Files
Gitea-Tools/audit_reconciliation_mode.py
sysadmin ddaf380db2 feat: gate reconciliation audit mode from unauthorized cleanup (Closes #419)
Add audit vs cleanup phase tracking so reconciliation audits stay read-only
unless cleanup is explicitly authorized with delete capability proof, safety
proof, and before/after snapshots. Block gitea_delete_branch and merged-cleanup
execution during audit phase, validate final reports for false no-mutations
claims, and document the boundary in the reconcile-landed-pr workflow.
2026-07-07 17:20:36 -04:00

344 lines
11 KiB
Python

"""Audit vs cleanup phase gates for reconciliation workflows (#419).
Audit/reconciliation tasks are read-only unless a separate cleanup phase is
explicitly authorized with exact capability proof, safety proof, and
before/after snapshots. Cleanup mutations must be classified in final reports;
audit reports must not claim ``no mutations`` when cleanup occurred.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
from typing import Any
RECONCILE_WORKFLOW_PATH = "workflows/reconcile-landed-pr.md"
PHASE_AUDIT = "audit"
PHASE_CLEANUP = "cleanup"
# Tasks that enter audit phase on capability resolution (read-only default).
AUDIT_PHASE_TASKS = frozenset({
"reconcile-landed-pr",
"reconcile_landed_pr",
"reconcile_issue_claims",
"reconcile_merged_cleanups",
})
# Mutation tasks forbidden during audit phase (fail closed).
AUDIT_FORBIDDEN_TASKS = frozenset({
"delete_branch",
"create_branch",
"push_branch",
"create_pr",
"commit_files",
"gitea_commit_files",
"mark_issue",
"lock_issue",
"claim_issue",
"close_pr",
"close_issue",
"create_issue",
"merge_pr",
"review_pr",
"submit_pr_review",
"comment_pr",
"comment_issue",
"set_issue_labels",
})
# Shell/git commands audit phase must not run.
AUDIT_FORBIDDEN_COMMAND_RE = re.compile(
r"(?:^|\s)(?:git\s+(?:push|branch\s+-D|worktree\s+remove)|"
r"gitea_delete_branch|delete_remote_branch)",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
_NO_MUTATIONS_RE = re.compile(
r"(?:no\s+mutations|mutations\s*:\s*none|no\s+unsafe\s+mutation)",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
_CLEANUP_OCCURRED_RE = re.compile(
r"(?:delete_remote_branch|remove_local_worktree|git\s+branch\s+-D|"
r"git\s+worktree\s+remove|remote branch.*deleted|worktree.*removed|"
r"cleanup\s+phase\s*:\s*(?!none\b)\S)",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
_EXTERNAL_STATE_RE = re.compile(
r"^\s*[-*]?\s*external[- ]state mutations\s*:",
re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE,
)
_GIT_REF_RE = re.compile(
r"^\s*[-*]?\s*git ref mutations\s*:",
re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE,
)
_CLEANUP_MUTATIONS_RE = re.compile(
r"^\s*[-*]?\s*cleanup mutations\s*:",
re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE,
)
_CLEANUP_PHASE_AUTH_RE = re.compile(
r"^\s*[-*]?\s*cleanup phase (?:authorized|authorization)\s*:\s*true",
re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE,
)
_DELETE_CAPABILITY_RE = re.compile(
r"^\s*[-*]?\s*delete.?branch capability(?: proven)?\s*:\s*true",
re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE,
)
_BEFORE_AFTER_RE = re.compile(
r"^\s*[-*]?\s*before/after (?:state )?snapshot\s*:",
re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE,
)
_SAFETY_PROOF_RE = re.compile(
r"^\s*[-*]?\s*(?:branch|worktree) safe to remove\s*:\s*true",
re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE,
)
_session: dict[str, Any] | None = None
def _blank_session() -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"phase": PHASE_AUDIT,
"entered_from_task": None,
"cleanup_authorized": False,
"cleanup_authorization": {},
}
def current_phase() -> str | None:
"""Return active reconciliation phase or None when unset."""
if not _session:
return None
return _session.get("phase")
def active_record() -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Return a copy of the session record, if any."""
return dict(_session) if _session else None
def clear_phase() -> None:
"""Clear reconciliation phase state."""
global _session
_session = None
def enter_audit_phase(task: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Enter read-only audit phase for a reconciliation task."""
global _session
normalized = (task or "").strip().lower()
_session = _blank_session()
_session["entered_from_task"] = normalized
return dict(_session)
def authorize_cleanup_phase(
*,
operator_approved: bool = False,
workflow_authorized: bool = False,
delete_capability_proven: bool = False,
safety_proof: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
before_after_snapshot: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Authorize cleanup phase after explicit approval and safety proofs."""
reasons: list[str] = []
if not (operator_approved or workflow_authorized):
reasons.append(
"cleanup phase requires operator approval or explicit workflow "
"authorization"
)
if not delete_capability_proven:
reasons.append(
"cleanup phase requires exact delete_branch capability proof "
"(gitea.branch.delete)"
)
safety = dict(safety_proof or {})
if not safety.get("safe_to_delete_remote") and not safety.get(
"safe_to_remove_worktree"
):
reasons.append(
"cleanup phase requires proof that branch/worktree is safe to remove"
)
snapshot = dict(before_after_snapshot or {})
if not snapshot.get("before") or not snapshot.get("after"):
reasons.append(
"cleanup phase requires before/after state snapshot"
)
if reasons:
return {
"authorized": False,
"phase": current_phase() or PHASE_AUDIT,
"reasons": reasons,
"safe_next_action": (
"remain in audit-only mode or supply operator approval, "
"delete_branch capability proof, safety proof, and "
"before/after snapshot before cleanup"
),
}
global _session
if _session is None:
_session = _blank_session()
_session["phase"] = PHASE_CLEANUP
_session["cleanup_authorized"] = True
_session["cleanup_authorization"] = {
"operator_approved": operator_approved,
"workflow_authorized": workflow_authorized,
"delete_capability_proven": delete_capability_proven,
"safety_proof": safety,
"before_after_snapshot": snapshot,
}
return {
"authorized": True,
"phase": PHASE_CLEANUP,
"reasons": [],
"cleanup_authorization": dict(_session["cleanup_authorization"]),
"safe_next_action": "proceed with authorized cleanup mutations only",
}
def check_audit_task_enters_phase(task: str) -> bool:
"""Return whether resolving *task* should enter audit phase."""
return (task or "").strip().lower() in AUDIT_PHASE_TASKS
def check_audit_mutation_allowed(task: str) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
"""Fail closed when a mutation task runs during audit phase."""
normalized = (task or "").strip().lower()
phase = current_phase()
if phase != PHASE_AUDIT:
return True, []
if normalized in AUDIT_FORBIDDEN_TASKS:
return False, [
f"task '{normalized}' is forbidden in audit-only reconciliation "
"mode: switch to an explicit cleanup phase with operator approval "
"and exact delete_branch capability proof before cleanup mutations"
]
return True, []
def check_cleanup_execution_allowed() -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
"""Fail closed when cleanup execution is attempted without authorization."""
phase = current_phase()
if phase == PHASE_CLEANUP and (_session or {}).get("cleanup_authorized"):
return True, []
if phase is None:
return False, [
"cleanup execution requires an active reconciliation session; "
"resolve a reconciliation audit task first"
]
return False, [
"cleanup execution forbidden in audit-only reconciliation mode; "
"call gitea_authorize_reconciliation_cleanup_phase with operator "
"approval, delete_branch capability proof, safety proof, and "
"before/after snapshot"
]
def classify_cleanup_mutation(action: str) -> str:
"""Map a cleanup action to the required mutation ledger category (#419)."""
normalized = (action or "").strip().lower()
if "delete_remote" in normalized or normalized in {
"delete_branch",
"gitea_delete_branch",
}:
return "external-state"
if "branch" in normalized and "delete" in normalized:
return "git-ref"
if "worktree" in normalized or "remove_local" in normalized:
return "cleanup"
return "cleanup"
def assess_audit_reconciliation_report(report_text: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Validate audit/cleanup reconciliation reports (fail closed)."""
text = report_text or ""
reasons: list[str] = []
cleanup_occurred = bool(_CLEANUP_OCCURRED_RE.search(text))
claims_no_mutations = bool(_NO_MUTATIONS_RE.search(text))
if cleanup_occurred and claims_no_mutations:
reasons.append(
"report claims no mutations but documents cleanup mutations; "
"audit-only reports must not perform cleanup and cleanup reports "
"must not claim no mutations"
)
if cleanup_occurred:
if not _CLEANUP_PHASE_AUTH_RE.search(text):
reasons.append(
"cleanup mutations reported without "
"'Cleanup phase authorized: true'"
)
if not _DELETE_CAPABILITY_RE.search(text):
reasons.append(
"cleanup mutations reported without delete_branch capability "
"proof"
)
if not _BEFORE_AFTER_RE.search(text):
reasons.append(
"cleanup mutations reported without before/after state snapshot"
)
if not _SAFETY_PROOF_RE.search(text):
reasons.append(
"cleanup mutations reported without branch/worktree safety proof"
)
if re.search(r"delete_remote|remote branch.*delet", text, re.I):
if not _EXTERNAL_STATE_RE.search(text):
reasons.append(
"remote branch deletion must be classified under "
"External-state mutations"
)
if re.search(r"git\s+branch\s+-D|local branch.*delet", text, re.I):
if not _GIT_REF_RE.search(text):
reasons.append(
"local branch deletion must be classified under "
"Git ref mutations"
)
if re.search(r"worktree.*remov|remove_local_worktree", text, re.I):
if not _CLEANUP_MUTATIONS_RE.search(text):
reasons.append(
"worktree removal must be classified under Cleanup mutations"
)
if (
RECONCILE_WORKFLOW_PATH.replace("workflows/", "") in text
or "reconcile-landed-pr" in text.lower()
):
if cleanup_occurred and "audit phase" in text.lower():
if "cleanup phase" not in text.lower():
reasons.append(
"report mixes audit phase with cleanup mutations without "
"documenting cleanup phase transition"
)
proven = not reasons
return {
"proven": proven,
"block": not proven,
"reasons": reasons,
"cleanup_occurred": cleanup_occurred,
"claims_no_mutations": claims_no_mutations,
"safe_next_action": (
"proceed"
if proven
else "fix audit/cleanup report: separate audit from cleanup phase, "
"classify mutations, and do not claim no mutations after cleanup"
),
}
def assess_audit_command_allowed(command: str) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
"""Block shell commands that perform cleanup during audit phase."""
phase = current_phase()
if phase != PHASE_AUDIT:
return True, []
cmd = (command or "").strip()
if AUDIT_FORBIDDEN_COMMAND_RE.search(cmd):
return False, [
f"command forbidden in audit-only reconciliation mode: {cmd!r}; "
"authorize cleanup phase before branch/worktree deletion or push"
]
return True, []