gitea_cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease (#515) posts a terminal `phase: released`
lease marker — a durable mutation of the PR lease ledger — but had no entry in
the canonical task-capability map and no role binding. Entry gated on
gitea.read, apply gated only on gitea.pr.comment, so any profile holding the
comment permission (author, reviewer, merger) reached the mutation path, while
the reconciler could not satisfy the operator-required resolve-exact-task ->
mutation sequence because no cleanup task was resolvable at all. The apply path
also called verify_preflight_purity(remote) with no task/org/repo, skipping the
resolved-task, canonical-root and explicit-target checks its siblings perform,
and passed request org/repo straight into _resolve.
Capability map and router:
- Map `cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease` and the tool-name alias
`gitea_cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease` to gitea.pr.comment + reconciler.
Both names carry an identical contract; unknown names keep failing closed on
the map's KeyError.
- Add both to role_session_router RECONCILER_TASKS and TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE so
the map and the router cannot disagree (the #723 defect-A class).
Tool enforcement (apply path only):
- Require the session to have resolved exactly the cleanup task; resolving a
different task, including a sibling reconciler task, does not authorize it.
- Require the reconciler role, checked independently of the permission gate.
- Require gitea.pr.comment.
- Validate explicit org/repo against the canonical repository identity derived
from the session binding, so request parameters can never redirect the
mutation, and forward worktree_path/task/org/repo to verify_preflight_purity
for canonical-root, workspace and anti-stomp binding (#733/#739).
- Require matching dry-run evidence proving lease_moot and cleanup_allowed for
the same PR, lease session, candidate head and lease marker id, with optional
caller expectations checked against the live lease.
New post_merge_moot_lease_gate module holds the pure authorization logic and an
append-only dry-run ledger: entries are only ever appended, lookup is
newest-wins, and dry_run_history hands out copies. Live, non-moot, superseded,
mismatched, malformed and foreign-repository leases all fail closed;
already-terminal cleanup stays idempotent.
The read-only apply=false assessment deliberately stays reachable under
gitea.read with no role gate, matching gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock
and gitea_cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease, so an operator can diagnose a
stuck lease from any attached namespace. This choice is documented in the map,
the tool docstring and docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md, and is directly tested.
_delete_branch_repository_binding_block is generalized into
_repository_binding_block(required_permission=...) and retained as a thin
delete-path alias so #733/#739 coverage keeps exercising its permission label.
Tests: new tests/test_issue_745_moot_lease_reconciler_gate.py (39 tests, 35
subtests) covers the map/router contract, alias parity, unknown-name rejection,
role and task gates, dry-run/apply sequencing, superseded and malformed leases,
repository binding, ledger append-only behavior, idempotency, and asserts no
production PR/session/marker is referenced. tests/test_post_merge_moot_lease.py
is updated from the permission-only model to reconciler + dry-run evidence, with
a new negative test pinning that a merger can no longer apply.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The independent review reproduced a real hole: the production first-bind path
never pinned repository/org, so the drift checks it feeds were skipped.
Root cause
----------
gitea_whoami, gitea_get_runtime_context, gitea_resolve_task_capability and
gitea_activate_profile all seeded the session context without repository or
org. First-bind-wins then made the mutation gate's later seed a no-op, and
assess_session_context only compares repository/org when the bound fields are
non-null. Result, reproduced in production order with the real REMOTES:
after whoami: repository=None org=None
same-host repo=Other-Tools -> NOT BLOCKED
same-host org=Other-Org -> NOT BLOCKED
cross-host -> blocked (this part always worked)
Binding REMOTES defaults would not fix it: REMOTES['prgs'].repo is 'Timesheet'
(a default *target*, not an authorization scope, see #530), so pinning it fails
closed on every legitimate Gitea-Tools mutation. There was no trusted source
for repository scope, so this adds one.
Design
------
- New optional profile field `allowed_repositories`: canonical owner/repository
slugs. An authorization boundary, never the binding itself. Config-only —
no env var can widen or forge it.
- The session repository is derived from the verified, workspace-aligned git
remote, never from caller-supplied org/repo, and validated against that
allowlist. The session binds immutably to exactly one canonical slug; org is
derived from it. A profile authorizing several repositories still binds to
the single verified one.
- Every first-bind entry point now pins the same complete context. Activation
rejects an unauthorized/unverifiable workspace. Mutations fail closed when
repository/org is unverified, and a tool-level org/repo override that
disagrees with the binding is rejected before the write.
- A mutation request can no longer establish, complete, or replace the binding
(it previously seeded from `org or REMOTES[...]`, i.e. caller-controlled).
- Enforcement is opt-in per profile: a profile without the field keeps prior
behaviour, so existing static-profile namespaces stay functional.
First-bind-wins, immutability, the RLock, profile isolation, host/identity
validation and the private pytest-only reset are unchanged.
gitea_auth.get_profile() built an explicit whitelist dict and silently dropped
`allowed_repositories`; the new integration tests caught that the scope was
never enforced through the real path.
Tests
-----
New tests/test_issue_714_production_first_bind.py drives the real entry points
in production order rather than constructing _SessionContext directly. Covers
complete first bind via each entry point, same-host repo/org drift, Timesheet
and other-repo/other-org rejection, unverified and unauthorized workspaces,
caller values unable to establish the binding, concurrent init selecting one
repository, and the PR #715 author path staying functional. Mutation-verified:
disabling trusted derivation, override validation, the scope check, or the
get_profile passthrough each fails these tests (9/8/4/5 failures).
No security assertion was weakened, removed, skipped, or rewritten.
Focused: 26 passed. Issue #714 total: 46 passed. Prior failing modules: 240
passed. Config/profile/remote modules: 130 passed. Full suite: 2739 passed,
6 skipped, 1 pre-existing warning, 161 subtests in 25.80s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Merged-PR source-branch cleanup is reconciler work (task_capability_map maps
cleanup_merged_pr_branch -> reconciler / gitea.branch.delete), but the
reconciler profile schema, execution-profile docs, and tests never covered
the permission, so no configured profile could run the guarded
gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path.
- reconciler_profile.py: add gitea.branch.delete to
RECONCILER_RECOMMENDED_OPERATIONS (not required; not forbidden)
- docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md: document merged-branch cleanup
ownership, least-privilege constraints, and the no-alias caveat
- tests/test_reconciler_profile.py: reconciler profile with branch.delete
stays valid and classified reconciler; missing grant is reported as
missing-recommended
- tests/test_branch_cleanup_guard.py: author- and merger-shaped profiles
without gitea.branch.delete fail closed on gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Introduce a dedicated reconciler role with gitea_reconcile_already_landed_pr,
which closes open PRs only after live fetch and ancestor proof against a fresh
target branch. Document the gitea-reconciler namespace and extend task routing.
PR closure had no first-class capability: agents could close PRs through
gitea_edit_pr(state=closed) with no close-specific capability proof, and
gitea_resolve_task_capability(close_pr) failed as unknown, leaving the
broad edit path as an untracked close fallback.
Add close_pr to the resolver TASK_MAP (gitea.pr.close, author-side) and
gate gitea_edit_pr(state=closed) on the same operation: without it the
close fails closed before any auth or API call, with reasons and a
structured permission_report; with it the close proceeds and is audited
as a distinct close_pr action carrying the required capability. Reject
invalid state values outright so case variants cannot bypass the gate.
Generalize the profile gate helper (_profile_operation_gate) and document
the PR comment / PR edit / PR close capability split.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Record the #139 accepted decision as a deployment doc: two static
per-role MCP namespaces (gitea-author, gitea-reviewer), one credential
per process, with dynamic profile switching and dispatcher routing
explicitly rejected for now. Covers rationale (audit clarity, credential
concentration, two-party review boundary, fail-closed behavior),
reference-only client setup via GITEA_MCP_CONFIG/GITEA_MCP_PROFILE,
the 'Auth unsupported' client-badge caveat, and reconnect/reload
requirements after profile/config/code changes. Cross-linked from the
execution-profiles model doc and the workflow runbooks; guarded by
docs-content tests.
Closes#143
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
- Add aliases 'issue.comment' and 'issue_comment' to GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES so short names normalize to gitea.issue.comment
- Grant 'issue.comment' (and short) in v2 example profiles for example-author and example-reviewer
- Grant in gitea-mcp.example.json mdcps-reviewer
- Update docs example profiles
- Add test coverage for new aliases and normalization
This enables gitea_create_issue_comment and list for profiles that include it, while preserving fail-closed for others and separation of duties (issue.comment does not imply pr.review etc).
Closes#137
Add gitea_list_issue_comments and gitea_create_issue_comment so
discussion/design workflows can read and post issue comments through
the MCP layer instead of direct API scripts.
- List requires gitea.read; create requires gitea.issue.comment —
gated separately from the gitea.pr.* review/merge family, fail closed.
- Issue comments never touch PR review endpoints.
- LLM-safe output: comment id/author/timestamps/body only; web links
appear solely under the GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS admin opt-in.
- Create operations are audit-logged (create_issue_comment) and errors
are redacted before being raised.
- Tests cover list/create success, permission blocks (including PR
review permissions not granting issue comments), forbidden-overrides,
empty body, missing issue with redacted error, endpoint separation,
and reveal opt-in.
- Document issue comments versus PR reviews in
docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md.
Closes#126
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Promote the #103 minimal alias map to the documented public table
GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES and add the #106 enforcement layer:
- normalize_operation(op, service): canonical namespaced names; legacy
spellings accepted only via the explicit table; unknown, ambiguous,
and cross-service names fail closed.
- check_operation(op, allowed, forbidden, service): normalizes BOTH the
requested operation and the profile lists before any membership
check; forbidden always overrides allowed; unnormalizable allowed
entries grant nothing and unnormalizable forbidden entries deny the
request, so normalization can never silently widen permissions;
empty/missing allowed list denies everything.
- gitea_check_pr_eligibility now routes its capability check through
check_operation, fixing the mismatch where canonical namespaced
profile ops (gitea.pr.merge) never matched the raw action (merge)
and namespaced forbidden entries were never enforced.
- Document the normalization table and enforcement rules in
docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md, replacing the stale 'enforcement
out of scope' caveat.
- tests/test_op_normalization.py: full #106 matrix (27 tests) —
qualified/legacy allowed and forbidden, unknown, ambiguous, service
mismatch, forbidden-overrides-allowed, empty/missing allowed,
duplicates after normalization, no permission widening, and
eligibility integration proving normalization happens before
enforcement. Existing v1/env unqualified behaviour stays compatible.
Closes#106
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8