From 619f67907726631a74e6333d8004a435130e2309 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Walker <913443@dadeschools.net>
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2026 22:45:27 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] feat(webui): Runtime and session view (Phase 1) (Closes
#641)
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Compose runtime health with inventory sessions/namespaces/worktrees into a
live /sessions page and JSON API. Surface stale PID/lease flags and durable
contamination markers when detectable. Recovery links name sanctioned
reconnect/restart paths only — no kill controls.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context)
---
docs/webui-local-dev.md | 29 +-
tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py | 457 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
webui/app.py | 20 ++
webui/nav.py | 7 +-
webui/runtime_views.py | 4 +-
webui/session_loader.py | 428 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
webui/session_views.py | 344 ++++++++++++++++++++++
webui/system_health_views.py | 6 +-
8 files changed, 1280 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py
create mode 100644 webui/session_loader.py
create mode 100644 webui/session_views.py
diff --git a/docs/webui-local-dev.md b/docs/webui-local-dev.md
index d9cc022..70bb50b 100644
--- a/docs/webui-local-dev.md
+++ b/docs/webui-local-dev.md
@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
| `/api/actions/{id}/preview` | Mutation ledger preview (GET, read-only) |
| `/leases` | Lease and collision visibility (#433) |
| `/api/leases` | JSON lease/collision export |
-| `/sessions` | Phase 1 shell stub — session inventory (backed by #636) |
+| `/sessions` | Runtime and session view (#641) — health + inventory sessions/namespaces/worktrees |
+| `/api/sessions` | JSON export for the runtime/session view |
+| `/api/v1/sessions` | Versioned alias of `/api/sessions` |
| `/inventory` | Phase 1 shell stub — unified inventory (backed by #636) |
| `/timeline` | Phase 1 shell stub — workflow event timeline |
| `/policy` | Phase 1 shell stub — capability/role policy placeholder |
@@ -284,11 +286,26 @@ The header carries two read-only status badges — an **environment** badge
a **mode: read-only** badge — plus a **Docs** link to this document. No
privileged action controls are present in the Phase 1 shell.
-Not-yet-implemented surfaces (`/sessions`, `/inventory`, `/timeline`,
-`/policy`, `/insights`) resolve to graceful read-only stub pages instead of
-404s; their backing views land in later child issues of #631 (the inventory
-surfaces are backed by #636). Mutating methods on stub routes still fail closed
-with `read-only-mvp`.
+Not-yet-implemented surfaces (`/inventory`, `/timeline`, `/policy`,
+`/insights`) resolve to graceful read-only stub pages instead of 404s; their
+backing views land in later child issues of #631 (the inventory surfaces are
+backed by #636). Mutating methods on stub routes still fail closed with
+`read-only-mvp`.
+
+### Runtime and sessions (#641)
+
+`/sessions` is a live Phase 1 read-only view that composes:
+
+* runtime health from `#430` (profile, role, identity, master parity, stale warning)
+* control-plane sessions / leases and filesystem locks / worktrees / namespaces from `#636`
+* durable contamination markers when detectable (`#630` runtime recovery, `#671` stable-branch push)
+
+It surfaces stale indicators (dead PID, expired lease) and never silences an
+active contamination marker. Recovery links point only at sanctioned
+reconnect/operator restart docs (`docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md`,
+`docs/mcp-namespace-health.md`, `docs/mcp-restart-path-inventory.md`, this
+document). The page does **not** restart, kill, or take over sessions; manual
+`pkill` of MCP daemons is contamination, not recovery.
## System-health dashboard (#639)
diff --git a/tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py b/tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bb49fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py
@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+"""Tests for the Runtime and session view (Phase 1, #641).
+
+Covers clean and stale session rendering, contamination marker surfacing,
+worktree binding display, sanctioned recovery links (no pkill), nav/live
+status, and the JSON API export.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sys
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest import mock
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+
+from webui.app import create_app
+from webui.inventory import (
+ AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+ AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+ InventorySection,
+ InventorySnapshot,
+ STATUS_OK,
+ STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+)
+from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS, STUB_PAGES, iter_nav_items
+from webui.runtime_health import FileHash, RuntimeSnapshot
+from webui.session_loader import (
+ ContaminationMarker,
+ SessionRow,
+ SessionViewSnapshot,
+ _build_session_rows,
+ load_session_view_snapshot,
+ snapshot_to_dict,
+)
+from webui.session_views import render_sessions_page
+
+
+def _runtime(
+ *,
+ stale: str | None = None,
+ profile: str = "prgs-author",
+ role: str = "author",
+) -> RuntimeSnapshot:
+ return RuntimeSnapshot(
+ project_id="gitea-tools",
+ repo_root="/tmp/repo",
+ remote="prgs",
+ host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+ profile_name=profile,
+ role_kind=role,
+ config_model="v2-contexts",
+ profile_mode="dynamic-profile",
+ profile_source="config file profile",
+ authenticated_username="jcwalker3",
+ identity_error=None,
+ repo_sha="a" * 40,
+ remote_master_sha="a" * 40,
+ commits_behind_master=0,
+ stale_runtime_warning=stale,
+ shell_health={"shell_use_allowed": True, "consecutive_spawn_failures": 0},
+ workflow_hashes=(
+ FileHash(label="SKILL.md", path="skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md", sha256="abc"),
+ ),
+ schema_hashes=(),
+ restart_guidance="docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md",
+ fetch_error=None,
+ )
+
+
+def _inventory(
+ *,
+ sessions: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
+ leases: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
+ locks: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
+ worktrees: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
+ namespaces: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
+) -> InventorySnapshot:
+ sections = (
+ InventorySection(
+ name="sessions",
+ authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+ status=STATUS_OK,
+ items=sessions,
+ ),
+ InventorySection(
+ name="leases",
+ authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+ status=STATUS_OK,
+ items=leases,
+ ),
+ InventorySection(
+ name="locks",
+ authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+ status=STATUS_OK,
+ items=locks,
+ ),
+ InventorySection(
+ name="worktrees",
+ authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+ status=STATUS_OK,
+ items=worktrees,
+ ),
+ InventorySection(
+ name="namespaces",
+ authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+ status=STATUS_OK,
+ items=namespaces
+ or (
+ {
+ "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+ "role": "author",
+ "mcp_namespace": "gitea-author",
+ "capability_summary": {
+ "can_author": True,
+ "can_review": False,
+ "can_merge": False,
+ },
+ "active": True,
+ },
+ ),
+ reason="only the profile serving this web process is observable",
+ ),
+ )
+ index = {section.name: section for section in sections}
+ return InventorySnapshot(
+ generated_at="2026-07-25T00:00:00+00:00",
+ sections=sections,
+ collisions=(),
+ correlations=(),
+ scan_ms=1.0,
+ _section_index=index,
+ )
+
+
+def _clean_session() -> dict:
+ return {
+ "session_id": "prgs-author-111-clean",
+ "role": "author",
+ "profile": "prgs-author",
+ "namespace": "gitea-author",
+ "pid": 1111,
+ "pid_alive": True,
+ "status": "active",
+ "started_at": "2026-07-25T00:00:00Z",
+ "last_heartbeat_at": "2026-07-25T01:00:00Z",
+ }
+
+
+def _stale_session() -> dict:
+ return {
+ "session_id": "prgs-author-222-stale",
+ "role": "author",
+ "profile": "prgs-author",
+ "namespace": "gitea-author",
+ "pid": 2222,
+ "pid_alive": False,
+ "status": "active",
+ "started_at": "2026-07-24T00:00:00Z",
+ "last_heartbeat_at": "2026-07-24T01:00:00Z",
+ }
+
+
+class TestBuildSessionRows(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_clean_session_has_no_stale_or_contamination_flags(self):
+ inventory = _inventory(
+ sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+ leases=(
+ {
+ "lease_id": "lease-clean",
+ "session_id": "prgs-author-111-clean",
+ "status": "active",
+ "expired": False,
+ "work_kind": "issue",
+ "work_number": 641,
+ },
+ ),
+ locks=(
+ {
+ "issue_number": 641,
+ "branch_name": "feat/issue-641-runtime-session-view",
+ "worktree_path": "~/Development/Gitea-Tools/branches/feat-issue-641",
+ "live": True,
+ },
+ ),
+ )
+ rows = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=())
+ self.assertEqual(len(rows), 1)
+ row = rows[0]
+ self.assertEqual(row.session_id, "prgs-author-111-clean")
+ self.assertEqual(row.role, "author")
+ self.assertEqual(row.namespace, "gitea-author")
+ self.assertEqual(row.pid_alive, True)
+ self.assertEqual(row.lease_ids, ("lease-clean",))
+ self.assertEqual(row.work_refs, ("issue#641",))
+ self.assertTrue(row.worktree_paths)
+ self.assertEqual(row.stale_flags, ())
+ self.assertEqual(row.contamination_flags, ())
+
+ def test_stale_session_flags_dead_pid(self):
+ inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_stale_session(),))
+ rows = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=())
+ self.assertEqual(rows[0].stale_flags, ("pid-dead",))
+
+ def test_contamination_marker_binds_to_session(self):
+ inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_clean_session(),))
+ marker = ContaminationMarker(
+ kind="runtime_recovery_contamination",
+ on_disk=True,
+ has_payload=True,
+ summary="manual daemon kill",
+ reason_class="manual_daemon_kill",
+ session_id="prgs-author-111-clean",
+ role="author",
+ command_summary="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
+ cleared=False,
+ )
+ rows = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=(marker,))
+ self.assertIn("runtime_recovery_contamination", rows[0].contamination_flags)
+
+ def test_process_wide_contamination_surfaces_on_all_sessions(self):
+ inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_clean_session(), _stale_session()))
+ marker = ContaminationMarker(
+ kind="stable_branch_contamination",
+ on_disk=True,
+ has_payload=True,
+ summary="direct master push attempt",
+ reason_class="stable_branch_push",
+ session_id=None,
+ cleared=False,
+ )
+ rows = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=(marker,))
+ self.assertEqual(len(rows), 2)
+ for row in rows:
+ self.assertTrue(
+ any("stable_branch_contamination" in f for f in row.contamination_flags)
+ )
+
+
+class TestRenderSessionsPage(unittest.TestCase):
+ def _snapshot(
+ self,
+ *,
+ sessions: tuple[dict, ...],
+ contamination: tuple[ContaminationMarker, ...] = (),
+ stale_runtime: str | None = None,
+ ) -> SessionViewSnapshot:
+ inventory = _inventory(
+ sessions=sessions,
+ leases=(
+ {
+ "lease_id": "lease-1",
+ "session_id": sessions[0]["session_id"] if sessions else "",
+ "status": "active",
+ "expired": False,
+ "work_kind": "issue",
+ "work_number": 641,
+ },
+ )
+ if sessions
+ else (),
+ locks=(
+ {
+ "issue_number": 641,
+ "worktree_path": "branches/feat-issue-641",
+ },
+ )
+ if sessions
+ else (),
+ worktrees=(
+ {
+ "rel_path": "branches/feat-issue-641",
+ "branch": "feat/issue-641-runtime-session-view",
+ "classification": "active_issue_work",
+ "registered_worktree": True,
+ "dirty": False,
+ },
+ ),
+ )
+ rows = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination)
+ return SessionViewSnapshot(
+ runtime=_runtime(stale=stale_runtime),
+ inventory=inventory,
+ sessions=rows,
+ contamination_markers=contamination,
+ )
+
+ def test_clean_session_render(self):
+ html = render_sessions_page(self._snapshot(sessions=(_clean_session(),)))
+ self.assertIn("Runtime and sessions", html)
+ self.assertIn("prgs-author-111-clean", html)
+ self.assertIn("gitea-author", html)
+ self.assertIn("branches/feat-issue-641", html)
+ self.assertIn("Sanctioned recovery", html)
+ self.assertIn("docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md", html)
+ # Recovery section must name reconnect and forbid manual kill.
+ recovery_idx = html.lower().find("sanctioned recovery")
+ self.assertGreaterEqual(recovery_idx, 0)
+ recovery = html[recovery_idx:].lower()
+ self.assertIn("reconnect", recovery)
+ self.assertIn("contamination", recovery)
+ self.assertIn("not recovery", recovery)
+ self.assertNotIn("run pkill", recovery)
+ self.assertNotIn("killall", recovery)
+
+ def test_stale_session_render(self):
+ html = render_sessions_page(self._snapshot(sessions=(_stale_session(),)))
+ self.assertIn("prgs-author-222-stale", html)
+ self.assertIn("pid-dead", html)
+ self.assertIn("badge-stale", html)
+
+ def test_contamination_render_is_not_silent(self):
+ marker = ContaminationMarker(
+ kind="runtime_recovery_contamination",
+ on_disk=True,
+ has_payload=True,
+ summary="manual kill",
+ reason_class="manual_daemon_kill",
+ session_id="prgs-author-111-clean",
+ command_summary="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
+ cleared=False,
+ )
+ html = render_sessions_page(
+ self._snapshot(sessions=(_clean_session(),), contamination=(marker,))
+ )
+ self.assertIn("Contamination markers", html)
+ self.assertIn("runtime_recovery_contamination", html)
+ self.assertIn("ACTIVE", html)
+ self.assertIn("badge-blocked", html)
+
+ def test_stale_runtime_banner(self):
+ html = render_sessions_page(
+ self._snapshot(
+ sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+ stale_runtime="server behind master by 3 commits",
+ )
+ )
+ self.assertIn("Stale runtime", html)
+ self.assertIn("server behind master", html)
+
+
+class TestSessionLoaderComposition(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_load_with_injected_sources(self):
+ inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_clean_session(), _stale_session()))
+ snap = load_session_view_snapshot(
+ load_runtime=lambda: _runtime(),
+ load_inventory=lambda: inventory,
+ inspect_contamination=lambda **_k: {
+ "on_disk": False,
+ "has_payload": False,
+ "summary": "absent",
+ },
+ load_contamination_payload=lambda **_k: None,
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(len(snap.sessions), 2)
+ self.assertEqual(snap.stale_session_count, 1)
+ self.assertEqual(snap.contaminated_session_count, 0)
+ data = snapshot_to_dict(snap)
+ self.assertEqual(data["view"], "runtime-sessions")
+ self.assertEqual(data["issue"], 641)
+ self.assertTrue(data["read_only"])
+ self.assertEqual(data["session_counts"]["total"], 2)
+ self.assertEqual(data["session_counts"]["stale"], 1)
+ self.assertIn("recovery_docs", data)
+
+
+class TestSessionsRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+ inventory = _inventory(
+ sessions=(_clean_session(), _stale_session()),
+ leases=(
+ {
+ "lease_id": "lease-x",
+ "session_id": "prgs-author-111-clean",
+ "status": "active",
+ "expired": False,
+ "work_kind": "issue",
+ "work_number": 641,
+ },
+ ),
+ locks=(
+ {
+ "issue_number": 641,
+ "worktree_path": "branches/feat-issue-641",
+ },
+ ),
+ worktrees=(
+ {
+ "rel_path": "branches/feat-issue-641",
+ "branch": "feat/issue-641-runtime-session-view",
+ "classification": "active_issue_work",
+ "registered_worktree": True,
+ "dirty": False,
+ },
+ ),
+ )
+ rows = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=())
+ self.snapshot = SessionViewSnapshot(
+ runtime=_runtime(stale="stale for test"),
+ inventory=inventory,
+ sessions=rows,
+ contamination_markers=(),
+ )
+ self._patch = mock.patch(
+ "webui.app.load_session_view_snapshot",
+ return_value=self.snapshot,
+ )
+ self._patch.start()
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ self._patch.stop()
+
+ def test_sessions_page_live(self):
+ response = self.client.get("/sessions")
+ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+ self.assertIn("Runtime and sessions", response.text)
+ self.assertIn("prgs-author-111-clean", response.text)
+ self.assertIn("prgs-author-222-stale", response.text)
+ self.assertIn("pid-dead", response.text)
+ self.assertIn("Sanctioned recovery", response.text)
+ self.assertNotIn("Phase 1 shell placeholder", response.text)
+ self.assertNotIn("child issue of #425", response.text.lower())
+
+ def test_api_sessions_json(self):
+ for path in ("/api/sessions", "/api/v1/sessions"):
+ response = self.client.get(path)
+ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200, path)
+ data = response.json()
+ self.assertEqual(data["view"], "runtime-sessions")
+ self.assertEqual(data["session_counts"]["total"], 2)
+ self.assertEqual(data["session_counts"]["stale"], 1)
+ self.assertTrue(data["read_only"])
+ self.assertEqual(data["mutations"], [])
+
+ def test_nav_marks_sessions_live(self):
+ sessions_items = [
+ item for item in iter_nav_items() if item.href == "/sessions"
+ ]
+ self.assertEqual(len(sessions_items), 1)
+ self.assertEqual(sessions_items[0].status, "live")
+ self.assertNotIn("/sessions", STUB_PAGES)
+ # Home page should not mark Sessions as stub.
+ home = self.client.get("/")
+ self.assertEqual(home.status_code, 200)
+ self.assertIn('href="/sessions"', home.text)
+ # Stub marker only appears next to remaining stub destinations.
+ self.assertNotIn(
+ 'href="/sessions">Sessions (stub)',
+ home.text,
+ )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ unittest.main()
diff --git a/webui/app.py b/webui/app.py
index cedcef1..560ec75 100644
--- a/webui/app.py
+++ b/webui/app.py
@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo
from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
+from webui.session_loader import (
+ load_session_view_snapshot,
+ snapshot_to_dict as session_view_snapshot_to_dict,
+)
+from webui.session_views import render_sessions_page
from webui.inventory import (
SECTION_NAMES as _INVENTORY_SECTIONS,
load_inventory_snapshot,
@@ -87,6 +92,7 @@ _LEGACY_PAGES = (
("/projects", "Projects", "registry and onboarding (#427)"),
("/prompts", "Prompts", "canonical workflow prompt library (#428)"),
("/runtime", "Runtime", "MCP health and stale-runtime detection (#430)"),
+ ("/sessions", "Sessions", "runtime and session view (#641)"),
("/audit", "Audit", "final-report paste and validator preview (#431)"),
("/worktrees", "Worktrees", "branch hygiene dashboard (#432)"),
("/leases", "Leases", "collision and lease visibility (#433)"),
@@ -325,6 +331,17 @@ async def api_runtime(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
return JSONResponse(runtime_snapshot_to_dict(load_runtime_snapshot()))
+async def sessions(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
+ """Runtime and session view (#641) — read-only composition of health + inventory."""
+ snapshot = load_session_view_snapshot()
+ return HTMLResponse(render_sessions_page(snapshot))
+
+
+async def api_sessions(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+ """JSON export for the runtime/session view (#641)."""
+ return JSONResponse(session_view_snapshot_to_dict(load_session_view_snapshot()))
+
+
async def _parse_audit_form(request: Request) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
if request.method == "GET":
return "", None
@@ -764,6 +781,9 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
Route("/api/prompts", api_prompts, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/runtime", runtime, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/runtime", api_runtime, methods=["GET"]),
+ Route("/sessions", sessions, methods=["GET"]),
+ Route("/api/sessions", api_sessions, methods=["GET"]),
+ Route("/api/v1/sessions", api_sessions, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/v1/timeline", api_v1_timeline, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/analytics", analytics, methods=["GET"]),
Route("/api/analytics", api_v1_analytics, methods=["GET"]),
diff --git a/webui/nav.py b/webui/nav.py
index 129b2a4..da9f763 100644
--- a/webui/nav.py
+++ b/webui/nav.py
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
)),
NavGroup("Runtime/Sessions", (
NavItem("/runtime", "Runtime health"),
- NavItem("/sessions", "Sessions", "stub"),
+ NavItem("/sessions", "Sessions"),
)),
NavGroup("Projects", (
NavItem("/projects", "Projects"),
@@ -76,11 +76,6 @@ NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
# issues of epic #631. Each maps a path to (title, description). Routes are
# registered so nav links resolve to a graceful, read-only stub page.
STUB_PAGES: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {
- "/sessions": (
- "Sessions",
- "Active session, capability, and role inventory. Backed by the unified "
- "inventory API (#636) once it lands.",
- ),
"/inventory": (
"Inventory",
"Unified sessions, leases, locks, namespaces, and worktree inventory. "
diff --git a/webui/runtime_views.py b/webui/runtime_views.py
index b057248..18ac5b4 100644
--- a/webui/runtime_views.py
+++ b/webui/runtime_views.py
@@ -88,5 +88,7 @@ def render_runtime_page(snapshot: RuntimeSnapshot) -> str:
"MVP is read-only — restart MCP servers from your IDE/operator "
"workflow. Related issue: #420. Guidance: "
f"{html.escape(snapshot.restart_guidance)}
"
- "This page does not expose tokens or perform MCP restarts.
"
+ "This page does not expose tokens or perform MCP restarts. "
+ "Correlated sessions, worktree bindings, and contamination markers: "
+ "/sessions (#641).
"
)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/webui/session_loader.py b/webui/session_loader.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8838d92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/webui/session_loader.py
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
+"""Compose runtime health + inventory into a sessions/runtime view (#641).
+
+Phase 1 is read-only. It correlates namespaces, sessions, capabilities,
+worktree bindings, lease ownership, stale flags, and contamination markers
+when they are detectable on disk (#630 / #671). It never restarts, kills, or
+takes over a session.
+
+Sources:
+
+* :mod:`webui.runtime_health` — profile, role, stale runtime, shell health.
+* :mod:`webui.inventory` — sessions, leases, locks, worktrees, namespaces
+ and collision signals from the control-plane DB + filesystem.
+* :mod:`mcp_session_state` — durable contamination markers (inspect only).
+
+Secrets are never read. Absolute paths are collapsed by inventory redaction.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+import mcp_session_state
+from webui.inventory import (
+ InventorySnapshot,
+ load_inventory_snapshot,
+ snapshot_to_dict as inventory_snapshot_to_dict,
+)
+from webui.runtime_health import (
+ RuntimeSnapshot,
+ load_runtime_snapshot,
+ snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict,
+)
+
+# Sanctioned recovery pointers only — never pkill / killall (#630).
+SANCTIONED_RECOVERY_DOCS: tuple[dict[str, str], ...] = (
+ {
+ "label": "MCP namespace EOF recovery (reconnect only)",
+ "path": "docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md",
+ "note": "IDE/client reconnect or operator-owned restart; never kill daemons.",
+ },
+ {
+ "label": "MCP namespace health",
+ "path": "docs/mcp-namespace-health.md",
+ "note": "client_namespace probe proves namespace health.",
+ },
+ {
+ "label": "Restart path inventory",
+ "path": "docs/mcp-restart-path-inventory.md",
+ "note": "Catalog of sanctioned reconnect/restart paths.",
+ },
+ {
+ "label": "Local web UI recovery",
+ "path": "docs/webui-local-dev.md",
+ "note": "Operator console start and documented recovery sequence.",
+ },
+)
+
+_CONTAMINATION_KINDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+ mcp_session_state.KIND_RUNTIME_RECOVERY_CONTAMINATION,
+ mcp_session_state.KIND_STABLE_BRANCH_CONTAMINATION,
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ContaminationMarker:
+ """A detectable durable contamination marker (audit-safe summary)."""
+
+ kind: str
+ on_disk: bool
+ has_payload: bool
+ summary: str
+ reason_class: str | None = None
+ session_id: str | None = None
+ role: str | None = None
+ command_summary: str | None = None
+ cleared: bool = False
+
+ def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+ return {
+ "kind": self.kind,
+ "on_disk": self.on_disk,
+ "has_payload": self.has_payload,
+ "summary": self.summary,
+ "reason_class": self.reason_class,
+ "session_id": self.session_id,
+ "role": self.role,
+ "command_summary": self.command_summary,
+ "cleared": self.cleared,
+ "active": self.on_disk and self.has_payload and not self.cleared,
+ }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SessionRow:
+ """One correlated session row for the sessions table."""
+
+ session_id: str
+ role: str | None
+ profile: str | None
+ namespace: str | None
+ pid: int | None
+ pid_alive: bool | None
+ status: str | None
+ started_at: str | None
+ last_heartbeat_at: str | None
+ lease_ids: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+ work_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+ worktree_paths: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+ stale_flags: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+ contamination_flags: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+ def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+ return {
+ "session_id": self.session_id,
+ "role": self.role,
+ "profile": self.profile,
+ "namespace": self.namespace,
+ "pid": self.pid,
+ "pid_alive": self.pid_alive,
+ "status": self.status,
+ "started_at": self.started_at,
+ "last_heartbeat_at": self.last_heartbeat_at,
+ "lease_ids": list(self.lease_ids),
+ "work_refs": list(self.work_refs),
+ "worktree_paths": list(self.worktree_paths),
+ "stale_flags": list(self.stale_flags),
+ "contamination_flags": list(self.contamination_flags),
+ "is_stale": bool(self.stale_flags),
+ "is_contaminated": bool(self.contamination_flags),
+ }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SessionViewSnapshot:
+ """Composed runtime + session inventory view (#641)."""
+
+ runtime: RuntimeSnapshot
+ inventory: InventorySnapshot
+ sessions: tuple[SessionRow, ...]
+ contamination_markers: tuple[ContaminationMarker, ...]
+ recovery_docs: tuple[dict[str, str], ...] = SANCTIONED_RECOVERY_DOCS
+ fetch_error: str | None = None
+
+ @property
+ def stale_session_count(self) -> int:
+ return sum(1 for row in self.sessions if row.stale_flags)
+
+ @property
+ def contaminated_session_count(self) -> int:
+ return sum(1 for row in self.sessions if row.contamination_flags)
+
+ @property
+ def active_contamination(self) -> tuple[ContaminationMarker, ...]:
+ return tuple(m for m in self.contamination_markers if m.to_dict()["active"])
+
+
+def _inspect_contamination(
+ kind: str,
+ *,
+ remote: str | None,
+ inspect: Callable[..., dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
+ load: Callable[..., dict[str, Any] | None] | None = None,
+) -> ContaminationMarker:
+ """Inspect one contamination kind; never raises into the page render path."""
+ inspect_fn = inspect or mcp_session_state.inspect_state_envelope
+ load_fn = load or mcp_session_state.load_state
+ try:
+ envelope = inspect_fn(kind=kind, remote=remote)
+ except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — fail soft for the dashboard
+ return ContaminationMarker(
+ kind=kind,
+ on_disk=False,
+ has_payload=False,
+ summary=f"contamination inspect failed: {type(exc).__name__}",
+ )
+
+ reason_class = None
+ session_id = None
+ role = None
+ command_summary = None
+ cleared = False
+ summary = str(envelope.get("summary") or "")
+
+ if envelope.get("on_disk") and envelope.get("has_payload"):
+ try:
+ payload = load_fn(kind=kind, remote=remote) or {}
+ except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
+ payload = {}
+ if isinstance(payload, dict):
+ reason_class = payload.get("reason_class")
+ session_id = payload.get("session_id")
+ role = payload.get("role")
+ command_summary = payload.get("command_summary") or payload.get("detail")
+ cleared = bool(payload.get("cleared_by_reconciler"))
+ if not summary:
+ summary = (
+ f"{kind}: {reason_class or 'present'}"
+ + (" (cleared)" if cleared else "")
+ )
+
+ return ContaminationMarker(
+ kind=kind,
+ on_disk=bool(envelope.get("on_disk")),
+ has_payload=bool(envelope.get("has_payload")),
+ summary=summary or f"{kind}: not present",
+ reason_class=str(reason_class) if reason_class else None,
+ session_id=str(session_id) if session_id else None,
+ role=str(role) if role else None,
+ command_summary=str(command_summary) if command_summary else None,
+ cleared=cleared,
+ )
+
+
+def _load_contamination_markers(
+ *,
+ remote: str | None,
+ inspect: Callable[..., dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
+ load: Callable[..., dict[str, Any] | None] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[ContaminationMarker, ...]:
+ return tuple(
+ _inspect_contamination(kind, remote=remote, inspect=inspect, load=load)
+ for kind in _CONTAMINATION_KINDS
+ )
+
+
+def _build_session_rows(
+ inventory: InventorySnapshot,
+ contamination: tuple[ContaminationMarker, ...],
+) -> tuple[SessionRow, ...]:
+ sessions_section = inventory.section("sessions")
+ leases_section = inventory.section("leases")
+ locks_section = inventory.section("locks")
+
+ leases_by_session: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
+ for lease in (leases_section.items if leases_section else ()):
+ sid = str(lease.get("session_id") or "")
+ if sid:
+ leases_by_session.setdefault(sid, []).append(lease)
+
+ locks_by_session_hint: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
+ for lock in (locks_section.items if locks_section else ()):
+ # Locks carry claimant profile/username, not control-plane session ids.
+ # Correlate later by matching lease work_number ↔ lock issue_number.
+ pass
+
+ active_markers = [m for m in contamination if m.to_dict()["active"]]
+ marker_session_ids = {
+ m.session_id for m in active_markers if m.session_id
+ }
+
+ rows: list[SessionRow] = []
+ for raw in sessions_section.items if sessions_section else ():
+ sid = str(raw.get("session_id") or "")
+ if not sid:
+ continue
+ session_leases = leases_by_session.get(sid, [])
+ lease_ids = tuple(
+ str(lease["lease_id"])
+ for lease in session_leases
+ if lease.get("lease_id")
+ )
+ work_refs: list[str] = []
+ work_numbers: list[int] = []
+ for lease in session_leases:
+ kind = lease.get("work_kind")
+ number = lease.get("work_number")
+ if kind and number is not None:
+ work_refs.append(f"{kind}#{number}")
+ try:
+ work_numbers.append(int(number))
+ except (TypeError, ValueError):
+ pass
+
+ worktree_paths: list[str] = []
+ for lock in (locks_section.items if locks_section else ()):
+ try:
+ issue_no = int(lock.get("issue_number"))
+ except (TypeError, ValueError):
+ continue
+ if issue_no in work_numbers and lock.get("worktree_path"):
+ worktree_paths.append(str(lock["worktree_path"]))
+
+ stale_flags: list[str] = []
+ if raw.get("pid_alive") is False:
+ stale_flags.append("pid-dead")
+ status = str(raw.get("status") or "").lower()
+ if status and status not in {"active", "alive", "running", "ok"}:
+ stale_flags.append(f"status:{status}")
+ for lease in session_leases:
+ if lease.get("expired") is True:
+ stale_flags.append("lease-expired")
+ if str(lease.get("status") or "").lower() == "active" and lease.get(
+ "expired"
+ ) is True:
+ stale_flags.append("active-lease-past-expiry")
+
+ contamination_flags: list[str] = []
+ if sid in marker_session_ids:
+ for marker in active_markers:
+ if marker.session_id == sid:
+ contamination_flags.append(marker.kind)
+ # Process-wide contamination with no session binding still surfaces
+ # against every live session so it cannot be silent (#630).
+ for marker in active_markers:
+ if not marker.session_id and marker.kind not in contamination_flags:
+ contamination_flags.append(f"{marker.kind}:process-wide")
+
+ rows.append(
+ SessionRow(
+ session_id=sid,
+ role=raw.get("role"),
+ profile=raw.get("profile"),
+ namespace=raw.get("namespace"),
+ pid=raw.get("pid") if isinstance(raw.get("pid"), int) else None,
+ pid_alive=raw.get("pid_alive")
+ if isinstance(raw.get("pid_alive"), bool)
+ else None,
+ status=raw.get("status"),
+ started_at=raw.get("started_at"),
+ last_heartbeat_at=raw.get("last_heartbeat_at"),
+ lease_ids=lease_ids,
+ work_refs=tuple(work_refs),
+ worktree_paths=tuple(worktree_paths),
+ stale_flags=tuple(dict.fromkeys(stale_flags)),
+ contamination_flags=tuple(dict.fromkeys(contamination_flags)),
+ )
+ )
+
+ # Silence unused variable for the locks_by_session_hint placeholder path.
+ _ = locks_by_session_hint
+ return tuple(rows)
+
+
+def load_session_view_snapshot(
+ *,
+ load_runtime: Callable[..., RuntimeSnapshot] | None = None,
+ load_inventory: Callable[..., InventorySnapshot] | None = None,
+ inspect_contamination: Callable[..., dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
+ load_contamination_payload: Callable[..., dict[str, Any] | None] | None = None,
+) -> SessionViewSnapshot:
+ """Build the composed sessions/runtime view. Fail-soft on partial sources."""
+ runtime_loader = load_runtime or load_runtime_snapshot
+ inventory_loader = load_inventory or load_inventory_snapshot
+ fetch_error: str | None = None
+
+ try:
+ runtime = runtime_loader()
+ except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
+ fetch_error = f"runtime snapshot failed: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}"
+ # Minimal placeholder so the page still renders inventory + recovery.
+ from webui.runtime_health import RuntimeSnapshot as _RS
+
+ runtime = _RS(
+ project_id="unknown",
+ repo_root="",
+ remote="",
+ host="",
+ profile_name="unknown",
+ role_kind="unknown",
+ config_model="unknown",
+ profile_mode="unknown",
+ profile_source="unknown",
+ authenticated_username=None,
+ identity_error=str(exc),
+ repo_sha=None,
+ remote_master_sha=None,
+ commits_behind_master=None,
+ stale_runtime_warning=None,
+ shell_health={},
+ workflow_hashes=(),
+ schema_hashes=(),
+ restart_guidance="docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md",
+ fetch_error=str(exc),
+ )
+
+ try:
+ inventory = inventory_loader()
+ except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
+ msg = f"inventory snapshot failed: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}"
+ fetch_error = f"{fetch_error}; {msg}" if fetch_error else msg
+ inventory = load_inventory_snapshot(
+ db_path="/nonexistent-for-fail-soft",
+ lock_dir="/nonexistent-for-fail-soft",
+ )
+
+ remote = getattr(runtime, "remote", None)
+ contamination = _load_contamination_markers(
+ remote=remote,
+ inspect=inspect_contamination,
+ load=load_contamination_payload,
+ )
+ sessions = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination)
+ return SessionViewSnapshot(
+ runtime=runtime,
+ inventory=inventory,
+ sessions=sessions,
+ contamination_markers=contamination,
+ fetch_error=fetch_error,
+ )
+
+
+def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
+ """JSON export for ``/api/sessions`` (read-only)."""
+ return {
+ "api_version": "v1",
+ "view": "runtime-sessions",
+ "issue": 641,
+ "fetch_error": snapshot.fetch_error,
+ "runtime": runtime_snapshot_to_dict(snapshot.runtime),
+ "inventory": inventory_snapshot_to_dict(snapshot.inventory),
+ "sessions": [row.to_dict() for row in snapshot.sessions],
+ "session_counts": {
+ "total": len(snapshot.sessions),
+ "stale": snapshot.stale_session_count,
+ "contaminated": snapshot.contaminated_session_count,
+ },
+ "contamination_markers": [
+ marker.to_dict() for marker in snapshot.contamination_markers
+ ],
+ "active_contamination": [
+ marker.to_dict() for marker in snapshot.active_contamination
+ ],
+ "recovery_docs": [dict(doc) for doc in snapshot.recovery_docs],
+ "read_only": True,
+ "phase": 1,
+ "mutations": [],
+ }
diff --git a/webui/session_views.py b/webui/session_views.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c0408e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/webui/session_views.py
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+"""HTML views for the Runtime and session view (Phase 1, #641).
+
+Read-only composition of runtime health (#430) and inventory sessions /
+namespaces / worktrees (#636). Surfaces stale and contamination indicators
+when detectable. Recovery links point only at sanctioned reconnect/restart
+docs — never at manual process kill (#630).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from html import escape
+from typing import Sequence
+
+from webui.layout import render_page
+from webui.session_loader import (
+ ContaminationMarker,
+ SessionRow,
+ SessionViewSnapshot,
+)
+
+
+def _badge(text: str, css: str) -> str:
+ return f'{escape(text)}'
+
+
+def _flags(flags: Sequence[str], *, css: str) -> str:
+ if not flags:
+ return '—'
+ return " ".join(_badge(flag, css) for flag in flags)
+
+
+def _runtime_banner(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+ runtime = snapshot.runtime
+ stale = runtime.stale_runtime_warning
+ stale_html = ""
+ if stale:
+ stale_html = (
+ f''
+ f"Stale runtime: {escape(stale)}
"
+ )
+ identity = runtime.authenticated_username or "unresolved"
+ if runtime.identity_error:
+ identity = f"unresolved ({runtime.identity_error})"
+
+ return f"""
+
Runtime context
+
+ | Profile | {escape(runtime.profile_name)} |
+ | Role kind | {escape(runtime.role_kind)} |
+ | Identity | {escape(str(identity))} |
+ | Remote / host |
+ {escape(runtime.remote)} · {escape(runtime.host)} |
+
+ | Local HEAD |
+ {escape(runtime.repo_sha or "unknown")} |
+
+ | Remote master |
+ {escape(runtime.remote_master_sha or "unknown")} |
+
+ | Commits behind |
+ {escape(str(runtime.commits_behind_master if runtime.commits_behind_master is not None else "unknown"))} |
+
+
+
Full runtime detail: /runtime ·
+ Inventory API: /api/v1/inventory
+ {stale_html}
+
"""
+
+
+def _summary_bar(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+ total = len(snapshot.sessions)
+ stale = snapshot.stale_session_count
+ contaminated = snapshot.contaminated_session_count
+ active_markers = len(snapshot.active_contamination)
+ inv_status = snapshot.inventory.status
+ return f"""
+
Sessions: {total}
+
Stale: {stale}
+
Contaminated: {contaminated}
+
Active markers: {active_markers}
+
Inventory: {escape(inv_status)}
+
"""
+
+
+def _render_session_row(row: SessionRow) -> str:
+ pid = "—" if row.pid is None else str(row.pid)
+ pid_alive = "—" if row.pid_alive is None else ("alive" if row.pid_alive else "dead")
+ pid_css = (
+ "badge-health-ok"
+ if row.pid_alive is True
+ else ("badge-blocked" if row.pid_alive is False else "badge-health-skipped")
+ )
+ leases = (
+ ", ".join(f"{escape(lid)}" for lid in row.lease_ids)
+ if row.lease_ids
+ else 'none'
+ )
+ work = (
+ ", ".join(escape(ref) for ref in row.work_refs)
+ if row.work_refs
+ else '—'
+ )
+ worktrees = (
+ "
".join(f"{escape(path)}" for path in row.worktree_paths)
+ if row.worktree_paths
+ else 'unbound'
+ )
+ return f"""
+ {escape(row.session_id)} |
+
+ {escape(str(row.role or "—"))} / {escape(str(row.profile or "—"))}
+ ns: {escape(str(row.namespace or "—"))}
+ |
+
+ {escape(pid)}
+ {_badge(pid_alive, pid_css)}
+ |
+ {escape(str(row.status or "—"))} {escape(str(row.last_heartbeat_at or ""))} |
+ {leases} {work} |
+ {worktrees} |
+ {_flags(row.stale_flags, css="badge-stale")} |
+ {_flags(row.contamination_flags, css="badge-blocked")} |
+
"""
+
+
+def _sessions_table(rows: Sequence[SessionRow]) -> str:
+ if not rows:
+ return (
+ 'No control-plane sessions recorded. Inventory may '
+ "be unavailable, or no MCP workers have registered yet.
"
+ )
+ body = "".join(_render_session_row(row) for row in rows)
+ return f"""
+
+
+ | Session |
+ Role / profile / namespace |
+ PID |
+ Status |
+ Leases / work |
+ Worktree binding |
+ Stale |
+ Contamination |
+
+
+
+ {body}
+
+
"""
+
+
+def _namespaces_section(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+ section = snapshot.inventory.section("namespaces")
+ if section is None:
+ return (
+ 'Namespaces
'
+ '
Namespaces section not loaded.
'
+ )
+ if not section.ok:
+ return f"""
+
Namespaces {_badge(section.status, "badge-health-degraded")}
+
{escape(section.reason or "unavailable")}
+
"""
+
+ rows = []
+ for item in section.items:
+ caps = item.get("capability_summary") or {}
+ cap_bits = ", ".join(
+ name for name, ok in sorted(caps.items()) if ok
+ ) or "none"
+ rows.append(
+ ""
+ f"{escape(str(item.get('mcp_namespace') or '—'))} | "
+ f"{escape(str(item.get('profile_name') or '—'))} | "
+ f"{escape(str(item.get('role') or '—'))} | "
+ f"{escape(cap_bits)} | "
+ f"{'yes' if item.get('active') else 'no'} | "
+ "
"
+ )
+ reason = (
+ f'{escape(section.reason)}
'
+ if section.reason
+ else ""
+ )
+ return f"""
+
Namespaces / capabilities
+ {reason}
+
+
+
+ | Namespace |
+ Profile |
+ Role |
+ Capabilities |
+ Active in process |
+
+
+
+ {"".join(rows) if rows else '| No namespace rows. |
'}
+
+
+
"""
+
+
+def _worktrees_section(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+ section = snapshot.inventory.section("worktrees")
+ if section is None:
+ return ""
+ if not section.ok and not section.items:
+ return f"""
+
Worktrees {_badge(section.status, "badge-health-degraded")}
+
{escape(section.reason or "unavailable")}
+
"""
+
+ rows = []
+ for item in section.items[:50]:
+ rows.append(
+ ""
+ f"{escape(str(item.get('rel_path') or item.get('path') or '—'))} | "
+ f"{escape(str(item.get('branch') or '—'))} | "
+ f"{escape(str(item.get('classification') or '—'))} | "
+ f"{'yes' if item.get('registered_worktree') else 'no'} | "
+ f"{'dirty' if item.get('dirty') else 'clean'} | "
+ "
"
+ )
+ more = ""
+ if len(section.items) > 50:
+ more = f'Showing 50 of {len(section.items)}. Full list: /worktrees.
'
+ return f"""
+
Worktree bindings
+
Registered issue worktrees under branches/. Hygiene detail: /worktrees.
+
+
+
+ | Path |
+ Branch |
+ Classification |
+ Registered |
+ State |
+
+
+
+ {"".join(rows) if rows else '| No worktrees recorded. |
'}
+
+
+ {more}
+
"""
+
+
+def _contamination_section(markers: Sequence[ContaminationMarker]) -> str:
+ if not markers:
+ return (
+ 'Contamination markers
'
+ '
No contamination kinds inspected.
'
+ )
+ rows = []
+ for marker in markers:
+ active = marker.to_dict()["active"]
+ status = "ACTIVE" if active else ("cleared" if marker.cleared else "absent")
+ css = "badge-blocked" if active else "badge-health-ok"
+ rows.append(
+ ""
+ f"{escape(marker.kind)} | "
+ f"{_badge(status, css)} | "
+ f"{escape(marker.reason_class or '—')} | "
+ f"{escape(marker.session_id or '—')} | "
+ f"{escape(marker.command_summary or marker.summary)} | "
+ "
"
+ )
+ return f"""
+
Contamination markers (#630 / #671)
+
Durable markers only — never silent when present. Clearance is reconciler-only.
+
+
+
+ | Kind |
+ State |
+ Reason class |
+ Session |
+ Summary |
+
+
+
+ {"".join(rows)}
+
+
+
"""
+
+
+def _recovery_section(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+ items = []
+ for doc in snapshot.recovery_docs:
+ items.append(
+ ""
+ f"{escape(doc['path'])} — "
+ f"{escape(doc['label'])}: {escape(doc['note'])}"
+ ""
+ )
+ return f"""
+
Sanctioned recovery (read-only)
+
This view does not restart, kill, or take over sessions.
+ Manual pkill / kill of MCP daemons is contamination (#630), not recovery.
+
+ {"".join(items)}
+ - Prefer IDE/client reconnect (
/mcp reconnect) or an operator-owned restart recorded in the restart inventory.
+
+
"""
+
+
+def render_sessions_page(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+ """Render the full HTML body for the runtime/session view."""
+ error_block = ""
+ if snapshot.fetch_error:
+ error_block = (
+ f'Partial load: '
+ f"{escape(snapshot.fetch_error)}
"
+ )
+ if snapshot.runtime.fetch_error:
+ error_block += (
+ f'Runtime note: '
+ f"{escape(snapshot.runtime.fetch_error)}
"
+ )
+
+ body = f"""
+{error_block}
+{_runtime_banner(snapshot)}
+{_summary_bar(snapshot)}
+
+
+
Sessions
+
Control-plane sessions correlated with leases and worktree bindings.
+ Stale and contamination flags are fail-soft: absence of a marker is not proof of cleanliness when inventory is degraded.
+ {_sessions_table(snapshot.sessions)}
+
+
+{_namespaces_section(snapshot)}
+{_worktrees_section(snapshot)}
+{_contamination_section(snapshot.contamination_markers)}
+{_recovery_section(snapshot)}
+"""
+ return render_page(title="Sessions", body_html=f"""Runtime and sessions
+Phase 1 read-only view (#641). Combines runtime health (#430) with
+unified inventory sessions/namespaces/worktrees (#636). No restart or session-takeover controls.
+{body}""")
diff --git a/webui/system_health_views.py b/webui/system_health_views.py
index e7ba492..c0474c7 100644
--- a/webui/system_health_views.py
+++ b/webui/system_health_views.py
@@ -278,8 +278,10 @@ def _recovery_card() -> str:
"controls arrive in Phase 2 (#642); until then recovery runs through "
"the sanctioned client reconnect / operator restart path.
"
""
- "- Runtime and session view — active profile, "
- "workflow hashes, and shell health.
"
+ "- Runtime health — active profile, workflow "
+ "hashes, and shell health.
"
+ "- Runtime and sessions — namespaces, session "
+ "rows, worktree bindings, and contamination markers (#641).
"
"- Reconnect the MCP client from the IDE, then re-run the blocked "
"cycle. Never kill the daemon process manually: unmanaged kills are "
"recorded as runtime contamination (#630).
"
--
2.43.7
From 1ca2b5040619f6d44ee8f804590a9bc257fd2e90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Walker <913443@dadeschools.net>
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2026 01:25:28 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] fix(webui): authority-aware ownership + redacted
contamination text (#641)
Addresses the two blockers from the PR #898 review at a81db754.
B1 - degraded ownership inventory was rendered as affirmative absence.
_build_session_rows read the sessions/leases/locks sections without
consulting their status, so a session row emitted lease_ids=() and
worktree_paths=() whether the session genuinely held nothing or the
lease store simply could not be read. The renderer printed both as
"none" and "unbound", contradicting the ownership_authority_complete
invariant documented on InventorySnapshot.
SessionRow now carries lease_authority and worktree_authority. A
worktree binding is correlated through lease work numbers, so it is
unproven when either the leases or the locks section fails to read --
this covers the narrow variant where locks hold real worktree paths but
a degraded leases section leaves work_numbers empty. The renderer emits
"unknown (inventory )" with an authority-unproven badge instead
of none/unbound, the card names the unreadable sections, and an empty
session list from an unreadable sessions section no longer reads as
"no sessions recorded". snapshot_to_dict exports
ownership_authority_complete, ownership_section_status, and per-row
lease_authority / worktree_authority so /api/sessions consumers can
distinguish the two cases.
B2 - contamination payload strings bypassed redaction.
_inspect_contamination copied command_summary, session_id, role and
reason_class out of the marker payload with only str(), while every
inventory-sourced field on the same page arrives through
webui.inventory.scrub(). The write-time redactor
stable_branch_push_guard.redact_command is a narrow denylist that leaves
absolute $HOME paths, -H 'X-Api-Key: ', --password , and
PRIVATE_KEY= intact, and this is the first web surface to render
command_summary at all.
Adds webui.inventory.scrub_text(), which collapses $HOME and redacts
credential-shaped tokens and URL userinfo anywhere inside a string rather
than only at its start, and routes the marker payload through it. scrub()
and every existing caller are untouched. The command_summary field is
kept: it is the #630 evidence naming which daemon was killed. The module
docstring claiming absolute paths were already collapsed is corrected.
Also: removes the locks_by_session_hint dead loop and its discard (N1),
adds the missing trailing newline to webui/runtime_views.py (N4), drops
an unused dataclasses.field import, and documents both honesty rules in
docs/webui-local-dev.md.
Tests: tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py grows from 12 to 26 cases,
covering degraded and unavailable ownership sections in both the HTML and
JSON paths, the locks-readable/leases-degraded variant, a guard against
over-correcting clean inventory into "unknown", the previously untested
expired-lease flag, HTML escaping of hostile values in clean and degraded
renders, and each secret class the write-time denylist misses. The
STATUS_UNAVAILABLE import that was present but unused is now exercised.
Validation, from the issue worktree with venv/bin/python (Python 3.14.5,
pytest 9.1.1):
pytest tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py tests/test_webui_*.py -q
-> 512 passed, 376 subtests (was 498 / 372; +14 new tests)
pytest tests/test_issue_854_semantic_container_exclusion.py -q
-> 13 passed, 8 subtests
13-file runtime/health/inventory/restart set
-> 1 failed, 223 passed; the single failure is
test_runtime_clarity.py::TestRuntimeClarity::
test_activate_profile_succeeds_when_enabled, the identical test and
assertion the reviewer recorded on master at 7af40fb5, so it is
baseline-equivalent and not introduced here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context)
---
docs/webui-local-dev.md | 20 ++
tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py | 292 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
webui/inventory.py | 65 +++++++
webui/runtime_views.py | 2 +-
webui/session_loader.py | 121 +++++++++++--
webui/session_views.py | 97 ++++++++--
6 files changed, 556 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/webui-local-dev.md b/docs/webui-local-dev.md
index 70bb50b..3e01401 100644
--- a/docs/webui-local-dev.md
+++ b/docs/webui-local-dev.md
@@ -307,6 +307,26 @@ reconnect/operator restart docs (`docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md`,
document). The page does **not** restart, kill, or take over sessions; manual
`pkill` of MCP daemons is contamination, not recovery.
+Honesty rules specific to this view:
+
+* **Ownership columns never assert absence they cannot prove.** When the
+ `leases` or `locks` section is degraded or unavailable, the Leases and
+ Worktree-binding cells render `unknown (inventory )` with an
+ *authority unproven* badge instead of `none` / `unbound`, and a caveat names
+ the unreadable sections. A worktree binding is correlated through lease work
+ numbers, so it is unproven when *either* section fails to read.
+ `/api/sessions` carries the same facts as `ownership_authority_complete`,
+ `ownership_section_status`, and per-row `lease_authority` /
+ `worktree_authority`, so a JSON consumer can tell "holds none" from "could
+ not be read".
+* **Contamination text is redacted at the display boundary.** Marker payloads
+ (`command_summary`, `reason_class`, `session_id`, `role`) are
+ operator-supplied free text that does not arrive through inventory scrubbing,
+ so they pass through `webui.inventory.scrub_text`, which collapses `$HOME` and
+ redacts credential-shaped tokens and URL userinfo *anywhere* in the string.
+ The write-time redactor is a narrow denylist and is not relied on. The field
+ itself is kept — it is the `#630` evidence naming which daemon was killed.
+
## System-health dashboard (#639)
`/system-health` renders the same snapshot the `/api/v1/system/health` API
diff --git a/tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py b/tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py
index 8bb49fd..4799b77 100644
--- a/tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py
+++ b/tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py
@@ -3,10 +3,16 @@
Covers clean and stale session rendering, contamination marker surfacing,
worktree binding display, sanctioned recovery links (no pkill), nav/live
status, and the JSON API export.
+
+Also pins the two invariants a reviewer found violated at head a81db754:
+degraded ownership sections must render as *unknown* rather than as an
+affirmative "none"/"unbound", and contamination payload text must be redacted
+at the display boundary rather than trusted from the write-time denylist.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
+import os
import sys
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
@@ -22,6 +28,7 @@ from webui.inventory import (
AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
InventorySection,
InventorySnapshot,
+ STATUS_DEGRADED,
STATUS_OK,
STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
)
@@ -32,6 +39,7 @@ from webui.session_loader import (
SessionRow,
SessionViewSnapshot,
_build_session_rows,
+ _inspect_contamination,
load_session_view_snapshot,
snapshot_to_dict,
)
@@ -77,36 +85,43 @@ def _inventory(
locks: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
worktrees: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
namespaces: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
+ statuses: dict[str, str] | None = None,
) -> InventorySnapshot:
+ """Build a snapshot; ``statuses`` degrades named sections (default all ok)."""
+ status_of = statuses or {}
+
+ def _status(name: str) -> str:
+ return status_of.get(name, STATUS_OK)
+
sections = (
InventorySection(
name="sessions",
authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
- status=STATUS_OK,
+ status=_status("sessions"),
items=sessions,
),
InventorySection(
name="leases",
authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
- status=STATUS_OK,
+ status=_status("leases"),
items=leases,
),
InventorySection(
name="locks",
authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
- status=STATUS_OK,
+ status=_status("locks"),
items=locks,
),
InventorySection(
name="worktrees",
authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
- status=STATUS_OK,
+ status=_status("worktrees"),
items=worktrees,
),
InventorySection(
name="namespaces",
authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
- status=STATUS_OK,
+ status=_status("namespaces"),
items=namespaces
or (
{
@@ -453,5 +468,272 @@ class TestSessionsRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
)
+class TestDegradedOwnershipAuthority(unittest.TestCase):
+ """B1: a section that could not be read must never render as absence."""
+
+ def _snapshot(self, inventory: InventorySnapshot) -> SessionViewSnapshot:
+ return SessionViewSnapshot(
+ runtime=_runtime(),
+ inventory=inventory,
+ sessions=_build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=()),
+ contamination_markers=(),
+ )
+
+ def test_unavailable_leases_mark_row_authority_unproven(self):
+ inventory = _inventory(
+ sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+ statuses={"leases": STATUS_UNAVAILABLE},
+ )
+ row = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=())[0]
+ self.assertEqual(row.lease_ids, ())
+ self.assertEqual(row.lease_authority, STATUS_UNAVAILABLE)
+ # Worktree binding is correlated through lease work numbers, so it
+ # inherits the unreadable lease section.
+ self.assertEqual(row.worktree_authority, STATUS_UNAVAILABLE)
+ self.assertFalse(row.ownership_authority_complete)
+
+ def test_readable_locks_are_not_reported_unbound_when_leases_degrade(self):
+ # The narrow variant: locks hold a real worktree_path and read cleanly,
+ # but the lease section that supplies the correlating work number does
+ # not. The row must say unknown, not "unbound".
+ inventory = _inventory(
+ sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+ locks=(
+ {
+ "issue_number": 641,
+ "worktree_path": "branches/feat-issue-641",
+ },
+ ),
+ statuses={"leases": STATUS_DEGRADED},
+ )
+ row = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=())[0]
+ self.assertEqual(row.worktree_paths, ())
+ self.assertEqual(row.worktree_authority, STATUS_DEGRADED)
+ self.assertFalse(row.ownership_authority_complete)
+
+ def test_degraded_render_says_unknown_not_none_or_unbound(self):
+ inventory = _inventory(
+ sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+ statuses={"leases": STATUS_UNAVAILABLE, "locks": STATUS_UNAVAILABLE},
+ )
+ html = render_sessions_page(self._snapshot(inventory))
+ self.assertIn("unknown (inventory unavailable)", html)
+ self.assertIn("authority unproven", html)
+ self.assertIn("Ownership authority incomplete", html)
+ # The affirmative-absence strings must be gone from the row entirely.
+ self.assertNotIn(">none<", html)
+ self.assertNotIn(">unbound<", html)
+
+ def test_clean_inventory_still_renders_affirmative_absence(self):
+ # Guards against over-correcting B1 into "everything is unknown".
+ inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_clean_session(),))
+ html = render_sessions_page(self._snapshot(inventory))
+ self.assertIn(">none<", html)
+ self.assertIn(">unbound<", html)
+ # The column legend mentions "unknown (inventory …)" as static copy, so
+ # assert on the per-row marker and the concrete statuses instead.
+ self.assertNotIn("authority unproven", html)
+ self.assertNotIn("unknown (inventory unavailable)", html)
+ self.assertNotIn("unknown (inventory degraded)", html)
+ self.assertNotIn("Ownership authority incomplete", html)
+
+ def test_json_export_carries_snapshot_and_per_row_authority(self):
+ inventory = _inventory(
+ sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+ statuses={"locks": STATUS_UNAVAILABLE},
+ )
+ data = snapshot_to_dict(self._snapshot(inventory))
+ self.assertFalse(data["ownership_authority_complete"])
+ self.assertEqual(
+ data["ownership_section_status"]["locks"], STATUS_UNAVAILABLE
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(data["ownership_section_status"]["leases"], STATUS_OK)
+ self.assertIn("unknown, not unowned", data["ownership_note"])
+
+ row = data["sessions"][0]
+ self.assertTrue(row["lease_authority_complete"])
+ self.assertFalse(row["worktree_authority_complete"])
+ self.assertEqual(row["worktree_authority"], STATUS_UNAVAILABLE)
+ self.assertFalse(row["ownership_authority_complete"])
+ self.assertIn("unknown, not unowned", row["ownership_note"])
+
+ def test_json_export_is_affirmative_when_every_source_reads(self):
+ inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_clean_session(),))
+ data = snapshot_to_dict(self._snapshot(inventory))
+ self.assertTrue(data["ownership_authority_complete"])
+ self.assertTrue(data["sessions"][0]["ownership_authority_complete"])
+
+ def test_missing_session_list_is_not_reported_as_no_sessions(self):
+ inventory = _inventory(statuses={"sessions": STATUS_UNAVAILABLE})
+ html = render_sessions_page(self._snapshot(inventory))
+ self.assertIn("could not be read", html)
+ self.assertIn("not evidence that no sessions exist", html)
+
+ def test_expired_lease_flags_row_as_stale(self):
+ inventory = _inventory(
+ sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+ leases=(
+ {
+ "lease_id": "lease-expired-1",
+ "session_id": "prgs-author-111-clean",
+ "status": "active",
+ "expired": True,
+ "work_kind": "issue",
+ "work_number": 641,
+ },
+ ),
+ )
+ row = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=())[0]
+ self.assertIn("lease-expired", row.stale_flags)
+ self.assertIn("active-lease-past-expiry", row.stale_flags)
+
+
+class TestContaminationRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
+ """B2: marker payload text is redacted at the display boundary."""
+
+ def _marker(self, payload: dict) -> ContaminationMarker:
+ return _inspect_contamination(
+ "runtime_recovery_contamination",
+ remote="prgs",
+ inspect=lambda **_k: {
+ "on_disk": True,
+ "has_payload": True,
+ "summary": "",
+ },
+ load=lambda **_k: payload,
+ )
+
+ def test_home_paths_are_collapsed(self):
+ home = os.path.expanduser("~")
+ marker = self._marker(
+ {"command_summary": f"pkill -f {home}/Development/Gitea-Tools/x.py"}
+ )
+ self.assertNotIn(home, marker.command_summary)
+ self.assertIn("~/Development/Gitea-Tools/x.py", marker.command_summary)
+
+ def test_secrets_missed_by_the_write_time_denylist_are_redacted(self):
+ # Each of these was verified in review to survive
+ # stable_branch_push_guard.redact_command untouched.
+ cases = (
+ ("curl -H 'X-Api-Key: SUPERSECRET123' https://example.invalid", "SUPERSECRET123"),
+ ("cmd --password hunter2 origin master", "hunter2"),
+ ("PRIVATE_KEY=abc123 python deploy.py", "abc123"),
+ ("fetch https://user:pw@example.invalid/x.git", "user:pw"),
+ )
+ for raw, secret in cases:
+ with self.subTest(raw=raw):
+ marker = self._marker({"command_summary": raw})
+ self.assertNotIn(secret, marker.command_summary)
+ self.assertIn("[redacted]", marker.command_summary)
+
+ def test_command_summary_is_redacted_not_removed(self):
+ # It is legitimate #630 evidence: the operator must still see which
+ # daemon was killed.
+ marker = self._marker(
+ {
+ "command_summary": "pkill -f gitea_mcp_server.py",
+ "reason_class": "manual_daemon_kill",
+ "session_id": "prgs-author-111-clean",
+ "role": "author",
+ }
+ )
+ self.assertIn("pkill -f gitea_mcp_server.py", marker.command_summary)
+ self.assertEqual(marker.reason_class, "manual_daemon_kill")
+ self.assertEqual(marker.session_id, "prgs-author-111-clean")
+ self.assertEqual(marker.role, "author")
+
+ def test_rendered_page_exposes_no_home_path_from_a_marker(self):
+ home = os.path.expanduser("~")
+ marker = self._marker(
+ {
+ "command_summary": f"pkill -f {home}/Development/Gitea-Tools/x.py",
+ "reason_class": "manual_daemon_kill",
+ }
+ )
+ inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_clean_session(),))
+ html = render_sessions_page(
+ SessionViewSnapshot(
+ runtime=_runtime(),
+ inventory=inventory,
+ sessions=_build_session_rows(inventory, (marker,)),
+ contamination_markers=(marker,),
+ )
+ )
+ self.assertIn("Contamination markers", html)
+ self.assertNotIn(home, html)
+
+
+class TestSessionsPageEscaping(unittest.TestCase):
+ """Hostile values from every rendered source stay inert (N2)."""
+
+ HOSTILE = ''
+
+ def test_hostile_session_and_marker_values_are_escaped(self):
+ session = dict(_clean_session())
+ session["session_id"] = f"sid-{self.HOSTILE}"
+ session["role"] = self.HOSTILE
+ session["profile"] = self.HOSTILE
+ session["namespace"] = self.HOSTILE
+ session["status"] = self.HOSTILE
+ inventory = _inventory(
+ sessions=(session,),
+ leases=(
+ {
+ "lease_id": self.HOSTILE,
+ "session_id": session["session_id"],
+ "status": "active",
+ "expired": False,
+ "work_kind": self.HOSTILE,
+ "work_number": 641,
+ },
+ ),
+ locks=(
+ {
+ "issue_number": 641,
+ "worktree_path": self.HOSTILE,
+ },
+ ),
+ )
+ marker = ContaminationMarker(
+ kind="runtime_recovery_contamination",
+ on_disk=True,
+ has_payload=True,
+ summary=self.HOSTILE,
+ reason_class=self.HOSTILE,
+ session_id=session["session_id"],
+ role=self.HOSTILE,
+ command_summary=self.HOSTILE,
+ cleared=False,
+ )
+ html = render_sessions_page(
+ SessionViewSnapshot(
+ runtime=_runtime(),
+ inventory=inventory,
+ sessions=_build_session_rows(inventory, (marker,)),
+ contamination_markers=(marker,),
+ )
+ )
+ self.assertNotIn("