting the variable does not currently change the
-behaviour of `/health` or any other endpoint. It is published here so the Phase
-2 action framework has a declared policy to honour rather than inventing a
-second one, exactly as `ACTIVE_PHASE` gates execution while the matrix is
-already declared. A regression test pins this "declared, not enforced" status,
-so wiring it later is a deliberate change rather than a silent one.
-
-Until Phase 2 wires it, probe protection rests on network placement alone, as
-[`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) (#435) states.
-
-## Environment variables
-
-| Variable | Default | Purpose |
-|----------|---------|---------|
-| `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE` | `none` | Identity source selection |
-| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | unset | Local-dev subject (insecure) |
-| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | `viewer` | Local-dev role (insecure) |
-| `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP` | unset | JSON subject → role map |
-| `WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH` | unset | Require auth for non-public probes |
-| `WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG` | unset | Append-only audit sink path |
-
-All are read server-side only. None is ever rendered into a page or returned by
-an API.
-
-## Non-goals
-
-- No full SSO product; authentication stays delegated to the proxy.
-- No browser-initiated merges or approvals in any phase covered here.
-- No tokens in the frontend, in browser storage, or in committed config.

docs/webui-deployment.md

@@ -7,10 +7,7 @@ only.
 ## MVP deployment model
 
 - **Default bind:** `127.0.0.1:8765` (`WEBUI_HOST` / `WEBUI_PORT`)
-- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement.
+- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement
-  The authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model that future gated writes
-  must pass through is defined in
-  [`webui-authz-audit.md`](webui-authz-audit.md) (#633).
 - **Mutations:** read-only routes; gated write actions remain disabled (#434)
 - **Secrets:** resolved server-side via `gitea_auth` / `GITEA_MCP_CONFIG`; never
   embedded in HTML, JavaScript, or browser storage

tests/test_arch01_platform.py

@@ -0,0 +1,572 @@
+"""Executable acceptance tests for ARCH-01 Slice A (#822).
+
+Each acceptance criterion (#822 §12) and named test (#822 §13) is exercised
+against a real SQLite database. The migration runs on a fresh DB in ``setUp``;
+the test-run output is the durable evidence the issue requires (§14).
+
+Enforcement being proven:
+
+* ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` — the ``cp_*`` actor functions exist only on the
+  trusted kernel connection; a raw connection cannot satisfy the triggers.
+* ``[SCHEMA]`` — fail-closed aborts, exact dominance set, NOT-NULL class,
+  immutability, and the last-active-grant floor are enforced by
+  CHECK/FK/trigger, verified here including raw-write bypass and concurrency.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import unittest
+from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
+
+import arch01_platform as ap
+from arch01_platform import (
+    ALREADY_INSTALLED,
+    AUTHORIZATION_DENIED,
+    CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST,
+    DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID,
+    DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+    DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
+    INSTALLED,
+    INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT,
+    INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE,
+    PlatformKernel,
+)
+
+INSTALLER = "platform.installer"
+
+_BOOTSTRAP_TABLES = (
+    "principal_equivalence_classes",
+    "principals",
+    "authoritative_issuers",
+    "authority_dominance",
+    "platform_bootstrap_seed",
+    "platform_bootstrap_grants",
+    "platform_active_invariant",
+    "install_state",
+)
+
+
+def _count(kernel: PlatformKernel, table: str) -> int:
+    return kernel._conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table}").fetchone()[0]
+
+
+def _count_where(kernel: PlatformKernel, table: str, where: str) -> int:
+    return kernel._conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table} WHERE {where}").fetchone()[0]
+
+
+def _all_bootstrap_empty(kernel: PlatformKernel) -> bool:
+    return all(_count(kernel, t) == 0 for t in _BOOTSTRAP_TABLES)
+
+
+class Arch01MemoryTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Single-connection behavior on an in-memory database."""
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.kernel = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self.kernel.close()
+
+    # -- AC1 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_install_clean(self) -> None:  # t_install_clean(+)
+        res = self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res.code, INSTALLED)
+        self.assertTrue(self.kernel.is_installed())
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "install_state"), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.active_grant_count(), 1)
+        self.assertIn(ap.EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED, self.kernel.audit_events())
+        rows = set(
+            self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT dominant, subordinate FROM authority_dominance"
+            ).fetchall()
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(rows, set(DOMINANCE_TUPLES))
+        issuer_ref = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT i.issuer_ref FROM principals p JOIN authoritative_issuers i "
+            "ON p.issuer_id = i.issuer_id WHERE p.principal_id = ?",
+            (INSTALLER,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        self.assertEqual(issuer_ref[0], DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID)
+
+    # -- AC2 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_install_twice(self) -> None:  # t_install_twice(-)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        res2 = self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER)
+        self.assertEqual(res2.code, ALREADY_INSTALLED)
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "principals"), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "platform_bootstrap_grants"), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "install_state"), 1)
+
+    # -- AC3 / AC5 -------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_install_stage_rollback(self) -> None:  # t_install_stage_rollback
+        for stop in range(1, 9):
+            with self.subTest(stages=stop):
+                k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+                try:
+                    self._partial_bootstrap_then_rollback(k, stop)
+                    self.assertTrue(
+                        _all_bootstrap_empty(k),
+                        f"partial rows survived rollback at stage {stop}",
+                    )
+                    self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+                finally:
+                    k.close()
+
+    def test_no_partial_after_rollback(self) -> None:  # t_no_partial_after_rollback
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            code = self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1])
+            self.assertEqual(code, DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH)
+            self.assertTrue(_all_bootstrap_empty(k))
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    # -- AC4 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_dominance_missing(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_missing(-)
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1]),
+                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    def test_dominance_extra(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_extra(-)
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            extra = DOMINANCE_TUPLES + (("platform.bootstrap", "rogue.extra"),)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=extra),
+                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    def test_dominance_malformed(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_malformed(-)
+        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
+        try:
+            malformed = DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1] + (("supervisor.root", "WRONG.subordinate"),)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=malformed),
+                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
+            )
+            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+    # -- AC6 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_principal_no_class(self) -> None:  # t_principal_no_class(-)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "install"):
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals"
+                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES ('x', 'operator', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                )
+
+    # -- AC7 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_noninstaller_null_issuer(self) -> None:  # t_nonobstaller_null_issuer(-)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            cur = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+            )
+            class_id = cur.lastrowid
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals"
+                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES ('rogue', 'operator', ?, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')",
+                    (class_id,),
+                )
+            self.assertIn("INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_installer_null_issuer_only_during_install(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("i2", "installer", "install"):
+            cur = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+            )
+            class_id = cur.lastrowid
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals"
+                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES ('i2', 'installer', ?, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')",
+                    (class_id,),
+                )
+
+    # -- AC8 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_context_missing(self) -> None:  # t_context_missing(-)
+        self.assertIsNone(self.kernel._ctx)
+        with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+            self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+            )
+        self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_context_stale(self) -> None:  # t_context_stale(-)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            self.kernel._ctx.expired = True
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                )
+            self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_context_epoch_shift(self) -> None:  # t_context_epoch_shift(-)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            self.kernel._ctx.live_epoch = self.kernel._ctx.bound_epoch + 99
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                )
+            self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_bad_actor_kind_or_mode_rejected(self) -> None:
+        for kind, mode in (("intruder", "normal"), ("operator", "sabotage")):
+            with self.subTest(kind=kind, mode=mode):
+                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", kind, mode):
+                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
+                        self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                            "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) "
+                            "VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                        )
+
+    # -- AC9 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_bootstrap_immutable_update(self) -> None:  # t_bootstrap_immutable_{update}
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        cases = [
+            ("UPDATE install_state SET installed_at = 'x' WHERE id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE"),
+            ("UPDATE platform_bootstrap_seed SET created_at = 'x' WHERE seed_id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_SEED"),
+            ("UPDATE authority_dominance SET subordinate = 'x' WHERE dominant = 'supervisor.root'", "IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE"),
+            (f"UPDATE authoritative_issuers SET issuer_ref = 'x' WHERE issuer_ref = '{DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID}'", "IMMUTABLE_ISSUER"),
+            (f"UPDATE principals SET actor_kind = 'operator' WHERE principal_id = '{INSTALLER}'", "IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL"),
+        ]
+        for sql, tag in cases:
+            with self.subTest(sql=sql):
+                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                        self.kernel._conn.execute(sql)
+                    self.assertIn(tag, str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_bootstrap_immutable_delete(self) -> None:  # t_bootstrap_immutable_{delete}
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        cases = [
+            ("DELETE FROM install_state WHERE id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE"),
+            ("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_SEED"),
+            ("DELETE FROM authority_dominance", "IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE"),
+            ("DELETE FROM authoritative_issuers", "IMMUTABLE_ISSUER"),
+            (f"DELETE FROM principals WHERE principal_id = '{INSTALLER}'", "IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL"),
+            ("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_grants", "IMMUTABLE_GRANT"),
+        ]
+        for sql, tag in cases:
+            with self.subTest(sql=sql):
+                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                        self.kernel._conn.execute(sql)
+                    self.assertIn(tag, str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_grant_reactivation_rejected(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        self.kernel.register_principal(
+            "op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED
+        )
+        gid = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grantee_principal_id = 'op1'"
+        ).fetchone()[0]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code,
+            INSTALLED,
+        )
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute(
+                    "UPDATE platform_bootstrap_grants SET active = 1 WHERE grant_id = ?",
+                    (gid,),
+                )
+            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_GRANT", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    # -- AC12 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_raw_write_bypass(self) -> None:  # t_raw_write_bypass(raw-bypass)
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            path = os.path.join(tmp, "p.sqlite3")
+            k = PlatformKernel(path)
+            self.assertEqual(k.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+            k.close()
+            raw = sqlite3.connect(path)
+            raw.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
+            try:
+                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
+                    raw.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES ('forged', '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
+                    )
+                    raw.commit()
+                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
+                    raw.execute("UPDATE install_state SET installed_at = 'x' WHERE id = 1")
+                    raw.commit()
+                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
+                    raw.execute("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_grants")
+                    raw.commit()
+            finally:
+                raw.close()
+
+    # -- AC13 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_audit_created(self) -> None:  # t_audit_created(+)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        self.kernel.register_principal(
+            "op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED
+        )
+        gid = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grantee_principal_id = 'op1'"
+        ).fetchone()[0]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code,
+            INSTALLED,
+        )
+        events = self.kernel.audit_events()
+        for evt in (
+            ap.EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED,
+            ap.EVT_GRANT_CREATED,
+            ap.EVT_GRANT_REVOKED,
+            ap.EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED,
+        ):
+            self.assertIn(evt, events)
+
+    # -- AC14 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_audit_immutable(self) -> None:  # t_audit_immutable(raw-bypass)
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as up:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute("UPDATE audit_records SET event = 'x' WHERE audit_id = 1")
+            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_AUDIT", str(up.exception))
+            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as dl:
+                self.kernel._conn.execute("DELETE FROM audit_records WHERE audit_id = 1")
+            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_AUDIT", str(dl.exception))
+
+    # -- meta ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_schema_meta(self) -> None:
+        rows = dict(self.kernel._conn.execute("SELECT key, value FROM arch01_meta").fetchall())
+        self.assertEqual(rows["schema_version"], str(ap.SCHEMA_VERSION))
+        self.assertIn("disabled by default", rows["architecture"])
+
+    def test_register_principal_creates_class_first(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        res = self.kernel.register_principal(
+            "svc1", "service", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res.code, INSTALLED)
+        row = self.kernel._conn.execute(
+            "SELECT current_class_id FROM principals WHERE principal_id = 'svc1'"
+        ).fetchone()
+        self.assertIsNotNone(row[0])
+
+    # -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def _partial_bootstrap_then_rollback(self, k: PlatformKernel, stop: int) -> None:
+        """Execute the first ``stop`` bootstrap statements, then ROLLBACK."""
+        now = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
+        k._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+        class_id = None
+        issuer_id = None
+        try:
+            with k.actor_context(INSTALLER, "installer", "install"):
+                c = k._conn
+                if stop >= 1:
+                    class_id = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)", (now,)
+                    ).lastrowid
+                if stop >= 2:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO principals(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                        "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
+                        (INSTALLER, class_id, INSTALLER, now),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 3:
+                    issuer_id = c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) VALUES ('operator-key', ?, ?)",
+                        (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
+                    ).lastrowid
+                if stop >= 4:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
+                        (issuer_id, INSTALLER),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 5:
+                    c.executemany(
+                        "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
+                        DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
+                    )
+                if stop >= 6:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
+                        (INSTALLER, now),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 7:
+                    c.execute(
+                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
+                        (INSTALLER, now),
+                    )
+                if stop >= 8:
+                    c.execute("INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)")
+        finally:
+            k._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
+
+    def _seed_bootstrap_and_mark(self, k: PlatformKernel, dominance) -> str:
+        """Seed a full bootstrap with a caller-supplied dominance set, then
+        attempt the marker insert. Returns the classified failure code (or
+        INSTALLED). Rolls back on failure so no partial rows remain."""
+        now = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
+        k._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
+        try:
+            with k.actor_context(INSTALLER, "installer", "install"):
+                c = k._conn
+                class_id = c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)", (now,)
+                ).lastrowid
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO principals(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
+                    "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
+                    (INSTALLER, class_id, INSTALLER, now),
+                )
+                issuer_id = c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) VALUES ('operator-key', ?, ?)",
+                    (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
+                ).lastrowid
+                c.execute(
+                    "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
+                    (issuer_id, INSTALLER),
+                )
+                c.executemany(
+                    "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
+                    dominance,
+                )
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
+                    (INSTALLER, now),
+                )
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
+                    (INSTALLER, now),
+                )
+                c.execute("INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)")
+                c.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO install_state(id, marker, installed_at) VALUES (1, 'installed', ?)",
+                    (now,),
+                )
+            k._conn.execute("COMMIT")
+            return INSTALLED
+        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+            k._safe_rollback()
+            return PlatformKernel._classify(exc)
+
+
+class Arch01ConcurrencyTest(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Concurrency invariants require file-backed DBs and independent connections."""
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "p.sqlite3")
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    # -- AC10 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_concurrent_install(self) -> None:  # t_concurrent_install(concurrency)
+        k1 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=0)
+        k2 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=0)
+        barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
+        results = {}
+
+        def _install(name, kernel):
+            barrier.wait()
+            results[name] = kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code
+
+        try:
+            with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:
+                f1 = ex.submit(_install, "a", k1)
+                f2 = ex.submit(_install, "b", k2)
+                f1.result()
+                f2.result()
+            codes = sorted(results.values())
+            self.assertEqual(codes.count(INSTALLED), 1, f"exactly one install expected: {results}")
+            other = [c for c in results.values() if c != INSTALLED][0]
+            self.assertIn(other, (ALREADY_INSTALLED, CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST))
+            self.assertTrue(k1.is_installed())
+            self.assertEqual(_count(k1, "install_state"), 1)
+            self.assertEqual(_count(k1, "principals"), 1)
+        finally:
+            k1.close()
+            k2.close()
+
+    # -- AC11 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
+    def test_concurrent_last_grant_revoke(self) -> None:  # t_concurrent_last_grant_revoke
+        setup = PlatformKernel(self.path)
+        self.assertEqual(setup.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        setup.register_principal("op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER)
+        self.assertEqual(setup.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+        self.assertEqual(setup.active_grant_count(), 2)
+        gids = [
+            r[0]
+            for r in setup._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE active = 1 ORDER BY grant_id"
+            ).fetchall()
+        ]
+        setup.close()
+        self.assertEqual(len(gids), 2)
+
+        k1 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=3000)
+        k2 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=3000)
+        barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
+        results = {}
+
+        def _revoke(name, kernel, gid):
+            barrier.wait()
+            results[name] = kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code
+
+        try:
+            with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:
+                f1 = ex.submit(_revoke, "a", k1, gids[0])
+                f2 = ex.submit(_revoke, "b", k2, gids[1])
+                f1.result()
+                f2.result()
+            codes = list(results.values())
+            self.assertEqual(codes.count(INSTALLED), 1, f"exactly one revoke should win: {results}")
+            self.assertEqual(codes.count(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED), 1, f"one revoke must be denied: {results}")
+            self.assertEqual(k1.active_grant_count(), 1)
+            self.assertEqual(_count_where(k1, "platform_bootstrap_grants", "active = 1"), 1)
+        finally:
+            k1.close()
+            k2.close()
+
+    def test_revoke_final_grant_denied(self) -> None:
+        k = PlatformKernel(self.path)
+        try:
+            self.assertEqual(k.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
+            gid = k._conn.execute(
+                "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE active = 1"
+            ).fetchone()[0]
+            res = k.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER)
+            self.assertEqual(res.code, AUTHORIZATION_DENIED)
+            self.assertEqual(k.active_grant_count(), 1)
+            self.assertEqual(_count_where(k, "platform_bootstrap_grants", "active = 1"), 1)
+        finally:
+            k.close()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_console_authz_audit.py

@@ -1,703 +0,0 @@
-"""Console authorization, redaction, and audit model tests (#633).
-
-Covers each acceptance criterion and each required test named in the issue:
-
-* AC1 — RBAC matrix and privileged-action list.
-* AC2 — redaction rules, unit-tested against sample payloads.
-* AC3 — audit event schema with required fields and retention defaults.
-* AC4 — Phase 2 integration points.
-* AC5 — local-dev mode with explicit insecurity warnings.
-
-Required tests: redaction units (token, keychain, password patterns),
-default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs, and audit record creation for a
-simulated privileged preview.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import datetime
-import json
-import os
-import pathlib
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
-
-from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP  # noqa: E402
-from webui import console_audit, console_authz  # noqa: E402
-from webui.app import create_app  # noqa: E402
-from webui.console_redaction import (  # noqa: E402
-    REDACTED,
-    redact_payload,
-    redact_text,
-    redaction_policy,
-    scan_for_secrets,
-)
-
-DOCS = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "docs"
-AUTHZ_DOC = DOCS / "webui-authz-audit.md"
-
-
-def _principal(role: str) -> console_authz.Principal:
-    return console_authz.Principal(
-        subject=f"{role}@example.com",
-        role=role,
-        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
-        authenticated=True,
-    )
-
-
-class TestRoleMatrix(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC1 — the written RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
-
-    def test_roles_are_ordered_least_to_most_authority(self):
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_authz.ROLE_ORDER,
-            ("viewer", "operator", "controller", "admin"),
-        )
-
-    def test_every_role_has_a_description(self):
-        for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
-            with self.subTest(role=role):
-                self.assertTrue(console_authz.ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role].strip())
-
-    def test_higher_roles_inherit_lower_role_actions(self):
-        matrix = {
-            entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
-            for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
-        }
-        for lower, higher in zip(
-            console_authz.ROLE_ORDER, console_authz.ROLE_ORDER[1:]
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(lower=lower, higher=higher):
-                self.assertTrue(matrix[lower].issubset(matrix[higher]))
-
-    def test_viewer_holds_no_write_action(self):
-        matrix = {
-            entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
-            for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
-        }
-        self.assertEqual(matrix["viewer"], set())
-
-    def test_privileged_action_list_is_non_empty_and_classified(self):
-        privileged = console_authz.privileged_actions()
-        self.assertTrue(privileged)
-        ids = {action.action_id for action in privileged}
-        # Merge and branch deletion are the canonical privileged pair.
-        self.assertIn("merge_pr", ids)
-        self.assertIn("delete_branch", ids)
-
-    def test_merge_and_delete_require_dual_control_and_break_glass(self):
-        for action_id in ("merge_pr", "delete_branch"):
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
-                self.assertTrue(action.dual_control)
-                self.assertTrue(action.break_glass)
-                self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
-
-    def test_every_write_action_requires_confirmation(self):
-        for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
-            with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
-                self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
-
-    def test_delete_branch_is_admin_only(self):
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_authz.get_action("delete_branch").minimum_role,
-            console_authz.ADMIN,
-        )
-
-    def test_actions_map_to_real_mcp_capability_vocabulary(self):
-        """The console must not invent an authority the MCP layer lacks."""
-        for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
-            with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
-                self.assertIn(action.task_key, TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP)
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    action.mcp_permission,
-                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["permission"],
-                )
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    action.mcp_role,
-                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["role"],
-                )
-
-    def test_matrix_declares_deny_by_default_and_execution_disabled(self):
-        matrix = console_authz.rbac_matrix()
-        self.assertEqual(matrix["default_decision"], "deny")
-        self.assertFalse(matrix["execution_enabled"])
-
-
-class TestAuthorizeDefaultDeny(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Fail-closed behaviour of the authorization decision."""
-
-    def test_anonymous_is_denied_every_action(self):
-        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id)
-                self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
-                )
-
-    def test_unknown_action_is_denied(self):
-        decision = console_authz.authorize(
-            "not_a_real_action", _principal("admin")
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION)
-
-    def test_unknown_role_is_denied(self):
-        rogue = console_authz.Principal(
-            subject="[email protected]",
-            role="superuser",
-            identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
-            authenticated=True,
-        )
-        decision = console_authz.authorize("comment_issue", rogue)
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE)
-
-    def test_insufficient_role_is_denied(self):
-        decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("operator"))
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE
-        )
-
-    def test_sufficient_role_allows_preview_only(self):
-        decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("controller"))
-        self.assertTrue(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
-
-    def test_execution_is_refused_while_phase_is_not_active(self):
-        decision = console_authz.authorize(
-            "merge_pr", _principal("controller"), for_execution=True
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE
-        )
-
-    def test_allowed_decision_never_reports_execution_enabled(self):
-        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                decision = console_authz.authorize(
-                    action_id, _principal("admin")
-                )
-                self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
-
-
-class TestIdentityResolution(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC5 — identity sources, including the insecure local-dev mode."""
-
-    def test_no_auth_mode_yields_anonymous_viewer(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(env={})
-        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
-        self.assertEqual(principal.identity_source, console_authz.IDENTITY_NONE)
-
-    def test_local_dev_mode_warns_that_identity_is_unverified(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            env={
-                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev",
-                console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
-                console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "admin",
-            }
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(principal.authenticated)
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, "admin")
-        self.assertTrue(principal.warnings)
-        self.assertIn("asserted", " ".join(principal.warnings).lower())
-
-    def test_local_dev_without_subject_falls_back_to_anonymous(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev"}
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
-
-    def test_local_dev_unknown_role_degrades_to_viewer(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            env={
-                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local_dev",
-                console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
-                console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "root",
-            }
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
-
-    def test_access_proxy_without_header_fails_closed(self):
-        """A proxy-mode request that did not traverse the proxy is anonymous."""
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            headers={},
-            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
-
-    def test_access_proxy_role_comes_from_server_config_not_client(self):
-        env = {
-            console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
-            console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: json.dumps(
-                {"[email protected]": "controller"}
-            ),
-        }
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            headers={
-                console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]",
-                "x-role": "admin",  # client-supplied role must be ignored
-            },
-            env=env,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, "controller")
-
-    def test_access_proxy_unmapped_subject_defaults_to_viewer(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            headers={
-                console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"
-            },
-            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
-
-    def test_malformed_role_map_does_not_raise_and_denies(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            headers={console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"},
-            env={
-                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
-                console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: "{not json",
-            },
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
-
-    def test_probe_auth_is_opt_in(self):
-        self.assertFalse(console_authz.probe_auth_required(env={}))
-        self.assertTrue(
-            console_authz.probe_auth_required(
-                env={console_authz.REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV: "1"}
-            )
-        )
-
-    def test_probe_auth_is_declared_but_not_yet_enforced(self):
-        """Phase 1 declares the probe-auth policy; no route enforces it yet.
-
-        The flag exists so the Phase 2 action framework has a declared policy
-        to honour instead of inventing a second one. Pinning the current
-        not-enforced status here means wiring it later is a deliberate change
-        that updates this test and the documentation together, rather than a
-        silent behaviour shift. The documentation must say so plainly, because
-        an operator who sets the variable believing it protects a probe is
-        worse off than one who knows it does not.
-        """
-        import inspect
-
-        from webui import app as webui_app
-
-        source = inspect.getsource(webui_app)
-        self.assertNotIn(
-            "probe_auth_required",
-            source,
-            msg=(
-                "webui.app now consults probe_auth_required, so probe auth is "
-                "no longer merely declared. Update the 'Probe authentication' "
-                "section of docs/webui-authz-audit.md, which states it "
-                "enforces nothing, and replace this test with real "
-                "enforcement coverage."
-            ),
-        )
-        self.assertIn(
-            "enforces nothing today",
-            AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
-        )
-
-
-class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC2 — required redaction units: token, keychain, password patterns."""
-
-    def test_token_assignment_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("GITEA_TOKEN=abcd1234efgh5678ijkl")
-        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
-        self.assertNotIn("abcd1234efgh5678ijkl", out)
-
-    def test_password_assignment_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("password: hunter2supersecret")
-        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
-        self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", out)
-
-    def test_keychain_reference_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("keychain:gitea-prgs-token")
-        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
-        self.assertNotIn("gitea-prgs-token", out)
-
-    def test_keychain_command_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("security find-generic-password -s gitea -w")
-        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
-        self.assertNotIn("find-generic-password -s gitea", out)
-
-    def test_bearer_credential_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("Authorization: Bearer abcdef1234567890abcdef")
-        self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890abcdef", out)
-
-    def test_jwt_is_redacted(self):
-        token = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0.abcdefghijklmnop"
-        out = redact_text(f"session={token}")
-        self.assertNotIn(token, out)
-
-    def test_private_key_block_is_redacted(self):
-        pem = (
-            "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
-            "MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial\n"
-            "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
-        )
-        out = redact_text(pem)
-        self.assertNotIn("MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial", out)
-
-    def test_api_key_assignment_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text('api_key = "sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210"')
-        self.assertNotIn("sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210", out)
-
-    def test_nested_payload_is_redacted_recursively(self):
-        payload = {
-            "token": "abc123456789",
-            "nested": {"note": "password=letmein12345"},
-            "list": ["keychain:some-entry"],
-            "safe": "plain text",
-        }
-        out = redact_payload(payload)
-        self.assertEqual(out["token"], REDACTED)
-        self.assertNotIn("letmein12345", json.dumps(out))
-        self.assertNotIn("some-entry", json.dumps(out))
-        self.assertEqual(out["safe"], "plain text")
-
-    def test_scan_reports_findings_before_and_none_after(self):
-        dirty = "password: hunter2supersecret"
-        self.assertTrue(scan_for_secrets(dirty))
-        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redact_text(dirty)), [])
-
-    def test_non_strings_pass_through_untouched(self):
-        self.assertEqual(redact_text(42), 42)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            redact_payload({"n": 1, "b": True}), {"n": 1, "b": True}
-        )
-
-    def test_policy_is_documented_and_declares_redact_before_persist(self):
-        policy = redaction_policy()
-        self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
-        self.assertIn("audit_records", policy["applies_to"])
-        self.assertTrue(policy["console_rules"])
-
-    def test_policy_statement_contains_no_secret_material(self):
-        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redaction_policy()), [])
-
-
-class TestAuditSchema(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC3 — audit event schema, required fields, and retention defaults."""
-
-    def _event(self, action_id="merge_pr", **kwargs):
-        return console_audit.build_event(
-            action_id=action_id,
-            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
-            decision=console_authz.authorize(action_id, _principal("operator")),
-            target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
-            request_id="req-test",
-            **kwargs,
-        )
-
-    def test_every_required_field_is_present(self):
-        event = self._event()
-        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_FIELDS:
-            with self.subTest(field=field):
-                self.assertIn(field, event)
-
-    def test_actor_carries_who_and_how_they_were_identified(self):
-        event = self._event()
-        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS:
-            with self.subTest(field=field):
-                self.assertIn(field, event["actor"])
-
-    def test_correlation_ids_are_present(self):
-        event = self._event()
-        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS:
-            with self.subTest(field=field):
-                self.assertIn(field, event["correlation"])
-        self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["request_id"], "req-test")
-        self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["mcp_task"], "merge_pr")
-
-    def test_timestamp_is_timezone_aware_utc_iso8601(self):
-        now = datetime.datetime(
-            2026, 7, 22, 10, 16, 42, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc
-        )
-        event = self._event(now=now)
-        self.assertEqual(event["timestamp"], "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00")
-        parsed = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(event["timestamp"])
-        self.assertIsNotNone(parsed.tzinfo)
-
-    def test_retention_defaults_by_class(self):
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD], 90
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED],
-            365,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS],
-            730,
-        )
-
-    def test_break_glass_action_retains_longest(self):
-        event = self._event("merge_pr")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
-        )
-
-    def test_routine_write_uses_standard_retention(self):
-        event = self._event("comment_issue")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD
-        )
-
-    def test_unknown_action_retains_as_privileged_not_standard(self):
-        """Conservative direction: keep an unclassifiable record longer."""
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.retention_class_for(None),
-            console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED,
-        )
-
-    def test_retention_expiry_matches_declared_days(self):
-        now = datetime.datetime(2026, 7, 22, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
-        event = self._event("comment_issue", now=now)
-        expires = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(
-            event["retention"]["expires_at"]
-        )
-        self.assertEqual((expires - now).days, 90)
-
-    def test_invalid_result_degrades_to_failed(self):
-        event = console_audit.build_event(action_id="merge_pr", result="banana")
-        self.assertEqual(event["result"], console_audit.RESULT_FAILED)
-
-    def test_denied_result_is_representable(self):
-        """An authorization denial has no MCP-side mutation record."""
-        self.assertIn(console_audit.RESULT_DENIED, console_audit.RESULTS)
-
-    def test_event_is_redacted_before_it_is_returned(self):
-        event = console_audit.build_event(
-            action_id="merge_pr",
-            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
-            detail="failed with token=abcdef1234567890",
-            metadata={"password": "hunter2supersecret"},
-        )
-        serialized = json.dumps(event)
-        self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890", serialized)
-        self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", serialized)
-        self.assertTrue(event["redacted"])
-
-    def test_audit_policy_reports_schema_and_retention(self):
-        policy = console_audit.audit_policy()
-        self.assertTrue(policy["append_only"])
-        self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            policy["retention_defaults_days"], console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS
-        )
-
-
-class TestAuditSink(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Append-only persistence behaviour."""
-
-    def test_write_is_a_noop_when_sink_is_unconfigured(self):
-        saved = os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
-        try:
-            self.assertFalse(console_audit.audit_enabled())
-            self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event({"schema_version": 1}))
-        finally:
-            if saved is not None:
-                os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = saved
-
-    def test_records_append_one_json_line_each(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
-            for _ in range(3):
-                event = console_audit.build_event(
-                    action_id="merge_pr", result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
-                )
-                self.assertTrue(console_audit.write_event(event, path=sink))
-            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                lines = [json.loads(line) for line in handle if line.strip()]
-            self.assertEqual(len(lines), 3)
-            self.assertEqual(len({line["event_id"] for line in lines}), 3)
-
-    def test_a_record_that_still_carries_a_secret_is_not_persisted(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
-            leaky = {
-                "schema_version": 1,
-                "detail": "password: hunter2supersecret",
-            }
-            self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event(leaky, path=sink))
-            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(sink))
-
-    def test_write_never_raises_on_a_bad_path(self):
-        self.assertFalse(
-            console_audit.write_event(
-                {"schema_version": 1}, path="/nonexistent-dir/audit.jsonl"
-            )
-        )
-
-    def test_simulated_privileged_preview_creates_an_audit_record(self):
-        """Required test: audit record creation for a privileged preview."""
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
-            os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = sink
-            try:
-                decision = console_authz.authorize(
-                    "merge_pr", _principal("controller")
-                )
-                outcome = console_audit.record_event(
-                    action_id="merge_pr",
-                    result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
-                    decision=decision,
-                    target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
-                    request_id="req-preview",
-                )
-            finally:
-                os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
-            self.assertTrue(outcome["written"])
-            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
-            self.assertEqual(record["action"], "merge_pr")
-            self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED)
-            self.assertEqual(record["action_class"], "privileged")
-            self.assertTrue(record["decision"]["allowed"])
-            self.assertFalse(record["decision"]["execution_enabled"])
-            self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["role"], "controller")
-
-    def test_decision_block_survives_redaction(self):
-        """Regression: naming it 'authorization' collided with a secret hint.
-
-        ``gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS`` contains "authorization" (for the
-        HTTP header), so a block under that key was replaced wholesale by the
-        placeholder and the record lost its decision entirely.
-        """
-        event = console_audit.build_event(
-            action_id="merge_pr",
-            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
-            decision=console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("admin")),
-        )
-        self.assertIsInstance(event["decision"], dict)
-        self.assertIn("allowed", event["decision"])
-
-
-class TestConsoleRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC4 — the wired Phase 2 integration points, still fail-closed."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app(bind_host="127.0.0.1"))
-
-    def test_unauthenticated_write_stub_is_denied(self):
-        """Required test: default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs."""
-        response = self.client.post(
-            "/api/actions/merge_pr/attempt", json={"pr_number": 99}
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
-        body = response.json()
-        self.assertFalse(body["success"])
-        authorization = body["authorization"]
-        self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            authorization["reason_code"], console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(authorization["execution_enabled"])
-
-    def test_preview_reports_an_authorization_decision(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/api/actions/merge_pr/preview?pr_number=7")
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
-        authorization = response.json()["authorization"]
-        self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
-        self.assertTrue(authorization["dual_control"])
-        self.assertEqual(authorization["required_role"], "controller")
-
-    def test_unknown_action_preview_still_404s(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/api/actions/no_such_action/preview")
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)
-
-    def test_security_model_endpoint_publishes_all_three_policies(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
-        body = response.json()
-        self.assertIn("rbac", body)
-        self.assertIn("redaction", body)
-        self.assertIn("audit", body)
-        self.assertEqual(body["rbac"]["default_decision"], "deny")
-
-    def test_security_model_endpoint_leaks_no_secrets(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
-        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(response.json()), [])
-
-    def test_security_model_rejects_writes(self):
-        response = self.client.post("/api/console/security-model", json={})
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
-
-    def test_existing_read_routes_are_unaffected(self):
-        for path in ("/", "/health", "/actions", "/api/actions"):
-            with self.subTest(path=path):
-                self.assertEqual(self.client.get(path).status_code, 200)
-
-
-class TestAuthzAuditDoc(unittest.TestCase):
-    """The model must be written down, not only coded."""
-
-    @classmethod
-    def setUpClass(cls):
-        cls.text = (
-            AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8") if AUTHZ_DOC.exists() else ""
-        )
-
-    def test_doc_exists(self):
-        self.assertTrue(AUTHZ_DOC.exists(), f"missing {AUTHZ_DOC}")
-
-    def test_doc_covers_each_required_section(self):
-        for heading in (
-            "Identity sources",
-            "Role matrix",
-            "Privileged actions",
-            "Secret redaction",
-            "Audit event schema",
-            "Retention",
-            "Phase 2 integration",
-            "Local-dev mode",
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(heading=heading):
-                self.assertIn(heading, self.text)
-
-    def test_doc_names_every_role(self):
-        for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
-            with self.subTest(role=role):
-                self.assertIn(role, self.text)
-
-    def test_doc_names_every_console_action(self):
-        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                self.assertIn(action_id, self.text)
-
-    def test_doc_states_retention_defaults(self):
-        for days in console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS.values():
-            with self.subTest(days=days):
-                self.assertIn(str(days), self.text)
-
-    def test_doc_warns_local_dev_is_insecure(self):
-        self.assertIn("INSECURE", self.text.upper())
-
-    def test_doc_states_default_deny(self):
-        self.assertIn("deny", self.text.lower())
-
-    def test_doc_contains_no_secret_material(self):
-        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(self.text), [])
-
-    def test_deployment_doc_links_to_the_model(self):
-        deployment = (DOCS / "webui-deployment.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-        self.assertIn("webui-authz-audit", deployment)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover
-    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import uuid
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
 from starlette.applications import Starlette
@@ -32,9 +31,6 @@ from final_report_validator import FINAL_REPORT_TASK_KINDS
 
 from webui.gated_actions import attempt_action, load_action_registry, preview_action
 from webui.gated_action_views import render_actions_page
-from webui import console_audit
-from webui.console_authz import authorize, rbac_matrix, resolve_principal
-from webui.console_redaction import redaction_policy
 from webui.audit_validator import audit_report, audit_to_dict
 from webui.audit_views import render_audit_page
 from webui.lease_loader import load_lease_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as lease_snapshot_to_dict
@@ -280,49 +276,6 @@ async def api_actions(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(load_action_registry().to_dict())
 
 
-def _request_id() -> str:
-    return f"req-{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
-
-
-def _audit_target(action_id: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
-    """Describe the action target for the audit record (never secrets)."""
-    if "pr_number" in params:
-        return {"kind": "pr", "ref": f"#{params['pr_number']}"}
-    if "issue_number" in params:
-        return {"kind": "issue", "ref": f"#{params['issue_number']}"}
-    if "branch_name" in params:
-        return {"kind": "branch", "ref": str(params["branch_name"])}
-    return {"kind": "unspecified", "ref": action_id}
-
-
-def _authorize_request(
-    request: Request,
-    action_id: str,
-    params: dict[str, object],
-    *,
-    for_execution: bool,
-    result: str,
-) -> dict[str, object]:
-    """Resolve principal, decide, and audit. Returns the decision payload.
-
-    Phase 1 records the decision rather than enforcing it as the terminal
-    outcome: ``webui.gated_actions`` already fails closed for every action, so
-    this layer cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision.
-    """
-    principal = resolve_principal(headers=dict(request.headers))
-    decision = authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=for_execution)
-    console_audit.record_event(
-        action_id=action_id,
-        result=result,
-        decision=decision,
-        principal=principal,
-        target=_audit_target(action_id, params),
-        request_id=_request_id(),
-        detail=decision.detail,
-    )
-    return decision.to_dict()
-
-
 async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     action_id = request.path_params["action_id"]
     params = dict(request.query_params)
@@ -332,13 +285,6 @@ async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     result = preview_action(action_id, **params)
     if "error" in result:
         return JSONResponse(result, status_code=404)
-    result["authorization"] = _authorize_request(
-        request,
-        action_id,
-        params,
-        for_execution=False,
-        result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
-    )
     return JSONResponse(result)
 
 
@@ -352,31 +298,10 @@ async def api_action_attempt(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     if not isinstance(body, dict):
         body = {}
     result = attempt_action(action_id, **body)
-    authorization = _authorize_request(
-        request,
-        action_id,
-        body,
-        for_execution=True,
-        result=(
-            console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
-            if not result.get("success")
-            else console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED
-        ),
-    )
-    result["authorization"] = authorization
     status = 403 if not result.get("success") else 200
     return JSONResponse(result, status_code=status)
 
 
-async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
-    """Read-only publication of the #633 authorization/redaction/audit model."""
-    return JSONResponse({
-        "rbac": rbac_matrix(),
-        "redaction": redaction_policy(),
-        "audit": console_audit.audit_policy(),
-    })
-
-
 async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response:
     path = request.url.path
     if path in _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS and request.method == "POST":
@@ -433,11 +358,6 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
                 methods=["POST"],
             ),
             Route("/api/leases", api_leases, methods=["GET"]),
-            Route(
-                "/api/console/security-model",
-                api_console_security_model,
-                methods=["GET"],
-            ),
         ],
         exception_handlers={405: method_not_allowed},
     )

webui/console_audit.py

@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-"""Console audit event schema, retention, and append-only sink (#633).
-
-``gitea_audit`` records MCP-side *mutations*: which profile and Gitea user
-performed which tool call. It carries no console actor, no identity source, no
-correlation identifier, and no retention class, so it cannot answer the
-question #633 exists to answer — *who sat at the console, what did they
-attempt, and was it authorized?* An authorization denial is not a mutation and
-would never appear there at all.
-
-This module adds the console-side record. It does not replace ``gitea_audit``:
-when a Phase 2 action eventually reaches MCP, both fire, correlated by
-``correlation.request_id``.
-
-Design constraints:
-
-- **Redact before persist.** Every record passes through
-  ``webui.console_redaction.redact_payload`` before serialization, so an
-  unredacted field is never durable.
-- **Append-only.** Records are appended as JSON lines. Nothing here updates or
-  deletes; retention is metadata on each record, enforced by an operator-run
-  policy, never by silent rewriting.
-- **Never raises.** Auditing must not break the request it describes. A failed
-  write returns ``False``.
-- **Off by default.** With ``WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`` unset, events are still
-  *built* (so callers and tests see the schema) but nothing is written.
-
-A record looks like this (synthetic values):
-
-    {"schema_version": 1, "event_id": "evt-0001",
-     "timestamp": "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00",
-     "actor": {"subject": "[email protected]", "role": "operator",
-               "identity_source": "access_proxy", "authenticated": true},
-     "action": "merge_pr", "action_class": "privileged",
-     "target": {"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
-     "result": "denied", "reason_code": "insufficient_role",
-     "correlation": {"request_id": "req-abc", "session_id": null,
-                     "mcp_task": "merge_pr", "mcp_permission": "gitea.pr.merge"},
-     "retention": {"class": "privileged", "days": 365,
-                   "expires_at": "2027-07-22T10:16:42+00:00"},
-     "redacted": true}
-
-Timestamps are timezone-aware ISO-8601 in UTC.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import datetime
-import json
-import os
-import uuid
-from typing import Any
-
-from webui import console_authz
-from webui.console_redaction import redact_payload, scan_for_secrets
-
-SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
-
-AUDIT_LOG_ENV = "WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG"
-
-# Result vocabulary. ``denied`` is the one ``gitea_audit`` has no equivalent
-# for: an authorization refusal never reaches the MCP layer.
-RESULT_ALLOWED = "allowed"
-RESULT_DENIED = "denied"
-RESULT_PREVIEWED = "previewed"
-RESULT_FAILED = "failed"
-RESULT_SUCCEEDED = "succeeded"
-
-RESULTS = frozenset(
-    {
-        RESULT_ALLOWED,
-        RESULT_DENIED,
-        RESULT_PREVIEWED,
-        RESULT_FAILED,
-        RESULT_SUCCEEDED,
-    }
-)
-
-# Retention classes and default lifetimes in days. Privileged and break-glass
-# records outlive routine ones because they are what an incident review needs.
-RETENTION_STANDARD = "standard"
-RETENTION_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
-RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS = "break_glass"
-
-RETENTION_DAYS: dict[str, int] = {
-    RETENTION_STANDARD: 90,
-    RETENTION_PRIVILEGED: 365,
-    RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS: 730,
-}
-
-# Fields every record must carry. Asserted by the test suite so a future edit
-# cannot quietly drop one.
-REQUIRED_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
-    "schema_version",
-    "event_id",
-    "timestamp",
-    "actor",
-    "action",
-    "action_class",
-    "target",
-    "result",
-    "reason_code",
-    "correlation",
-    "retention",
-    "redacted",
-)
-
-REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
-    "subject",
-    "role",
-    "identity_source",
-    "authenticated",
-)
-
-REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
-    "request_id",
-    "session_id",
-    "mcp_task",
-    "mcp_permission",
-)
-
-
-def audit_log_path() -> str | None:
-    """Configured sink path, or ``None`` when console auditing is off."""
-    return (os.environ.get(AUDIT_LOG_ENV) or "").strip() or None
-
-
-def audit_enabled() -> bool:
-    return audit_log_path() is not None
-
-
-def retention_class_for(action: console_authz.ConsoleAction | None) -> str:
-    """Classify retention from the action, defaulting to the longest-lived.
-
-    An unknown action is treated as privileged rather than standard: for a
-    safety control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
-    """
-    if action is None:
-        return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
-    if action.break_glass:
-        return RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
-    if action.privileged:
-        return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
-    return RETENTION_STANDARD
-
-
-def _retention_block(
-    retention_class: str, now: datetime.datetime
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    days = RETENTION_DAYS.get(
-        retention_class, RETENTION_DAYS[RETENTION_PRIVILEGED]
-    )
-    return {
-        "class": retention_class,
-        "days": days,
-        "expires_at": (now + datetime.timedelta(days=days)).isoformat(),
-    }
-
-
-def build_event(
-    *,
-    action_id: str,
-    result: str,
-    decision: console_authz.AuthorizationDecision | None = None,
-    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
-    target: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    reason_code: str | None = None,
-    request_id: str | None = None,
-    session_id: str | None = None,
-    detail: str | None = None,
-    metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    now: datetime.datetime | None = None,
-    event_id: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build one redacted, JSON-able console audit record.
-
-    Redaction runs here rather than at write time so an in-memory record handed
-    to a template or an API response is already clean.
-    """
-    ts = now or datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
-    action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
-    who = principal or (
-        decision.principal if decision else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
-    )
-    resolved_result = result if result in RESULTS else RESULT_FAILED
-    resolved_reason = reason_code or (
-        decision.reason_code if decision else "unspecified"
-    )
-    retention_class = retention_class_for(action)
-
-    event: dict[str, Any] = {
-        "schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
-        "event_id": event_id or f"evt-{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-        "timestamp": ts.isoformat(),
-        "actor": who.to_dict(),
-        "action": action_id,
-        "action_class": action.action_class if action else "unknown",
-        "target": dict(target or {}),
-        "result": resolved_result,
-        "reason_code": resolved_reason,
-        "correlation": {
-            "request_id": request_id,
-            "session_id": session_id,
-            "mcp_task": action.task_key if action else None,
-            "mcp_permission": action.mcp_permission if action else None,
-        },
-        "retention": _retention_block(retention_class, ts),
-        "redacted": True,
-        "detail": detail,
-        "metadata": dict(metadata or {}),
-    }
-    if decision is not None:
-        # Deliberately *not* named "authorization": ``gitea_audit`` treats that
-        # substring as a secret key hint (it matches the HTTP Authorization
-        # header) and would replace this whole block with the placeholder.
-        event["decision"] = {
-            "allowed": decision.allowed,
-            "required_role": decision.required_role,
-            "requires_confirmation": decision.requires_confirmation,
-            "dual_control": decision.dual_control,
-            "break_glass": decision.break_glass,
-            "execution_enabled": decision.execution_enabled,
-        }
-
-    redacted = redact_payload(event)
-    if not isinstance(redacted, dict):  # pragma: no cover - defensive
-        return {"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION, "redacted": True}
-    return redacted
-
-
-def write_event(event: dict[str, Any], path: str | None = None) -> bool:
-    """Append *event* as one JSON line. Never raises.
-
-    Returns ``True`` when a line was written, ``False`` when auditing is off or
-    the write failed. A record that still trips a secret detector is dropped
-    rather than persisted.
-    """
-    sink = path or audit_log_path()
-    if not sink:
-        return False
-    try:
-        if scan_for_secrets(event):
-            return False
-        line = json.dumps(event, default=str, sort_keys=True)
-        with open(sink, "a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-            handle.write(line + "\n")
-        return True
-    except Exception:
-        return False
-
-
-def record_event(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build and persist one record; return the record either way.
-
-    Callers get the record back so it can be surfaced in a response or a test
-    regardless of whether a sink is configured.
-    """
-    event = build_event(**kwargs)
-    written = write_event(event)
-    return {"event": event, "written": written}
-
-
-def audit_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Machine-readable audit schema and retention defaults (never secrets)."""
-    return {
-        "schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
-        "required_fields": list(REQUIRED_FIELDS),
-        "required_actor_fields": list(REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS),
-        "required_correlation_fields": list(REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS),
-        "results": sorted(RESULTS),
-        "retention_defaults_days": dict(RETENTION_DAYS),
-        "sink_env": AUDIT_LOG_ENV,
-        "enabled": audit_enabled(),
-        "append_only": True,
-        "redact_before_persist": True,
-        "timestamp_format": "ISO-8601, timezone-aware, UTC",
-        "relationship_to_mcp_audit": (
-            "webui.console_audit records console intent and authorization "
-            "outcomes; gitea_audit records MCP mutations. A Phase 2 action "
-            "emits both, correlated by correlation.request_id."
-        ),
-    }

webui/console_authz.py

@@ -1,537 +0,0 @@
-"""Console authorization and RBAC model (#633, Phase 1).
-
-The read-only MVP (#426–#436) ships with no authentication: protection comes
-from network placement alone (#435). That is adequate while every route is a
-GET, and inadequate the moment Phase 2 wires a gated write. This module is the
-authorization model those writes must go through, landed *before* any of them
-exists so no write can be added without an authority to check against.
-
-Phase 1 scope is the model itself: identity resolution, the role matrix, the
-privileged-action list, and a fail-closed :func:`authorize`. It deliberately
-does **not** enable any write. ``webui.gated_actions`` stays globally disabled,
-so an allow decision here is necessary but never sufficient.
-
-Two invariants hold for every caller:
-
-- **Default deny.** An unrecognised action, an unknown role, or an absent
-  principal denies. There is no implicit allow branch and no "unless" clause.
-- **Authorization is not execution.** :func:`authorize` returns a decision
-  record. It never calls MCP, never mutates, and never consults credentials.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
-from typing import Any
-
-from task_capability_map import required_permission, required_role
-
-# --- Roles ------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Ordered least to most authority. Higher ranks inherit every lower rank's
-# permitted actions; the matrix below is expressed as a minimum required rank.
-VIEWER = "viewer"
-OPERATOR = "operator"
-CONTROLLER = "controller"
-ADMIN = "admin"
-
-ROLE_ORDER: tuple[str, ...] = (VIEWER, OPERATOR, CONTROLLER, ADMIN)
-_ROLE_RANK: dict[str, int] = {role: idx for idx, role in enumerate(ROLE_ORDER)}
-
-ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
-    VIEWER: "Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase.",
-    OPERATOR: "Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR.",
-    CONTROLLER: "Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR.",
-    ADMIN: "Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions.",
-}
-
-# --- Identity sources -------------------------------------------------------
-IDENTITY_NONE = "none"
-IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV = "local_dev"
-IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY = "access_proxy"
-
-IDENTITY_SOURCES: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {
-    IDENTITY_NONE: {
-        "description": (
-            "No authentication configured. Every request is anonymous and "
-            "capped at viewer. This is the MVP default and the only mode "
-            "whose safety rests entirely on network placement (#435)."
-        ),
-        "authenticated": False,
-        "safe_for_shared_host": False,
-        "phase_available": 1,
-    },
-    IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV: {
-        "description": (
-            "Developer-supplied principal read from the environment. INSECURE: "
-            "the subject and role are asserted, never verified. Loopback only."
-        ),
-        "authenticated": True,
-        "safe_for_shared_host": False,
-        "phase_available": 1,
-    },
-    IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY: {
-        "description": (
-            "Subject asserted by a trusted access proxy (Cloudflare Access, "
-            "WARP, or an org VPN portal) via a verified request header. The "
-            "proxy performs authentication; the console performs authorization."
-        ),
-        "authenticated": True,
-        "safe_for_shared_host": True,
-        "phase_available": 2,
-    },
-}
-
-# Environment configuration. All are read server-side and never rendered.
-AUTH_MODE_ENV = "WEBUI_AUTH_MODE"
-DEV_SUBJECT_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT"
-DEV_ROLE_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_ROLE"
-ROLE_MAP_ENV = "WEBUI_ROLE_MAP"
-REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV = "WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH"
-ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER = "cf-access-authenticated-user-email"
-
-# --- Action classes ---------------------------------------------------------
-CLASS_READ = "read"
-CLASS_WRITE = "gated_write"
-CLASS_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
-CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE = "destructive"
-
-# --- Privileged action list -------------------------------------------------
-# ``task_key`` ties each console action back to ``task_capability_map``, so the
-# console cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not already define.
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ConsoleAction:
-    """One console action and the authority required to invoke it."""
-
-    action_id: str
-    task_key: str
-    action_class: str
-    minimum_role: str
-    requires_confirmation: bool
-    dual_control: bool
-    break_glass: bool
-    phase: int
-    summary: str
-
-    @property
-    def mcp_permission(self) -> str:
-        return required_permission(self.task_key)
-
-    @property
-    def mcp_role(self) -> str:
-        return required_role(self.task_key)
-
-    @property
-    def privileged(self) -> bool:
-        return self.action_class in {CLASS_PRIVILEGED, CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE}
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        data = asdict(self)
-        data["mcp_permission"] = self.mcp_permission
-        data["mcp_role"] = self.mcp_role
-        data["privileged"] = self.privileged
-        return data
-
-
-_ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="claim_issue",
-        task_key="claim_issue",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Apply status:in-progress to an issue.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="comment_issue",
-        task_key="comment_issue",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Post an issue comment.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="create_issue",
-        task_key="create_issue",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Open a new tracking issue.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="comment_pr",
-        task_key="comment_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Post a PR thread comment.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="create_pr",
-        task_key="create_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Open a PR from a locked feature branch.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="review_pr",
-        task_key="review_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
-        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=3,
-        summary="Submit an approve / request-changes verdict.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="close_pr",
-        task_key="close_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
-        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=3,
-        summary="Close a pull request without merging.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="merge_pr",
-        task_key="merge_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
-        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=True,
-        break_glass=True,
-        phase=3,
-        summary="Merge an approved pull request.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="delete_branch",
-        task_key="delete_branch",
-        action_class=CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE,
-        minimum_role=ADMIN,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=True,
-        break_glass=True,
-        phase=3,
-        summary="Remove a remote feature branch.",
-    ),
-)
-
-ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}
-
-
-def privileged_actions() -> tuple[ConsoleAction, ...]:
-    """Actions requiring dual control, break-glass, or controller+ authority."""
-    return tuple(a for a in _ACTION_SPECS if a.privileged)
-
-
-def get_action(action_id: str) -> ConsoleAction | None:
-    return ACTIONS.get(action_id)
-
-
-# --- Principals -------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class Principal:
-    """Who is making a request, and how strongly that is known."""
-
-    subject: str
-    role: str
-    identity_source: str
-    authenticated: bool
-    warnings: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
-
-    @property
-    def rank(self) -> int:
-        return _ROLE_RANK.get(self.role, -1)
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "subject": self.subject,
-            "role": self.role,
-            "identity_source": self.identity_source,
-            "authenticated": self.authenticated,
-            "warnings": list(self.warnings),
-        }
-
-
-ANONYMOUS = Principal(
-    subject="anonymous",
-    role=VIEWER,
-    identity_source=IDENTITY_NONE,
-    authenticated=False,
-    warnings=("No authentication configured; capped at viewer.",),
-)
-
-
-def auth_mode(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
-    """Resolve the configured identity source, defaulting to ``none``."""
-    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
-    raw = (source.get(AUTH_MODE_ENV) or "").strip().lower().replace("-", "_")
-    if raw in IDENTITY_SOURCES:
-        return raw
-    return IDENTITY_NONE
-
-
-def _role_map(env: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
-    """Parse ``WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`` (JSON subject→role). Invalid config yields {}."""
-    raw = (env.get(ROLE_MAP_ENV) or "").strip()
-    if not raw:
-        return {}
-    try:
-        parsed = json.loads(raw)
-    except Exception:
-        return {}
-    if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
-        return {}
-    return {
-        str(k): str(v).strip().lower()
-        for k, v in parsed.items()
-        if str(v).strip().lower() in _ROLE_RANK
-    }
-
-
-def resolve_principal(
-    headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-) -> Principal:
-    """Resolve the requesting principal. Unknown or unconfigured → anonymous.
-
-    Never raises and never trusts a client-supplied role: the role always comes
-    from server-side configuration keyed by the resolved subject.
-    """
-    source_env = dict(env) if env is not None else dict(os.environ)
-    lowered = {str(k).lower(): str(v) for k, v in (headers or {}).items()}
-    mode = auth_mode(source_env)
-
-    if mode == IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV:
-        subject = (source_env.get(DEV_SUBJECT_ENV) or "").strip()
-        if not subject:
-            return ANONYMOUS
-        role = (source_env.get(DEV_ROLE_ENV) or VIEWER).strip().lower()
-        if role not in _ROLE_RANK:
-            role = VIEWER
-        return Principal(
-            subject=subject,
-            role=role,
-            identity_source=IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV,
-            authenticated=True,
-            warnings=(
-                "local-dev identity is asserted, not verified; never use "
-                "outside loopback.",
-            ),
-        )
-
-    if mode == IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY:
-        subject = (lowered.get(ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER) or "").strip()
-        if not subject:
-            # Proxy mode with no proxy header means the request did not
-            # traverse the proxy. Fail closed rather than trust it.
-            return ANONYMOUS
-        role = _role_map(source_env).get(subject, VIEWER)
-        return Principal(
-            subject=subject,
-            role=role,
-            identity_source=IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
-            authenticated=True,
-        )
-
-    return ANONYMOUS
-
-
-def probe_auth_required(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> bool:
-    """Whether non-public probes must be authenticated. Default False.
-
-    #633 requires the console to *fail closed on missing auth for non-public
-    health probes if configured*. The default stays off so the MVP ``/health``
-    contract is unchanged; an operator opts in explicitly.
-    """
-    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
-    return (source.get(REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {
-        "1",
-        "true",
-        "yes",
-    }
-
-
-# --- Authorization ----------------------------------------------------------
-
-DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION = "unknown_action"
-DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED = "unauthenticated"
-DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE = "insufficient_role"
-DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE = "unknown_role"
-DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE = "phase_not_active"
-ALLOW_PREVIEW = "allowed_preview_only"
-
-# Phase 1 is the only active console phase. Phase 2 opens gated writes and is
-# gated on this model landing; nothing here enables it.
-ACTIVE_PHASE = 1
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class AuthorizationDecision:
-    """Result of an authorization check. Never an execution grant."""
-
-    allowed: bool
-    reason_code: str
-    detail: str
-    action_id: str
-    principal: Principal
-    required_role: str | None = None
-    action_class: str | None = None
-    requires_confirmation: bool = False
-    dual_control: bool = False
-    break_glass: bool = False
-    execution_enabled: bool = False
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "allowed": self.allowed,
-            "reason_code": self.reason_code,
-            "detail": self.detail,
-            "action_id": self.action_id,
-            "principal": self.principal.to_dict(),
-            "required_role": self.required_role,
-            "action_class": self.action_class,
-            "requires_confirmation": self.requires_confirmation,
-            "dual_control": self.dual_control,
-            "break_glass": self.break_glass,
-            "execution_enabled": self.execution_enabled,
-            "active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
-        }
-
-
-def authorize(
-    action_id: str,
-    principal: Principal | None = None,
-    *,
-    for_execution: bool = False,
-) -> AuthorizationDecision:
-    """Decide whether *principal* may invoke *action_id*. Deny by default.
-
-    ``for_execution`` distinguishes a read-only preview from a real invocation.
-    Even an allowed decision reports ``execution_enabled=False`` while the
-    console is in Phase 1, so no caller can read an allow as permission to
-    mutate.
-    """
-    who = principal if principal is not None else ANONYMOUS
-    action = get_action(action_id)
-
-    if action is None:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION,
-            detail=f"No console action registered as {action_id!r}.",
-            action_id=action_id,
-            principal=who,
-        )
-
-    base: dict[str, Any] = {
-        "action_id": action_id,
-        "principal": who,
-        "required_role": action.minimum_role,
-        "action_class": action.action_class,
-        "requires_confirmation": action.requires_confirmation,
-        "dual_control": action.dual_control,
-        "break_glass": action.break_glass,
-        "execution_enabled": False,
-    }
-
-    if not who.authenticated:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED,
-            detail=(
-                "Write actions require an authenticated principal; this "
-                "request is anonymous."
-            ),
-            **base,
-        )
-
-    if who.rank < 0:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE,
-            detail=f"Role {who.role!r} is not in the console role matrix.",
-            **base,
-        )
-
-    if who.rank < _ROLE_RANK[action.minimum_role]:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE,
-            detail=(
-                f"Action {action_id!r} requires {action.minimum_role!r}; "
-                f"principal holds {who.role!r}."
-            ),
-            **base,
-        )
-
-    if for_execution and action.phase > ACTIVE_PHASE:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE,
-            detail=(
-                f"Action {action_id!r} belongs to phase {action.phase}; the "
-                f"console is in phase {ACTIVE_PHASE}. Execution is not wired."
-            ),
-            **base,
-        )
-
-    return AuthorizationDecision(
-        allowed=True,
-        reason_code=ALLOW_PREVIEW,
-        detail=(
-            "Principal holds the required role. Preview only — execution "
-            "remains disabled until the Phase 2 action framework ships."
-        ),
-        **base,
-    )
-
-
-def rbac_matrix() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Machine-readable RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
-    return {
-        "model_version": 1,
-        "active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
-        "roles": [
-            {
-                "role": role,
-                "rank": _ROLE_RANK[role],
-                "description": ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role],
-                "permitted_actions": sorted(
-                    a.action_id
-                    for a in _ACTION_SPECS
-                    if _ROLE_RANK[role] >= _ROLE_RANK[a.minimum_role]
-                ),
-            }
-            for role in ROLE_ORDER
-        ],
-        "identity_sources": IDENTITY_SOURCES,
-        "actions": [a.to_dict() for a in _ACTION_SPECS],
-        "privileged_actions": [a.action_id for a in privileged_actions()],
-        "default_decision": "deny",
-        "execution_enabled": False,
-    }

webui/console_redaction.py

@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
-"""Secret redaction policy for every console surface (#633).
-
-The MVP already redacts MCP-side mutation records through ``gitea_audit``.
-This module is the console-facing policy: one redaction pass applied to API
-payloads, rendered HTML, log lines, and audit records *before* they leave the
-server or reach persistent storage.
-
-Design constraints:
-
-- **Reuse, never fork.** ``gitea_audit.redact`` remains the authority for
-  secret-looking dict keys, ``Authorization`` material, and raw URLs. This
-  module runs that pass first and then applies console-specific patterns for
-  keychain references, key/value assignments, private-key blocks, and JWTs.
-- **Never raises.** Redaction is a safety control; a malformed payload must
-  degrade to a redacted placeholder rather than propagate an exception.
-- **Redact before persist.** ``webui.console_audit`` calls this module before
-  writing, so an unredacted record is never durable.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import re
-from typing import Any
-
-import gitea_audit
-
-REDACTED = gitea_audit.REDACTED
-
-# Console-specific patterns applied after the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass.
-# Each keeps the identifying key so an operator can still tell *what* was
-# removed, and replaces only the secret run itself.
-_KEYCHAIN_REF = re.compile(r"(?i)\bkeychain:[\w.\-/@]+")
-_KEYCHAIN_CMD = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)\bsecurity\s+find-(?:generic|internet)-password\b[^\n]*"
-)
-_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)\b(token|password|passwd|secret|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|"
-    r"client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key)\b(\s*[:=]\s*)"
-    r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
-)
-_ENV_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)\b(GITEA_(?:TOKEN|PASS|PASSWORD)[A-Z0-9_]*)(\s*=\s*)"
-    r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
-)
-_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK = re.compile(
-    r"-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----",
-    re.S,
-)
-_JWT = re.compile(
-    r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\b"
-)
-
-# Shapes that mean a payload still carries a secret. ``scan_for_secrets`` uses
-# these to assert a surface is clean.
-_DETECTORS: tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...] = (
-    ("keychain_reference", _KEYCHAIN_REF),
-    ("keychain_command", _KEYCHAIN_CMD),
-    ("credential_assignment", _ASSIGNMENT),
-    ("credential_env_assignment", _ENV_ASSIGNMENT),
-    ("private_key_block", _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK),
-    ("json_web_token", _JWT),
-    ("bearer_credential", re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:bearer|basic)\s+\S{8,}")),
-)
-
-
-def _mask_assignment(match: re.Match[str]) -> str:
-    """Keep the key and separator, replace the value."""
-    return f"{match.group(1)}{match.group(2)}{REDACTED}"
-
-
-def redact_text(text: Any) -> Any:
-    """Redact secret material from a single string.
-
-    Non-strings are returned unchanged so this is safe to map over mixed
-    payloads. Runs the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass first, then the
-    console-specific patterns.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
-        return text
-    try:
-        out = gitea_audit.redact(text)
-        if not isinstance(out, str):  # defensive; redact() returns str for str
-            return REDACTED
-        out = _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK.sub(f"{REDACTED}_PRIVATE_KEY", out)
-        out = _ENV_ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
-        out = _ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
-        out = _KEYCHAIN_CMD.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_COMMAND", out)
-        out = _KEYCHAIN_REF.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_REF", out)
-        out = _JWT.sub(f"{REDACTED}_JWT", out)
-        return out
-    except Exception:
-        # Fail closed: an unredactable string is dropped rather than emitted raw.
-        return REDACTED
-
-
-def redact_payload(value: Any) -> Any:
-    """Recursively redact a JSON-able payload for any console surface.
-
-    Secret-looking dict keys are replaced wholesale by the shared
-    ``gitea_audit`` policy; every remaining string is run through
-    :func:`redact_text`.
-    """
-    try:
-        shared = gitea_audit.redact(value)
-    except Exception:
-        return REDACTED
-    return _walk(shared)
-
-
-def _walk(value: Any) -> Any:
-    if isinstance(value, dict):
-        return {k: _walk(v) for k, v in value.items()}
-    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
-        return [_walk(v) for v in value]
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        return redact_text(value)
-    return value
-
-
-def scan_for_secrets(value: Any) -> list[str]:
-    """Return detector names that still match *value* after serialization.
-
-    Used to assert an outbound payload or rendered page is clean. An empty
-    list means no known secret shape was found. Already-redacted hits are not
-    findings.
-    """
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        text = value
-    else:
-        try:
-            text = json.dumps(value, default=str)
-        except Exception:
-            text = str(value)
-    findings: list[str] = []
-    for name, pattern in _DETECTORS:
-        for match in pattern.finditer(text):
-            if REDACTED in match.group(0):
-                continue
-            findings.append(name)
-            break
-    return findings
-
-
-def redaction_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Machine-readable statement of the redaction rules (never secrets)."""
-    return {
-        "policy_version": 1,
-        "applies_to": [
-            "json_api_responses",
-            "rendered_html",
-            "server_logs",
-            "audit_records",
-        ],
-        "ordering": "shared gitea_audit pass, then console patterns",
-        "redact_before_persist": True,
-        "shared_rules": {
-            "source": "gitea_audit.redact",
-            "secret_key_hints": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS),
-            "secret_value_prefixes": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES),
-            "urls": "credentials, secret query parameters, and real hosts redacted",
-        },
-        "console_rules": [
-            {"name": name, "pattern": pattern.pattern}
-            for name, pattern in _DETECTORS
-        ],
-        "placeholder": REDACTED,
-        "failure_mode": "fail closed — unredactable values become the placeholder",
-    }