docs/mcp-namespace-health.md

@@ -109,3 +109,51 @@ When `mcp_connected_namespaces_missing` is detected, workflows must **fail close
 
 Only sanctioned recovery: **client reconnect path**, followed by full preflight (`whoami` → capability resolve → task).
 
+### Native detection tool
+
+`gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_attachment` classifies the condition and records it in
+the session. Pass the namespaces the host reports Connected and the namespaces
+actually attached to the active session tool surface:
+
+| Argument | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `connected_servers` | Namespaces the host/CLI reports Connected |
+| `attached_session_namespaces` | Namespaces exposed in the active session tool surface |
+| `required_namespaces` | Namespaces this workflow needs (defaults to the role namespaces) |
+| `discovery_cache_hit` / `discovery_cache_age_seconds` | Client tool-discovery cache state |
+| `auto_attach_attempted` / `auto_attach_succeeded` | Whether the runtime auto-attached |
+| `session_tool_snapshot_at` / `namespace_connected_at` | Epoch seconds, to detect startup ordering races |
+
+It returns `discovery_status`
+(`namespaces_attached` | `connected_but_namespaces_missing` | `disconnected`),
+`missing_namespaces`, `proof_of_connected_vs_attached` (per namespace
+`{connected, attached}`), `error_type`, `reconnect_required`, `auto_recovered`,
+`startup_ordering_race`, `late_attaching_namespaces`, `sanctioned_recovery_tool`,
+and a reconnect-only `exact_next_action`.
+
+### Startup ordering
+
+`session_tool_snapshot_at` earlier than a namespace's `namespace_connected_at`
+means that namespace could not have been in the session snapshot, however healthy
+it looks now. That is reported as `startup_ordering_race` with the affected
+namespaces listed — the multi-role parallel-connect case where Connected flips
+true after the session tool list was already captured.
+
+### Fail-closed gate
+
+The recorded verdict gates mutations, mirroring the #543 health gate: a namespace
+that has not been assessed does not gate, but one recorded Connected-but-unattached
+blocks the mutation whose role namespace it is
+(`review_pr` / `submit_review` → `gitea-reviewer`, `merge_pr` → `gitea-merger`,
+`work_issue` / `create_pr` → `gitea-author`). `gitea_submit_pr_review` and
+`gitea_merge_pr` return the block reason plus the hard-stop policy string, and the
+only offered recovery is `gitea_request_mcp_reconnect`.
+
+### Telemetry
+
+The `telemetry` block carries `connected_count`, `attached_count`,
+`required_count`, `missing_count`, `discovery_status`, `discovery_cache_hit`,
+`discovery_cache_age_seconds`, `reconnect_required`, `auto_attach_attempted`,
+`auto_recovered`, `startup_ordering_race`, and `error_type`. It contains namespace
+names and counts only — never tokens, endpoints, env values, or filesystem paths.
+

docs/mcp-tool-inventory.md

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ that gates each call, not which tools exist.
 - `gitea_assess_conflict_fix_push`
 - `gitea_assess_gitea_operation_path`
 - `gitea_assess_master_parity`
+- `gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_attachment`
 - `gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_health`
 - `gitea_assess_pr_sync_status`
 - `gitea_assess_review_merge_state_machine`

docs/remote-mcp/threat-model-anchors.json

@@ -10,71 +10,237 @@
   ],
   "generated_against_commit": "a143cd065ba06e1a2bdc5143a19ec156e53650ef",
   "anchors": [
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:24728", "expect": "mcp_daemon_guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()"},
+    {
-    {"anchor": "mcp_daemon_guard.py:49", "expect": "_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS = mcp_transport_config.SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS"},
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:24848",
-    {"anchor": "mcp_daemon_guard.py:195", "expect": "def bind_native_mcp_transport"},
+      "expect": "mcp_daemon_guard.bind_native_mcp_transport()"
-    {"anchor": "irrecoverable_provenance.py:497", "expect": "def assess_transport_for_auth_mint"},
+    },
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:9132", "expect": "assess_transport_for_auth_mint()"},
+    {
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:9381", "expect": "assess_transport_for_auth_mint()"},
+      "anchor": "mcp_daemon_guard.py:49",
-    {"anchor": "mcp_server.py:4", "expect": "The transport is selected by deployment configuration"},
+      "expect": "_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS = mcp_transport_config.SUPPORTED_TRANSPORTS"
-
+    },
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:15415", "expect": "def _is_client_managed_process"},
+    {
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:15445", "expect": "def _provenance_mutation_block"},
+      "anchor": "mcp_daemon_guard.py:195",
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:15453", "expect": "unsupported_manual_launch"},
+      "expect": "def bind_native_mcp_transport"
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19004", "expect": "server_provenance"},
+    },
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:21445", "expect": "def _check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics"},
+    {
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:21465", "expect": "\"ps\", \"-o\", \"pid,lstart,command\""},
+      "anchor": "irrecoverable_provenance.py:497",
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:21509", "expect": "\"ps\", \"eww\""},
+      "expect": "def assess_transport_for_auth_mint"
-    {"anchor": "gitea_config.py:1172", "expect": "RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS"},
+    },
-    {"anchor": "gitea_config.py:1233", "expect": "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED"},
+    {
-
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:9175",
-    {"anchor": "gitea_config.py:54", "expect": "ENV_PROFILE = \"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE\""},
+      "expect": "assess_transport_for_auth_mint()"
-    {"anchor": "gitea_config.py:97", "expect": "_REVIEW_MERGE_OPS"},
+    },
-    {"anchor": "gitea_config.py:499", "expect": "repository authorization scope"},
+    {
-
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:9424",
-    {"anchor": "gitea_config.py:956", "expect": "def _keychain_token"},
+      "expect": "assess_transport_for_auth_mint()"
-    {"anchor": "gitea_config.py:974", "expect": "def resolve_token"},
+    },
-    {"anchor": "gitea_config.py:1015", "expect": "def keychain_auth"},
+    {
-    {"anchor": "gitea_config.py:294", "expect": "def _validate_identity_auth"},
+      "anchor": "mcp_server.py:4",
-    {"anchor": "mcp_daemon_guard.py:583", "expect": "def assert_keychain_access_allowed"},
+      "expect": "The transport is selected by deployment configuration"
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19261", "expect": "def gitea_list_profiles"},
+    },
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19312", "expect": "gitea_config.resolve_token(p)"},
+    {
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19555", "expect": "def gitea_audit_config"},
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:15465",
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19577", "expect": "service_summaries(config)"},
+      "expect": "def _is_client_managed_process"
-
+    },
-    {"anchor": "gitea_config.py:704", "expect": "def resolve_service"},
+    {
-    {"anchor": "gitea_config.py:837", "expect": "def service_summaries"},
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:15495",
-    {"anchor": "gitea_config.py:851", "expect": "_keychain_token(auth.get(\"id\"))"},
+      "expect": "def _provenance_mutation_block"
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17710", "expect": "\"jenkins-mcp\""},
+    },
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17716", "expect": "external-mcp"},
+    {
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17737", "expect": "\"glitchtip-mcp\""},
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:15503",
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17742", "expect": "external-mcp"},
+      "expect": "unsupported_manual_launch"
-    {"anchor": "mcp_discoverability.py:9", "expect": "EXPECTED_JENKINS_TOOLS"},
+    },
-    {"anchor": "mcp_discoverability.py:17", "expect": "EXPECTED_GLITCHTIP_TOOLS"},
+    {
-
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19054",
-    {"anchor": "sentry_incident_bridge.py:36", "expect": "SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN"},
+      "expect": "server_provenance"
-    {"anchor": "sentry_incident_bridge.py:190", "expect": "def resolve_token"},
+    },
-    {"anchor": "sentry_incident_bridge.py:289", "expect": "Authorization"},
+    {
-    {"anchor": "sentry_observability.py:55", "expect": "SENTRY_DSN"},
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:21565",
-
+      "expect": "def _check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics"
-    {"anchor": "master_parity_gate.py:168", "expect": "def capture_startup_parity"},
+    },
-    {"anchor": "master_parity_gate.py:255", "expect": "mutation_safe"},
+    {
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19105", "expect": "def gitea_assess_master_parity"},
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:21585",
-
+      "expect": "\"ps\", \"-o\", \"pid,lstart,command\""
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:193", "expect": "ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV"},
+    },
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:194", "expect": "AUTHOR_WORKTREE_ENV"},
+    {
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:2351", "expect": "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock.json"},
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:21629",
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:10897", "expect": "def gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"},
+      "expect": "\"ps\", \"eww\""
-    {"anchor": "mcp_server.py:13", "expect": "/tmp/mcp_server_stderr.log"},
+    },
-
+    {
-    {"anchor": "issue_lock_store.py:26", "expect": "DEFAULT_LOCK_DIR"},
+      "anchor": "gitea_config.py:1172",
-    {"anchor": "issue_lock_store.py:83", "expect": "def session_pointer_path"},
+      "expect": "RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS"
-    {"anchor": "issue_lock_store.py:98", "expect": "def is_process_alive"},
+    },
-    {"anchor": "mcp_session_state.py:27", "expect": "DEFAULT_STATE_DIR"},
+    {
-    {"anchor": "control_plane_db.py:47", "expect": "DEFAULT_DB_PATH"},
+      "anchor": "gitea_config.py:1233",
-    {"anchor": "control_plane_db.py:380", "expect": "mode=0o700"},
+      "expect": "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED"
-    {"anchor": "control_plane_db.py:386", "expect": "sqlite3.connect"},
+    },
-    {"anchor": "control_plane_db.py:1145", "expect": "os.getpid()"},
+    {
-    {"anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:12804", "expect": "owner_pid_alive"}
+      "anchor": "gitea_config.py:54",
+      "expect": "ENV_PROFILE = \"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE\""
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_config.py:97",
+      "expect": "_REVIEW_MERGE_OPS"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_config.py:499",
+      "expect": "repository authorization scope"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_config.py:956",
+      "expect": "def _keychain_token"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_config.py:974",
+      "expect": "def resolve_token"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_config.py:1015",
+      "expect": "def keychain_auth"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_config.py:294",
+      "expect": "def _validate_identity_auth"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "mcp_daemon_guard.py:583",
+      "expect": "def assert_keychain_access_allowed"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19311",
+      "expect": "def gitea_list_profiles"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19362",
+      "expect": "gitea_config.resolve_token(p)"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19675",
+      "expect": "def gitea_audit_config"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19697",
+      "expect": "service_summaries(config)"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_config.py:704",
+      "expect": "def resolve_service"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_config.py:837",
+      "expect": "def service_summaries"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_config.py:851",
+      "expect": "_keychain_token(auth.get(\"id\"))"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17760",
+      "expect": "\"jenkins-mcp\""
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17766",
+      "expect": "external-mcp"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17787",
+      "expect": "\"glitchtip-mcp\""
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:17792",
+      "expect": "external-mcp"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "mcp_discoverability.py:9",
+      "expect": "EXPECTED_JENKINS_TOOLS"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "mcp_discoverability.py:17",
+      "expect": "EXPECTED_GLITCHTIP_TOOLS"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "sentry_incident_bridge.py:36",
+      "expect": "SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "sentry_incident_bridge.py:190",
+      "expect": "def resolve_token"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "sentry_incident_bridge.py:289",
+      "expect": "Authorization"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "sentry_observability.py:55",
+      "expect": "SENTRY_DSN"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "master_parity_gate.py:168",
+      "expect": "def capture_startup_parity"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "master_parity_gate.py:255",
+      "expect": "mutation_safe"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:19155",
+      "expect": "def gitea_assess_master_parity"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:193",
+      "expect": "ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:194",
+      "expect": "AUTHOR_WORKTREE_ENV"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:2351",
+      "expect": "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock.json"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:10940",
+      "expect": "def gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "mcp_server.py:13",
+      "expect": "/tmp/mcp_server_stderr.log"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "issue_lock_store.py:26",
+      "expect": "DEFAULT_LOCK_DIR"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "issue_lock_store.py:83",
+      "expect": "def session_pointer_path"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "issue_lock_store.py:98",
+      "expect": "def is_process_alive"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "mcp_session_state.py:27",
+      "expect": "DEFAULT_STATE_DIR"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "control_plane_db.py:47",
+      "expect": "DEFAULT_DB_PATH"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "control_plane_db.py:380",
+      "expect": "mode=0o700"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "control_plane_db.py:386",
+      "expect": "sqlite3.connect"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "control_plane_db.py:1145",
+      "expect": "os.getpid()"
+    },
+    {
+      "anchor": "gitea_mcp_server.py:12854",
+      "expect": "owner_pid_alive"
+    }
   ]
 }

docs/remote-mcp/threat-model.md

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ document cites an anchor the fixture does not cover.
 
 This guard exists because #930 did not have one. Its inventory was generated at
 `7bf4f125`; by `aad5c8b4` its `gitea_mcp_server.py` anchors had drifted — the transport
-bind it cited at line 23750 now lives at `gitea_mcp_server.py:24728`, and its
+bind it cited at line 23750 now lives at `gitea_mcp_server.py:24848`, and its
 client-managed provenance anchor at 14588 now lands in an unrelated function. Nothing
 failed, because nothing checked. Anchors into a ~24,700-line module rot silently, and a
 security document that cannot prove its own citations is worse than none, because it is
@@ -77,15 +77,15 @@ authenticate the *caller*, not the *intent*.
 
 | ID | Boundary | Protects | Crossing requires today | Crossing must require remotely |
 | -- | -------- | -------- | ----------------------- | ------------------------------ |
-| B1 | LLM client ↔ MCP server session | A1, A3, A10 — that a mutating session was established through the sanctioned client path | A single configured bind (`gitea_mcp_server.py:24728`) validated against one closed allowlist (`mcp_daemon_guard.py:49`, `mcp_daemon_guard.py:195`) — since #931 the identifier comes from deployment configuration and defaults to the local transport, so the boundary no longer rests on a literal, but it still rests on the *bind* rather than on an authenticated caller; client-managed provenance (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15415`) or a refusal (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15453`); production transport before recovery-authorization mint (`irrecoverable_provenance.py:497`, consumed at `gitea_mcp_server.py:9132` and `gitea_mcp_server.py:9381`) | An authenticated handshake issuing a server-side session identity bound to a principal, with the transport recorded in provenance. The physical proof (a pipe) must become a cryptographic one. |
+| B1 | LLM client ↔ MCP server session | A1, A3, A10 — that a mutating session was established through the sanctioned client path | A single configured bind (`gitea_mcp_server.py:24848`) validated against one closed allowlist (`mcp_daemon_guard.py:49`, `mcp_daemon_guard.py:195`) — since #931 the identifier comes from deployment configuration and defaults to the local transport, so the boundary no longer rests on a literal, but it still rests on the *bind* rather than on an authenticated caller; client-managed provenance (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15465`) or a refusal (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15503`); production transport before recovery-authorization mint (`irrecoverable_provenance.py:497`, consumed at `gitea_mcp_server.py:9175` and `gitea_mcp_server.py:9424`) | An authenticated handshake issuing a server-side session identity bound to a principal, with the transport recorded in provenance. The physical proof (a pipe) must become a cryptographic one. |
 | B2 | Role ↔ role | A9 — that author, reviewer, merger, and reconciler are distinct authorities | **The process boundary only.** The role is a property of the process, read once from `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` (`gitea_config.py:54`). A caller gets author permissions by connecting to the author process. Review and merge are the operations singled out for extra care (`gitea_config.py:97`) | A per-request principal, so the role follows from the credential presented and cannot be selected by reaching a different endpoint. |
 | B3 | MCP server ↔ credential store | A3, A8 — that only sanctioned code turns a profile into a token | `_keychain_token` shelling out to the login keychain (`gitea_config.py:956`), dispatched by `resolve_token` (`gitea_config.py:974`) with the reference type built at `gitea_config.py:1015`, gated by `assert_keychain_access_allowed` (`mcp_daemon_guard.py:583`). Inline secrets are rejected at config load (`gitea_config.py:294`) | A credential provider keyed by the *request* principal, returning only that principal's credential, with the source recorded and the value never returned. |
 | B4 | MCP server ↔ Gitea | A1, A2 — that only authorized calls reach the forge | A bearer token over TLS. Server-side, nothing distinguishes one role's token from another beyond the account it belongs to | Unchanged at the forge; the endpoint in front of it must refuse unauthenticated and plaintext connections before tool dispatch. |
-| B5 | MCP server ↔ caller's filesystem | A7 — that a tool acts on the *caller's* disk or refuses | Nothing. The server's disk *is* the caller's disk. Worktree bootstrap writes directly (`gitea_mcp_server.py:10897`); the active workspace is process-global (`gitea_mcp_server.py:193`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:194`) | An explicit per-tool classification, enforced at dispatch, refusing filesystem tools over a transport that cannot reach the caller's disk. A green verdict about the wrong disk is the failure to prevent. |
+| B5 | MCP server ↔ caller's filesystem | A7 — that a tool acts on the *caller's* disk or refuses | Nothing. The server's disk *is* the caller's disk. Worktree bootstrap writes directly (`gitea_mcp_server.py:10940`); the active workspace is process-global (`gitea_mcp_server.py:193`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:194`) | An explicit per-tool classification, enforced at dispatch, refusing filesystem tools over a transport that cannot reach the caller's disk. A green verdict about the wrong disk is the failure to prevent. |
-| B6 | MCP server ↔ coordination state | A6, A9 — mutual exclusion | Local files and a local SQLite database, with liveness judged from the local process table (`issue_lock_store.py:98`), keyed on paths under one user's home (`issue_lock_store.py:26`, `mcp_session_state.py:27`, `control_plane_db.py:47`) and on `os.getpid()` (`control_plane_db.py:1145`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:12804`). A legacy global slot still exists at `gitea_mcp_server.py:2351`, and the session-pointer file is named per PID (`issue_lock_store.py:83`) | One authority per ownership question, with liveness from session identity and expiry, and atomic acquire, renew, and release across hosts. |
+| B6 | MCP server ↔ coordination state | A6, A9 — mutual exclusion | Local files and a local SQLite database, with liveness judged from the local process table (`issue_lock_store.py:98`), keyed on paths under one user's home (`issue_lock_store.py:26`, `mcp_session_state.py:27`, `control_plane_db.py:47`) and on `os.getpid()` (`control_plane_db.py:1145`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:12854`). A legacy global slot still exists at `gitea_mcp_server.py:2351`, and the session-pointer file is named per PID (`issue_lock_store.py:83`) | One authority per ownership question, with liveness from session identity and expiry, and atomic acquire, renew, and release across hosts. |
 | B7 | Gitea integration ↔ unrelated integrations | A4, A5 — that a Gitea compromise is not a CI and observability compromise | **Nothing.** See §5. The Gitea server reads Jenkins and GlitchTip secrets (`gitea_config.py:851`, reached from `gitea_config.py:837`) and holds the Sentry token (`sentry_incident_bridge.py:190`) | A hard process boundary. This is the boundary #956 exists to create. |
 | B8 | Tenant ↔ tenant (`prgs` / `mdcps` / `local-lab`) | A2 — that one organization's compromise is not another's | Convention. One configuration declares all three contexts; `resolve_service` fails closed on a *disabled* context (`gitea_config.py:704`) but the credentials of enabled ones remain reachable in-process. A per-profile repository scope exists (`gitea_config.py:499`) | Separate deployments, or at minimum per-tenant credential scopes with no process able to resolve both. |
-| B9 | Deployed code ↔ merged policy | A1, A10 — that the running server enforces the rules that were actually merged | Comparing this process's startup commit against this disk (`master_parity_gate.py:168`), conjoined into a single verdict (`master_parity_gate.py:255`) published by `gitea_mcp_server.py:19105` | Freshness defined against the deployed build identity, with an explicit fail-closed verdict when undeterminable. |
+| B9 | Deployed code ↔ merged policy | A1, A10 — that the running server enforces the rules that were actually merged | Comparing this process's startup commit against this disk (`master_parity_gate.py:168`), conjoined into a single verdict (`master_parity_gate.py:255`) published by `gitea_mcp_server.py:19155` | Freshness defined against the deployed build identity, with an explicit fail-closed verdict when undeterminable. |
 
 ### What no boundary constrains
 
@@ -130,10 +130,10 @@ Two flows deserve attention because neither is obvious from the code:
 
 1. **The keychain flow fans out.** B3 is drawn once but resolves credentials for *every*
    configured profile and service, not only the active one. `gitea_list_profiles`
-   (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19261`) reports each profile's credential status by calling
+   (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19311`) reports each profile's credential status by calling
-   `resolve_token` on it (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19312`), and `gitea_audit_config`
+   `resolve_token` on it (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19362`), and `gitea_audit_config`
-   (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19555`) reports service credential status through
+   (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19675`) reports service credential status through
-   `service_summaries` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19577`).
+   `service_summaries` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19697`).
 2. **The return path is a flow too.** Content read from Gitea travels back into the model
    and is treated as instruction. This is the ADV2 edge, and it is the only edge in the
    diagram with no authentication on it, because it is not a request.
@@ -178,16 +178,16 @@ the credential, and an attacker holding the token does not call our tools.
 
 **Finding 3 — Any one role process can resolve every other role's credential.** This is not
 inferred; it is demonstrated by tool output. `gitea_list_profiles`
-(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19261`) called from the **author** session reports
+(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19311`) called from the **author** session reports
 `identity_status: "credentials present"` for `prgs-merger`, `prgs-reviewer`,
 `prgs-reconciler`, and every `mdcps` profile, because it calls `resolve_token` on each one
-(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19312`). The author process does not merely *have access to* the
+(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19362`). The author process does not merely *have access to* the
 merger's credential — it reads it to answer a status query. B2 is not a credential boundary
 in either direction.
 
 **Finding 4 — The Gitea server reads CI and observability secrets.** `gitea_audit_config`
-(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19555`) reports `MDCPS Jenkins: enabled, read-only, authenticated`.
+(`gitea_mcp_server.py:19675`) reports `MDCPS Jenkins: enabled, read-only, authenticated`.
-That word `authenticated` is produced by `service_summaries` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19577`,
+That word `authenticated` is produced by `service_summaries` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19697`,
 defined at `gitea_config.py:837`), whose default check calls `_keychain_token` on the
 service's own keychain reference (`gitea_config.py:851`). Producing that one line requires
 the Gitea MCP server to read the Jenkins secret and the GlitchTip secret out of the
@@ -195,8 +195,8 @@ keychain. B7 does not exist.
 
 **Finding 5 — Jenkins and GlitchTip are already decomposed; the reach is residual.** Their
 tools live in separately registered servers, marked `external-mcp`
-(`gitea_mcp_server.py:17710`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:17716`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:17737`,
+(`gitea_mcp_server.py:17760`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:17766`, `gitea_mcp_server.py:17787`,
-`gitea_mcp_server.py:17742`) with their own expected tool sets (`mcp_discoverability.py:9`,
+`gitea_mcp_server.py:17792`) with their own expected tool sets (`mcp_discoverability.py:9`,
 `mcp_discoverability.py:17`). The correct decomposition was already chosen. What remains is
 a leak across it: the credential *references* still live in the Gitea configuration and are
 still resolved by the Gitea process. #75 bundled these services into one control-plane
@@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ GlitchTip, the Sentry bridge runs *inside* the Gitea server, resolving its token
 process environment (`sentry_incident_bridge.py:190`) and sending it as a bearer header
 (`sentry_incident_bridge.py:289`). Being an environment variable rather than a keychain item
 makes it strictly worse: it needs no keychain prompt and is inherited by every subprocess the
-server spawns — including the `ps` invocations at `gitea_mcp_server.py:21465` and
+server spawns — including the `ps` invocations at `gitea_mcp_server.py:21585` and
-`gitea_mcp_server.py:21509`, reached from `gitea_mcp_server.py:21445`.
+`gitea_mcp_server.py:21629`, reached from `gitea_mcp_server.py:21565`.
 
 **Finding 7 — The highest-value coordination asset has the weakest gate.** A6 is protected
 by filesystem permissions alone (CR14). Corrupting a lease requires no Gitea credential,
@@ -217,8 +217,8 @@ assumes. Every other asset costs an attacker a credential; this one costs nothin
 local access, which is exactly ADV5's position.
 
 **Finding 8 — Provenance authenticates the launch, not the caller.** `server_provenance` is
-reported as exactly `client_managed` or `manual_launch` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19004`),
+reported as exactly `client_managed` or `manual_launch` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:19054`),
-derived from environment inspection (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15415`) with the recognized-key
+derived from environment inspection (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15465`) with the recognized-key
 allowlist at `gitea_config.py:1172` and the generator that emits the marker at
 `gitea_config.py:1233`. Every one of those facts is fixed at process start. A client that is
 trustworthy at launch and compromised a minute later remains `client_managed` for the life
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ holds the token and calls the API instead of the tool.
 
 **D3 — Credential resolution is scoped to the request principal.** A session must resolve its
 own credential and must have no path to any other principal's. The resolve-every-profile
-behavior behind `gitea_mcp_server.py:19312` and `gitea_mcp_server.py:19577` must report
+behavior behind `gitea_mcp_server.py:19362` and `gitea_mcp_server.py:19697` must report
 configured-or-not from configuration alone, without resolving the secret.
 
 *Rationale.* Finding 3. An audit surface that proves a credential exists by fetching it is a
@@ -334,11 +334,11 @@ The client is attached to the local fleet over stdio.
 
 | Boundary | What ADV1 reaches | Stopped by |
 | -------- | ----------------- | ---------- |
-| B1 | Everything the fleet serves. The client *is* the sanctioned launcher: it satisfies the client-managed check (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15415`) by construction, and provenance is never re-verified after launch (Finding 8). | Nothing. The guard authenticates the launch, not the caller. |
+| B1 | Everything the fleet serves. The client *is* the sanctioned launcher: it satisfies the client-managed check (`gitea_mcp_server.py:15465`) by construction, and provenance is never re-verified after launch (Finding 8). | Nothing. The guard authenticates the launch, not the caller. |
 | B2 | All five roles — it is attached to all five namespaces. It can author a PR, approve it from the reviewer namespace, and merge it from the merger namespace. | Only the in-process self-review check, which compares `jcwalker3` (author) against `sysadmin` (reviewer) and **passes**, because Finding 1 made them different accounts while leaving reviewer and merger identical. A9 falls in one sequence of legitimate calls. |
 | B3 | Every credential in CR1–CR10 via CR13, with no additional prompt — the daemon is already sanctioned, so `assert_keychain_access_allowed` (`mcp_daemon_guard.py:583`) returns immediately. | Nothing. |
 | B4 | A1 and A2 in full. | Branch protection at the forge, to the extent configured. |
-| B5 | The operator's checkout and every worktree, through the author tools (`gitea_mcp_server.py:10897`), plus the shared stderr path at `mcp_server.py:13`. | Nothing; the server's disk is the target disk. |
+| B5 | The operator's checkout and every worktree, through the author tools (`gitea_mcp_server.py:10940`), plus the shared stderr path at `mcp_server.py:13`. | Nothing; the server's disk is the target disk. |
 | B6 | All coordination state — no credential required (CR14). It can forge lease ownership and clear decision locks. | Filesystem permissions, which it already satisfies. |
 | B7 | Jenkins (A4) and GlitchTip (A5) secrets via Finding 4, and CR11/CR12 from its own environment. | Nothing. |
 | B8 | Both tenants. | Nothing in-process; only the disabled-context check (`gitea_config.py:704`), which does not apply to enabled contexts. |

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -6716,6 +6716,45 @@ def _live_namespace_health_gate(task: str) -> list[str]:
     )
 
 
+# Session-scoped MCP namespace *attachment* assessments (#708).
+# Distinct from _LIVE_NAMESPACE_HEALTH: a namespace can probe healthy while never
+# being attached to the active session tool surface ("Connected" != "tools available").
+_LIVE_NAMESPACE_ATTACHMENT: dict[str, dict] = {}
+
+
+def _record_live_namespace_attachment(assessment: dict | None) -> None:
+    """Store a per-namespace attachment verdict for mutation gates (#708)."""
+    if not isinstance(assessment, dict):
+        return
+    proof = assessment.get("proof_of_connected_vs_attached")
+    if not isinstance(proof, dict):
+        return
+    missing = set(assessment.get("missing_namespaces") or [])
+    error_type = assessment.get("error_type")
+    for ns, state in proof.items():
+        ns_name = str(ns or "").strip()
+        if not ns_name or not isinstance(state, dict):
+            continue
+        attached = bool(state.get("attached"))
+        _LIVE_NAMESPACE_ATTACHMENT[ns_name] = {
+            "namespace": ns_name,
+            "connected": bool(state.get("connected")),
+            "attached": attached,
+            "attachment_healthy": attached and ns_name not in missing,
+            "error_type": None if attached else error_type,
+            "discovery_status": assessment.get("discovery_status"),
+            "reconnect_required": bool(assessment.get("reconnect_required")),
+            "auto_recovered": bool(assessment.get("auto_recovered")),
+        }
+
+
+def _namespace_attachment_gate(task: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Fail closed on a recorded Connected-but-unattached namespace (#708)."""
+    return mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session(
+        task, _LIVE_NAMESPACE_ATTACHMENT
+    )
+
+
 def _decision_lock_binding(lock: dict | None = None) -> dict:
     """Resolve key fields for durable decision-lock storage."""
     profile = get_profile()
@@ -7596,6 +7635,10 @@ def _evaluate_pr_review_submission(
         if ns_gate:
             reasons.extend(ns_gate)
             return result
+        attach_gate = _namespace_attachment_gate("review_pr")
+        if attach_gate:
+            reasons.extend(attach_gate)
+            return result
 
     if action not in _REVIEW_ACTIONS:
         reasons.append(
@@ -11154,6 +11197,13 @@ def gitea_merge_pr(
         reasons.extend(ns_gate)
         return result
 
+    # Gate 0c — the merger namespace must be attached to the active session (#708).
+    # Connected at the host layer is not proof the tools are in this session.
+    attach_gate = _namespace_attachment_gate("merge_pr")
+    if attach_gate:
+        reasons.extend(attach_gate)
+        return result
+
     # Gate 1 — valid merge method (no API call on a bad method).
     if do not in _MERGE_METHODS:
         reasons.append(
@@ -19419,6 +19469,76 @@ def gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_health(
     return result
 
 
+@mcp.tool()
+def gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_attachment(
+    connected_servers: list[str] | None = None,
+    attached_session_namespaces: list[str] | None = None,
+    required_namespaces: list[str] | None = None,
+    discovery_cache_age_seconds: float | None = None,
+    discovery_cache_hit: bool | None = None,
+    auto_attach_attempted: bool = False,
+    auto_attach_succeeded: bool = False,
+    session_tool_snapshot_at: float | None = None,
+    namespace_connected_at: dict | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Detect Connected-but-namespaces-not-attached MCP sessions (#708).
+
+    MCP servers can report **Connected** at the CLI/host inventory layer while the
+    active LLM session exposes none of their tool namespaces. That is a *session
+    attachment* failure and is reported here as its own typed condition,
+    ``mcp_connected_namespaces_missing`` — deliberately distinct from config drift
+    (#672), transport-closed (#584), and resolver EOF (#685).
+
+    Connected is not proof that tools are available. The required preflight proof is
+    live tool visibility plus ``gitea_whoami`` on the role namespace, never host
+    Connected status alone.
+
+    The verdict is recorded in the session so ``gitea_submit_pr_review`` and
+    ``gitea_merge_pr`` fail closed while a required namespace is unattached. The only
+    sanctioned recovery is the client attach/reconnect path followed by full preflight;
+    direct imports, CLI/API mutation, profile hopping, session-state overrides, and
+    process kills are forbidden and never suggested.
+
+    Args:
+        connected_servers: Namespaces the host/CLI reports as Connected.
+        attached_session_namespaces: Namespaces actually exposed in the active
+            session tool surface.
+        required_namespaces: Namespaces required for this workflow; defaults to the
+            canonical Gitea role namespaces.
+        discovery_cache_age_seconds: Age of the client tool-discovery cache entry.
+        discovery_cache_hit: Whether the tool list came from that cache.
+        auto_attach_attempted: Whether the runtime tried to auto-attach namespaces.
+        auto_attach_succeeded: Whether that auto-attach succeeded.
+        session_tool_snapshot_at: Epoch seconds the session tool snapshot was taken.
+        namespace_connected_at: Per-namespace epoch seconds that connect completed,
+            used to identify multi-role startup ordering races.
+
+    Returns:
+        dict with ``discovery_status``, ``missing_namespaces``,
+        ``proof_of_connected_vs_attached``, ``error_type``, ``reconnect_required``,
+        ``auto_recovered``, ``startup_ordering_race``, a secret-free ``telemetry``
+        block, and a reconnect-only ``exact_next_action``.
+    """
+    result = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
+        connected_servers=connected_servers,
+        attached_session_namespaces=attached_session_namespaces,
+        required_namespaces=required_namespaces,
+        discovery_cache_age_seconds=discovery_cache_age_seconds,
+        discovery_cache_hit=discovery_cache_hit,
+        auto_attach_attempted=auto_attach_attempted,
+        auto_attach_succeeded=auto_attach_succeeded,
+        session_tool_snapshot_at=session_tool_snapshot_at,
+        namespace_connected_at=namespace_connected_at,
+    )
+    _record_live_namespace_attachment(result)
+    # #606-style watchdog check-in (best-effort, fail open). Status only, no names.
+    sentry_observability.monitor_checkin(
+        "namespace_attachment",
+        "ok" if result.get("attachment_healthy") else "error",
+    )
+    return result
+
+
 @mcp.tool()
 def gitea_activate_profile(
     profile_name: str,

mcp_namespace_health.py

@@ -53,6 +53,21 @@ EOF_PATTERNS = (
 
 ERROR_CONNECTED_NAMESPACES_MISSING = "mcp_connected_namespaces_missing"
 
+# Namespaces that must be *attached to the active session* for a mutation task (#708).
+# Connected-at-host is not attached-in-session; these are gated separately from the
+# #543 health map because a namespace can be healthy on probe yet absent from the
+# session tool surface.
+ATTACHMENT_GATED_TASKS = {
+    "review_pr": "gitea-reviewer",
+    "submit_review": "gitea-reviewer",
+    "merge_pr": "gitea-merger",
+    "work_issue": "gitea-author",
+    "create_pr": "gitea-author",
+}
+
+# The only sanctioned recovery for an unattached namespace (#678 exposes it natively).
+SANCTIONED_ATTACH_RECOVERY_TOOL = "gitea_request_mcp_reconnect"
+
 UNSAFE_FALLBACK_WARNING = (
     "Workflow Safety Hard Stop (#708): Connected-but-namespaces-missing recovery must "
     "NEVER use direct imports, Gitea API mutations, profile hopping, session-state "
@@ -73,13 +88,28 @@ def assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
     connected_servers: list[str] | tuple[str, ...] | set[str] | None = None,
     attached_session_namespaces: list[str] | tuple[str, ...] | set[str] | None = None,
     required_namespaces: list[str] | tuple[str, ...] | set[str] | None = None,
+    discovery_cache_age_seconds: float | int | None = None,
+    discovery_cache_hit: bool | None = None,
+    auto_attach_attempted: bool = False,
+    auto_attach_succeeded: bool = False,
+    session_tool_snapshot_at: float | int | None = None,
+    namespace_connected_at: dict[str, float] | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Assess whether host-connected MCP servers have attached tool namespaces in the active session (#708).
 
     Addresses the Connected-but-namespaces-missing defect: CLI/host status may report Connected
     while the active LLM session tool surface exposes 0 attached tool namespaces.
 
-    Returns structured telemetry and detection details.
+    This is a *distinct* condition from config drift (#672), transport-closed (#584),
+    and resolver EOF (#685): the transport is up and the host reports Connected, yet the
+    namespace never entered the session tool surface.
+
+    Startup ordering (``session_tool_snapshot_at`` + ``namespace_connected_at``) identifies
+    the race where the session tool snapshot was taken before a role server finished
+    ``initialize``/``list_tools``, which is why parallel multi-role startup can leave the
+    session with an empty namespace set while Connected later flips true.
+
+    Returns structured detection details plus secret-free telemetry.
     """
     connected = [str(s).strip() for s in (connected_servers or []) if str(s).strip()]
     attached = set(str(ns).strip() for ns in (attached_session_namespaces or []) if str(ns).strip())
@@ -106,6 +136,24 @@ def assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
         else ("connected_but_namespaces_missing" if len(connected) > 0 else "disconnected")
     )
 
+    # Startup-ordering race: a namespace that finished connecting *after* the session
+    # tool snapshot was taken cannot be in that snapshot, however healthy it looks now.
+    connected_at = {
+        str(k).strip(): v
+        for k, v in (namespace_connected_at or {}).items()
+        if str(k).strip() and isinstance(v, (int, float))
+    }
+    late_attaching: list[str] = []
+    if isinstance(session_tool_snapshot_at, (int, float)):
+        for ns_name, ts in connected_at.items():
+            if ts > session_tool_snapshot_at and ns_name not in attached:
+                late_attaching.append(ns_name)
+    late_attaching.sort()
+    startup_ordering_race = bool(late_attaching)
+
+    auto_recovered = bool(auto_attach_attempted and auto_attach_succeeded and attachment_healthy)
+    reconnect_required = not attachment_healthy
+
     reasons: list[str] = []
     remediation: list[str] = []
     if missing:
@@ -114,7 +162,9 @@ def assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
             f"are missing from active session attached tools (Connected ≠ attached tools, #708)."
         )
         remediation.append(
-            "Reconnect the IDE/client MCP session to attach namespaces to the active session. "
+            "Reconnect the IDE/client MCP session to attach namespaces to the active session "
+            f"(sanctioned path: {SANCTIONED_ATTACH_RECOVERY_TOOL}), then re-run full preflight "
+            "(gitea_whoami -> gitea_resolve_task_capability -> task). "
             "Do not use direct imports, CLI API mutations, profile hopping, or session file overrides."
         )
     elif not connected:
@@ -123,6 +173,19 @@ def assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
     else:
         reasons.append("All connected MCP server namespaces are attached to the active session.")
 
+    if startup_ordering_race:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"startup ordering race: namespace(s) {late_attaching} finished connecting after the "
+            "active session tool snapshot was taken, so they cannot appear in that snapshot (#708)."
+        )
+    if auto_attach_attempted and not auto_attach_succeeded:
+        reasons.append(
+            "automatic namespace attachment was attempted and did not succeed; only the sanctioned "
+            "client reconnect path remains."
+        )
+    if auto_recovered:
+        reasons.append("namespaces were automatically attached; no operator reconnect was required.")
+
     return {
         "success": attachment_healthy,
         "attachment_healthy": attachment_healthy,
@@ -141,9 +204,73 @@ def assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
             else "None; session tool namespaces attached."
         ),
         "unsafe_fallback_policy": UNSAFE_FALLBACK_WARNING,
+        "sanctioned_recovery_tool": SANCTIONED_ATTACH_RECOVERY_TOOL,
+        "reconnect_required": reconnect_required,
+        "auto_attach_attempted": bool(auto_attach_attempted),
+        "auto_recovered": auto_recovered,
+        "startup_ordering_race": startup_ordering_race,
+        "late_attaching_namespaces": late_attaching,
+        # Secret-free structured signals (#708 AC5). Namespace names and counts only:
+        # never tokens, endpoints, env values, or filesystem paths.
+        "telemetry": {
+            "connected_count": len(connected),
+            "attached_count": len(attached),
+            "required_count": len(req),
+            "missing_count": len(missing),
+            "discovery_status": discovery_status,
+            "discovery_cache_hit": (
+                None if discovery_cache_hit is None else bool(discovery_cache_hit)
+            ),
+            "discovery_cache_age_seconds": (
+                float(discovery_cache_age_seconds)
+                if isinstance(discovery_cache_age_seconds, (int, float))
+                else None
+            ),
+            "reconnect_required": reconnect_required,
+            "auto_attach_attempted": bool(auto_attach_attempted),
+            "auto_recovered": auto_recovered,
+            "startup_ordering_race": startup_ordering_race,
+            "error_type": None if attachment_healthy else ERROR_CONNECTED_NAMESPACES_MISSING,
+        },
     }
 
 
+def required_namespace_for_attachment(task: str) -> str | None:
+    """Map a mutation task to the MCP namespace that must be *attached* (#708)."""
+    return ATTACHMENT_GATED_TASKS.get((task or "").strip())
+
+
+def attachment_gate_from_session(
+    task: str,
+    session_attachment: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] | None,
+) -> list[str]:
+    """Fail-closed gate on recorded connected-but-unattached namespaces (#708).
+
+    Mirrors :func:`mutation_gate_from_session`: a namespace that has not been
+    assessed yet does not gate, so this never blocks a session that simply has
+    not run the assessment. Once an assessment records the namespace required
+    for *task* as Connected-but-unattached, the mutation fails closed and the
+    only offered recovery is the sanctioned client reconnect path.
+    """
+    ns = required_namespace_for_attachment(task)
+    if not ns:
+        return []
+    store = session_attachment or {}
+    entry = store.get(ns)
+    if not entry:
+        return []
+    if entry.get("attached") and entry.get("attachment_healthy"):
+        return []
+    detail = entry.get("error_type") or ERROR_CONNECTED_NAMESPACES_MISSING
+    return [
+        f"live MCP namespace '{ns}' is recorded {detail}: the host reports Connected but the "
+        f"namespace is not attached to the active session tool surface; reconnect the "
+        f"IDE/client MCP session and re-run preflight before {(task or 'mutation')} "
+        "(fail closed, #708)",
+        UNSAFE_FALLBACK_WARNING,
+    ]
+
+
 
 def _as_list(value: Any) -> list[str] | None:
     if value is None:

skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md

@@ -204,6 +204,28 @@ proposed command before running it; `gitea_audit_runtime_recovery_contamination`
 to inspect or (reconciler-only) clear the marker. Full contrast in
 `docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md`.
 
+## Connected is not attached (#708)
+
+A host/CLI MCP inventory showing **Connected** is not proof the tools are usable.
+The active session can expose **none** of a Connected server's tool namespaces —
+a *session attachment* failure, distinct from config drift (#672),
+transport-closed (#584), and resolver EOF (#685).
+
+Required preflight proof is **live tool visibility plus `gitea_whoami` on the role
+namespace**, never host Connected status alone. Call
+`gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_attachment` with the Connected set and the namespaces
+actually attached to the session; it returns the typed condition
+**mcp_connected_namespaces_missing** with per-namespace connected-vs-attached proof,
+and records the verdict so review and merge fail closed while a required namespace
+is unattached.
+
+Only sanctioned recovery: the client attach/reconnect path
+(`gitea_request_mcp_reconnect`), then full preflight
+(`gitea_whoami` → `gitea_resolve_task_capability` → task). Never recover by direct
+module import, CLI/raw API mutation, profile hopping, session-state overrides,
+process kills, or `.env`/mtime edits. A final report must not claim a healthy
+session without attachment proof.
+
 ## Shell Spawn Hard-Stop Rule
 
 `exit_code: -1` with empty stdout/stderr means the shell failed to spawn — not a

tests/test_issue_708_attachment_wiring.py

@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+"""Regression tests for Issue #708 wiring: detection must reach a gate, not just exist.
+
+The prior #708 slice added a pure decision function with no call site, so a session
+whose namespaces were Connected-but-unattached still passed every mutation gate.
+These tests pin the parts that make the detection load-bearing:
+
+* the typed condition is distinct from #672 / #584 / #685,
+* the session store records a per-namespace attachment verdict,
+* review/merge mutations fail closed while a required namespace is unattached,
+* recovery is reconnect-only and never suggests an unsafe fallback,
+* startup ordering races and discovery-cache telemetry are reported,
+* a healthy final report cannot be produced without attachment proof.
+"""
+
+import mcp_namespace_health
+
+
+REQUIRED = ["gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger", "gitea-tools"]
+
+
+def _connected_but_unattached():
+    """The #708 signature: host says Connected, session tool surface is empty."""
+    return mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
+        connected_servers=REQUIRED,
+        attached_session_namespaces=[],
+        required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+    )
+
+
+# --- AC1: distinct typed detection -----------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_connected_with_empty_session_tool_list_is_typed_distinctly():
+    res = _connected_but_unattached()
+    assert res["attachment_healthy"] is False
+    assert res["discovery_status"] == "connected_but_namespaces_missing"
+    assert res["error_type"] == "mcp_connected_namespaces_missing"
+    assert sorted(res["missing_namespaces"]) == sorted(REQUIRED)
+    # Not misclassified as config drift (#672), transport-closed (#584), or EOF (#685).
+    assert res["error_type"] not in {
+        "mcp_config_drift",
+        "transport_closed",
+        "mcp_client_eof",
+    }
+
+
+def test_proof_carries_connected_and_attached_per_namespace():
+    res = _connected_but_unattached()
+    proof = res["proof_of_connected_vs_attached"]
+    for ns in REQUIRED:
+        assert proof[ns] == {"connected": True, "attached": False}
+
+
+# --- AC2: recovery is auto-attach or reconnect-only -------------------------
+
+
+def test_exact_next_action_is_reconnect_only():
+    res = _connected_but_unattached()
+    assert res["reconnect_required"] is True
+    action = res["exact_next_action"]
+    assert "Reconnect the IDE/client MCP session" in action
+    for forbidden in ("pkill", "chmod", "curl", ".env", "sys.path"):
+        assert forbidden not in action
+
+
+def test_sanctioned_recovery_tool_is_named():
+    res = _connected_but_unattached()
+    assert res["sanctioned_recovery_tool"] == "gitea_request_mcp_reconnect"
+    assert "gitea_request_mcp_reconnect" in " ".join(res["remediation"])
+
+
+def test_successful_auto_attach_reports_recovered_without_operator():
+    res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
+        connected_servers=REQUIRED,
+        attached_session_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+        required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+        auto_attach_attempted=True,
+        auto_attach_succeeded=True,
+    )
+    assert res["attachment_healthy"] is True
+    assert res["auto_recovered"] is True
+    assert res["reconnect_required"] is False
+
+
+def test_failed_auto_attach_still_requires_reconnect():
+    res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
+        connected_servers=REQUIRED,
+        attached_session_namespaces=[],
+        required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+        auto_attach_attempted=True,
+        auto_attach_succeeded=False,
+    )
+    assert res["auto_recovered"] is False
+    assert res["reconnect_required"] is True
+    assert any("did not succeed" in r for r in res["reasons"])
+
+
+def test_reconnect_rediscovery_clears_the_condition():
+    """Attach state after a reconnect is healthy without any other change."""
+    before = _connected_but_unattached()
+    after = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
+        connected_servers=REQUIRED,
+        attached_session_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+        required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+        discovery_cache_hit=False,
+        discovery_cache_age_seconds=0.0,
+    )
+    assert before["attachment_healthy"] is False
+    assert after["attachment_healthy"] is True
+    assert after["discovery_status"] == "namespaces_attached"
+    assert after["missing_namespaces"] == []
+
+
+# --- AC4: startup ordering across multiple role servers ---------------------
+
+
+def test_multi_role_startup_ordering_race_is_reported():
+    res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
+        connected_servers=REQUIRED,
+        attached_session_namespaces=["gitea-author"],
+        required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+        session_tool_snapshot_at=1000.0,
+        namespace_connected_at={
+            "gitea-author": 990.0,
+            "gitea-reviewer": 1005.0,
+            "gitea-merger": 1007.0,
+        },
+    )
+    assert res["startup_ordering_race"] is True
+    assert res["late_attaching_namespaces"] == ["gitea-merger", "gitea-reviewer"]
+    assert res["telemetry"]["startup_ordering_race"] is True
+
+
+def test_no_ordering_race_when_snapshot_follows_connect():
+    res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
+        connected_servers=REQUIRED,
+        attached_session_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+        required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+        session_tool_snapshot_at=2000.0,
+        namespace_connected_at={ns: 1000.0 for ns in REQUIRED},
+    )
+    assert res["startup_ordering_race"] is False
+    assert res["late_attaching_namespaces"] == []
+
+
+# --- AC5: telemetry ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_telemetry_reports_cache_and_recovery_signals():
+    res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
+        connected_servers=REQUIRED,
+        attached_session_namespaces=["gitea-author"],
+        required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+        discovery_cache_hit=True,
+        discovery_cache_age_seconds=42.5,
+    )
+    tel = res["telemetry"]
+    assert tel["connected_count"] == 4
+    assert tel["attached_count"] == 1
+    assert tel["missing_count"] == 3
+    assert tel["discovery_cache_hit"] is True
+    assert tel["discovery_cache_age_seconds"] == 42.5
+    assert tel["reconnect_required"] is True
+    assert tel["error_type"] == "mcp_connected_namespaces_missing"
+
+
+def test_telemetry_leaks_no_secrets():
+    res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
+        connected_servers=REQUIRED,
+        attached_session_namespaces=[],
+        required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+    )
+    blob = repr(res["telemetry"]).lower()
+    for leak in ("token", "authorization", "password", "secret", "/users/", "http"):
+        assert leak not in blob
+
+
+# --- AC2/AC6: fail-closed mutation gate -------------------------------------
+
+
+def _session_store_from(assessment):
+    """Mirror the server-side recorder without importing the MCP server module."""
+    store = {}
+    missing = set(assessment["missing_namespaces"])
+    for ns, state in assessment["proof_of_connected_vs_attached"].items():
+        attached = bool(state["attached"])
+        store[ns] = {
+            "namespace": ns,
+            "connected": bool(state["connected"]),
+            "attached": attached,
+            "attachment_healthy": attached and ns not in missing,
+            "error_type": None if attached else assessment["error_type"],
+        }
+    return store
+
+
+def test_review_and_merge_fail_closed_while_unattached():
+    store = _session_store_from(_connected_but_unattached())
+    for task in ("review_pr", "submit_review", "merge_pr", "create_pr", "work_issue"):
+        reasons = mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session(task, store)
+        assert reasons, f"{task} must fail closed while its namespace is unattached"
+        assert "fail closed, #708" in reasons[0]
+
+
+def test_gate_offers_only_sanctioned_recovery():
+    store = _session_store_from(_connected_but_unattached())
+    reasons = mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", store)
+    joined = " ".join(reasons)
+    assert "reconnect" in joined.lower()
+    assert "Workflow Safety Hard Stop (#708)" in joined
+    # Unsafe fallbacks appear only inside the prohibition, never as advice.
+    assert "NEVER use" in joined
+
+
+def test_gate_passes_once_namespaces_are_attached():
+    healthy = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
+        connected_servers=REQUIRED,
+        attached_session_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+        required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+    )
+    store = _session_store_from(healthy)
+    for task in ("review_pr", "submit_review", "merge_pr", "create_pr", "work_issue"):
+        assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session(task, store) == []
+
+
+def test_unassessed_session_does_not_gate():
+    """No recorded assessment must not fabricate a block (matches #543 semantics)."""
+    assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", {}) == []
+    assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", None) == []
+
+
+def test_unmapped_task_is_not_gated():
+    store = _session_store_from(_connected_but_unattached())
+    assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("gitea_read", store) == []
+
+
+def test_partial_attachment_gates_only_the_affected_role():
+    """Author attached, reviewer not: author work proceeds, review fails closed."""
+    res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
+        connected_servers=REQUIRED,
+        attached_session_namespaces=["gitea-author", "gitea-tools"],
+        required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+    )
+    store = _session_store_from(res)
+    assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("work_issue", store) == []
+    assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("review_pr", store)
+    assert mcp_namespace_health.attachment_gate_from_session("merge_pr", store)
+
+
+# --- AC4: no false healthy report without attachment proof ------------------
+
+
+def test_no_false_healthy_without_attachment_proof():
+    """Connected alone never yields a healthy verdict."""
+    res = mcp_namespace_health.assess_connected_namespace_attachment(
+        connected_servers=REQUIRED,
+        attached_session_namespaces=None,
+        required_namespaces=REQUIRED,
+    )
+    assert res["success"] is False
+    assert res["attachment_healthy"] is False
+    assert res["telemetry"]["attached_count"] == 0
+
+
+def test_attachment_gate_maps_each_role_namespace():
+    assert mcp_namespace_health.required_namespace_for_attachment("review_pr") == "gitea-reviewer"
+    assert mcp_namespace_health.required_namespace_for_attachment("merge_pr") == "gitea-merger"
+    assert mcp_namespace_health.required_namespace_for_attachment("create_pr") == "gitea-author"
+    assert mcp_namespace_health.required_namespace_for_attachment("nope") is None