fix: map Gitea auth failures to structured MCP tool errors (Closes #699)
HTTP 401/scope-403/network failures become typed client errors with stable reason codes. The FastMCP Tool.run boundary returns CallToolResult isError payloads so stdio transport survives; daemon logs use sanitized reason codes only. Regression tests cover author/reconciler profiles, transport survival, and non-misclassification of unexpected exceptions. Cross-links: #685, #695, #697, #698, PR #696 (scopes not absorbed).
This commit is contained in:
+106
-16
@@ -243,6 +243,96 @@ def _redact(text):
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return str(text)
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# ── Classified client failures (#699) ─────────────────────────────────────────
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# Subclasses of RuntimeError preserve existing ``except RuntimeError`` call
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# sites. The MCP tool-error boundary maps these to sanitized CallToolResult
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# isError payloads so auth-class failures never terminate stdio transport.
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class GiteaClientError(RuntimeError):
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"""Base for known Gitea client failures with a stable reason_code."""
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reason_code = "client_error"
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error_class = "client"
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http_status = None
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def __init__(self, message, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
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super().__init__(message)
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if reason_code is not None:
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self.reason_code = reason_code
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if http_status is not None:
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self.http_status = http_status
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class GiteaAuthError(GiteaClientError):
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"""Authentication failure (invalid/revoked credentials → typically HTTP 401)."""
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reason_code = "auth_failed"
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error_class = "authentication"
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http_status = 401
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class GiteaAuthzError(GiteaClientError):
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"""Authorization / insufficient-scope failure (typically HTTP 403 + scope)."""
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reason_code = "authz_insufficient_scope"
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error_class = "authorization"
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http_status = 403
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class GiteaNetworkError(GiteaClientError):
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"""Transport / DNS / timeout failure contacting Gitea."""
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reason_code = "network_error"
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error_class = "network"
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http_status = None
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class GiteaConfigError(GiteaClientError):
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"""Local configuration / credential resolution failure (not HTTP auth)."""
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reason_code = "config_error"
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error_class = "configuration"
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http_status = None
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def _looks_like_insufficient_scope(detail: str) -> bool:
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"""True when a 403 body indicates token scope deficiency, not generic deny."""
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lower = (detail or "").lower()
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markers = (
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"insufficient scope",
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"required scope",
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"does not have at least one of required scope",
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"token does not have",
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"missing scope",
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"scope(s)",
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)
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return any(m in lower for m in markers)
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def _raise_http_error(code: int, detail: str) -> None:
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"""Raise a classified client error for a non-retryable HTTP failure."""
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safe = _redact(detail).strip()
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if code == 401:
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msg = f"HTTP 401: {safe}" if safe else "HTTP 401: authentication failed"
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raise GiteaAuthError(
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msg,
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reason_code="auth_invalid_token",
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http_status=401,
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)
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if code == 403 and _looks_like_insufficient_scope(safe):
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msg = f"HTTP 403: {safe}" if safe else "HTTP 403: insufficient scope"
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raise GiteaAuthzError(
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msg,
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reason_code="authz_insufficient_scope",
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http_status=403,
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)
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if code in (502, 503, 504):
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msg = f"HTTP {code}: Gitea upstream unavailable"
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raise RuntimeError(f"{msg}: {safe}" if safe else msg)
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raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {code}: {safe}" if safe else f"HTTP {code}")
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def _add_query(url, **params):
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"""Return *url* with the given query parameters added or overridden.
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@@ -315,23 +405,21 @@ def api_request(method, url, auth_header, payload=None, *,
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"""Make an authenticated JSON request to the Gitea API.
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Returns parsed JSON on success (or ``None`` for an empty body), and raises
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``RuntimeError`` on failure.
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a classified client error on failure.
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On HTTP 429 the request is retried up to *max_retries* times: honoring a
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valid ``Retry-After`` header (seconds or HTTP-date) when present, otherwise
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using capped jittered exponential backoff. Successful responses are
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unchanged.
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All failures are converted to a ``RuntimeError`` with a clear, secret
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-redacted message (no raw stack traces or credential material):
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All failures use a clear, secret-redacted message (no raw stack traces or
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credential material). Classification (#699):
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- Non-429 HTTP errors surface the status code and a redacted response body.
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502/503/504 upstream errors get an explicit "Gitea upstream unavailable"
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message.
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- Timeouts and network/DNS failures (``URLError`` / ``TimeoutError``) surface
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a generic "network error contacting Gitea" message.
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- A malformed (non-JSON) success body surfaces a "malformed JSON response"
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message rather than a raw decode error.
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- HTTP 401 → :class:`GiteaAuthError` (``auth_invalid_token``)
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- HTTP 403 with scope deficiency → :class:`GiteaAuthzError`
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- Other non-429 HTTP errors → ``RuntimeError`` (502/503/504 note upstream)
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- Timeouts / DNS / ``URLError`` → :class:`GiteaNetworkError`
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- Malformed success JSON → ``RuntimeError`` (not reclassified as auth)
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The ``*_func`` parameters and ``timeout`` are injection points for
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deterministic testing.
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@@ -370,14 +458,16 @@ def api_request(method, url, auth_header, payload=None, *,
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except Exception:
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error_body = ""
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detail = _redact(error_body).strip()
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if e.code in (502, 503, 504):
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msg = f"HTTP {e.code}: Gitea upstream unavailable"
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raise RuntimeError(f"{msg}: {detail}" if detail else msg) from e
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raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {e.code}: {detail}") from e
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try:
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_raise_http_error(e.code, detail)
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except Exception as mapped:
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raise mapped from e
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raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {e.code}: {detail}") from e # pragma: no cover
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except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as e:
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reason = getattr(e, "reason", e)
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raise RuntimeError(
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f"network error contacting Gitea: {_redact(reason)}"
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raise GiteaNetworkError(
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f"network error contacting Gitea: {_redact(reason)}",
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reason_code="network_error",
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) from e
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if not body:
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+17
-3
@@ -1084,7 +1084,9 @@ from gitea_auth import ( # noqa: E402
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repo_api_url,
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get_profile,
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gitea_url,
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GiteaConfigError,
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)
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import mcp_tool_error_boundary # noqa: E402
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import gitea_audit # noqa: E402
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import gitea_config # noqa: E402
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import capability_stop_terminal # noqa: E402
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@@ -1464,6 +1466,12 @@ def _with_optional_url(result: dict, url: str | None) -> dict:
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result["url"] = url
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return result
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# #699: known auth/authz/network/config failures → structured CallToolResult
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# isError; stdio transport must survive (no unhandled raise / process exit).
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from mcp.server.fastmcp.tools.base import Tool as _FastMCPTool # noqa: E402
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mcp_tool_error_boundary.install_tool_run_boundary(_FastMCPTool)
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mcp = FastMCP("gitea-tools", instructions=(
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"Gitea issue tracker and PR management for dadeschools and prgs instances. "
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"Use the gitea_ prefixed tools to create issues, PRs, list issues, etc."
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@@ -1801,12 +1809,18 @@ def _enforce_remote_repo_guard(
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def _auth(host: str) -> str:
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"""Get auth header, raise if unavailable."""
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"""Get auth header, raise if unavailable.
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Missing credentials are a configuration failure, not a silent internal
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crash. Typed as :class:`gitea_auth.GiteaConfigError` so the tool-error
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boundary (#699) maps them to a structured isError result without EOF.
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"""
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header = get_auth_header(host)
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if header is None:
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raise RuntimeError(
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raise GiteaConfigError(
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f"No credentials for {host}. "
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"Ensure you've logged in via HTTPS at least once."
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"Ensure you've logged in via HTTPS at least once.",
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reason_code="config_error",
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)
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return header
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@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
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"""MCP tool-boundary error mapping for known Gitea client failures (#699).
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Known authentication / authorization / network / configuration failures must
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leave the tool boundary as a sanitized structured ``CallToolResult`` with
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``isError=True``. The stdio transport must remain connected; callers must
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never observe EOF for recoverable auth-class defects.
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Unexpected exceptions are mapped to ``internal_error`` and are never labeled
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as authentication failures.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import json
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import logging
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import sys
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from typing import Any
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logger = logging.getLogger("gitea_mcp.tool_error_boundary")
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# Stable reason codes (issue #699 AC).
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REASON_AUTH_FAILED = "auth_failed"
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REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN = "auth_invalid_token"
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REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE = "authz_insufficient_scope"
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REASON_NETWORK_ERROR = "network_error"
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REASON_CONFIG_ERROR = "config_error"
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REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR = "internal_error"
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ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION = "authentication"
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ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION = "authorization"
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ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK = "network"
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ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION = "configuration"
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ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL = "internal"
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# Tokens / secret substrings that must never appear in tool error text.
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_SECRET_MARKERS = (
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"token ",
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"bearer ",
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"basic ",
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"authorization:",
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"password=",
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"keychain",
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)
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def _redact_text(text: str) -> str:
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try:
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from gitea_auth import _redact
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return _redact(text)
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except Exception:
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return str(text)
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def _safe_message(message: str) -> str:
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"""Redact secrets and drop obviously sensitive fragments."""
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redacted = _redact_text(message or "")
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lower = redacted.lower()
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for marker in _SECRET_MARKERS:
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if marker in lower and marker.strip() not in ("keychain",):
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# Already redacted by gitea_auth; keep length bounded.
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break
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# Never echo raw multi-line bodies that might hold tokens.
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one_line = " ".join(redacted.split())
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if len(one_line) > 400:
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one_line = one_line[:400] + "…"
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return one_line
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def classify_exception(exc: BaseException) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""Return a structured classification for *exc*.
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Only known auth/authz/network/config classes receive those labels.
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Everything else is ``internal_error`` — never silently rebranded as auth.
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"""
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# Lazy import avoids circular import at module load (gitea_auth imports
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# are safe; typed exceptions live there).
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import gitea_auth
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if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError):
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return {
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"reason_code": getattr(exc, "reason_code", None) or REASON_AUTH_FAILED,
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"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
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"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None) or 401,
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"message": _safe_message(str(exc)),
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"transport_survives": True,
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}
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if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError):
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return {
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"reason_code": getattr(exc, "reason_code", None)
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or REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE,
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"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
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"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None) or 403,
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"message": _safe_message(str(exc)),
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"transport_survives": True,
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}
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if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError):
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return {
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"reason_code": getattr(exc, "reason_code", None) or REASON_NETWORK_ERROR,
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"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK,
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"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None),
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"message": _safe_message(str(exc)),
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"transport_survives": True,
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}
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if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaConfigError):
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return {
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"reason_code": getattr(exc, "reason_code", None) or REASON_CONFIG_ERROR,
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"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
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"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None),
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"message": _safe_message(str(exc)),
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"transport_survives": True,
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}
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# gitea_config.ConfigError is configuration, not authentication.
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try:
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import gitea_config
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if isinstance(exc, gitea_config.ConfigError):
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return {
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"reason_code": REASON_CONFIG_ERROR,
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"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
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"http_status": None,
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"message": _safe_message(str(exc)),
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"transport_survives": True,
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}
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except Exception:
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pass
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# Heuristic fallback only for already-redacted RuntimeError messages that
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# historically used the plain "HTTP 401/403" form before typed exceptions.
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# Never treat arbitrary RuntimeError as auth.
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if isinstance(exc, RuntimeError):
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text = str(exc)
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lower = text.lower()
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if lower.startswith("http 401") or "invalid username, password or token" in lower:
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return {
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"reason_code": REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN,
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"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
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"http_status": 401,
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"message": _safe_message(text),
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"transport_survives": True,
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}
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if "insufficient scope" in lower or (
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lower.startswith("http 403") and "scope" in lower
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):
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return {
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"reason_code": REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE,
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"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
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"http_status": 403,
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"message": _safe_message(text),
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"transport_survives": True,
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}
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if "network error contacting gitea" in lower:
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return {
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"reason_code": REASON_NETWORK_ERROR,
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"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK,
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"http_status": None,
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"message": _safe_message(text),
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"transport_survives": True,
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}
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return {
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"reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
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"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
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"http_status": None,
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"message": _safe_message(str(exc) or type(exc).__name__),
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"transport_survives": True,
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}
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def build_structured_error_payload(
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classification: dict[str, Any],
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*,
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tool_name: str | None = None,
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profile_name: str | None = None,
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) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""LLM-safe structured payload for tool errors (no secrets)."""
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payload: dict[str, Any] = {
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"success": False,
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"isError": True,
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"reason_code": classification["reason_code"],
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"error_class": classification["error_class"],
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"message": classification["message"],
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"transport_survives": True,
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"retryable": classification["error_class"]
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in {ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION, ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK, ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION},
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}
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if classification.get("http_status") is not None:
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payload["http_status"] = classification["http_status"]
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if tool_name:
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payload["tool"] = tool_name
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if profile_name:
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payload["profile"] = profile_name
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return payload
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def log_sanitized_daemon_reason(
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classification: dict[str, Any],
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*,
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tool_name: str | None = None,
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stream=None,
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) -> None:
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"""Write an actionable, secret-free reason line to the daemon log."""
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stream = stream if stream is not None else sys.stderr
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parts = [
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"mcp_tool_error",
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f"reason_code={classification.get('reason_code')}",
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f"error_class={classification.get('error_class')}",
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]
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if tool_name:
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parts.append(f"tool={tool_name}")
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status = classification.get("http_status")
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if status is not None:
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parts.append(f"http_status={status}")
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# Message already sanitized; still scan for secret markers.
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msg = _safe_message(str(classification.get("message") or ""))
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for marker in ("token ", "Bearer ", "Basic ", "password="):
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if marker.lower() in msg.lower():
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msg = "[redacted]"
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break
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parts.append(f"detail={msg}")
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line = " ".join(parts)
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try:
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stream.write(line + "\n")
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if hasattr(stream, "flush"):
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stream.flush()
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except Exception:
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pass
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logger.warning(line)
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def to_call_tool_result(
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exc: BaseException,
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*,
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tool_name: str | None = None,
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profile_name: str | None = None,
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log: bool = True,
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) -> Any:
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"""Build a FastMCP ``CallToolResult`` with ``isError=True`` for *exc*."""
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from mcp.types import CallToolResult, TextContent
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classification = classify_exception(exc)
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if log:
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log_sanitized_daemon_reason(classification, tool_name=tool_name)
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payload = build_structured_error_payload(
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classification, tool_name=tool_name, profile_name=profile_name
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)
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text = json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
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return CallToolResult(
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content=[TextContent(type="text", text=text)],
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structuredContent=payload,
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isError=True,
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)
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||||
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def is_known_client_failure(exc: BaseException) -> bool:
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"""True when *exc* is a known classified client failure (not internal)."""
|
||||
classification = classify_exception(exc)
|
||||
return classification["error_class"] != ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL or isinstance(
|
||||
exc, RuntimeError
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def install_tool_run_boundary(Tool) -> None:
|
||||
"""Patch FastMCP ``Tool.run`` so failures become structured isError results.
|
||||
|
||||
Auth/authz/network/config failures carry their reason codes. Unexpected
|
||||
exceptions map to ``internal_error`` — never reclassified as auth. The
|
||||
stdio transport receives ``CallToolResult(isError=True)`` instead of an
|
||||
unhandled raise path that some hosts surface as EOF (#699).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if getattr(Tool.run, "_gitea_auth_boundary_installed", False):
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
original_run = Tool.run
|
||||
|
||||
async def run_boundary(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
arguments: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
context=None,
|
||||
convert_result: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> Any:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
result = await self.fn_metadata.call_fn_with_arg_validation(
|
||||
self.fn,
|
||||
self.is_async,
|
||||
arguments,
|
||||
{self.context_kwarg: context}
|
||||
if self.context_kwarg is not None
|
||||
else None,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if convert_result:
|
||||
result = self.fn_metadata.convert_result(result)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
except Exception as exc:
|
||||
profile_name = None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from gitea_auth import get_profile
|
||||
|
||||
profile_name = (get_profile() or {}).get("profile_name")
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
profile_name = None
|
||||
|
||||
# Always return structured isError CallToolResult so stdio survives.
|
||||
return to_call_tool_result(
|
||||
exc,
|
||||
tool_name=getattr(self, "name", None),
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
run_boundary._gitea_auth_boundary_installed = True # type: ignore[attr-defined]
|
||||
run_boundary._gitea_auth_boundary_original = original_run # type: ignore[attr-defined]
|
||||
Tool.run = run_boundary # type: ignore[method-assign]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
|
||||
"""Structured MCP auth errors and stdio transport survival (#699).
|
||||
|
||||
Acceptance criteria coverage:
|
||||
- Known Gitea auth failures → sanitized structured isError CallToolResult
|
||||
- Transport survives (no process exit / os._exit on auth failure)
|
||||
- Subsequent tool call still returns a structured response
|
||||
- Auth vs authorization vs network vs config vs internal distinction
|
||||
- Unexpected exceptions are not misclassified as authentication
|
||||
- Secret leakage scan of tool error text and daemon reason codes
|
||||
- Author and reconciler profile labels covered in classification payloads
|
||||
- Native provenance non-bypass: env flag / offline runner cannot skip the
|
||||
structured boundary mapping for auth failures
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import io
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
import urllib.error
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
import gitea_auth
|
||||
import mcp_tool_error_boundary as boundary
|
||||
from tests.test_api_reliability import FAKE_AUTH, URL, FakeResp, http_error
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# api_request classification
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
class TestApiRequestAuthClassification(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_401_raises_gitea_auth_error(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(
|
||||
401, '{"message":"invalid username, password or token"}'
|
||||
)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.reason_code, "auth_invalid_token")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.http_status, 401)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.error_class, "authentication")
|
||||
self.assertIsInstance(ctx.exception, RuntimeError)
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_403_scope_raises_authz(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(
|
||||
403,
|
||||
'{"message":"token does not have at least one of required scope(s): [write:repository]"}',
|
||||
)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.reason_code, "authz_insufficient_scope")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.error_class, "authorization")
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_403_generic_not_auth(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(403, '{"message":"user has no permission"}')
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
self.assertNotIsInstance(ctx.exception, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError)
|
||||
self.assertNotIsInstance(ctx.exception, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError)
|
||||
self.assertIn("HTTP 403", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_network_raises_gitea_network_error(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = TimeoutError("timed out")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.reason_code, "network_error")
|
||||
self.assertIn("network error contacting Gitea", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_malformed_json_not_auth(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.return_value = FakeResp("not-json{")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
self.assertNotIsInstance(ctx.exception, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError)
|
||||
self.assertIn("malformed JSON", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_401_redacts_token_in_body(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(
|
||||
401, "rejected token supersecret123 for user"
|
||||
)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
msg = str(ctx.exception)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("supersecret123", msg)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(FAKE_AUTH, msg)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Boundary classification + CallToolResult
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
class TestToolErrorBoundary(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_auth_error_to_call_tool_result(self):
|
||||
exc = gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError(
|
||||
"HTTP 401: invalid username, password or token",
|
||||
reason_code="auth_invalid_token",
|
||||
http_status=401,
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = boundary.to_call_tool_result(
|
||||
exc, tool_name="gitea_whoami", profile_name="prgs-author", log=False
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result.isError)
|
||||
payload = result.structuredContent
|
||||
self.assertEqual(payload["reason_code"], "auth_invalid_token")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(payload["error_class"], "authentication")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(payload["transport_survives"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(payload["profile"], "prgs-author")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(payload["tool"], "gitea_whoami")
|
||||
text = result.content[0].text
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("supersecret", text)
|
||||
self.assertIn("auth_invalid_token", text)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_authz_distinct_from_auth(self):
|
||||
exc = gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError(
|
||||
"HTTP 403: token does not have at least one of required scope(s)",
|
||||
reason_code="authz_insufficient_scope",
|
||||
http_status=403,
|
||||
)
|
||||
c = boundary.classify_exception(exc)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(c["error_class"], "authorization")
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(c["error_class"], "authentication")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(c["reason_code"], "authz_insufficient_scope")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_network_and_config_classes(self):
|
||||
net = boundary.classify_exception(
|
||||
gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError("network error contacting Gitea: timed out")
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(net["error_class"], "network")
|
||||
cfg = boundary.classify_exception(
|
||||
gitea_auth.GiteaConfigError("No credentials for gitea.example.com")
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cfg["error_class"], "configuration")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unexpected_exception_not_auth(self):
|
||||
c = boundary.classify_exception(ValueError("something weird broke"))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(c["reason_code"], "internal_error")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(c["error_class"], "internal")
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(c["error_class"], "authentication")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_random_runtimeerror_not_auth(self):
|
||||
c = boundary.classify_exception(RuntimeError("lock file write failed"))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(c["reason_code"], "internal_error")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(c["error_class"], "internal")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_author_and_reconciler_profiles_in_payload(self):
|
||||
exc = gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError(
|
||||
"HTTP 401: invalid username, password or token",
|
||||
reason_code="auth_invalid_token",
|
||||
)
|
||||
for profile in ("prgs-author", "prgs-reconciler"):
|
||||
result = boundary.to_call_tool_result(
|
||||
exc, tool_name="gitea_whoami", profile_name=profile, log=False
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.structuredContent["profile"], profile)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
result.structuredContent["reason_code"], "auth_invalid_token"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_daemon_log_has_reason_code_no_secrets(self):
|
||||
buf = io.StringIO()
|
||||
classification = {
|
||||
"reason_code": "auth_invalid_token",
|
||||
"error_class": "authentication",
|
||||
"http_status": 401,
|
||||
"message": "HTTP 401: invalid username, password or token secret=abc",
|
||||
}
|
||||
boundary.log_sanitized_daemon_reason(
|
||||
classification, tool_name="gitea_whoami", stream=buf
|
||||
)
|
||||
line = buf.getvalue()
|
||||
self.assertIn("reason_code=auth_invalid_token", line)
|
||||
self.assertIn("tool=gitea_whoami", line)
|
||||
# The message may still contain "token" as English word in Gitea messages;
|
||||
# ensure raw credential material markers are not present as values.
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("secret=abc", line.replace(" ", ""))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_secret_markers_stripped_from_payload(self):
|
||||
exc = gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError(
|
||||
"HTTP 401: failed token supersecretXYZ rejected"
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Simulate pre-redacted path via classify after api_request-style redact.
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
boundary,
|
||||
"_redact_text",
|
||||
return_value="HTTP 401: failed token [REDACTED] rejected",
|
||||
):
|
||||
c = boundary.classify_exception(exc)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("supersecretXYZ", c["message"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Tool.run boundary: transport survival + second call
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
class TestToolRunBoundaryInstall(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
from mcp.server.fastmcp.tools.base import Tool
|
||||
|
||||
# Re-install is a no-op when already patched by gitea_mcp_server import.
|
||||
boundary.install_tool_run_boundary(Tool)
|
||||
self.Tool = Tool
|
||||
|
||||
def _make_tool(self, fn, name="demo_tool"):
|
||||
return self.Tool.from_function(fn, name=name)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_auth_failure_returns_is_error_not_raise(self):
|
||||
def boom() -> dict:
|
||||
raise gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError(
|
||||
"HTTP 401: invalid username, password or token",
|
||||
reason_code="auth_invalid_token",
|
||||
http_status=401,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
tool = self._make_tool(boom, name="gitea_whoami")
|
||||
import asyncio
|
||||
|
||||
result = asyncio.run(tool.run({}, convert_result=True))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(getattr(result, "isError", False))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
result.structuredContent["reason_code"], "auth_invalid_token"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_transport_survives_second_call(self):
|
||||
"""After an auth failure, a subsequent call still gets a structured result."""
|
||||
state = {"n": 0}
|
||||
|
||||
def flaky() -> dict:
|
||||
state["n"] += 1
|
||||
if state["n"] == 1:
|
||||
raise gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError(
|
||||
"HTTP 401: invalid username, password or token",
|
||||
reason_code="auth_invalid_token",
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {"ok": True, "call": state["n"]}
|
||||
|
||||
tool = self._make_tool(flaky, name="gitea_whoami")
|
||||
import asyncio
|
||||
|
||||
async def _both():
|
||||
first = await tool.run({}, convert_result=True)
|
||||
second = await tool.run({}, convert_result=True)
|
||||
return first, second
|
||||
|
||||
first, second = asyncio.run(_both())
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertTrue(first.isError)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(first.structuredContent["error_class"], "authentication")
|
||||
# Second call succeeds (or would return another structured error — not EOF).
|
||||
self.assertFalse(getattr(second, "isError", False))
|
||||
# convert_result for dict returns content blocks / structured form
|
||||
# depending on FastMCP version — assert process continued.
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(second)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_auth_failure_does_not_call_os_exit(self):
|
||||
def boom() -> dict:
|
||||
raise gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError(
|
||||
"HTTP 401: invalid username, password or token",
|
||||
reason_code="auth_invalid_token",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
tool = self._make_tool(boom)
|
||||
import asyncio
|
||||
|
||||
with patch("os._exit") as mock_exit:
|
||||
result = asyncio.run(tool.run({}, convert_result=True))
|
||||
mock_exit.assert_not_called()
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result.isError)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_reconciler_profile_auth_failure_structured(self):
|
||||
def boom() -> dict:
|
||||
raise gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError(
|
||||
"HTTP 401: invalid username, password or token",
|
||||
reason_code="auth_invalid_token",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
tool = self._make_tool(boom, name="gitea_list_issues")
|
||||
import asyncio
|
||||
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"gitea_auth.get_profile",
|
||||
return_value={"profile_name": "prgs-reconciler"},
|
||||
):
|
||||
result = asyncio.run(tool.run({}, convert_result=True))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result.isError)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.structuredContent.get("profile"), "prgs-reconciler")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_internal_exception_not_labeled_auth(self):
|
||||
def boom() -> dict:
|
||||
raise KeyError("unexpected internal bug")
|
||||
|
||||
tool = self._make_tool(boom)
|
||||
import asyncio
|
||||
|
||||
result = asyncio.run(tool.run({}, convert_result=True))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result.isError)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.structuredContent["error_class"], "internal")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.structuredContent["reason_code"], "internal_error")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Provenance: no env flag / offline path skips structured boundary for auth
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
class TestNativeProvenanceNonBypass(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_env_flag_cannot_disable_classification(self):
|
||||
"""No supported env flag turns auth failures into unlabeled exits."""
|
||||
# Even with various offline/test flags set, classification remains.
|
||||
env_keys = (
|
||||
"GITEA_OFFLINE",
|
||||
"GITEA_SKIP_AUTH_BOUNDARY",
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_OFFLINE",
|
||||
"GITEA_BYPASS_NATIVE_MCP",
|
||||
)
|
||||
saved = {k: os.environ.get(k) for k in env_keys}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
for k in env_keys:
|
||||
os.environ[k] = "1"
|
||||
exc = gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError(
|
||||
"HTTP 401: invalid username, password or token",
|
||||
reason_code="auth_invalid_token",
|
||||
)
|
||||
c = boundary.classify_exception(exc)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(c["error_class"], "authentication")
|
||||
result = boundary.to_call_tool_result(exc, log=False)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result.isError)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result.structuredContent["reason_code"], "auth_invalid_token")
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
for k, v in saved.items():
|
||||
if v is None:
|
||||
os.environ.pop(k, None)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
os.environ[k] = v
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_bypass_attribute_on_boundary(self):
|
||||
"""Boundary module must not expose an offline bypass switch."""
|
||||
for name in dir(boundary):
|
||||
lower = name.lower()
|
||||
self.assertFalse(
|
||||
lower.startswith("bypass") or lower.startswith("skip_native"),
|
||||
msg=f"unexpected bypass surface: {name}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user