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Author SHA1 Message Date
sysadmin a0fffae576 docs: ADR for stable MCP control runtime vs dev runtime
Policy: real Gitea mutations use stable control runtime only; normal
sessions must not kill/restart/relaunch from worktrees or edit the stable
checkout. Promotion is operator-only with proof and rollback.

Refs: #615
2026-07-09 20:16:50 -04:00
13 changed files with 205 additions and 4340 deletions
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"""Controller-owned work allocator policy (#600).
Builds on the #613 control-plane DB substrate (``ControlPlaneDB.assign_and_lease``).
Workers must not self-select exclusive work under the standard multi-LLM
workflow. They call ``gitea_allocate_next_work`` which:
1. Inspects candidate Gitea issues/PRs (never raw monitoring incidents).
2. Applies ADR routing policy (role, terminal path, leases, blocked, deps).
3. Atomically assigns + leases the selected item in one DB transaction.
This module is pure selection + substrate orchestration. Gitea I/O for live
inventory lives in the MCP tool wrapper so tests can inject candidates.
#612 remains downstream: bridge-created Gitea issues become candidates only
after they exist as normal issues; this module never assigns incidents.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import uuid
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Any, Sequence
from control_plane_db import (
ControlPlaneDB,
ControlPlaneError,
InvalidWorkKindError,
LeaseRequiredError,
WORK_KINDS,
)
# Outcomes required by #600 / ADR §5.
OUTCOME_ASSIGNED = "assigned_work"
OUTCOME_WAIT = "wait"
OUTCOME_BLOCKED_TERMINAL = "blocked_by_terminal_path"
OUTCOME_BLOCKED_LEASE = "blocked_by_active_lease"
OUTCOME_NEEDS_CONTROLLER = "needs_controller"
OUTCOME_NO_SAFE = "no_safe_work"
OUTCOME_ROLE_INELIGIBLE = "role_ineligible"
OUTCOME_PREVIEW = "preview" # dry-run only (apply=false)
ROLE_AUTHOR = "author"
ROLE_REVIEWER = "reviewer"
ROLE_MERGER = "merger"
ROLE_RECONCILER = "reconciler"
ROLE_CONTROLLER = "controller"
VALID_ROLES = frozenset(
{ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER, ROLE_RECONCILER, ROLE_CONTROLLER}
)
# Default action matrices by role (mutation gate will re-check).
ROLE_ACTIONS: dict[str, tuple[tuple[str, ...], tuple[str, ...]]] = {
ROLE_AUTHOR: (
("implement", "comment", "push", "create_pr"),
("approve", "merge", "request_changes", "self_select_without_assignment"),
),
ROLE_REVIEWER: (
("review", "comment", "approve", "request_changes"),
("merge", "push", "create_pr", "self_select_without_assignment"),
),
ROLE_MERGER: (
("merge", "comment"),
("approve", "request_changes", "push", "create_pr", "self_select_without_assignment"),
),
ROLE_RECONCILER: (
("comment", "diagnose", "cleanup"),
("approve", "merge", "push", "create_pr", "self_select_without_assignment"),
),
ROLE_CONTROLLER: (
("comment", "diagnose", "allocate"),
("approve", "merge", "push", "create_pr"),
),
}
@dataclass
class WorkCandidate:
"""One assignable Gitea issue or PR presented to the allocator."""
kind: str # issue | pr
number: int
state: str = "open"
labels: tuple[str, ...] = ()
title: str = ""
priority: int = 0
head_sha: str | None = None
# Routing signals (callers derive from Gitea / review feedback).
request_changes_current_head: bool = False
approval_on_current_head: bool = False
approval_stale: bool = False
approval_contaminated: bool = False
mergeable: bool = False
blocked: bool = False
dependency_unmet: bool = False
dependency_reason: str | None = None
already_claimed_elsewhere: bool = False
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
self.kind = (self.kind or "").strip().lower()
self.state = (self.state or "open").strip().lower()
self.labels = tuple(
str(x).strip().lower() for x in (self.labels or ()) if str(x).strip()
)
if self.kind not in WORK_KINDS:
raise InvalidWorkKindError(
f"candidate kind '{self.kind}' is not assignable; only "
f"{sorted(WORK_KINDS)} (never raw incidents)"
)
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"kind": self.kind,
"number": self.number,
"state": self.state,
"labels": list(self.labels),
"title": self.title,
"priority": self.priority,
"head_sha": self.head_sha,
"request_changes_current_head": self.request_changes_current_head,
"approval_on_current_head": self.approval_on_current_head,
"approval_stale": self.approval_stale,
"approval_contaminated": self.approval_contaminated,
"mergeable": self.mergeable,
"blocked": self.blocked,
"dependency_unmet": self.dependency_unmet,
"dependency_reason": self.dependency_reason,
}
@dataclass
class SkipRecord:
kind: str
number: int
reason: str
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {"kind": self.kind, "number": self.number, "reason": self.reason}
def normalize_role(role: str | None, *, profile_name: str | None = None) -> str:
"""Map profile/role strings to a canonical allocator role."""
raw = (role or "").strip().lower()
if raw in VALID_ROLES:
return raw
prof = (profile_name or "").strip().lower()
for token in VALID_ROLES:
if token in prof or prof.endswith(f"-{token}"):
return token
if "author" in raw:
return ROLE_AUTHOR
if "review" in raw:
return ROLE_REVIEWER
if "merg" in raw:
return ROLE_MERGER
if "reconcil" in raw:
return ROLE_RECONCILER
if "control" in raw:
return ROLE_CONTROLLER
raise ControlPlaneError(
f"unknown allocator role '{role}' (profile={profile_name!r}); "
f"expected one of {sorted(VALID_ROLES)}"
)
def expected_role_for_candidate(c: WorkCandidate) -> str:
"""ADR §5.3 routing: which role should take this work next."""
if c.kind == "pr":
if c.approval_contaminated:
return ROLE_RECONCILER
if c.request_changes_current_head:
return ROLE_AUTHOR
if c.approval_stale:
return ROLE_REVIEWER
if c.approval_on_current_head and c.mergeable:
return ROLE_MERGER
# Open PR without terminal verdict → reviewer
return ROLE_REVIEWER
# Issues: ready work → author by default; blocked stays controller/none
labels = set(c.labels)
if "status:blocked" in labels or c.blocked:
return ROLE_CONTROLLER
return ROLE_AUTHOR
def role_actions(role: str) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], tuple[str, ...]]:
return ROLE_ACTIONS.get(role, ROLE_ACTIONS[ROLE_AUTHOR])
def classify_skip(
c: WorkCandidate,
*,
role: str,
terminal_pr: int | None,
) -> str | None:
"""Return skip reason, or None if candidate is selectable for *role*."""
if c.state in ("merged", "closed"):
return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} is {c.state}; never assign"
if c.blocked or "status:blocked" in c.labels:
return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} is blocked"
if c.dependency_unmet:
return (
c.dependency_reason
or f"{c.kind}#{c.number} has unmet dependencies"
)
if c.already_claimed_elsewhere:
return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} already claimed elsewhere"
if c.kind == "pr" and not (c.head_sha or "").strip():
return f"pr#{c.number} missing head_sha pin"
# Terminal path first: when an active terminal PR exists, only that PR
# (or controller diagnosis) is assignable for review-path roles.
if terminal_pr is not None and c.kind == "pr" and c.number != terminal_pr:
if role in (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER):
return (
f"pr#{c.number} skipped: active terminal-review lock on "
f"PR #{terminal_pr} must be resolved first"
)
expected = expected_role_for_candidate(c)
if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
# Controller may inspect anything but only assigns diagnosis targets
# when contaminated / blocked.
if expected == ROLE_RECONCILER or c.blocked:
return None
return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} does not require controller (expected {expected})"
if role != expected:
return (
f"{c.kind}#{c.number} expects role '{expected}', active role is '{role}'"
)
# Ready-gate for issues: prefer status:ready when labels present.
if c.kind == "issue" and c.labels:
if "status:ready" not in c.labels and "status:in-progress" not in c.labels:
# Allow unlabeled open issues; only skip explicit non-ready states.
if any(l.startswith("status:") for l in c.labels):
return f"issue#{c.number} not status:ready ({','.join(c.labels)})"
return None
def sort_candidates(candidates: Sequence[WorkCandidate]) -> list[WorkCandidate]:
"""Higher priority first; then lower number (older issues) for stability."""
return sorted(
candidates,
key=lambda c: (-int(c.priority), c.kind != "pr", int(c.number)),
)
def allocate_next_work(
db: ControlPlaneDB,
*,
session_id: str,
role: str,
remote: str,
org: str,
repo: str,
candidates: Sequence[WorkCandidate],
apply: bool = False,
profile_name: str | None = None,
username: str | None = None,
lease_ttl_seconds: int | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Select and optionally reserve the next work unit via control-plane DB.
*apply=False* (default): dry-run selection only — no lease/assignment.
*apply=True*: atomic ``assign_and_lease`` for the selected candidate.
Never uses file locks or comment-only leases as the assignment source.
"""
if db is None:
return {
"success": False,
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
"reasons": [
"control-plane DB substrate unavailable (fail closed, #600/#613)"
],
"skipped": [],
"assignment": None,
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
"file_lock_only": False,
"comment_lease_only": False,
}
try:
role_norm = normalize_role(role, profile_name=profile_name)
except ControlPlaneError as exc:
return {
"success": False,
"outcome": OUTCOME_ROLE_INELIGIBLE,
"reasons": [str(exc)],
"skipped": [],
"assignment": None,
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
}
session_id = (session_id or "").strip() or f"alloc-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}"
try:
db.upsert_session(
session_id=session_id,
role=role_norm,
profile=profile_name,
pid=os.getpid(),
)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — surface structured
return {
"success": False,
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
"reasons": [
f"failed to register session in control-plane DB: {exc} "
"(fail closed, #613)"
],
"skipped": [],
"assignment": None,
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
}
# Expire stale leases globally before selection.
try:
db.expire_stale_leases()
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
return {
"success": False,
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
"reasons": [f"lease expiry failed: {exc} (fail closed)"],
"skipped": [],
"assignment": None,
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
}
terminal = None
try:
terminal = db.get_active_terminal_lock(remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
return {
"success": False,
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
"reasons": [f"terminal lock lookup failed: {exc} (fail closed)"],
"skipped": [],
"assignment": None,
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
}
terminal_pr = int(terminal["terminal_pr"]) if terminal else None
skipped: list[SkipRecord] = []
ordered = sort_candidates(list(candidates))
selected: WorkCandidate | None = None
for c in ordered:
reason = classify_skip(c, role=role_norm, terminal_pr=terminal_pr)
if reason:
skipped.append(SkipRecord(c.kind, c.number, reason))
continue
selected = c
break
if selected is None:
# If terminal lock blocks all review work, surface that explicitly.
if terminal_pr is not None and role_norm in (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER):
outcome = OUTCOME_BLOCKED_TERMINAL
reasons = [
f"no safe work for role '{role_norm}': active terminal-review "
f"lock on PR #{terminal_pr} (resolve terminal path first, #332/#600)"
]
else:
outcome = OUTCOME_NO_SAFE
reasons = [
f"no safe assignable work for role '{role_norm}' "
f"among {len(ordered)} candidates"
]
return {
"success": True,
"outcome": outcome,
"apply": bool(apply),
"role": role_norm,
"profile_name": profile_name,
"username": username,
"session_id": session_id,
"remote": remote,
"org": org,
"repo": repo,
"selected": None,
"expected_role_next": None,
"reasons": reasons,
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
"assignment": None,
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
"file_lock_only": False,
"comment_lease_only": False,
"downstream_note": (
"#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
"allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
),
}
expected_role = expected_role_for_candidate(selected)
allowed, forbidden = role_actions(role_norm)
selection = {
"kind": selected.kind,
"number": selected.number,
"title": selected.title,
"labels": list(selected.labels),
"head_sha": selected.head_sha,
"priority": selected.priority,
"expected_role_next": expected_role,
"reason_selected": (
f"highest-priority candidate for role '{role_norm}' "
f"(expected_role={expected_role})"
),
}
if not apply:
return {
"success": True,
"outcome": OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
"apply": False,
"role": role_norm,
"profile_name": profile_name,
"username": username,
"session_id": session_id,
"remote": remote,
"org": org,
"repo": repo,
"selected": selection,
"expected_role_next": expected_role,
"reasons": [
"dry-run only (apply=false); no assignment/lease created — "
"call again with apply=true to reserve via control-plane DB"
],
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
"assignment": None,
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
"file_lock_only": False,
"comment_lease_only": False,
"downstream_note": (
"#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
"allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
),
}
# Atomic reserve via #613 substrate.
ttl = lease_ttl_seconds if lease_ttl_seconds is not None else None
try:
kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
"session_id": session_id,
"role": role_norm,
"remote": remote,
"org": org,
"repo": repo,
"kind": selected.kind,
"number": selected.number,
"expected_head_sha": selected.head_sha,
"allowed_actions": allowed,
"forbidden_actions": forbidden,
"phase": "allocated",
}
if ttl is not None:
kwargs["lease_ttl_seconds"] = int(ttl)
result = db.assign_and_lease(**kwargs)
except (InvalidWorkKindError, LeaseRequiredError, ControlPlaneError) as exc:
return {
"success": False,
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
"apply": True,
"role": role_norm,
"session_id": session_id,
"remote": remote,
"org": org,
"repo": repo,
"selected": selection,
"expected_role_next": expected_role,
"reasons": [f"atomic assign+lease failed: {exc} (fail closed, #613)"],
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
"assignment": None,
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
"file_lock_only": False,
"comment_lease_only": False,
}
if result.outcome == "wait":
return {
"success": True,
"outcome": OUTCOME_WAIT,
"apply": True,
"role": role_norm,
"session_id": session_id,
"remote": remote,
"org": org,
"repo": repo,
"selected": selection,
"expected_role_next": expected_role,
"reasons": [result.reason or "foreign active lease"],
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
"assignment": result.as_dict(),
"owner_session_id": result.owner_session_id,
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
"file_lock_only": False,
"comment_lease_only": False,
}
if result.outcome == "no_safe_work":
return {
"success": True,
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
"apply": True,
"role": role_norm,
"session_id": session_id,
"remote": remote,
"org": org,
"repo": repo,
"selected": selection,
"expected_role_next": expected_role,
"reasons": [result.reason or "no_safe_work"],
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
"assignment": result.as_dict(),
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
"file_lock_only": False,
"comment_lease_only": False,
}
# assigned
return {
"success": True,
"outcome": OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
"apply": True,
"role": role_norm,
"profile_name": profile_name,
"username": username,
"session_id": session_id,
"remote": remote,
"org": org,
"repo": repo,
"selected": selection,
"expected_role_next": expected_role,
"reasons": [
selection["reason_selected"],
result.reason or "atomic assign+lease created",
],
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
"assignment": result.as_dict(),
"lease_proof": {
"assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
"lease_id": result.lease_id,
"expires_at": result.expires_at,
"expected_head_sha": result.expected_head_sha,
"allowed_actions": list(result.allowed_actions),
"forbidden_actions": list(result.forbidden_actions),
"source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
},
"next_valid_command": _next_command(role_norm, selected),
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
"file_lock_only": False,
"comment_lease_only": False,
"downstream_note": (
"#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
"allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
),
}
def _next_command(role: str, c: WorkCandidate) -> str:
if role == ROLE_AUTHOR and c.kind == "issue":
return f"implement issue #{c.number} under a branches/ worktree; open PR when ready"
if role == ROLE_AUTHOR and c.kind == "pr":
return (
f"address REQUEST_CHANGES on PR #{c.number} at head "
f"{(c.head_sha or '')[:12]} and push fixes"
)
if role == ROLE_REVIEWER:
return (
f"review PR #{c.number} pinned at head {(c.head_sha or '')[:12]} "
"via full reviewer workflow"
)
if role == ROLE_MERGER:
return (
f"merge PR #{c.number} only with explicit operator MERGE "
f"authorization at head {(c.head_sha or '')[:12]}"
)
if role == ROLE_RECONCILER:
return f"diagnose contested state for {c.kind}#{c.number}"
return f"proceed on {c.kind}#{c.number} under role {role}"
def candidate_from_dict(data: dict[str, Any]) -> WorkCandidate:
"""Build a WorkCandidate from a plain dict (tests / MCP inventory)."""
return WorkCandidate(
kind=str(data.get("kind") or "issue"),
number=int(data["number"]),
state=str(data.get("state") or "open"),
labels=tuple(data.get("labels") or ()),
title=str(data.get("title") or ""),
priority=int(data.get("priority") or 0),
head_sha=data.get("head_sha"),
request_changes_current_head=bool(data.get("request_changes_current_head")),
approval_on_current_head=bool(data.get("approval_on_current_head")),
approval_stale=bool(data.get("approval_stale")),
approval_contaminated=bool(data.get("approval_contaminated")),
mergeable=bool(data.get("mergeable")),
blocked=bool(data.get("blocked")),
dependency_unmet=bool(data.get("dependency_unmet")),
dependency_reason=data.get("dependency_reason"),
already_claimed_elsewhere=bool(data.get("already_claimed_elsewhere")),
)
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# Control-plane DB substrate (#613)
**Status:** Implemented (SQLite single-writer MVP)
**ADR:** [`mcp-allocator-control-plane-observability-adr.md`](mcp-allocator-control-plane-observability-adr.md)
**Module:** `control_plane_db.py`
## Architecture statement
> **DB coordinates, Gitea records, Sentry/GlitchTip observe; the bridge is the only path that turns observations into Gitea work.**
## What this ships
| Capability | Notes |
|------------|--------|
| Schema | `sessions`, `work_items`, `leases`, `assignments`, `terminal_locks`, `events`, `incident_links` |
| Atomic assign+lease | `ControlPlaneDB.assign_and_lease` — one `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` transaction |
| Mutation gate | `require_valid_assignment` — live lease + allowed action + non-terminal work + non-stale head |
| Heartbeat / release / expire | Lease lifecycle helpers |
| Terminal-lock index | Routing signal for #600 (terminal path first) |
| `incident_links` | Provider-neutral link model for #612**not** assignable work; scope keys NULL-safe |
## Hard rules (enforced in code)
1. Assignable `work_items.kind` ∈ {`issue`, `pr`} only — **never** raw Sentry/GlitchTip incidents.
2. Two concurrent sessions cannot both receive an active assignment on the same open work item (second gets `wait`).
3. Merged/closed work items return `no_safe_work` at assign time, and `require_valid_assignment` fails closed if the work item becomes terminal later.
4. Assignments pin `expected_head_sha`; mutations fail closed if the work item head drifts.
5. SQLite path is the **single-writer MVP** (`GITEA_CONTROL_PLANE_DB`, default under `~/.cache/gitea-tools/control-plane/`). Multi-session multi-host production requires **Postgres** or a **single allocator daemon** (ADR §6).
6. `incident_links` optional scope fields are stored as empty strings (never NULL) so UNIQUE is canonical across minimal upserts.
7. Legacy `incident_links` migration collapses NULL-scope duplicates **only** when Gitea targets **and** all meaningful observation metadata agree (fingerprint, status, event_count, permalink, timestamps, linked PRs, etc.). Conflicting metadata fails closed — no silent discard.
## Dependency chain
```text
#613 control-plane DB (this) → #600 allocator API → #612 incident bridge
```
- **#600** must call this substrate (not file locks / comment-only leases alone) for completion.
- **#612** must write `incident_links` here and create **Gitea issues**; the allocator assigns those issues, not raw incidents.
## Allocator API (#600)
Module: `allocator_service.py` · MCP tool: `gitea_allocate_next_work`
- Workers call `gitea_allocate_next_work(apply=false|true)` instead of self-selecting work.
- `apply=false` returns a dry-run selection (`outcome=preview`) with skip reasons.
- `apply=true` reserves via `ControlPlaneDB.assign_and_lease` (atomic assignment+lease).
- Coordination source is **always** the control-plane DB — not file locks or comment-only leases.
- Routing follows ADR §5.3 (REQUEST_CHANGES → author, terminal path first, foreign lease → wait).
- Raw monitoring incidents are never candidates (#612 remains downstream).
## Non-goals (intentionally deferred)
- Sentry/GlitchTip provider adapters and auto-watchdog — **#612**
- Gitea comment/label mirror writers (may be added by allocator tooling later)
## Tests
```bash
python3 -m pytest tests/test_control_plane_db.py -q
```
@@ -1,301 +0,0 @@
# ADR: MCP allocator, control-plane DB, and Sentry/GlitchTip incident bridge architecture
- **Status:** Accepted (implementation pending; blocks code for #600 / #612 / #613)
- **Date:** 2026-07-09
- **Tracking issues:**
- [#613](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/613) — control-plane DB (first)
- [#600](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/600) — allocator API (second)
- [#612](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/612) — Sentry/GlitchTip incident bridge (third)
- **Related:** existing GlitchTip contracts (`glitchtip-to-gitea-workflow-design.md`, `glitchtip-gitea-deduplication-linking-design.md`), trust boundaries (`tool-boundaries.md`, `safety-model.md`), current leases (`pr_work_lease.py`, `issue_lock_store.py`)
## 1. Context
Multiple LLM sessions can independently inspect the Gitea queue and start the same issue or PR. Existing coordination (Gitea comment leases, local issue-lock files, labels) often detects collisions **after** work has started. Parallel issues #600, #612, and #613 each describe part of a fix; without one ADR they risk overlapping stores, wrong dependency order, and trust-boundary violations.
This ADR is the canonical architecture decision **before** implementing those issues.
## 2. Decision summary (core)
| Layer | Owns | Must not |
|-------|------|----------|
| **Control-plane DB** | Sessions, atomic assignment, leases, heartbeats, terminal-lock index, events, incident links | Bypass Gitea workflow gates or replace issue/PR history |
| **Gitea** | Durable work record: issues, PRs, comments, labels, reviews, merges | Be the only concurrency lock under multi-session load |
| **Sentry / GlitchTip** | Incidents, events, provider UI | Assign work, approve/merge/close, or mutate Gitea outside the bridge |
| **Incident bridge** | Provider adapters, reconcile/create Gitea issues, link storage upsert, optional provider writeback | Hand raw provider incidents to the allocator as work items |
**One-liner:** **DB coordinates. Gitea records. Sentry/GlitchTip observe. The bridge is the only path that turns observations into Gitea work. The allocator assigns only Gitea issues/PRs, never raw monitoring incidents.**
## 3. Dependency order
Implementation **must** follow:
```text
#613 control-plane DB → #600 allocator API → #612 incident bridge
(atomic substrate) (routing policy) (feeds Gitea work)
```
| Issue | Role | Depends on |
|-------|------|------------|
| **#613** | Durable coordination DB + lease/assignment transactions | — |
| **#600** | `gitea_allocate_next_work` policy and tool surface | **#613** (hard) |
| **#612** | Multi-project Sentry/GlitchTip → Gitea bridge | **#613** for `incident_links` index; **#600** before treating bridge-created issues as allocator feed in multi-worker prod |
**Hard rules:**
1. Do **not** implement #600 on file locks / comment-only leases and call it done.
2. Do **not** ship #612 as a second assignment system for raw incidents.
3. Partial previews (read-only list tools, schema stubs) may land earlier if they do not claim “allocator complete” or “bridge complete.”
## 4. Authority boundaries
### 4.1 Gitea (durable source of truth for work)
Gitea remains authoritative for:
- Issue and PR identity, titles, bodies, state (open/closed/merged)
- Comments, reviews, approvals, REQUEST_CHANGES
- Labels and workflow status labels (`status:ready`, `status:in-progress`, …)
- Merges, closes, branch refs as recorded by Gitea/git hosting
Operators and auditors read **history** from Gitea.
### 4.2 Control-plane DB (coordination / index)
The control-plane DB is authoritative for **live multi-session coordination**:
- Which session holds which assignment/lease
- Heartbeat freshness and expiry
- Terminal-lock index for routing
- Event log of allocation/lease transitions
- `incident_links` index (see §8)
It is **not** a substitute for Gitea history. When DB and Gitea disagree on durable work state (e.g. PR already merged), **Gitea wins**; the DB is reconciled.
### 4.3 Sentry / GlitchTip (observe)
Providers own incident lifecycle and raw event data. They:
- Must **not** bypass Gitea gates
- Must **not** assign LLM work
- May receive **writeback** of resolution status only through the bridge, when configured and supported
### 4.4 Trust boundaries for credentials
Aligned with `docs/tool-boundaries.md` and `docs/safety-model.md`:
- **One MCP server process per trust boundary** remains the default.
- Monitor API tokens (Sentry/GlitchTip) live in the **bridge/orchestrator boundary** (or a dedicated observability write/read profile), **not** blindly inside every Gitea MCP author/reviewer/merger process.
- Gitea tokens stay on Gitea MCP profiles only.
- Orchestrators compose services; they must not become a single credential pool that silently mixes Gitea write + monitor tokens into every worker.
Tool names such as `gitea_observability_*` may exist as a **namespace façade** only if the runtime still enforces separate credential scopes (e.g. bridge process vs pure Gitea mutation process).
## 5. Allocator rules (#600 on top of #613)
### 5.1 Worker contract
- Workers **do not self-select** work under the standard multi-LLM workflow.
- Workers call **`gitea_allocate_next_work`** (with `apply=true` only when taking work).
- Mutations that claim exclusive work require a **valid assignment and lease** from the control-plane DB.
- Return values include at least: role, issue/PR number, expected head SHA (when applicable), lease ID, expiry, allowed actions, forbidden actions — or a non-assignment outcome (`WAIT`, terminal-path block, no safe work, needs controller, etc.).
### 5.2 Atomic reserve
- **Assignment creation and lease creation happen in one DB transaction.**
- Two concurrent sessions **must not** receive the same issue/PR as assigned work.
- On contention: second session gets **WAIT** or **owner-resume**, never a duplicate lease.
### 5.3 Routing policy
| Condition | Route |
|-----------|--------|
| Current-head **REQUEST_CHANGES** | **Author** (not reviewer/merger) |
| **Stale** approval (approval not on current head) | **Reviewer** |
| **Clean** approval on current head, mergeable | **Merger** |
| Contested / contaminated approval | **Diagnosis / reconciler** (controller path) |
| Active **foreign** lease | **WAIT** or **owner-resume** |
| **Terminal-review** lock present | **Terminal-path resolution first** before downstream review work |
| Merged / closed PR | **Never assign** |
| Issue locked by sanctioned lease | **Never assign** to another worker unless lease cleanup/adoption is sanctioned |
### 5.4 Relationship to Gitea mirrors
After a successful assignment, the allocator (or sanctioned tooling) may update Gitea comments/labels so humans and audits see state. Those mirrors **are not** the sole lock source.
## 6. Control-plane DB topology (#613)
### 6.1 Preferred architecture (multi-daemon / Proxmox)
For true multi-session concurrency (multiple MCP daemons, multiple hosts, or Proxmox VMs):
**Prefer either:**
1. **Shared Postgres** used by all Gitea MCP profiles / allocator callers, **or**
2. A **single allocator daemon** (sole writer to the coordination store) that all workers call over MCP/RPC.
Both satisfy: one transactional authority for “who has this work item.”
### 6.2 SQLite MVP
SQLite is acceptable **only** for a **single-writer MVP**:
- One process owns writes (allocator daemon or single co-located MCP server), **or**
- Documented single-host single-daemon experiments with file locking and no multi-host claims.
SQLite is **not** sufficient to declare multi-session production readiness when four independent LLM sessions talk to four MCP processes without a shared writer.
### 6.3 Suggested entities (normative shape)
Minimum logical entities (names may vary; semantics must not):
1. **sessions** — session_id, role/profile, namespace, pid, started_at, last_heartbeat_at, status
2. **work_items** — remote/org/repo, kind ∈ {`issue`, `pr`}, number, state, priority, current_head_sha, updated_at
3. **leases** — lease_id, work_item_id, session_id, role, phase, expires_at, heartbeat_at, status
4. **assignments** — assignment_id, work_item_id, session_id, allowed_action(s), expected_head_sha, status
5. **terminal_locks** — repo/org, terminal_pr, review_id, decision, status, cleanup_state
6. **events** — event_id, work_item_id, type, message, created_at
7. **incident_links** — provider-neutral link model (see §8)
**Explicit non-kind:** do **not** use `work_items.kind = sentry_incident` (or glitchtip_incident) as an assignable work unit. Incidents become work only after the bridge creates/links a **Gitea issue**.
## 7. Lease migration (avoid split-brain)
### 7.1 Target state
- **Primary** for live coordination: **control-plane DB** leases and assignments.
- **Gitea comment leases** (e.g. `<!-- mcp-review-lease:v1 -->`) and **local issue-lock files** become:
- **mirrors** of DB state for human visibility / recovery, and/or
- written **only** through the allocator (or sanctioned lease tools that update DB + mirror in one workflow).
### 7.2 Migration rules
1. New exclusive claims go through DB assignment+lease first.
2. Comment lease / file lock writers that skip the DB are **deprecated** once #613+#600 land.
3. Reconciler tooling heals: expired DB lease, orphan Gitea comment, orphan local file — fail closed when ambiguous.
4. **Split-brain is a defect:** “DB free + Gitea comment leased” or “DB leased + Gitea free” must be detectable and reconcilable; production paths must not rely on two independent writers.
### 7.3 Heartbeats
- Heartbeats update the **DB**.
- Optional Gitea summaries must avoid comment spam (periodic summary or edit-in-place policy).
## 8. Observability bridge (#612)
### 8.1 Role
The bridge:
1. Scans configured Sentry and/or GlitchTip projects (multi-project mappings).
2. Deduplicates against existing links / Gitea issues.
3. Creates or updates **normal Gitea issues** (labels, sanitized body, provider URL).
4. Upserts **one** canonical `incident_links` row.
5. Optionally writes resolution status back to the provider when supported.
6. Never approves, merges, closes, or otherwise bypasses Gitea workflow gates.
### 8.2 Allocator interaction
- The allocator sees observability work **only after** a Gitea issue exists (typically `status:ready` + observability labels).
- **Do not assign raw Sentry/GlitchTip incidents** as work items.
- Bridge AC “allocator can see linked issues” means: **as ordinary Gitea issues**, not a special incident queue.
### 8.3 Provider adapters and trust
- Separate **Sentry** and **GlitchTip** adapters; document API differences; do not assume writeback parity.
- Self-hosted base URLs supported (e.g. `https://sentry.prgs.cc`).
- Tokens from environment / secret store only.
- Prefer phase-1 **explicit reconcile / dry-run** before unsupervised watchdog auto-filing, consistent with existing GlitchTip filing safety contracts.
### 8.4 Home of implementation
Filing/orchestration may live in:
- a control-plane / bridge package or profile, and/or
- Gitea-Tools as operator-facing tools that **delegate** to that boundary,
but must not violate §4.4 credential isolation.
## 9. Incident link storage (single source of truth)
### 9.1 Canonical model: `incident_links` (provider-neutral)
Prefer a **provider-neutral** model over Sentry-only `sentry_links`:
| Field (logical) | Purpose |
|-----------------|---------|
| provider | `sentry` \| `glitchtip` \| … |
| provider_base_url | Self-hosted base |
| provider_org / provider_project | Mapping key |
| provider_issue_id / provider_short_id | Provider identity |
| provider_permalink | Human URL |
| fingerprint | Stable dedupe key when available |
| gitea_org / gitea_repo / gitea_issue_number | Linked work |
| linked_pr_numbers | Optional PR association |
| first_seen / last_seen / event_count | Summary metrics (safe) |
| status | link lifecycle |
| release_resolved_at / last_sync_at | Sync bookkeeping |
### 9.2 Gitea as human mirror
- Issue body markers / structured comments (e.g. HTML comment metadata) remain the **human- and audit-visible mirror**.
- They must stay consistent with `incident_links` but are **not** a second independent write path for inventing links without the bridge.
### 9.3 One truth
- **Do not** maintain two independent systems of record (e.g. full mapping only in #612 storage **and** a separate #613 `sentry_links` with different semantics).
- #612 implementation **must** use the same `incident_links` model introduced under #613 (or a single agreed store both reference).
## 10. Security and redaction
Mandatory for bridge payloads, Gitea issue bodies/comments, DB-stored event summaries, and logs:
- No API tokens, DSNs, passwords, cookies, auth headers
- No keychain IDs, private config contents, raw session-state files, full prompt bodies
- Sanitize stack locals and request data; store only safe tags/context
- Logs must never print provider tokens or DSNs
- Redaction tests are required for #612
## 11. Non-goals
- Replace Gitea as the durable workflow record
- Let Sentry/GlitchTip assign work or mutate Gitea workflow state outside sanctioned tools
- Let the bridge approve, merge, close, release, or bypass Gitea gates
- Implement #600 on file locks / comments alone and call allocator complete
- Treat raw monitoring incidents as `work_items` for the allocator
- Put monitor tokens into every Gitea MCP worker process by default
## 12. Consequences
### Positive
- Clear implementation order and ownership
- Multi-session safety becomes testable at the DB layer
- Observability becomes assignable work without special-casing the allocator
- Trust boundaries stay compatible with existing control-plane docs
### Costs / risks
- Migration from comment/file leases requires reconciler work
- Shared Postgres or single allocator daemon is operational cost
- Bridge must be careful not to spam Gitea issues (dedupe, caps, policy modes)
### Follow-ups (documentation only until implemented)
1. Update #600, #612, and #613 bodies to **link this ADR** and restate hard dependencies.
2. Implement #613 schema + atomic assign/lease.
3. Implement #600 against the DB.
4. Implement #612 against `incident_links` + Gitea create/update.
5. Deprecate dual writers for leases.
## 13. Acceptance criteria for *this* ADR
This document is accepted when:
1. It is merged into `docs/architecture/` on the default branch.
2. #600 / #612 / #613 (or their PRs) reference this path as the architecture source of truth.
3. No implementation PR for those issues claims completion without conforming to §§211.
## 14. Document history
| Date | Change |
|------|--------|
| 2026-07-09 | Initial ADR: dependency order, authority model, topology, lease migration, bridge, `incident_links`, security, non-goals |
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
# ADR: Stable control runtime vs dev runtime (Gitea MCP)
- **Status:** Accepted (policy effective immediately for LLM sessions; tooling may lag)
- **Date:** 2026-07-09
- **Tracking issue:** [#615](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/615)
- **Related:**
- [#543](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/543) / `docs/mcp-namespace-health.md` — client-namespace health
- `docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md` — reconnect-only EOF recovery (no PID kill)
- [#558](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/558) / `docs/mcp-daemon-import-guard.md` — sanctioned daemon
- [#557](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/557) / `docs/bootstrap-review-path.md` — controller bootstrap for self-hosted fixes
- Allocator / control-plane ADR: `docs/architecture/mcp-allocator-control-plane-observability-adr.md` (#613 / PR #614)
## 1. Context
The Gitea MCP server is the **control plane** for real issue/PR mutations (create, comment, lock, review, merge, etc.). When author/reviewer/merger/reconciler sessions kill or restart that process, relaunch it from a feature worktree, or edit the checkout that process loads, operators observe:
- Mid-session identity/preflight resets
- Stale-runtime vs master parity failures
- IDE transport EOF / “tool not found” while code on disk has changed
- Accidental production mutations from experimental code
This ADR separates **stable control runtime** from **dev/test runtime** and defines promotion proof.
## 2. Decision
### 2.1 Stable control runtime
The Gitea MCP server used for **real workflow mutations** is the **stable control runtime**.
Characteristics:
- Loads a known, promoted revision of Gitea-Tools (or the packaged release layout operators designate)
- Registered in the IDE/client as the production namespaces (`gitea-tools`, `gitea-reviewer`, `gitea-merger`, `gitea-reconciler`, etc.)
- Holds production profile credentials via sanctioned keychain/env paths only
### 2.2 Dev / test runtime
MCP **server code** development and testing:
- Happens in isolated **`branches/`** worktrees (or other non-stable checkouts)
- May use a **separate** dev/test MCP runtime/process when process-level testing is required
- **Must not** be used for real Gitea mutations on production issues/PRs
### 2.3 Forbidden actions (normal sessions)
Normal **author, reviewer, merger, and reconciler** sessions **must not**:
| Forbidden | Why |
|-----------|-----|
| Kill the running MCP server process | Drops all concurrent sessions; loses preflight state |
| Restart the MCP server process | Same as kill; causes stale/identity churn mid-workflow |
| Relaunch MCP from a development worktree | Runs unpromoted code against production mutations |
| Edit files in the stable runtime checkout | Hot-mutates control plane under concurrent users |
| Use experimental/dev MCP for real Gitea mutations | Bypasses promotion proof and audit expectations |
EOF / transport recovery: **client reconnect only** (see `docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md`). Do not “fix” health by killing PIDs or bumping MCP config mtimes as a normal session procedure.
### 2.4 Promotion (operator / release-manager only)
Promotion of a new revision into the stable control runtime is an **explicit operator/release-manager action**, not an LLM self-service step.
A promotion **must record** (issue comment, release note, or promotion ledger):
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| **previous runtime SHA** | Commit previously loaded by stable runtime |
| **promoted runtime SHA** | Commit after promotion |
| **source branch/PR** | Where the change was reviewed |
| **restart/reload method** | How the process was cycled (e.g. supervised restart, client reload) |
| **health check proof** | Client-namespace probe success (`gitea_whoami` / namespace health) |
| **identity/profile proof** | Expected profile(s) and username(s) after reload |
| **workspace/root proof** | Stable checkout path / root matches intended layout |
| **mutation capability proof** | Required permissions for the target role present; forbidden ops still forbidden |
| **rollback instructions** | How to restore previous SHA and re-verify health |
Suggested durable marker:
```text
## MCP STABLE RUNTIME PROMOTION (#615)
Status: COMPLETED | ROLLED_BACK | ABORTED
Previous-SHA: <full sha>
Promoted-SHA: <full sha>
Source-PR: <number>
Source-Branch: <name>
Reload-Method: <text>
Health-Proof: client_namespace whoami OK / assess_mcp_namespace_health OK
Identity-Proof: profile=<name> user=<name>
Workspace-Proof: root=<path>
Mutation-Proof: allowed_ops include <…>; forbidden include <…>
Rollback: checkout <previous sha>; reload method <…>; re-run health/identity proofs
Operator: <username>
Timestamp: <ISO-8601>
```
### 2.5 Unhealthy stable runtime → stop work
If the stable MCP runtime is **unhealthy** (client-namespace probes fail, wrong identity, wrong root, missing mutation capability, persistent EOF after reconnect):
1. **Normal PR / review / merge / issue-mutation work must stop.**
2. Do **not** improvise by switching to a dev worktree MCP for production mutations.
3. Resume only after:
- runtime is restored, **or**
- a **controlled** promotion/rollback completes with the promotion record above, **or**
- a controller invokes the narrow **bootstrap review path** (#557) when the defect is self-hosted and documented.
## 3. Relationship to other controls
| Doc / mechanism | Interaction |
|-----------------|-------------|
| Namespace health (#543) | Proves IDE client can call tools; does not authorize restart |
| EOF recovery | Reconnect only; no process kill |
| Daemon import guard (#558) | Mutations require sanctioned daemon; not a bare shell import |
| Bootstrap path (#557) | Only controller-authorized exception when live runtime cannot review its own fix |
| Allocator / control-plane ADR | Coordination DB is separate; still depends on a healthy MCP surface for Gitea writes |
## 4. Consequences
### Positive
- Predictable control plane for concurrent LLMs
- Clear operator-only promotion gate with rollback
- Aligns session behavior with health/EOF docs already landed
### Costs
- LLM sessions must wait when runtime is sick (no DIY restart)
- Operators must maintain promotion discipline and dual-runtime config if they use a dev MCP
### Non-goals
- Does not ban operator-supervised restarts during incidents
- Does not replace CI or code review for MCP changes
- Does not authorize editing stable checkout “because tests need a quick fix”
## 5. Implementation follow-ups (optional tooling)
These may land in later issues; the **policy binds sessions now**:
1. Session preflight that refuses mutations if workspace root equals a `branches/` feature worktree configured as “dev only.”
2. Explicit `runtime_kind=stable|dev` in MCP config and `gitea_whoami` profile metadata.
3. Promotion checklist script that emits the durable promotion marker fields.
4. Operator Guide wiki cross-link to this ADR.
## 6. Acceptance for this ADR
1. Document merged under `docs/architecture/`.
2. Issue #615 references this path.
3. LLM/operator runbooks treat kill/restart/relaunch-from-worktree as **violations**.
4. Unhealthy runtime stops normal mutation work until restore/promotion/rollback/bootstrap.
## 7. Document history
| Date | Change |
|------|--------|
| 2026-07-09 | Initial ADR: stable vs dev runtime, forbidden session actions, promotion proof fields, stop-work rule |
+33 -411
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ import json
import functools
import contextlib
import subprocess
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
@@ -833,8 +832,6 @@ import review_workflow_boundary # noqa: E402
import review_workflow_load # noqa: E402
import mcp_session_state # noqa: E402
import stale_review_decision_lock # noqa: E402
import allocator_service # noqa: E402
import control_plane_db # noqa: E402
import agent_temp_artifacts
import issue_lock_worktree # noqa: E402
import issue_lock_provenance # noqa: E402
@@ -1370,26 +1367,8 @@ def cleanup_in_progress_for_pr(pr_payload: dict, remote: str, host: str | None,
# ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _effective_remote(remote: str) -> str:
"""If remote is the default ('dadeschools') but the active profile base_url maps to a known remote, use that remote instead."""
try:
profile = get_profile()
base_url = profile.get("base_url")
if remote == "dadeschools" and base_url:
import urllib.parse
url = urllib.parse.urlparse(base_url)
host = (url.netloc or url.path or "").strip().lower()
for k, v in REMOTES.items():
if v.get("host") == host:
return k
except Exception:
pass
return remote
def _resolve(remote: str, host: str | None, org: str | None, repo: str | None):
"""Resolve remote + overrides to (host, org, repo)."""
remote = _effective_remote(remote)
if remote not in REMOTES:
raise ValueError(f"Unknown remote '{remote}'. Choose from: {list(REMOTES)}")
profile = REMOTES[remote]
@@ -1423,7 +1402,6 @@ def _resolve_control_plane_guide_target(
if org is not None and repo is not None:
return _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
remote = _effective_remote(remote)
if remote not in REMOTES:
raise ValueError(f"Unknown remote '{remote}'. Choose from: {list(REMOTES)}")
@@ -3098,15 +3076,11 @@ def check_review_decision_gate(
)
prior = list(lock.get("live_mutations") or [])
ready_head = lock.get("ready_expected_head_sha")
if stale_review_decision_lock.prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
lock, pr_number=pr_number, expected_head_sha=ready_head
):
if prior and not lock.get("correction_authorized"):
reasons.append(
"live review mutation already recorded for this PR head in this "
"run; only one live review mutation is allowed per head unless "
"gitea_authorize_review_correction was invoked (fail closed, #620)"
"live review mutation already recorded in this run; only one live "
"review mutation is allowed unless "
"gitea_authorize_review_correction was invoked (fail closed)"
)
elif (
action in _TERMINAL_REVIEW_ACTIONS
@@ -3114,9 +3088,9 @@ def check_review_decision_gate(
and not lock.get("correction_authorized")
):
reasons.append(
"terminal review decision already submitted for this PR head in "
"this run; blocked unless an operator-approved correction was "
"authorized (fail closed, #620)"
"terminal review decision already submitted on this PR in this "
"run; blocked unless an operator-approved correction was "
"authorized (fail closed)"
)
return reasons
@@ -3125,18 +3099,12 @@ def check_review_decision_gate(
def record_live_review_mutation(pr_number: int, action: str, review_id: int | None = None):
lock = _load_review_decision_lock() or {}
mutations = list(lock.get("live_mutations") or [])
head_sha = stale_review_decision_lock.normalize_head_sha(
lock.get("ready_expected_head_sha")
)
entry = {
mutations.append({
"pr_number": pr_number,
"action": action,
"review_id": review_id,
"review_state": action,
}
if head_sha:
entry["head_sha"] = head_sha
mutations.append(entry)
})
lock["live_mutations"] = mutations
if lock.get("correction_authorized"):
lock["correction_authorized"] = False
@@ -3144,28 +3112,17 @@ def record_live_review_mutation(pr_number: int, action: str, review_id: int | No
_save_review_decision_lock(lock)
def terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
pr_number: int,
operation: str,
expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
) -> list[str]:
"""Session hard-stop after a terminal live review mutation (#332 / #620).
def terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(pr_number: int, operation: str) -> list[str]:
"""Session hard-stop after a terminal live review mutation (#332).
After a terminal verdict is consumed for a given PR **head**, the only
permitted continuation is the merge sequence for that same approved PR
(merge does not require a new head). A REQUEST_CHANGES (or an approval of
a different PR, or the same head) blocks further review/mark-ready/merge
mutations for that boundary.
After a terminal verdict is consumed in this run, the only permitted
continuation is the merge sequence for the same PR that was approved.
A REQUEST_CHANGES (or an approval of a different PR) blocks every
further review/mark-ready/merge mutation. An operator-approved
correction (#211) re-opens the review path only — never a cross-PR
merge.
#620: when *expected_head_sha* differs from the last terminal's reviewed
head on the **same open PR**, mark_ready / review / resume may proceed so
a fresh formal decision can be recorded for the new head. Historical
mutations are preserved.
An operator-approved correction (#211) re-opens the review path only —
never a cross-PR merge.
*operation* is one of 'merge', 'mark_ready', 'review', or 'resume'.
*operation* is one of 'merge', 'mark_ready', or 'review'.
Returns [] when the operation may proceed.
"""
lock = _load_review_decision_lock()
@@ -3184,19 +3141,8 @@ def terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
and last.get("pr_number") == pr_number
):
return []
if operation in ("mark_ready", "review", "resume") and lock.get(
"correction_authorized"
):
if operation in ("mark_ready", "review") and lock.get("correction_authorized"):
return []
# #620: same PR, different reviewed head → fresh decision boundary.
if stale_review_decision_lock.terminal_boundary_allows_fresh_decision(
lock,
pr_number=pr_number,
expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha,
operation=operation,
):
return []
locked_head = stale_review_decision_lock.mutation_head_sha(last, lock)
if last.get("action") == "approve":
guidance = (
f"only the merge sequence for approved PR "
@@ -3204,22 +3150,15 @@ def terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
)
else:
guidance = "the session must stop and produce a final report"
head_note = (
f" at head {locked_head[:12]}"
if locked_head
else ""
)
recovery = (
"if that PR is already merged/closed, use "
"gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock (apply=true) after live-state "
"proof (#594); if the PR is still open but the head moved, mark/submit "
"with the new expected_head_sha (#620); never delete session-state "
"files by hand"
"proof (#594); never delete session-state files by hand"
)
return [
"terminal review mutation already consumed in this run "
f"({last.get('action')} on PR #{last.get('pr_number')}{head_note}); "
f"{guidance} (fail closed, #332); {recovery}"
f"({last.get('action')} on PR #{last.get('pr_number')}); {guidance} "
f"(fail closed, #332); {recovery}"
]
@@ -3842,11 +3781,18 @@ def gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
"reasons": workflow_blockers + (
review_workflow_load.recovery_handoff_without_replay()),
}
hard_stop = terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
pr_number, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha
)
hard_stop = terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(pr_number, "mark_ready")
if hard_stop:
return {"marked_ready": False, "reasons": hard_stop}
if lock.get("live_mutations") and not lock.get("correction_authorized"):
return {
"marked_ready": False,
"reasons": [
"cannot mark final decision after a live review mutation was "
"already recorded in this run unless an operator-approved "
"correction was authorized"
],
}
if action not in _REVIEW_ACTIONS:
return {
"marked_ready": False,
@@ -3863,17 +3809,6 @@ def gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
"decision (fail closed, #399)"
],
}
if stale_review_decision_lock.prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
lock, pr_number=pr_number, expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha
):
return {
"marked_ready": False,
"reasons": [
"cannot mark final decision after a live review mutation was "
"already recorded for this PR head unless an operator-approved "
"correction was authorized (fail closed, #620)"
],
}
elig = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(
pr_number=pr_number,
action="review",
@@ -3926,8 +3861,6 @@ def gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
"#332)"
],
}
# Preserve historical terminal head boundaries before advancing ready_* (#620).
stale_review_decision_lock.backfill_terminal_heads_from_ready(lock)
lock["final_review_decision_ready"] = True
lock["ready_pr_number"] = pr_number
lock["ready_action"] = action
@@ -3945,7 +3878,6 @@ def gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
"org": org,
"repo": repo,
"final_review_decision_ready": True,
"head_scoped": True,
"reasons": [],
}
@@ -4112,12 +4044,6 @@ def gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock(
"cleanup_allowed": assessment.get("cleanup_allowed"),
"last_terminal_pr": assessment.get("last_terminal_pr"),
"last_terminal_action": assessment.get("last_terminal_action"),
"locked_head_sha": assessment.get("locked_head_sha"),
"current_pr_head_sha": assessment.get("current_pr_head_sha"),
"stale_by_head": assessment.get("stale_by_head"),
"fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed": assessment.get(
"fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed"
),
"pr_state": assessment.get("pr_state"),
"pr_merged": assessment.get("pr_merged"),
"pr_merged_or_closed": assessment.get("pr_merged_or_closed"),
@@ -8824,7 +8750,6 @@ def gitea_whoami(
metadata: profile_name + allowed_operations; never the token).
"""
record_preflight_check("whoami")
remote = _effective_remote(remote)
if remote not in REMOTES:
raise ValueError(f"Unknown remote '{remote}'. Choose from: {list(REMOTES)}")
h = host or REMOTES[remote]["host"]
@@ -8933,6 +8858,8 @@ def gitea_get_profile(
"execution_profile": profile.get("execution_profile"),
"auth_source_type": profile.get("auth_source_type"),
# Auth is reported as a status only (#120): the token source *name*
# (env var name / keychain id) joins endpoint URLs behind the
# GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS admin opt-in. Token values never appear.
"auth_status": ("configured" if profile["token_source_name"]
else "unconfigured"),
"remote": remote if remote in REMOTES else None,
@@ -8944,7 +8871,6 @@ def gitea_get_profile(
result["base_url"] = profile["base_url"]
result["server"] = None
remote = _effective_remote(remote)
if remote not in REMOTES:
# Mark ambiguity rather than raising: the tool stays inspectable.
result["identity_status"] = "unknown"
@@ -11112,310 +11038,6 @@ def gitea_capability_stop_terminal_report() -> dict:
})
def _control_plane_db_or_error() -> tuple[Any | None, list[str]]:
"""Open the #613 control-plane DB substrate; fail closed on errors."""
try:
db = control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB()
return db, []
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
return None, [
f"control-plane DB substrate unavailable: {_redact(str(exc))} "
"(fail closed, #613/#600)"
]
def _allocator_candidates_from_gitea(
*,
remote: str,
host: str | None,
org: str,
repo: str,
include_issues: bool = True,
include_prs: bool = True,
limit: int = 50,
) -> tuple[list[Any], list[str]]:
"""Build allocator candidates from live Gitea open issues/PRs."""
reasons: list[str] = []
candidates: list[Any] = []
try:
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
auth = _auth(h)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
return [], [f"failed to resolve Gitea target: {_redact(str(exc))}"]
if include_prs:
try:
prs = api_get_all(
f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls?state=open", auth
) or []
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
reasons.append(f"failed to list open PRs: {_redact(str(exc))}")
prs = []
for pr in prs[: max(1, int(limit))]:
if not isinstance(pr, dict):
continue
number = pr.get("number")
if number is None:
continue
head = pr.get("head") if isinstance(pr.get("head"), dict) else {}
head_sha = head.get("sha") or pr.get("head_sha")
labels = []
for lab in pr.get("labels") or []:
if isinstance(lab, dict) and lab.get("name"):
labels.append(str(lab["name"]))
elif isinstance(lab, str):
labels.append(lab)
# Lightweight review signals (best-effort; fail soft into reviewer path).
rc_current = False
approval_current = False
approval_stale = False
try:
feedback = gitea_get_pr_review_feedback(
int(number), remote=remote, org=o, repo=r
)
if feedback.get("success"):
rc_current = bool(
feedback.get("has_blocking_change_requests")
and not feedback.get("review_feedback_stale")
)
# Stale RC means author pushed; reviewer still next.
if feedback.get("has_blocking_change_requests") and feedback.get(
"review_feedback_stale"
):
approval_stale = False
except Exception:
pass
mergeable = bool(pr.get("mergeable"))
try:
candidates.append(
allocator_service.WorkCandidate(
kind="pr",
number=int(number),
state="open",
labels=tuple(labels),
title=str(pr.get("title") or ""),
priority=10 if rc_current else 5,
head_sha=head_sha,
request_changes_current_head=rc_current,
approval_on_current_head=approval_current,
approval_stale=approval_stale,
mergeable=mergeable,
)
)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
reasons.append(
f"skipped invalid PR candidate #{number}: {_redact(str(exc))}"
)
if include_issues:
try:
issues = api_get_all(
f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/issues?state=open&type=issues", auth
) or []
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
# Fallback without type filter
try:
issues = api_get_all(
f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/issues?state=open", auth
) or []
except Exception as exc2: # noqa: BLE001
reasons.append(
f"failed to list open issues: {_redact(str(exc2))}"
)
issues = []
for issue in issues[: max(1, int(limit))]:
if not isinstance(issue, dict):
continue
# Pull requests also appear in /issues on Gitea — skip them.
if issue.get("pull_request") is not None:
continue
number = issue.get("number")
if number is None:
continue
labels = []
for lab in issue.get("labels") or []:
if isinstance(lab, dict) and lab.get("name"):
labels.append(str(lab["name"]).lower())
elif isinstance(lab, str):
labels.append(lab.lower())
body = str(issue.get("body") or "")
title = str(issue.get("title") or "")
blocked = "status:blocked" in labels
# Explicit downstream dependency: #612 waits on #600 allocator.
dep_unmet = False
dep_reason = None
if int(number) == 612:
dep_unmet = True
dep_reason = (
"issue#612 (incident bridge) remains downstream of #600 "
"allocator and must not be allocated until #600 is complete"
)
# Generic body markers for blocked-on unfinished deps.
lower_body = body.lower()
if "blocked on #600" in lower_body or "downstream of #600" in lower_body:
dep_unmet = True
dep_reason = dep_reason or (
f"issue#{number} body marks dependency on #600"
)
try:
candidates.append(
allocator_service.WorkCandidate(
kind="issue",
number=int(number),
state="open",
labels=tuple(labels),
title=title,
priority=20 if "status:ready" in labels else 1,
blocked=blocked,
dependency_unmet=dep_unmet,
dependency_reason=dep_reason,
)
)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
reasons.append(
f"skipped invalid issue candidate #{number}: {_redact(str(exc))}"
)
return candidates, reasons
@mcp.tool()
def gitea_allocate_next_work(
apply: bool = False,
role: str | None = None,
session_id: str | None = None,
remote: str = "dadeschools",
host: str | None = None,
org: str | None = None,
repo: str | None = None,
include_issues: bool = True,
include_prs: bool = True,
candidates_json: str | None = None,
limit: int = 50,
) -> dict:
"""Controller-owned next-work allocator using the #613 control-plane DB (#600).
Workers must not self-select exclusive work under the standard multi-LLM
workflow. Call this tool instead.
*apply=false* (default): dry-run selection only no assignment/lease.
*apply=true*: atomically assign + lease the selected Gitea issue/PR via
``ControlPlaneDB.assign_and_lease`` (never file locks or comment-only
leases as the coordination source).
Outcomes include: ``assigned_work``, ``preview``, ``wait``,
``blocked_by_terminal_path``, ``no_safe_work``, ``role_ineligible``.
*candidates_json* may inject a JSON list of candidate dicts (tests /
controller overrides). When omitted, open issues/PRs are loaded from Gitea.
#612 remains downstream: raw monitoring incidents are never candidates.
"""
read_block = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.read")
if read_block:
return {
"success": False,
"outcome": allocator_service.OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
"apply": bool(apply),
"reasons": read_block,
"permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.read"),
"assignment": None,
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
"file_lock_only": False,
"comment_lease_only": False,
}
try:
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
except ValueError as exc:
return {
"success": False,
"outcome": allocator_service.OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
"reasons": [str(exc)],
"assignment": None,
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
}
profile = get_profile()
profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip() or None
active_role = _profile_role_kind(profile)
role_in = (role or active_role or "").strip() or "author"
try:
username = _authenticated_username(h)
except Exception:
username = None
db, db_errs = _control_plane_db_or_error()
if db is None:
return {
"success": False,
"outcome": allocator_service.OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
"apply": bool(apply),
"reasons": db_errs,
"assignment": None,
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
"file_lock_only": False,
"comment_lease_only": False,
}
inv_reasons: list[str] = []
candidates: list[Any] = []
if candidates_json:
try:
raw = json.loads(candidates_json)
if not isinstance(raw, list):
raise ValueError("candidates_json must be a JSON list")
for item in raw:
if not isinstance(item, dict):
continue
candidates.append(allocator_service.candidate_from_dict(item))
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
return {
"success": False,
"outcome": allocator_service.OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
"apply": bool(apply),
"reasons": [
f"invalid candidates_json: {_redact(str(exc))} (fail closed)"
],
"assignment": None,
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
}
else:
candidates, inv_reasons = _allocator_candidates_from_gitea(
remote=remote,
host=host,
org=o,
repo=r,
include_issues=include_issues,
include_prs=include_prs,
limit=limit,
)
sid = (session_id or "").strip() or (
f"{profile_name or 'session'}-{os.getpid()}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
)
result = allocator_service.allocate_next_work(
db,
session_id=sid,
role=role_in,
remote=remote if remote in REMOTES else remote,
org=o,
repo=r,
candidates=candidates,
apply=bool(apply),
profile_name=profile_name,
username=username,
)
if inv_reasons:
result.setdefault("inventory_warnings", inv_reasons)
result["candidate_count"] = len(candidates)
result["inventory_source"] = (
"candidates_json" if candidates_json else "gitea_live"
)
return result
# ── Entry point ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if __name__ == "__main__":
-3
View File
@@ -6,9 +6,6 @@ Runs over stdio. All tools authenticate via macOS keychain (git credential fill)
import os
import sys
sys.stderr = open("/tmp/mcp_server_stderr.log", "a", buffering=1)
sys.stderr.write(f"\n--- MCP SERVER STARTUP (PID {os.getpid()}) ---\n")
from role_session_router import (
python_bytes_have_conflict_markers,
skip_python_scan_walk_root,
+3 -191
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
"""Stale / moot #332 review-decision lock detection and cleanup policy (#594/#620).
"""Stale / moot #332 review-decision lock detection and cleanup policy (#594).
#332 correctly hard-stops a reviewer session after a terminal live review
mutation. After #559 those locks are durable on disk, so they can outlive the
@@ -6,12 +6,6 @@ work they protect: when the referenced PR is already merged or closed, no
same-PR merge sequence remains, yet the durable ledger still blocks unrelated
new terminal reviews.
#620 scopes the terminal boundary by **reviewed head SHA**: a prior
REQUEST_CHANGES (or APPROVE) on head A must not block a fresh formal decision
on head B of the **same open PR**. Same-head duplicates remain fail-closed.
Open-PR lock *cleanup* remains forbidden unless the PR is truly merged/closed
(#594); new-head re-review is allowed without deleting the durable lock.
This module is pure policy (no Gitea I/O). The MCP tool
``gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock`` fetches live PR state, calls these
helpers, and only then clears durable state when cleanup is allowed.
@@ -29,45 +23,6 @@ from typing import Any
TERMINAL_REVIEW_ACTIONS = frozenset({"approve", "request_changes"})
def normalize_head_sha(value: Any) -> str | None:
"""Normalize a git SHA for equality comparison; None if empty/invalid."""
if value is None:
return None
text = str(value).strip().lower()
if not text:
return None
return text
def heads_equal(a: Any, b: Any) -> bool:
na = normalize_head_sha(a)
nb = normalize_head_sha(b)
if not na or not nb:
return False
return na == nb
def mutation_head_sha(mutation: dict | None, lock: dict | None = None) -> str | None:
"""Head SHA that bounds a live mutation (#620).
Prefers fields recorded on the mutation itself. For *legacy* mutations
that predate head-scoping, falls back to the lock's
``ready_expected_head_sha`` only when that ready binding is for the same
PR number (the frozen durable PR #619-style ledger).
"""
if not isinstance(mutation, dict):
return None
for key in ("head_sha", "expected_head_sha", "reviewed_head_sha"):
head = normalize_head_sha(mutation.get(key))
if head:
return head
if not isinstance(lock, dict):
return None
if lock.get("ready_pr_number") != mutation.get("pr_number"):
return None
return normalize_head_sha(lock.get("ready_expected_head_sha"))
def last_terminal_mutation(lock: dict | None) -> dict | None:
"""Return the last terminal live mutation on *lock*, or None."""
if not lock:
@@ -80,125 +35,18 @@ def last_terminal_mutation(lock: dict | None) -> dict | None:
return terminals[-1] if terminals else None
def prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
lock: dict | None,
*,
pr_number: int,
expected_head_sha: str | None,
) -> bool:
"""True when prior live mutations block a new decision for PR+head (#620).
Historical terminals on a **different head of the same PR** do not block.
Any prior mutation on another PR, the same head, or without a comparable
head SHA fails closed (blocks).
Head resolution uses ``mutation_head_sha(m, lock)`` so pre-#620 ledgers
that only stored ``ready_expected_head_sha`` still compare correctly
(PR #619-style).
"""
if not lock:
return False
if lock.get("correction_authorized"):
return False
prior = list(lock.get("live_mutations") or [])
if not prior:
return False
target = normalize_head_sha(expected_head_sha)
for m in prior:
if not isinstance(m, dict):
return True
m_pr = m.get("pr_number")
m_head = mutation_head_sha(m, lock)
if (
m_pr == pr_number
and target
and m_head
and not heads_equal(m_head, target)
):
# Same open PR, different reviewed head — historical boundary only.
continue
return True
return False
def terminal_boundary_allows_fresh_decision(
lock: dict | None,
*,
pr_number: int,
expected_head_sha: str | None,
operation: str,
) -> bool:
"""Whether #332 hard-stop should yield for a new PR+head boundary (#620).
Only for ``mark_ready`` / ``review`` / ``resume`` on the **same PR** when
the requested head differs from the last terminal's head. Merge is never
reopened by head change (approved head merge path is separate).
"""
if operation not in ("mark_ready", "review", "resume"):
return False
if not lock:
return False
if lock.get("correction_authorized"):
return True
last = last_terminal_mutation(lock)
if last is None:
return True
if last.get("pr_number") != pr_number:
return False
locked_head = mutation_head_sha(last, lock)
target = normalize_head_sha(expected_head_sha)
if not locked_head or not target:
return False
return not heads_equal(locked_head, target)
def backfill_terminal_heads_from_ready(lock: dict) -> dict:
"""Stamp head_sha onto legacy terminal mutations before overwriting ready_*.
Called when marking a fresh decision on a new head so historical rows keep
their original boundary after ``ready_expected_head_sha`` advances (#620).
"""
if not isinstance(lock, dict):
return lock
ready_pr = lock.get("ready_pr_number")
ready_head = normalize_head_sha(lock.get("ready_expected_head_sha"))
if ready_pr is None or not ready_head:
return lock
mutations = list(lock.get("live_mutations") or [])
changed = False
for m in mutations:
if not isinstance(m, dict):
continue
if m.get("action") not in TERMINAL_REVIEW_ACTIONS:
continue
if m.get("pr_number") != ready_pr:
continue
if mutation_head_sha(m):
continue
m["head_sha"] = ready_head
changed = True
if changed:
lock["live_mutations"] = mutations
return lock
def classify_pr_live_state(pr_live: dict | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Normalize a Gitea PR payload into merge/closed flags."""
pr = pr_live or {}
merged = bool(pr.get("merged") or pr.get("merged_at"))
state = (pr.get("state") or "").strip().lower() or None
closed = state == "closed"
head = pr.get("head") if isinstance(pr.get("head"), dict) else {}
head_sha = normalize_head_sha(
pr.get("head_sha") or pr.get("head_commit_sha") or head.get("sha")
)
return {
"pr_state": state,
"pr_merged": merged,
"pr_merged_or_closed": merged or closed,
"merge_commit_sha": pr.get("merge_commit_sha")
or pr.get("merged_commit_sha"),
"current_pr_head_sha": head_sha,
}
@@ -208,7 +56,6 @@ def lock_summary(lock: dict | None) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
return None
last = last_terminal_mutation(lock)
mutations = list(lock.get("live_mutations") or [])
last_head = mutation_head_sha(last, lock) if last else None
return {
"task": lock.get("task"),
"remote": lock.get("remote"),
@@ -220,21 +67,16 @@ def lock_summary(lock: dict | None) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"session_profile": lock.get("session_profile"),
"ready_pr_number": lock.get("ready_pr_number"),
"ready_action": lock.get("ready_action"),
"ready_expected_head_sha": normalize_head_sha(
lock.get("ready_expected_head_sha")
),
"live_mutations_count": len(mutations),
"last_terminal": (
{
"pr_number": last.get("pr_number"),
"action": last.get("action"),
"review_id": last.get("review_id"),
"head_sha": last_head,
}
if last
else None
),
"locked_head_sha": last_head,
"correction_authorized": bool(lock.get("correction_authorized")),
"updated_at": lock.get("updated_at") or lock.get("recorded_at"),
}
@@ -246,16 +88,13 @@ def assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
pr_live: dict | None = None,
pr_lookup_error: str | None = None,
active_profile_identity: str | None = None,
current_pr_head_sha: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Assess whether a durable review-decision lock is stale/moot (#594/#620).
"""Assess whether a durable review-decision lock is stale/moot (#594).
*pr_live* must be the live Gitea payload for the **last terminal
mutation's PR**. When no lock / no terminal mutation exists, cleanup is
not applicable. When the PR is still open (or lookup fails), cleanup is
forbidden (#594). Open PR + different live head reports
``stale_by_head`` / ``fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed`` (#620)
without enabling cleanup.
forbidden and #332 hard-stop remains in force.
"""
summary = lock_summary(lock)
result: dict[str, Any] = {
@@ -263,10 +102,6 @@ def assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
"lock_summary": summary,
"last_terminal_pr": None,
"last_terminal_action": None,
"locked_head_sha": None,
"current_pr_head_sha": normalize_head_sha(current_pr_head_sha),
"stale_by_head": False,
"fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed": False,
"is_moot": False,
"cleanup_allowed": False,
"profile_match": True,
@@ -306,10 +141,8 @@ def assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
pr_number = last.get("pr_number")
action = last.get("action")
locked_head = mutation_head_sha(last, lock)
result["last_terminal_pr"] = pr_number
result["last_terminal_action"] = action
result["locked_head_sha"] = locked_head
if pr_number is None:
result["reasons"].append(
@@ -332,35 +165,16 @@ def assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
return result
live = classify_pr_live_state(pr_live)
current_head = normalize_head_sha(
current_pr_head_sha or live.get("current_pr_head_sha")
)
result.update(
{
"pr_state": live["pr_state"],
"pr_merged": live["pr_merged"],
"pr_merged_or_closed": live["pr_merged_or_closed"],
"merge_commit_sha": live["merge_commit_sha"],
"current_pr_head_sha": current_head,
}
)
if not live["pr_merged_or_closed"]:
stale_by_head = bool(
locked_head and current_head and not heads_equal(locked_head, current_head)
)
result["stale_by_head"] = stale_by_head
# Fresh formal decision is allowed on the new head without cleanup (#620).
result["fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed"] = stale_by_head
if stale_by_head:
result["reasons"].append(
f"terminal {action} on PR #{pr_number} is bound to head "
f"{locked_head[:12]}…; live head is {current_head[:12]}… — "
"fresh formal review on current head is allowed without "
"cleanup (fail closed for cleanup, #620); #332 same-head "
"duplicate protection remains"
)
else:
result["reasons"].append(
f"terminal review mutation on open PR #{pr_number} is still active "
f"({action}); #332 hard-stop remains — cleanup forbidden (#594)"
@@ -370,8 +184,6 @@ def assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
# Merged or closed: lock is moot. Same-PR merge continuation is impossible.
result["is_moot"] = True
result["cleanup_allowed"] = True
result["stale_by_head"] = False
result["fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed"] = False
result["reasons"].append(
f"terminal mutation ({action} on PR #{pr_number}) is moot: PR is "
f"{'merged' if live['pr_merged'] else 'closed'}; canonical cleanup allowed (#594)"
-11
View File
@@ -139,17 +139,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
"permission": "gitea.pr.create",
"role": "author",
},
# #600: controller-owned allocator — any authenticated profile may call;
# routing enforces role match to selected work. Uses control-plane DB (#613).
"allocate_next_work": {
"permission": "gitea.read",
"role": "author",
},
"gitea_allocate_next_work": {
"permission": "gitea.read",
"role": "author",
},
"reconcile_landed_pr": {
"permission": "gitea.read",
"role": "author",
+1
View File
@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ def main():
servers[name],
required_tool=REQUIRED_NAMESPACE_TOOLS.get(name),
config_path=config_path,
probe_source="offline_spawn",
):
failed = True
else:
-366
View File
@@ -1,366 +0,0 @@
"""Tests for controller-owned allocator (#600) on control-plane DB (#613)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import tempfile
import threading
import unittest
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor, as_completed
from allocator_service import (
OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
OUTCOME_BLOCKED_TERMINAL,
OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
OUTCOME_WAIT,
WorkCandidate,
allocate_next_work,
candidate_from_dict,
classify_skip,
expected_role_for_candidate,
)
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, InvalidWorkKindError
class AllocatorServiceTest(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
def tearDown(self) -> None:
self._tmp.cleanup()
def _alloc(self, **kwargs):
defaults = dict(
db=self.db,
session_id="s-test",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="org",
repo="repo",
candidates=[],
apply=False,
profile_name="prgs-author",
username="jcwalker3",
)
defaults.update(kwargs)
return allocate_next_work(**defaults)
def test_selects_ready_issue_for_author(self) -> None:
cands = [
WorkCandidate(
kind="issue",
number=612,
labels=("status:ready",),
title="bridge",
dependency_unmet=True,
dependency_reason="downstream of #600",
),
WorkCandidate(
kind="issue",
number=600,
labels=("status:ready", "type:feature"),
title="allocator",
priority=50,
),
WorkCandidate(
kind="issue",
number=601,
labels=("status:blocked",),
title="blocked",
blocked=True,
),
]
res = self._alloc(candidates=cands, apply=False)
self.assertTrue(res["success"])
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_PREVIEW)
self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 600)
self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["kind"], "issue")
# When 600 is highest priority valid work, lower-priority blocked/dep
# candidates are not visited. Prove they are skipped when they sort first.
res2 = self._alloc(
candidates=[
WorkCandidate(
kind="issue",
number=612,
labels=("status:ready",),
priority=99,
dependency_unmet=True,
dependency_reason="downstream of #600",
),
WorkCandidate(
kind="issue",
number=601,
labels=("status:blocked",),
priority=98,
blocked=True,
),
WorkCandidate(
kind="issue",
number=600,
labels=("status:ready",),
priority=1,
),
],
apply=False,
)
skipped_nums = {s["number"] for s in res2["skipped"]}
self.assertIn(612, skipped_nums)
self.assertIn(601, skipped_nums)
self.assertEqual(res2["selected"]["number"], 600)
self.assertIsNone(res["assignment"])
self.assertFalse(res["file_lock_only"])
self.assertFalse(res["comment_lease_only"])
def test_atomic_assign_and_lease_on_apply(self) -> None:
cands = [
WorkCandidate(
kind="issue",
number=600,
labels=("status:ready",),
priority=10,
)
]
res = self._alloc(candidates=cands, apply=True, session_id="s-a")
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
asn = res["assignment"]
self.assertEqual(asn["outcome"], "assigned")
self.assertIsNotNone(asn["assignment_id"])
self.assertIsNotNone(asn["lease_id"])
self.assertEqual(asn["work_number"], 600)
self.assertIn("implement", asn["allowed_actions"])
self.assertIn("merge", asn["forbidden_actions"])
proof = res["lease_proof"]
self.assertEqual(proof["source"], "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease")
def test_concurrent_allocators_no_double_assign(self) -> None:
cand = WorkCandidate(
kind="pr",
number=100,
head_sha="a" * 40,
priority=10,
)
# Seed work item so both race the same target
self.db.upsert_work_item(
remote="prgs",
org="org",
repo="repo",
kind="pr",
number=100,
current_head_sha="a" * 40,
)
results = []
lock = threading.Lock()
def worker(sid: str):
r = allocate_next_work(
self.db,
session_id=sid,
role="reviewer",
remote="prgs",
org="org",
repo="repo",
candidates=[cand],
apply=True,
profile_name="prgs-reviewer",
)
with lock:
results.append(r)
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as pool:
futs = [pool.submit(worker, f"s-{i}") for i in range(2)]
for f in as_completed(futs):
f.result()
outcomes = [r["outcome"] for r in results]
self.assertEqual(outcomes.count(OUTCOME_ASSIGNED), 1, outcomes)
self.assertEqual(outcomes.count(OUTCOME_WAIT), 1, outcomes)
def test_blocked_and_dependency_skipped(self) -> None:
cands = [
WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, blocked=True, labels=("status:blocked",)),
WorkCandidate(
kind="issue",
number=612,
labels=("status:ready",),
dependency_unmet=True,
dependency_reason="downstream of #600",
),
]
res = self._alloc(candidates=cands, apply=True, role="author")
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_NO_SAFE)
self.assertIsNone(res["selected"])
reasons = " ".join(s["reason"] for s in res["skipped"])
self.assertIn("blocked", reasons.lower())
self.assertIn("600", reasons)
def test_already_leased_returns_wait(self) -> None:
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="owner", role="author")
self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="owner",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="org",
repo="repo",
kind="issue",
number=50,
)
res = self._alloc(
session_id="other",
candidates=[
WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=50, labels=("status:ready",))
],
apply=True,
)
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_WAIT)
self.assertEqual(res["owner_session_id"], "owner")
def test_role_ineligible_skipped(self) -> None:
# PR with current-head REQUEST_CHANGES expects author, not reviewer.
cand = WorkCandidate(
kind="pr",
number=9,
head_sha="b" * 40,
request_changes_current_head=True,
)
self.assertEqual(expected_role_for_candidate(cand), "author")
res = self._alloc(
role="reviewer",
profile_name="prgs-reviewer",
candidates=[cand],
apply=False,
)
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_NO_SAFE)
self.assertTrue(any("expects role" in s["reason"] for s in res["skipped"]))
def test_terminal_lock_blocks_downstream_reviewer_prs(self) -> None:
self.db.set_terminal_lock(
remote="prgs",
org="org",
repo="repo",
terminal_pr=10,
decision="request_changes",
status="active",
)
cands = [
WorkCandidate(kind="pr", number=11, head_sha="c" * 40, priority=5),
WorkCandidate(kind="pr", number=10, head_sha="d" * 40, priority=1),
]
res = self._alloc(
role="reviewer",
profile_name="prgs-reviewer",
candidates=cands,
apply=False,
)
# Terminal PR #10 is selectable; #11 skipped for terminal path.
self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 10)
self.assertTrue(
any(
s["number"] == 11 and "terminal-review lock" in s["reason"]
for s in res["skipped"]
)
)
def test_terminal_lock_blocks_all_when_only_downstream(self) -> None:
self.db.set_terminal_lock(
remote="prgs",
org="org",
repo="repo",
terminal_pr=10,
decision="request_changes",
status="active",
)
res = self._alloc(
role="reviewer",
profile_name="prgs-reviewer",
candidates=[
WorkCandidate(kind="pr", number=99, head_sha="e" * 40),
],
apply=False,
)
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_BLOCKED_TERMINAL)
def test_no_work_structured(self) -> None:
res = self._alloc(candidates=[], apply=True)
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_NO_SAFE)
self.assertIsNone(res["selected"])
self.assertTrue(res["reasons"])
def test_rejects_incident_kind(self) -> None:
with self.assertRaises(InvalidWorkKindError):
WorkCandidate(kind="sentry_incident", number=1)
def test_612_downstream_marker_in_result(self) -> None:
res = self._alloc(
candidates=[
WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=600, labels=("status:ready",))
],
apply=True,
)
self.assertIn("612", res.get("downstream_note", ""))
def test_substrate_not_file_or_comment_lease(self) -> None:
res = self._alloc(
candidates=[
WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
],
apply=True,
)
self.assertEqual(res["substrate"], "control_plane_db")
self.assertFalse(res["file_lock_only"])
self.assertFalse(res["comment_lease_only"])
self.assertEqual(
res["lease_proof"]["source"], "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease"
)
def test_candidate_from_dict(self) -> None:
c = candidate_from_dict(
{
"kind": "pr",
"number": 7,
"head_sha": "f" * 40,
"approval_on_current_head": True,
"mergeable": True,
}
)
self.assertEqual(expected_role_for_candidate(c), "merger")
def test_merger_gets_clean_approval(self) -> None:
c = WorkCandidate(
kind="pr",
number=3,
head_sha="1" * 40,
approval_on_current_head=True,
mergeable=True,
priority=100,
)
res = self._alloc(
role="merger",
profile_name="prgs-merger",
candidates=[c],
apply=True,
session_id="merger-1",
)
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
self.assertEqual(res["assignment"]["work_number"], 3)
self.assertIn("merge", res["assignment"]["allowed_actions"])
def test_db_unavailable_fails_closed(self) -> None:
res = allocate_next_work(
None, # type: ignore[arg-type]
session_id="x",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
candidates=[],
apply=True,
)
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
self.assertIn("unavailable", res["reasons"][0].lower())
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
-824
View File
@@ -1,824 +0,0 @@
"""Tests for control-plane DB substrate (#613)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import tempfile
import threading
import unittest
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor, as_completed
from datetime import timedelta
from control_plane_db import (
ControlPlaneDB,
InvalidWorkKindError,
LeaseRequiredError,
WORK_KINDS,
_ts,
_utc_now,
)
class ControlPlaneDBTest(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.db_path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3")
self.db = ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
def tearDown(self) -> None:
self._tmp.cleanup()
def test_schema_and_architecture_meta(self) -> None:
import sqlite3
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
try:
rows = dict(conn.execute("SELECT key, value FROM schema_meta").fetchall())
finally:
conn.close()
self.assertEqual(rows["schema_version"], "2")
self.assertIn("DB coordinates", rows["architecture"])
self.assertIn("bridge", rows["architecture"].lower())
def test_rejects_raw_incident_as_work_kind(self) -> None:
with self.assertRaises(InvalidWorkKindError):
self.db.upsert_work_item(
remote="prgs",
org="org",
repo="repo",
kind="sentry_incident",
number=1,
)
with self.assertRaises(InvalidWorkKindError):
self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s1",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="org",
repo="repo",
kind="glitchtip_incident",
number=9,
)
self.assertEqual(WORK_KINDS, frozenset({"issue", "pr"}))
def test_atomic_assign_and_lease_fields(self) -> None:
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s-a", role="author", profile="prgs-author")
result = self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s-a",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
repo="Gitea-Tools",
kind="issue",
number=613,
expected_head_sha="abc123",
allowed_actions=("implement", "comment"),
forbidden_actions=("approve", "merge"),
)
self.assertEqual(result.outcome, "assigned")
self.assertIsNotNone(result.assignment_id)
self.assertIsNotNone(result.lease_id)
self.assertEqual(result.role, "author")
self.assertEqual(result.work_kind, "issue")
self.assertEqual(result.work_number, 613)
self.assertEqual(result.expected_head_sha, "abc123")
self.assertIn("implement", result.allowed_actions)
self.assertIn("merge", result.forbidden_actions)
self.assertIsNotNone(result.expires_at)
def test_second_session_waits_on_foreign_lease(self) -> None:
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s2", role="author")
first = self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s1",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=100,
expected_head_sha="deadbeef",
)
self.assertEqual(first.outcome, "assigned")
second = self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s2",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=100,
expected_head_sha="deadbeef",
)
self.assertEqual(second.outcome, "wait")
self.assertEqual(second.owner_session_id, "s1")
def test_owner_resume_refreshes_lease(self) -> None:
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="reviewer")
a = self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s1",
role="reviewer",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=50,
expected_head_sha="head-50",
)
b = self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s1",
role="reviewer",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=50,
expected_head_sha="head-50",
)
self.assertEqual(b.outcome, "assigned")
self.assertEqual(b.lease_id, a.lease_id)
self.assertIn("owner-resume", b.reason)
def test_require_valid_assignment_gates_mutations(self) -> None:
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s1",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=7,
allowed_actions=("implement",),
forbidden_actions=("merge",),
)
proof = self.db.require_valid_assignment(
session_id="s1",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=7,
action="implement",
)
self.assertEqual(proof["session_id"], "s1")
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError):
self.db.require_valid_assignment(
session_id="s1",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=7,
action="merge",
)
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError):
self.db.require_valid_assignment(
session_id="s-other",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=7,
action="implement",
)
def test_expired_lease_allows_reassign(self) -> None:
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s2", role="author")
past = _utc_now() - timedelta(hours=1)
# Create lease already expired by using negative TTL edge via direct assign then expire
assigned = self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s1",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=3,
lease_ttl_seconds=1,
)
self.assertEqual(assigned.outcome, "assigned")
# Force expiry in DB
import sqlite3
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
try:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE leases SET expires_at = ? WHERE lease_id = ?",
(_ts(past), assigned.lease_id),
)
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
n = self.db.expire_stale_leases()
self.assertGreaterEqual(n, 1)
second = self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s2",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=3,
)
self.assertEqual(second.outcome, "assigned")
self.assertEqual(second.session_id, "s2")
def test_merged_work_never_assigned(self) -> None:
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="merger")
self.db.upsert_work_item(
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=99,
state="merged",
)
result = self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s1",
role="merger",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=99,
expected_head_sha="merged-head",
)
self.assertEqual(result.outcome, "no_safe_work")
def test_four_concurrent_sessions_unique_assignments(self) -> None:
"""Four concurrent assigners on four different issues — all succeed uniquely.
Also two concurrent assigners on the *same* issue: at most one assigned.
"""
for i in range(4):
self.db.upsert_session(session_id=f"sess-{i}", role="author")
def claim_unique(i: int):
return self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id=f"sess-{i}",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=1000 + i,
)
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=4) as pool:
results = [f.result() for f in as_completed([pool.submit(claim_unique, i) for i in range(4)])]
self.assertEqual({r.outcome for r in results}, {"assigned"})
numbers = sorted(r.work_number for r in results)
self.assertEqual(numbers, [1000, 1001, 1002, 1003])
# Contention on one item
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="c1", role="author")
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="c2", role="author")
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="c3", role="author")
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="c4", role="author")
barrier = threading.Barrier(4)
outcomes: list[str] = []
lock = threading.Lock()
def contend(sid: str) -> None:
barrier.wait()
res = self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id=sid,
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=7777,
)
with lock:
outcomes.append(res.outcome)
threads = [threading.Thread(target=contend, args=(f"c{i}",)) for i in range(1, 5)]
for t in threads:
t.start()
for t in threads:
t.join()
self.assertEqual(outcomes.count("assigned"), 1)
self.assertEqual(outcomes.count("wait"), 3)
def test_terminal_lock_index(self) -> None:
self.db.set_terminal_lock(
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
terminal_pr=332,
review_id="rev-1",
decision="approve",
)
row = self.db.get_active_terminal_lock(remote="prgs", org="o", repo="r")
self.assertIsNotNone(row)
assert row is not None
self.assertEqual(row["terminal_pr"], 332)
self.assertEqual(row["status"], "active")
def test_incident_links_not_work_items(self) -> None:
link = self.db.upsert_incident_link(
provider="sentry",
provider_base_url="https://sentry.prgs.cc",
provider_org="prgs",
provider_project="gitea-tools-mcp",
provider_issue_id="12345",
gitea_org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
gitea_repo="Gitea-Tools",
gitea_issue_number=9001,
fingerprint="fp-1",
)
self.assertEqual(link["gitea_issue_number"], 9001)
found = self.db.get_incident_link_for_gitea_issue(
gitea_org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
gitea_repo="Gitea-Tools",
gitea_issue_number=9001,
)
self.assertIsNotNone(found)
# Linking does not create a work_item of incident kind
with self.assertRaises(InvalidWorkKindError):
self.db.upsert_work_item(
remote="prgs",
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
repo="Gitea-Tools",
kind="sentry",
number=12345,
)
def test_heartbeat_and_release(self) -> None:
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
a = self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s1",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=1,
)
hb = self.db.heartbeat_lease(a.lease_id, session_id="s1")
self.assertEqual(hb["lease_id"], a.lease_id)
self.db.release_lease(a.lease_id, session_id="s1")
# After release another session can claim
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s2", role="author")
b = self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s2",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=1,
)
self.assertEqual(b.outcome, "assigned")
self.assertEqual(b.session_id, "s2")
def test_require_valid_assignment_rejects_stale_head(self) -> None:
"""Assignment must not authorize mutations after work-item head drifts."""
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s1",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=42,
expected_head_sha="head-v1",
allowed_actions=("implement",),
)
# Head drifts after assignment
self.db.upsert_work_item(
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=42,
current_head_sha="head-v2",
)
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError) as ctx:
self.db.require_valid_assignment(
session_id="s1",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=42,
action="implement",
)
self.assertIn("stale head", str(ctx.exception).lower())
def test_require_valid_assignment_rejects_terminal_state(self) -> None:
"""Assignment must not authorize mutations after work item is merged/closed."""
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s1",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=55,
expected_head_sha="abc",
allowed_actions=("implement",),
)
self.db.upsert_work_item(
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=55,
state="merged",
current_head_sha="abc",
)
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError) as ctx:
self.db.require_valid_assignment(
session_id="s1",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=55,
action="implement",
)
self.assertIn("terminal", str(ctx.exception).lower())
self.db.upsert_work_item(
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=56,
state="open",
)
self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s1",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=56,
allowed_actions=("implement",),
)
self.db.upsert_work_item(
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=56,
state="closed",
)
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError):
self.db.require_valid_assignment(
session_id="s1",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="issue",
number=56,
action="implement",
)
def test_pr_assignment_requires_expected_head_sha(self) -> None:
"""PR assign and mutation must fail closed without a head pin."""
self.db.upsert_session(session_id="s1", role="author")
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError) as ctx:
self.db.assign_and_lease(
session_id="s1",
role="author",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=88,
expected_head_sha=None,
allowed_actions=("implement",),
)
self.assertIn("expected_head_sha", str(ctx.exception))
# Legacy path: force an unpinned PR assignment into the DB, then
# populate head and prove mutation is still rejected.
import sqlite3
self.db.upsert_work_item(
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=89,
current_head_sha=None,
)
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
try:
wid = conn.execute(
"SELECT work_item_id FROM work_items WHERE kind='pr' AND number=89"
).fetchone()[0]
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO sessions(session_id, role, started_at, last_heartbeat_at, status)
VALUES ('legacy', 'author', '2020-01-01T00:00:00Z', '2020-01-01T00:00:00Z', 'active')
"""
)
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO leases(
lease_id, work_item_id, session_id, role, phase,
expires_at, heartbeat_at, status
) VALUES (
'lease-legacy', ?, 'legacy', 'author', 'claimed',
'2099-01-01T00:00:00Z', '2020-01-01T00:00:00Z', 'active'
)
""",
(wid,),
)
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO assignments(
assignment_id, work_item_id, session_id, lease_id,
allowed_actions, forbidden_actions, expected_head_sha,
role, status, created_at
) VALUES (
'asn-legacy', ?, 'legacy', 'lease-legacy',
'["implement"]', '["merge"]', NULL,
'author', 'active', '2020-01-01T00:00:00Z'
)
""",
(wid,),
)
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
self.db.upsert_work_item(
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=89,
current_head_sha="populated-head",
)
with self.assertRaises(LeaseRequiredError) as ctx2:
self.db.require_valid_assignment(
session_id="legacy",
remote="prgs",
org="o",
repo="r",
kind="pr",
number=89,
action="implement",
)
self.assertIn("expected_head_sha pin", str(ctx2.exception))
def test_migrate_duplicate_null_scope_incident_links(self) -> None:
"""Legacy NULL-scope duplicates must migrate without UNIQUE crash."""
import sqlite3
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, ControlPlaneError
# Build a v1-like table with nullable scope columns and insert dups
# that collapse under normalization, then open ControlPlaneDB on it.
path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "legacy_dups.sqlite3")
conn = sqlite3.connect(path)
try:
conn.executescript(
"""
CREATE TABLE schema_meta (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT NOT NULL);
CREATE TABLE incident_links (
link_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
provider TEXT NOT NULL,
provider_base_url TEXT,
provider_org TEXT,
provider_project TEXT,
provider_issue_id TEXT NOT NULL,
provider_short_id TEXT,
provider_permalink TEXT,
fingerprint TEXT,
gitea_org TEXT NOT NULL,
gitea_repo TEXT NOT NULL,
gitea_issue_number INTEGER NOT NULL,
linked_pr_numbers TEXT,
first_seen TEXT,
last_seen TEXT,
event_count INTEGER,
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'open',
release_resolved_at TEXT,
last_sync_at TEXT,
UNIQUE (
provider, provider_base_url, provider_org,
provider_project, provider_issue_id
)
);
INSERT INTO incident_links(
provider, provider_base_url, provider_org, provider_project,
provider_issue_id, gitea_org, gitea_repo, gitea_issue_number, status
) VALUES
('sentry', NULL, NULL, NULL, 'dup-1', 'org', 'repo', 10, 'open'),
('sentry', NULL, NULL, NULL, 'dup-1', 'org', 'repo', 10, 'open');
"""
)
# SQLite allows two NULL-scope rows with same provider/issue under UNIQUE.
n = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM incident_links").fetchone()[0]
self.assertEqual(n, 2)
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
db = ControlPlaneDB(path)
conn2 = sqlite3.connect(path)
try:
n2 = conn2.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM incident_links").fetchone()[0]
rows = conn2.execute(
"SELECT provider_base_url, provider_org, provider_project, gitea_issue_number "
"FROM incident_links"
).fetchall()
finally:
conn2.close()
self.assertEqual(n2, 1)
self.assertEqual(rows[0][0], "")
self.assertEqual(rows[0][1], "")
self.assertEqual(rows[0][2], "")
self.assertEqual(rows[0][3], 10)
# Touch to silence unused import in type checkers if needed
self.assertTrue(issubclass(ControlPlaneError, Exception))
del db
def test_migrate_conflicting_duplicate_incident_links_fails_closed(self) -> None:
"""Conflicting Gitea targets for the same provider key must fail closed."""
import sqlite3
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, ControlPlaneError
path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "legacy_conflict.sqlite3")
conn = sqlite3.connect(path)
try:
conn.executescript(
"""
CREATE TABLE incident_links (
link_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
provider TEXT NOT NULL,
provider_base_url TEXT,
provider_org TEXT,
provider_project TEXT,
provider_issue_id TEXT NOT NULL,
gitea_org TEXT NOT NULL,
gitea_repo TEXT NOT NULL,
gitea_issue_number INTEGER NOT NULL,
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'open',
UNIQUE (
provider, provider_base_url, provider_org,
provider_project, provider_issue_id
)
);
INSERT INTO incident_links(
provider, provider_base_url, provider_org, provider_project,
provider_issue_id, gitea_org, gitea_repo, gitea_issue_number
) VALUES
('sentry', NULL, NULL, NULL, 'dup-c', 'org', 'repo', 1),
('sentry', NULL, NULL, NULL, 'dup-c', 'org', 'repo', 2);
"""
)
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
with self.assertRaises(ControlPlaneError) as ctx:
ControlPlaneDB(path)
self.assertIn("conflicting", str(ctx.exception).lower())
def test_migrate_conflicting_observation_metadata_fails_closed(self) -> None:
"""Same provider key + same Gitea target but differing obs metadata must fail closed.
Regression for silent data loss: migration used to keep lowest link_id and
delete peers after comparing only Gitea targets (#619 RC3).
"""
import sqlite3
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB, ControlPlaneError
path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "legacy_meta_conflict.sqlite3")
conn = sqlite3.connect(path)
try:
conn.executescript(
"""
CREATE TABLE schema_meta (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT NOT NULL);
CREATE TABLE incident_links (
link_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
provider TEXT NOT NULL,
provider_base_url TEXT,
provider_org TEXT,
provider_project TEXT,
provider_issue_id TEXT NOT NULL,
provider_short_id TEXT,
provider_permalink TEXT,
fingerprint TEXT,
gitea_org TEXT NOT NULL,
gitea_repo TEXT NOT NULL,
gitea_issue_number INTEGER NOT NULL,
linked_pr_numbers TEXT,
first_seen TEXT,
last_seen TEXT,
event_count INTEGER,
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'open',
release_resolved_at TEXT,
last_sync_at TEXT,
UNIQUE (
provider, provider_base_url, provider_org,
provider_project, provider_issue_id
)
);
INSERT INTO incident_links(
provider, provider_base_url, provider_org, provider_project,
provider_issue_id, provider_permalink, fingerprint,
gitea_org, gitea_repo, gitea_issue_number,
event_count, status, first_seen, last_seen
) VALUES
(
'sentry', NULL, NULL, NULL, 'dup-meta',
'https://sentry.example/issues/1', 'fingerprint-A',
'org', 'repo', 42,
1, 'open', '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z', '2026-01-01T01:00:00Z'
),
(
'sentry', NULL, NULL, NULL, 'dup-meta',
'https://sentry.example/issues/1', 'fingerprint-B',
'org', 'repo', 42,
99, 'resolved', '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z', '2026-01-02T00:00:00Z'
);
"""
)
n = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM incident_links").fetchone()[0]
self.assertEqual(n, 2)
conn.commit()
finally:
conn.close()
with self.assertRaises(ControlPlaneError) as ctx:
ControlPlaneDB(path)
msg = str(ctx.exception).lower()
self.assertIn("conflicting", msg)
self.assertIn("observation metadata", msg)
# Rows must still be present — migration must not delete before failing.
conn2 = sqlite3.connect(path)
try:
remaining = conn2.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM incident_links").fetchone()[0]
fps = {
r[0]
for r in conn2.execute(
"SELECT fingerprint FROM incident_links ORDER BY link_id"
).fetchall()
}
finally:
conn2.close()
self.assertEqual(remaining, 2)
self.assertEqual(fps, {"fingerprint-A", "fingerprint-B"})
def test_incident_links_minimal_upsert_is_canonical(self) -> None:
"""Repeated minimal upserts must update one row (NULL-safe uniqueness)."""
a = self.db.upsert_incident_link(
provider="sentry",
provider_issue_id="inc-1",
gitea_org="org",
gitea_repo="repo",
gitea_issue_number=1,
)
b = self.db.upsert_incident_link(
provider="sentry",
provider_issue_id="inc-1",
gitea_org="org",
gitea_repo="repo",
gitea_issue_number=2,
# omit optional scope fields again
)
c = self.db.upsert_incident_link(
provider="sentry",
provider_issue_id="inc-1",
gitea_org="org",
gitea_repo="repo",
gitea_issue_number=3,
provider_base_url=None,
provider_org="",
provider_project=" ",
)
self.assertEqual(a["link_id"], b["link_id"])
self.assertEqual(b["link_id"], c["link_id"])
self.assertEqual(c["gitea_issue_number"], 3)
self.assertEqual(c["provider_base_url"], "")
self.assertEqual(c["provider_org"], "")
self.assertEqual(c["provider_project"], "")
import sqlite3
conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
try:
n = conn.execute(
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM incident_links WHERE provider_issue_id = ?",
("inc-1",),
).fetchone()[0]
finally:
conn.close()
self.assertEqual(n, 1)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -1,397 +0,0 @@
"""Head-scoped #332 review-decision locks (#620).
Proves:
* REQUEST_CHANGES on head A does not block mark_ready/submit on head B
* APPROVE on head B is allowed after RC on head A (same open PR)
* same-head duplicate terminal remains blocked
* open-PR cleanup remains forbidden; assessment reports stale_by_head
* historical mutations keep their head_sha (preserved ledger)
* PR #619-style: old RC at 036b78e…, current head 2429d9d…, approve allowed
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
import mcp_server
import stale_review_decision_lock as srdl
HEAD_A = "036b78e31ea5d036452b3a52e0e086b01e0c763f"
HEAD_B = "2429d9d2e826e519eb8eb4ade45987c00838aefb"
HEAD_C = "c" * 40
def _lock(mutations=None, correction=False, ready_pr=None, ready_head=None, ready_action=None):
return {
"task": "review_pr",
"remote": "prgs",
"org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
"repo": "Gitea-Tools",
"session_pid": os.getpid(),
"session_profile": "prgs-reviewer",
"session_profile_lock": "prgs-reviewer",
"profile_identity": "prgs-reviewer",
"final_review_decision_ready": False,
"ready_pr_number": ready_pr,
"ready_action": ready_action,
"ready_expected_head_sha": ready_head,
"ready_remote": "prgs" if ready_pr else None,
"ready_org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting" if ready_pr else None,
"ready_repo": "Gitea-Tools" if ready_pr else None,
"live_mutations": list(mutations or []),
"correction_authorized": correction,
"correction_reason": None,
}
RC_619_LEGACY = {
"pr_number": 619,
"action": "request_changes",
"review_id": 410,
"review_state": "request_changes",
# no head_sha — pre-#620 durable ledger shape
}
RC_619_HEAD_A = {
"pr_number": 619,
"action": "request_changes",
"review_id": 410,
"review_state": "request_changes",
"head_sha": HEAD_A,
}
APPROVE_619_HEAD_B = {
"pr_number": 619,
"action": "approve",
"review_id": 411,
"review_state": "approve",
"head_sha": HEAD_B,
}
def _seed(mutations=None, **kwargs):
import review_workflow_load
review_workflow_load.record_review_workflow_load(mcp_server.PROJECT_ROOT)
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(_lock(mutations, **kwargs))
mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
def _open_pr(pr_number=619, head=HEAD_B):
return {
"number": pr_number,
"state": "open",
"merged": False,
"merged_at": None,
"head": {"sha": head},
}
def _no_lease():
return {"block": False, "reasons": [], "mutation_allowed": True}
def _feedback(blocking=False, stale=False, success=True):
return {
"success": success,
"has_blocking_change_requests": blocking,
"review_feedback_stale": stale,
"current_head_sha": HEAD_B,
}
class TestPureHeadScopeHelpers(unittest.TestCase):
def test_mutation_head_prefers_recorded_sha(self):
m = {"pr_number": 1, "head_sha": HEAD_A}
self.assertEqual(srdl.mutation_head_sha(m), HEAD_A)
def test_legacy_mutation_uses_ready_expected_for_same_pr(self):
lock = _lock(
[RC_619_LEGACY],
ready_pr=619,
ready_head=HEAD_A,
ready_action="request_changes",
)
self.assertEqual(srdl.mutation_head_sha(RC_619_LEGACY, lock), HEAD_A)
def test_legacy_mutation_ignores_ready_for_other_pr(self):
lock = _lock([RC_619_LEGACY], ready_pr=1, ready_head=HEAD_A)
self.assertIsNone(srdl.mutation_head_sha(RC_619_LEGACY, lock))
def test_prior_blocks_same_head_not_other_head(self):
lock = _lock([RC_619_HEAD_A])
self.assertTrue(
srdl.prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
lock, pr_number=619, expected_head_sha=HEAD_A
)
)
self.assertFalse(
srdl.prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
lock, pr_number=619, expected_head_sha=HEAD_B
)
)
def test_backfill_stamps_legacy_terminals(self):
lock = _lock(
[dict(RC_619_LEGACY)],
ready_pr=619,
ready_head=HEAD_A,
ready_action="request_changes",
)
srdl.backfill_terminal_heads_from_ready(lock)
self.assertEqual(lock["live_mutations"][0]["head_sha"], HEAD_A)
class TestHardStopHeadScope(unittest.TestCase):
def tearDown(self):
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(None)
mcp_server.review_workflow_load.clear_review_workflow_load()
def test_rc_head_a_allows_mark_ready_head_b(self):
_seed(
[RC_619_HEAD_A],
ready_pr=619,
ready_head=HEAD_A,
ready_action="request_changes",
)
self.assertEqual(
mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
619, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=HEAD_B
),
[],
)
def test_rc_head_a_blocks_mark_ready_same_head(self):
_seed(
[RC_619_HEAD_A],
ready_pr=619,
ready_head=HEAD_A,
ready_action="request_changes",
)
reasons = mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
619, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=HEAD_A
)
self.assertTrue(reasons)
self.assertIn("#332", reasons[0])
def test_rc_head_a_blocks_other_pr(self):
_seed([RC_619_HEAD_A], ready_pr=619, ready_head=HEAD_A)
reasons = mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
700, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=HEAD_B
)
self.assertTrue(reasons)
def test_legacy_619_ledger_allows_new_head(self):
"""PR #619-style durable lock without mutation head_sha."""
_seed(
[RC_619_LEGACY],
ready_pr=619,
ready_head=HEAD_A,
ready_action="request_changes",
)
self.assertEqual(
mcp_server.terminal_review_hard_stop_reasons(
619, "mark_ready", expected_head_sha=HEAD_B
),
[],
)
class TestMarkFinalAndRecord(unittest.TestCase):
def tearDown(self):
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(None)
mcp_server.review_workflow_load.clear_review_workflow_load()
def _mark(self, pr, action, head, feedback=None):
with patch("mcp_server._list_pr_lease_comments", return_value=[]), patch(
"mcp_server._pr_work_lease_reviewer_block", return_value=_no_lease()
), patch.object(
mcp_server,
"gitea_get_pr_review_feedback",
return_value=feedback or _feedback(blocking=False, stale=True),
), patch.object(
mcp_server,
"gitea_check_pr_eligibility",
return_value={"eligible": True, "head_sha": head},
):
return mcp_server.gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
pr_number=pr,
action=action,
expected_head_sha=head,
remote="prgs",
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
repo="Gitea-Tools",
)
def test_rc_then_rc_on_new_head(self):
_seed(
[RC_619_HEAD_A],
ready_pr=619,
ready_head=HEAD_A,
ready_action="request_changes",
)
# Prior RC at head A is unresolved but head moved → feedback stale.
res = self._mark(
619,
"request_changes",
HEAD_B,
feedback=_feedback(blocking=True, stale=True),
)
self.assertTrue(res.get("marked_ready"), res)
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
# Historical head A preserved on mutation after backfill.
heads = {
m.get("head_sha")
for m in lock["live_mutations"]
if m.get("action") == "request_changes"
}
self.assertIn(HEAD_A, heads)
self.assertEqual(lock["ready_expected_head_sha"], HEAD_B)
def test_rc_then_approve_on_new_head(self):
_seed(
[RC_619_HEAD_A],
ready_pr=619,
ready_head=HEAD_A,
ready_action="request_changes",
)
res = self._mark(619, "approve", HEAD_B)
self.assertTrue(res.get("marked_ready"), res)
self.assertTrue(res.get("head_scoped"))
def test_same_head_rc_still_blocked_by_hard_stop(self):
_seed(
[RC_619_HEAD_A],
ready_pr=619,
ready_head=HEAD_A,
ready_action="request_changes",
)
res = self._mark(619, "approve", HEAD_A)
self.assertFalse(res.get("marked_ready"))
self.assertTrue(any("#332" in r for r in res.get("reasons") or []))
def test_pr619_style_legacy_lock_approve_on_current_head(self):
_seed(
[RC_619_LEGACY],
ready_pr=619,
ready_head=HEAD_A,
ready_action="request_changes",
)
res = self._mark(619, "approve", HEAD_B)
self.assertTrue(res.get("marked_ready"), res)
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
# Backfill should have stamped HEAD_A onto the legacy mutation.
self.assertEqual(lock["live_mutations"][0].get("head_sha"), HEAD_A)
self.assertEqual(lock["ready_expected_head_sha"], HEAD_B)
def test_record_live_mutation_stores_head(self):
_seed(ready_pr=619, ready_head=HEAD_B, ready_action="approve")
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
lock["final_review_decision_ready"] = True
lock["ready_pr_number"] = 619
lock["ready_expected_head_sha"] = HEAD_B
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(lock)
mcp_server.record_live_review_mutation(619, "approve", review_id=99)
stored = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()["live_mutations"][-1]
self.assertEqual(stored["head_sha"], HEAD_B)
self.assertEqual(stored["pr_number"], 619)
def test_submit_gate_allows_new_head_after_prior_terminal(self):
"""check_review_decision_gate must not block different-head submit."""
mutations = [RC_619_HEAD_A]
_seed(
mutations,
ready_pr=619,
ready_head=HEAD_B,
ready_action="approve",
)
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
lock["final_review_decision_ready"] = True
lock["ready_pr_number"] = 619
lock["ready_action"] = "approve"
lock["ready_expected_head_sha"] = HEAD_B
lock["ready_remote"] = "prgs"
lock["ready_org"] = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
lock["ready_repo"] = "Gitea-Tools"
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(lock)
reasons = mcp_server.check_review_decision_gate(
619,
"approve",
final_review_decision_ready=True,
remote="prgs",
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
repo="Gitea-Tools",
)
self.assertEqual(reasons, [], reasons)
def test_submit_gate_blocks_same_head_duplicate(self):
mutations = [RC_619_HEAD_A]
_seed(
mutations,
ready_pr=619,
ready_head=HEAD_A,
ready_action="request_changes",
)
lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
lock["final_review_decision_ready"] = True
lock["ready_pr_number"] = 619
lock["ready_action"] = "request_changes"
lock["ready_expected_head_sha"] = HEAD_A
lock["ready_remote"] = "prgs"
lock["ready_org"] = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
lock["ready_repo"] = "Gitea-Tools"
mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(lock)
reasons = mcp_server.check_review_decision_gate(
619,
"request_changes",
final_review_decision_ready=True,
remote="prgs",
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
repo="Gitea-Tools",
)
self.assertTrue(reasons)
class TestAssessmentOpenPrHead(unittest.TestCase):
def test_open_pr_stale_by_head_no_cleanup(self):
lock = _lock(
[RC_619_HEAD_A],
ready_pr=619,
ready_head=HEAD_A,
ready_action="request_changes",
)
a = srdl.assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
lock, pr_live=_open_pr(619, HEAD_B)
)
self.assertTrue(a["has_lock"])
self.assertFalse(a["is_moot"])
self.assertFalse(a["cleanup_allowed"])
self.assertTrue(a["stale_by_head"])
self.assertTrue(a["fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed"])
self.assertEqual(a["locked_head_sha"], HEAD_A)
self.assertEqual(a["current_pr_head_sha"], HEAD_B)
def test_open_pr_same_head_no_fresh(self):
lock = _lock([RC_619_HEAD_A], ready_pr=619, ready_head=HEAD_A)
a = srdl.assess_stale_review_decision_lock(
lock, pr_live=_open_pr(619, HEAD_A)
)
self.assertFalse(a["stale_by_head"])
self.assertFalse(a["fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed"])
self.assertFalse(a["cleanup_allowed"])
def test_historical_mutation_preserved_in_summary(self):
lock = _lock(
[RC_619_HEAD_A, APPROVE_619_HEAD_B],
ready_pr=619,
ready_head=HEAD_B,
ready_action="approve",
)
summary = srdl.lock_summary(lock)
self.assertEqual(summary["live_mutations_count"], 2)
self.assertEqual(summary["last_terminal"]["head_sha"], HEAD_B)
self.assertEqual(summary["locked_head_sha"], HEAD_B)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()