Files
Gitea-Tools/webui/timeline.py
sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8 a1e5a4af8c fix(webui): validate externally influenced event_type at the timeline boundary (#637)
Review #526 found that event_type reached the serialized timeline payload
without crossing the redaction/validation boundary every other free-text
field on the same event crosses. A synthetic secret-shaped 40-hex canary
was redacted through message but survived verbatim through event_type on
the same control-plane record.

CTH heading path: CTH_TYPES is now the single authority for what a CTH
type may be. canonical_thread_handoff.is_known_cth_type() is that
authority, used by format_cth_body (write), assess_cth_comment (assess),
and now the read path too; parse_cth_comment reports membership as
cth_type_known and stays total. adapt_cth_comments serializes
handoff:<type> only for a declared type and otherwise emits the constant
handoff:unrecognized, so arbitrary, malformed, secret-shaped, or
whitespace-manipulated heading content never becomes an event_type.

Control-plane path: a stored event_type is treated as source data.
_safe_cp_event_type accepts only an ordinary identifier that is not a
bare secret-shaped hex run and that a redaction pass leaves unchanged;
anything else fails closed to the constant unsafe:redacted and marks the
event sensitive. The value is never emitted verbatim, never partially
sanitized, and never rewritten into a different valid-looking type.

Remaining serialized-field audit: event_key ids must be plain numeric
identifiers, the CTH adapter refuses a scope it cannot express, per-source
failure reasons are redacted (they can quote an authenticated fetch error),
and echoed scope/filter values are guarded so reflection is not a bypass.

Legitimate values are preserved: every declared CTH type, the real
producer types (assigned, lease_released, lease_adopted,
dependency_edge_state_change, allocation, pr.opened, lease.renew), and
the existing issue, PR, evidence, and full-SHA references.

Tests seed the canary independently through both event_type paths with a
benign message, so message redaction cannot be why they pass; each
inspects event_type directly, asserts the canary is absent from the
complete serialized payload, and asserts scan_for_secrets finds nothing.

tests/test_webui_timeline.py 64 passed, 15 subtests
pytest -k webui 362 passed, 285 subtests
pytest -k redact 79 passed
tests/test_canonical_thread_handoff.py tests/test_control_plane_db.py 29 passed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-23 18:45:54 -04:00

907 lines
36 KiB
Python

"""Workflow-event and conversation timeline model (#637, Phase 1).
Operators cannot browse a unified timeline of workflow events, decisions,
tool calls, and handoffs: the evidence is scattered across control-plane
events, Gitea canonical handoff comments, and local logs. This module defines
one durable, versioned event schema and per-source adapters that normalise
those scattered records into a single ``WorkflowEvent`` stream, plus a
read-only query layer (filter by issue / PR / session, stable ordering,
pagination) that the ``/api/v1/timeline`` route serves.
Design rules honoured here:
- **Read-only.** Sources are read; nothing is mutated. The control-plane
database is opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI so a missing or unwritable DB
degrades to a reason instead of creating directories or running migrations.
- **Fail-soft per source.** An unavailable source degrades to a status with a
reason rather than raising, and a source that could not run is never
rendered as an empty-and-healthy timeline.
- **Answerable filters only.** Each source declares which filter dimensions it
can actually answer. A filter dimension no source that ran can carry is
refused with an explicit reason rather than silently matching nothing: an
empty page from an unanswerable filter reads to an operator as "no such
activity", which is a different — and false — statement.
- **Redaction at the boundary, fail closed.** Every free-text field (event
messages, redacted tool arguments, decision/proof text) is run through the
console redaction policy before it leaves this module, and *before* any
structured value is derived from it — evidence references are extracted from
redacted text, then independently revalidated before serialization. An
unredactable value becomes the placeholder, and a value that cannot be proven
safe is dropped — an unredacted payload is never emitted, and a generation
error never drops raw data to a caller or a log.
- **Stable ordering.** Events sort by ``(timestamp, source_rank, event_key)``
with a deterministic tiebreak, so pagination is stable across calls and
events with equal or missing timestamps keep a fixed order.
Non-goals (from the issue): no full chat replay, no mutation of historical
events, no unredacted tool-argument storage.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
import sqlite3
from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Any, Callable, Iterable
import control_plane_db
from webui import console_redaction
# The schema is versioned so consumers can branch on shape. Bump on any
# breaking change to WorkflowEvent's serialized form.
TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
# Known event sources and their deterministic ordering rank. When two events
# carry the same timestamp, the source rank breaks the tie before the
# per-source event key, so a control-plane event and a handoff comment minted
# in the same second always sort in a fixed order.
SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE = "control_plane"
SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF = "gitea_handoff"
_SOURCE_RANK = {
SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE: 0,
SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF: 1,
}
# The filter dimensions the query layer accepts.
FILTER_ISSUE = "issue"
FILTER_PR = "pr"
FILTER_SESSION = "session"
# Which dimensions each source can actually answer. This is a property of the
# underlying records, not of the query code: the control-plane ``events`` table
# is (event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at) and carries no
# session identity at all, so no control-plane event can ever match a session
# filter. A CTH handoff comment can declare its session as a field, so the
# handoff source answers all three. Filtering on a dimension the surviving
# sources cannot carry is refused in ``load_timeline`` rather than answered
# with an empty page.
_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE: (FILTER_ISSUE, FILTER_PR),
SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF: (FILTER_ISSUE, FILTER_PR, FILTER_SESSION),
}
# Why a source cannot answer a dimension, for the refusal reason an operator reads.
_SOURCE_FILTER_LIMITS: dict[tuple[str, str], str] = {
(SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE, FILTER_SESSION): (
"control-plane events carry no session identity "
"(the events table has no session column)"
),
}
# A timestamp far in the future so events with no parseable timestamp sort
# last (after everything real) instead of first, without raising.
_MISSING_TS_SORT = "9999-12-31T23:59:59Z"
def _parse_ts(value: str | None) -> str | None:
"""Normalise a timestamp to ``...Z`` UTC, or None when unparseable."""
if not value:
return None
text = str(value).strip()
if not text:
return None
candidate = text[:-1] + "+00:00" if text.endswith("Z") else text
try:
parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(candidate)
except ValueError:
return None
if parsed.tzinfo is None:
parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
def _redact(value: Any) -> Any:
"""Redact a single free-text field, failing closed to the placeholder."""
if value is None:
return None
return console_redaction.redact_text(str(value))
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class WorkflowEvent:
"""One normalised timeline event.
Every field is optional except ``source``/``event_type``/``event_key``
because sources carry different subsets. The class is frozen so an adapted
event is an immutable record; a consumer that needs a variant builds a new
one rather than mutating history.
"""
source: str
event_type: str
event_key: str
timestamp: str | None = None
actor: str | None = None
role: str | None = None
issue_number: int | None = None
pr_number: int | None = None
session_id: str | None = None
tool_name: str | None = None
decision: str | None = None
message: str | None = None
correlation_id: str | None = None
evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
sensitive: bool = False
def sort_key(self) -> tuple[str, int, str]:
return (
self.timestamp or _MISSING_TS_SORT,
_SOURCE_RANK.get(self.source, 99),
self.event_key,
)
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"source": self.source,
"event_type": self.event_type,
"event_key": self.event_key,
"timestamp": self.timestamp,
"actor": self.actor,
"role": self.role,
"issue_number": self.issue_number,
"pr_number": self.pr_number,
"session_id": self.session_id,
"tool_name": self.tool_name,
"decision": self.decision,
"message": self.message,
"correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
"evidence_refs": list(self.evidence_refs),
"sensitive": self.sensitive,
}
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Adapters — pure functions from a source's raw records to WorkflowEvents. #
# Each is total: a malformed record is skipped, never raised on. #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Event types whose payload is treated as sensitive and always redaction-hard
# (they can carry lease/session provenance or tool arguments).
_SENSITIVE_EVENT_HINTS = ("lease", "capability", "token", "auth", "secret")
# Reference tokens (issue/PR/comment ids) and SHAs parsed out of proof text.
_EVIDENCE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"(?:#|PR\s*#?|issue\s*#?|comment\s*#?)(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE)
# A commit reference is only recognised when the text *declares* it as one.
# A bare lowercase hex run is not evidence of anything: at 40 characters it is
# exactly the shape of a Gitea personal access token, and at 7 it also matches
# ordinary words such as "defaced". Requiring an anchoring keyword keeps real
# references ("commit abc1234", "at head a209756...", "base caaae9b6") usable
# while refusing to lift an undeclared secret-shaped run out of free text.
_SHA_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i:\b(?:commit|sha|head|base|parent|revision|rev|merge[- ]base)\b[\s:=@#]*)"
r"([0-9a-f]{7,40})\b"
)
# Shapes a serialized evidence reference is allowed to take. Anything else is
# dropped rather than emitted.
_REF_ISSUE_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^#[0-9]{1,9}$")
_REF_SHA_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{7,40}$")
# A long undelimited hex run with no declaring context is treated as credential
# material wherever it appears, never as an identifier.
_BARE_SECRET_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{32,}$")
# An event type reads like an identifier, but a stored one is externally
# influenced: any producer that writes the control-plane ``events`` table
# chooses the string. It reaches ``to_dict`` verbatim, so it is validated here
# rather than trusted because of where it came from.
_CP_EVENT_TYPE_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9._:+-]{0,63}$")
# Emitted in place of a value that cannot be proven safe. Deliberately not a
# plausible workflow type: an unsafe value is refused, never quietly rewritten
# into a different valid-looking one that would misdescribe the record.
UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE = "unsafe:redacted"
# Emitted for a CTH heading that is not a declared member of ``CTH_TYPES``. The
# contract is enforced on write (``format_cth_body``) and on assess; the read
# path the timeline uses enforces it too rather than assuming it was.
UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE = "handoff:unrecognized"
# A source record id is a plain integer in both sources it comes from: the
# control-plane ``events`` primary key and a Gitea comment id. ``event_key`` is
# serialized verbatim and is the pagination tiebreak, so anything else is
# refused rather than interpolated into it.
_RECORD_ID_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9]{1,19}$")
def _kind_to_numbers(kind: str | None, number: int | None) -> tuple[int | None, int | None]:
"""Map a control-plane work-item (kind, number) to (issue_no, pr_no)."""
if number is None:
return (None, None)
if kind == "pr":
return (None, int(number))
if kind == "issue":
return (int(number), None)
return (None, None)
def _correlation_for(kind: str | None, number: int | None) -> str | None:
if number is None or kind not in ("issue", "pr"):
return None
return f"{kind}#{number}"
def _extract_evidence_refs(*texts: str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""Extract issue/PR and declared-commit references from **redacted** text.
Callers must pass text that has already been through :func:`_redact`; this
function derives a structured field from its input, so extracting ahead of
redaction would republish whatever redaction was about to remove. Every
reference is revalidated by :func:`_validated_evidence_refs` before it is
serialized.
"""
refs: list[str] = []
for text in texts:
if not text:
continue
for match in _EVIDENCE_REF_RE.finditer(text):
token = f"#{match.group(1)}"
if token not in refs:
refs.append(token)
for match in _SHA_RE.finditer(text):
token = match.group(1)
if token not in refs:
refs.append(token)
return tuple(refs)
def _validated_evidence_refs(refs: Iterable[str]) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], bool]:
"""Independently revalidate references immediately before serialization.
Extraction is not trusted on its own. A reference survives only when it has
a known reference shape and is unchanged by a second redaction pass — a
value the redaction policy would alter is credential material that must not
be emitted as a structured field. A full 40-character SHA stays usable
because extraction only accepts a hex run the source text explicitly
declared as a commit. Returns ``(safe_refs, dropped_any)``; ``dropped_any``
marks the event sensitive so the drop is visible rather than silent.
"""
safe: list[str] = []
dropped = False
for ref in refs or ():
try:
token = str(ref).strip()
if not token:
continue
recognised = bool(_REF_ISSUE_SHAPE.match(token) or _REF_SHA_SHAPE.match(token))
if not recognised:
dropped = True
continue
if _redact(token) != token:
dropped = True
continue
if token not in safe:
safe.append(token)
except Exception:
# Fail closed: a reference that cannot be proven safe is dropped.
dropped = True
continue
return (tuple(safe), dropped)
def _safe_session_id(value: Any) -> str | None:
"""Return a session identifier only when it is safe to emit.
The value is authoritative source data — a session the record names for
itself — but it is still free text. It is dropped when redaction alters it
or when it is a bare secret-shaped hex run, so a credential parked in a
session field can never reach the payload or be echoed back by a filter.
"""
if value is None:
return None
text = str(value).strip()
if not text:
return None
if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text):
return None
return text if _redact(text) == text else None
def _safe_record_id(value: Any) -> str | None:
"""Return a source record id only when it is a plain numeric identifier.
``event_key`` is serialized verbatim and is the deterministic pagination
tiebreak, so an id is interpolated into it only when it has the shape both
real sources actually produce. A record whose identity cannot be trusted is
refused by the caller rather than keyed on.
"""
if value is None or isinstance(value, bool):
return None
if isinstance(value, int):
return str(value)
text = str(value).strip()
return text if _RECORD_ID_SHAPE.match(text) else None
def _safe_cp_event_type(value: Any) -> tuple[str, bool]:
"""Validate a stored control-plane event type. Returns ``(type, unsafe)``.
The stored value is externally influenced — whichever producer wrote the
``events`` row chose the string — and ``to_dict`` serializes it verbatim, so
it passes a boundary of its own instead of relying on the one ``message``
passes. A value survives only when it is an ordinary identifier, is not a
bare secret-shaped hex run, and is unchanged by a redaction pass. Anything
else fails closed to :data:`UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE`: the record stays visible as
an audit entry, but the value itself is never republished — not verbatim,
not partially sanitized, and not rewritten into some other valid-looking
type that would misdescribe what happened.
"""
text = ("" if value is None else str(value)).strip()
if not text:
return ("", False)
if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text):
return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
if not _CP_EVENT_TYPE_SHAPE.match(text):
return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
if _redact(text) != text:
return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
return (text, False)
def _safe_echo(value: Any) -> Any:
"""Guard a scalar that is echoed back rather than derived from a record.
Query scope and filter values are caller-supplied and are reflected in the
response so an operator can see what was asked. Reflection is still
emission: a value redaction would alter, or a bare secret-shaped hex run, is
replaced by the placeholder instead of being echoed verbatim. Ordinary
scope and filter values pass through untouched.
"""
if value is None or isinstance(value, (int, bool)):
return value
text = str(value)
if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text.strip()):
return console_redaction.REDACTED
return _redact(text)
def adapt_cp_events(rows: Iterable[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
"""Adapt control-plane ``events`` rows (joined to work_items) into events.
Each row is expected to carry ``event_id``, ``event_type``, ``message``,
``created_at`` and the joined work-item ``kind``/``number``. Rows missing
an id or type are skipped so a partially written table never raises.
"""
events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
for row in rows or []:
try:
event_id = _safe_record_id(row.get("event_id"))
raw_event_type = (row.get("event_type") or "").strip()
if event_id is None or not raw_event_type:
continue
# The stored type is source data, not a trusted constant: validate
# it before it is serialized, exactly as `message` below is redacted
# before it is serialized.
event_type, event_type_unsafe = _safe_cp_event_type(raw_event_type)
kind = row.get("kind")
number = row.get("number")
issue_no, pr_no = _kind_to_numbers(kind, number)
sensitive = event_type_unsafe or any(
hint in raw_event_type.lower() for hint in _SENSITIVE_EVENT_HINTS
)
events.append(
WorkflowEvent(
source=SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE,
event_type=event_type,
event_key=f"cp:{event_id}",
timestamp=_parse_ts(row.get("created_at")),
issue_number=issue_no,
pr_number=pr_no,
# No session_id: the control-plane events table is
# (event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)
# and records no session. Inventing one from the work item
# or the message text would be a guess, so this source
# declares the session dimension unsupported instead
# (_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT) and the query layer refuses a
# session filter it cannot honestly answer.
message=_redact(row.get("message")),
correlation_id=_correlation_for(kind, number),
sensitive=sensitive,
)
)
except Exception:
# A single malformed row must not sink the whole adaptation.
continue
return events
def adapt_cth_comments(
comments: Iterable[dict[str, Any]],
*,
kind: str,
number: int,
) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
"""Adapt Gitea Canonical Thread Handoff (CTH) comments into events.
Only comments that parse as a CTH (``canonical_thread_handoff.parse_cth_comment``)
become events; ordinary comments are ignored. ``kind``/``number`` scope the
events to the issue or PR the comments belong to.
"""
# Imported lazily so this module has no import-time dependency on the
# handoff parser when only the control-plane adapter is used.
from canonical_thread_handoff import is_known_cth_type, parse_cth_comment
# ``kind``/``number`` are interpolated into event_key and correlation_id, so
# they are normalised once here. A scope this adapter cannot express is
# refused outright rather than serialized into an identifier.
kind = (kind or "").strip().lower()
if kind not in ("issue", "pr"):
return []
try:
number = int(number)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return []
issue_no, pr_no = _kind_to_numbers(kind, number)
correlation = _correlation_for(kind, number)
events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
for comment in comments or []:
try:
body = comment.get("body") or ""
parsed = parse_cth_comment(body)
if not parsed:
continue
fields = parsed.get("fields") or {}
cth_type = parsed.get("cth_type") or ""
comment_id = _safe_record_id(comment.get("id"))
if comment_id is None:
continue
# The CTH heading is free text: the parser accepts whatever follows
# "## CTH:", and only the write and assess paths check it against
# the contract. Check it here too — an unrecognised heading is
# reported as such rather than serialized into event_type, so
# arbitrary, malformed, or secret-shaped heading content has no way
# through. Declared types are preserved exactly.
cth_type_known = is_known_cth_type(cth_type)
# Redaction runs first, and every derived value is taken from the
# redacted text — deriving evidence refs from the raw proof would
# re-emit exactly what redaction was about to remove.
decision = _redact(fields.get("decision"))
proof = _redact(fields.get("proof"))
next_action = _redact(fields.get("next action"))
refs, refs_dropped = _validated_evidence_refs(
_extract_evidence_refs(proof, decision)
)
events.append(
WorkflowEvent(
source=SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF,
event_type=(
f"handoff:{cth_type.strip()}"
if cth_type_known
else UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE
),
event_key=f"cth:{kind}:{number}:{comment_id}",
timestamp=_parse_ts(comment.get("created_at")),
actor=_redact((comment.get("user") or {}).get("login")),
role=_redact(fields.get("next owner")),
issue_number=issue_no,
pr_number=pr_no,
# A CTH names its own session when the producer records one;
# it is read from that declared field, never inferred from
# unrelated text.
session_id=_safe_session_id(fields.get("session")),
decision=decision,
message=next_action or _redact(fields.get("status")),
correlation_id=correlation,
evidence_refs=refs,
sensitive=refs_dropped or not cth_type_known,
)
)
except Exception:
continue
return events
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Read-only control-plane event source. #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
_CP_EVENTS_QUERY = """
SELECT e.event_id AS event_id,
e.event_type AS event_type,
e.message AS message,
e.created_at AS created_at,
w.kind AS kind,
w.number AS number
FROM events e
JOIN work_items w ON e.work_item_id = w.work_item_id
WHERE w.remote = ? AND w.org = ? AND w.repo = ?
"""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SourceStatus:
"""Fail-soft status for one timeline source.
``supported_filters`` states which filter dimensions this source's records
can carry; ``unsupported_filters`` names the requested dimensions it cannot,
so an operator can see *why* a source contributed nothing rather than being
left to read an empty list as an absence of activity.
"""
name: str
ok: bool
reason: str | None = None
count: int = 0
supported_filters: tuple[str, ...] = ()
unsupported_filters: tuple[str, ...] = ()
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"name": self.name,
"ok": self.ok,
"reason": self.reason,
"count": self.count,
"supported_filters": list(self.supported_filters),
"unsupported_filters": list(self.unsupported_filters),
}
def _cp_status(*, ok: bool, reason: str | None = None, count: int = 0) -> SourceStatus:
return SourceStatus(
SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE,
ok=ok,
# A failure reason is serialized like any other field and is often an
# exception string carrying a path or a transport error, so it crosses
# the redaction boundary too. Static reasons pass through unchanged.
reason=_redact(reason),
count=count,
supported_filters=_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT[SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE],
)
def _handoff_status(*, ok: bool, reason: str | None = None, count: int = 0) -> SourceStatus:
return SourceStatus(
SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF,
ok=ok,
# Same boundary as the control-plane status: this reason can quote an
# error raised by a live authenticated fetch.
reason=_redact(reason),
count=count,
supported_filters=_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT[SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF],
)
def read_cp_events(
*,
remote: str,
org: str,
repo: str,
db_path: str | None = None,
) -> tuple[list[WorkflowEvent], SourceStatus]:
"""Read scoped control-plane events read-only. Never creates the DB.
Opens the SQLite file through a ``mode=ro`` URI: a health/timeline read
must never create directories or run the schema migration that
``ControlPlaneDB()`` performs on construction. A missing or unreadable DB
degrades to a status with a reason.
"""
path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path()).strip()
conn: sqlite3.Connection | None = None
try:
conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True)
conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
cursor = conn.execute(_CP_EVENTS_QUERY, (remote, org, repo))
rows = [dict(r) for r in cursor.fetchall()]
except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
return ([], _cp_status(ok=False, reason=f"control-plane DB unavailable: {exc}"))
except sqlite3.Error as exc:
return ([], _cp_status(ok=False, reason=f"control-plane read failed: {exc}"))
finally:
if conn is not None:
conn.close()
events = adapt_cp_events(rows)
return (events, _cp_status(ok=True, count=len(events)))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Filter, sort, paginate. #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def filter_events(
events: Iterable[WorkflowEvent],
*,
issue: int | None = None,
pr: int | None = None,
session: str | None = None,
) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
"""Filter events by issue number, PR number, and/or session id.
Filters are conjunctive. A filter that names a dimension an event does not
carry excludes that event (an issue filter excludes PR-only events).
"""
out: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
for ev in events:
if issue is not None and ev.issue_number != issue:
continue
if pr is not None and ev.pr_number != pr:
continue
if session is not None and ev.session_id != session:
continue
out.append(ev)
return out
def sort_events(events: Iterable[WorkflowEvent]) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
"""Return events in stable timeline order (ascending)."""
return sorted(events, key=lambda ev: ev.sort_key())
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class TimelinePage:
"""One page of the sorted, filtered timeline."""
events: tuple[WorkflowEvent, ...]
total: int
limit: int
offset: int
@property
def next_offset(self) -> int | None:
nxt = self.offset + len(self.events)
return nxt if nxt < self.total else None
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"events": [ev.to_dict() for ev in self.events],
"pagination": {
"total": self.total,
"limit": self.limit,
"offset": self.offset,
"returned": len(self.events),
"next_offset": self.next_offset,
"has_more": self.next_offset is not None,
},
}
_MAX_LIMIT = 500
_DEFAULT_LIMIT = 50
def _coerce_bounds(limit: int | None, offset: int | None) -> tuple[int, int]:
try:
lim = int(limit) if limit is not None else _DEFAULT_LIMIT
except (TypeError, ValueError):
lim = _DEFAULT_LIMIT
try:
off = int(offset) if offset is not None else 0
except (TypeError, ValueError):
off = 0
lim = max(1, min(lim, _MAX_LIMIT))
off = max(0, off)
return (lim, off)
def paginate(events: list[WorkflowEvent], *, limit: int | None, offset: int | None) -> TimelinePage:
lim, off = _coerce_bounds(limit, offset)
window = events[off : off + lim]
return TimelinePage(events=tuple(window), total=len(events), limit=lim, offset=off)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Composition — load_timeline aggregates all sources, fail-soft. #
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# A comment source is a callable that, given (kind, number), returns the raw
# Gitea comment list for that issue/PR. The route supplies a live fail-soft
# fetcher; tests supply a fixture. When None, the handoff source is reported as
# not-run (never silently empty-and-healthy).
CommentSource = Callable[[str, int], list[dict[str, Any]]]
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class TimelineSnapshot:
"""One answered timeline query.
``ok`` is False when the query could not be answered as asked — currently
when a requested filter dimension no surviving source can carry was
supplied. The page is then empty *and* the snapshot says so, because an
``ok`` empty page is a claim that no such activity exists.
"""
schema_version: int
remote: str
org: str
repo: str
filters: dict[str, Any]
page: TimelinePage
sources: tuple[SourceStatus, ...]
ok: bool = True
error: dict[str, Any] | None = None
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"ok": self.ok,
"error": self.error,
"schema_version": self.schema_version,
# Scope and filters are echoed caller input, not derived record
# data. Reflecting a value is still emitting it, so both cross the
# same boundary; ordinary scope and filter values are unchanged.
"scope": {
"remote": _safe_echo(self.remote),
"org": _safe_echo(self.org),
"repo": _safe_echo(self.repo),
},
"filters": {key: _safe_echo(value) for key, value in self.filters.items()},
"sources": [s.to_dict() for s in self.sources],
**self.page.to_dict(),
}
def _unanswerable_reasons(
statuses: Iterable[SourceStatus], unanswerable: Iterable[str]
) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
"""Explain, per source, why each unanswerable dimension went unanswered."""
out: list[dict[str, str]] = []
for status in statuses:
for dim in unanswerable:
if dim not in status.supported_filters:
reason = _SOURCE_FILTER_LIMITS.get(
(status.name, dim), f"this source's records carry no {dim} identity"
)
elif not status.ok:
reason = (
f"this source can carry {dim} but did not run: "
f"{status.reason or 'unavailable'}"
)
else:
continue
out.append({"source": status.name, "filter": dim, "reason": reason})
return out
def load_timeline(
*,
remote: str,
org: str,
repo: str,
issue: int | None = None,
pr: int | None = None,
session: str | None = None,
limit: int | None = None,
offset: int | None = None,
db_path: str | None = None,
comment_source: CommentSource | None = None,
) -> TimelineSnapshot:
"""Aggregate every timeline source into one filtered, paginated snapshot.
Sources are read independently and fail soft: an unavailable source
contributes a ``SourceStatus`` with ``ok=False`` and a reason, and never
collapses the whole timeline. The handoff source only runs when a specific
issue or PR is requested (a handoff comment belongs to one thread) and a
``comment_source`` is available; otherwise it is reported as ``not run``
rather than as an empty-and-healthy source.
A filter dimension that no surviving source can carry — a ``session``
filter when the only source that ran is the control plane, whose events
record no session — is refused with ``ok=False`` and a structured error
instead of being answered with an empty page.
"""
all_events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
statuses: list[SourceStatus] = []
cp_events, cp_status = read_cp_events(remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo, db_path=db_path)
all_events.extend(cp_events)
statuses.append(cp_status)
# Gitea handoff comments are thread-scoped: only fetch when the caller
# narrowed to one issue or PR, and only when a source was provided.
handoff_target: tuple[str, int] | None = None
if pr is not None:
handoff_target = ("pr", pr)
elif issue is not None:
handoff_target = ("issue", issue)
if handoff_target is None:
statuses.append(
_handoff_status(
ok=False,
reason="not run: handoff comments are thread-scoped; filter by issue or pr to include them",
)
)
elif comment_source is None:
statuses.append(
_handoff_status(
ok=False,
reason="not run: no comment source configured for this timeline read",
)
)
else:
kind, number = handoff_target
try:
comments = comment_source(kind, number) or []
handoff_events = adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind=kind, number=number)
all_events.extend(handoff_events)
statuses.append(_handoff_status(ok=True, count=len(handoff_events)))
except Exception as exc: # fail soft: a fetch/parse error degrades this source only
statuses.append(_handoff_status(ok=False, reason=f"handoff source failed: {exc}"))
requested = tuple(
name
for name, value in ((FILTER_ISSUE, issue), (FILTER_PR, pr), (FILTER_SESSION, session))
if value is not None
)
statuses = [
replace(
status,
unsupported_filters=tuple(
dim for dim in requested if dim not in status.supported_filters
),
)
for status in statuses
]
filters = {"issue": issue, "pr": pr, "session": session}
# A dimension is answerable only if a source that actually ran can carry it.
# If none can, refuse: an empty page would assert "no such activity", which
# is a claim this timeline is not in a position to make.
answerable: set[str] = set()
for status in statuses:
if status.ok:
answerable.update(status.supported_filters)
unanswerable = tuple(dim for dim in requested if dim not in answerable)
if unanswerable:
return TimelineSnapshot(
schema_version=TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
remote=remote,
org=org,
repo=repo,
filters=filters,
page=paginate([], limit=limit, offset=offset),
sources=tuple(statuses),
ok=False,
error={
"code": "filter_not_supported",
"unsupported_filters": list(unanswerable),
"detail": (
"no timeline source that ran can answer "
+ ", ".join(f"'{dim}'" for dim in unanswerable)
+ "; the result is refused rather than returned empty"
),
"sources": _unanswerable_reasons(statuses, unanswerable),
},
)
filtered = filter_events(all_events, issue=issue, pr=pr, session=session)
ordered = sort_events(filtered)
page = paginate(ordered, limit=limit, offset=offset)
return TimelineSnapshot(
schema_version=TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
remote=remote,
org=org,
repo=repo,
filters=filters,
page=page,
sources=tuple(statuses),
)
def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: TimelineSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
return snapshot.to_dict()