Files
Gitea-Tools/tests/test_issue_886_apply_authorization_conjunction.py
T
sysadminandGrok 4.5 461e1dac78 feat(mcp): enforce scoped recovery playbook before full restart (Closes #669)
Add recovery_playbook.py with the narrow-to-broad recovery ladder, symptom
routing, attempt-log helpers, and escalation metrics. Wire the attempt-log
gate into restart_coordinator so rolling/full/host restarts require prior
insufficient narrower attempts (or break-glass). Document the ladder and
update gitea_request_mcp_restart for prior_recovery_attempts_json.

Co-Authored-By: Grok 4.5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-25 17:35:11 -04:00

396 lines
17 KiB
Python

"""``apply_authorized`` requires BOTH authorizations (#886 review blocker B1).
The #663 restart-class matrix and the #661 drain-proof hard gate are independent
authorizations that first coexisted when PR #882 landed on master and PR #886
merged it into the restart-class branch. The union preserved both, but the apply
decision consulted only the drain gate::
payload["apply_authorized"] = gate.allow # pre-fix
so a clean drain proof — or an authorized break-glass, which needs no proof at
all — reported ``apply_authorized: True`` for a restart class the least-privilege
matrix had just denied, in the same payload that carried
``allow_restart: False`` and "role 'author' may not request full_mcp_restart".
These tests pin the conjunction and the properties that must survive it. They
exercise the real MCP tool, which previously had no test coverage at all — that
absence is why the defect shipped.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
import drain_proof
import gitea_mcp_server as srv
CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV = "GITEA_CONTROLLER_RESTART_APPROVAL_AUTHORIZATION"
BREAK_GLASS_ENV = "GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION"
# A quiet control plane: nothing live, so the blast radius never masks the
# authorization outcome under test.
QUIET_SESSIONS: list[dict] = []
QUIET_LEASES: list[dict] = []
# #669: broad restarts need a prior narrow-attempt log (unless break-glass).
PRIOR_NARROW_ATTEMPTS_JSON = json.dumps(
[
{
"action": "client_reconnect",
"outcome": "insufficient",
"reason": "still flapping after reconnect",
}
]
)
class _FakeDB:
"""Minimal control-plane DB stand-in for the restart inventory."""
def __init__(self, sessions=QUIET_SESSIONS, terminal=None):
self._sessions = list(sessions)
self._terminal = terminal
def list_sessions(self, statuses=None, limit=None):
return list(self._sessions)
def get_active_terminal_lock(self, remote=None, org=None, repo=None):
return self._terminal
def _profile(role: str) -> dict:
return {"profile_name": f"prgs-{role}", "role_kind": role, "role": role}
class _RestartToolHarness(unittest.TestCase):
"""Drives the real ``gitea_request_mcp_restart`` with a stubbed inventory."""
def _call(self, *, role: str, env: dict | None = None, **kwargs) -> dict:
environ = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items()
if k not in (CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV, BREAK_GLASS_ENV)}
environ.update(env or {})
with patch.object(srv, "_profile_operation_gate", return_value=None), \
patch.object(srv, "_resolve",
return_value=("gitea.prgs.cc",
"Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
"Gitea-Tools")), \
patch.object(srv, "get_profile", return_value=_profile(role)), \
patch.object(srv, "_control_plane_db_or_error",
return_value=(_FakeDB(), [])), \
patch.object(srv.lease_lifecycle, "list_active_leases",
return_value={"leases": list(QUIET_LEASES)}), \
patch.dict(os.environ, environ, clear=True):
return srv.gitea_request_mcp_restart(
remote="prgs",
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
repo="Gitea-Tools",
session_id="probe-session",
**kwargs,
)
def _clean_proof_for(self, preview: dict) -> str:
"""Mint a genuinely clean, signature-valid proof bound to *preview*.
Built from the tool's own dry-run report, so the fingerprint matches and
the proof is rejected for authorization reasons only — never because it
was stale or forged.
"""
proof = drain_proof.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=preview,
drain_state={
"assignments_stopped": True,
"checkpoints_complete": True,
"handoffs_verified": True,
"leases_handled": True,
"acks": {},
},
requesting_session_id="probe-session",
)
self.assertTrue(proof.clean, "harness must mint a clean proof")
return json.dumps(proof.as_dict())
class TestConjunction(_RestartToolHarness):
"""AC1/AC2 — the two authorizations are ANDed, in both directions."""
def test_gate_allow_with_class_denied_yields_apply_authorized_false(self):
# An author may not request full_mcp_restart (CONTROL_ROLES only).
preview = self._call(role="author", restart_class="full_mcp_restart")
self.assertFalse(preview["allow_restart"])
result = self._call(
role="author",
restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
dry_run=False,
drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
)
self.assertTrue(result["apply_gate"]["drain_gate_allow"],
"drain gate itself should have allowed this proof")
self.assertFalse(result["apply_gate"]["restart_class_authorized"])
self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"],
"a clean proof must not authorize a denied class")
self.assertFalse(result["allow_restart"])
def test_gate_allow_with_class_allowed_can_yield_apply_authorized_true(self):
preview = self._call(
role="operator",
restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
prior_recovery_attempts_json=PRIOR_NARROW_ATTEMPTS_JSON,
env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"},
)
self.assertTrue(preview["allow_restart"],
"operator + controller approval must authorize the class")
result = self._call(
role="operator",
restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
prior_recovery_attempts_json=PRIOR_NARROW_ATTEMPTS_JSON,
dry_run=False,
drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"},
)
self.assertTrue(result["apply_gate"]["drain_gate_allow"])
self.assertTrue(result["apply_gate"]["restart_class_authorized"])
self.assertTrue(result["apply_authorized"],
"both authorizations pass; apply must be authorized")
def test_denial_is_attributable_to_the_authorization_that_caused_it(self):
preview = self._call(role="author", restart_class="full_mcp_restart")
result = self._call(
role="author",
restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
dry_run=False,
drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
)
blob = " ".join(result["apply_gate"]["reasons"]).lower()
self.assertIn("restart class authorization denied", blob)
self.assertIn("full_mcp_restart", blob)
class TestProofCannotOverrideAuthorization(_RestartToolHarness):
"""AC3 — a clean proof never overrides a class or requester-role denial."""
def test_clean_proof_cannot_override_role_denial(self):
for role in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler"):
with self.subTest(role=role):
preview = self._call(role=role, restart_class="full_mcp_restart")
result = self._call(
role=role,
restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
dry_run=False,
drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
)
self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
def test_clean_proof_cannot_override_missing_controller_approval(self):
# Correct role, but the class demands controller approval and the
# environment carries none.
preview = self._call(role="operator", restart_class="full_mcp_restart")
self.assertFalse(preview["allow_restart"])
result = self._call(
role="operator",
restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
dry_run=False,
drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
)
self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
def test_clean_proof_cannot_override_unknown_class(self):
preview = self._call(role="operator", restart_class="not_a_real_class",
env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"})
self.assertFalse(preview["allow_restart"])
result = self._call(
role="operator",
restart_class="not_a_real_class",
dry_run=False,
drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"},
)
self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
def test_clean_proof_cannot_override_missing_scope_target(self):
# worker_restart without target_session_id fails closed on scoping.
preview = self._call(role="operator", restart_class="worker_restart",
env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"})
self.assertFalse(preview["allow_restart"])
result = self._call(
role="operator",
restart_class="worker_restart",
dry_run=False,
drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"},
)
self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
class TestBreakGlassDoesNotCollapseTheMatrix(_RestartToolHarness):
"""AC4 — break-glass bypasses the drain proof only, never the class matrix."""
def test_break_glass_does_not_authorize_a_denied_class(self):
result = self._call(
role="author",
restart_class="host_restart",
dry_run=False,
request_break_glass=True,
env={BREAK_GLASS_ENV: "operator-issued"},
)
self.assertTrue(result["break_glass_authorized"])
self.assertTrue(result["apply_gate"]["drain_gate_allow"],
"break-glass does satisfy the drain gate")
self.assertFalse(result["apply_gate"]["restart_class_authorized"])
self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"],
"break-glass must not collapse the class matrix")
def test_break_glass_across_every_worker_role_and_restricted_class(self):
for role in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler"):
for klass in ("rolling_mcp_restart", "full_mcp_restart",
"host_restart"):
with self.subTest(role=role, restart_class=klass):
result = self._call(
role=role,
restart_class=klass,
dry_run=False,
request_break_glass=True,
env={BREAK_GLASS_ENV: "operator-issued"},
)
self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
def test_break_glass_still_works_when_the_class_is_authorized(self):
# Break-glass keeps its purpose: skipping the drain proof for a caller
# the matrix does allow.
result = self._call(
role="operator",
restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
dry_run=False,
request_break_glass=True,
env={BREAK_GLASS_ENV: "operator-issued",
CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"},
)
self.assertTrue(result["apply_authorized"])
self.assertEqual(result["apply_gate"]["verdict"], "break_glass")
def test_break_glass_is_not_self_assertable(self):
# Requested but no environment authorization -> no bypass, and the
# unproven apply is denied.
result = self._call(
role="operator",
restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
dry_run=False,
request_break_glass=True,
env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"},
)
self.assertTrue(result["break_glass_requested"])
self.assertFalse(result["break_glass_authorized"])
self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
self.assertIn("incident", result)
class TestRestrictedClassesStayDenied(_RestartToolHarness):
"""AC5 — restricted classes remain denied to unauthorized requesters."""
def test_restricted_classes_denied_for_worker_roles(self):
for role in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler"):
for klass in ("rolling_mcp_restart", "full_mcp_restart",
"host_restart"):
with self.subTest(role=role, restart_class=klass):
preview = self._call(
role=role,
restart_class=klass,
env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"},
)
self.assertFalse(preview["allow_restart"])
self.assertFalse(preview["permission_authorized"])
self.assertFalse(preview["role_authorized"])
def test_host_restart_needs_controller_and_infrastructure_operator(self):
# controller approval alone is not enough for host_restart.
preview = self._call(role="controller", restart_class="host_restart",
env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"})
self.assertFalse(preview["approval_satisfied"])
self.assertFalse(preview["allow_restart"])
class TestExistingPathsStillWork(_RestartToolHarness):
"""AC6 — valid scoped and unscoped restart paths are unaffected."""
def test_dry_run_never_reports_apply_authorization(self):
result = self._call(role="operator", restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"})
self.assertNotIn("apply_authorized", result)
self.assertNotIn("apply_gate", result)
self.assertFalse(result["apply_supported"])
self.assertFalse(result["restart_performed"])
def test_self_service_unscoped_classes_authorize_for_every_role(self):
for role in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler",
"controller", "operator", "admin"):
for klass in ("client_reconnect", "session_reconnect"):
with self.subTest(role=role, restart_class=klass):
preview = self._call(role=role, restart_class=klass)
self.assertTrue(preview["allow_restart"])
def test_scoped_class_with_target_authorizes_and_applies(self):
env = {CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"}
preview = self._call(role="operator", restart_class="worker_restart",
target_session_id="worker-1", env=env)
self.assertTrue(preview["allow_restart"])
result = self._call(
role="operator",
restart_class="worker_restart",
target_session_id="worker-1",
dry_run=False,
drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
env=env,
)
self.assertTrue(result["apply_authorized"])
def test_apply_still_denies_without_any_proof(self):
# The #661 hard gate is untouched by the conjunction.
result = self._call(
role="operator",
restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
prior_recovery_attempts_json=PRIOR_NARROW_ATTEMPTS_JSON,
dry_run=False,
env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"},
)
self.assertFalse(result["apply_gate"]["drain_gate_allow"])
self.assertTrue(result["apply_gate"]["restart_class_authorized"])
self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
self.assertEqual(result["incident"]["kind"], "restart_drain_gate_denied")
def test_apply_denies_on_malformed_proof(self):
result = self._call(
role="operator",
restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
dry_run=False,
drain_proof_json="{not valid json",
env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"},
)
self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
self.assertTrue(any("invalid drain_proof_json" in reason
for reason in result["apply_gate"]["reasons"]))
def test_tool_never_restarts_on_any_path(self):
for kwargs in (
{"restart_class": "client_reconnect"},
{"restart_class": "full_mcp_restart", "dry_run": False},
{"restart_class": "host_restart", "dry_run": False,
"request_break_glass": True},
):
with self.subTest(**kwargs):
result = self._call(role="operator", env={
CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes", BREAK_GLASS_ENV: "yes"},
**kwargs)
self.assertFalse(result["restart_performed"])
self.assertFalse(result["apply_supported"])
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()