feat: enforce capability stop terminal mode after reviewer denial (Issue #197)

Enter terminal mode when review_pr/merge_pr capability is denied. Block
reviewer queue tools (list_prs, eligibility checks) and add report-purity
validators for forbidden PR selection, fallback, and empty-queue claims.

Closes #197

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

capability_stop_terminal.py

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+"""Hard-stop terminal mode after reviewer capability denial (#197)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+
+TERMINAL_REPORT_HEADING = (
+    "Cannot perform reviewer task under current profile. "
+    "No reviewer mutations performed."
+)
+
+REVIEWER_CAPABILITY_TASKS = frozenset({
+    "review_pr",
+    "merge_pr",
+    "blind_pr_queue_review",
+    "request_changes_pr",
+    "approve_pr",
+})
+
+BLOCKED_QUEUE_TOOLS = frozenset({
+    "list_prs",
+    "check_pr_eligibility",
+    "view_pr",
+    "submit_pr_review",
+    "dry_run_pr_review",
+    "merge_pr",
+    "review_pr",
+})
+
+_session_terminal: dict | None = None
+
+
+def enter_from_capability_result(capability: dict) -> dict | None:
+    """Enter terminal mode when a reviewer/merge task is denied."""
+    global _session_terminal
+    task = (capability or {}).get("requested_task", "")
+    required_role = (capability or {}).get("required_role_kind")
+    if not capability.get("stop_required"):
+        return None
+    if required_role != "reviewer" and task not in REVIEWER_CAPABILITY_TASKS:
+        return None
+    record = {
+        "active": True,
+        "requested_task": task,
+        "required_role_kind": required_role,
+        "active_profile": capability.get("active_profile"),
+        "active_identity": capability.get("active_identity"),
+        "stop_required": True,
+        "exact_safe_next_action": capability.get("exact_safe_next_action"),
+        "terminal_message": TERMINAL_REPORT_HEADING,
+    }
+    _session_terminal = record
+    return dict(record)
+
+
+def enter_from_route_result(route: dict) -> dict | None:
+    """Enter terminal mode from a role router wrong_role_stop (#206 compat)."""
+    if (route or {}).get("route_result") != "wrong_role_stop":
+        return None
+    if route.get("required_role") != "reviewer":
+        return None
+    return enter_from_capability_result({
+        "requested_task": route.get("task_type"),
+        "required_role_kind": "reviewer",
+        "stop_required": True,
+        "active_profile": route.get("active_profile"),
+        "active_identity": None,
+        "exact_safe_next_action": route.get("message"),
+    })
+
+
+def is_active() -> bool:
+    return bool(_session_terminal and _session_terminal.get("active"))
+
+
+def active_record() -> dict | None:
+    if not is_active():
+        return None
+    return dict(_session_terminal)
+
+
+def clear():
+    global _session_terminal
+    _session_terminal = None
+
+
+def check_reviewer_queue_tool(tool_name: str) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
+    """Return (allowed, reasons). False when terminal mode blocks queue work."""
+    if not is_active():
+        return True, []
+    name = (tool_name or "").strip().lower().removeprefix("gitea_")
+    if name in BLOCKED_QUEUE_TOOLS:
+        return False, [
+            TERMINAL_REPORT_HEADING,
+            f"Reviewer queue tool '{tool_name}' is blocked after "
+            "capability denial (fail closed).",
+            "Relaunch a reviewer MCP namespace to perform reviewer work.",
+        ]
+    return True, []
+
+
+def validate_eligibility_wording(text: str) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
+    """Reject session-based eligibility reasoning (#197)."""
+    lower = (text or "").lower()
+    violations = []
+    if "not authored by this session" in lower:
+        violations.append(
+            "eligibility must use authenticated account identity, not "
+            "'this session' wording"
+        )
+    if re.search(r"not (?:self-)?authored by (?:the )?session", lower):
+        violations.append("session-based eligibility reasoning is invalid")
+    return (len(violations) == 0), violations
+
+
+def assess_capability_stop_report(
+    report_text: str,
+    *,
+    trust_gate_status: str | None = None,
+    capability_denied: bool = True,
+) -> dict:
+    """Validate final report purity after reviewer capability denial."""
+    text = report_text or ""
+    lower = text.lower()
+    violations = []
+
+    if capability_denied and TERMINAL_REPORT_HEADING.lower() not in lower:
+        violations.append("missing required terminal report heading")
+
+    forbidden_patterns = [
+        ("pr selection", re.compile(
+            r"selected pr|pr #\d+ (?:to review|selected)|eligible pr|"
+            r"next pr to review", re.I)),
+        ("sibling repo inventory", re.compile(
+            r"sibling repo|other repo|mcp-control-plane|gitea-tools and", re.I)),
+        ("author fallback", re.compile(
+            r"rebase conflicted|author-side fallback|have me rebase|"
+            r"implement the fix|push a branch|open a pr for", re.I)),
+        ("invalid session eligibility", re.compile(
+            r"not authored by this session", re.I)),
+    ]
+    for label, pattern in forbidden_patterns:
+        if pattern.search(text):
+            violations.append(f"forbidden after hard stop: {label}")
+
+    empty_queue_patterns = re.compile(
+        r"\b0 open pr|\bno open pr|\bno eligible pr|\bempty (?:review )?queue|"
+        r"inventory empty",
+        re.I,
+    )
+    if empty_queue_patterns.search(text):
+        if trust_gate_status != "trusted_empty":
+            violations.append(
+                "empty-queue claim after capability stop without "
+                "pr_inventory_trust_gate.status == trusted_empty"
+            )
+
+    ok, elig_violations = validate_eligibility_wording(text)
+    violations.extend(elig_violations)
+
+    if violations:
+        return {
+            "pure": False,
+            "downgraded": True,
+            "violations": violations,
+            "reasons": violations,
+        }
+    return {
+        "pure": True,
+        "downgraded": False,
+        "violations": [],
+        "reasons": [],
+    }
+
+
+def build_terminal_report(capability: dict) -> dict:
+    """Minimal allowed report fields after hard stop."""
+    return {
+        "terminal_mode": True,
+        "heading": TERMINAL_REPORT_HEADING,
+        "authenticated_profile": capability.get("active_profile"),
+        "authenticated_identity": capability.get("active_identity"),
+        "denied_task": capability.get("requested_task"),
+        "required_role_kind": capability.get("required_role_kind"),
+        "stop_required": capability.get("stop_required"),
+        "required_action": capability.get("exact_safe_next_action"),
+        "mutations_performed": False,
+        "allowed_sections": [
+            "authenticated identity/profile",
+            "denied capability result",
+            "reason task cannot proceed",
+            "required reviewer profile/identity",
+            "mutation confirmation (none)",
+        ],
+        "forbidden_sections": [
+            "PR selection",
+            "sibling-repo queue recommendations",
+            "author-side fallback suggestions",
+            "empty-queue claims without trusted_empty",
+            "session-based eligibility wording",
+        ],
+    }

mcp_server.py

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ from gitea_auth import (  # noqa: E402
 )
 import gitea_audit  # noqa: E402
 import gitea_config  # noqa: E402
+import capability_stop_terminal  # noqa: E402
 
 
 def _reveal_endpoints() -> bool:
@@ -406,6 +407,11 @@ def gitea_list_prs(
         'mergeable', 'updated_at' ('url' only with the reveal opt-in).
         The additional 'updated_at' aids stale/conflicting queue detection.
     """
+    allowed, block_reasons = capability_stop_terminal.check_reviewer_queue_tool(
+        "list_prs"
+    )
+    if not allowed:
+        raise RuntimeError("; ".join(block_reasons))
     h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
     auth = _auth(h)
     url = f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls?state={state}"
@@ -517,6 +523,17 @@ def gitea_check_pr_eligibility(
         'permission_report' (#142).
     """
     action = (action or "").strip().lower()
+    if action in ("review", "approve", "request_changes", "merge"):
+        allowed, block_reasons = capability_stop_terminal.check_reviewer_queue_tool(
+            "check_pr_eligibility"
+        )
+        if not allowed:
+            return {
+                "eligible": False,
+                "requested_action": action,
+                "reasons": block_reasons,
+                "terminal_mode": True,
+            }
     profile = get_profile()
     result = {
         "eligible": False,
@@ -3476,7 +3493,7 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
             "STOP: the active profile cannot perform the requested task; "
             "follow exact_safe_next_action instead of improvising.")
 
-    return {
+    result = {
         "requested_task": task,
         "required_operation_permission": required_permission,
         "required_role_kind": required_role,
@@ -3491,6 +3508,33 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
         "different_mcp_namespace_required": different_namespace_required,
         "exact_safe_next_action": next_safe_action,
     }
+    if stop_required:
+        terminal = capability_stop_terminal.enter_from_capability_result(result)
+        if terminal:
+            result["terminal_mode"] = True
+            result["terminal_report"] = (
+                capability_stop_terminal.build_terminal_report(result)
+            )
+    return result
+
+
+@mcp.tool()
+def gitea_capability_stop_terminal_report() -> dict:
+    """Read-only: terminal report template after reviewer capability denial (#197)."""
+    record = capability_stop_terminal.active_record()
+    if not record:
+        return {
+            "terminal_mode": False,
+            "reasons": ["capability stop terminal mode is not active"],
+        }
+    return capability_stop_terminal.build_terminal_report({
+        "requested_task": record.get("requested_task"),
+        "required_role_kind": record.get("required_role_kind"),
+        "active_profile": record.get("active_profile"),
+        "active_identity": record.get("active_identity"),
+        "stop_required": record.get("stop_required"),
+        "exact_safe_next_action": record.get("exact_safe_next_action"),
+    })
 
 
 # ── Entry point ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

review_proofs.py

@@ -330,22 +330,167 @@ def assess_self_review_contamination(reviewer_identity, pr_author,
     }
 
 
-def assess_role_boundary(proof):
+def assess_capability_evidence(capability_claims):
+    """#179 gap 1: a capability claim needs exact evidence, not assertion.
+
+    *capability_claims* is a list of ``{'task', 'allowed',
+    'evidence_source'}`` dicts, one per capability the report claims (e.g.
+    review_pr, merge_pr). Each claim must name its task, be allowed, and
+    cite an exact evidence source (``gitea_resolve_task_capability`` output
+    or equivalent runtime-context evidence). No claims at all fails closed.
+    """
+    reasons = []
+    claims = capability_claims or []
+    if not claims:
+        reasons.append(
+            "no capability evidence provided; capability checks may not be "
+            "claimed as passed"
+        )
+    for claim in claims:
+        task = (claim.get("task") or "").strip() or "<unnamed task>"
+        if claim.get("allowed") is not True:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"capability '{task}' is not proven allowed; fail closed"
+            )
+        if not (claim.get("evidence_source") or "").strip():
+            reasons.append(
+                f"capability '{task}' claimed without exact evidence "
+                "(cite gitea_resolve_task_capability output or equivalent)"
+            )
+    proven = not reasons
+    return {"proven": proven, "reasons": reasons, "claims": len(claims)}
+
+
+def assess_sweep_evidence(sweep):
+    """#179 gap 2: secret/provenance sweeps must state exact method + scope.
+
+    *sweep* keys: ``command`` (the exact command, script, grep pattern, or
+    named sweep method), ``scope`` (what was scanned, e.g. 'full PR diff
+    against prgs/master'), ``clean`` (bool result). A vague summary without
+    the exact method is downgraded; a missing sweep fails closed.
+    """
+    if not sweep:
+        return {
+            "verdict": "missing",
+            "proven": False,
+            "reasons": ["no secret/provenance sweep reported; fail closed"],
+        }
+    reasons = []
+    if not (sweep.get("command") or "").strip():
+        reasons.append(
+            "sweep method/command not stated exactly (command, script, "
+            "pattern, or named sweep method required)"
+        )
+    if not (sweep.get("scope") or "").strip():
+        reasons.append("sweep scope not stated (what diff/files were scanned)")
+    if not isinstance(sweep.get("clean"), bool):
+        reasons.append("sweep result not stated as clean/not-clean")
+    verdict = "exact" if not reasons else "vague"
+    return {
+        "verdict": verdict,
+        "proven": verdict == "exact",
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "clean": sweep.get("clean") if isinstance(sweep.get("clean"), bool)
+        else None,
+    }
+
+
+def assess_live_state_recheck(recheck):
+    """#179 gap 3: explicit live-state recheck before review/merge mutation.
+
+    *recheck* keys: ``pr_state``, ``pinned_head_sha``, ``live_head_sha``,
+    ``pinned_base_ref``, ``live_base_ref``, ``blocking_change_requests``.
+    Proven only when the PR is still open, the live head equals the pinned
+    head (full 40-hex), the base branch is unchanged, and blocking review
+    state was checked and is absent. Not performing the recheck fails
+    closed and blocks mutation.
+    """
+    if not recheck:
+        return {
+            "proven": False,
+            "block": True,
+            "reasons": [
+                "final live-state recheck not performed before mutation; "
+                "fail closed"
+            ],
+        }
+    reasons = []
+    if (recheck.get("pr_state") or "").strip().lower() != "open":
+        reasons.append(
+            f"PR state is '{recheck.get('pr_state')}', not open; stop"
+        )
+
+    pinned = (recheck.get("pinned_head_sha") or "").strip().lower()
+    live = (recheck.get("live_head_sha") or "").strip().lower()
+    if not (_FULL_SHA.match(pinned) and _FULL_SHA.match(live)):
+        reasons.append(
+            "pinned/live head SHAs missing or not full 40-hex; fail closed"
+        )
+    elif pinned != live:
+        reasons.append(
+            "live head SHA no longer equals the pinned head; re-pin and "
+            "re-validate before mutation"
+        )
+
+    base_pinned = _normalize_ref(recheck.get("pinned_base_ref"))
+    base_live = _normalize_ref(recheck.get("live_base_ref"))
+    if not base_pinned or not base_live:
+        reasons.append("base refs missing from live-state recheck; fail closed")
+    elif base_pinned != base_live:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"base branch changed from '{base_pinned}' to '{base_live}'"
+        )
+
+    blocking = recheck.get("blocking_change_requests")
+    if blocking is None:
+        reasons.append(
+            "blocking review state not checked; fail closed"
+        )
+    elif blocking:
+        reasons.append(
+            "an undismissed REQUEST_CHANGES / blocking review state remains "
+            "unresolved"
+        )
+
+    proven = not reasons
+    return {"proven": proven, "block": not proven, "reasons": reasons}
+
+
+def assess_role_boundary(proof=None, *, task_role=None, namespaces_used=None,
+                         justification=None):
     """Assess reviewer/author role separation for blind queue workflows.
 
     Issue #175 blocks a reviewer queue task from silently becoming author
-    implementation work. The workflow may use both namespaces only when that
-    mixed use is explicit, justified, and non-mutating; author mutations after
-    a reviewer queue task require an explicit operator authorization.
+    implementation work. Issue #179 also requires reviewer workflows to
+    report namespace use and justify any foreign namespace calls. This helper
+    accepts both forms:
 
-    *proof* keys:
-    ``task_role`` ('reviewer' or 'author'), ``task_kind`` (for example
-    'blind_pr_queue_review'), ``reviewer_namespace_used``,
-    ``author_namespace_used``, ``author_mutations`` (list), ``review_mutations``
-    (list), ``operator_authorized_author_work``, ``mixed_namespace_justification``,
-    ``scratch_evidence_claimed``, and ``scratch_evidence_durable``.
+    - the #175 dict proof with mutation details, or
+    - the #179 keyword form: ``task_role``, ``namespaces_used``,
+      ``justification``.
     """
-    proof = proof or {}
+    if proof is None:
+        namespaces_reported = namespaces_used is not None
+        namespaces = list(namespaces_used or [])
+        proof = {
+            "task_role": task_role,
+            "reviewer_namespace_used": any(
+                "reviewer" in (namespace or "").lower()
+                for namespace in namespaces
+            ),
+            "author_namespace_used": any(
+                "author" in (namespace or "").lower()
+                for namespace in namespaces
+            ),
+            "mixed_namespace_justification": justification,
+            "author_mutations": [],
+            "review_mutations": [],
+            "_namespaces_used": namespaces,
+            "_namespaces_reported": namespaces_reported,
+        }
+    else:
+        proof = dict(proof or {})
+
     task_role = (proof.get("task_role") or "").strip().lower()
     task_kind = (proof.get("task_kind") or "").strip().lower()
     author_mutations = list(proof.get("author_mutations") or [])
@@ -364,6 +509,8 @@ def assess_role_boundary(proof):
 
     if task_role not in {"reviewer", "author"}:
         reasons.append("task role missing or unknown; role boundary unproven")
+    if proof.get("_namespaces_reported") is False:
+        reasons.append("namespaces used were not reported; fail closed")
 
     if task_role == "reviewer":
         if author_mutations and not authorized:
@@ -409,18 +556,35 @@ def assess_role_boundary(proof):
         status = "clean"
         safe_next_action = "proceed"
 
+    namespaces = proof.get("_namespaces_used")
+    if namespaces is None:
+        namespaces = []
+        if reviewer_used:
+            namespaces.append("gitea-reviewer")
+        if author_used:
+            namespaces.append("gitea-author")
+    foreign = [
+        namespace for namespace in namespaces
+        if task_role and task_role not in (namespace or "").lower()
+    ]
+
     return {
         "status": status,
         "clean": status == "clean",
+        "proven": status == "clean",
         "reasons": reasons,
         "violations": violations,
         "safe_next_action": safe_next_action,
+        "foreign_namespaces": foreign,
+        "justified": bool(mixed_justification),
     }
 
 
 def build_final_report(checkout_proof, inventory, validation, contamination,
                        identity_eligible, merge_performed,
-                       issue_status_verified, role_boundary=None):
+                       issue_status_verified,
+                       capability_evidence=None, sweep=None, live_state=None,
+                       role_boundary=None):
     """Required behavior 6 + acceptance criteria: one report, distinct proofs.
 
     Combines the individual proof verdicts into the final-report fields the
@@ -431,6 +595,13 @@ def build_final_report(checkout_proof, inventory, validation, contamination,
     - 'downgraded' — one or more proofs missing/weak; do not merge.
     - 'blocked'    — a *violation*: a merge was claimed although the proofs
       did not allow one.
+
+    #179 raises the A bar: the report must also carry exact capability
+    evidence (``assess_capability_evidence``), an exact secret/provenance
+    sweep (``assess_sweep_evidence``), a pre-mutation live-state recheck
+    (``assess_live_state_recheck`` — also required for ``merge_allowed``),
+    and a clean role boundary (``assess_role_boundary``). Omitting any of
+    them downgrades; a merge without the live recheck is a violation.
     """
     contamination_status = contamination.get("status", "unknown")
     checkout_proven = bool(checkout_proof.get("proven"))
@@ -443,6 +614,29 @@ def build_final_report(checkout_proof, inventory, validation, contamination,
     }
     role_status = role_boundary.get("status", "warning")
 
+    capability_evidence = capability_evidence or {
+        "proven": False,
+        "reasons": ["capability evidence not provided (#179)"],
+    }
+    sweep = sweep or {
+        "verdict": "missing",
+        "proven": False,
+        "reasons": ["secret/provenance sweep evidence not provided (#179)"],
+    }
+    live_state = live_state or {
+        "proven": False,
+        "block": True,
+        "reasons": ["pre-mutation live-state recheck not provided (#179)"],
+    }
+    role_boundary = role_boundary or {
+        "proven": False,
+        "reasons": ["role-boundary/namespace usage not reported (#179)"],
+    }
+    capability_proven = bool(capability_evidence.get("proven"))
+    sweep_proven = bool(sweep.get("proven"))
+    live_state_proven = bool(live_state.get("proven"))
+    role_boundary_clean = bool(role_boundary.get("proven"))
+
     downgrade_reasons = []
     if not identity_eligible:
         downgrade_reasons.append("identity/profile not eligible for review")
@@ -466,6 +660,23 @@ def build_final_report(checkout_proof, inventory, validation, contamination,
         downgrade_reasons.extend(role_boundary.get("reasons", []))
     if not issue_status_verified:
         downgrade_reasons.append("linked issue status not verified")
+    if not capability_proven:
+        downgrade_reasons.append("exact capability evidence missing (#179)")
+        downgrade_reasons.extend(capability_evidence.get("reasons", []))
+    if not sweep_proven:
+        downgrade_reasons.append(
+            f"secret/provenance sweep evidence is "
+            f"{sweep.get('verdict', 'missing')} (#179)"
+        )
+        downgrade_reasons.extend(sweep.get("reasons", []))
+    if not live_state_proven:
+        downgrade_reasons.append(
+            "pre-mutation live-state recheck missing or failed (#179)"
+        )
+        downgrade_reasons.extend(live_state.get("reasons", []))
+    if not role_boundary_clean:
+        downgrade_reasons.append("role/namespace boundary not clean (#179)")
+        downgrade_reasons.extend(role_boundary.get("reasons", []))
 
     merge_allowed = (
         identity_eligible
@@ -474,6 +685,8 @@ def build_final_report(checkout_proof, inventory, validation, contamination,
         and role_status == "clean"
         and validation_claimable
         and validation.get("verdict") != "invalid"
+        # #179: no merge without a proven final live-state recheck.
+        and live_state_proven
     )
 
     violations = []
@@ -508,6 +721,10 @@ def build_final_report(checkout_proof, inventory, validation, contamination,
         "merge_allowed": merge_allowed,
         "merge_performed": bool(merge_performed),
         "issue_status_verified": bool(issue_status_verified),
+        "capability_evidence_proven": capability_proven,
+        "sweep_verdict": sweep.get("verdict"),
+        "live_state_recheck_proven": live_state_proven,
+        "role_boundary_clean": role_boundary_clean,
     }
 
 
@@ -635,6 +852,22 @@ def assess_controller_handoff(report_text, role=None):
     }
 
 
+def assess_capability_stop_terminal_report(
+    report_text,
+    *,
+    trust_gate_status=None,
+    capability_denied=True,
+):
+    """Issue #197: reports after reviewer capability denial must stay pure."""
+    from capability_stop_terminal import assess_capability_stop_report
+
+    return assess_capability_stop_report(
+        report_text,
+        trust_gate_status=trust_gate_status,
+        capability_denied=capability_denied,
+    )
+
+
 # ── PR Inventory Trust Gate (Issue #194) ──────────────────────────────────────
 #
 # A reviewer agent may not convert an empty PR list response into a definitive

skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md

@@ -232,19 +232,35 @@ Worktree folder = branch with `/` replaced by `-`
    validation result after the command has completed and its output has
    been read (`review_proofs.assess_validation_report`).
 10. **Do not merge if checks fail. Do not merge if the reviewer is the author.**
-11. The final report must distinguish (`review_proofs.build_final_report`):
+11. **#179 A-bar proofs** (all fail closed when missing —
+    `review_proofs.assess_capability_evidence`, `assess_sweep_evidence`,
+    `assess_live_state_recheck`, `assess_role_boundary`):
+    - Capability claims must cite exact `gitea_resolve_task_capability`
+      output (or runtime context); a bare "capability checks passed" is
+      downgraded.
+    - The secret/provenance sweep must state the exact command/script/
+      pattern/named method and the scope scanned.
+    - Immediately before submitting a review verdict (and again before any
+      merge), re-read live PR state and prove: still open, live head ==
+      pinned head, base unchanged, no unresolved blocking review state.
+    - Reviewer runs stay in the reviewer namespace; any author-namespace
+      call requires an explicit justification in the report.
+12. The final report must distinguish (`review_proofs.build_final_report`):
     identity eligible; PR author different from reviewer; session
-    contamination absent (with evidence); role boundary clean; validation
-    performed on the pinned head; merge performed; issue status verified. If
-    any proof is missing, stop or downgrade the result instead of merging
-    confidently.
+    contamination absent (with evidence); validation performed on the pinned
+    head; capability evidence; sweep verdict; live-state recheck; role
+    boundary; merge performed; issue status verified. If any proof is
+    missing, stop or downgrade the result instead of merging confidently.
 
 ## G. Merge / cleanup workflow
 
 Only an eligible (non-author) reviewer merges. Before merging: always verify
-the authenticated identity **and** the PR author; respect runtime profile
-gates; run independent validation (do not trust the author's reported
-results); and merge with a **pinned head SHA** and, where supported, the
+the authenticated identity **and** the PR author; cite exact capability
+evidence for merge_pr (#179); respect runtime profile gates; run independent
+validation (do not trust the author's reported results); perform the **final
+live-state recheck** (#179 — PR still open, live head == pinned head, base
+unchanged, no unresolved blocking review state) immediately before the merge
+mutation; and merge with a **pinned head SHA** and, where supported, the
 **expected changed-file set**, so a moved head or widened diff refuses the
 merge. After a real merge:
 

skills/llm-project-workflow/templates/merge-pr.md

@@ -20,10 +20,21 @@ Steps:
    *If the current identity does not match the required role (or is the PR author), STOP. Relaunch/switch to the correct profile first.*
 2. Verify authenticated identity + active profile.
 3. Confirm PR #<pr>: author (not you), state open, mergeable, review approved. Check if PR body uses `Closes #N` or `Fixes #N`; if it uses `Implements #N` or `Refs #N`, manual closing will be needed in step 29.
-4. If any gate fails → STOP and report.
-4. Merge with explicit confirmation (e.g. confirmation="MERGE PR <pr>"),
-   optionally pinning the reviewed head SHA / changed-file set.
-5. Confirm remote master now contains the merge commit (or the expected changes if squash merged).
+4. Capability evidence (#179): cite the exact gitea_resolve_task_capability
+   output (or runtime context) proving merge_pr is allowed — a bare
+   "capability checks passed" claim is downgraded.
+5. Final live-state recheck (#179), immediately before the merge mutation —
+   re-read the live PR and prove:
+   - PR still open
+   - live head SHA still equals the pinned/reviewed head SHA
+   - base branch unchanged
+   - no undismissed REQUEST_CHANGES / blocking review state remains
+   If any recheck fails → STOP, re-pin, re-validate.
+6. If any gate fails → STOP and report.
+7. Merge with explicit confirmation (e.g. confirmation="MERGE PR <pr>"),
+   pinning the reviewed head SHA (expected_head_sha) and, where supported,
+   the changed-file set.
+8. Confirm remote master now contains the merge commit (or the expected changes if squash merged).
    *Note: Gitea PR "closed" state is NOT equivalent to "merged". Do not assume a closed PR succeeded without verifying the actual landed changes.*
 
 Then run the cleanup template (worktree-cleanup.md):

skills/llm-project-workflow/templates/review-pr.md

@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ Steps:
    - Target task role: reviewer identity (must NOT be the PR author)
    *If the current identity does not match the required role (or is the PR author), STOP. Relaunch/switch to the correct profile first.*
 2. Verify your authenticated identity (whoami) and the active profile.
+   Capability evidence (#179): cite the exact gitea_resolve_task_capability
+   output (or runtime context) for review_pr (and merge_pr if merging later);
+   a bare "capability checks passed" claim is downgraded. Stay in the
+   reviewer namespace: any author-namespace call must be justified in the
+   report (#179).
 3. Fetch the PR facts: PR author, head SHA, state (must be open), base branch.
    Pin the head SHA in your notes; every later step validates THAT SHA.
 4. If authenticated user == PR author → STOP (no self-review).
@@ -58,12 +63,23 @@ Steps:
    If HEAD does not match the pinned head → STOP before review/merge.
 7. Confirm the worktree is clean. Inspect the FULL diff; confirm scope matches
    issue #<n>; flag any unrelated files, secrets, or formatting churn. Check that the PR body correctly uses Gitea-closing keywords (`Closes #N` or `Fixes #N`) instead of non-closing ones (`Implements #N`, `Refs #N`).
+   Secret/provenance sweep must be exact (#179): state the exact command,
+   script, grep pattern, or named sweep method AND the scope scanned (e.g.
+   `git diff prgs/master...HEAD | grep -inE '<pattern>'`); "checked the diff
+   for secrets" alone is downgraded.
 8. Run the test suite; report the exact command and exact results — pass/fail
    plus passed/skipped/failed counts, any ignored paths and why they are safe
    to ignore, and whether the command differs from the repository's canonical
    validation command. Only claim a result after the output has been read.
-9. Post the review verdict: approve only if scope is clean and checks pass;
-   otherwise request changes with specifics. Never merge from this review step.
+9. Final live-state recheck (#179), immediately before submitting the review
+   verdict — re-read the live PR and prove:
+   - PR still open
+   - live head SHA still equals the pinned head SHA from step 3
+   - base branch unchanged
+   - no undismissed REQUEST_CHANGES / blocking review state left unaccounted
+   If anything moved → STOP, re-pin, re-validate before any verdict.
+10. Post the review verdict: approve only if scope is clean and checks pass;
+    otherwise request changes with specifics. Never merge from this review step.
    Include a "Review Metadata" block (attribution only — docs/llm-agent-sha.md):
 
    Review Metadata:

tests/test_capability_stop_terminal.py

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+"""Tests for capability stop terminal mode (#197)."""
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import capability_stop_terminal
+import gitea_config
+import mcp_server
+from review_proofs import assess_capability_stop_terminal_report
+
+CONFIG = {
+    "version": 2,
+    "contexts": {
+        "ctx": {
+            "enabled": True,
+            "gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.example.com"},
+        }
+    },
+    "profiles": {
+        "prgs-author": {
+            "enabled": True,
+            "context": "ctx",
+            "role": "author",
+            "username": "jcwalker3",
+            "auth": {"type": "env", "name": "GITEA_TOKEN_AUTHOR"},
+            "allowed_operations": [
+                "gitea.read", "gitea.issue.create", "gitea.pr.create",
+                "gitea.branch.push",
+            ],
+            "forbidden_operations": [
+                "gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.pr.review",
+            ],
+            "execution_profile": "prgs-author",
+        },
+    },
+    "rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},
+}
+
+
+class TestCapabilityStopTerminal(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        capability_stop_terminal.clear()
+        self._remotes = patch.dict(mcp_server.REMOTES, {
+            "prgs": {
+                "host": "gitea.example.com",
+                "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                "repo": "Gitea-Tools",
+            },
+        })
+        self._remotes.start()
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+        self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.config_path = os.path.join(self._dir.name, "profiles.json")
+        with open(self.config_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            fh.write(json.dumps(CONFIG))
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._remotes.stop()
+        capability_stop_terminal.clear()
+        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
+        gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
+        self._dir.cleanup()
+
+    def _env(self):
+        return {
+            "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
+            "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author",
+            "GITEA_TOKEN_AUTHOR": "author-pass",
+        }
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "jcwalker3"})
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
+    def test_review_pr_stop_enters_terminal_mode(self, _auth, _api):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env()):
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
+                task="review_pr", remote="prgs"
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(res["stop_required"])
+        self.assertTrue(res.get("terminal_mode"))
+        self.assertTrue(capability_stop_terminal.is_active())
+        self.assertIn(
+            capability_stop_terminal.TERMINAL_REPORT_HEADING,
+            res["terminal_report"]["heading"],
+        )
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "jcwalker3"})
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
+    def test_list_prs_blocked_after_capability_stop(self, _auth, _api):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env()):
+            mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="review_pr", remote="prgs")
+            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
+                mcp_server.gitea_list_prs(remote="prgs")
+        self.assertIn("Cannot perform reviewer task", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "jcwalker3"})
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
+    def test_eligibility_check_blocked_after_stop(self, _auth, _api):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env()):
+            mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="review_pr", remote="prgs")
+            res = mcp_server.gitea_check_pr_eligibility(
+                pr_number=193, action="review", remote="prgs"
+            )
+        self.assertFalse(res["eligible"])
+        self.assertTrue(res.get("terminal_mode"))
+
+    def test_report_with_pr_selection_impure(self):
+        report = (
+            "Cannot perform reviewer task under current profile. "
+            "No reviewer mutations performed.\n"
+            "Selected PR #193 for review anyway."
+        )
+        result = assess_capability_stop_terminal_report(report)
+        self.assertFalse(result["pure"])
+
+    def test_session_eligibility_wording_blocked(self):
+        ok, violations = capability_stop_terminal.validate_eligibility_wording(
+            "PR 193 is not authored by this session so it is eligible."
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertTrue(violations)
+
+    def test_rebase_fallback_blocked_in_report(self):
+        report = (
+            "Cannot perform reviewer task under current profile. "
+            "No reviewer mutations performed.\n"
+            "Or have me rebase conflicted PR 193."
+        )
+        result = assess_capability_stop_terminal_report(report)
+        self.assertFalse(result["pure"])
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("author fallback" in v for v in result["violations"])
+        )
+
+    def test_empty_queue_without_trusted_empty_blocked(self):
+        report = (
+            "Cannot perform reviewer task under current profile. "
+            "No reviewer mutations performed.\n"
+            "The repo has 0 open PRs."
+        )
+        result = assess_capability_stop_terminal_report(
+            report, trust_gate_status="untrusted_empty"
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["pure"])
+
+    def test_pure_terminal_report_passes(self):
+        report = (
+            "Cannot perform reviewer task under current profile. "
+            "No reviewer mutations performed.\n"
+            "Identity: jcwalker3 / prgs-author.\n"
+            "Required: prgs-reviewer.\n"
+            "No mutations performed."
+        )
+        result = assess_capability_stop_terminal_report(report)
+        self.assertTrue(result["pure"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_review_proofs.py

@@ -21,10 +21,13 @@ import unittest
 sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 
 from review_proofs import (  # noqa: E402
+    assess_capability_evidence,
     assess_controller_handoff,
     assess_inventory_completeness,
+    assess_live_state_recheck,
     assess_role_boundary,
     assess_self_review_contamination,
+    assess_sweep_evidence,
     assess_validation_report,
     build_final_report,
     pr_inventory_trust_gate,
@@ -116,6 +119,63 @@ def _good_role_boundary():
     )
 
 
+def _good_capability_evidence():
+    return assess_capability_evidence([
+        {
+            "task": "review_pr",
+            "allowed": True,
+            "evidence_source": (
+                "gitea_resolve_task_capability(review_pr) output: "
+                "allowed_in_current_session=true, profile prgs-reviewer"
+            ),
+        },
+        {
+            "task": "merge_pr",
+            "allowed": True,
+            "evidence_source": (
+                "gitea_resolve_task_capability(merge_pr) output: "
+                "allowed_in_current_session=true, profile prgs-reviewer"
+            ),
+        },
+    ])
+
+
+def _good_sweep(**overrides):
+    sweep = {
+        "command": (
+            "git diff prgs/master...HEAD | grep -inE "
+            "'password|token|secret|api[_-]?key|authorization|bearer|https?://'"
+        ),
+        "scope": "full PR diff against prgs/master",
+        "clean": True,
+    }
+    sweep.update(overrides)
+    return assess_sweep_evidence(sweep)
+
+
+def _good_live_state(**overrides):
+    recheck = {
+        "pr_state": "open",
+        "pinned_head_sha": PINNED,
+        "live_head_sha": PINNED,
+        "pinned_base_ref": "master",
+        "live_base_ref": "master",
+        "blocking_change_requests": False,
+    }
+    recheck.update(overrides)
+    return assess_live_state_recheck(recheck)
+
+
+def _good_role_boundary_179(**overrides):
+    kwargs = {
+        "task_role": "reviewer",
+        "namespaces_used": ["gitea-reviewer"],
+        "justification": None,
+    }
+    kwargs.update(overrides)
+    return assess_role_boundary(**kwargs)
+
+
 class TestCheckoutProof(unittest.TestCase):
     """Required behavior 1 + 2: prove HEAD == pinned PR head or stop."""
 
@@ -466,6 +526,9 @@ class TestFinalReport(unittest.TestCase):
             "identity_eligible": True,
             "merge_performed": False,
             "issue_status_verified": True,
+            "capability_evidence": _good_capability_evidence(),
+            "sweep": _good_sweep(),
+            "live_state": _good_live_state(),
             "role_boundary": _good_role_boundary(),
         }
         kwargs.update(overrides)
@@ -879,5 +942,209 @@ class TestPRInventoryTrustGate(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertTrue(res["corroborated"])
 
 
+class TestCapabilityEvidence(unittest.TestCase):
+    """#179 gap 1: capability claims need exact evidence."""
+
+    def test_evidence_backed_claims_are_proven(self):
+        result = _good_capability_evidence()
+        self.assertTrue(result["proven"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["reasons"], [])
+
+    def test_claim_without_evidence_source_is_not_proven(self):
+        result = assess_capability_evidence([
+            {"task": "review_pr", "allowed": True, "evidence_source": ""},
+        ])
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("evidence" in r.lower() for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_no_claims_at_all_fails_closed(self):
+        result = assess_capability_evidence([])
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+
+    def test_disallowed_task_is_not_proven(self):
+        result = assess_capability_evidence([
+            {
+                "task": "merge_pr",
+                "allowed": False,
+                "evidence_source": "gitea_resolve_task_capability output",
+            },
+        ])
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+
+
+class TestSweepEvidence(unittest.TestCase):
+    """#179 gap 2: secret/provenance sweep must be exact."""
+
+    def test_exact_sweep_is_proven(self):
+        result = _good_sweep()
+        self.assertEqual(result["verdict"], "exact")
+        self.assertTrue(result["proven"])
+
+    def test_vague_sweep_without_command_is_downgraded(self):
+        result = _good_sweep(command="")
+        self.assertEqual(result["verdict"], "vague")
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+
+    def test_sweep_without_scope_is_downgraded(self):
+        result = _good_sweep(scope="")
+        self.assertEqual(result["verdict"], "vague")
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+
+    def test_missing_sweep_fails_closed(self):
+        result = assess_sweep_evidence(None)
+        self.assertEqual(result["verdict"], "missing")
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+
+    def test_unstated_result_is_downgraded(self):
+        result = _good_sweep(clean=None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+
+
+class TestLiveStateRecheck(unittest.TestCase):
+    """#179 gap 3: explicit pre-mutation live-state recheck."""
+
+    def test_clean_recheck_is_proven(self):
+        result = _good_live_state()
+        self.assertTrue(result["proven"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["block"])
+
+    def test_missing_recheck_fails_closed(self):
+        result = assess_live_state_recheck(None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
+
+    def test_closed_pr_blocks(self):
+        result = _good_live_state(pr_state="closed")
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
+
+    def test_moved_head_blocks(self):
+        result = _good_live_state(live_head_sha=OTHER)
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("head" in r.lower() for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_changed_base_blocks(self):
+        result = _good_live_state(live_base_ref="develop")
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+
+    def test_unresolved_blocking_reviews_block(self):
+        result = _good_live_state(blocking_change_requests=True)
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+
+    def test_unchecked_blocking_state_fails_closed(self):
+        result = _good_live_state(blocking_change_requests=None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+
+
+class TestRoleBoundary179(unittest.TestCase):
+    """#179 gap 4: reviewer flows avoid unjustified author-namespace use."""
+
+    def test_native_namespace_only_is_clean(self):
+        result = _good_role_boundary_179()
+        self.assertTrue(result["proven"])
+
+    def test_foreign_namespace_without_justification_is_downgraded(self):
+        result = _good_role_boundary_179(
+            namespaces_used=["gitea-reviewer", "gitea-author"]
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("justif" in r.lower() for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_foreign_namespace_with_justification_is_clean(self):
+        result = _good_role_boundary_179(
+            namespaces_used=["gitea-reviewer", "gitea-author"],
+            justification=(
+                "author namespace read-only whoami used to evidence "
+                "self-review contamination status"
+            ),
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["proven"])
+
+    def test_unreported_namespaces_fail_closed(self):
+        result = _good_role_boundary_179(namespaces_used=None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["proven"])
+
+
+class TestFinalReport179Bar(unittest.TestCase):
+    """#179 acceptance adds capability, sweep, live-state, and role proofs."""
+
+    def _report(self, **overrides):
+        kwargs = {
+            "checkout_proof": _good_checkout(),
+            "inventory": _good_inventory(),
+            "validation": _good_validation(),
+            "contamination": _good_contamination(),
+            "identity_eligible": True,
+            "merge_performed": False,
+            "issue_status_verified": True,
+            "capability_evidence": _good_capability_evidence(),
+            "sweep": _good_sweep(),
+            "live_state": _good_live_state(),
+            "role_boundary": _good_role_boundary(),
+        }
+        kwargs.update(overrides)
+        return build_final_report(**kwargs)
+
+    def test_all_179_proofs_present_is_grade_a(self):
+        report = self._report()
+        self.assertEqual(report["grade"], "A")
+        self.assertTrue(report["capability_evidence_proven"])
+        self.assertEqual(report["sweep_verdict"], "exact")
+        self.assertTrue(report["live_state_recheck_proven"])
+        self.assertTrue(report["role_boundary_clean"])
+
+    def test_missing_capability_evidence_downgrades(self):
+        report = self._report(capability_evidence=None)
+        self.assertNotEqual(report["grade"], "A")
+        self.assertFalse(report["capability_evidence_proven"])
+
+    def test_unevidenced_capability_claim_downgrades(self):
+        report = self._report(
+            capability_evidence=assess_capability_evidence([
+                {"task": "review_pr", "allowed": True, "evidence_source": ""},
+            ])
+        )
+        self.assertNotEqual(report["grade"], "A")
+
+    def test_vague_sweep_downgrades(self):
+        report = self._report(sweep=_good_sweep(command=""))
+        self.assertNotEqual(report["grade"], "A")
+        self.assertEqual(report["sweep_verdict"], "vague")
+
+    def test_missing_sweep_downgrades(self):
+        report = self._report(sweep=None)
+        self.assertNotEqual(report["grade"], "A")
+
+    def test_missing_live_state_recheck_downgrades_and_blocks_merge(self):
+        report = self._report(live_state=None)
+        self.assertNotEqual(report["grade"], "A")
+        self.assertFalse(report["merge_allowed"])
+        self.assertFalse(report["live_state_recheck_proven"])
+
+    def test_stale_live_state_blocks_merge(self):
+        report = self._report(live_state=_good_live_state(live_head_sha=OTHER))
+        self.assertNotEqual(report["grade"], "A")
+        self.assertFalse(report["merge_allowed"])
+
+    def test_merge_claim_without_live_recheck_is_a_violation(self):
+        report = self._report(live_state=None, merge_performed=True)
+        self.assertEqual(report["grade"], "blocked")
+        self.assertTrue(report["violations"])
+
+    def test_unjustified_author_namespace_downgrades(self):
+        report = self._report(
+            role_boundary=_good_role_boundary_179(
+                namespaces_used=["gitea-reviewer", "gitea-author"]
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertNotEqual(report["grade"], "A")
+        self.assertFalse(report["role_boundary_clean"])
+
+    def test_positive_baseline_from_173_still_holds(self):
+        report = self._report()
+        self.assertTrue(report["inventory_complete"])
+        self.assertTrue(report["validated_on_pinned_head"])
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()